transcriber's note: minor typographical errors in the original text have been corrected and footnotes moved to the end of the book. bolshevism the enemy of political and industrial democracy by john spargo author of "social democracy explained" "socialism, a summary and interpretation of socialist principles" "applied socialism" etc. harper & brothers publishers new york and london * * * * * * * books by john spargo bolshevism americanism and social democracy social democracy explained harper & brothers, new york established * * * * * * * contents preface i. the historical background ii. from revolution to revolution iii. the war and the people iv. the second revolution v. from bourgeoisie to bolsheviki vi. the bolshevik war against democracy vii. bolshevist theory and practice postscriptum: a personal statement appendices: i. an appeal to the proletariat by the petrograd workmen's and soldiers' council ii. how the russian peasants fought for a constituent assembly iii. former socialist premier of finland on bolshevism preface in the following pages i have tried to make a plain and easily understandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of bolshevism. i have attempted to provide the average american reader with a fair and reliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the russian bolsheviki. in order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simple and clear as possible, i have not tried to deal with the numerous manifestations of bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myself strictly to the russian example. with some detail--too much, some of my readers may think!--i have sketched the historical background in order that the bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged in connection with the whole revolutionary movement in russia. whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational "exposure" of bolshevism and the bolsheviki will be disappointed. it has been my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an _ex-parte_ indictment. a great many lurid and sensational stories about the bolsheviki have been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of this phase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal and depraved monsters of iniquity. there is not a crime known to mankind, apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. my long experience in the socialist movement has furnished me with too much understanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements are abused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth. that experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible stories told about the bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation in fact or greatly exaggerated. the "rumor factories" in geneva, stockholm, copenhagen, the hague, and other european capitals, which were so busy during the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres, victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentous events, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all, seem now to have turned their attention to the bolsheviki. however little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrain from wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in the quite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minions were committing their infamous outrages against the working-people and their leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimes committed by our own industrial czars against our working-people and their leaders--that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncing the bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. when the same journals that defended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of i.w.w. agitators and the savage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime was exercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for better wages, denounce the bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their "lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere men become bitter and scornful. i am not a bolshevik or a defender of the bolsheviki. as a social democrat and internationalist of many years' standing--and therefore loyal to america and american ideals--i am absolutely opposed to the principles and practices of the bolsheviki, which, from the very first, i have regarded and denounced as an inverted form of czarism. it is quite clear to my mind, however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or from misrepresentation of facts and motives. i am convinced that the stupid campaign of calumny which has been waged against the bolsheviki has won for them the sympathy of many intelligent americans who love fairness and hate injustice. in this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge in them. in this study i have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories of bolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the past year. i have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents edited and annotated by mr. sisson and published by the united states committee on public information. i do not doubt that there is much that is true in that collection of documents--indeed, there is some corroboration of some of them--but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yet available to the student. so much doubt and suspicion is reasonably and properly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole mass is greatly impaired. to rely upon these documents to make a case against the bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated and authenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, would be like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict a man serious crime. that the bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes is certain. ample evidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. they have committed many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to the russian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes in question. but their worst crimes have been against political and social democracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as little scruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by the romanovs. this is a terrible charge, i know, but i believe that the most sympathetic toward the bolsheviki among my readers will, if they are candid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence. concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that i have confined myself to the following: official documents issued by the bolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited bolshevik leaders and officials--in the form in which they have been published by the bolsheviki themselves; the declarations of russian socialist organizations of long and honorable standing in the international socialist movement; the statements of equally well-known and trusted russian socialists, and of responsible russian socialist journals. while i have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against the bolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references, i have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes and references concerning matters of general knowledge. to have given references and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historical outlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and served only to frighten away the ordinary reader. i have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which i may mention the following: peter kropotkin's _memoirs of a revolutionist_ and _ideals and realities of russian literature_; s. stepniak's _underground russia_; leo deutsch's _sixteen years in siberia_; alexander ular's _russia from within_; william english walling's _russia's message_; zinovy n. preev's _the russian riddle_; maxim litvinov's _the bolshevik revolution: its rise and meaning_; m.j. olgin's _the soul of the russian revolution_; a.j. sack's _the birth of russian democracy_; e.a. ross's _russia in upheaval_; isaac don levine's _the russian revolution_; bessie beatty's _the red heart of russia_; louise bryant's _six red months in russia_; leon trotzky's _our revolution_ and _the bolsheviki and world peace_; gabriel domergue's _la russe rouge_; nikolai lenine's _the soviets at work_; zinoviev and lenine's _sozialismus und krieg_; emile vandervelde's _trois aspects de la révolution russe_; p.g. chesnais's _la révolution et la paix_ and _les bolsheviks_. i have also freely availed myself of the many admirable translations of official bolshevist documents published in _the class struggle_, of new york, a pro-bolshevist magazine; the collection of documents published by _the nation_, of new york, a journal exceedingly generous in its treatment of bolshevism and the bolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent "international notes" by _justice_, of london, the oldest socialist newspaper in the english language, i believe, and one of the most ably edited. grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered and valuable information given by mr. alexander kerensky, former premier of russia; mr. henry l. slobodin, of new york; mr. a.j. sack, director of the russian information bureau in the united states; dr. boris takavenko, editor of _la russia nuova_, rome, italy; mr. william english walling, new york; and my friend, father cahill, of bennington. among the appendices at the end of the volume will be found some important documents containing some contemporary russian socialist judgments of bolshevism. these documents are, i venture to suggest, of the utmost possible value and importance to the student and general reader. john spargo, "nestledown," old bennnigton, vermont, _end of january, _. bolshevism chapter i the historical background i for almost a full century russia has been the theater of a great revolutionary movement. in the light of russian history we read with cynical amusement that in , when all europe was in a revolutionary ferment, a german economist confidently predicted that revolutionary agitation could not live in the peculiar soil of russian civilization. august franz von haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even a profound student of russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief that the amount of rural communism existing in russia, particularly the _mir_, would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise and stir the national life. as a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared in the land of the czars long before the german economist made his remarkably ill-judged forecast. at the end of the napoleonic wars many young officers of the russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionary ideas and ideals acquired in france, italy, and germany, and intent upon action. at first their intention was simply to make an appeal to alexander i to grant self-government to russia, which at one time he had seemed disposed to do. soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratory movement having for its object the overthrow of czarism. the story of the failure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt at revolution in december, , was suppressed, and how the leaders were punished by nicholas i--these things are well known to most students of russian history. the decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, as they were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that their efforts were altogether vain. on the contrary, their inspiration was felt throughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of the period. during that period russian literature was tinged with the faith in social regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. the decembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the russian revolutionary movement of our time. in the writings of pushkin--himself a decembrist--lermontoff, gogol, turgeniev, dostoyevsky, and many others less well known, the influence of the decembrist movement is clearly manifested. if we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern social revolutionary movement in russia, that title can be applied to alexander herzen with greater fitness than to any other. his influence upon the movement during many years was enormous. herzen was half-german, his mother being german. he was born at moscow in , shortly before the french occupation of the city. his parents were very rich and he enjoyed the advantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. at twenty-two years of age he was banished to a small town in the urals, where he spent six years, returning to moscow in . it is noteworthy that the offense for which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise of the decembrist martyrs. this occurred at a meeting of one of the "students' circles" founded by herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary socialist ideals among the students. upon his return to moscow in herzen, together with bakunin and other friends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in he was again exiled. in , through the influence of powerful friends, he received permission to leave russia for travel abroad. he never again saw his native land, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. after a tour of italy, herzen arrived in paris on the eve of the revolution of , joining there his friends, bakunin and turgeniev, and many other revolutionary leaders. it was impossible for him to participate actively in the uprising, owing to the activity of the paris police, but he watched the revolution with the profoundest sympathy. and when it failed and was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almost unbounded. for a brief period he was the victim of the most appalling pessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with proudhon in issuing a radical revolutionary paper, _l'ami du peuple_, of which, kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of russian literature, "almost every number was confiscated by the police of napoleon the third." the paper had a very brief life, and herzen himself was soon expelled from france, going to switzerland, of which country he became a citizen. in herzen settled in london, where he published for some years a remarkable paper, called _kolokol (the bell)_, in which he exposed the iniquities and shortcomings of czarism and inspired the youth of russia with his revolutionary ideals. the paper had to be smuggled into russia, of course, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the most absorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the czars. herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible to exaggerate the extent of his influence. but when the freedom of the serfs, for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by alexander ii, and other extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. he died in in switzerland. ii alexander ii was not alone in hoping that the act of liberation would usher in a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for russia. many of the most radical of the intelligentsia, followers of herzen, believed that russia was destined to outstrip the older nations of western europe in its democracy and its culture. it was not long before disillusionment came: the serfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had been dealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. as a result there were numerous uprisings of peasants--riots which the government suppressed in the most sanguinary manner. from that time until the present the land question has been the core of the russian problem. every revolutionary movement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to the peasants. within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionary unrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituted a policy of vigorous repression. progressive papers, which had sprung up as a result of the liberal tendencies characterizing the reign of alexander ii thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers were imprisoned and exiled. among those thus punished was that brilliant writer, tchernyshevsky, to whom the russian movement owes so much. his _contemporary review_ was, during the four critical years - the principal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the life of russia. in it the greatest leaders of russian thought discussed the land question, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects. this served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the study of the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of the country; secondly, it provided these intellectuals with a bond of union and stimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. that alexander ii had been influenced to sign the emancipation act by tchernyshevsky and his friends did not cause the authorities to spare tchernyshevsky when, in , he engaged in active socialist propaganda. he was arrested and imprisoned in a fortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced two generations of discontented and protesting russians--_what is to be done?_ in form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaborate treatise upon russian social conditions. it dealt with the vexed problems of marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, and other similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problems became widely accepted as the program of revolutionary russia. few books in any literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted as much influence upon the life of a nation. in the following year, , tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in siberia, remaining there until , when he returned to russia. he lived only six years longer, dying in . the attempt made by a young student to assassinate alexander ii, on april , , was seized upon by the czar and his advisers as an excuse for instituting a policy of terrible reaction. the most repressive measures were taken against the intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which had been introduced were practically destroyed. it was impossible to restore serfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was even worse than if they had remained serfs. excessive taxation, heavy redemption charges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people to desperation. large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasants and a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the people were portrayed with fervor and passion. in - there were numerous demonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policy of the government. it was at this time that michael bakunin, from his exile in switzerland, conspired with nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants, through the society for the liberation of the people. bakunin advised the students to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach them and, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. it was at this time, too, that nicholas tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous circle of tchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the empire books dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remedies therefor. this work greatly influenced the young intelligentsia, but the immediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. even the return from switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds of students who were disciples of bakunin and peter lavrov did not produce any great success. very soon a new organization appeared. the remnant of the circle tchaykovsky, together with some followers of bakunin, formed a society called the land and freedom society. this society, which was destined to exert a marked influence upon revolutionary russia, was the most ambitious revolutionary effort russia had known. the society had a constitution and a carefully worked out program. it had one special group to carry on propaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and a third to employ armed force against the government and against those guilty of treachery toward the society. the basis of the society was the conviction that russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economic revolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow czarism and establish the ideal state of society. the members of this land and freedom society divided their work into four main divisions: ( ) agitation--passive and active. passive agitation included strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on. active agitation meant riots and uprisings. ( ) organization--the formation of a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. ( ) education--the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, a continuation of the work of the tchaykovsky circle. ( ) secularization--the carrying on of systematic work against the orthodox church through special channels. one of the early leaders of this society was george plechanov, who later founded the russian social democracy and gave to the russian revolutionary movement its marxian character, inspiring such men as nikolai lenine and leon trotzky, among many others. the society did not attain any very great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and it was that fact more than any other which determined plechanov's future course. iii when the failure of the land and freedom methods became evident, and the government became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals and groups resorted to acts of terrorism. it was thus that vera zasulich attempted the assassination of the infamous chief of police trepov. the movement to temper czarism by assassination systematically pursued was beginning. in the land and freedom society held a conference for the purpose of discussing its program. a majority favored resorting to terroristic tactics; plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionists were opposed--favoring the old methods. the society split, the majority becoming known as the will of the people and adopting a terroristic program. this organization sentenced czar alexander ii to death and several unsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. the leaders believed that the assassination of the czar would give rise to a general revolution throughout the whole of russia. in february, , occurred the famous attempt to blow up the winter palace. for a time it seemed that the czar had learned the lesson the will of the people sought to teach him, and that he would institute far-reaching reforms. pursuing a policy of vacillation and fear, however, alexander ii soon fell back into the old attitude. on march , , a group of revolutionists, among them sophia perovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, only in damaging the bottom of the czar's carriage and wounding a number of cossack soldiers. "thank god, i am untouched," said the czar, in response to the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "it's too soon to thank god!" cried n.i. grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the czar. within a short time alexander ii and his assailant were both dead. the assassination of alexander ii was a tragic event for russia. on the very morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan for extensive reforms presented by the liberal minister, loris-melikoff. it had been decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a number of well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. these reforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy the revolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation and given russia a new hope. that hope died with alexander ii. his son, alexander iii, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised his father against making any concessions to the agitators. it was not surprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against the liberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the empire, and to adopt the most oppressive policies. the new czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionary bureaucrat pobiedonostzev. at first it was believed that out of respect for his father's memory alexander iii would carry out the program of reforms formulated by loris-melikoff, as his father had promised to do. in a manifesto issued on the th of april, , alexander iii promised to do this, but in the same document there were passages which could only be interpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would be resisted and absolutism upheld at all cost. doubtless it was due to the influence of pobiedonostzev, procurator of the holy synod, that alexander iii soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in the matter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasants feared that serfdom was to be restored. a terrible persecution of the jews was begun, lasting for several years. the poles, too, felt the oppressive hand of pobiedonostzev. the latter was mastered by the slavophil philosophy that the revolutionary unrest in russia was traceable to the diversity of races, languages, and religions. he believed that nihilism, anarchism, and socialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability could come only from the persistent and vigorous development of the three principles of nationality, orthodoxy, and autocracy as the basis of the state. in this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy of alexander iii. in the manifesto of april th was announced the czar's determination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. that was the foundation stone. to uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracy and orthodoxy were, in russia, closely related. hence the non-orthodox sects--such as the finnish protestants, german lutherans, polish roman catholics, the jews, and the mohammedans--were increasingly restricted in the observance of their religion. they might not build new places of worship; their children could not be educated in the faith of their parents. in many cases children were taken away from their parents in order to be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodox faith. in a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use of languages other than russian. along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single mold went a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. all this was accompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusual in russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the will of the people party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials. plots to assassinate the czar were laid, but they were generally betrayed to the police. the most serious of these plots, in march, , led to the arrest of all the conspirators. in the mean time there had appeared the first definite marxian social democratic group in russia. plechanov, vera zasulich, leo deutsch, and other russian revolutionists in switzerland formed the organization known as the group for the emancipation of labor. this organization was based upon the principles and tactics of marxian socialism and sought to create a purely proletarian movement. as we have seen, when revolutionary terrorism was at its height plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futility and pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. in the early 'eighties this class was so small in russia that it seemed to many of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quite hopeless to rely upon it. plechanov was derided as a mere theorist and closet philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that socialism must come in russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. by means of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tactics of the will of the people party, plechanov gathered to his side of the controversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid the basis for the social democratic labor party. with the relatively rapid expansion of capitalism, beginning with the year , and the inevitable increase of the city proletariat, the marxian movement made great progress. a strong labor-union movement and a strong political socialist movement were thus developed side by side. at the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the one available reply of the oppressed to brutal autocracy. while the marxian movement made headway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement made headway among the peasants. various groups appeared in different parts of the country. when alexander iii died, at the end of , both movements had developed considerable strength. working in secret and subject to terrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisoned and exiled, these two wings of the russian revolutionary movement were gathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive and serious than anything that had hitherto been attempted. whenever a new czar ascended the throne in russia it was the fashion to hope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. frequently, as in the case of alexander iii, all such hopes were speedily killed, but repeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopes with the death of successive czars. when, therefore, alexander iii was succeeded by his son, nicholas ii, liberal russia expectantly awaited the promulgation of constitutional reforms. in this they were doomed to disappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession of the new czar's immediate predecessor. nicholas ii was evidently going to be quite as reactionary as his father was. this was made manifest in a number of ways. when a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulated him upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he would listen to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires," the reply of the new czar was a grim warning of what was to come. nicholas ii told the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father and uphold the principles of absolutism, and that any thought of participation by the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was a senseless dream. more significant still, perhaps, was the fact that the hated pobiedonostzev was retained in power. the revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more. some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove to be the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all the revolutionary forces, anarchists and socialists alike, peasants and industrial workers. this hope was destined to fail, but there was an unmistakable revolutionary awakening. in the latter part of january, , an open letter to nicholas ii was smuggled into the country from switzerland and widely distributed. it informed the czar that the socialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things which he was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "it will not be long before you find yourself entangled by it." iv in one respect nicholas ii differed from alexander iii--he was by nature more humane and sentimental. like his father, he was thoroughly dominated by pobiedonostzev's theory that russia, in order to be secure and stable, must be based upon nationality, orthodoxy, and autocracy. he wanted to see holy russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. but his sensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodox sects and the jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he would not approve its continuance. at the same time, he was not willing to face the issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restore religious freedom. that would have meant the overthrow of pobiedonostzev and the czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for that nicholas ii lacked the necessary courage and stamina. cowardice and weakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning. when the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed the severity which had marked the treatment of the jews and the non-orthodox christian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once more there was a revival of hope. but the efforts of the finns to secure a modification of the russification policy were quite fruitless. when a deputation was sent from finland to represent to the czar that the rights and privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation were being denied to the people of finland, nicholas ii refused to grant the deputation an audience. instead of getting relief, the people of finland soon found that the oppression steadily increased. it was evident that finnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest of russian homogeneity. it soon became apparent, moreover, that pobiedonostzev was to enjoy even more power than he had under alexander iii. in proportion as the character of nicholas ii was weaker than that of his father, the power of the procurator of the holy synod was greater. and there was a superstitious element in the mentality of the new czar which pobiedonostzev played upon with infinite cunning. he ruled the weak-willed czar and filled the ministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely. notwithstanding the czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and means to add to the persecutions of the jews and the various non-orthodox christian sects. in his determination to hammer the varied racial groups into a homogeneous nation, he adopted terrible measures and so roused the hatred of the finns, armenians, georgians, and other subject peoples, stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionary action. it is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to the dynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical russophil. the poles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest, into the revolutionary movement. armenians were persecuted and their church lands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into the revolutionary current. worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the jews. not only were they compelled to live within the pale of settlement, but this was so reduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. intolerable restrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondary schools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. it was hoped in this way to destroy the intellectual leadership of the jews. pogroms were instigated, stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. the minister of the interior, von plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drown the revolution in jewish blood," while pobiedonostzev's ambition was "to force one-third of the jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"--to escape persecution. the other third he expected to die of hunger and misery. when leo tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon the civilized world on behalf of the victims, the holy synod denounced tolstoy and his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the orthodox church and the state." later, in , the holy synod excommunicated tolstoy from the orthodox church. the fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. these local organizations had been instituted in , by alexander ii, in the liberal years of his reign. elected mainly by the landlords and the peasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. possessing no political powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, they were important agencies of local government. the representatives of each county constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by all the county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. both types concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. they built roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms and agricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our state governments. they maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries: co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. they provided the peasants with cheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and so forth. in many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. in some instances they published newspapers and magazines. it must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative public bodies elected by any large part of the people. while the suffrage was quite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured a majority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform a great democratic service. but for them, life would have been well-nigh impossible for the peasant. in addition to the services already enumerated, these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the empire, and when crop failures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos which undertook the work of relief. hampered at every point, denied the right to control the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law from discussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became the natural channels for the spreading of discontent and opposition to the régime through private communication and discussion. to bureaucrats of the type of pobiedonostzev and von plehve, with their fanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were so many plague spots. not daring to suppress them altogether, they determined to restrict them at every opportunity. some of the zemstvos were suspended and disbanded for certain periods of time. individual members were exiled for utterances which von plehve regarded as dangerous. the power of the zemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such important functions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limiting in the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to each zemstvo. since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by the governors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times a formidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. this weapon von plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions of the zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort of representative government. v the result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionary movements of the peasants and the city workers. that the zemstvos were not naturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration. economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep these popular bodies conservative. landowners were always in the majority and in general the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightened wealthy and cultivated classes. the peasant representatives in the zemstvos were generally peasants of the most successful and prosperous type, hating the revolutionists and all their works. by means of a policy incredibly insane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goaded to revolt. the newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more and more critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation of existing conditions. presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed the example of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which a program for common action was agreed upon. thus they were resorting to illegal methods, exactly as the socialists had done. finally, many of the liberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party--the union of liberation--with a special organ of its own, called _emancipation_. this organ, edited by the brilliant and courageous peter struve, was published in stuttgart, germany, and, since its circulation in russia was forbidden, it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as the revolutionary socialist journals were. thus another bond was established between two very different movements. as was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. in the cities the working-men were drawn mainly into the social democratic working-men's party, founded by plechanov and others in , but the peasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around the standard of the socialist-revolutionists, successors to the will of the people party. this party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just as the party of plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. it emphasized the land question above all else. it naturally scorned the view, largely held by the marxists in the other party, that russia must wait until her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realize socialism. it scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answered the terrorism of czarism by a terrorism of the people. it maintained a special department for carrying on this grim work. its central committee passed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees were carried out by the members of its fighting organization. to this organization within the party belonged many of the ablest and most consecrated men and women in russia. a few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of this terroristic retaliation: in march, , sypiagin, the minister of the interior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of the fighting organization, stephen balmashev, who was disguised as an officer. sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the central committee. he had been responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for the suffering of many exiles. balmashev went to his death with heroic fortitude. in may, , gregory gershuni and two associates executed the reactionary governor of ufa. early in june, , borikov, governor-general of finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. a month later, july th, the infamous von plehve, who had been judged by the central committee and held responsible for the kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown under the wheels of his carriage by sazanov, a member of the fighting force. the death of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. in february, , ivan kaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon the ruthless governor-general of moscow, the grand-duke serghei alexandrovich. there was war in russia--war between two systems of organized terrorism. sometimes the czar and his ministers weakened and promised concessions, but always there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor of oppression. the assassination of von plehve, however, for the first time really weakened the government. czarism was, in fact, already toppling. the new minister of the interior, von plehve's successor, prince svyatpolk-mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise. while he maintained von plehve's methods of suppressing the radical organizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entrap revolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to the moderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward the zemstvos. by this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution. taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvos organized a national convention. this the government forbade, but it had lost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the order and proceeded to hold the convention. at this convention, held at st. petersburg, november , , attended by many of the ablest lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in russia, a resolution was adopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of the people together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional government in russia. it was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, which the latter dared not accept. on the contrary, in december the czar issued an ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms were promised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake. vi meanwhile the war with japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be an unbroken series of military defeats and disasters for russia. from the opening of the war in february to the end of the year the press had been permitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was not possible to hide for long the bitter truth. taxes mounted higher and higher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss of life was enormous. news of the utter failure and incompetence of the army and the navy seeped through. here was russia with a population three times as large as that of japan, and with an annual budget of two billions as against japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. what did this failure signify? in the first place, it signified the weakness and utter incompetence of the régime. it meant that imperialist expansion, with a corresponding strengthening of the old régime, was out of the question. most intelligent russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at the succession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of the bureaucracy. it signified something else, also. there were many who remembered the scandals of the turkish war, in , when bessarabia was recovered. at that time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery, much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border. high military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. food intended for the army was stolen and sold--sometimes, it was said, to the enemy. materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. the army was demoralized and the turks repulsed the russians again and again. now similar stories began to be circulated. returning victims told stories of brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying men neglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. they told worse stories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of army supplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the russian army ever had, and so on. it was suggested, and widely believed, that germany had connived at the systematic corruption of the russian bureaucracy and the russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends. such was the state of russia at the end of the year . then came the tragic events of january, , which marked the opening of the revolution. in order to counteract the agitation of the social democrats among the city workers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government had caused to be formed "legal" unions--that is, organizations of workmen approved by the government. in order to give these organizations some semblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive the workers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government from time to time. on more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by the government spread beyond control and caused great alarm. the czar and his agents were playing with fire. among such unions was the gathering of industrial working-men of st. petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionary objects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual, and moral improvement; strengthening of russian national ideas; development of sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men and improvement of labor conditions and mutual assistance." it was founded by father gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and was regarded by the socialists as a czarist tool. on january d--russian calendar--several thousand men belonging to the gathering of industrial workin-gmen of st. petersburg went out on strike. by the th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. it was estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousand men were out on strike, practically paralyzing the industrial life of the city. at meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much to do with the political demands for constitutional government as with the original grievances of the strikers. the strike was fast becoming a revolution. on the th father gapon led the hosts to the winter palace, to present a petition to the czar asking for reforms. the text of the petition was widely circulated beforehand. it begged the czar to order immediately "that representatives of all the russian land, of all classes and groups, convene." it outlined a moderate program which had the support of almost the entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy: let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to this end that election for the constituent assembly be based on general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. this is our main request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward death. but this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. many others are necessary, and we tell them to you, sire, directly and openly, as to our father. we need: _i. measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of the russian people_: ( ) personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs; ( ) general and compulsory public education at the expense of the state; ( ) responsibility of the ministers to the people, and guaranties of lawfulness in administration; ( ) equality before the law for all without exemption; ( ) immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their convictions. ( ) separation of the church from the state. _ii. measures against the poverty of the people_: ( ) abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income taxes on a progressive scale; ( ) abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and gradual transferring of the land to the people; ( ) the orders for the naval and military ministers should be filled in russia and not abroad; ( ) the cessation of the war by the will of the people. _iii. measures against oppression of labor by capital_: ( ) protection of labor by legislation; ( ) freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and trades-unions; ( ) an eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime; ( ) freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor strikes); ( ) participation of labor representatives in the framing of a bill concerning state insurance of working-men; ( ) normal wages. those are, sire, the principal wants with which we have come to you. let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them, and you will make russia happy and glorious, and your name will be branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever and ever. if, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall die here, on the place before your palace. we have no other refuge and no other means. we have two roads before us, one to freedom and happiness, the other to the grave. tell us, sire, which, and we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied russia. we do not regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly. led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical father gapon, who was clad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-people marched that day to the winter palace, confident that the czar would see them, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. it was not a revolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; the marchers did not carry red flags nor sing socialist songs of revolt. instead, they bore pictures of the czar and other members of the royal family and sang "god save the czar" and other well-known religious hymns. no attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square in front of the winter palace. suddenly, without a word of warning, troops appeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into the crowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and wounding nearly three thousand. all who were able to do so turned and fled, among them father gapon. bloody sunday, as the day is known in russian annals, is generally regarded as the beginning of the first revolution. immediately people began to talk of armed resistance. on the evening of the day of the tragedy there was a meeting of more than seven hundred intellectuals at which the means for carrying on revolution was the topic discussed. this was the first of many similar gatherings which took place all over russia. soon the intellectuals began to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of their professional interests, but in reality for political purposes. there were unions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and so on. quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected another and more important union, namely, the union of all classes against autocracy and despotism. the czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the relief of the families of the victims of bloody sunday. on the th of january he received a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men and delivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses by its stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre of bloody sunday. then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointment of a commission to "investigate the causes of labor unrest in st. petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in the future." this commission was to consist of representatives of capital and labor. the working-men thereupon made the following demands: ( ) that labor be given an equal number of members in the commission with capital; ( ) that the working-men be permitted to freely elect their own representatives; ( ) that the sessions of the commission be open to the public; ( ) that there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives of labor in the commission; ( ) that all the working-people arrested on january th be released. these demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by the government, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission and refuse to have anything to do with it. at last it became evident to the government that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplish any good, and it was therefore abandoned. the czar and his advisers were desperate and vacillating. one day they would adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures of repression and punishment. little heeding the stupid charge by the holy synod that the revolutionary leaders were in the pay of the japanese, the workers went on organizing and striking. all over russia there were strikes, the movement had spread far beyond the bounds of st. petersburg. general strikes took place in many of the large cities, such as riga, vilna, libau, warsaw, lodz, batum, minsk, tiflis, and many others. conflicts between strikers and soldiers and police were common. russia was aflame with revolution. the movement spread to the peasants in a most surprising manner. numerous extensive and serious revolts of peasants occurred in different parts of russia, the peasants looting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaks of rioting. while this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. the terrible defeat of the russian forces by the japanese--the foe that had been so lightly regarded--at mukden was a crushing blow which greatly impaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at the front. disaster followed upon disaster. may saw the destruction of the great russian fleet. in june rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crew of the battle-ship _potyamkin_, which was on the black sea, mutinied and hoisted the red flag. after making prisoners of their officers, the sailors hastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at odessa who were in conflict with soldiers and police. vii it was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. it was not easy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the most important events. on every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many of them without any sort of leadership or plan. strikes which began over questions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of a constituent assembly. on the other hand, political demonstrations became transformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, into strikes for immediate economic betterment. there was an intense class conflict going on in russia, as the large number of strikes for increased wages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfed and obscured the class struggle. for the awakened proletariat of the cities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well as political. they wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the class struggle, as plechanov and his friends declared it to be. yet the fact remained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat was fighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting against autocracy, for the overthrow of czarism and the establishment of political democracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. the reason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of russia of the fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old régime, and that capitalist development requires popular education, a relatively high standard of living, political freedom, and stability and order in government. it was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associations of manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grant extensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merely incidental. what had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classes against autocracy. of course, in such a merging of classes there necessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. not all the social groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organized peasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement. there were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with which the revolution was concerned--the political and the economic. with regard to the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave to theoretical formulæ who sought to maintain the thesis that class interests divided masses and classes here. all classes, with the exception of the bureaucracy, wanted the abolition of czarism and absolutism and the establishment of a constitutional government, elected by the people on a basis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate. upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties and classes recognized the need of extensive change. it was universally recognized that some solution of the land question must be found. there can never be social peace or political stability in russia until that problem is settled. now, it was easy for the socialist groups, on the one hand, and the moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the large estates be divided among the peasants. but while the socialist groups--those of the peasants as well as those of city workers--demanded that the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements, especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should pay compensation for the land taken. judgment upon this vital question has long been embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemption payments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. during the period of greatest intensity, the summer of , a federation of the various revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based its policy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation _in some cases_. all through this trying period the czar and his advisers were temporizing and attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. a greater degree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, the imperial duma, was provided for. this body was not to be a parliament in any real sense, but a debating society. it could _discuss_ proposed legislation, but it had no powers to _enact_ legislation of any kind. absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity. of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, not even the most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather than to diminish the flame. on the d of august-- th, according to the old russian calendar--the war with japan came to an end with the signing of the treaty of portsmouth. russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of a nation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior in military capacity and morale. the news of the conditions of peace intensified the ardor and determination of the revolting russian people and, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of the government. september witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation, and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out in various parts of the country. by the middle of october the whole life of russia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. in some of the cities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a state of siege, under revolutionary leadership. on the th of october--russian style--the czar issued the famous manifesto which acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of absolutism. after the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction the manifesto said: we make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will: ( ) to grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions. ( ) to admit now to participation in the imperial duma, without stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in the short time remaining before the convening of the duma, all the classes of the population, _leaving the farther development of the principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order._ ( ) _to establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become binding without the consent of the imperial duma, and that the representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us_. we call upon all faithful sons of russia to remember their duty to their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore quiet and peace in our native land. viii the czar's manifesto rang through the civilized world. in all lands it was hailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom. the joy of the russian people was unbounded. at last, after fourscore years of heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless, the goal of freedom was attained. men, women, and children sang in the streets to express their joy. red flags were displayed everywhere and solemnly saluted by the officers and men of the czar's army. but the rejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. with that fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, nicholas ii had no sooner issued his manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evil forces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. the day following the issuance of the manifesto, while the people were still rejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. the cry went forth, "kill the intellectuals and the jews!" there had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents, bodies of so-called "patriots." these were, in the main, recruited from the underworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were released from the prison for the purpose. officially known as the association of the russian people and the association to combat the revolution, these organizations were popularly nicknamed the black hundreds. most of the members were paid directly by the government for their services, while others were rewarded with petty official positions. the czar himself accepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins. within three weeks after the issuance of the manifesto more than a hundred organized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly four thousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the most competent authorities. in odessa alone more than one thousand persons were killed and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. in all the bloody pages of the history of the romanovs there is nothing comparable to the frightful terror of this period. naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which nicholas ii and his advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect of increasing the relative strength and prestige of the socialists in the revolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. to meet such brutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate. the council of workmen's deputies, which had been organized by the proletariat of st. petersburg a few days before the czar issued his manifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of the revolution. similar bodies were organized in other great cities. the example set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many places and councils of peasants' deputies were organized. in a few cases large numbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing the working class, formed councils of soldiers' deputies. here, then, was a new phenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the struggle to democratize and liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort of revolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of the state. we shall never comprehend the later developments in russia, especially the phenomenon of bolshevism, unless we have a sympathetic understanding of these soviets--autonomous, non-political units of working-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly by the workers. as the revolutionary resistance to the black hundreds increased, and the rapidly growing soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegates asserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing political state, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions. on november d--new style--in a vain attempt to appease the incessant demand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to put an end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, a partial amnesty was declared. on the th a sop was thrown to the peasants in the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemption payments. had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect of stemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances it was of no avail. early in december the press censorship was abolished by decree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press had thrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. the government of nicholas ii was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical, corrupt, and inefficient. the army and navy, demoralized by the defeat suffered at the hands of japan, and especially by knowledge of the corruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longer dependable. tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with the workmen in the cities in open rebellion. many more indulged themselves in purposeless rioting. the organization of the various councils of delegates representing factory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had one disastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. as we have seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united all classes against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude. given the conditions prevailing in russia, and especially the lack of industrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of the industrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success in the revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the old régime. nothing could have better served the autocracy, and therefore injured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in the ranks of the revolutionists. this was exactly what the separate organizations of the working class accomplished. all the provocative agents of the czar could not have contrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. _divide et impera_ has been the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutest advisers of nicholas ii must have grinned with satanic glee when they realized how seriously the forces they were contending against were dividing. stupid oppression had driven into one united force the wage-earning and wage-paying classes. working-men and manufacturers made common cause against that stupid oppression. now, however, as the inevitable result of the organization of the soviets, and the predominance of these in the revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. in proportion as the class struggle between employers and employed was accentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized and obscured. numerous strikes for increased wages occurred, forcing the employers to organize resistance. workers in one city--st. petersburg, for example--demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, and proclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longer hours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, their employers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoring their competitors. as might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon the government, the very government they had denounced and conspired to overthrow. the president of the council of workmen's deputies of st. petersburg, chrustalev-nosar, in his _history of the council of workmen's deputies_, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on november th--new style--introducing, from november th, an eight-hour workday in all shops and factories "in a revolutionary way." by way of commentary, he quotes a further order, adopted november , repealing the former order and declaring: the government, headed by count witte, _in its endeavor to break the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of capital_, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in st. petersburg into a national problem. the consequence has been that the working-men of st. petersburg are unable now, apart from the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of the council. the council of workmen's deputies, therefore, deems it necessary to _stop temporarily the immediate and general establishment of an eight-hour workday by force_. the councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. at first these strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. soon, however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which can only be used effectively on rare occasions. it is impossible to rekindle frequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary to make a successful general strike. this the leaders of the proletariat of russia overlooked. they overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workers were exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged and were on the verge of starvation. the consequence was that most of the later strikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought. naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage in proportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. it once more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. once more it proclaimed martial law in many cities. with all its old-time assurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen and peasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. it issued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. with the full sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication of documentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the black hundreds renewed their brutality. the strong council of workmen's deputies of st. petersburg, with which witte had dealt as though it were part of the government itself, was broken up and suppressed. witte wanted constitutional government on the basis of the october manifesto, but he wanted the orderly development of russian capitalism. in this attitude he was supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. the very men who in the summer of had demanded that the government grant the demands of the workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with the workers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later were demanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force to end disorder. recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with the proletariat in their demands. the class struggle in modern industrial society is a fact, and there is abundant justification--the justification of necessity and of achievement--for aggressive class consciousness and class warfare. but it is quite obvious that there are times when class interests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger social interests. it is obviously dangerous and reactionary--and therefore wrong--to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments of great calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the johnstown flood and the messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague. marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle which has guided the socialist movement, would never have questioned this important truth; he would never have supported class separatism under conditions such as those prevailing in russia at the end of . only doctrinaires, slaves to formulæ, but blind to reality, could have sanctioned such separatism. but doctrinaires always abound in times of revolution. by december the government was stronger than it had been at any time since the revolution began. the zemstvos were no longer an active part of the revolutionary movement. indeed, there had come over these bodies a great change, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionary landowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred to defensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers. practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or less open support of the government. december witnessed a new outburst in st. petersburg, moscow, and other cities. barricades were raised in the streets in many places. in moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary struggles took place, more than a thousand persons were killed. the government was better prepared than the workers; the army had recovered no little of its lost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done on previous occasions. the strikes and insurrections were put down in bloody vengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribably horrible and savage. by way of protest and retaliation, there were individual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the governor of tambov by marie spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. the first revolution was drowned in blood and tears. chapter ii from revolution to revolution i no struggle for human freedom was ever wholly vain. no matter how vast and seemingly complete the failure, there is always something of enduring good achieved. that is the law of progress, universal and immutable. the first russian revolution conformed to the law; it had failed and died in a tragic way, yet its failure was relative and it left something of substantial achievement as the foundation for fresh hope, courage, and effort. czarism had gathered all its mighty black forces and seemed, at the beginning of , to be stronger than at any time in fifty years. the souls of russia's noblest and best sons and daughters were steeped in bitter pessimism. and yet there was reason for hope and rejoicing; out of the ruin and despair two great and supremely vital facts stood in bold, challenging relief. the first of these facts was the new aspect of czarism, its changed status. absolutism as a legal institution was dead. nothing that nicholas ii and his advisers were able to do could undo the constitutional changes effected when the imperial edict made it part of the fundamental law of the nation that "no law can become binding without the consent of the imperial duma," and that the duma, elected by the people, had the right to control the actions of the officials of the government, even when such officials were appointed by the czar himself. absolutism was illegal now. attempts might be made to reintroduce it, and, indeed, that was the real significance of the policy pursued by the government, but absolutism could no longer possess the moral strength that inheres in the sanctity of law. in fighting it the russian people now had that strength upon their side. the second vital and hopeful fact was likewise a moral force. absolutism with all its assumed divine prerogatives, in the person of the czar, had declared its firm will "to grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of conscience, of speech, of assemblage and of unions." this civic freedom absolutism had sanctioned. by that act it gave the prestige of legality to such assemblages, discussions, and publications as had always hitherto been forced to accept risks and disabilities inseparable from illegal conduct. civic freedom had long been outlawed, a thing associated with lawlessness and crime, and so long as that condition remained many who believed in civic freedom itself, who wanted a free press, freedom of public assemblage and of conscience in matters pertaining to religion, were kept from participation in the struggle. respect for law, as law, is deeply rooted in civilized mankind--a fact which, while it makes the task of the revolutionist hard, and at times impedes progress, is, nevertheless, of immense value to human society. civic freedom was not yet a fact. it seemed, as a reality, to be as far away as ever. meetings were forbidden by officials and broken up by soldiers and police; newspapers were suppressed, as of old; labor-unions, and even the unions of the intellectuals, were ruthlessly persecuted and treated as conspiracies against the state. all this and more was true and discouraging. yet there was substantial gain: civic freedom as a practical fact did not exist, but civic freedom as a lawful right lived in the minds of millions of people--the greatest fact in russia. the terms of the manifesto of october th--absolutism's solemn covenant with the nation--had not been repealed, and the nation knew that the government did not dare to repeal it. not all the czar's armies and black hundreds could destroy that consciousness of the lawful right to civic freedom. nothing could restore the old condition. whereas in the past the government, in suppressing the press and popular assemblages, could say to the people, "we uphold the law!" now when the government attempted these things, the people defiantly cried out, "you break the law!" absolutism was no longer a thing of law. nicholas ii and all his bureaucrats could not return the chicken to the egg from which it had been hatched. they could not unsay the fateful words which called into being the imperial duma. the revolution had put into their souls a terrible fear of the wrath of the people. the czar and his government had to permit the election of the duma to proceed, and yet, conscious of the fact that the success of the duma inevitably meant the end of the old régime, they were bound, in self-protection, to attempt to kill the duma in the hope that thereby they would kill, or at least paralyze, the revolution itself. thus it was, while not daring to forbid the elections for the duma to proceed, the government adopted a machiavellian policy. the essentials of that policy were these: on the one hand, the duma was not to be seriously considered at all, when it should assemble. it would be ignored, if possible, and no attention paid to any of its deliberations or attempts to legislate. a certain amount of latitude would be given to it as a debating society, a sort of safety-valve, but that was all. if this policy could not be carried out in its entirety, if, for example, it should prove impossible to completely ignore the duma, it would be easy enough to devise a mass of hampering restrictions and regulations which would render it impotent, and yet necessitate no formal repudiation of the october manifesto. on the other hand, there was the possibility that the duma might be captured and made a safe ally. the suffrage upon which the elections were to be based was most undemocratic and unjust, giving to the landlords and the prosperous peasants, together with the wealthy classes in the cities, an enormous preponderance in the electorate. by using the black hundreds to work among the electors--bribing, cajoling, threatening, and coercing, as the occasion might require--it might be possible to bring about the election of a duma which would be a pliant and ready tool of the government. one of the favorite devices of the black hundreds was to send agents among the workers in the cities and among the peasants to discredit the duma in advance, and to spread the idea that it would only represent the bourgeoisie. many of the most influential socialist leaders unfortunately preached the same doctrine. this was the natural and logical outcome of the separate action of the classes in the revolution, and of the manner in which the proletariat had forced the economic struggle to the front during the political struggle. in the vanguard of the fight for the duma were the constitutional democrats, led by miliukov, prince lvov, and many prominent leaders of the zemstvos. the divorce between the classes represented by these men and the proletariat represented by the social democrats was absolute. it was not surprising that the leaders of the social democratic party should be suspicious and distrustful of the constitutional democrats and refuse to co-operate with them. but many of the social democrats went much farther than this, and, in the name of socialism and proletarian class consciousness, adopted the same attitude toward the duma itself as that which the agents of the black hundreds were urging upon the people. among the socialist leaders who took this position was vladimir ulyanov, the great propagandist whom the world knows to-day as nikolai lenine, bolshevik prime minister and dictator. lenine urged the workers to boycott the duma and to refuse to participate in the elections in any manner whatever. at a time when only a united effort by all classes could be expected to accomplish anything, and when such a victory of the people over the autocratic régime as might have been secured by united action would have meant the triumph of the revolution, lenine preached separatism. unfortunately, his influence, even at that time, was very great and his counsels prevailed with a great many socialist groups over the wiser counsels of plechanov and others. it may be said, in explanation and extenuation of lenine's course, that the boycotting of the elections was the logical outcome of the class antagonism and separatism, and that the bourgeois leaders were just as much responsible for the separatism as the leaders of the proletariat were. all this is true. it is quite true to say that wiser leadership of the manufacturing class in the critical days of would have made concessions and granted many of the demands of the striking workmen. by so doing they might have maintained unity in the political struggle. but, even if so much be granted, it is poor justification and defense of a socialist policy to say that it was neither better nor worse, neither more stupid nor more wise, than that of the bourgeoisie! in the circumstances, lenine's policy was most disastrous for russia. it is not necessary to believe the charge that was made at the time and afterward that lenine was in the pay of the government and a tool of the black hundreds. subsequent incidents served to fasten grave suspicion upon him, but no one ever offered proof of corruption. in all probability, he was then, and throughout the later years, honest and sincere--a fanatic, often playing a dangerous game, unmoral rather than immoral, believing that the end he sought justified any means. ii when the elections for the duma were held, in march, , the failure of the government's attempt to capture the body was complete. it was overwhelmingly a progressive parliament that had been elected. the constitutional democrats, upon a radical program, had elected the largest number of members, . next came the representatives of the peasants' organizations, with a program of moderate socialism, numbering . this group became known in the duma as the labor group. a third group consisted of representatives of border provinces, mostly advanced liberals, called autonomists, on account of their special interest in questions concerning local autonomy. there were only avowed supporters of the government. finally, despite the socialist boycott of the elections, there were almost as many socialists elected as there were supporters of the government. once more russia had spoken for democracy in no uncertain voice. and once more czarism committed the incredible folly of attempting to stem the tide of democracy by erecting further measures of autocracy as a dam. shortly before the time came for the assembling of the newly elected duma, the czar's government announced new fundamental laws which limited the powers of the duma and practically reduced it to a farce. in the first place, the imperial council was to be reconstituted and set over the duma as an upper chamber, or senate, having equal rights with the duma. half of the members of the imperial council were to be appointed by the czar and the other half elected from universities, zemstvos, bourses, and by the clergy and the nobility. in other words, over the duma was to be set a body which could always be so manipulated as to insure the defeat of any measure displeasing to the old régime. and the czar reserved to himself the power to summon or dissolve the duma at will, as well as the power to declare war and to make peace and to enter into treaties with other nations. what a farce was this considered as a fulfilment of the solemn assurances given in october, ! but the reactionary madness went even farther; believing the revolutionary movement to have been crushed to such a degree that it might act with impunity, autocracy took other measures. three days before the assembling of the duma the czar replaced his old ministry by one still more reactionary. at the head of the cabinet, as prime minister, he appointed the notorious reactionary bureaucrat, goremykin. with full regard for the bloody traditions of the office, the infamous stolypin, former governor of saratov, was made minister of the interior. at the head of the department of agriculture, which was charged with responsibility for dealing with agrarian problems, was placed stishinsky, a large landowner, bitterly hostile to, and hated by, the peasants. the composition of the new ministry was a defiance of the popular will and sentiment, and was so interpreted. the duma opened on april th, at the taurida palace. st. petersburg was a vast armed camp that day. tens of thousands of soldiers, fully armed, were massed at different points in readiness to suppress any demonstrations by the populace. it was said that provocateurs moved among the people, trying to stir an uprising which would afford a pretext for action by the soldiers. the members of the duma were first received by the czar at the winter palace and addressed by him in a pompous speech which carefully avoided all the vital questions in which the russian people were so keenly interested. it was a speech which might as well have been made by the first czar nicholas. but there was no need of words to tell what was in the mind of nicholas ii; that had been made quite evident by the new laws and the new ministry. before the duma lay the heavy task of continuing the revolution, despite the fact that the revolutionary army had been scattered as chaff is scattered before the winds. the first formal act of the duma, after the opening ceremonies were finished, was to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners. the members of the duma had come to the taurida palace that day through streets crowded with people who chanted in monotonous chorus the word "amnesty." the oldest man in the assembly, i.i. petrunkevitch, was cheered again and again as he voiced the popular demand on behalf of "those who have sacrificed their freedom to free our dear fatherland." there were some seventy-five thousand political prisoners in russia at that time, the flower of russian manhood and womanhood, treated as common criminals and, in many instances, subject to terrible torture. well might petrunkevitch proclaim: "all the prisons of our country are full. thousands of hands are being stretched out to us in hope and supplication, and i think that the duty of our conscience compels us to use all the influence our position gives us to see that the freedom that russia has won costs no more sacrifices ... i think, gentlemen ... we cannot refrain just now from expressing our deepest feelings, the cry of our heart--that free russia demands the liberation of all prisoners." at the end of the eloquent appeal there was an answering cry of: "amnesty!" "amnesty!" the chorus of the streets was echoed in the duma itself. there was no lack of courage in the duma. one of its first acts was the adoption of an address in response to the speech delivered by the czar to the members at the reception at the winter palace. the address was in reality a statement of the objects and needs of the russian people, their program. it was a radical document, but moderately couched. it demanded full political freedom; amnesty for all who had been imprisoned for political reasons or for violations of laws in restriction of religious liberty; the abolition of martial law and other extraordinary measures; abolition of capital punishment; the abolition of the imperial council and democratization of the laws governing elections to the duma; autonomy for finland and poland; the expropriation of state and private lands in the interest of the peasants; a comprehensive body of social legislation designed to protect the industrial workers. in a word, the program of the duma was a broad and comprehensive program of political and social democracy, which, if enacted, would have placed russia among the foremost democracies of the world. the boldness of the duma program was a direct challenge to the government and was so interpreted by the czar and his ministers. by the reactionary press it was denounced as a conspiracy to hand the nation over to the socialists. that it should have passed the duma almost unanimously was an indication of the extent to which the liberal bourgeoisie represented by the constitutional democrats was prepared to go in order to destroy autocracy. no wonder that some of the most trusted marxian socialists in russia were urging that it was the duty of the socialists to co-operate with the duma! yet there was a section of the marxists engaged in a constant agitation against the duma, preaching the doctrine of the class struggle, but blind to the actual fact that the dominant issue was in the conflict between the democracy of the duma and the autocracy of czarism. the class consciousness of the old régime was much clearer and more intelligent. the czar refused to receive the committee of the duma, appointed to make formal presentation of the address. then, on may th, goremykin, the prime minister, addressed the duma, making answer to its demands. on behalf of the government he rebuked the duma for its unpatriotic conduct in a speech full of studied insult and contemptuous defiance. he made it quite clear that the government was not going to grant any reforms worthy of mention. more than that, he made it plain to the entire nation that nicholas ii and his bureaucracy would never recognize the duma as an independent parliamentary body. thus the old régime answered the challenge of the duma. for seventy-two days the duma worked and fought, seventy-two days of parliamentary history for which there is no parallel in the annals of parliamentary government. for the sake of the larger aims before it, the duma carried out the demands of the government that it approve certain petty measures placed before it for the formality of its approval. on the other hand, it formulated and passed numerous measures upon its own initiative and demanded that they be recognized as laws of the land. among the measures thus adopted were laws guaranteeing freedom of assemblage; equality of all citizens before the law; the right of labor organizations to exist and to conduct strikes; reform of judicial procedure in the courts; state aid for peasants suffering from crop failure and other agrarian reforms; the abolition of capital punishment. in addition to pursuing its legislative program, the duma members voiced the country's protest against the shortcomings of the government, subjecting the various ministers to searching interpellation, day after day. not a single one of the measures adopted by the duma received the support of the imperial council. this body was effectively performing the task for which it had been created. to the interpellations of the duma the czar's ministers made the most insulting replies, when they happened to take any notice of them at all. all the old iniquities were resorted to by the government, supported, as always, by the reactionary press. the homes of members of the duma were entered and searched by the police and every parliamentary right and privilege was flouted. even the publication of the speeches delivered in the duma was forbidden. the duma had from the first maintained a vigorous protest against "the infamy of executions without trial, pogroms, bombardment, and imprisonment." again and again it had been charged that pogroms were carried out under the protection of the government, in accordance with the old policy of killing the jews and the intellectuals. the answer of the government was--another pogrom of merciless savagery. on june st, at byalostock, upward of eighty men, women, and children were killed, many more wounded, and scores of women, young and old, brutally outraged. the duma promptly sent a commission to byalostock to investigate and report upon the facts, and presently the commission made a report which proved beyond question the responsibility of the government for the whole brutal and bloody business. it was shown that the inflammatory manifestos calling upon the "loyal" citizens to make the attack were printed in the office of the police department; that soldiers in the garrison had been told days in advance when the pogrom would take place; and that in the looting and sacking of houses and shops, which occurred upon a large scale, officers of the garrison had participated. these revelations made a profound impression in russia and throughout europe. iii the duma finally brought upon itself the whole weight of czarism when it addressed a special appeal to the peasants of the country in which it dealt with candor and sincerity with the great agrarian problems which bore upon the peasants so heavily. the appeal outlined the various measures which the duma had tried to enact for the relief of the peasants, and the attitude of the czar's ministers. the many strong peasants' organizations, and their numerous representatives in the duma, made the circulation of this appeal an easy matter. the government could not close these channels of communication, nor prevent the duma's strong plea for lawful rights and against lawlessness by government officials from reaching the peasants. only one method of defense remained to the czar and his ministers: on july th, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came a new manifesto from the czar, dissolving the duma. in the manifesto all the old arrogance of absolutism reappeared. a more striking contrast to the manifesto of the previous october could not be readily imagined. the duma was accused of having exceeded its rights by "investigating the actions of local authorities appointed by the emperor," notwithstanding the fact that in the october manifesto it had been solemnly covenanted "that the representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us." the duma was condemned for "finding imperfections in the fundamental laws which can be altered only by the monarch's will" and for its "overtly lawless act of appealing to the people." the manifesto charged that the growing unrest and lawlessness of the peasants were due to the failure of the duma to ameliorate their conditions--and this in spite of the record! when the members of the duma arrived at the taurida palace next day they found the place filled with troops who prevented their entrance. they were powerless. some two hundred-odd members adjourned to viborg, whence they issued an appeal to the people to defend their rights. these men were not socialists, most of them belonging to the party of the constitutional democrats, but they issued an appeal to the people to meet the dissolution of the imperial duma by a firm refusal to pay taxes, furnish recruits for the army, or sanction the legality of any loans to the government. this was practically identical with the policy set forth in the manifesto of the executive committee of the st. petersburg council of workmen's deputies at the beginning of the previous december, before the elections to the duma. now, however, the socialists in the duma--both the social democrats and the socialist-revolutionists--together with the semi-socialist labor group, decided that it was not enough to appeal for passive resistance; that only an armed uprising could accomplish anything. they therefore appealed to the city proletariat, the peasants, the army, and the navy to rise in armed strength against the tyrannical régime. neither appeal produced any noteworthy result. the response to the viborg appeal was far less than that which followed the similar appeal of the st. petersburg workmen in december. the signers of the appeal were arrested, sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and deprived of their electoral rights. to the appeal of the duma socialists there was likewise very little response, either from city workers, peasants, soldiers, or marines. russia was struggle-weary. the appeals fell upon the ears of a cowed and beaten populace. the two documents served only to emphasize one fact, namely, that capacity and daring to attempt active and violent resistance was still largely confined to the working-class representatives. in appealing to the workers to meet the attacks of the government with armed resistance, the leaders of the peasants and the city proletariat were ready to take their places in the vanguard of the fight. on the other hand, the signers of the viborg appeal for passive resistance manifested no such determination or desire, though they must have known that passive resistance could only be a temporary phase, that any concerted action by the people to resist the collection of taxes and recruiting for the army would have led to attack and counter-attack-to a violent revolution. feeling perfectly secure, the government, while promising the election of another duma, carried on a policy of vigorous repression of all radical and revolutionary agitation and organization. executions without trial were almost daily commonplaces. prisoners were mercilessly tortured, and, in many cases, flogged to death. hundreds of persons, of both sexes, many of them simple bourgeois-liberals and not revolutionists in any sense of the word, were exiled to siberia. the revolutionary organizations of the workers were filled with spies and provocateurs, an old and effective method of destroying their morale. in all the provinces of russia field court martial was proclaimed. field court martial is more drastic than ordinary court martial and practically amounts to condemnation without trial, for trials under it are simply farcical, since neither defense nor appeal is granted. nearly five hundred revolutionists were put to death under this system, many of them without even the pretense of a trial. the black hundreds were more active than ever, goaded on by the holy synod. goremykin resigned as premier and his place was taken by the unspeakably cruel and bloodthirsty stolypin, whose "hemp neckties," as the grim jest of the masses went, circled the necks of scores of revolutionists swinging from as many gallows. there were many resorts to terrorism on the part of the revolutionists during the summer of , many officials paying for the infamies of the government with their lives. how many of these "executions" were genuine revolutionary protests, and how many simple murders instigated or committed by provocative agents for the purpose of discrediting the revolutionists and affording the government excuses for fresh infamies, will perhaps never be known. certainly, in many cases, there was no authorization by any revolutionary body. in february, , the elections for the second duma were held under a reign of terror. the bureaucracy was determined to have a "safe and sane" body this time, and resorted to every possible nefarious device to attain that end. whole masses of electors whose right to vote had been established at the previous election were arbitrarily disfranchised. while every facility was given to candidates openly favoring the government, including the octobrists, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of radical candidates, especially socialists. the meetings of the latter were, in hundreds of cases, prohibited; in other hundreds of cases they were broken up by the black hundreds and the police. many of the most popular candidates were arrested and imprisoned without trial, as were members of their campaign committees. yet, notwithstanding all these things, the second duma was, from the standpoint of the government, worse than the first. the socialists, adopting the tactics of plechanov, against the advice of lenine, his former pupil and disciple, had decided not to boycott the elections this time, but to participate in them. when the returns were published it was found that the social democrats and the socialist-revolutionists had each elected over sixty deputies, the total being nearly a third of the membership-- . in addition there were some ninety members in the peasants' labor group, which were semi-socialist. there were constitutional democrats. the government supporters, including the octobrists, numbered less than one hundred. from the first the attitude of the government toward the new duma was one of contemptuous arrogance. "the czar's hangman," stolypin, lectured the members as though they were naughty children, forbidding them to invite experts to aid them in framing measures, or to communicate with any of the zemstvos or municipal councils upon any questions whatsoever. "the duma was not granted the right to express disapproval, reproach, or mistrust of the government," he thundered. to the duma there was left about as much real power as is enjoyed by the "governments" of our "juvenile republics." as a natural consequence of these things, the second duma paid less attention to legislation than the first duma had done, and gave its time largely to interpellations and protests. partly because of the absence of some of the most able leaders they had had in the first duma, and partly to the aggressive radicalism of the socialists, which they could only half-heartedly approve at best, the constitutional democrats were less influential than in the former parliament. they occupied a middle ground--always a difficult position. the real fight was between the socialists and the reactionaries, supporters of the government. among the latter were perhaps a score of members belonging to the black hundreds, constituting the extreme right wing of the reactionary group. between these and the socialists of the extreme left the assembly was kept at fever pitch. the black hundreds, for the most part, indulged in violent tirades of abuse, often in the most disgusting profanity. the socialists replied with proletarian passion and vigor, and riotous scenes were common. the second duma was hardly a deliberative assembly! on june st stolypin threw a bombshell into the duma by accusing the social democrats of having conspired to form a military plot for the overthrow of the government of nicholas ii. evidence to this effect had been furnished to the police department by the spy and provocative agent, azev. of course there was no secret about the fact that the social democrats were always trying to bring about revolt in the army and the navy. they had openly proclaimed this, time and again. in the appeal issued at the time of the dissolution of the first duma they had called upon the army and navy to rise in armed revolt. but the betrayal of their plans was a matter of some consequence. azev himself had been loudest and most persistent in urging the work on. stolypin demanded that all the social democrats be excluded permanently from the duma and that sixteen of them be handed over to the government for imprisonment. the demand was a challenge to the whole duma, since it called into question the right of the duma to determine its own membership. obviously, if members of parliament are to be dismissed whenever an autocratic government orders it, there is an end of parliamentary government. the demand created a tremendous sensation and gave rise to a long and exciting debate. before it was ended, however, nicholas ii ordered the duma dissolved. on june d the second duma met the fate of its predecessor, having lasted one hundred days. iv as on the former occasion, arrangements were at once begun to bring about the election of another and more subservient duma. it is significant that throughout nicholas ii and his cabinet recognized the imperative necessity of maintaining the institution in form. they dared not abolish it, greatly as they would have liked to do so. on the day that the duma was dissolved the czar, asserting his divine right to enact and repeal laws at will, disregarding again the solemn assurances of the october manifesto, by edict changed the electoral laws, consulting neither the duma nor the imperial council. this new law greatly decreased the representation of the city workers and the peasants in the duma and correspondingly increased the representation of the rich landowners and capitalists. a docile and "loyal" duma was thus made certain, and no one was very much surprised when the elections, held in september, resulted in an immense reactionary majority. when the third duma met on december , , the reactionaries were as strong as the socialist and labor groups had been in the previous duma, and of the reactionaries the group of members of the black hundreds was a majority. in the mean time there had been the familiar rule of brutal reaction. most of the social democratic members of the second duma were arrested and condemned for high treason, being sent to prison and to siberia. new laws and regulations restricting the press were proclaimed and enforced with increasing severity. by comparison with the next two years, the period from to was a period of freedom. after the election of the third duma the bureaucracy grew ever bolder. books and leaflets which had been circulated openly and with perfect freedom during and were forbidden, and, moreover, their authors were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. while the law still granted freedom of assemblage and the right to organize meetings, these rights did not exist as realities. everywhere the black hundreds held sway, patronized by the czar, who wore their emblem and refused to permit the punishment of any of their members, even though they might be found guilty by the courts. it is not necessary to dwell upon the work of the third duma. this is not a history of russia, and a detailed study of the servile parliament of nicholas ii and stolypin would take us too far afield from our special study--the revolutionary movement. suffice it, therefore, to say that some very useful legislation, necessary to the economic development of russia, was enacted, and that, despite the overwhelming preponderance of reactionaries, it was not an absolutely docile body. on several occasions the third duma exercised the right of criticism quite vigorously, and on two or three occasions acted in more or less open defiance of the wishes of the government. a notable instance of this was the legislation of , considerably extending freedom of religious organization and worship, which was, however, greatly curtailed later by the imperial council--and then nullified by the government. the period - was full of despair for sensitive and aspiring souls. the steady and rapid rise in the suicide-rate bore grim and eloquent testimony to the character of those years of dark repression. the number of suicides in st. petersburg increased during the period - more than per cent.; in moscow about per cent.! in the latter city two-fifths of the suicides in were of persons less than twenty years old! and yet, withal, there was room for hope, the soul of progress was not dead. in various directions there was a hopeful and promising growth. first among these hopeful and promising facts was the marvelous growth of the consumers' co-operatives. after began the astonishing increase in the number of these important organizations, which continued, year after year, right up to the revolution of . in there were , such co-operatives in russia; in there were , . another hopeful sign was the steadily increasing literacy of the masses. statistics upon this point are almost worthless. russian official statistics are notoriously defective and the figures relating to literacy are peculiarly so, but the leaders of russian socialism have attested to the fact. in this connection it is worthy of note that, according to the most authentic official records, the number of persons subscribing to the public press grew in a single year, from to , fully per cent. education and organization were going on, hand in hand. nor was agitation dead. in the duma the socialist and labor parties and groups, knowing that they had no chance to enact their program, made the duma a rostrum from which to address the masses throughout the nation. sometimes, indeed, the newspapers were forbidden to print their speeches, but as a rule they were published, at least by the liberal papers, and so disseminated among the masses. in these speeches the social democrats, socialist-revolutionaries, laborites, and more daring of the constitutional democrats mercilessly exposed the bureaucracy, so keeping the fires of discontent alive. v of vast significance to mankind was the controversy that was being waged within the socialist movement of russia during these years, for this was the period in which bolshevism was shaping itself and becoming articulate. the words "bolsheviki" and "bolshevism" first made their appearance in , but it was not until that they began to acquire their present meaning. at the second convention of the social democratic party, held in , the party split in two factions. the majority faction, headed by lenine, adopted the name bolsheviki, a word derived from the russian word "bolshinstvo," meaning "majority." the minority faction, which followed plechanov, though he did not formally join it, was called, in contradistinction, the "mensheviki"--that is, the minority. no question of principle was involved in the split, the question at issue being simply whether there should be more or less centralization in the organization. there was no thought on either side of leaving the social democratic party. it was simply a factional division in the party itself and did not prevent loyal co-operation. both the bolsheviki and the mensheviki remained social democrats--that is, socialists of the school of marx. during the revolutionary struggle of - the breach between the two factions was greatly widened. the two groups held utterly irreconcilable conceptions of socialist policy, if not of socialism as an ideal. the psychology of the two groups was radically different. by this time the lenine faction was no longer the majority, being, in fact, a rather small minority in the party. the plechanov faction was greatly in the majority. but the old names continued to be used. although a minority, the lenine faction was still called the bolsheviki, and the plechanov faction called the mensheviki, despite the fact that it was the majority. thus bolshevism no longer connoted the principles and tactics of the majority. it came to be used interchangeably with leninism, as a synonym. the followers of vladimir ulyanov continued to regard themselves as part of the social democratic party, its radical left wing, and it was not until after the second revolution, in , that they manifested any desire to be differentiated from the social democrats. vladimir ulyanov was born in , at simbirsk, in central russia. there is no mystery about his use of the alias, nikolai lenine, which he has made world-famous and by which he chooses to be known. almost every russian revolutionist has had to adopt various aliases for self-protection and for the protection of other russian socialists. ulyanov has followed the rule and lived and worked under several aliases, and his writings under the name "nikolai lenine" made him a great power in the russian socialist movement. lenine's father was a governmental official employed in the department of public instruction. it is one of the many anomalies of the life of the russian dictator that he himself belongs by birth, training, culture, and experience to the bourgeoisie against which he fulminates so furiously. even his habits and tastes are of bourgeois and not proletarian origin. he is an intellectual of the intellectuals and has never had the slightest proletarian experience. as a youth still in his teens he entered the university of st. petersburg, but his stay there was exceedingly brief, owing to a tragedy which greatly embittered his life and gave it its direction. an older brother, who was also a student in the university, was condemned to death, in a secret trial, for complicity in a terrorist plot to assassinate alexander iii. shortly afterward he was put to death. lenine himself was arrested at the same time as his brother, but released for lack of evidence connecting him with the affair. it is said, however, that the arrest caused his expulsion from the university. lenine was not the only young man to be profoundly impressed by the execution of the youthful alexander ulyanov; another student, destined to play an important rôle in the great tragedy of revolutionary russia, was stirred to bitter hatred of the system. that young student was alexander kerensky, whose father and the father of the ulyanovs were close friends. lenine's activities brought him into conflict with the authorities several times and forced him to spend a good deal of time in exile. as a youth of seventeen, at the time of the execution of his brother, he was dismissed from the law school in st. petersburg. a few years later he was sent to siberia for a political "crime." upon various occasions later he was compelled to flee from the country, living sometimes in paris, sometimes in london, but more often in switzerland. it was through his writings mainly that he acquired the influence he had in the russian movement. there is nothing unusual or remarkable about this, for the social democratic party of russia was practically directed from geneva. lenine was in london when the revolution of broke out and caused him to hurry to st. petersburg. as a young man lenine, like most of the intelligentsia of the period, gave up a good deal of his spare time to teaching small groups of uneducated working-men the somewhat abstract and intricate theories and doctrines of socialism. to that excellent practice, no doubt, much of lenine's skill as a lucid expositor and successful propagandist is due. he has written a number of important works, most of them being of a polemical nature and dealing with party disputations upon questions of theory and tactics. the work by which he was best known in socialist circles prior to his sensational rise to the premiership is a treatise on _the development of capitalism in russia_. this work made its appearance in , when the marxian socialist movement was still very weak. in it lenine defended the position of the marxians, plechanov and his group, that russia was not an exception to the general law of capitalist development, as was claimed by the leaders of the people's party, the _narodniki_. the book gave lenine an assured position among the intellectual leaders of the movement, and was regarded as a conclusive defense of the position of the plechanov group, to which lenine belonged. since his overthrow of the kerensky régime, and his attempt to establish a new kind of social state in russia, lenine has been frequently confronted by his own earlier reasoning by those who believe his position to be contrary to the true marxian position. from to lenine's views developed farther and farther away from those of his great teacher, george plechanov. his position in the period of the first duma can best be stated, perhaps, in opposition to the position of plechanov and the mensheviki. accepting the marxian theory of historical development, plechanov and his followers believed that russia must pass through a phase of capitalist development before there could be a social--as distinguished from a merely political--revolution. certainly they believed, an intensive development of industry, bringing into existence a strong capitalist class, on the one hand, and a strong proletariat, on the other hand, must precede any attempt to create a social democratic state. they believed, furthermore, that a political revolution, creating a democratic constitutional system of government, must come before the social revolution could be achieved. they accepted the traditional marxian view that the achievement of this political revolution must be mainly the task of the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, and especially the socialists, should co-operate with the enlightened bourgeoisie in attaining that political revolution without which there could never be a socialist commonwealth. plechanov was not blind to the dangers of compromise which must be faced in basing the policy of a movement of the masses upon this reasoning. he argued, however, that there was no choice in the matter at all; that the iron law of historical inevitability and necessity determined the matter. he pointed out that the bourgeoisie, represented by the constitutional democrats in the political struggle, were compelled to wage relentless war upon absolutism, the abolition of which was as absolutely essential to the realization of their class aims as it was to the realization of the class aims of the proletariat. hence, in this struggle, the capitalist class, as yet too weak to accomplish the overthrow of autocracy and czarism, and the proletariat, equally dependent for success upon the overthrow of autocracy and czarism, and equally too weak to accomplish it unaided, had to face the fact that historical development had given the two classes which were destined to wage a long conflict an immediate unity of interest. their imperative needs at the moment were not conflicting needs, but identical ones. to divide their forces, to refuse to co-operate with each other, was to play the game of the czar and his associates, argued plechanov. the mensheviki favored participation in the duma elections and co-operation with the liberal and radical bourgeoisie parties, in so far as might be necessary to overthrow the autocracy, and without sacrificing socialist principles. they pointed out that this position was evidently feared by the bureaucracy far more than the position of the extremists among the social democrats and the socialist-revolutionists, who refused to consider such co-operation, and pointed to the fact that provocateurs in large numbers associated themselves with the latter in their organizations and preached the same doctrine of absolute isolation and exclusiveness. it will be seen that the position of the mensheviki was one of practical political opportunism, an opportunism, however, that must be sharply distinguished from what wilhelm liebknecht used to call "political cow-trading." no man in the whole history of international socialism ever more thoroughly despised this species of political opportunism than george plechanov. to those who are familiar with the literature of international socialism it will be unnecessary to say that plechanov was not the man to deprecate the importance of sound theory as a guide to the formulation of party policies. for many years he was rightly regarded as one of the greatest theoreticians of the movement. certainly there was only one other writer in the whole international movement who could be named as having an equal title to be considered the greatest socialist theorist since marx--karl kautsky. but plechanov[ ]--like marx himself--set reality above dogma, and regarded movement as of infinitely greater importance than theory. the mensheviki wanted to convene a great mass convention of representatives of the industrial proletariat during the summer of . "it is a class movement," they said, "not a little sectarian movement. how can there be a _class_ movement unless the way is open to all the working class to participate?" accordingly, they wanted a convention to which all the factory-workers would be invited to send representatives. there should be no doctrinal tests, the sole qualification being membership in the working class. it did not matter to the advocates of this policy whether a man belonged to the social democratic party or to any party; whether he called himself a revolutionist or anything else. it was, they said, a movement of the working class, not the movement of a sect within the working class. they knew, of course, that in such a great mass movement there would probably be some theoretical confusion, more or less muddled thinking. they recognized, too, that in the great mass convention they proposed some social democratic formulations might be rejected and some others adopted which did not accord with the marxian doctrines. but, quoting marx to the effect that "one step of real movement is worth a thousand programs," they contended that if there was anything at all in the marxian theory of progress through class struggles, and the historic rule of the working class, it must follow that, while they might make mistakes and go temporarily astray, the workers could not go far wrong, their class interests being a surer guide than any amount of intellectualism could produce. lenine and his friends, the bolsheviki, bitterly opposed all this reasoning and took a diametrically opposite position upon every one of the questions involved. they absolutely opposed any sort of co-operation with bourgeois parties of any kind, for any purpose whatever. no matter how progressive a particular bourgeois party might be, nor how important the reform aimed at, they believed that social democrats should remain in "splendid isolation," refusing to make any distinction between more liberal and less liberal, progressive and reactionary, groups in the bourgeoisie. trotzky, who did not at first formally join the bolsheviki, but was a true bolshevik in his intellectual convictions and sympathies, fully shared this view. now, lenine and trotzky were dogmatic marxists, and as such they could not deny the contention that capitalism must attain a certain development before socialism could be attained in russia. nor could they deny that absolutism was an obstacle to the development both of capitalist industry and of socialism. they contended, however, that the peculiar conditions in russia, resulting from the retardation of her economic development for so long, made it both possible and necessary to create a revolutionary movement which would, at one and the same time, overthrow both autocracy and capitalism. necessarily, therefore, their warfare must be directed equally against autocracy and all political parties of the landlord and capitalist classes. they were guided throughout by this fundamental conviction. the policy of absolute and unqualified isolation in the duma, which they insisted the social democrats ought to pursue, was based upon that conviction. vi all this is quite clear and easily intelligible. granted the premise, the logic is admirable. it is not so easy, however, to see why, even granting the soundness of their opposition to _co-operation_ with bourgeois parties and groups in the duma, there should be no political _competition_ with them--which would seem to be logically implied in the boycott of the duma elections. non-participation in the elections, consistently pursued as a proletarian policy, would leave the proletariat unrepresented in the legislative body, without one representative to fight its battles on what the world universally regards as one of the most important battle-fields of civilization. and yet, here, too, they were entirely logical and consistent--they did not believe in parliamentary government. as yet, they were not disposed to emphasize this overmuch, not, apparently, because of any lack of candor and good faith, but rather because the substitute for parliamentary government had not sufficiently shaped itself in their minds. the desire not to be confused with the anarchists was another reason. because the bolsheviki and the anarchists both oppose parliamentary government and the political state, it has been concluded by many writers on the subject that bolshevism is simply anarchism in another guise. this is a mistake. bolshevism is quite different from and opposed to anarchism. it requires strongly centralized government, which anarchism abhors. parliamentary government cannot exist except upon the basis of the will of the majority. whoever enters into the parliamentary struggle, therefore, must hope and aim to convert the majority. back of that hope and aim must be faith in the intellectual and moral capacity of the majority. at the foundation of bolshevist theory and practice lies the important fact that there is no such faith, and, consequently, neither the hope nor the aim to convert the majority and with its strength make the revolution. out of the adult population of russia at that time approximately per cent. were peasants and less than per cent. belonged to the industrial proletariat. at that time something like per cent. of the people were illiterate. even in st. petersburg--where the standard of literacy was higher than in any other city--not more than per cent. of the people could sign their own names in , according to the most authentic government reports. when we contemplate such facts as these can we wonder that impatient revolutionaries should shrink from attempting the task of converting a majority of the population to an intelligent acceptance of socialism? there was another reason besides this, however. lenine--and he personifies bolshevism--was, and is, a doctrinaire marxist of the most dogmatic type conceivable. as such he believed that the new social order must be the creation of that class which is the peculiar product of modern capitalism, the industrial proletariat. to that class alone he and his followers pinned all their faith and hope, and that class was a small minority of the population and bound to remain a minority for a very long period of years. here, then, we have the key. it cannot be too strongly stressed that the bolsheviki did not base their hope upon the working class of russia, and did not trust it. the working class of russia--if we are to use the term with an intelligent regard to realities--was and is mainly composed of peasants; the industrial proletariat was and is only a relatively small part of the great working class of the nation. _but it is upon that small section, as against the rest of the working class, that bolshevism relies_. lenine has always refused to include the peasants in his definition of the working class. with almost fanatical intensity he has insisted that the peasant, together with the petty manufacturer and trader, would soon disappear; that industrial concentration would have its counterpart in a great concentration of landownings and agriculture; that the small peasant holdings would be swallowed up by large, modern agricultural estates, with the result that there would be an immense mass of landless agricultural wage-workers. this class would, of course, be a genuinely proletarian class, and its interests would be identical with those of the industrial proletariat. until that time came it would be dangerous to rely upon the peasants, he urged, because their instincts are bourgeois rather than proletarian. naturally, he has looked askance at the peasant socialist movements, denying that they were truly socialist at all. they could not be socialist movements in the true sense, he contended, because they lacked the essential quality of true socialists, namely, proletarian class consciousness. naturally, too, lenine and his followers have always regarded movements which aimed to divide the land among the peasants, and so tend to give permanence to a class of petty agriculturists, as essentially reactionary. the exigencies of the struggle have forced them into some compromises, of course. for example, at first they were not willing to admit that the peasants could be admitted into their group at all, but later on they admitted some who belonged to the poorest class of peasants. throughout, however, they have insisted that the peasant class as a whole was a class of petty bourgeoisie and that its instincts and interests would inevitably lead it to side with the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat. of course, this is a very familiar phase of socialist evolution in every country. it lasted in germany many years. in russia, however, the question assumed an importance it never had in any other country, owing to the vast preponderance of peasants in the population. anything more un-russian than this theorizing cannot be well conceived. it runs counter to every fact in russian experience, to the very basis of her economic life at this stage of her history. lenine is a russian, but his dogmas are not russian, but german. bolshevism is the product of perverted german scholasticism. even the industrial workers as a whole, in their present stage of development, were not to be trusted, according to the bolshevist leaders. they frankly opposed the mensheviki when the latter proposed to hold their great convention of industrial workers, giving as their reason the fear that the convention majority would not consist of class-conscious revolutionary marxian socialists. in other words, they feared that the majority would not be on their side, and they had not the time or the patience to convert them. there was no pretense of faith in the majority of the industrial proletariat, much less of faith in the entire working class of russia. the industrial proletariat was a minority of the working class, and the bolsheviki pinned their faith to a minority of that minority. they wanted to establish, not democracy, but dictatorship of russia by a small, disciplined, intelligent, and determined minority of working-men. the lines of cleavage between the mensheviki and the bolsheviki were thus clearly drawn. the former, while ready to join in mass uprisings and armed insurrections by the masses, believed that the supreme necessity was education and organization of all the working-people. still relying upon the industrial proletariat to lead the struggle, they nevertheless recognized that the peasants were indispensable. the bolsheviki, on the other hand, relied exclusively upon armed insurrection, initiated and directed by desperate minorities. the mensheviki contended that the time for secret, conspiratory action was past; that russia had outgrown that earlier method. as far as possible, they carried the struggle openly into the political field. they organized unions, educational societies, and co-operatives, confident that through these agencies the workers would develop cohesion and strength, which, at the right time, they would use as their class interests dictated. the bolsheviki, on the other hand, clung to the old conspiratory methods, always mastered by the idea that a sudden _coup_ must some day place the reins of power in the hands of a revolutionary minority of the workers and enable them to set up a dictatorship. that dictatorship, it must be understood, was not to be permanent; democracy, possibly even political democracy, would come later. as we have already noted, into the ranks of the terrorist socialist-revolutionaries and the bolsheviki spies and provocative agents wormed their way in large numbers. it is the inevitable fate of secret, conspiratory movements that this should be so, and also that it should result in saturating the minds of all engaged in the movements with distrust and suspicion. more than once the charge of being a provocateur was leveled at lenine and at trotzky, but without justification, apparently. there was, indeed, one incident which placed lenine in a bad light. it belongs to a somewhat later period than we have been discussing, but it serves admirably to illustrate conditions which obtained throughout the whole dark period between the two great revolutions. one of lenine's close friends and disciples was roman malinovsky, a fiery speaker of considerable power, distinguished for his bitter attacks upon the bourgeois progressive parties and upon the mensheviki. the tenor of his speeches was always the same--only the interest of the proletariat should be considered; all bourgeois political parties and groups were equally reactionary, and any co-operation with them, for any purpose, was a betrayal of socialist principle. malinovsky was trusted by the bolsheviki. he was elected to the fourth duma, where he became the leader of the little group of thirteen social democrats. like other members of the bolshevik faction, he entered the duma, despite his contempt for parliamentary action, simply because it afforded him a useful opportunity for agitation and demonstrations. in the duma he assailed even a portion of the social democratic group as belonging to the bourgeoisie, succeeding in splitting it in two factions and becoming the leader of the bolshevik faction, numbering six. this blatant demagogue, whom lenine called "the russian bebel," was proposed for membership in the international socialist bureau, the supreme council of the international socialist movement, and would have been sent as a delegate to that body as a representative of russian socialist movement but for the discovery of the fact that he was a secret agent of the czar's government! it was proved that malinovsky was a provocateur in the pay of the police department, and that many, if not all, of his speeches had been prepared for him in the police department by a former director named beletzky. the exposure made a great sensation in russian socialist circles at the time, and the fact that it was nikolai lenine who had proposed that malinovsky be chosen to sit in the international socialist bureau naturally caused a great deal of unfriendly comment. it cannot be denied that the incident placed lenine in an unfavorable light, but it must be admitted that nothing developed to suggest that he was guilty of anything more serious than permitting himself to be outwitted and deceived by a cunning trickster. the incident serves to show, however, the ease with which the extreme fanaticism of the bolsheviki played into the hands of the autocracy. vii while bolsheviki and mensheviki wrangled and disputed, great forces were at work among the russian people. by the terrible pall of depression and despair which had settled upon the nation as a result of the failure of the first revolution began to break. there was a new generation of college students, youthful and optimistic spirits who were undeterred by the failure of - , confident that they were wiser and certain to succeed. also there had been an enormous growth of working-class organizations, large numbers of unions and co-operative societies having been formed in spite of the efforts of the government. the soul of russia was once more stirring. the end of and the beginning of witnessed a new series of strikes, such as had not occurred since . the first were students' strikes, inaugurated in support of their demand for the abolition of capital punishment. these were quickly followed by important strikes in the industrial centers for economic ends--better wages and shorter working-hours. as in the period immediately preceding the first revolution, the industrial unrest soon manifested itself in political ways. without any conscious leadership at all this would have been inevitable in the existing circumstances. but there was leadership. social democrats of both factions, and socialists of other groups as well, moved among the workers, preaching the old, yet ever new, gospel of revolt. political strikes followed the strikes for immediate economic ends. throughout the latter part of and the whole of the revolutionary movement once more spread among the masses. the year was hardly well begun when revolutionary activities assumed formidable proportions. january th--russian calendar--anniversary of bloody sunday, was celebrated all over the country by great demonstrations which were really demonstration-strikes. in st. petersburg fifty-five thousand workers went out--and there were literally hundreds of other smaller "strikes" of a similar nature throughout the country. in april another anniversary of the martyrdom of revolting working-men was similarly celebrated in most of the industrial centers, hundreds of thousands of workers striking as a manifestation against the government. the st of may was celebrated as it had not been celebrated since . in the various industrial cities hundreds of thousands of workmen left their work to march through the streets and hold mass meetings, and so formidable was the movement that the government was cowed and dared not attempt to suppress it by force. there was a defiant note of revolution in this great uprising of the workers. they demanded an eight-hour day and the right to organize unions and make collective bargains. in addition to these demands, they protested against the balkan war and against militarism in general. had the great war not intervened, a tragic interlude in russia's long history of struggle, the year would have seen the greatest struggle for the overthrow of czarism in all that history. whether it would have been more successful than the effort of can never be known, but it is certain that the working-class revolutionary movement was far stronger than it was nine years before. on the other hand, there would not have been the same degree of support from the other classes, for in the intervening period class lines had been more sharply drawn and the class conflict greatly intensified. surging through the masses like a mighty tide was the spirit of revolt, manifesting itself much as it had done nine years before. all through the early months of the year the revolutionary temper grew. the workers became openly defiant and the government, held in check, doubtless, by the delicate balance of the international situation, dared not resort to force with sufficient vigor to stamp out the agitation. mass meetings were held in spite of all regulations to the contrary; political strikes occurred in all parts of the country. in st. petersburg and moscow barricades were thrown up in the streets as late as july. then the war clouds burst. a greater passion than that of revolution swept over the nation and it turned to present a united front to the external foe. chapter iii the war and the people i the war against austria and germany was not unpopular. certainly there was never an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused so little resentment among the russian people. wars are practically never popular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this is especially true of autocratically governed countries. the heavy burdens which all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon the petty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded with dread and sorrow. the memory of the war with japan was too fresh and too bitter to make it possible for the mass of the russian people to welcome the thought of another war. it cannot, therefore, in truth be said that the war with the central empires was popular. but it can be said with sincerity and the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it was accepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, a necessary war. opposition to the war was not greater in russia than in england or france, or, later, in america. of course, there were religious pacifists and socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as they would have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter what the issues involved might be, but their number and their influence were small and quite unimportant. the one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of peril to the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds, classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincere patriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionate revolutionary agitation. it can hardly be questioned or doubted that if the war had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitated revolution instead of retarding it. from this point of view the war was a deplorable disaster. that no serious attempt was made to bring about a revolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declaration of war did not enrage the people. if not a popular and welcome event, therefore, the declaration of war by the czar was not an unpopular one. never before since his accession to the throne had nicholas ii had the support of the nation to anything like the same extent. take the jews, for example. bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been, despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and the pogrom; tortured by cossacks and black hundreds; robbed by official extortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rot and die in the noisome pale--the jews owed no loyalty to the czar or even to the nation. had they sought revenge in the hour of russia's crisis, in howsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their action and hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. it is almost unthinkable that the czar could have thought of the jews in his vast empire in those days without grave apprehension and fear. yet, as all the world knows, the jews resolutely overcame whatever suggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity, responded to russia's call without hesitation and without political intrigue or bargaining. as a whole, they were as loyal as any of the czar's subjects. how shall we explain this phenomenon? the explanation is that the leaders of the jewish people, and practically the whole body of jewish intellectuals, recognized from the first that the war was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war of conflicting ideals. they recognized that the entente, as a whole, notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of russia, represented the generous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every jew in that they must be securely established before the emancipation of the jew could be realized. their hatred of czarism was not engulfed by any maudlin sentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. they were not swept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaim their loyalty to the infamous oppressor. no. their loyalty was to the entente, not to the czar. they were guided by enlightened self-interest, by an intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggle against teutonic militarist-imperialism. every intelligent and educated jew in russia knew that the real source of the brutal anti-semitism which characterized the rule of the romanovs was prussian and not russian. he knew that it had long been one of the main features of germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred and fear of the jews by russian officialdom. there could not be a more tragic mistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the jews in russia that anti-semitism is characteristically russian. surely, the fact that the first duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights to the jews with all the rest of the population proves that the russian people did not hate the jews. the ill-treatment of the jews was part of the policy by which germany, for her own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken russia and so prevent the development of her national solidarity. racial animosity and conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. internal war and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled, and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the same end, and were, therefore, the object of germany's intrigues in russia, equally with hostility to the jews, as we shall have occasion to note. german intrigue in russia is an interesting study in economic determinism. unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand russia's part in the war and her rôle in the history of the past few decades. a brief study of the map of europe by any person who possesses even an elementary knowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal germany's interest in russia and make quite plain why german statesmen have so assiduously aimed to keep russia in a backward economic condition. as a great industrial nation it was to germany's interest to have russia remain backward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite as surely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness and inefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in russia's military organization. as a highly developed industrial nation russia would of necessity have been germany's formidable rival--perhaps her most formidable rival--and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormous advantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far east. as a feudal agricultural country, on the other hand, russia would be a great market for german manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a most convenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which germany could rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains--a supply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportation not subject to naval attack. for the russian jew the defeat of germany was a vital necessity. the victory of germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen prussian influence in russia and add to the misery and suffering of the jewish population. that other factors entered into the determination of the attitude of the jews, such as, for example, faith in england as the traditional friend of the jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion of belgium, is quite true. but the great determinant was the well-understood fact that germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated russian politics and the russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the jewish race. germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of the oppression which cursed every jew in russia. ii the democratic elements in russia were led to support the government by very similar reasoning. the same economic and dynastic motives which had led germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in russia led her to take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent the establishment of democracy. this had been long recognized by all liberal russians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. it was as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that st. petersburg was the national capital. it was part of the intellectual creed of practically every liberal russian that there was a natural affinity between the great autocracies of germany and russia, and that a revolution in russia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutism would be suppressed by prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those of loyal russian troops. it was generally believed by russian socialists that in the kaiser had promised to send troops into russia to crush the revolution if called upon for that aid. many german socialists, it may be added, shared that belief. autocracies have a natural tendency to combine forces against revolutionary movements. it would have been no more strange for wilhelm ii to aid nicholas ii in quelling a revolution that menaced his throne than it was for alexander i to aid in putting down revolution in germany; or than it was for nicholas i to crush the hungarian revolution in , in the interest of francis joseph; or than it was for bismarck to rush to the aid of alexander ii in putting down the polish insurrection in . the democrats of russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the natural affinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the romanov and hohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union by years and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. as isaac don lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the russian revolution, nicholas ii was more than seven-eighths german, less than one-eighth of his blood heritage being romanov. catherine the great, wife of peter iii, was a prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughly prussianized her court. after her--from to --six czars reigned in russia, five of whom married german wives. as was inevitable in such circumstances, the russian court had long been notoriously subject to german influences and strongly pro-german in its sympathies--by no means a small matter in an autocratic country. fully aware of their advantage, the kaiser and his ministers increased the german influence and power at the russian court by encouraging german nobles to marry into russian court circles. the closing decade of the reign of nicholas ii was marked by an extraordinary increase of prussian influence in his court, an achievement in which the kaiser was greatly assisted by the czarina, who was, it will be remembered, a german princess. naturally, the german composition and character of the czar's court was reflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departments of the russian government, including the army. the russian secret service was very largely in the hands of germans and russians who had married german wives. the same thing may be said of the police department. many of the generals and other high officers in the russian army were either of german parentage or connected with germany by marriage ties. in brief, the whole russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by german influence. outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the great landowners. those of the baltic provinces were largely of teutonic descent, of course. many had married german wives. the result was that the nobility of these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life of russia, was, to a very large degree, pro-german. in addition to these, there were numerous large landowners of german birth, while many, probably a big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrial establishments and landed estates were german citizens. it is notorious that the principal factories upon which russia had to rely for guns and munitions were in charge of germans, who had been introduced because of their high technical efficiency. in view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited, it was natural for the democrats of russia to identify germany and german intrigue and influence with the hated bureaucracy. it was as natural as it was for the german influence to be used against the democratic movement in russia, as it invariably was. practically the entire mass of democratic opinion in russia, including, of course, all the socialist factions, regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic german influences as a menace to russia, a cancer that must be cut out. with the exception of a section of the socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, the mass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic russians saw in the war a welcome breaking of the german yoke. believing that the victory of germany would restore the yoke, and that her defeat by russia would eliminate the power which had sustained czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied with enthusiasm at the call to arms. they were loyal, but to russia, not to the czar. they felt that in warring against prussian militarist-imperialism they were undermining russian absolutism. that the capitalists of russia should want to see the power of germany to hold russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. to all intents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, russia was virtually a german colony to be exploited for the benefit of germany. the commercial treaties of , which gave germany such immense trade advantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. on the other hand, the immense french loan of , the greater part of which had been used to develop the industrial life of russia, had the effect of bringing russian capitalists into closer relations with french capitalists. for further capital russia could only look to france and england with any confident hope. above all, the capitalists of russia wanted freedom for economic development; they wanted stability and national unity, the very things germany was preventing. they wanted efficient government and the elimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. the law of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalist system could not grow within the narrow confines of absolutism. for the russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vital importance that germany's power should not be increased, as it would of necessity be if the entente submitted to her threats and permitted serbia to be crushed by austria, and the furtherance of the pan-german _mitteleuropa_ designs. it was vitally necessary to russian capitalism that germany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of russia should be broken. the issue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonly understood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates the capitalist classes of all lands. the russian capitalist class was animated by no fear of german competition in the sense in which the nations of the world have understood that term. they had their own vast home market to develop. the industrialization of the country must transform a very large part of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having new needs and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend. for many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market, constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increased and forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process, as it was bound to do. it was germany as a persistent meddler in russian government and politics that the capitalists of russia resented. it was the unfair advantage that this underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field that stirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of russia. that, and the knowledge that german intrigue by promoting divisions in russia was the mainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of russia in support of the war. there was a small section of this class that went much farther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. they realized fully that turkey had already fallen under the domination of germany to such a degree that in the event of a german victory in the war, or, what really amounted to the same thing, the submission of the entente to her will, germany would become the ruler of the dardanelles and european turkey be in reality, and perhaps in form, part of the german empire. such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the most disastrous consequences for russia. inevitably, it would add to german prestige and power in the russian empire, and weld together the hohenzollern, habsburg, and romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionary mass, which, under the efficient leadership of germany, might easily dominate the entire world. moreover, like many of the ablest russians, including the foremost marxian socialist scholars, they believed that the normal economic development of russia required a free outlet to the warm waters of the mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to the great ocean highways. therefore they hoped that one result of a victorious war by the entente against the central empires, in which russia would play an important part, would be the acquisition of constantinople by russia. thus the old vision of the czars had become the vision of an influential and rising class with a solid basis of economic interest. iii as in every other country involved, the socialist movement was sharply divided by the war. paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revival of revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, the socialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. they were, indeed, at a very low state. they had not yet recovered from the reaction. the manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolution of the second duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of all radical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced the socialist parties in membership and influence. the masses were, for a long time, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. the socialist factions meanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upon theoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of the working-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, and which they could hardly be supposed to understand. the socialist parties and groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaders were practically all in exile. had a revolution broken out, as it would have done but for the war, socialist leadership would have asserted itself. as in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the war among the socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separation and made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted a particular view. just as in germany, france, and england, some of the most revolutionary socialists joined with the more moderate socialists in upholding the war, while extremely moderate socialists joined with socialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. it is possible, however, to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerable accuracy: a majority of the socialist-revolutionary party executive issued an anti-war manifesto. there is no means of telling how far the views expressed represented the attitude of the peasant socialists as a whole, owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties of assembling the members. the manifesto read: there is no doubt that austrian imperialism is responsible for the war with serbia. but is it not equally criminal on the part of serbs to refuse autonomy to macedonia and to oppress smaller and weaker nations? it is the protection of this state that our government considers its "sacred duty." what hypocrisy! imagine the intervention of the czar on behalf of poor serbia, whilst he martyrizes poland, finland and the jews, and behaves like a brigand toward persia. whatever may be the course of events, the russian workers and peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for russia a place among civilized nations. this manifesto was issued, as reported in the socialist press, prior to the actual declaration of war. it was a threat of revolution made with a view to preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as the similar threats of revolution made by the german socialists before the war to the same end. the mildness of manner which characterizes the manifesto may be attributed to two causes--weakness of the movement and a resulting lack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the fact that many of the leaders, while they hated the czar and all his works, and could not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce with their great enemy, nevertheless were pro-ally and anxious for the defeat of german imperialism. in other words, these leaders shared the national feeling against germany, and, had they been free citizens of a democratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war. when the duma met, on august th, for the purpose of voting the war credits, the social democrats of both factions, bolsheviki and mensheviki, fourteen in number,[ ] united upon a policy of abstention from voting. valentin khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement: a terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people of the entire world. millions of workers have been torn away from their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. millions of families have been delivered over to famine. war has already begun. while the governments of europe were preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the german workers at the head, unanimously protested. the hearts of the russian workers are with the european proletariat. this war is provoked by the policy of expansion for which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible. the proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against this attack. the conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting return of barbarism. but we are convinced that the working class will find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the conclusion of peace at an early date. the terms of that peace will be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats. we are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the great masses of europe, and show them the real causes of all the violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this new explosion of barbarism will be the last. as soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the social democratic group left the chamber in silence. they were immediately followed by the laborites and socialist-revolutionists representing the peasant socialists, so that none of the socialists in the duma voted for the war credits. as we shall see later on, the laborites and most of the socialist-revolutionists afterward supported the war. the declaration of the social democrats in the duma was as weak and as lacking in definiteness of policy as the manifesto of the socialist-revolutionists already quoted. we know now that it was a compromise. it was possible to get agreement upon a statement of general principles which were commonplaces of socialist propaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class will find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the conclusion of peace at an early date." it was easy enough to do this, but it would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistance and opposition to the war. it was easy to agree not to vote for the war credits, since there was no danger that this would have any practical effect, the voting of the credits--largely a mere form--being quite certain. it would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote _against_ the credits. under the strong leadership of alexander kerensky the labor party soon took a decided stand in support of the war. in the name of the entire group of the party's representatives in the duma, kerensky read at an early session a statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "we firmly believe," said kerensky, "that the great flower of russian democracy, together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemy and _will defend their native land_." the party had decided, he said, to support the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of our civilization created by the blood of our race.... we believe that through the agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the russian people will be strengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terrible internal troubles." kerensky declared that the workers would take no responsibility for the suicidal war into which the governments of europe had plunged their peoples. he strongly criticized the government, but ended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers to support the war: "the socialists of england, belgium, france, and germany have tried to protest against rushing into war. we russian socialists were not able at the last to raise our voices freely against the war. but, deeply convinced of the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherly greetings to all who protested against the preparations for this fratricidal conflict of peoples. remember that russian citizens have no enemies among the working classes of the belligerents! _protect your country to the end against aggression by the states whose governments are hostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terrible war had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhood been directing the activities of those who control the destinies of russia and other lands!_ as it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment, show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those who have fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire for reconciliation with the non-russian peoples of the empire. "and, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of the people, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the war expenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes. "peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of russia in these great trials, harden your spirit! gather all your strength and, having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who are shedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternal greetings." kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance. made on behalf of the entire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thought of the representatives of the peasant socialists and socialistically inclined radicals. their solemnly measured protest against the reactionary policy of the government was as significant as the announcement that they would support the war. it was a fact that at the very time when national unity was of the most vital importance the government was already goading the people into despairing revolt. that a section of the bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war, aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it would mean russia's defeat and germany's triumph, is a certainty. the government soon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. many russian socialists have charged that the policy of the bolsheviki was inspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed. others believe that the policy was instigated by german provocateurs, for very obvious purposes. it was not uncommon for german secret agents to worm their way into the russian socialist ranks, nor for the agents of the russian police to keep the german secret service informed of what was going on in russian socialist circles. whatever truth there may be in the suspicion that the anti-war bolshevik faction of the social democrats were the victims of the russian police espionage system, and were betrayed by one whom they had trusted, as the socialist-revolutionists had been betrayed by azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrest of five of the bolshevist social democratic members of the duma, on november th. never before had the government disregarded the principle of parliamentary immunity. when members of the first duma, belonging to various parties, and members of the second duma, belonging to the social democratic party, were arrested it was only after the duma had been formally dissolved. the arrest of the five social democrats while the duma was still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives. the government based its action upon the following allegations, which appear to have been substantially correct: in october arrangements were made to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the social democratic organization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. the police learned of the plan, and when at last, on november th, the conference was held at viborg, eight miles from petrograd--as the national capital was now called--a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, including five members of the imperial duma, messrs. petrovsky, badavev, mouranov, samoelov, and chagov. the police arrested six persons, but did not arrest the duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. an examining magistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference, under article no. of the penal code, and issued warrants for their arrest. among those arrested was kamanev, one of lenine's closest friends, who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that he was censured by his party. at this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made to circulate among the masses a manifesto which declared that "from the viewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all the nations of russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the czar and of its armies would be of extremely little consequence." the manifesto urged the imperative necessity of _carrying on on all sides the propaganda of the social revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and that weapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves of other countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments_. the manifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organization of a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with the aim of creating republics in russia, poland, germany, austria, and all other european countries, these to be federated into a republican united stares of europe. the declaration that the defeat of the russian armies would be "of extremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of the anti-war agitation of the bolsheviki. lenine and zinoviev, still in exile, adopted the view that the defeat of russia was _actually desirable_ from the point of view of the russian working class. "we are russians, and for that very reason we want czarism to be defeated," was the cry.[ ] in his paper, the _social democrat_, published in switzerland, lenine advocated russian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in the army, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. the majority of the bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wing socialists of the socialist-revolutionary party, who shared their views and became known as "porazhentsi"--that is, advocates of defeat. naturally, the charge was made that they were pro-german, and it was even charged that they were in the pay of germany. possibly some of them were, but it by no means follows that because they desired russia's defeat they were therefore consciously pro-german. they were not pro-german, but anti-czarists. they believed quite honestly, most of them, that russia's defeat was the surest and quickest way of bringing about the revolution in russia which would overthrow czarism. in many respects their position was quite like that of those irish rebels who desired to see england defeated, even though it meant germany's triumph, not because of any love for germany, but because they hated england and believed that her defeat would be ireland's opportunity. however short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judged to be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. it is a remarkable fact that the bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radical and extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrow nationalists. they were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as the sinn-feiners of ireland. they were not blind to the terrible wrongs inflicted upon belgium, or to the fact that germany's victory over russia would make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, france and england. but neither to save belgium nor to prevent german militarism crushing french and english workers under its iron heel would they have the russian workers make any sacrifice. they saw, and cared only for, what they believed to be _russian_ interests. iv but during the first months of the war the porazhentsi--including the bolsheviki--were a very small minority. the great majority of the socialist-revolutionists rallied to the support of the allied cause. soon after the war began a socialist manifesto to the laboring masses of russia was issued. it bore the signature of many of the best-known russian socialists, representing all the socialist factions and groups except the bolsheviki. among the names were those of george plechanov, leo deutsch, gregory alexinsky, n. avksentiev, b. vorovonov, i. bunakov, and a. bach--representing the best thought of the movement in practically all its phases. this document is of the greatest historical importance, not merely because it expressed the sentiments of socialists of so many shades, but even more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why socialists should support the war and why the defeat of germany was essential to russian and international social democracy. despite its great length, the manifesto is here given in its entirety: we, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of russian socialistic thought. we differ on many things, but we firmly agree in that the defeat of russia in her struggle with germany would mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that, guided by this conviction, our adherents in russia must come together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the grave danger the country is now facing. we address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men, peasants, artisans, clerks--to all of those who earn their bread in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren. we send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them: listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the western strongholds of russia, has occupied an important part of our territory and is menacing kiev, petrograd, and moscow, these most important centers of our social life. misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from german invasion you support our old political régime. these people want to see russia defeated because of their hatred of the czar's government. like one of the heroes of our genius of satire, shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. but russia belongs not to the czar, but to the russian working-people. in defending russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend the road to their freedom. as we said before, the inevitable consequences of german victory would be the strengthening of our old régime. the russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. _in a faint, half-hearted manner they are defending russia from germany_. the ministers who resigned recently, maklakov and shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the czar, in november, , in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the czar to make a separate peace with germany. _they understand that the defeat of germany would be a defeat of the principles of monarchism, so dear to all our european reactionaries_. our people will never forget _the failure of the czar's government to defend russia_. but if the progressive, the politically conscious people will not take part in the struggle against germany, the czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "it is not our fault that germany defeats us; it is the fault of the revolutionists who have betrayed their country," and this will vindicate the government in the eyes of the people. the political situation in russia is such that only across the bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. remember, _we do not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then revolution against the internal, the czar's government_. in the course of events the defeat of the czar's government may serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a guaranty of, the elimination of the german danger. the french revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking france on all sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular movement against the old régime became mature enough to render their efforts effective. furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby to take part in the struggle of the classes. these persons do not know what they are talking about. in the first place, in order that the struggle of the classes in russia should be successful, certain social and political conditions must exist there. _these conditions will not exist if germany wins_. in the second place, if the working-man of russia cannot but defend himself against the exploitation of the russian landed aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn around his neck by the german landed aristocracy (the _junker_) and the german capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present time _supported by a considerable part of the german proletariat that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the proletariat of other countries_. by striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of german imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of russia will continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective. it has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. but never before did it have to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as he is now. the position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree; therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious children of the working-people of russia, lies an enormous responsibility. if you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, russia will be crushed by germany. and when russia will be crushed by germany, it will fare badly with the allies. this does not need any demonstration. but if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the terrible danger menacing them. therefore, go deeply into the situation. you make a great mistake if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the working-people to defend our country. in reality, nobody's interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than the interests of the working-population. take, for instance, the franco-prussian war of - . when the germans besieged paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more than the rich. in the same way, when germany exacted five billions of contribution from vanquished france, this same, in the final count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely falls on the lower classes. more than that. the most dangerous consequence to france, due to her defeat in - , was the retardation of her economic development. in other words, the defeat of france badly reflected upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more, upon her entire subsequent development. the defeat of russia by germany will much more injure our people than the defeat of france injured the french people. the war now exacts incredibly large expenditures. it is more difficult for russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure than for the wealthy states of western europe. russia's back, even before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. now this debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of russia are subject to wholesale devastation. if the germans will win the final victory, they will demand from us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams of gold that poured into victorious germany from vanquished france, after the war of , will seem a mere trifle. but that will not be all. the most consequent and outspoken heralds of german imperialism are even now saying that it is necessary to exact from russia the cession of important territory, which should be cleared from the present population for the greater convenience of german settlers. never before have plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed such cynical heartlessness! but for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western borderlands. already, in , russia, being in a difficult situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with germany, very disadvantageous to herself. the treaty hindered, at the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress of our industries. it affected, with equal disadvantage, the interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry. it is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious german imperialism would impose upon us. in economic matters, russia would become a german colony. russia's further economic development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped. degeneration and deprivation would be the result of german victory for an important part of the russian working-people. what will german victory bring to western europe? after all we have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many of the unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the western countries allied to russia. we wish to draw your attention to the following: england, france, even belgium and italy, are, in a political sense, far ahead of the german empire, which has not as yet grown up to a parliamentary régime. german victory over these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to our western allies. indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to political suicide. the most important, the most vital interests of the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an active participation in the defense of the country. your watchword must be victory over the foreign enemy. in an active movement toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become free and strong. obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents. although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation, in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning. you must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than complete indifference. every act of agitation in the rear of the army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy. the thunders of the war certainly cannot make the russian manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time of peace. in the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will, as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor. you will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct. but in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to the cause of the defense of russia. the private must be subject to the general. the workmen of every factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt, the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they forget how severely the interests of the entire russian proletariat and peasantry would suffer from german victory. the tactics which can be defined by the motto, "all or nothing," are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. the general staff of the german army would greet with pleasure the news that we had adopted such tactics. _believe us that this staff is ready to help all those who would like to preach it in our country_. they want trouble in russia, they want strikes in england, they want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their conquering schemes. but you will not make them rejoice. you will not forget the words of our great fabulist: "what the enemy advises is surely bad." you must insist that all your representatives take the most active part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. your representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work of the special technical organizations, such as the war-industrial committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but also in all other organizations of social and political character. the situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other way than by the war of national defense. that the foregoing manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority of russian socialists there can be no doubt whatever. between this position and that of the porazhentsi with their doctrine that russia's defeat by germany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a not inconsiderable number of socialists, including such able leaders as paul axelrod. those who took up this intermediate position were both anti-czarists and anti-german-imperialists. they were pro-ally in the large sense, and desired to see the allies win over the central empires, if not a "crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. but they regarded the alliance of czarism with the allies as an unnatural marriage. they believed that autocratic russia's natural alliance was with autocratic germany and austria. their hatred of czarism led them to wish for its defeat, even by germany, provided the victory were not so great as to permit germany to extend her domain over russia or any large part of it. their position became embodied in the phrase, "victory by the allies on the west and russia's defeat on the east." this was, of course, utterly unpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality. v thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as plechanov, deutsch, bourtzev, tseretelli, kerensky, and many others, and in part to the instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by socialists of all shades and factions--except the extreme bolsheviki and the so-called "internationalist" sections of mensheviki and socialist-revolutionists--became general. the anti-war minority was exceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. had the government been both wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe, and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democratic movement, it is most unlikely that russia would have collapsed. as it was, the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the military force of the nation--a policy admirably suited to german needs. extremes meet. on the one hand there were the porazhentsi socialists, contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a german victory over russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the russian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. on the other hand, within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionary pro-german officials were animated by the belief that the victory of germany was essential to the permanence of absolutism and autocratic government. they, too, like the socialist "defeatists," aimed to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation. these germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconscious but exceedingly useful allies in the socialist intransigents. actuated by motives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corrupt and reactionary force that ever infested the old régime. this force, the reactionary germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed that germany would win the war. they had exerted every ounce of pressure they could command to keep the czar from maintaining the treaty with france and entering into the war on her side against germany and austria. when they failed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superior efficiency of the german military machine would soon triumph. but when they witnessed the great victorious onward rush of the russian army, which for a time manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed to be possible, they began to bestir themselves. from this quarter came the suggestion, very early in the war, as plechanov and his associates charged in their manifesto, that the czar ought to make an early peace with germany. they went much farther than this. through every conceivable channel they contrived to obstruct russia's military effort. they conspired to disorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, the food-supply, the manufacture of munitions. they, too, in a most effective manner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. there was universal uneasiness. in the allied chancelleries there was fear of a treacherous separate peace between russia and germany. it was partly to avert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that england undertook the forcing of the dardanelles. all over russia there was an awakening of the memories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of the nation. men told once more the story of the russian general in manchuria, in , who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot, answered that the boots were in the pocket of grand-duke vladimir! they told again the story of the cases of "shells" for the manchurian army which were intercepted in the nation's capital, _en route_ to moscow, and found to contain--paving-stones! how general kuropatkin managed to amass a fortune of over six million rubles during the war with japan was remembered. fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grew almost to the panic point. so bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the germanophile reactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves took the matter in hand. municipalities all over the country formed a union of cities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. the national union of zemstvos did the same thing. more than three thousand institutions were established on the different russian fronts by the national union of zemstvos. these institutions included hospitals, ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dental stations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motor transportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things which the administration absolutely failed to provide. the same great organization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots and socks. civil russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcome incompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. for this work the civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. instead, they were oppressed and hindered. against them was directed the hate of the dark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierce opposition and scorn of men who called themselves socialists and champions of proletarian freedom! there was treachery in the general staff and throughout the war department, at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, sukhomlinov. it was treachery in the general staff which led to the tragic disasters in east prussia. the great drive of the austrian and german armies in , which led to the loss of poland, lithuania, and large parts of volhynia and courland, and almost entirely eliminated russia from the war, was unquestionably brought about by co-operation with the german general staff on the part of the sinister "occult government," as the germanophile reactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known. no wonder that plechanov and his friends in their manifesto to the russian workers declared that the reactionaries were defending russia from subjugation by germany in "a half-hearted way," and that "our people will never forget the failure of the czar's government to defend russia." they were only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking; what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country were ready to say in harsher language. as early as january, , the duma met and cautiously expressed its alarm. in july it met again, many of the members coming directly from the front, in uniform. only the fear that a revolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented a revolution at that time. the duma was in a revolutionary mood. miliukov, for example, thundered: " ... in january we came here with ... the feeling of patriotic alarm. we then kept this feeling to ourselves. yet in closed sessions of committees we told the government all that filled the soul of the people. the answer we received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the government could get along without us, without our co-operation. to-day we have convened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. the patriotic alarm of the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of our country. secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a year ago have turned out to be mere words. yet the country cannot be satisfied with words. _the people wish to take affairs into their own hands and to correct what has been neglected. the people look upon us as legal executors of their will_." kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "_i appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fight for a full right to govern the state_." the key-note of revolution was being sounded now. for the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "the people wish to take affairs into their own hands," and in kerensky's challenge, "i appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country." the duma was the logical center around which the democratic forces of the country could rally. its moderate character determined this. only its example was necessary to the development of a great national movement to overthrow the old régime with its manifold treachery, corruption, and incompetence. when, on august d, the progressive bloc was formed by a coalition of constitutional democrats, progressives, nationalists, and octobrists--the last-named group having hitherto generally supported the government--there was a general chorus of approval throughout the country, if the program of the bloc was not radical enough to satisfy the various socialist groups, even the laborites, led by kerensky, it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in the main, as far as it went. all over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsible government. the municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutions in support of it. the great associations of manufacturers supported it. all over the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. it was generally believed that the czar and his advisers would accept the situation and accede to the popular demand. but once more the influence of the reactionaries triumphed, and on september d came the defiant answer of the government to the people. it was an order suspending the duma indefinitely. the gods make mad those whom they would destroy. things went from bad to worse. more and more oppressive grew the government; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealings with the wide-spread popular unrest. heavier and heavier grew the burden of unscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. worse and worse became the condition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect of the sick and wounded. incompetence, corruption, and treason combined to hurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. the germanophiles were still industriously at work in the most important and vital places, practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history of any nation. they played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who was the nominal ruler of the vast russian empire, and frightened him into sanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppression instead of making generous concessions. russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respect than any other belligerent on either side, yet russia was in the grip of famine. there was a vast surplus of food grains and cereals over and above the requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there was wide-spread hunger. prices rose to impossible levels. the most astonishing anarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of the food-supply. it was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journey from moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in moscow the price was two and a half dollars a pound. here, as throughout the nation, incompetence was reinforced by corruption and pro-german treachery. many writers have called attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormous exportation of food grains in russia went on side by side with per capita underconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests, amounting to not less than per cent. now, of course, conditions were far worse. when the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders to deal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. more than that, it made war upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making it possible for the nation to endure. every conceivable obstacle was placed in the way of the national union of zemstvos and the union of cities; the co-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meeting the distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted in every possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. the officials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers in substituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchens and relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive, were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. the black hundreds were perniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacy of a separate peace with germany. in october, , a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted and published a resolution which declared: the tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of germany to destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the affairs of our state. vi an adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summary is of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task of reaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in russia and its far-reaching consequences. the russian revolution of was not responsible for the disastrous separate peace with germany. the foundations for that were laid by the reactionaries of the old régime. it was the logical outcome of their long-continued efforts. lenine, trotzky, and their bolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions, ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy of the worst reactionaries in russia realized one part of an iniquitous program. the revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of the russian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; to serve the allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable. there would have been a separate peace if the old régime had remained in power a few weeks longer and the revolution been averted. it is most likely that it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded at brest-litovsk, and that it would have resulted in an actual and active alliance of the romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the hohenzollerns and the habsburgs. the russian revolution of had this great merit: it so delayed the separate peace between russia and germany that the allies were able to prepare for it. it had the merit, also, that it forced the attainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduce germany's military gain on the western front to a minimum. the manner in which the bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenzied efforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as it was by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, served the foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. the bolshevist, wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally of reaction. chapter iv the second revolution i when the duma assembled on november , --new style--the approaching doom of czar nicholas ii was already manifest. why the revolution did not occur at that time is a puzzle not easy to solve. perhaps the mere fact that the duma was assembling served to postpone resort to drastic measures. the nation waited for the duma to lead. it is probable, also, that fear lest revolution prove disastrous to the military forces exercised a restraining influence upon the people. certain it is that it would have been easy enough to kindle the fires of revolution at that time. never in the history of the nation, not even in , were conditions riper for revolt, and never had there been a more solid array of the nation against the bureaucracy. discontent and revolutionary temper were not confined to socialists, nor to the lower classes. landowners, capitalists, military officials, and intellectuals were united with the peasants and artisans, to an even greater extent than in the early stages of the first revolution. conservatives and moderates joined with social democrats and socialist-revolutionists in opposition to the corrupt and oppressive régime. even the president of the duma, michael rodzianko, a conservative landowner, assailed the government. one of the principal reasons for this unexampled unity against the government was the wide-spread conviction, based, as we have seen, upon the most damning evidence, that premier sturmer and his cabinet were not loyal to the allies and that they contemplated making a separate peace with germany. all factions in the duma were bitterly opposed to a separate peace. rodzianko was loudly cheered when he denounced the intrigues against the allies and declared: "russia gave her word to fight in common with the allies till complete and final victory is won. russia will not betray her friends, and with contempt refuses any consideration of a separate peace. russia will not be a traitor to those who are fighting side by side with her sons for a great and just cause." notwithstanding the intensification of the class conflict naturally resulting from the great industrial development since , patriotism temporarily overshadowed all class consciousness. the cheers that greeted rodzianko's declaration, and the remarkable ovation to the allied ambassadors, who were present, amply demonstrated that, in spite of the frightful suffering and sacrifice which the nation had endured, all classes were united in their determination to win the war. only a corrupt section of the bureaucracy, at one end of the social scale, and a small section of extreme left-wing socialists, at the other end of the social scale, were at that time anti-war. there was this difference between the socialist pacifists and the bureaucratic advocates of peace with germany: the former were not pro-german nor anti-ally, but sincere internationalists, honest and brave--however mistaken--advocates of peace. outside of the bureaucracy there was no hostility to the allies in russia. except for the insignificant socialist minority referred to, the masses of the russian people realized that the defeat of the hohenzollern dynasty was necessary to a realization of the ideal of a free russia. the new and greater revolution was already beginning, and determination to defeat the hohenzollern bulwark of the romanov despotism was almost universal. the whole nation was pervaded by this spirit. paul miliukov, leader of the constitutional democrats, popularly known as the "cadets," furiously lashed premier sturmer and quoted the irrefutable evidence of his pro-germanism and of his corruption. sturmer reeled under the smashing attack. in his rage he forbade the publication of miliukov's speech, but hundreds of thousands of copies of it were secretly printed and distributed. every one recognized that there was war between the duma and the government, and notwithstanding the criticism of the socialists, who naturally regarded it as a bourgeois body, the duma represented russia. sturmer proposed to his cabinet the dissolution of the duma, but failed to obtain the support of a majority. then he determined to get the czar's signature to a decree of dissolution. but the czar was at the general headquarters of the army at the time and therefore surrounded by army officers, practically all of whom were with the duma and inspired by a bitter resentment of the pro-german intrigues, especially the neglect of the army organization. the weak will of nicholas ii was thus beyond the reach of sturmer's influence for the time being. meanwhile, the ministers of the army and navy had appeared before the duma and declared themselves to be on the side of the people and their parliament. on his way to visit the czar at general headquarters, premier sturmer was met by one of the czar's messengers and handed his dismissal from office. the duma had won. the evil genius which inspired and controlled him led nicholas ii to appoint as sturmer's successor the utterly reactionary bureaucrat, alexander trepov, and to retain in office as minister of the interior the infamous protopopov, associate of the unsavory rasputin. when trepov made his first appearance as premier in the duma he was loudly hissed by the socialists. other factions, while not concealing their disappointment, were more tolerant and even became more hopeful when they realized that from the first trepov was fighting to oust protopopov. that meant, of course, a fight against rasputin as well. whatever trepov's motives might be in fighting protopopov and rasputin he was helping the opposition. but trepov was no match for such opponents. it soon became evident that as premier he was a mere figurehead and that rasputin and protopopov held the government in their hands. protopopov openly defied the premier and the duma. in december it began to be rumored in political circles that sturmer, who was now attached in some not clearly defined capacity to the foreign office, was about to be sent to a neutral country as ambassador. the rumor created the utmost consternation in liberal circles in russia and in the allied embassies. if true, it could only have one meaning, namely, that arrangements were being made to negotiate a separate peace with germany--and that meant that russia was to become germany's economic vassal. the duma demanded a responsible ministry, a cabinet directly responsible to, and controlled by, the duma as the people's representative. this demand had been constantly made since the first revolution. even the imperial council, upon which the czar had always been able to rely for support against revolutionary movements, now joined forces with the duma in making this demand. that traditionally reactionary, bureaucratic body, composed of former premiers, cabinet ministers, and other high officials, formally demanded that the czar take steps to make the government responsible to the popularly elected assemblage. this was a small revolution in itself. the fabric of czarism had cracked. ii there can be no doubt in the mind of any student of russian affairs that the unity of the imperial council and the duma, like the unity of classes, was due to the strong pro-ally sentiment which at that time possessed practically the entire nation. on december th--new style--germany offered russia a separate peace, and three days later the foreign minister, pokrovsky, visited the duma and announced that russia would reject the offer. the duma immediately passed a resolution declaring that "the duma unanimously favors a categorical refusal by the allied governments to enter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever." on the th a similar resolution was adopted by the imperial council, which continued to follow the leadership of the duma. before adjourning for the christmas holidays the duma passed another resolution, aimed chiefly at protopopov and sturmer, protesting against the sinister activities which were undermining the war-making forces of the nation, and praising the work of the zemstvos and working-class organizations which had struggled bravely to sustain the army, feed the people, care for the sick and wounded, and avert utter chaos. on december th, in the early hours of the morning, the monk rasputin was murdered and his body thrown into the neva. the strangest and most evil of all the actors in the russian drama was dead, but the system which made him what he was lived. rasputin dead exercised upon the diseased mind of the czarina--and, through her, upon the czar--even a greater influence than when he was alive. nicholas ii was as powerless to resist the insane czarina's influence as he had proved himself to be when he banished the grand-duke nicholas for pointing out that the czarina was the tool of evil and crafty intriguers. heedless of the warning implied in the murder of rasputin, and of the ever-growing opposition to the government and the throne, the czar inaugurated, or permitted to be inaugurated, new measures of reaction and repression. trepov was driven from the premiership and replaced by prince golitizin, a bureaucrat of small brain and less conscience. the best minister of education russia had ever had, ignatyev, was replaced by one of the blackest of all reactionaries. the czar celebrated the new-year by issuing an edict retiring the progressive members of the imperial council, who had supported the duma, and appointing in their stead the most reactionary men he could find in the empire. at the head of the council as president he placed the notorious jew-hating stcheglovitov. as always, hatred of the jew sprang from fear of progress. as one reads the history of january, , in russia, as it was reported in the press day by day, and the numerous accounts of competent and trustworthy observers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that protopopov deliberately sought to precipitate a revolution. mad as this hypothesis seems to be, it is nevertheless the only one which affords a rational explanation of the policy of the government. no sooner was golitizin made premier than it was announced that the opening of the duma would be postponed till the end of january, in order that the cabinet might be reorganized. later it was announced that the duma opening would be again postponed--this time till the end of february. in the reorganization of the cabinet, shuvaviev, the war minister, who had loyally co-operated with the zemstvos and had supported the duma in november, was dismissed. pokrovsky, the foreign minister, who had announced to the duma in december the rejection of the german peace offer, was reported to be "sick" and given "leave of absence." other changes were made in the cabinet, in every case to the advantage of the reactionaries. it was practically impossible for anyone in russia to find out who the ministers of the government were. protopopov released sukhomlinov, the former minister of war who had been justly convicted of treason. this action, taken, it was said, at the direction of the czarina, added to the already wide-spread belief that the government was animated by a desire to make peace with germany. that the czar himself was loyal to the allies was generally believed, but there was no such belief in the loyalty of protopopov, sturmer, and their associates. the nation meantime was drifting into despair and anarchy. the railway system was deliberately permitted to become disorganized. hunger reigned in the cities and the food reserves for the army were deliberately reduced to a two days' supply. the terror of hunger spread through the large cities and through the army at the front like prairie fire. it became evident that protopopov was carrying out the plans of the germanophiles, deliberately trying to disorganize the life of the nation and make successful warfare impossible. socialists and labor leaders charged that his agents were encouraging the pacifist minority and opposing the patriotic majority among the workers. the work of the war industries committee which controlled organizations engaged in the manufacture of war-supplies which employed hundreds of thousands of workers was hampered in every way. it is the testimony of the best-known and most-trusted working-class leaders in russia that the vast majority of the workers, while anxious for a general democratic peace, were opposed to a separate peace with germany and favored the continuation of the war against prussianism and the co-operation of all classes to that end. the pacifists and "defeatist" socialists represented a minority. to the minority every possible assistance was given, while the leaders of the working class who were loyal to the war, and who sought to sustain the morale of the workers in support of the war, were opposed and thwarted in their efforts and, in many cases, cast into prison. the black hundreds were still at work. socialist leaders of the working class issued numerous appeals to the workers, warning them that protopopov's secret police agitators were trying to bring about strikes, and begging them not to lend themselves to such treacherous designs, which could only aid germany at the expense of democracy in russia and elsewhere. it became known, too, that large numbers of machine-guns were being distributed among the police in petrograd and placed at strategic points throughout the city. it was said that protopopov was mad, but it was the methodical madness of a desperate, reactionary, autocratic régime. iii protopopov and sturmer and their associates recognized as clearly as the liberals did the natural kinship and interdependence of the three great autocracies, the romanov, habsburg, and hohenzollern dynasties. they knew well that the crushing of autocracy in austria-hungary and germany would make it impossible to maintain autocracy in russia. they realized, furthermore, that while the nation was not willing to attempt revolution during the war, the end of the war would inevitably bring with it revolution upon a scale far vaster than had ever been attempted before, unless, indeed, the revolutionary leaders could be goaded into making a premature attempt to overthrow the monarchy. in that case, it might be possible to crush them. given a rebellion in the cities, which could be crushed by the police amply provided with machine-guns, and by "loyal" troops, with a vast army unprovided with food and no means of supplying it, there would be abundant justification for making a separate peace with germany. thus the revolution would be crushed and the whole system of autocracy, russian, austrian, and german, preserved. the morning of the th of february--new style--was tense with an ominous expectancy. in the allied chancelleries anxious groups were gathered. they realized that the fate of the allies hung in the balance. in petrograd alone three hundred thousand workers went out on strike that day, and the police agents did their level best to provoke violence. the large bodies of troops massed at various points throughout the city, and the police with their machine-guns, testified to the thoroughness with which the government had prepared to crush any revolutionary manifestations. thanks to the excellent discipline of the workers, and the fine wisdom of the leaders of the social democrats, the socialist-revolutionists, and the labor group, who constantly exhorted the workers not to fall into the trap set for them, there was no violence. at the opening session of the duma, kerensky, leader of the labor group, made a characteristic address in which he denounced the arrest of the labor group members of the war industries committee. he directed his attack against the "system," not against individuals: "we are living in a state of anarchy unprecedented in our history. in comparison with it the period of seems like child's play. chaos has enveloped not only the political, but the economic life of the nation as well. it destroys the very foundations of the nation's social economic structure. "things have come to such a pass that recently one of the ministries, shipping coal from petrograd to a neighboring city, had armed the train with a special guard so that other authorities should not confiscate the coal on the way! we have arrived already at the primitive stage when each person defends with all the resources at his command the material in his possession, ready to enter into mortal combat for it with his neighbor. we are witnessing the same scenes which france went through at the time of the revolution. then also the products shipped to paris were accompanied by special detachments of troops to prevent their being seized by the provincial authorities.... "behold the cabinet of rittich-protopopov-golitizin dragging into the court the labor group of the war industries committee, charged with aiming at the creation of a russian social-democratic republic! they did not even know that nobody aims at a 'social-democratic' republic. one aiming at a republic labors for popular government. but has the court anything to say about all these distinctions? we know beforehand what sentences are to be imposed upon the prisoners.... "i have no desire to criticize the individual members of the cabinet. the greatest mistake of all is to seek traitors, german agents, separate sturmers. _we have a still greater enemy than the german influence, than the treachery and treason of individuals. and that enemy is the system--the system of a medieval form of government_." how far the conspiracy of the government of russia against the war of russia and her allies extended is shown by the revelations made in the duma on march d by one of the members, a. konovalov. he reported that two days previously, march st, the only two members of the labor group of the war industries committee who were not in prison issued an appeal to the workers not to strike. these two members of the labor group of the war industries committee, anosovsky and ostapenko, took their exhortation to the bureau of the war industries committee for its approval. but, although approved by this great and important organization, the appeal was not passed by the government censor. when guchkov, president of the war industries committee, attempted to get the appeal printed in the newspapers he was prevented by action emanating from the office of protopopov. iv through all the early days of march there was labor unrest in petrograd, as well as in some other cities. petrograd was, naturally, the storm center. there were small strikes, but, fortunately, not much rioting. the extreme radicals were agitating for the release of the imprisoned leaders of the labor group and urging drastic action by the workers. much of this agitation was sincere and honest, but no little of it was due to the provocative agents. these, disguised as workmen, seized every opportunity to urge revolt. any pretext sufficed them; they stimulated the honest agitation to revolt as a protest against the imprisonment of the labor group, and the desperate threat that unless food was forthcoming revolution would be resorted to for sinister purposes. and all the time the police and the troops were massed to crush the first rising. the next few days were destined to reveal the fact that the cunning and guile of protopopov had overreached itself; that the soldiers could not be relied upon to crush any uprising of the people. there was some rioting in petrograd on march d, and the next day the city was placed under martial law. on march th the textile workers went out on strike and were quickly followed by several thousand workers belonging to other trades. next day there was a tremendous popular demonstration at which the workers demanded food. the strike spread during the next two or three days until there was a pretty general stoppage of industry. students from the university joined with the striking workmen and there were numerous demonstrations, but little disposition to violence. when the cossacks and mounted police were sent to break up the crowds, the cossacks took great care not to hurt the people, fraternizing with them and being cheered by them. it was evident that the army would not let itself be used to crush the uprising of the people. the police remained "loyal," but they were not adequate in numbers. protopopov had set in motion forces which no human agency could control. the revolution was well under way. the duma remained in constant session. meantime the situation in the capital was becoming serious in the extreme. looting of stores began, and there were many victims of the police efforts to disperse the crowds. in the midst of the crisis the duma repudiated the government and broke off all relations with it. the resolution of the duma declared that "the government which covered its hands with the blood of the people should no longer be admitted to the duma. with such a government the duma breaks all relations forever." the answer of czar nicholas was an order to dissolve the duma, which order the duma voted to ignore, remaining in session as before. on sunday, march th, there was a great outpouring of people at a demonstration. police established on the roofs of some public buildings attacked the closely packed throngs with machine-gun fire, killing and wounding hundreds. one of the famous regiments, the volynski, revolted, killed its commander, and joined the people when ordered to fire into the crowds. detachments of soldiers belonging to other regiments followed their example and refused to fire upon the people. one or two detachments of troops did obey orders and were immediately attacked by the revolutionary troops. there was civil war in petrograd. while the fighting was still going on, the president of the duma sent the following telegram to the czar: the situation is grave. anarchy reigns in the capital. the government is paralyzed. the transport of provisions and fuel is completely disorganized. general dissatisfaction is growing. irregular rifle-firing is occurring in the streets. it is necessary to charge immediately some person enjoying the confidence of the people to form a new government. it is impossible to linger. any delay means death. let us pray to god that the responsibility in this hour will not fall upon a crowned head. rodzianko. the duma waited in vain that night for an answer from the czar. the bourgeois elements in the duma were terrified. only the leaders of the different socialist groups appeared to possess any idea of providing the revolutionary movement with proper direction. while the leaders of the bourgeois groups were proclaiming their conviction that the revolution would be crushed in a few hours by the tens of thousands of troops in petrograd who had not yet rebelled, the socialist leaders were busy preparing plans to carry on the struggle. even those social democrats who for various reasons had most earnestly tried to avert the revolution gave themselves with whole-hearted enthusiasm to the task of organizing the revolutionary forces. following the example set in the revolution, there had been formed a central committee of the working-class organizations to direct the movement. this body, composed of elected representatives of the unions and socialist societies, was later known as the council of workmen's deputies. it was this body which undertook the organization of the revolution. this revolution, unlike that of , was initiated by the bourgeoisie, but its originators manifested little desire and less capacity to lead it. when monday morning came there was no longer an unorganized, planless mass confusedly opposing a carefully organized force, but a compact, well-organized, and skilfully led movement. processions were formed, each under responsible directors with very definite instructions. as on the previous day, the police stationed upon roofs of buildings, and at various strategic points, fired upon the people. as on the previous day, also, the soldiers joined the revolution and refused to shoot the people. the famous guards' regiment, long the pet and pride of the czar, was the first to rebel. the soldiers killed the officer who ordered them to fire, and then with cheers joined the rebels. when the military authorities sent out another regiment to suppress the rebel guards' regiment they saw the new force go over to the revolution in a body. other regiments deserted in the same manner. the flower of the russian army had joined the people in revolting against the czar and the system of czarism. on the side of the revolutionists were now many thousands of well-trained soldiers, fully armed. soon they took possession of the arsenal, after killing the commander. the soldiers made organized and systematic warfare upon the police. every policeman seen was shot down, police stations were set on fire, and prisons were broken open and the prisoners released. the numerous political prisoners were triumphantly liberated and took their places in the revolutionary ranks. in rapid succession the great bastiles fell! peter and paul fortress, scene of infinite martyrdom, fell into the hands of the revolutionary forces, and the prisoners, many of them heroes and martyrs of other uprisings, were set free amid frenzied cheering. the great schlüsselburg fortress was likewise seized and emptied. with twenty-five thousand armed troops on their side, the revolutionists were practically masters of the capital. they attacked the headquarters of the hated secret service and made a vast, significantly symbolical bonfire of its archives. once more rodzianko appealed to the czar. it is no reflection upon rodzianko's honesty, or upon his loyalty to the people, to say that he was appalled by the development of the struggle. he sympathized with the people in their demand for political democracy and would wage war to the end upon czarism, but he feared the effect of the revolution upon the army and the allied cause. moreover, he was a landowner, and he feared socialism. in he had joined forces with the government when the socialists led the masses--and now the socialist leaders were again at the head of the masses. perhaps the result would have been otherwise if the duma had followed up its repudiation of the government by openly and unreservedly placing itself at the head of the uprising. in any other country than russia that would have been done, in all probability, but the russian bourgeoisie was weak. this was due, like so much else in russia, to the backwardness of the industrial system. there was not a strong middle class and, therefore, the bourgeoisie left the fighting to the working class. rodzianko's new appeal to the czar was pathetic. when hundreds of dead and dying lay in the streets and in churches, hospitals, and other public buildings, he could still imagine that the czar could save the situation: "the situation is growing worse. it is necessary to take measures immediately, for to-morrow it will be too late," he telegraphed. "the last hour has struck to decide the fate of the country and of the dynasty." poor, short-sighted bourgeois! it was already "too late" for "measures" by the weak-minded nicholas ii to avail. the "fate of the country and of the dynasty" was already determined! it was just as well that the czar did not make any reply to the message. the new ruler of russia, king demos, was speaking now. workers and soldiers sent deputations to the taurida palace, where the duma was sitting. rodzianko read to them the message he had sent to the czar, but that was small comfort. thousands of revolutionists, civilian and military, stormed the taurida palace and clamored to hear what the socialists in the duma had to say. in response to this demand tchcheidze, kerensky, skobelev, and other socialists from various groups appeared and addressed the people. these men had a message to give; they understood the ferment and were part of it. they were of the revolution--bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh, and so they were cheered again and again. and what a triumvirate they made, these leaders of the people! tchcheidze, once a university professor, keen, cool, and as witty as george bernard shaw, listened to with the deference democracy always pays to intellect. kerensky, lawyer by profession, matchless as an orator, obviously the prophet and inspirer rather than the executive type; skobelev, blunt, direct, and practical, a man little given to romantic illusions. it was skobelev who made the announcement to the crowd outside the taurida palace that the old system was ended forever and that the duma would create a provisional committee. he begged the workers and the soldiers to keep order, to refrain from violence against individuals, and to observe strict discipline. "freedom demands discipline and order," he said. that afternoon the duma selected a temporary committee to restore order. the committee, called the duma committee of safety, consisted of twelve members, representing all the parties and groups in the duma. the hastily formed committee of the workers met and decided to call on the workmen to hold immediate elections for the council of workmen's deputies--the first meeting of which was to be held that evening. that this was a perilous thing to do the history of the first revolution clearly showed, but no other course seemed open to the workers, in view of the attitude of the bourgeoisie. on behalf of the duma committee, rodzianko issued the following proclamation: the provisional committee of the members of the imperial duma, aware of the grave conditions of internal disorder created by the measure of the old government, has found itself compelled to take into its hands the re-establishment of political and civil order. in full consciousness of the responsibility of its decision, the provisional committee expresses its trust that the population and the army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new government which will comply with the wishes of the population, and be able to enjoy its confidence. michail rodzianko, _speaker of the imperial duma_. february , .[ ] that night the first formal session of the council of workmen's deputies was held. tchcheidze was elected president, kerensky vice-president. the deputies had been elected by the working-men of many factories and by the members of socialist organizations. it was not until the following day that soldiers' representatives were added and the words "and soldiers" added to the title of the council. at this first meeting the council--a most moderate and capable body--called for a constituent assembly on the basis of equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage. this demand was contained in an address to the people which read, in part: to finish the struggle successfully in the interests of democracy, the people must create their own powerful organization. the council of the workmen's deputies, holding its session in the imperial duma, makes it its supreme task to organize the people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political freedom and popular government in russia. we appeal to the entire population of the capital to rally around the council, to form local committees in the various boroughs, and to take over the management of local affairs. all together, with united forces, we will struggle for a final abolition of the old system and the calling of a constituent assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. this document is of the highest historical importance and merits close study. as already noted, tchcheidze, leader of the mensheviki, was president of the council, and this appeal to the people shows how fully the moderate views of his group prevailed. indeed, the manner in which the moderate counsels of the mensheviki dominated the council at a time of great excitement and passion, when extremists might have been expected to obtain the lead, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole story of the second russian revolution. it appeared at this time that the russian proletariat had fully learned the tragic lessons of - . it is evident from the text of the appeal that at the time the council looked upon the revolution as being primarily a political event, not as a movement to reconstruct the economic and social system. there is no reference to social democracy. even the land question is not referred to. how limited their purpose was at the moment may be gathered from the statement, "the council ... makes it its supreme task to organize the people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political freedom and popular government." it is also clearly evident that, notwithstanding the fact that the council itself was a working-class organization, a manifestation of the class consciousness of the workers, the leaders of the council did not regard the revolution as a proletarian event, nor doubt the necessity of co-operation on the part of all classes. proletarian exclusiveness came later, but on march th the appeal of the council was "to the entire population." march th saw the arrest of many of the leading reactionaries, including protopopov and the traitor sukhomlinov, and an approach to order. all that day the representatives of the duma and the representatives of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, as it was now called, embryo of the first soviet government, tried to reach an agreement concerning the future organization of russia. the representatives of the duma were pitifully lacking in comprehension of the situation. they wanted the czar deposed, but the monarchy itself retained, subject to constitutional limitations analogous to those obtaining in england. they wanted the romanov dynasty retained, their choice being the czar's brother, grand-duke michael. the representatives of the soviet, on the other hand, would not tolerate the suggestion that the monarchy be continued. standing, as yet, only for political democracy, they insisted that the monarchy must be abolished and that the new government be republican in form. the statesmanship and political skill of these representatives of the workers were immeasurably superior to those possessed by the bourgeois representatives of the duma. v thursday, march , --new style--was one of the most fateful and momentous days in the history of mankind. it will always be remembered as the day on which czarism ceased to exist in russia. at three o'clock in the afternoon miliukov, leader of the constitutional democrats, appeared in front of the taurida palace and announced to the waiting throngs that an agreement had been reached between the duma and the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies; that it had been decided to depose the czar, to constitute immediately a provisional government composed of representatives of all parties and groups, and to proceed with arrangements for the holding of a constituent assembly at an early date to determine the form of a permanent democratic government for russia. at the head of the provisional government, as premier, had been placed prince george e. lvov, who as president of the union of zemstvos had proved himself to be a democrat of the most liberal school as well as an extraordinarily capable organizer. the position of minister of foreign affairs was given to miliukov, whose strong sympathy with the allies was well known. the position of minister of justice was given to alexander kerensky, one of the most extraordinary men in russia, a leader of the group of toil, a party of peasant socialists, vice-president of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies. at the head of the war department was placed alexander guchkov, a soldier-politician, leader of the octobrist party, who had turned against the first revolution in , when it became an economic war of the classes, evoking thereby the hatred of the socialists, but who as head of the war industries committee had achieved truly wonderful results in the present war in face of the opposition of the government. the pressing food problem was placed in the hands of andrei shingarev. as minister of agriculture shingarev belonged to the radical left wing of the cadets. it cannot be said that the composition of the provisional government was received with popular satisfaction. it was top-heavy with representatives of the bourgeoisie. there was only one socialist, kerensky. miliukov's selection, inevitable though it was, and great as his gifts were, was condemned by the radical working-men because he was regarded as a dangerous "imperialist" on account of his advocacy of the annexation of constantinople. guchkov's inclusion was equally unpopular on account of his record at the time of the first revolution. the most popular selection was undoubtedly kerensky, because he represented more nearly than any of the others the aspirations of the masses. as a whole, it was the fact that the provisional government was too fully representative of the bourgeois parties and groups which gave the bolsheviki and other radicals a chance to condemn it. the absence of the name of tchcheidze from the list was a surprise and a disappointment to most of the moderate socialists, for he had come to be regarded as one of the most capable and trustworthy leaders of the masses. the fact that he was not included in the new government could hardly fail to cause uneasy suspicion. it was said later that efforts had been made to induce him to join the new government, but that he declined to do so. tchcheidze's position was a very difficult one. thoroughly in sympathy with the plan to form a coalition provisional government, and supporting kerensky in his position, tchcheidze nevertheless declined to enter the new cabinet himself. in this he was quite honest and not at all the tricky politician he has been represented as being. tchcheidze knew that the duma had been elected upon a most undemocratic suffrage and that it did not and could not represent the masses of the peasants and wage-workers. these classes were represented in the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, which continued to exist as a separate body, independent of the duma, but co-operating with it as an equal. from a socialist point of view it would have been a mistake to disband the council, tchcheidze believed. he saw soviet government as the need of the critical moment, rather than as the permanent, distinctive type of russian social democracy as the critics of kerensky have alleged. while the provisional government was being created, the czar, at general headquarters, was being forced to recognize the bitter fact that the romanov dynasty could no longer live. when he could no more resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by the representatives of the duma, he wrote and signed a formal instrument of abdication of the russian throne, naming his brother, grand-duke michael, as his successor. the latter dared not attempt to assume the imperial rôle. he recognized that the end of autocracy had been reached and declined to accept the throne unless chosen by a popular referendum vote. on march th, the day after the abdication of nicholas ii, michael issued a statement in which he said: this heavy responsibility has come to me at the voluntary request of my brother, who has transferred the imperial throne to me during a time of warfare which is accompanied by unprecedented popular disturbances. moved by the thought, which is in the minds of the entire people, that the good of the country is paramount, i have adopted the firm resolution to accept the supreme power only if this be the will of our great people, who, by a plebiscite organized by their representatives in a constituent assembly, shall establish a form of government and new fundamental laws for the russian state. consequently, invoking the benediction of our lord, i urge all citizens of russia to submit to the provisional government, established upon the initiative of the duma and invested with full plenary powers, until such time which will follow with as little delay as possible, as the constituent assembly, on a basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall, by its decision as to the new form of government, express the will of the people. the hated romanov dynasty was ended at last. it is not likely that grand-duke michael entertained the faintest hope that he would ever be called to the throne, either by a constituent assembly or by a popular referendum. not only was the romanov dynasty ended, but equally so was monarchical absolutism itself. no other dynasty would replace that of the romanovs. russia had thrown off the yoke of autocracy. the second revolution was an accomplished fact; its first phase was complete. thoughtful men among the revolutionists recognized that the next phase would be far more perilous and difficult. "the bigger task is still before us," said miliukov, in his address to the crowd that afternoon. a constituent assembly was to be held and that was bound to intensify the differences which had been temporarily composed during the struggle to overthrow the system of absolutism. and the differences which existed between the capitalist class and the working class were not greater than those which existed within the latter. chapter v from bourgeoisie to bolsheviki i it required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of the provisional government established by the revolutionary coalition headed by prince lvov. from the very first day it was evident that the cabinet could never satisfy the russian people. it was an anomaly in that the revolution had been a popular revolution, while the provisional government was overwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers, and merchants--the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. the very meager representation given to the working class, through kerensky, was, in the circumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard of the most obvious realities. much has been said and written of the doctrinaire attitude which has characterized the bolsheviki in the later phases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience to preconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that the statesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as the bolsheviki later proved to be. they were subservient to dogma and indifferent to fact. the bourgeois leaders of russia--and those socialists who co-operated with them--attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the whole situation, namely, the fact that the revolution was essentially a socialist revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the people were bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhat crudely conceived, program of socialization. it was not a mere political revolution, and political changes which left the essential social structure unchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democratic opportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands of landowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail to invite their savage attack. only the most hopeless and futile of doctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. it was quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that russia must follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rule for a period more or less prolonged. true, that had been the experience of most nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must be the experience of russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike those which had obtained in any nation which had by revolution established constitutional government upon a democratic basis. to begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itself had been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. feudalism and monarchical autocracy fell in western europe before the might of a powerful rising class. that this class in every case drew to its side the masses and benefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the fact that in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisie was the most powerful. it was that fact which established its right to rule in place of the deposed rulers. the russian middle class, however, lacked that historic right to rule. in consequence of the backwardness of the nation from the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisie was correspondingly backward and weak. never in any country had a class so weak and uninfluential essayed the rôle of the ruling class. to believe that a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. of the population could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundred and eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years of revolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd. the industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as the bourgeoisie. except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, this class could not rule russia. its fitness and right to rule are not appreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. it cannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionary struggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the russian revolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of the peasant organizations. with more than one hundred and thirty-five millions of peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movement had drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor the class-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rule without angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it. every essential fact in the russian situation, which was so unique, pointed to the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligent leaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained, together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. in any event, the domination of the provisional government by a class so weak and so narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. as soon as time for reflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust were inevitable. ii from the first days there were ominous murmurings. yet it must be confessed that the provisional government manifested much greater enlightenment than might have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program--quite remarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come from a government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionary russia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundation of an enduring structure. on march th the provisional government issued a statement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. this document, which is said to have been the joint work of p.i. novgorodtzev, n.v. nekrasov, and p.n. miliukov, read as follows: citizens: the executive committee of the duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces of the old régime so that we can proceed to a more stable organization of the executive power, with men whose past political activity assures them the country's confidence. the new cabinet will base its policy upon the following principles: _first_.--an immediate and general amnesty for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and military and agrarian offenses. _second_.--liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by military requirements. _third_.--abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions. _fourth_.--to proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation of a constituent assembly, based on universal suffrage. this assembly will establish a stable universal régime. _fifth_.--the substitution of the police by a national militia, with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities. _sixth_.--communal elections to be based on universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. _seventh_.--the troops which participated in the revolutionary movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in petrograd. _eighth_.--while maintaining strict military discipline for troops in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other citizens. the provisional government desires to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of the measures of reform above mentioned. this address is worthy of especial attention. the generous liberalism of the program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalism only. it is not directly and definitely concerned with the great fundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life and well-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. it is the program of men who saw in the revolution only a great epochal political advance. in this it reflects its bourgeois origin. with the exception of the right to organize unions and strikes--which is a political measure--not one of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is met in the program. the land question, which was the economic basis of the revolution, and without which there could have been no revolution, was not even mentioned. and the manifesto which the provisional government addressed to the nation on march th was equally silent with regard to the land question and the socialization of industry. evidently the provisional government desired to confine itself as closely as possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economic reform to be attended to by the constituent assembly. if that were its purpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearly stated and not merely left to inference. but whatever the shortcomings of its first official statements, the actual program of the provisional government during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and afforded room for great hope. on march st the constitution of finland was restored. on the following day amnesty was granted to all political and religious offenders. within a few days freedom and self-government were granted to poland, subject to the ratification of the constituent assembly. at the same time all laws discriminating against the jews were repealed by the following decree: all existing legal restrictions upon the rights of russian citizens, based upon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. in accordance with this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in russia as a whole, as well as for separate localities, concerning: . selection of place of residence and change of residence. . acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving such for security. . engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions. . participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or by employment. . employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade apprentices. . entering the government service, civil as well as military, and the grade or condition of such service; participation in the elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution of the duties connected with such positions. . admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships. also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions. . performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors. . the use of language and dialects, other than russian, in the proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping. thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon the jewish people were swept away. had the provisional government done nothing else than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. but it accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month, in addition to its liberation of finns, poles, and jews, the provisional government abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincial governors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincial county councils; _confiscated the large land holdings of the imperial family and of the monasteries_; levied an excess war-profits tax on all war industries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than had prevailed before. the provisional government had gone farther, and, while declaring that these matters must be left to the constituent assembly for settlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of _the distribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions of expropriation and distribution to be determined by the constituent assembly_. the provisional government also established a war cabinet which introduced various reforms into the army. all the old oppressive regulations were repealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. some of these reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerous experiments. much criticism has been leveled against the rules providing for the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliation board to act in disputes between men and officers over questions of discipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiers to address officers by the title "sir." it must be borne in mind, however, in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honest effort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and to infuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on." it is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions which called them forth. certainly the provisional government--which the government of the united states formally recognized on march d, being followed in this by the other allied governments next day--could not be accused fairly of being either slothful or unfaithful. its accomplishments during those first weeks were most remarkable. nevertheless, as the days went by it became evident that it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it could not last very long. iii the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates was pursuing its independent existence, under the leadership of tchcheidze, skobelev, tseretelli, and other moderate social democrats. as yet the bolsheviki were a very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. there can be very little doubt that the council represented the feelings of the great mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than the provisional government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree, alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. a great psychological fact existed, a fact which the provisional government and the governments of the allied nations might well have reckoned with: the russian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressively class conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class. the majority of the social democratic party was, at the beginning, so far from anything like bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunistic in its policies, that its official organ, _pravda_--not yet captured by the bolsheviki--put forward a program which might easily have been made the basis for an effective coalition. it was in some respects disappointingly moderate: like the program of the provisional government, it left the land question untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding the confiscation of the property of the royal family and the church bore upon it. the social democratic party, reflecting the interests of the city proletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim for distribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between its leaders and the leaders of the socialist-revolutionary party, the party of the peasants. the program as printed in pravda read: . a biennial one-house parliament. . wide extension of the principle of self-government. . inviolability of person and dwelling. . unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly. . freedom of movement in business. . equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and nationality. . abolition of class distinction. . education in native language; native languages everywhere to have equal rights with official language. . every nationality in the state to have the right of self-definition. . the right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury. . election of magistrates. . a citizen army instead of ordinary troops. . separation of church from state and school from church. . free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of sixteen. . state feeding of poor children. . confiscation of church property, also that of the royal family. . progressive income tax. . an eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen. . prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women. . a clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on end. it would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embraced all that the majority of the social democratic party aimed at. it was not intended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption by the constituent assembly, for the convocation of which the social democrats were most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majority of socialists of different factions. in a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in the pre-bolshevist period, trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dual authority." in a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he described it as "the epoch of dual impotence, the government not able, and the soviet not daring," and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-of severity."[ ] there was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. on the one hand, there was the provisional government, to which the soviet had given its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions of government. on the other hand, there was the soviet itself, claiming the right to control the course of the provisional government and indulging in systematic criticism of the latter's actions. it was inevitable that the soviet should have been driven irresistibly to the point where it must either renounce its own existence or oppose the provisional government. the dominating spirit and thought of the soviet was that of international social democracy. while most of the delegates believed that it was necessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the central empires, they were still socialists, internationalists, fundamental democrats, and anti-imperialists. not without good and sufficient reason, they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the most influential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire for territorial expansion, especially the annexation of constantinople, and that they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the old régime with england, france, and italy. in the meetings of the soviet, and in other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war was not simply a war for national defense, for which there was democratic sanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that the provisional government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy. strength was given to this feeling when miliukov, the foreign minister, in an interview championed the annexation of constantinople as a necessary safeguard for the outlet to the mediterranean which russian economic development needed. immediately there was an outcry of protest from the soviet, in which, it should be observed, the bolsheviki were already gaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of kamenev, lenine's colleague, who had returned from siberian exile. it was not only the bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies. practically the whole body of socialists, mensheviki and bolsheviki alike, agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. socialists loyal to the national defense and socialists who repudiated that policy and deemed it treason to the cause of socialism were united in this one thing. the storm of protest which miliukov's interview provoked was stilled temporarily when the premier, lvov, announced that the foreign minister's views concerning the annexation of constantinople were purely personal and did not represent the policy of the provisional government. assurances were given that the provisional government was in accord with the policy of the soviet. on april th a national congress of the councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was a distinct menace to the provisional government. an earlier proclamation by the petrograd soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to "proletarians and working-people of all countries," but being in fact an appeal to the german working class to rise and refuse to fight against democratic and free russia.[ ] it declared that the peoples must take the matter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. the new declaration was addressed to the russian people: _first_.--the provisional government, which constituted itself during the revolution, in agreement with the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates of petrograd, published a proclamation announcing its program. this congress records that this program contains in principle political demands for russian democracy, and _recognizes that so far the provisional government has faithfully carried out its promises_. _second_.--this congress appeals to the whole revolutionary democracy of russia to rally to the support of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, which is the center of the organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the revolution. _third_.--the congress recognizes the necessity of permanent political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over the provisional government which will keep it up to a more energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its democratizing the whole russian life and paving the way for a common _peace without annexations or contributions_, but on a basis of free national development of all peoples. _fourth_.--the congress appeals to the democracy, while declining responsibility for any of its acts, to support the provisional government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the conquest of the revolution, _and as long as the basis of its foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial expansion_. _fifth_.--the congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of russia, rallying around the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, to be ready to _vigorously suppress any attempt by the government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the carrying out of its pledges_.[ ] on april th, acting under pressure from the soviet, the provisional government published a manifesto to the russian people in which it announced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the congress of councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates had adopted. on may st miliukov, the foreign minister, transmitted this manifesto to the allied governments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments to restate their war aims. accompanying the manifesto was a note of explanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the socialists as an intimation to the allies that the manifesto was intended merely for home consumption, and that the provisional government would be glad to have the allies disregard it. it is difficult for any one outside of russia, whose sympathies were with the entente allies, to gather such an impression from the text of the note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spread the belief that russia was about to make a separate peace with germany made it necessary for the provisional government to state its "entire agreement" with the aims of the allies as set forth by their statesmen, including president wilson, and to affirm that "the provisional government, in safeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strict regard for its agreement with the allies of russia." although it was explained that the note had been sent with the knowledge and approval of the provisional government, the storm of fury it produced was directed against miliukov and, in less degree, guchkov. tremendous demonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. in the soviet a vigorous demand for the overthrow of the provisional government was made by the steadily growing bolshevik faction and by many anti-bolsheviki socialists. to avert the disaster of a vote of the soviet against it, the provisional government made the following explanation of the so-called miliukov note: the note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the provisional government, and was unanimously approved. this note, in speaking of a "decisive victory," had in view a solution of the problems mentioned in the communication of april th, and which was thus specified: "the government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that free russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. "the russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. its aim is not to subjugate or humiliate any one. in the name of the higher principles of equity, the russian people have broken the chains which fettered the polish nation, but it will not suffer that its own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or weakened in its vital forces. "in referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a durable peace, the provisional government had in view the reduction of armaments, the establishment of international tribunals, etc. "this explanation will be communicated by the minister of foreign affairs to the ambassadors of the allied powers." this assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the soviet meeting held on the evening of may th, and a resolution of confidence in the provisional government was carried, after a very stormy debate. the majority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote of about twenty-five hundred. it was clearly evident that the political government and the soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume the functions of government, were nearing a serious breach. with each day the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, as the organized expression of the great mass of wage-workers in petrograd, grew in power over the provisional government and its influence throughout the whole of russia. on may th guchkov resigned, and three days later miliukov followed his example. the party of the constitutional democrats had come to be identified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialism and secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. the crisis developed an intensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. iv the crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the provisional government. indeed, that was a minor cause. behind all the discussions and disputes over miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the foreign office there was the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the bolsheviki. under the leadership of kamenev, lenine, and others less well known, who skillfully exploited the friction with the provisional government, the idea of overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates would rule russia in the interests of the working class made steady if not rapid progress. late in april lenine and several other active bolshevik leaders returned to petrograd from switzerland, together with martov and other menshevik leaders, who, while differing from the bolsheviki upon practically all other matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromising opposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace.[ ] as is well known, they were granted special facilities by the german government in order that they might reach russia safely. certain swiss socialist leaders, regarded as strongly pro-german, arranged with the german government that the russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across germany by rail, in closed carriages. unusual courtesies were extended to the travelers by the german authorities, and it was quite natural that lenine and his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with, if not the paid agents and tools of, the german government. the manner in which their actions, when they arrived in russia, served the ends sought by the german military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion so that it became a strong conviction. suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simple explanation of the conduct of lenine and his companions. it is not at all necessary to conclude that they were german agents. let us look at the facts with full candor: lenine had long openly advocated the view that the defeat of russia, even by germany, would be good for the russian revolutionary movement. but that was in the days before the overthrow of the czar. since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; he had opposed the continuation of the war and urged the russian workers to withhold support from it. he had influenced the soviets to demand a restatement of war aims by the allies, and to incessantly agitate for immediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. of course, the preaching of such a policy in russia at that time by a leader so powerful and influential as lenine, bound as it was to divide russia and sow dissension among the allies, fitted admirably into the german plans. that germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service so valuable can hardly be doubted. on his side, lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed to understand that the german government had its own selfish interests in view when it arranged for his passage across germany. but the fact that the allies would suffer, and that the central empires would gain some advantage, was of no consequence to him. that was an unavoidable accident and was purely incidental. his own purpose, to lead the revolutionary movement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanatical thoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. if the conditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached russia by the co-operation of the allies, whose cause would be served, however unintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. on the other hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would lead to the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those of germany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. germany might reason that a revolutionary uprising led by lenine would rid her of one of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe on the western front. at that reasoning lenine would smile in derision, thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in russia would sweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of austro-german capitalist-imperialism. lenine knew that he was being used by germany, but he believed that he, in turn, was using germany. he was supremely confident that he could outplay the german statesmen and military leaders. it was a dangerous game that lenine was playing, and he knew it, but the stakes were high and worth the great risk involved. it was not necessary for germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service would be an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. he argued that his work could, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to germany. so far as there is any evidence to show, lenine has been personally incorruptible. holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality," unmoral rather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends which he sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspired mankind, he would, doubtless, take german money if he saw that it would help him to achieve his purposes. he would do so, however, without any thought of self-aggrandizement. it is probably safe and just to believe that if lenine ever took money from the germans, either at that time or subsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result of his efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governments concerned in the war. it must be remembered, moreover, that the distinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governments like those which ruled germany and austria and the more democratic governments of france, england, and america, have very little meaning or value to men like lenine. they regard the political form as relatively unimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interest represented by the governments. capitalist governments are all equally undesirable. what lenine's program was when he left switzerland is easily learned. a few days before he left switzerland he delivered a lecture on "the russian revolution," in which he made a careful statement of his position. it gives a very good idea of lenine's mental processes. it shows him as a marxist of the most dogmatic type--the type which caused marx himself to rejoice that he was not a "marxist": as to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of the power of the state and militarism: from the praxis of the french commune of , marx shows that "the working class cannot simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes." the proletariat must break down this machinery. and this has been either concealed or denied by the opportunists.[ ] but it is the most valuable lesson of the paris commune of and the revolution in russia in . the difference between us and the anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the development of our revolution. the difference with the opportunists and the kautsky[ ] disciples is that we claim that we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the "democratic" bourgeois republics, but _the direct power of armed and organized workers_. such was the character of the commune of and of the council of workmen and soldiers of and . on this basis we build.[ ] lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a new phase of the revolution; to carry the revolt against czarism onward against the bourgeoisie. notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared at that time that his policy included the establishment of a "democratic republic," confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor of the peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. but the latter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "peace negotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments, but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries." in his criticism of kerensky and tchcheidze the bolshevik leader was especially scornful and bitter. in a letter which he addressed to the socialists of switzerland immediately after his departure for russia, lenine gave a careful statement of his own position and that of his friends. it shows an opportunistic attitude of mind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderate socialists _in direction only_, not in the _quality of being opportunistic_: historic conditions have made the russians, _perhaps for a short period_, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, _but socialism cannot now prevail in russia_. we can expect only an agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and _may result in measures for the control of production and distribution_. the main results of the present revolution will have to be _the creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary development_, and to influence the more highly developed european countries into action.[ ] the bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following: ( ) the soviets of workers, soldiers, and peasants to constitute themselves into the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat; ( ) immediate confiscation of landed estates without compensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, without waiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize into soviets; ( ) measures for the control of production and distribution by the revolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of the national debt; ( ) the workers to take possession of factories and operate them in co-operation with the technical staffs; ( ) refusal by the soviets to recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the czar or the bourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; ( ) the workers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiations of peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with the bourgeoisie; ( ) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by the capitalists. according to litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly authority, as soon as lenine arrived in russia he submitted a new program to his party which was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted socialist principles, that "lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refused to accept it."[ ] this program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding the constituent assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amount to the abandonment of the accepted plans. _he proposed that universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only the industrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry be permitted to vote at all!_ against the traditional socialist view that class distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by the victorious proletariat, lenine proposed to make the class division more rigid and enduring. he proposed to give the sole control of russia into the hands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of one hundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred and thirty-five millions of whom were peasants! of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these and the universally accepted socialist principle of democratic government. lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeois conception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, a declaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic." russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democratic republic is a bourgeois republic. again and again, during the time we are discussing and later, lenine assailed the principle of democratic government. "since march, , the word 'democracy' is simply a shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation," he declared in an article written after the bolsheviki had overthrown kerensky.[ ] when democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. from the first days after his return to russia lenine advocated, instead of a parliamentary republic similar to that of france or the united states, what he called a soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: local government would be carried on by local soviets composed of delegates elected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry," to use a common bolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist upon classifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class. what lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what litvinov means[ ] is that the industrial wage-workers--to whom is applied the term "working class"--must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers, though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as more prosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers. these local soviets functioning in local government would, in lenine's soviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the soviets in the country, and that central committee would be the state. except in details of organization, this is not materially different from the fundamental idea of the i.w.w. with which we are familiar.[ ] according to the latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federated through a central council, will take the place of parliamentary government elected on territorial lines. according to the bolshevik plan, soviets would take the place held by the unions in the plan of the i.w.w. it is not to be wondered at that, in the words of litvinov, lenine's own closest friends shrank from his scheme and lenine "was compelled to drop it for a time." v bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of leon trotzky, who arrived in petrograd on may th. trotzky was born in moscow about forty-five years ago. like lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, his father being a wealthy moscow merchant. he is a jew and his real name is bronstein. to live under an assumed name has always been a common practice among russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. certainly all who knew anything at all of the personnel of the russian revolutionary movement during the past twenty years knew that trotzky was bronstein, and that he was a jew. the idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of the american press, that there must be something discreditable or mysterious connected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can only be explained by monumental ignorance of russian revolutionary history. trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of russia for twenty years. as early as his activities as a socialist propagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitary confinement. in he was exiled to eastern siberia, whence he managed to escape. during the next three years he lived abroad, except for brief intervals spent in russia, devoting himself to socialist journalism. his first pamphlet, published in geneva in , was an attempt to reconcile the two factions in the social democratic party, the bolsheviki and the mensheviki. he was an orthodox marxist of the most extreme doctrinaire type, and naturally inclined to the bolshevik view. yet he never joined the bolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastly and earnestly striving to unite them. when the revolution of broke out trotzky had already attained considerable influence among the socialists. he was regarded as one of the ablest of the younger marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupy the place of plechanov. he became one of the most influential leaders of the st. petersburg soviet, and was elected its president. in that capacity he labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, as organizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warring individuals and groups. when the end came he was arrested and thrown into prison, where he remained for twelve months. after that he was tried and sentenced to life-exile in northern siberia. from this he managed to escape, however, and from until the outbreak of the war in he lived in vienna. the first two years of the war he lived in france, doing editorial work for a radical russian socialist daily paper, the _nashe slovo_. his writing, together with his activity in the zimmerwald movement of anti-war socialists, caused his expulsion from france. the swiss government having refused to permit him to enter switzerland, he sought refuge in spain, where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. released through the intervention of spanish socialists, he set sail with his family for new york, where he arrived early in january, . soon after the news of the russian revolution thrilled the world trotzky, like many other russian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on march th on a norwegian steamer. at halifax he and his family, together with a number of other russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship and interned in a camp for war prisoners, trotzky resisting violently and having to be carried off the ship. the british authorities kept them interned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of the foreign minister of the russian provisional government, miliukov. such, in brief outline, is the history of the man trotzky. it is a typical russian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedingly able fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. lenine, in one of his many disputes with trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himself with revolutionary phrases,"[ ] and the description is very apt. he possesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary jewish socialists of russia. to a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament and an exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which finds its highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, and which accepts, phrases as though they were realities. understanding of trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding the development of his thought in the first revolution, - . he began as an extremely orthodox marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish a socialist order in russia until a more or less protracted intensive economic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, made change inevitable, must fail. he accepted the view that a powerful capitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historical rôle, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn by the proletariat. that was the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. to it he clung with all the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "utopians" and "dreamers" the peasant socialists who refused to accept the marxian theory of socialism as the product of historic necessity as applicable to russia. the great upheaval of changed his viewpoint. the manner in which revolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in trotzky, as in many others, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. in an essay written soon after the outbreak of the revolution he wrote: "the revolution has come. _one move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships and fatigue_." the idea that the revolution had "lifted the people over scores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of the manner in which socialism was to come. still calling himself a marxist, and believing as strongly as ever in the fundamental marxian doctrines, as he understood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiar aptitude for talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of marxism. he declared his belief that in russia it was possible to change from absolutism to socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolonged period of capitalist development. at the same time, he maintained a scornful attitude toward the "utopianism" of the peasant socialists, who had always made the same contention, because he believed they based their hopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of socialism. he had small patience for their agrarian socialism with its economic basis in peasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation. he argued that the russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with the ills of the bureaucratic system that it was itself decadent; not virile and progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. since it was thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling any revolutionary historical rôle, that became the _immediate_ task of the proletariat. here was an example of the manner in which lifting over revolutionary steps was accomplished. of course, the peasantry was in a backward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarian rôle. nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and an irresistible hunger for land. without this class supporting it, or, at least, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seize and hold the power of government. it would be possible to solve the difficulty here presented, trotzky contended, if the enactment of the peasant program were permitted during the revolution and accepted by the proletariat as a _fait accompli_. this would satisfy the peasants and make them content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. once firmly established in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to gradually apply the true socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convert the peasants. "once in power, the proletariat will appear before the peasantry as its liberator," he wrote. his imagination fired by the manner in which the soviet of which he was president held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising, and the representative character it developed, trotzky conceived the idea that it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship. parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain a dictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie or proletariat. in the soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience in abnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected to the test of maintaining the economic life of the nation, trotzky saw the ideal proletarian government. he once described the soviet as "a true, unadulterated democracy," but, unless we are to dismiss the description as idle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was used in an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological and historical meaning. democracy has always meant absence of class rule; proletarian dictatorship is class rule. in the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views which trotzky held during and immediately after the first revolution, it is easy to see the genesis of the policies of the bolshevik government which came twelve years later. the intervening years served only to deepen his convictions. at the center of all his thinking during that period was his belief in the sufficiency of the soviet, and in the need of proletarian dictatorship. throwing aside the first cautious thought that these things arose from the peculiar conditions existing in russia as a result of her retarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable to all nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still living in barbarism or savagery. vi after the crisis which resulted in the resignation of miliukov and guchkov, it was evident that the lvov government could not long endure. the situation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that the complete reorganization of the provisional government, upon much more radical lines, was imperative. the question arose among the revolutionary working-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operation with the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition cabinet or whether they should refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. this, of course, opened the entire controversy between bolsheviki and mensheviki. in the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. the army was demoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the porazhentsi. to deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arranged for, as follows: the convention of soldiers' delegates from the front, which opened on may th and lasted for about a week, and the first all-russian congress of peasants' delegates, which opened on may th and lasted for about twelve days. between the two gatherings there was also an important meeting of the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. the dates here are of the greatest significance: the first convention was opened three days before miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred; the second convention was opened four days after the resignation of miliukov and one day after that of guchkov. it was guchkov's unique experience to address the convention of soldiers' delegates from the front as minister of war and marine, explaining and defending his policy with great ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as a private citizen. guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the military situation. with truly amazing candor he described conditions and explained how they had been brought about. he begged the soldiers not to lay down their arms, but to fight with new courage. kerensky followed with a long speech, noble and full of pathos. in some respects, it was the most powerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, who were staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar freedom. he did not lack courage to speak plainly: "my heart and soul are uneasy. i am greatly worried and i must say so openly, no matter what ... the consequences will be. the process of resurrecting the country's creative forces for the purpose of establishing the new régime rests on the basis of liberty and personal responsibility.... a century of slavery has not only demoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band of traitors, _but it has also destroyed in the people themselves the consciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country's destiny_." it was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "i regret that i did not die two months ago. i would have died happy with the dream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in russia, hopeful of a time when we could respect one another's right without resorting to the knout." to the soldiers kerensky brought this challenge: "you fired on the people when the government demanded. but now, when it comes to obeying your own revolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! does this mean that free russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" he closed with an eloquent peroration: "i came here because i believe in my right to tell the truth as i understand it. people who even under the old régime went about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, i say, will not be terrorized. the fate of our country is in our hands and the country is in great danger. we have sipped of the cup of liberty and we are somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobriety and discipline. we must go down in history meriting the epitaph on our tombstones, 'they died, but they were never slaves.'" from the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies came i.g. tseretelli, who had just returned from ten years' siberian exile. a native of georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spent either in socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. a man of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadership of the socialist group in the second duma had marked him as one of the truly great men of russia. to the convention of soldiers' delegates from the front tseretelli brought the decisions of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part with tchcheidze, skobelev, and others. the council had decided "to send an appeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that _in order to bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the revolution and russia by defending the front_." this action had been taken despite the opposition of the bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate socialists were still in control of the soviet. an appeal to the army, drawn up by tseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the bolsheviki, who refrained from voting. this appeal to the army tseretelli presented to the soldiers' delegates from the front: comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the revolutionary democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you. a hard task has fallen to your lot. you have paid a dear price, you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes of the czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms, without ammunition, without bread! why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the czar and his coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to ruin. and the revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and executioners. the working class did not need the war. the workers did not begin it. it was started by the czars and capitalists of all countries. each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary suffering and misfortune. having dethroned the czar, the russian people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war in the quickest possible manner. the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies has appealed to all nations to end the butchery. we have appealed to the french and the english, to the germans and the austrians.[ ] russia wants an answer to this appeal. remember, however, comrades and soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of wilhelm overpower revolutionary russia before our brothers, the workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond. our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph of wilhelm hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of russian freedom. the ruin of free russia will be a tremendous, irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of the whole world. comrades, soldiers, defend revolutionary russia with all your might! the workers and peasants of russia desire peace with all their soul. but this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations based on the agreement of all. what would happen if we should agree to a separate peace--a peace for ourselves alone! what would happen if the russian soldiers were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference to them what happens to the whole world! here is what would happen. having destroyed our allies in the west, german imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force of its arms. germany's imperialists, her landowners and capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay tribute to her. was it to bow down at the feet of wilhelm that we overthrew nicholas? comrades--soldiers! the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies leads you to peace by another route. we lead you to peace by calling upon the workers and peasants of serbia and austria to rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international conference of socialists for a universal and determined revolt against war. there is a great necessity, comrades--soldiers, for the peoples of the world to awaken. time is needed in order that they should rebel and with an iron hand force their czars and capitalists to peace. time is needed so that the toilers of all lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and robbers. _but remember, comrades--soldiers, this time will never come if you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your ranks are crushed and under the feet of wilhelm falls the breathless corpse of the russian revolution_. remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are now standing in defense of russia's freedom. you defend the revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants. let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great sacrifices already made by you. _it is impossible to defend the front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the trenches under any circumstances_.[ ] at times only an attack can repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. at times awaiting an attack means patiently waiting for death. again, only the change to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of the front, from destruction. remember this, comrades--soldiers! having sworn to defend russian freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military situation may require. the freedom and happiness of russia are in your hands. in defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and trickery. the fraternization which is developing on the front can easily turn into such a trap. revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? with an army also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and freedom. at present, however, not only in the german army, but even in the austro-hungarian army, in spite of the number of individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no revolution. in those countries the armies are still blindly following wilhelm and charles, the landowners and capitalists, and agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence. there the general staff will make use not only of your credulity, but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. you go out to fraternize with open hearts. and to meet you an officer of the general staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common soldier. you speak with the enemy without any trickery. at that very time he photographs the surrounding territory. you stop the shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred. comrades--soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not by separate agreements made at the front by single companies, battalions, or regiments. not in separate peace or in a separate truce lies the salvation of the russian revolution, the triumph of peace for the whole world. the people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace lead you to destruction. do not believe them. the road to peace is a different one. it has been pointed out to you already by the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies: tread it. sweep aside everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the army disorganization and loss of spirit. your fighting power serves the cause of peace. the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies is able to continue its revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow the military destruction of russia. comrades--soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of russia, but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope. soldiers of the revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith, for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace. in the name of the happiness and freedom of revolutionary russia, in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil your military duties with unconquerable strength. again and again tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read this appeal to the army. he was cheered, too, when he explained that the soviet had decided to support the reconstructed provisional government and called upon the soldiers to do likewise. there was a storm of applause when he said: "we well realize the necessity of having a strong power in russia; however, the strength of this power must rely upon its progressive and revolutionary policy. our government must adopt the revolutionary slogans of democracy. it must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. it must turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. it must safeguard the interests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation for the protection of labor. it must lead russia to a speedy and lasting peace worthy of a great people." when plechanov was introduced to the convention as "the veteran of the russian revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever been accorded. the great socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forceful attack upon the theories of the bolsheviki. he was frequently interrupted by angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered with rapier-like sentences. he was asked what a "democratic" government should be, and replied: "i am asked, 'what should a democratic government be? my answer is: it should be a government enjoying the people's full confidence and sufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. under what condition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established? in my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, _that the government be composed of representatives of all those parts of the population that are not interested in the restoration of the old order. what is called a coalition ministry is necessary_. our comrades, the socialists, acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should set forth definite conditions, definite demands. _but there should be no demands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes, to the spokesmen of other parts of the population_." "would you have us russian proletarians fight in this war for england's colonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at plechanov, and greeted by the jubilant applause of the bolsheviki. plechanov replied with great spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "the answer is clear to every one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations," he said. "the colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and their populations should also be given the right to determine freely their own destinies. it is clear that russia cannot fight for the sake of any one's predatory aspirations. _but i am surprised that the question of annexations is raised in russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the prussian heel!_ i do not understand this exclusive solicitude for germany's interests." to those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading the idea that the german working class would refuse to fight against the russian revolutionists, the great socialist teacher, possessing one of the ripest minds in the whole international socialist movement, and an intimate knowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and recited a significant page of socialist history: "in the fall of , when wilhelm was planning to move his troops on the then revolutionary russia, i asked my comrades, the german social democrats, 'what will you do in case wilhelm declares war on russia?' at the party convention in mannheim, bebel gave me an answer to this question. bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a general strike in the event of war being declared on russia. but this resolution was not adopted; _members of the trade-unions voted against it_. this is a fact which you should not forget. bebel had to beat a retreat and introduce another resolution. kautsky and rosa luxemburg were dissatisfied with bebel's conduct. i asked kautsky whether there is a way to bring about a general strike against the workers' will. as there is no such way, there was nothing else that bebel could do. _and if wilhelm had sent his hordes to russia in , the german workers would not have done an earthly thing to prevent the butchery_. in september, , the situation was still worse." the opposition to plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was an evidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readiness to make peace at any price almost--a general peace preferably, but, if not, then a separate peace--had permeated even the most intelligent part of the russian army. bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influential in the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories. yet the majority was with kerensky, tseretelli, and plechanov, as the following resolutions adopted by the convention prove: the first convention of the delegates from the front, having heard reports on current problems from the representatives of the provisional government, members of the executive committee of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, and from representatives of the socialist parties, and having considered the situation, hereby resolves: ( ) that the disorganization of the food-supply system and the weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a degree that the freedom won by the revolution is seriously endangered. ( ) that the sole salvation lies in establishing a government enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the population. the convention extends to the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new order in russia, in the interests of the russian democracy and at the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the above council transformed into an all-russian council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. _the convention is of the opinion that the war is at present conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of the masses_, and it, therefore, urges the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates to take the most energetic and effective measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. not a drop of russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us. considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the organized revolutionary democracy, that is, by the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, responsible for its acts to the whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates to take part in the new provisional government. the convention demands that the representatives of the church give up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the possession of churches and monasteries. the convention makes an urgent appeal to all parts of the population. . to the comrade-soldiers in the rear: comrades! come to fill up our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder with us for the country's defense! . comrade-workers! work energetically and unite your efforts, and in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for nations! by strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom! . fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! follow the historic example of minin! even as he, open your treasuries and quickly bring your money to the aid of russia! . to the peasants: fathers and brothers! bring your last mite to help the weakening front! give us bread, and oats and hay to our horses. remember that the future russia will be yours! . comrades-intellectuals! come to us and bring the light of knowledge into our dark trenches! share with us the difficult work of advancing russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship of new russia! . to the russian women: support your husbands and sons in the performing of their civil duty to the country! replace them where this is not beyond your strength! let your scorn drive away all those who are slackers in these difficult times! no one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty and sincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression. the fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, their spokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. pardonably weary of a war in which they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any other army in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments which had made covenants with the hated romanov dynasty, they were still far from being ready to follow the leadership of bolsheviki. they had, instead, adopted the sanely constructive policy of tchcheidze, tseretelli, skobelev, plechanov, and other socialists who from the first had seen the great struggle in its true perspective. that they did not succeed in averting disaster is due in part to the fact that the revolution itself had come too late to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of the governments allied with russia to render intelligent aid. vii the provisional government was reorganized. before we consider the actions of the all-russian congress of peasants' delegates, one of the most important gatherings of representatives of russian workers ever held, the reorganization of the provisional government merits attention. on the th, at a special sitting of the duma, guchkov and miliukov explained why they had resigned. guchkov made it a matter of conscience. anarchy had entered into the administration of the army and navy, he said: "in the way of reforms the new government has gone very far. not even in the most democratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, and equality been so extensively applied in military life. we have gone somewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives us farther still.... i could not consent to this dangerous work; i could not sign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapid deterioration of our military forces. a country, and especially an army, cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences." miliukov told his colleagues of the duma that he had not resigned of his own free will, but under pressure: "i had to resign, yielding not to force, but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. with a clear conscience i can say that i did not leave on my own account, but was compelled to leave." nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he had pursued was the correct one. "you could see for yourselves that my activity in foreign politics was in accord with your ideas," he declared amid applause which eloquently testified to the approval with which the bourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariat condemned. he pointed out that the pacifist policies of zimmerwald and keinthal had permeated a large part of the socialist movement, and that the soviet, the councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, claiming to exercise control over the provisional government, were divided. he feared that the proposal to establish a coalition government would not lead to success, because of "discord in the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates itself." not all the members of the latter body were agreed upon entering into a coalition government, and "it is evident that those who do not enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered, and it is possible that the socialists who enter the cabinet will find themselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the government did before." still, because it meant the creation of a stronger government at once, which was the most vital need, he, like guchkov, favored a coalition which would ally the constitutional democratic party with the majority of the socialists. the soviet had decided at its meeting on may th to participate in a coalition ministry. the struggle upon that question between bolsheviki and mensheviki was long and bitter. the vote, which was forty-one in favor of participation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the full strength of bolshevism in its stronghold. after various conferences between premier lvov and the other ministers, on the one side, and representatives of the soviet, on the other side, a new provisional government was announced, with prince lvov again prime minister. in the new cabinet there were seven constitutional democrats, six socialists, and two octobrists. as minister of war and head of the army and navy alexander kerensky took the place of guchkov, while p.n. pereverzev, a clever member of the socialist-revolutionary party, succeeded kerensky as minister of justice. in miliukov's position at the head of the ministry of foreign affairs was placed m.i. terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of the constitutional-democratic party, who had held the post of minister of finance, which was now given to a.i. shingariev, a brilliant member of the same party, who had proved his worth and capacity as minister of agriculture. to the latter post was appointed v.m. chernov, the leader of the socialist-revolutionists, one of the most capable socialists in russia, or, for that matter, the world. other socialists of distinction in the new provisional government were i.g. tseretelli, as minister of posts and telegraphs, and m.i. skobelev, as minister of labor. as minister of supply an independent socialist, a.v. peshekhonov, was chosen. it was a remarkable cabinet. so far as the socialists were concerned, it would have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. as in the formation of the first provisional government, attempts had been made to induce tchcheidze to accept a position in the cabinet, but without success. he could not be induced to enter a coalition ministry, though he strongly and even enthusiastically supported in the soviet the motion to participate in such a ministry. apart from the regret caused by tchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the socialists had sent into the second provisional government their strongest and most capable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen and who would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. on the side of the constitutional democrats and the octobrists, too, there were men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberal minds. the selection of terestchenko as minister of foreign affairs was by many socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, the coalition ministry met with warm approbation. if any coalition of the sort could succeed, the cabinet headed by prince lvov might be expected to do so. on the th, the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates adopted a resolution, introduced by tchcheidze, president of the council, warmly approving the entrance of the socialist ministers into the cabinet and accepting the declaration of the new provisional government as satisfactory. this resolution was bitterly opposed by the bolsheviki, who were led in the fight by trotzky. this was trotzky's first speech in petrograd since his arrival the previous day from america. his speech was a demagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements. participation in the coalition ministry by the socialists was a dangerous policy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of class struggle. elaborating his views further, he said: "i never believed that the emancipation of the working class will come from above. division of power will not cease with the entrance of the socialists into the ministry. a strong revolutionary power is necessary. the russian revolution will not perish. but i believe only in a miracle from below. there are three commandments for the proletariat. they are: first, transmission of power to the revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; and third, confidence in their own revolutionary powers." this was the beginning of trotzky's warfare upon the coalition government, a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might. tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the bolshevik leader's criticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of the executive committee presented by tchcheidze was carried by a large majority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. the resolution read as follows: acknowledging that the declaration of the provisional government, which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of representatives of the revolutionary democracy, conforms to the idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the revolution and its further development, the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates has determined: i. representatives of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates must enter into the provisional government. ii. those representatives of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates who join the government must, until the creation of an all-russian organ of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, consider themselves responsible to the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, and must pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that council. iii. the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates expresses its full confidence in the new provisional government, and urges all friends of democracy to give this government active assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power necessary for the safety of the revolution's gains and for its further development. if there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning the state of working-class opinion in russia at that time, two months after the overthrow of the old régime, it is that the overwhelming majority of the working-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of the mensheviki and the socialist-revolutionists--the policy of co-operating with liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stable government--as against the policy of the bolsheviki. the two votes of the petrograd soviet told where the city workers stood. that very section of the proletariat upon which the bolsheviki leaders based their hopes had repudiated them in the most emphatic manner. the delegates of the soldiers at the front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leaders of the bolsheviki. and at the first opportunity which presented itself the peasants placed themselves in definite opposition to bolshevism. on the afternoon preceding the action of the soviet in giving its indorsement to the new provisional government and instructing its representatives to enter the coalition cabinet, there assembled in the people's house, petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to the first all-russian congress of peasants. never before had so many peasant delegates been gathered together in russia to consider their special problems. there were present delegates from every part of russia, even from the extreme border provinces, and many from the front. on the platform were the members of the organizing committee, the executive committee of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, the socialist-revolutionary party, the social democratic party, and a number of prominent socialist leaders. as might be expected in a peasants' congress, members of the socialist-revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering . the next largest group was the social democratic party, including bolsheviki and mensheviki, numbering . there were delegates described as non-partizan; belonged to the group called the "people's socialists" and to the labor group. it was the most representative body of peasant workers ever brought together. among the first speakers to address the congress was the venerable "grandmother" of the russian revolution, catherine breshkovskaya, who spoke with the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "tell me," she demanded, "is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and in allowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to die from fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? if our army had a real desire to help the allies, the war would be finished in one or two months, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_." v.m. chernov, leader of the socialist-revolutionary party, the new minister of agriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skill and courage the arguments of the bolsheviki, making a superb defense of the policy of participation in the government. kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as minister of war and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, for self-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new provisional government. he did not mince matters: "i intend to establish an iron discipline in the army. i am certain that i shall succeed in my undertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward the country, the duty of honor.... by all means, we must see that the country becomes free and strong enough to elect the constituent assembly, the assembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to the toiling russian peasants that for which they have been yearning for centuries, the land.... we are afraid of no demagogues, whether they come from the right or from the left. we shall attend to our business, quietly and firmly." kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that there should be "no repetition of the sad events of - , when the entire country seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it became involved in anarchy." the speech created a profound impression and it was voted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of the congress, and have them distributed throughout the army. a similar honor was accorded the speech of i.i. bunakov, one of the best known and most popular of the leaders of the socialist-revolutionary party. with remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the bolsheviki and the porazhentsi. taking the cry that there must be "no annexations," for example, he declared that the peasants of russia could only accept that in the sense that poland be reunited and her independence be restored; that the people of alsace and lorraine be permitted to be reunited to france; that armenia be taken from turkey and made independent. the peasants could not accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. he assailed the treacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "but such peace is unacceptable to us peasants. a separate peace would kill not only our revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. a separate peace is dishonor for russia and treason toward the allies.... we must start an offensive. to remain in the trenches without moving is a separate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. a separate truce demoralizes the army and ruins the people. this spring, according to our agreement with the allies, we should have begun a general offensive, but instead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _the allies saved the russian revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... when our minister of war, kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the russian army must support him with all its strength, with all the means available.... from here we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage an offensive. let the army know that it must fight and die for russia's freedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming socialist commonwealth." in the resolutions which were adopted the congress confined itself to outlining a program for the constituent assembly, urging the abolition of private property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineral resources. it urged the provisional government to "issue an absolutely clear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question the provisional government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will." it also issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earning population of russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for the constituent assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves to advocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement on principles of equality." in the election for an executive committee to carry on the work of the congress and maintain the organization the delegates with bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under." those who were elected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of the policy of participation in and responsibility for the provisional government, and known to be ardent believers in the constituent assembly. chernov, with votes, led the poll; breshkovskaya came next with ; kerensky came third with ; avksentiev had ; bunakov ; vera finger , and so on. nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerable nicholas tchaykovsky, well known in america. once more a great representative body of russian working-people had spoken and rejected the teachings and the advice of the bolsheviki. viii as we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelming majority of the organized workers that the socialists entered the coalition ministry. it was with that mandate that kerensky undertook the herculean task of restoring the discipline and morale of the russian army. in that work he was the agent and representative of the organized working class. for this reason, if for no other, kerensky and his associates were entitled to expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty to the working class. instead of giving that support, however, the bolsheviki devoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the provisional government to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, had been approved by the great mass of the organized workers. they availed themselves of every means in their power to hamper kerensky in his work and to hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation to sustain the military forces. kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensive against the austro-german forces. that such offensive was needed was obvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and the bolsheviki. the congress of soldiers' delegates from the front and the petrograd soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, as had most of the well-known peasants' leaders. it was a working-class policy. but that fact did not prevent the bolsheviki from throwing obstacles in the way of its fulfilment. they carried on an active propaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination, fraternization, and refusal to fight. they encouraged sabotage as a means of insuring the failure of the efforts of the provisional government. so thoroughly did they play into the hands of the german military authorities, whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay of germany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians and journalists, but by the most responsible socialists in russia. the epic story of kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate the russian army is too well known to need retelling here. though it was vain and ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever be remembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. the audacity and the courage with which kerensky and a few loyal associates strove to maintain russia in the struggle made the allied nations, and all the civilized world, their debtors. many mistakes were made, it is true, yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more or succeeded where they failed. it must be confessed, furthermore, that the governments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievous mistakes on their part. perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge to kerensky's account was the signing of the famous declaration of soldiers' rights. this document, which was signed on may th, can only be regarded in the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. in his address to the all-russian congress of peasants' delegates, on may th, speaking for the first time in his capacity as minister of war, kerensky had declared, "i intend to establish an iron discipline in the army," yet the declaration of soldiers' rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make any real discipline impossible. was it because he was inconsistent, vacillating, and weak that kerensky attached his name to such a document? such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. the fact is that kerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. he and his socialist associates in the cabinet held their positions by authority of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, and they had agreed to be subject to its guidance and instruction. the soviet was responsible for the declaration of soldiers' rights. kerensky was acting under its orders. the soviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famous order number one, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders of their officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionary authorities--that is, by the soviet or its accredited agents. that the order was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that it was justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered among the officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the fact remains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. the fact that kerensky's predecessor, guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers' delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was at a low ebb. it brought the army into the arena of politics and made questions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering. the declaration of soldiers' rights was a further step along a road which inevitably led to disaster. that remarkable document provided that soldiers and officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights; that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that their correspondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be free to receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which they desired. it provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute to officers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform when not actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty" hours. finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in the hands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were to have four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth. of course, the declaration of soldiers' rights represented a violent reaction. under the old régime the army was a monstrously cruel machine; the soldiers were slaves. at the first opportunity they had revolted and, as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. on may th the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates issued a declaration in which it was said: "from now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery of saluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses.... discipline in the revolutionary army will exist, prompted by popular enthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by a slavish salute." if we are tempted to laugh at this naïve idealism, we americans will do well to remember that it was an american statesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a million men overnight, and that a shrewd american capitalist-idealist sent forth a "peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end the greatest war in history. ix throughout the first half of june, while arrangements for a big military offensive were being made, and were causing kerensky and the other socialist ministers to strain every nerve, lenine, trotzky, kamenev, zinoviev, and other leaders of the bolsheviki were as strenuously engaged in denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. whatever gift or genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction and obstruction. the student will search in vain among the multitude of records of meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a single instance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service to the soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by any bolshevik leader. but they never missed an opportunity to embarrass those who were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that was already too heavy. lenine denounced the offensive against germany as "an act of treason against the socialist international" and poured out the vials of his wrath against kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions of the soviet and other working-class organizations. thus we had the astonishing and tragic spectacle of one socialist leader working with titanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized by the old régime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatest militarist system in the world, while another socialist leader worked with might and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation of the demoralized army. and all the while the german general staff gloated at every success of the bolsheviki. there was a regular system of communications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the german general staff. in proof of this statement only one illustration need be offered, though many such could be cited: at the all-russian congress of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, on june d, kerensky read, in the presence of lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of the german eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration of certain delegates of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. at this session lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. he said that it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revamping all the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. he minimized the loss which russia had suffered at germany's hands, and the gains germany had made in belgium and northern france, pointing out that she had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which england would be very unlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. taunted with being in favor of a separate peace with germany, lenine indignantly denied the accusation. "it is a lie," he cried. "down with a separate peace! _we russian revolutionists will never consent to it._" he argued that there could be only one policy for socialists in any country--namely, to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in that country. no war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless what its motives, should be supported by socialists. he argued that the adoption of his policy by the russian working class would stand ten times the chance of succeeding that the military policy would have. the german working class would compel their government and the general staff to follow the example of russia and make peace. kerensky was called upon to reply to lenine. at the time when the restoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, it was necessary for kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminable debates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the bolshevik offensive always being waged in the rear. that, of course, was part of the bolshevist plan of campaign. so kerensky, wearied by his tremendous efforts to perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered lenine. his reply was a forensic masterpiece. he took the message of the commander-in-chief of the german eastern front and hurled it at lenine's head, figuratively speaking, showing how lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the german propaganda. with merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how the bolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination of nationalities," as the basis of a propaganda to bring about the dismemberment of russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small, helpless states. to lenine's statements about the readiness of the german working class to rebel, kerensky made retort that lenine should have remained in germany while on his way to russia and preached his ideas there. a few days earlier, at a session of the same congress, trotzky and kamenev had made vigorous assault upon the coalition government and upon the socialist policy with reference thereto. in view of what subsequently transpired, it is important to note that trotzky made much of the delay in calling together the constituent assembly: "the policy of continual postponement _and the detailed preparations_ for calling the constituent assembly is a false policy. it may destroy even the very realization of the constituent assembly." this profession of concern for the constituent assembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. he did not in the least care about or believe in the constituent assembly, and had not done so at any time since the first revolution of - . his whole thought rejected such a democratic instrument. however, he and his associates knew that the demand for a constituent assembly was almost universal, and that to resist that demand was impossible. their very obvious policy in the circumstances was to try and force the holding of the assembly prematurely, without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for a nation-wide electoral campaign. a hastily gathered, badly organized constituent assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easily stampeded or controlled by a determined minority. trotzky assailed the coalition government with vitriolic passion. at the moment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the only possible condition for the survival of the revolution, and that any division in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it might be based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his bolshevik colleagues deliberately stirred up dissension. even if their opposition to political union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of a sound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was either treachery or madness. when a house is already on fire the only thing in order, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is to work to extinguish the fire. it is obviously not the time to debate whether the house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. russia was a house on fire; the bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating. kamenev followed trotzky's lead in attacking the coalition government. in a subtle speech he supported the idea of splitting russia up into a large number of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination of peoples," applied to the separatist movement in the ukraine. he insisted that for the russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whether the central empires or the entente nations won in the war. he argued that the only hope for the russian revolution must be the support of the revolutionary proletariat in the other european countries, particularly those adjacent to russia: "if the revolutionary proletariat of europe fails to support the russian revolution the latter will be ruined. as that support is the only guaranty of the safety of the revolution, we cannot change our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing will stimulate the awakening of the proletariat of europe." in other words, kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life and his all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel. it was in this manner that the bolshevist leaders conspired to russia's destruction. they were absorbing the time and energies of the men who were really trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerous futile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates, moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation. further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. thus tseretelli, kerensky, skobelev, and many others whose efforts might have saved the revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense of responsibility. lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists because they were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those same capitalists were needed if the nation was to live. later on, when confronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availed himself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. at this earlier period he was, as tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers, without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of his propaganda. and that was equally true of the bolsheviki as a whole. they talked about sending "ultimatums" to the allies, while the whole system of national defense was falling to pieces. tseretelli made the only reply it was possible for a sane man to make: "it is proposed that we speak to the allies with ultimatums, but did those who made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to the breaking of diplomatic relations with the allies, and to that very separate peace which is condemned by all factions among us? did lenine think of the actual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists at this time? can the bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to the correct solution of the crisis? no. if they guarantee this they do not know what they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. the bolshevik road can lead us only to one end, civil war." once more the good sense of the working class prevailed. by an overwhelming majority of votes the congress decided to uphold the coalition government and rejected the bolshevik proposals. the resolution adopted declared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elements would deal a blow at the revolutionary cause," but that equally the transfer of all power to the soviets would be disastrous to the revolution, and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from her elements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten the ruin of the revolution." therefore, having heard the explanations of the socialist ministers and having full confidence in them, the congress insisted that the socialist ministers be solely responsible to the "plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organized revolutionary democracy of russia, which organ must be composed of the representatives of the all-russian congress of councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, as well as of representatives of the all-russian congress of peasants' delegates." but in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiated their policies, the bolsheviki continued their tactics. lenine, trotzky, tshitsherin, zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop working and to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. the all-russian congress of workmen's and soldiers' delegates issued an appeal to the workers warning them not to heed the call of the bolsheviki, which had been made at the "moment of supreme danger." the appeal said: comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers, we tell you, "do not do that which you are called upon to do." at this dangerous moment you are called out into the streets to demand the overthrow of the provisional government, to whom the all-russian congress has just found it necessary to give its support. and those who are calling you cannot but know that out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may result.... you are being called to a demonstration in favor of the revolution, _but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage of your demonstration ... the counter-revolutionists are eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks of the revolutionary democracy and enable them to crush the revolution_. x not only in this way were the bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwart the efforts of the socialist ministers to carry out the mandates of the majority of the working class of russia, but they were equally active in trying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. all through june the bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. in the ranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting was carried on. the duma had voted, on june th, for an immediate offensive, and it was approved by the petrograd soviet. the provisional government on that date published a note to the allied governments, requesting a conference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. these actions were approved by the all-russian congress of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, as was also the expulsion from russia of the swiss socialist, robert grimm, who was a notorious agent of the german government. grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders of hoffman, the swiss minister of foreign affairs, and was trying to bring about a separate peace between russia and germany. he was also intimately connected with the infamous "parvus," the trusted social democrat who was a spy and tool of the german government. as always, the great majority of the representatives of the actual working class of russia took the sane course. but the bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops, preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey the orders of "bourgeois" officers. the provisional government was not blind to the peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force, conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not be stayed. the bolsheviki, unable to control the workmen's and soldiers' council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and to discredit it. they conspired to overthrow the provisional government. their plot was to bring about an armed revolt on the th of june, when the all-russian congress of soviets would be in session. they planned to arrest the members of the provisional government and assume full power. _at the same time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave the trenches_. on the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot was divulged. there was treachery within their own ranks. the bolshevik leaders humbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. under other conditions the provisional government might have refused to be satisfied with apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face to face with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine of freedom. the time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected to recognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the license that leads always to tyranny. it takes time and experience of freedom to teach the stern lesson that, as rousseau has it, freedom comes by way of self-imposed compulsions to be free. the offensive which kerensky had urged and planned began on july st and its initial success was encouraging. it seemed as though the miracle of the restoration of the russian army had been achieved, despite everything. here was an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than three million men,[ ] an army which had suffered incredible hardships, again going into battle with songs. on the st of july more than thirty-six thousand prisoners were taken by the russians on the southwestern front. then came the tragic harvest of the bolshevist propaganda. in northeastern galicia the th russian regiment left the trenches and forced other units to do the same thing, opening a clear way for the german advance. regiment after regiment refused to obey orders. officers were brutally murdered by their men. along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles the russians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting to fight, while the enemy steadily advanced. this was made possible by the agitation of the bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provoked among the troops in the garrison at petrograd. on the th of july, at the very time when the separatist movement in the ukraine, the resignation of the constitutional democrats from the government, and the revolt and treachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing the opportunity afforded by the general chaos, the bolsheviki attempted to realize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of the proletariat," but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part of the proletariat. there was no pretense that they represented a majority of the proletariat, even. it was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorship of a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. for two days the revolt lasted, more than five hundred men, women, and children being killed in the streets of petrograd. on the th prince lvov resigned as premier. in the mean time the bolshevist uprising had been put down by cossack troops and the leaders were in hiding. kerensky stepped into lvov's position as premier and continued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of the chaos. there could not have been any selfish ambition in this; no place-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden kerensky then assumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation. he knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determined never to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to be done and his comrades desired him to do it.[ ] there had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organized workers, called the united executive committee of the all-russian councils of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' delegates, a body of more than three hundred elected representatives of the various soviets. they represented the views of many millions. this body vigorously denounced the bolsheviki and rallied to the support of kerensky and his colleagues. in a manifesto to the people the bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the blood of all who had been slain in the uprising. on july st a second manifesto was issued by the committee calling upon the workers to uphold the government so long as the authorized representatives of the working class determined that to be the proper course to follow. the charge that lenine, zinoviev, trotzky, and others were acting under german instructions and receiving german money spread until it was upon almost every tongue in petrograd. on july th gregory alexinsky, a well-known socialist, in his paper, _bez lisnih slov_, published a circumstantial story of german intrigue in the ukraine, revealed by one yermolenko, an ensign in the th siberian regiment, who had been sent to russia by the german government. this yermolenko charged that lenine had been instructed by the authorities in berlin, just as he himself had been, and that lenine had been furnished with almost unlimited funds by the german government, the arrangement being that it was to be forwarded through one svendson, at stockholm.[ ] by a vote of to the united executive committee of the all-russian councils of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' delegates adopted the following resolution: the whole revolutionary democracy desires that the bolsheviki group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt, or of having received money from german sources be tried publicly. in consequence, the executive committee considers it absolutely inadmissible that lenine and zinoviev should escape justice, and demands that the bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically express its censure of the conduct of its leaders. later on, under the "terror," there was some pretense of an "investigation" of the charge that lenine and others had received german money, but there has never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. groups of russian socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked that a commission of well-known socialists from the leading countries of europe and from the united states, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sent to russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge. the united executive committee of the workers' organizations adopted a resolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members of all affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that all majority decisions be absolutely obeyed. they took the position--too late, alas!--that the will of the majority must be observed, since the only alternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority. repressive measures against the bolsheviki were adopted by the kerensky cabinet with the full approval of the committee. some of the bolshevik papers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished at the very beginning of the revolution, was partially restored in that it was ordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front. lenine and zinoviev were in hiding, but trotzky, kamenev, alexandra kollontay, and many other noted bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days. it was kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by the allies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to those which president wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date for the constituent assembly elections, september th, while sternly repressing the bolsheviki, it might be possible to save russia. but it was too late. despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support of the great majority of the soviets, he was defeated. day after day conditions at the front grew worse. by the beginning of august practically the whole of galicia was in the hands of the germans. russian soldiers in large numbers retreated before inferior numbers of germans, refusing to strike a blow. germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits, and an orgy of drunkenness took place. the red flag was borne by debauched and drunken mobs. what a fate for the symbol of universal freedom and human brotherhood! it was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. crisis followed upon crisis. chernov resigned his position as minister of agriculture. kerensky resigned as premier, but the members of the provisional government by unanimous vote declined to accept the resignation. they called a joint meeting of all the cabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the duma, of the soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers. at this meeting the whole critical situation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that kerensky continue in office. the political parties represented were the social democrats, the socialist-revolutionists, the democratic radicals, the labor union party, the popular socialists, and the constitutional democrats. from these groups came an appeal which kerensky could not deny. he said: "in view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of a compromise between the various political groups, socialist as well as non-socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... i was obliged to resign. friday's conference, ... after a prolonged discussion, resulted in the parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with the task of reconstructing the government. considering it impossible for me in the present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration within are threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is now intrusted to me, i regard this task as an express order of the country to construct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible time and in spite of all the obstacles which might arise." for the second time kerensky was premier at the head of a coalition ministry. no other government was possible for russia except a strong despotism. theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, but the stern reality was that nothing else was possible. the leader of the peasants, chernov, returned to his old post as minister of agriculture and the constitutional democrats took their share of the burden. there were six parties and groups in the new cabinet, four of them of various shades of socialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. never before, perhaps, and certainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or more difficult task than that which this new provisional government undertook. heroically kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of general kornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in the army, but it was too late. the disintegration had gone too far. the measures which the revolutionary democracy had introduced into the army, in the hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. officers were butchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, in some instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, even offering to pay indemnities. moreover, the industrial organization of the country had been utterly demoralized. the manufacture of army supplies had fallen off more than per cent., with the result that the state of affairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old régime. xi it became evident to the provisional government that something big and dramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the constituent assembly elections. accordingly, it was decided to call together a great extraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, to consider the situation and the best means of meeting it. the extraordinary national conference, as it was called, was opened in moscow, on august th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. some of these members--principally those from the soviets--had been elected as delegates, but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said to speak as authorized representatives. there were about one hundred and ninety men who had been members of one or other of the dumas; one hundred representatives of the peasants' soviets and other peasant organizations; about two hundred and thirty representatives of the soviets of industrial workers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; about one hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fifty from municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks and industrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the union of zemstvos and towns. it was a conference more thoroughly representative of russia than any that had ever been held. there were, indeed, no representatives of the old régime, and there were few representatives of the bolsheviki. the former had no place in the new russia that was struggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been found necessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter. it was to this conference that president wilson sent his famous message giving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the people and government of russia. for three days the great assembly debated and listened to speeches from men representing every section of the country, every class, and every party. kerensky, tseretelli, tchcheidze, boublikov, plechanov, kropotkin, breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers; general kornilov and general kaledine spoke for the military command; miliukov, nekrasov, guchkov, maklakov, and others spoke for the bourgeoisie. at times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, but throughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimity of feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support the provisional government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, to remain loyal to the allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separate peace, and to work for the success of the constituent assembly. but, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, the moscow conference showed that there was still a great gulf between the classes, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcome the peril that hung over the nation like the sword of damocles, there could be no unity in working out the great economic and social program which must be the basis for the social democratic commonwealth which the workers sought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as much as they feared the triumph of germany. in some respects the conference intensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civil strife. the bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. they pointed to the conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the socialist ministers, and of the officials of the soviets, to compromise with the bourgeoisie. this propaganda had its effect and bolshevism grew in consequence, especially in petrograd. then followed the disastrous military and political events which made it practically impossible for the kerensky government to stand. at the front the soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. kornilov was quite helpless. germany began a new offensive, and on september d german armies crossed the dvina near riga. on september d riga was surrendered to the germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in petrograd. then on the th came the revolt of kornilov against the provisional government and the vulgar quarrel between him and kerensky. kornilov charged that the provisional government, under pressure from the bolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the german general staff. kerensky, backed by the rest of the cabinet, ordered kornilov's removal, while kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front, against petrograd. it was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can be found except in the strained mental condition of all the principal parties concerned. in less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the two leaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removing misunderstandings. as things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two men suffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, provided all the elements of a disaster. kornilov's revolt was crushed without great trouble and with very little bloodshed, kornilov himself being arrested. the soviets stood by the provisional government, for they saw in the revolt the attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. even the bolsheviki were temporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback." kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of the russian armies. always, it seemed, through every calamity, all parties except the bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough to undertake the heaviest and hardest tasks. toward the end of september what may be termed the kerensky régime entered upon its last phase. for reasons which have been already set forth, the bolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the provisional government, and upon the official leaders of the soviets, on account of the moscow conference. they demanded that the united executive committee of the soviets convoke a new conference. they contended that the moscow conference had been convoked by the government, not by the soviets, and that the united executive committee must act for the latter. the united executive committee complied and summoned a new national democratic conference, which assembled on september th. by this time, as a result of the exhaustion of the patience of many workers, many of the soviets had ceased to exist, while others existed on paper only. according to the _izvestya soveta_, there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time, many scores of which had disappeared. according to the same authority, the peasants were drawing away from the workers' and soldiers' soviets. the united executive committee, which had been elected in june, was, of course, dominated by anti-bolsheviki--that is, by menshevik social democrats and by socialist-revolutionists. the democratic conference was not confined to the soviets. it embraced delegates from soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; from municipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. it differed from the moscow conference principally in that the delegates were elected and that it did not include so many representatives of the capitalist class. the petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the great capitalists. there were more than a thousand members in attendance at this democratic conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section of the social democrats. the socialist-revolutionists were not very numerous. this conference created another coalition cabinet, the last of the kerensky régime. kerensky continued as premier and as commander-in-chief of the army. there were in the cabinet five social democrats, two socialist-revolutionists, eight constitutional democrats, and two non-partisans. it was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting the standards insisted upon by many radical socialists, who, while not bolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absolute socialist predominance in the provisional government. of course, the new coalition ministry infuriated the bolsheviki. from his hiding-place lenine issued a series of "letters to the comrades," which were published in the _rabochiy put_, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising like that of july, only upon a larger scale. in these letters he scoffed at the constituent assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. meanwhile, trotzky, out of prison again, and other bolshevik leaders were agitating by speeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. the provisional government dared not try to suppress them. its hold upon the people was now too weak. the democratic conference introduced one innovation. it created a preliminary parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its first official title was the provisional council of the republic. this new body was to function as a parliament until the constituent assembly convened, when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body the constituent assembly might create. this preliminary parliament and its functions were thus described: this council, in which all classes of the population will be represented, and in which the delegates elected to the democratic conference will also participate, will be given the right of addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts and discussing all those questions which will be presented for consideration by the provisional government, as well as those which will arise on its own initiative. resting on the co-operation of such a council, the government, preserving, in accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power created by the revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the great public significance of such a council in all its acts up to the time when the constituent assembly gives full and complete representation to all classes of the population of russia. this preliminary parliament was really another duma--that is, it was a very limited parliamentary body. its life was short and quite uneventful. it assembled for the first time on october th and was dispersed by the bolsheviki on november th. when it assembled there were members--the number fixed by the decree of the provisional government. of these, were bolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others, thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred. even with the bolsheviki withdrawn, when kerensky appeared before the preliminary parliament on november th and made his last appeal, a resolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by a small majority. only about three hundred members were in attendance on this occasion, and of these voted the expression of confidence, while voted against it, and declined to vote at all. the bolsheviki had forced the united executive committee to convene a new all-russian congress of soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixed at november th. while the elections and arrangements for this congress were proceeding, the bolsheviki were actively and openly organizing an uprising. in their papers and at their meetings they announced that on november th there would be an armed uprising against the government. their intentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed that the government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt to carry those intentions into practice. it was said that of the delegates to the all-russian congress of soviets-numbering as against more than one thousand at the former congress of peasant soviets alone--a majority were bolsheviki. it was charged that the bolsheviki had intimidated many workers into voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, put forward their men as anti-bolsheviki and secured their election by false pretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. it was quite certain that a great many soviets had refused to send delegates, and that many thousands of workers, and these all anti-bolsheviki, had simply grown weary and disgusted with the whole struggle. whatever the explanation might be, the fact remained that of the delegates were generally rated as bolsheviki, while were socialist-revolutionists and mensheviki. not all of the socialist-revolutionists could be counted as anti-bolsheviki, moreover. there were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quite clearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not bolsheviki, at least anti-government. for the first time in the whole struggle the bolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-class convention. on the night of the th, a few hours before the opening of the congress of soviets, the bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefully planning. they were not met with the resistance they had expected--for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. kerensky recognized that it was useless for him to attempt to carry on the fight. the bolsheviki had organized their red guards, and these, directed by military leaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the central telephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on. part of the petrograd garrison joined with the bolsheviki, the other part simply refusing to do anything. on the morning of november th the members of the provisional government were arrested in the winter palace, but kerensky managed to escape. the bolshevik _coup d'état_ was thus accomplished practically without bloodshed. a new government was formed, called the council of people's commissaries, of which nikolai lenine was president and leon trotzky commissioner for foreign affairs. the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. kerensky's attempt to rally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a pathetic failure, as it was bound to be. it was like the last fitful flicker with which a great flame dies. the masses wanted peace--for that they would tolerate even a dictatorship. chapter vi the bolshevik war against democracy i the defenders and supporters of the bolsheviki have made much of the fact that there was very little bloodshed connected with the successful bolshevik uprising in petrograd. that ought not to be permitted, however, to obscure the fundamental fact that it was a military _coup d'état_, the triumph of brute force over the will of the vast majority of the people. it was a crime against democracy. that the people were passive, worn out, and distracted, content to wait for the constituent assembly, only makes the bolshevik crime appear the greater. let us consider the facts very briefly. less than three weeks away was the date set for the constituent assembly elections. campaigns for the election of representatives to that great democratic convention were already in progress. it was to be the most democratic constitutional convention that ever existed in any country, its members being elected by the entire population, every man and woman in russia being entitled to vote. the suffrage was equal, direct, universal, and secret. moreover, there was a great democratic reconstruction of the nation actually in progress at the time. the building up of autonomous democratic local governing bodies, in the shape of a new type of zemstvos, was rapidly progressing. the old-time zemstvos had been undemocratic and did not represent the working-people, but the new zemstvos were composed of representatives nominated and elected by universal suffrage, equal, secret, and direct. instead of being very limited in their powers as the old zemstvos were, the new zemstvos were charged with all the ordinary functions of local government. the elections to these bodies served as an admirable practical education in democracy, making it more certain than would otherwise have been the case that the russian people would know how to use their new political instrument so as to secure a constituent assembly fully representing their will and their desire. at the same time active preparations for holding the election of members to the constituent assembly were actually under way. the socialist parties were making special efforts to educate the illiterate voters how to use their ballots correctly. the provisional government, on its part, was pushing the preparations for the elections as rapidly as possible. all over the country special courts were established, in central places, to train the necessary workers so that the elections might be properly conducted. above all, the great problem of the socialization of the land which had been agitated for so many years had now reached the stage at which its solution might almost have been said to be complete. the national soviet of peasants, together with the socialist revolutionary party, had formulated a law on the subject which represented the aspiration and the best thought of the leaders of the peasants' movement. that law had been approved in the council of ministers and was ready for immediate promulgation. peasant leaders like chernov, rakitnikov, vikhiliaev, and maslov had put an immense amount of work into the formulation of this law, which aimed to avoid anarchy, to see to it that instead of an individualistic scramble by the peasants for the land, in small and unorganized holdings, the problem should be scientifically dealt with, lands being justly distributed among the peasant communes, and among the peasants who had been despoiled, and large estates co-operatively organized and managed. all this the bolsheviki knew, for it was common knowledge. there is no truth whatever in the claim set up by many of the apologists for the bolsheviki that they became enraged and resorted to desperate tactics because nothing effective was being done to realize the aims of the revolution, to translate its ideals into fact. quite the contrary is true. _the bolshevik insurrection was precipitated by its leaders precisely because they saw that the provisional government was loyally and intelligently carrying out the program of the revolution, in co-operation with the majority of the working-class organizations and their leaders._ the bolsheviki did not want the ideals of the revolution to be realized, for the very simple reason that they were opposed to those ideals. in all the long struggle from herzen to kerensky the revolutionary movement of russia had stood for political democracy first of all. now, at the moment when political democracy was being realized, the bolsheviki sought to kill it and to set up something else--namely, a dictatorship of a small party of less than two hundred thousand over a nation of one hundred and eighty millions. there can be no dispute as to this aim; it has been stated by lenine with great frankness. "_just as one hundred and fifty thousand lordly landowners under czarism dominated the one hundred and thirty millions of russian peasants, so two hundred thousand members of the bolshevik party are imposing their proletarian will on the mass, but this time in the interest of the latter._"[ ] lenine's figures probably exaggerate the bolshevik numbers, but, assuming them to be accurate, can anybody in his right mind, knowing anything of the history of the russian revolutionary movement, believe that the substitution of a ruling class of one hundred and fifty thousand by one of two hundred thousand, to govern a nation of one hundred and eighty millions, was the end to which so many lives were sacrificed? can any sane and sincere person believe that the class domination described by the great arch-bolshevik himself comes within measurable distance of being as much of a realization of the ideals of the revolution as did the constituent assembly plan with its basis of political democracy, universal, equal, direct, secret, all-determining suffrage? we do not forget lenine's statement that this new domination of the people by a ruling minority differs from the old régime in that the bolsheviki are imposing their will upon the mass "_in the interest of the latter_." what ruling class ever failed to make that claim? was it not the habit of the czars, all of them, during the whole revolutionary epoch, to indulge in the pious cant of proclaiming that they were motived only by their solicitude for the interests and well-being of the peasants? it is a curious illustration of the superficial character of the bolshevist mentality that a man so gifted intellectually as lenine undoubtedly is should advance in justification of his policy a plea so repugnant to morality and intelligence, and that it should be quietly accepted by men and women calling themselves radical revolutionists. some years ago a well-known american capitalist announced with great solemnity that he and men like himself were the agents of providence, charged with managing industry "for the good of the people." naturally, his naïve claim provoked the scornful laughter of every radical in the land. yet, strange as it may seem, whenever i have pointed out to popular audiences that lenine asserted the right of two hundred thousand proletarians to impose their rule upon russia, always, without a single exception, some defender of the bolsheviki--generally a socialist or a member of the i.w.w.--has entered the plea, "yes, but it is for the good of the people!" if the bolsheviki had wanted to see the realization of the ideals of the revolution, they would have found in the conditions existing immediately prior to their insurrection a challenge calling them to the service of the nation, in support of the provisional government and the preliminary parliament. they would have permitted nothing to imperil the success of the program that was so well advanced. as it was, determination to defeat that program was their impelling motive. not only did they fear and oppose _political_ democracy; they were equally opposed to democracy in _industry_, to that democracy in the economic life of the nation which every socialist movement in the world had at all times acknowledged to be its goal. as we shall see, they united to political dictatorship industrial dictatorship. they did not want democracy, but power; they did not want peace, even, as they wanted power. the most painstaking and sympathetic study of the russian revolution will not disclose any great ideal or principle, moral or political, underlying the distinctive bolshevik agitation and program. nothing could well be farther from the truth than the view taken by many amiable people who, while disavowing the actions of the bolsheviki, seek to mitigate the judgment which mankind pronounces against them by the plea that, after all, they are extreme idealists, misguided, of course, but, nevertheless, inspired by a noble ideal; that they are trying, as john brown and many others have tried, to realize a great ideal, but have been made incapable of seeing their ideal in its proper perspective, and, therefore, of making the compromises and adjustments which the transmutation of ideals to reality always requires. no sympathizer with russia--certainly no socialist--can fail to wish that this indulgent criticism were true. its acceptance would lighten the darkest chapter in russian history, and, at the same time, remove from the great international socialist movement a shameful reproach. but the facts are incompatible with such a theory. instead of being fanatical idealists, incapable of compromises and adjustments, the bolsheviki have, from the very beginning, been loudly scornful of rigid and unbending idealism; have made numerous compromises, alliances, and "political deals," and have repeatedly shifted their ground in accordance with political expediency. they have been consistently loyal to no aim save one--the control of power. they have been opportunists of the most extreme type. there is not a single socialist or democratic principle which they have not abandoned when it served, their political ends; not a single instrument, principle, or device of autocratic despotism which they have not used when by so doing they could gain power. for the motto of bolshevism we might well paraphrase the well-known line of horace, and make it read, "get power, honestly, if you can, if not--somehow or other." of course, this judgment applies only to bolshevism as such: to the special and peculiar methods and ideas which distinguish the bolsheviki from their fellow-socialists. it is not to be questioned that as socialists and revolutionists they have been inspired by some of the great ideals common to all socialists everywhere. but they differed from the great mass of russian socialists so fundamentally that they separated themselves from them and became a separate and distinct party. _that which caused this separation is the essence of bolshevism--not the ideals held in common_. no understanding of bolshevism is possible unless this fundamental fact is first fully understood. power, to be gained at any cost, and ruthlessly applied, by the proletarian minority, is the basic principle of bolshevism as a distinct form of revolutionary movement. of course, the bolshevik leaders sought this power for no sordid, self-aggrandizing ends; they are not self-seeking adventurers, as many would have us believe. they are sincerely and profoundly convinced that the goal of social and economic freedom and justice can be more easily attained by their method than by the method of democratic socialism. still, the fact remains that what social ideals they hold are no part of bolshevism. they are socialist ideals. bolshevism is a distinctive method and a program, and its essence is the relentless use of power by the proletariat against the rest of society in the same manner that the bourgeois and military rulers of nations have commonly used it against the proletariat. bolshevism has simply inverted the old czarist régime. the fairness and justice of this judgment are demonstrated by the bolsheviki themselves. they denounced kerensky's government for not holding the elections for the constituent assembly sooner, posing as the champions of the constituante. when they had themselves assumed control of the government they delayed the meeting of the constituent assembly and then suppressed it by force of arms! they denounced kerensky for having restored the death penalty in the army in cases of gross treachery, professing an intense horror of capital punishment as a form of "bourgeois savagery." when they came into power they instituted capital punishment for _civil_ and _political offenses_, establishing public hangings and floggings as a means of impressing the population![ ] they had bitterly assailed kerensky for his "militarism," for trying to build up the army and for urging men to fight. in less critical circumstances they themselves resorted to forced conscription. they condemned kerensky and his colleagues for "interfering with freedom of speech and press." when they came into power they suppressed all non-bolshevist papers and meetings in a manner differing not at all from that of the czar's régime, forcing the other socialist parties and groups to resort to the old pre-revolution "underground" methods. the evidence of all these things, and things even worse than these, is conclusive and unimpeachable. it is contained in the records of the bolshevik government, in its publications, and in the reports of the great socialist parties of russia, officially made to the international socialist bureau. surely the evidence sustains the charge that, whatever else they may or may not be, the bolsheviki are not unbending and uncompromising idealists of the type of john brown and william lloyd garrison, as they are so often represented as being by well-meaning sentimentalists whose indulgence of the bolsheviki is as unlimited as their ignorance concerning them. some day, perhaps, a competent psychologist will attempt the task of explaining the psychology of our fellow-citizens who are so ready to defend the bolsheviki for doing the very things they themselves hate and condemn. in any list of men and women in this country friendly to the bolsheviki it will be found that they are practically all pacifists and anti-conscriptionists, while a great many are non-resistants and conscientious objectors to military service. practically all of them are vigorous defenders of the freedom of the press, of the right of public assemblage and of free speech. with the exception of a few anarchists, they are almost universally strong advocates of radical political democracy. how can high-minded and intelligent men and women--as many of them are--holding such beliefs as these give countenance to the bolsheviki, who bitterly and resolutely oppose all of them? how can they denounce america's adoption of conscription and say that it means that "democracy is dead in america" while, at the same time, hailing the birth of democracy in russia, where conscription is enforced by the bolsheviki? how, again, can they at one and the same time condemn american democracy for its imperfections, as in the matter of suffrage, while upholding and defending the very men who, in russia, deliberately set out to destroy the universal equal suffrage already achieved? how can they demand freedom of the press and of assemblage, even in war-time, and denounce such restrictions as we have had to endure here in america, and at the same time uphold the men responsible for suppressing the press and public assemblages in russia in a manner worse than was attempted by the czar? is there no logical sense in the average radical's mind? or can it be that, after all, the people who make up the bolshevist following, and who are so much given to engaging in protest demonstrations of various kinds, are simply restless, unanchored spirits, for whom the stimulant and excitation of revolt is a necessity? how many are simply victims of subtle neuroses occasioned by sex derangements, by religious chaos, and similar causes? ii the bolshevik rule began as a reign of terror. we must not make the mistake of supposing that it was imposed upon the rest of russia as easily as it was imposed upon petrograd, where conditions were exceptional. in the latter city, with the assistance of the preobrajenski and seminovsky regiments from the garrison, and of detachments of sailors from the baltic fleet, to all of whom most extravagant promises were made, the _coup d'état_ was easily managed with little bloodshed. but in a great many other places the bolshevist rule was effected in no such peaceful fashion, but by means of a bloody terror. here, for example, is the account of the manner in which the counter-revolution of the bolsheviki was accomplished at saratov, as given by a competent eye-witness, a well-known russian socialist whose long and honorable service in the revolutionary movement entitles her to the honor of every friend of free russia--inna rakitnikov:[ ] here ... is how the bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at saratov. i was witness to these facts myself. saratov is a big university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. the zemstvo of saratov was one of the best in russia. the peasant population of this province, among whom the revolutionary socialist propaganda was carried on for several years, by the revolutionary socialist party, is wide awake and well organized. the municipality and the agricultural committees were composed of socialists. the population was actively preparing for the elections to the constituent assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of the different parties. on the night of october th [november th, european calendar], by reason of an order that had come from petrograd, the bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at saratov. the following forces were its instruments: the garrison, which was a stranger to the mass of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of leaders, some intellectuals, who, up to that time, had played no rôle in the public life of the town. it was indeed a military _coup d'état. the city hall, where sat the socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, was surrounded by soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front and the bombardment began. this lasted a whole night; some were wounded, some killed_. the municipal judges were arrested. soon after a manifesto solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the "counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power of saratov was going to pass into the hands of the soviet (bolshevist) of the workmen's and soldiers' delegates. as soon as the overthrow of the existing authorities was effected and the bolsheviki, through their red guards and other means, were in a position to exert their authority, they resorted to every method of oppression and repression known to the old autocratic régime. they suppressed the papers of the socialist parties and groups opposed to them, and in some instances confiscated the plants, turned out the editors, and used the papers themselves. in one of his "letters to the comrades," published in the _rabochiy put_, a few days before the insurrection, lenine had confessed that kerensky had maintained freedom of the press and of assemblage. the passage is worth quoting, not only for the information it contains concerning the kerensky régime, but also because it affords a standard by which to judge the bolsheviki. lenine wrote: the germans have only one liebknecht, no newspapers, no freedom of assemblage, no councils; they are working against the intense hostility of all classes of the population, including the wealthy peasants--with the imperialist bourgeoisie splendidly organized--and yet the germans are making some attempt at agitation; _while we, with tens of papers, with freedom of assemblage, with the majority of the council with us, we, the best situated of all the proletarian internationalists, can we refuse to support the german revolutionists in organizing a revolt?_ that it was not the "german revolutionists" who in november, , wanted the russians to revolt against the kerensky government, but the majority socialists, upon whom lenine had poured his contempt, on the one hand, and the german general staff, on the other hand, is a mere detail. the important thing is that lenine admitted that under the kerensky government the russian workers, including the bolsheviki, were "the best situated of all the proletarian internationalists," and that they had "tens of papers, with freedom of assemblage." in the face of such statements by lenine himself, written a few days before the bolshevik counter-revolution, what becomes of the charge that the suppression of popular liberties under kerensky was one of the main causes of the revolt of the bolsheviki? against the tolerance of kerensky, the arbitrary and despotic methods of the bolsheviki stand out in strong contrast. many non-bolshevist socialist organs were suppressed; papers containing matter displeasing to the bolshevik authorities were suspended, whole issues were confiscated, and editors were imprisoned, precisely as in the days of the czar. it became necessary for the socialist-revolutionists to issue their paper with a different title, and from a different place, every day. here is the testimony of inna rakitnikov again, contained in an official report to the international socialist bureau: all the non-bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing-establishments were looted. after the creation of the "revolutionary tribunal" the authors of articles that were not pleasing to the bolsheviki, as well as the directors of newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to make amends or go to prison, etc. the premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged. the red guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises disappeared. thus were looted the premises of the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party ( galernaia street) and--several times--the office of the paper _dielo naroda_ ( liteinia street) ... the office of the paper volya naroda, etc.... but the central committee ... continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title, as in the time of czarism, and thus continued its propaganda.... the _yolya naroda_, referred to by inna rakitnikov, was the official organ of the socialist-revolutionary party. it was raided on several occasions. for example, in january, , the leaders of the party reported that a detachment of bolshevik red guards had broken into the office of the paper, committed various depredations, and made several arrests.[ ] here is another socialist witness: one of the ablest of the leaders of the bohemian socialists in the united states is joseph martinek, the brilliant and scholarly editor of the bohemian socialist weekly, the _delnicke listy_. he has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. a student of russian history, speaking the language fluently, it was his good fortune to spend several weeks in petrograd immediately before and after the bolshevik counter-revolution. he testifies that the "freedom of the press established by kerensky" was "terminated by the bolsheviki."[ ] this is not the testimony of "capitalist newspapers," but of socialists of unquestionable authority and standing. the _dielo naroda_ was a socialist paper, and the volunteer venders of it, who were brutally beaten and shot down by red guards, were socialist working-men.[ ] when oskar tokoi, the well-known revolutionary finnish socialist leader, former prime minister of finland, declares that "freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free press is altogether destroyed,"[ ] the bolsheviki and their sympathizers cannot plead that they are the victims of "capitalist misrepresentation." the attitude of the bolshevik leaders toward the freedom of the press has been frankly stated editorially in pravda, their official organ, in the following words: the press is a most dangerous weapon in the hands of our enemies. we will tear it from them, we will reduce it to impotence. it is the moment for us to prepare battle. we will be inflexible in our defense of the rights of the exploited. the struggle will be decisive. we are going to smite the journals with fines, to shut them up, to arrest the editors, and hold them as hostages.[ ] is it any wonder that paul axelrod, who was one of the representatives of russia on the international socialist bureau prior to the outbreak of the war, has been forced to declare that the bolsheviki have "introduced into russia a system worse than czarism, suppressing the constituent assembly and the liberty of the press"?[ ] or that the beloved veteran of the russian revolution, nicholas tchaykovsky, should lament that "the bolshevik usurpation is the continuation of the government by which czarism held the country in an iron grip"?[ ] iii lenine, trotzky, zinoviev, and other bolshevik leaders early found themselves so much at variance with the accepted socialist position that they decided to change their party name. they had been social democrats, a part of the social democratic party of russia. now ever since bronterre o'brien first used the terms "social democrat" and "social democracy," in , their meaning has been pretty well established. a social democrat is one who aims to base government and industry upon democracy. certainly, this cannot be said to be an accurate description of the position of men who believe in the rule of a nation of one hundred and eighty millions by a small party of two hundred thousand or less--or even by an entire class representing not more than six per cent. of the population--and lenine and his friends, recognizing the fact, decided to change the name of their group to the _communist party_, by which name they are now known in russia. lenine frankly admits that it would be a mistake to speak of this party as a party of democracy. he says: the word "democracy" cannot be scientifically applied to the communist party. since march, , the word democracy is simply a shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it from establishing boldly, freely, and regardless of all obstacles a new form of power; the council of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' deputies, harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority.[ ] the phrase "harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority" would seem to indicate that lenine's ideal is that of the old nihilists--or of anarchists of the bakuninist school. that is very far from the truth. the phrase in question is merely a rhetorical flourish. no man has more caustically criticized and ridiculed the anarchists for their dream of organization without authority than nikolai lenine. moreover, his conception of soviet government provides for a very strong central authority. it is a new kind of state, but a state, nevertheless, and, as we shall discover, far more powerful than the political state with which we are familiar, exercising far greater control over the life of the individual. it is not to be a democratic state, but a very despotic one, a dictatorship by a small but powerful ruling class. it was not the word "democracy" which lenine felt to be a "shackle upon the revolutionary nation," but democracy itself. the manner in which they betrayed the constituent assembly will prove the complete hostility of the bolsheviki to democratic government. in order to excuse and justify the bolsheviki's actions in this regard, their supporters in this country have assiduously circulated two statements. they are, first, that the provisional government purposely and with malicious intent delayed the convocation of the constituent assembly, hoping to stave it off altogether; second, that such a long time had elapsed between the elections and the convocation that when the latter date was reached the delegates no longer represented the true feeling of the electorate. with regard to the first of these statements, which is a repetition of a charge made by trotzky before the bolshevik revolt, it is to be noted that it is offered in justification of the bolshevik _coup d'état_. if the charge made were true, instead of false, as it can easily be shown to be, it would only justify the counter-revolution if the counter-revolution itself were made the instrument for insuring the safety of the constituent assembly. but the bolsheviki _suppressed the constituent assembly_. by what process of reasoning do we reach the result that because the provisional government delayed the convocation of the constituent assembly, which the people desired, a counter-revolutionary movement to _suppress it altogether_, by force of arms, was right and proper? with regard to the second statement, which is a repetition of an argument advanced in russia, it should be sufficient to emphasize a few dates. the bolsheviki seized the power of government on november th and the elections for the constituent assembly took place on november th--nearly three weeks later. the date set by the kerensky government for the opening of the constituent assembly was december th and on that date some forty-odd members put in an appearance. recognizing that they could not begin business until a quorum appeared, these decided to wait until at least a quorum should be present. they did not attempt to do any work. what happened is told in the following passages from a signed statement by members--all socialist-revolutionists.[ ] on the appointed day and hour of the opening of the session of the constituent assembly ... the delegates to the constituent assembly who had arrived in petrograd gathered at the tavrichesky palace. the elected representatives of the people beheld innumerable banners and large crowds surrounding the palace. this was petrograd greeting the representatives of the people. at the doors of the palace the picture changed. there stood armed guards and at the orders of the usurpers, the bolsheviki, they refused to let the delegates pass into the tavrichesky palace. it appeared that, in order to enter the building, the _delegates had first to pay respects to the commissaire, a satellite of lenine and trotzky, and there receive special permission_. the delegates would not submit to that; elected by the people and equipped with formal authorization, they had the right to freely enter any public building assigned for their meeting. the delegates decided to enter the tavrichesky palace without asking the new authorities, and they succeeded in doing so. on the first day the guards did not dare to lift their arms against the people's elected representatives and allowed them to enter the building without molestation. there was no struggle, no violence, no sacrifices; the delegates demanded that the guards respect their rights; they demanded to be admitted, and the guards yielded. in the tavrichesky palace the delegates opened their meeting; v.m. chernov was elected chairman. there were, altogether, about forty delegates present. they realized that there were not enough present to start the work of the constituent assembly. _it was decided that it would be advisable to await the arrival of the other delegates and start the work of the constituent assembly only when a sufficient number were present_. those already there decided to meet daily at the tavrichesky palace in order to count all the delegates as they arrived, and on an appointed day to publicly announce the day and hour of the beginning of the activities of the constituent assembly. when the delegates finished their session and adjourned, the old guards had been dismissed for their submissive attitude toward the delegates and replaced by armed civilian followers of lenine and trotzky. the latter issued an order to disband the delegates, but there were none to be disbanded. the following day the government of the bolsheviki dishonestly and basely slandered the people's representatives in their official announcement which appeared in pravda. that lying newspaper wrote that the representatives of the people had forced their way into the palace, accompanied by junkers and the white guards of the bourgeoisie, that the representatives wanted to take advantage of their small numbers and had begun the work of the constituent assembly. every one knows that this is slanderous as regards the representatives of the people. such lies and slanders were resorted to by the old régime. the aim of the slanders and the lies is clear. _the usurpers do not want the people's representatives to have the supreme power and therefore are preparing to disband the constituent assembly_. on the th of november, in the evening, _having begun to arrest members of the constitutional-democratic party, the bolsheviki violated the inviolability of the constituent assembly. on december d a delegate to the constituent assembly, the socialist-revolutionist, filippovsky, who was elected by the army on the southwestern front, was arrested_. in accordance with their decision reached on november th, the delegates gathered at the tavrichesky palace on november th and th. as on the first day, armed soldiers stood guard at the entrance of the palace and would not let any one pass. the delegates, however, insisted and were finally allowed to enter. on the third day, scenes of brutal violence toward the people's representatives took place at the palace. peasants were the unfortunate victims of this violence. when the delegates had ended their session and all that remained was the affixing of the signatures to the minutes, sailors forced their way into the hall; these were headed by a bolshevik officer, _a former commander of the fortress of st. peter and st. paul_. the commander demanded that the delegates disband. in reply it was stated that the delegates would disband after they had finished their business. then at the order of the commander the sailors took the delegate ilyan, elected by the peasants of the province of tambov, by the arm and dragged him to the exit. after ilyan, the sailors dragged out the peasant delegate from the province of moscow, bikov; then the sailors approached maltzev, a peasant delegate from the province of kostroma. he, however, shouted out that he would rather be shot than to submit to such violence. his courage appealed to the sailors and they stopped. now all the halls in the tavrichesky palace are locked and it is impossible to meet there. the delegates who come to the tavrichesky palace cannot even gather in the lobby, for as soon as a group gathers, the armed hirelings of lenine and trotzky disperse them. thus, in former times, behaved the servants of the czar and the enemies of the people, policemen and gendarmes. this is not the testimony of correspondents of bourgeois journals; it is from a statement prepared at the time and signed by more than a hundred socialists, members of the oldest and largest socialist party in russia, many of them men whose long and honorable service has endeared them to their comrades in all lands. it is not testimony that can be impeached or controverted. it forms part of the report of these well-known and trusted socialists to their comrades in russia and elsewhere. the claim that the elections to the constituent assembly were held on the basis of an obsolete register, before the people had a chance to become acquainted with the bolshevist program, and that so long a time had elapsed since the elections that the delegates could not be regarded as true representatives of the people, was first put forward by the bolsheviki when the constituent assembly was finally convened, on january th. it was an absurd claim for the bolsheviki to make, for one of the very earliest acts of the bolshevik government, after the overthrow of kerensky, was to issue a decree ordering that the elections be held as arranged. by that act they assumed responsibility for the elections, and could not fairly and honorably enter the plea, later on, that the elections were not valid. here is the story of the struggle for the constituent assembly, briefly summarized. the first provisional government issued a manifesto on march , , promising to convoke the constituent assembly "as soon as possible." this promise was repeated by the provisional government when it was reorganized after the resignation of miliukov and guchkov in the middle of may. that the promise was sincere there can be no reasonable doubt, for the provisional government at once set about creating a commission to work out the necessary machinery and was for the election by popular vote of delegates to the constituent assembly. russia was not like a country which had ample electoral machinery already existing; new machinery had to be devised for the purpose. this commission was opened on june , ; its work was undertaken with great earnestness, and completed in a remarkably short time, with the result that on july d the provisional government--kerensky at its head--announced that the elections to the constituent assembly would be held on september th, and the convocation of the assembly itself on the th of december. it was soon found, however, that it would be physically impossible for the local authorities all to be prepared to hold the election on the date set--it was necessary, among other things, to first elect the local authorities which were to arrange for the election of the delegates to the constituent assembly--and so, on august d, kerensky signed the following decree, making _the one and only postponement_ of the constituent assembly, so far as the provisional government was concerned: desiring to assure the convocation of the constituent assembly as soon as possible, the provisional government designated the th of september as election-day, in which case the whole burden of making up the election lists must fall on the municipalities and the newly elected zemstvos. _the enormous labor of holding the elections for the local institution has taken time_. at present, in view of the date of establishment of the local institutions, on the basis decreed by the government--direct, general, equal, and secret suffrage--the provisional government has decided: to set aside as the day for the elections to the constituent assembly the th of november, of the year , and as the date for the convocation of the constituent assembly the th of december, of the year . notwithstanding this clear and honorable record, we find trotzky, at a conference of northern councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, on october th, when he well knew that arrangements for holding the constituent assembly elections were in full swing, charging that kerensky was engaged in preventing the convocation of the constituent assembly! he demanded at that time that all power should be taken from the provisional government and transferred to the soviets. these, he said, would convoke the assembly on the date that had been assigned, december th. the bolshevik _coup d'état_ took place, as already noted, less than three weeks before the date set for the elections, for which every preparation had been made by the government and the local authorities. it was at the beginning of the campaign, and the bolsheviki had their own candidates in the field in many places. it was a foregone conclusion that the constituent assembly brought into being by the universal suffrage would be dominated by socialists. there was never the slightest fear that it would be dominated by the bourgeois parties. what followed is best told in the exact language of a protest to the international socialist bureau by inna rakitnikov, representative of the revolutionary socialist party, which was, be it remembered, the largest and the oldest of the russian socialist parties: the _coup d'état_ was followed by various other manifestations of bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. bands of soldiers looted the country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also pillaged. bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause trouble there.... the bands of soldiers who were sent into the country used not only persuasion, but also violence, _trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the constituent assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the socialist-revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc_.... the inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. there were hardly any abstentions; _ per cent. of the population took part in the voting_. the day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their best clothes; they believed that the constituent assembly would give them order, laws, the land. in the government of saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve socialist-revolutionists. there were others (such as the government of pensa, for example) that elected only socialist-revolutionists. the bolsheviki had the majority only in petrograd and moscow and in certain units of the army. to violence and conquest of power by force of arms the population answered by the elections to the constituent assembly, the people sent to this assembly, not the bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority, socialist-revolutionists. of course, this is the testimony of one who is confessedly anti-bolshevist, one who has suffered deep injury at the hands of the bolsheviki of whom she writes. for all that, her testimony cannot be ignored or laughed aside. it has been indorsed by e. roubanovitch, a member of the international socialist bureau, and a man of the highest integrity, in the following words: "i affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the bolsheviki." what is more important, however, is that the subsequent conduct of the bolsheviki in all matters relating to the constituent assembly was such as to confirm belief in her statements. no bolshevik spokesman has ever yet challenged the accuracy of the statement that an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to the constituent assembly were representatives of the revolutionary socialist party. as a matter of fact, the bolsheviki elected less than one-third of the deputies. in the announcement of their withdrawal from the constituent assembly when it assembled in january the bolshevik members admitted that the socialist-revolutionists had "obtained a majority of the constituent assembly." the attitude of the bolsheviki toward the constituent assembly changed as their electoral prospects changed. at first, believing that, as a result of their successful _coup_, they would have the support of the great mass of the peasants and city workers, they were vigorous in their support of the assembly. in the first of their "decrees" after the overthrow of the kerensky cabinet, the bolshevik "commissaries of the people" announced that they were to exercise complete power "until the meeting of the constituent assembly," which was nothing less than a pledge that they would regard the latter body as the supreme, ultimate authority. three days after the revolt lenine, as president of the people's commissaries, published this decree: in the name of the government of the republic, elected by the all-russian congress of councils of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, with the participation of the peasants' delegates, the council of the people's commissaries decrees: . that the elections to the constituent assembly shall be held on november th, the day set aside for this purpose. . all electoral committees, all local organizations, the councils of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' delegates and the soldiers' organizations at the front are to bend every effort toward safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair play at the elections to the constituent assembly, which will be held on the appointed date. if this attitude had been maintained throughout, and had the bolsheviki loyally accepted the verdict of the electorate when it was given, there could have been no complaint. but the evidence shows that their early attitude was not maintained. later on, as reports received from the interior of the country showed that the masses were not flocking to their banners, they began to assume a critical attitude toward the constituent assembly. the leaders of the socialist-revolutionary party were warning their followers that the bolsheviki would try to wreck the constituent assembly, for which they were bitterly denounced in organs like _pravda_ and _izvestya_. very soon, however, these bolshevist organs began to discuss the constituent assembly in a very critical spirit. it was possible, they pointed out, that it would have a bourgeois majority, treating the socialist-revolutionists and the cadets as being on the same level, equally servants of the bourgeoisie. then appeared editorials to show that it would not be possible to place the destinies of russia in the hands of such people, even though they were elected by the "unthinking masses." finally, when it was clear that the socialist-revolutionary party had elected a majority of the members, _pravda_ and _izvestya_ took the position that _the victorious people did not need a constituent assembly_; that a new instrument had been created which made the old democratic method obsolete.[ ] the "new instrument" was, of course, the bolshevist soviet. iv for the moment we are not concerned with the merits or the failings of the soviet considered as an instrument of government. we are concerned only with democracy and the relation of the bolshevist method to democracy. from this point of view, then, let us consider the facts. the soviet was not something new, as so many of our american drawing-room champions of bolshevism seem to think. the soviet was the type of organization common to russia. there were soviets of peasants, of soldiers, of teachers, of industrial workers, of officers, of professional men, and so on. every class and every group in the classes had its own soviet. the soviet in its simplest form is a delegate body consisting of representatives of a particular group--a peasants' soviet, for example. another type, more important, roughly corresponds to the central labor union in an american city, in that it is composed of representatives of workers of all kinds. these delegates are, in the main, chosen by the workers in the shops and factories and in the meetings of the unions. the anti-bolshevist socialists, such as the mensheviki and the socialist-revolutionists, were not opposed to soviets as working-class organizations. on the contrary, they approved of them, supported them, and, generally, belonged to them. they were opposed only to the theory that these soviets, recruited in a more or less haphazard manner, as such organizations must necessarily be, were better adapted to the governing of a great country like russia than a legal body which received its mandate in elections based upon universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. no one ever pretended that the soviets represented all the workers of russia--including peasants in that term--or even a majority of them. no one ever pretended that the soviet, as such, was a stable and constant factor. new soviets were always springing up and others dying out. many existed only in name, on paper. _there never has been an accurate list of the soviets existing in russia_. many lists have been made, but always by the time they could be tabulated and published there have been many changes. for these and other reasons which will suggest themselves to the mind of any thoughtful reader, many of the leaders of the revolutionary movement in russia have doubted the value of the soviet as a _unit of government, while highly valuing it as a unit of working-class organization and struggle_. back of all the strife between the bolsheviki centered around the soviets and the socialist-revolutionists and mensheviki, centered around the constituent assembly, was a greater fact than any we have been discussing, however. the bolsheviki with their doctrinaire marxism had carried the doctrine of the class struggle to such extreme lengths that they virtually placed the great mass of the peasants with the bourgeoisie. the revolution must be controlled by the proletariat, they argued. the control of the government and of industry by the people, which was the slogan of the old democracy, will not do, for the term "the people" includes bourgeois elements. even if it is narrowed by excluding the great capitalists and landowners, still it embraces the lesser capitalists, small landowners, shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie in general. these elements weaken the militancy of the proletariat. what is needed is the dictatorship of the proletariat. now, only a very small part of the peasantry, the very poor peasants, can be safely linked to the proletariat--and even these must be carefully watched. it was a phase of the old and familiar conflict between agrarian and industrial groups in the socialist movement. it is not very many years since the socialist party of america was convulsed by a similar discussion. could the farmer ever be a genuine and sincere and trustworthy socialist? the question was asked in the party papers in all seriousness, and in one or two state organizations measures were taken to limit the number of farmers entering the party, so that at all times there might be the certainty of a preponderance of proletarian over farmer votes. similar distrust, only upon a much bigger scale, explains the fight for and against the constituent assembly. lenine and his followers distrusted the peasants as a class whose interests were akin to the class of small property-owners. he would only unite with the poor, propertyless peasants. the leaders of the peasantry, on the other hand, supported by the more liberal marxians, would expand the meaning of the term "working class" and embrace within its meaning all the peasants as well as all city workers, most of the professional classes, and so on. we can get some idea of this strife from a criticism which lenine directs against the mensheviki: in its class composition this party is not socialist at all. it does not represent the toiling masses. it represents fairly prosperous peasants and working-men, petty traders, many small and some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois net.[ ] it is clear from this criticism that lenine does not believe that a genuine socialist party--and, presumably, therefore, the same must apply to a socialist government--can represent "fairly prosperous peasants and working-men." we now know how to appraise the soviet government. the constitution of russia under the rule of the bolsheviki is required by law to be posted in all public places in russia. in article ii, chapter v, paragraph , of this document it is set forth that "the constitution of the russian socialist federated soviet republic involves, in view of the present transition period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urban and rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerful all-russian soviet authority." attention is called to this passage here, not for the sake of pointing out the obvious need for some exact definition of the loose expression, "the poorest peasantry," nor for the sake of any captious criticism, but solely to point out the important fact that lenine only admits a part of the peasantry--the poorest--to share in the dictatorship of the proletariat. turning to another part of the same important document--article iii, chapter vi, section a, paragraph --we find the basis of representation in the all-russian congress of soviets stated. there are representatives of town soviets and representatives of provincial congresses of soviets. the former represent the industrial workers; the latter represent the peasants almost exclusively. it is important, therefore, to note that there is one delegate for every twenty-five thousand city voters and one for every one hundred and twenty-five thousand peasant voters! in section b of the same article, chapter x, paragraph , we find the same discrimination: it takes five peasants' votes to equal the vote of one city voter; it was this general attitude of the bolsheviki toward the peasants, dividing them into classes and treating the great majority of them as petty, rural bourgeoisie, which roused the resentment of the peasants' leaders. they naturally insisted that the peasants constituted a distinct class, co-operating with the proletariat, not to be ruled by it. even marie spiridonova, who at first joined with the bolsheviki, was compelled, later on, to assert this point of view. it is easy to understand the distrust of the bolsheviki by the socialist parties and groups which represented the peasants. the latter class constituted more than per cent. of the population. moreover, it had furnished the great majority of the fighters in the revolutionary movement. its leaders and spokesmen resented the idea that they were to be dictated to and controlled by a minority, which was, as lenine himself admitted, not materially more numerous than the old ruling class of landowners had been. they wanted a democratic governmental system, free from class rule, while the bolsheviki wanted class rule. generalizations are proverbially perilous, and should be very cautiously made and applied to great currents of thought and of life. but in a broad sense we may fairly say that the socialism of the socialist-revolutionists and the mensheviki, the socialism of kerensky and the men who were the majority of the constituent assembly, was the product of russian life and russian economic development, while the socialism that the bolsheviki tried by force of arms to impose upon russia was as un-russian as it could be. the bolshevist conception of socialism had its origin in marxian theory. both marx and engels freely predicted the setting up of "a dictatorship of the proletariat"--the phrase which the bolsheviki have made their own. yet, the bolsheviki are not marxians. their socialism is as little marxian as russian. when marx and engels forecasted the establishment of proletarian dictatorship it was part of their theorem that economic evolution would have reduced practically all the masses to a proletarian state; that industrial and commercial concentration would have reached such a stage of development that there would be on the one side a small class of owners, and, on the other side, the proletariat. there would be, they believed, no middle class. the disappearance of the middle class was, for them and for their followers, a development absolutely certain to take place. they saw the same process going on with the same result in agriculture. it might be less rapid in its progress, but not one whit less certain. it was only as the inevitable climax to this evolution that they believed the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved. in other words, the proletariat would be composed of the overwhelming majority of the body politic and social. that is very different from the bolshevist attempt to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land where more than per cent, of the people are peasants; where industrial development is behind the rest of the world, and where dictatorship of the proletariat means the domination of more than one hundred and eighty millions of people by two hundred thousand "proletarians and the poorest peasants," according to lenine's statement, or by six per cent. of the population _if we assume the entire proletariat to be united in the dictatorship!_ v at the time of the disturbances which took place in petrograd in december, over the delay in holding the constituent assembly, the bolshevik government announced that the constituante would be permitted to convene on january th, provided that not less than four hundred delegates were in attendance. accordingly, the defenders of the constituent assembly arranged for a great demonstration to take place on that day in honor of the event. it was also intended to be a warning to the bolsheviki not to try to further interfere with the constituante. an earnest but entirely peaceful mass of people paraded with flags and banners and signs containing such inscriptions as "proletarians of all countries, unite!" "land and liberty," "long live the constituent assembly," and many others. they set out from different parts of the city to unite at the field of mars and march to the taurida palace to protest against any interference with the constituent assembly. as they neared the taurida palace they were confronted by red guards, who, without any preliminary warning or any effort at persuasion, fired into the crowd. among the first victims was a member of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates, the siberian peasant logvinov, part of whose head was shot away by an explosive bullet. another victim was the militant socialist-revolutionist gorbatchevskaia. several students and a number of workmen were also killed. similar massacres occurred at the same time in other parts of the city. other processions wending their way toward the meeting-place were fired into. altogether one hundred persons were either killed or very seriously wounded by the red guards, who said that they had received orders "not to spare the cartridges." similar demonstrations were held in moscow and other cities and were similarly treated by the red guards. in moscow especially the loss of life was great. yet the bolshevist organs passed these tragic events over in complete silence. they did not mention the massacres, nor did they mention the great demonstration at the funeral of the victims, four days later. when the constituent assembly was formally opened, on january th, it was well known on every hand that the bolshevik government would use force to destroy it if the deputies refused to do exactly as they were told. the corridors were filled with armed soldiers and sailors, ready for action. the lenine-trotzky ministry had summoned an extraordinary congress of soviets to meet in petrograd at the same time, and it was well understood that they were determined to erect this soviet congress into the supreme legislative power. if the constituent assembly would consent to this, so much the better, of course. in that case there would be a valuable legal sanction, the sanction of a democratically elected body expressly charged with the task of determining the form and manner of government for free russia. should the constituent assembly not be willing, there was an opportunity for another _coup d'état_. in precisely the same way as the ministry during the last years of czarism would lay before the duma certain documents and demand that they be approved, so the central executive committee of the soviets--the bolshevik power--demanded that the constituent assembly meekly assent to a document prepared for it in advance. it was at once a test and a challenge; if the assembly was willing to accept orders from the soviet authority and content itself with rubber-stamping the decrees of the latter, as ordered, it could be permitted to go on--at least for a time. at the head of the constituent assembly, as president, the deputies elected victor chernov, who had been minister of agriculture under kerensky. at the head of the bolshevik faction was sverdlov, chairman of the executive committee of the soviets. he it was who opened the fight, demanding that the following declaration be adopted by the constituante as the basis of a constitution for russia: declaration of the right's of the toiling and exploited people i . russia is to be declared a republic of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' soviets. all power in the cities and in the country belongs to the soviets. . the russian soviet republic is based on the free federation of free peoples, on the federation of national soviet republics. ii assuming as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society, and the placing of society upon a socialistic basis, and the ultimate bringing about of victory for socialism in every country, the constituent assembly further decides: . that the socialization of land be realized, private ownership of land be abolished, all the land be proclaimed common property of the people and turned over to the toiling masses without compensation on the basis of equal right to the use of land. all forests, mines, and waters which are of social importance, as well as all living and other forms of property, and all agricultural enterprises, are declared national property. . to confirm the decree of the soviets concerning the inspection of working conditions, the highest department of national economy, which is the first step in achieving the ownership by the soviets of the factories, mines, railroads, and means of production and transportation. . to confirm the decree of the soviets transferring all banks to the ownership of the soviet republic, as one of the steps in the freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism. . to enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life. in order to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to prevent the restoration of the rule of the exploiters, the toiling masses will be armed and a red guard composed of workers and peasants formed, and the exploiting classes shall be disarmed. iii . declaring its firm determination to make society free from the chaos of capitalism and imperialism, which has drenched the country in blood in this most criminal war of all wars, the constituent assembly accepts completely the policy of the soviets, whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the most extensive fraternization between the workers and peasants of warring armies, and by revolutionary methods to bring about a democratic peace among the belligerent nations without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of the free self-determination of nations--at any price. . for this purpose the constituent assembly declares its complete separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples of the colonies and the small nations generally. the constituent assembly accepts the policy of the council of people's commissars in giving complete independence to finland, in beginning the withdrawal of troops from persia, and in declaring for armenia the right of self-determination. a blow at international financial capital is the soviet decree which annuls foreign loans made by the governments of the czar, the landowners and the bourgeoisie. the soviet government is to continue firmly on this road until the final victory from the yoke of capitalism is won through international workers' revolt. as the constituent assembly was elected on the basis of lists of candidates nominated before the november revolution, when the people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and did not know how powerful would be the strength of the exploiters in defending their privileges, and had not yet begun to create a socialist society, the constituent assembly considers it, even from a formal point of view, unjust to oppose the soviet power. the constituent assembly is of the opinion that at this moment, in the decisive hour of the struggle of the people against their exploiters, the exploiters must not have a seat in any government organization or institution. the power completely and without exception belongs to the people and its authorized representatives--the workers', soldiers' and peasants' soviets. supporting the soviet rule and accepting the orders of the council of people's commissars, the constituent assembly acknowledges its duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society. striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and thereby also a complete and strong, union among the toiling classes of all the russian nations, the constituent assembly limits itself to outlining the basis of the federation of russian soviet republics, leaving to the people, to the workers and soldiers, to decide for themselves, in their own soviet meetings, if they are willing, and on what conditions they prefer, to join the federated government and other federations of soviet enterprise. these general principles are to be published without delay, and the official representatives of the soviets are required to read them at the opening of the constituent assembly. the demand for the adoption of this declaration gave rise to a long and stormy debate. the leaders of the socialist-revolutionists and the mensheviki stoutly contended that the adoption of the declaration would be virtually an abdication of the task for which the constituent assembly had been elected by the people, and, therefore, a betrayal of trust. they could not admit the impudent claim that an election held in november, based upon universal suffrage, on lists made up as recently as september, could in january be set aside as being "obsolete" and "unrepresentative." that a majority of the bolshevik candidates put forward had been defeated, nullified, they argued, the claim of the bolsheviki that the fact that the candidates had all been nominated before the november insurrection should be regarded as reason for acknowledging the bolshevik soviet as superior to the constituent assembly. they insisted upon the point, which the bolshevik spokesmen did not attempt to controvert, that the constituent assembly represented the votes of many millions of men and women,[ ] while the total actual membership represented by the soviet power did not at the time number one hundred thousand! as might have been expected, the proposal to adopt the declaration submitted to the constituent assembly in this arrogant fashion was rejected by an enormous majority. the bolshevik members, who had tried to make the session a farce, thereupon withdrew after submitting a statement in which they charged the constituent assembly with being a counter-revolutionary body, and the revolutionary-socialist party with being a traitorous party "directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workers' revolution." the statement said that the bolshevik members withdrew "in order to permit the soviet power to determine what relations it would hold with the counter-revolutionary section of the constituent assembly"--a threat which needed no interpretation. after the withdrawal of the bolshevik members, the majority very quickly adopted a declaration which had been carefully prepared by the socialist-revolutionists during the weeks which had elapsed since the elections in the preliminary conferences which had been held for that purpose. the declaration read as follows: russia's form of government in the name of the peoples who compose the russian state, the all-russian constituent assembly proclaims the russian state to be the russian democratic federated republic, uniting indissolubly into one whole the peoples and territories which are sovereign within the limits prescribed by the federal constitution. laws regarding land ownership . _the right to privately own land within the boundaries of the russian republic is hereby abolished forever._ . all land within the boundaries of the russian republic, with all mines, forests, and waters, is hereby declared the property of the nation. . the republic has the right to control all land, with all the mines, forests, and waters thereof, through the central and local administration, in accordance with the regulation provided by the present law. . the autonomous provinces of the russian republic have title to land on the basis of the present law and in accordance with the federal constitution. . the tasks of the central and local governments as regards the use of lands, mines, forests, and waters are: a. the creation of conditions conducive to the best possible utilization of the country's natural resources and the highest possible development of its productive forces. b. the fair distribution of all natural wealth among the people. . the rights of individuals and institutions to land, mines, forests, and waters are restricted merely to utilization by said individuals and institutions. . the use of all mines, forests, land, and waters is free to all citizens of the russian republic, regardless of nationality or creed. this includes all unions of citizens, also governmental and public institutions. . the right to use the land is to be acquired and discontinued on the basis prescribed by this fundamental law. . _all titles to land at present held by the individuals, associations, and institutions are abolished in so far as they contradict this law._ . all land, mines, forests, waters, at present owned by and otherwise in the possession of individuals, associations, and institutions, _are confiscated without compensation for the loss incurred._ democratic peace in the name of the peoples of the russian republic, the all-russian constituent assembly expresses the firm will of the people to _immediately discontinue the war_ and conclude a just and general peace, appeals to the allied countries proposing to define jointly the exact terms of the democratic peace acceptable to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms, in behalf of the allies, to the governments fighting against the russian republic and her allies. the constituent assembly firmly believes that the attempts of the peoples of russia to end the disastrous war will meet with a unanimous response on the part of the peoples and the governments of the allied countries, and that by common efforts a speedy peace will be attained, which will safeguard the well-being and dignity of all the belligerent countries. the constituent assembly resolves to elect from its midst an authorized delegation which will carry on negotiations with the representatives of the allied countries and which will present the appeal to jointly formulate terms upon which a speedy termination of the war will be possible, as well as for the purpose of carrying out the decisions of the constituent assembly regarding the question of peace negotiations with the countries fighting against us. this delegation, which is to be under the guidance of the constituent assembly, is to immediately start fulfilling the duties imposed upon it. expressing, in the name of the peoples of russia, its regret that the negotiations with germany, which were started without preliminary agreement with the allied countries, have assumed the character of negotiations for a separate peace, the constituent assembly, in the name of the peoples of the federated republic, _while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on of the negotiations with the countries warring against us_ in order to work toward a general democratic peace which shall be in accordance "with the people's will and protect russia's interests." vi immediately following the dissolution of the constituent assembly a body of red guards shot the two constitutional democrats, kokoshkin and shingariev, who were at the time confined as prisoners who were ill in the naval hospital. the reason for the brutal murder of these men was that they were bourgeoisie and, therefore, enemies of the working class! it is only just to add that the foul deed was immediately condemned by the bolshevik government and by the soviet of petrograd. "the working class will never approve of any outrages upon our prisoners, whatever may have been their political offense against the people and their revolution," the latter body declared, in a resolution on the subject of the assassinations. two days after the dissolution of the constituent assembly twenty-three socialist-revolutionist members of that body, assembled at the office of their party, were arrested, and the premises occupied by red guards, the procedure being exactly as it used to be in the old days under the czar. there is a relentless logic of life and action from which there can be no escape. czarism was a product of that inexorable process. all its oppression and brutality proceeded by an inevitable and irresistible sequence from the first determination and effort to realize the principle of autocracy. any dictatorship, whether of a single man, a group or class, must rest ultimately upon oppressive and coercive force. believing that the means would be justified by the end, lenine and trotzky and their associates had suppressed the constituent assembly, claiming that parliamentary government, based upon the equal and free suffrage of all classes, was, during the transition period, dangerous to the proletariat; that in its stead a new type of government must be established--government by associations of wage-earners, soldiers, and peasants, called soviets. but what if among these there should develop a purpose contrary to the purpose of the bolsheviki? would men who, starting out with a belief in the constituante, and as its champions, used force to destroy and suppress it the moment it became evident that its purpose was not their purpose, hesitate to suppress and destroy any soviet movement which adopted policies contrary to their own? what assurance could there be, once their point of view, their initial principle, was granted, that the freedom denied to the constituante would be assured to the soviets? in the very nature of the case there could be no such assurance. however honest and sincere the bolsheviki themselves might be in their belief that there would be such assurance, there could in fact be none, for the logic of life is stronger than any human will. as was inevitable, the bolsheviki soon found themselves in the position of suppressing soviets which they could not control as freely and in the same manner as they had suppressed the constituent assembly. when, for example, the soldiers of the preobrajenski regiment--the very men who helped the bolsheviki into power--became dissatisfied and organized, publishing their own organ, _the soldier's cloak_, the paper was confiscated and the organization suppressed.[ ] the forcible suppression of soviets was common. the central executive committee of the national soviet of peasants' delegates, together with the old central executive committee of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates (who had never acknowledged the october elections), convoked an extraordinary assembly of soviets on january th, the same date as that on which the bolshevik congress of soviets was convoked. circumstances compelled the opening to be deferred until two days later, the th. this conference, called the third all-russian congress of peasants' soviets, was suppressed by force, many of the delegates and all the members of the executive committee being arrested. the following extract from a declaration of protest addressed by the outraged peasants to the congress of soviets of workmen, soldiers, and peasants convoked by the bolshevik government tells the story: as soon as the congress was opened, sailors and red guards, armed with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises ( kirillovskaia street), surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave. "in whose name do you order us, who are delegates to the peasants' congress of all-russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants. "in the name of the baltic fleet," the sailor's replied. the peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. one by one the peasants ascended the tribune to stigmatize the bolsheviki in speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the constituent assembly.... this session of the congress presented a strange spectacle: disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they were there, the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined them. then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. the soldiers, lowering their guns, knelt down also. the bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn of events. "enough said," declared the chiefs; "we have come not to speak, but to act. if they do not want to go to smolny, let them get out of here." and they set themselves to the task. in groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled upon, and, on their refusal to go to smolny, pushed out of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing. members of the executive committee were arrested,[ ] the premises occupied by sailors and red guards, the objects found therein stolen. the peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality. a certain number were lodged in the barracks of the preobrajenski regiment. the sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to logvinov, and wept when they saw that they had understood nothing, now became the docile executioners of the orders of the bolsheviki. and when they were asked, "why do you do this?" they answered, as in the time, still recent, of czarism: "it is the order. no need to talk."[ ] we do not need to rely upon the testimony of witnesses belonging to the revolutionary socialist party, the mensheviki, or other factions unfriendly to the bolsheviki. however trustworthy such testimony may be, and however well corroborated, we cannot expect it to be convincing to those who pin their faith to the bolsheviki. such people will believe only what the bolsheviki themselves say about bolshevism. it is well, therefore, that we can supplement the testimony already given by equally definite and direct testimony from official bolshevist sources to the same effect. from the official organs of the bolsheviki it can be shown that the bolshevik authorities suppressed soviet after soviet; that when they found that soviets were controlled by socialists who belonged to other factions they dissolved them and ordered new elections, refusing to permit the free choice of the members to be expressed in selecting their officers. the bolsheviki did this, it should be remembered, not merely in cases where mensheviki or socialist-revolutionists were in the majority, but also in cases where the majority consisted of members of the socialist-revolutionary party of the left--the faction which had united with the bolsheviki in suppressing the constituante. their union with the bolsheviki was from the first a compromise, based upon the political opportunism of both sides. the socialist-revolutionists of the left did not believe in the bolshevik theories or program, but they wanted the political assistance of the bolsheviki. the latter did not believe in the theories or program of the socialist-revolutionists of the left, but they wanted their political support. the union could not long endure; the differences were too deeply rooted. before very long the bolsheviki were fighting their former allies and the socialist-revolutionists of the left, like marie spiridonova, for example, were fighting the bolsheviki. at kazan, where lenine went to school, the soviet was dissolved because it was controlled by socialist-revolutionists of the left, former allies, now hostile to the bolsheviki. here are two paragraphs from _izvestya_, one of the bolshevist official organs: kazan, _july th. as the important offices in the soviet were occupied by socialist-revolutionists of the left, the extraordinary commission has dissolved the provisional soviet. the governmental power is now represented by a revolutionary committee. (izvestya, july , .)_ kazan, _august _. the state of mind of the workmen is revolutionary. _if the mensheviki dare to carry on their propaganda, death menaces them. (idem, august .)_ and here is confirmation from another official organ of the bolsheviki, _pravda_: kazan, _august th_. the provisional congress of the soviets of the peasants has been dissolved because of the absence from it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is obviously counter-revolutionary. (pravda, august , .)_ as early as april, , the soviet at jaroslav was dissolved by the bolshevik authorities and new elections ordered.[ ] in these elections the mensheviki and the socialist-revolutionists everywhere gained an absolute majority.[ ] the population here wanted the constituent assembly and they wanted russia to fight on with the allies. attempts to suppress this majority led to insurrection, which the bolsheviki crushed in the most brutal manner, and when the people, overpowered and helpless, sought to make peace, the bolsheviki only _increased the artillery fire_! here is an "official bulletin," published in _izvestya_, july , : at jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our troops, has tried to enter into negotiations. _the reply has been given under the form of redoubled artillery fire._ _izvestya_ published, on july th, a bolshevist military proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of jaroslav concerning the insurrection which originally arose from the suppression of the soviet and other popular assemblages: the general staff notifies to the population of jaroslav that all those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in the course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the america bridge. those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and no quarter will be given to any one_. heavy artillery fire and gas-bombs will be used against them. _all those who remain will perish in the ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, the traitors, and the enemies of the workers' and peasants' revolution._ next day, july th, _izvestya_ published the information that "after minute questionings and full inquiry" a special commission appointed to inquire into the events relating to the insurrection at jaroslav had listed persons as having "taken an active part in the insurrection and had relations with the czecho-slovaks," and that by order of the commissioners the whole band of had been shot! it is needless to multiply the illustrations of brutal oppression--of men and women arrested and imprisoned for no other crime than that of engaging in propaganda in favor of government by universal suffrage; of newspapers confiscated and suppressed; of meetings banned and soviets dissolved because the members' "state of mind" did not please the bolsheviki. maxim gorky declared in his _novya zhizn_ that there had been "ten thousand lynchings." upon what authority gorky--who was inclined to sympathize with the bolsheviki, and who even accepted office under them--based that statement is not known. probably it is an exaggeration. one thing, however, is quite certain, namely, that a reign of terror surpassing the worst days of the old régime was inflicted upon unhappy russia by the bolsheviki. at the very beginning of the bolshevik régime trotzky laughed to scorn all the protests against violence, threatening that resort would be had to the guillotine. speaking to the opponents of the bolshevik policy in the petrograd soviet, he said: "you are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against our class enemies, but know that not later than a month hence this terror will take a more terrible form on the model of the terror of the great revolutionaries of france. not a fortress, but the guillotine will be for our enemies." that threat was not literally carried out, but there was a near approach to it when public hangings for civil offenses were established. for reintroducing the death penalty into the army as a means of putting an end to treason and the brutal murder of officers by rebellious soldiers, the bolsheviki excoriated kerensky. _yet they themselves introduced hanging and flogging in public for petty civil crimes!_ the death penalty was never inflicted for civil crimes under the late czar. it was never inflicted for political offenses. only rarely was it inflicted for murder. it remained for a so-called "socialist" government to resort to such savagery as we find described in the following extract from the recognized official organ of the bolshevik government: two village robbers were condemned to death. all the people of semenovskaia and the surrounding communes were invited to the ceremony. on july th, at midday, a great crowd of interested spectators arrived at the village of loupia. the organizers of the execution gave to each of the bystanders the opportunity of flogging the condemned to obtain from them supplementary confessions. the number of blows was unlimited. then a vote of the spectators was taken as to the method of execution. the majority was for hanging. in order that the spectacle could be easily seen, the spectators were ranged in three ranks--the first row sat down, the second rested on the knee, and the third stood up.[ ] the bolshevik government created an all-russian extraordinary commission, which in turn created provincial and district extraordinary commissions. these bodies--the local not less than the national--were empowered to make arrests and even decree and carry out capital sentences. there was no appeal from their decisions; they were simply required to _report afterward_! only members of the bolshevik party were immune from this terror. alminsky, a bolshevist writer of note, felt called upon to protest against this hideous travesty of democratic justice, and wrote in _pravda_: the absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the "instruction" issued by the all-russian extraordinary commission to "all provincial extraordinary commissions," which says: "the all-russian extraordinary commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying out house searches, arrests, executions, of which it _afterward_ reports to the council of the people's commissaries and to the central executive council." further, the provincial and district extraordinary commissions "are independent in their activities, and when called upon by the local executive council present a report of their work." in so far as house searches and arrests are concerned, a report made _afterward_ may result in putting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. the same cannot be said of executions.... it can also be seen from the "instruction" that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members of the government, of the central council, and of the local executive committees. with the exception of these few persons all members of the local committees of the [bolshevik] party, of the control committees, and of the executive committee of the party may be shot at any time by the decision of any extraordinary commission of a small district town if they happen to be on its territory, and a report of that made _afterward._[ ] vii while in some respects, such as this terrible savagery, bolshevism has out-heroded herod and surpassed the régime of the romanovs in cruel oppression, upon the whole its methods have been very like that of the latter. there is really not much to choose between the ways of stolypin and von plehve and those of the lenine-trotzky rule. the methods employed have been very similar and in not a few instances the same men who acted as the agents of espionage and tyranny for the czar have served the bolsheviki in the same capacity. just as under czarism there was alliance with the black hundreds and with all sorts of corrupt and vicious criminal agents, so we find the same phenomenon recurring under the bolsheviki. the time has not yet arrived for the compilation of the full record of bolshevism in this particular, but enough is known to justify the charge here made. that agents-provocateurs, spies, informers, police agents, and pogrom-makers formerly in the service of the czar have been given positions of trust and honor by lenine and trotzky unfortunately admits of no doubt whatever. it was stated at a meeting of russians held in paris in the summer of that one of the first russian regiments which refused to obey orders to advance "contained former political or civil police agents out of refractory soldiers." during the kerensky régime, at the time when lenine was carrying on his propaganda through _pravda_,[ ] vladimir bourtzev exposed three notorious agents of the old police terror, provocateurs, who were working on the paper. in august, , the jewish conjoint committee in london published a long telegram from the representative of the jewish committee in petrograd, calling attention to the fact that lenine's party was working in tacit agreement with the black hundreds. the telegram is here given in full: extreme russian reactionaries have allied themselves closely with extreme revolutionaries, and black hundreds have entered into tacit coalition with the lenine party. in the army the former agents and detectives of the political police carry on ardent campaign for defeat, and in the rear the former agents-provocateurs prepare and direct endless troubles. the motives of this policy on the part of the reactionaries are clear. it is the direct road to a counter-revolution. the troubles, the insurrections, and shocking disorders which follow provoke disgust at the revolution, while the military defeats prepare the ground for an intervention of the old friend of the russian black hundreds, william ii, the counter-revolutionaries work systematically for the defeat of the russian armies, sometimes openly, cynically. thus in their press and proclamations they go so far as to throw the whole responsibility for the war and for the obstacles placed in the way of a peace with germany on the jews. it is these "diabolical jews," they say, who prevent the conclusion of peace and insist on the continuation of the war, because they desire to ruin russia. proclamations in this sense have been found, together with a voluminous anti-semitic literature, in the offices of the party of lenine bolsheviki (maximalists), and particularly at the headquarters of the extreme revolutionaries, château knheshinskaja. salutations. blank. that the leaders of the bolsheviki, particularly lenine and trotzky, ever entered into any "agreement" with the black hundreds, or took any part in the anti-semitic campaign referred to, is highly improbable. unless and until it is supported by ample evidence of a competent nature, we shall be justified in refusing to believe anything of the sort. it is, however, quite probable that provocateurs worming their way into lenine's and trotzky's good graces tried to use the bolshevik agitation as a cover for their own nefarious work. as we have seen already, lenine had previously been imposed upon by a notorious secret police agent, malinovsky. but the open association of the bolsheviki with men who played a despicable rôle under the old régime is not to be denied. the simple-minded reader of bolshevist literature who believes that the bolshevik government, whatever its failings, has the merit of being a government by real working-men and working-women, needs to be enlightened. not only are lenine and trotzky not of the proletariat themselves, but they have associated with themselves men whose lives have been spent, not as workers, not even as simple bourgeoisie, but as servants of the terror-system of the czar. they have associated with themselves, too, some of the most corrupt criminals in russia. here are a few of them: professor kobozev, of riga, joined the bolsheviki and was active as a delegate to the municipal council of petrograd. according to the information possessed by the russian revolutionary leaders, this professor kobozev used to be a police spy, his special job being to make reports to the police concerning the political opinions and actions of students and faculty members. one of the very first men released from prison by the bolsheviki was one doctor doubrovine, who had been a leader of the black hundreds, an organizer of many pogroms. he became an active bolshevik. kamenev, the bolshevik leader, friend of lenine, is a journalist. he was formerly a member of the old social democratic party. soon after the war broke out he was arrested and behaved so badly that he was censured by his party. early in the revolution of he was accused of serving the secret police at kiev. bonno brouevitch, military councilor to the bolshevik government, was a well-known anti-semite who had been dismissed from his military office on two occasions, once by the czar's government and once by the provisional government. general komisarov, another of lenine's trusted military officials and advisers, was formerly a chief official of the czar's secret police, known for his terrible persecution of the revolutionists. accused of high treason by the provisional government, he fled, but returned and joined the lenine-trotzky forces. prince andronikov, associate of rasputin; (lenine's "my friend, the prince"); orlov, police agent and "denouncer" and secretary of the infamous protopopov; postnikov, convicted and imprisoned as a german spy in ; lepinsky, formerly in the czar's secret police; and gualkine, friend of the unspeakable rasputin, are some of the other men who have been closely identified with the "proletarian régime" of the bolsheviki.[ ] the man they released from prison and placed in the important position of military commander of petrograd was muraviev, who had been chief of the czar's police and was regarded by even the moderate members of the provisional government, both under lvov and kerensky, as a dangerous reactionary.[ ] karl radek, the bohemian, a notorious leader of the russian bolsheviki, who undertook to stir up the german workers and direct the spartacide revolt, was, according to _justice_, expelled from the german social democratic party before the war as a thief and a police spy.[ ] how shall we justify men calling themselves socialists and proletarian revolutionists, who ally themselves with such men as these, but imprison, harry, and abuse such men and women as bourtzev, kropotkin, plechanov, breshkovskaya, tchaykovsky, spiridonova, agounov, larokine, avksentiev, and many other socialists like them? in surveying the fight of the bolsheviki to establish their rule it is impossible to fail to observe that their chief animus has been directed against other socialists, rather than against members of the reactionary parties. that this has been the fact they do not themselves deny. for example, the "people's commissary of justice," g.i. oppokov, better known as "lomov," declared in an interview in january, : "our chief enemies are not the cadets. our most irreconcilable opponents are the moderate socialists. this explains the arrests of socialists and the closing down of socialist newspapers. such measures of repression are, however, only temporary."[ ] and in the soviet at petrograd, july , , according to _pravda_, lachevitch, one of the delegates, said: "the socialist-revolutionists of the right and the mensheviki are more dangerous for the government of the soviets than the bourgeoisie. but these enemies are not yet exterminated and can move about freely. the proletariat must act. we ought, once for all, to rid ourselves of the socialist-revolutionists of the right and of the mensheviki." in this summary of the bolsheviki war against democracy, it will be observed, no attempt has been made to gather all the lurid and fantastic stories which have been published by sensational journalists. the testimony comes from socialist sources of the utmost reliability, much of it from official bolshevist sources. the system of oppression it describes is twin brother to that which existed under the romanovs, to end which hundreds of thousands of the noblest and best of our humankind gave up their lives. under the banner of social democracy a tyranny has been established as infamous as anything in the annals of autocracy. "_o liberty, what monstrous crimes are committed in thy great name!_" chapter vii bolshevist theory and practice i utopia-making is among the easiest and most fascinating of all intellectual occupations. few employments which can be called intellectual are easier than that of devising panaceas for the ills of society, of demonstrating on paper how the rough places of life may be made plain and its crooked ones made straight. and it is not a vain and fruitless waste of effort and of time, as things so easy of achievement often are. many of the noblest minds of all lands and all ages have found pleasure and satisfaction in the imagining of ideal commonwealths and by so doing have rendered great service to mankind, enriching literature and, what is more important, stimulating the urge and passion for improvement and the faith of men in their power to climb to the farthest heights of their dreams. but the material of life is hard and lacks the plastic quality of inspired imagination. though there is probably no single evil which exists for which a solution has not been devised in the wonderful laboratory of visioning, the perversity of the subtle and mysterious thing called life is such that many great and grave evils continue to challenge, perplex, and harass our humankind. yet, notwithstanding the plain lesson of history and experience, the reminder impressed on every page of humanity's record, that between the glow and the glamour of the vision and its actual realization stretches a long, long road, there are many simple-minded souls to whom the vision gleamed is as the goal attained. they do not distinguish between schemes on paper and ideals crystallized into living realities. this type of mind is far more common than is generally recognized; that is why so many people quite seriously believe that the bolsheviki have really established in russia a society which conforms to the generous ideals of social democracy. they have read the rhetorical "decrees" and "proclamations" in which the shibboleths of freedom and democracy abound, and are satisfied. yet it ought to be plainly evident to any intelligent person that, even if the decrees and proclamations were as sound as they are in fact unsound, and as definite as they are in fact vague, they would afford no real basis for judging bolshevism as an actual experiment in social polity. there is, in ultimate analysis, only one test to apply to bolshevism--namely, the test of reality. we must ask what the bolsheviki did, not what they professed; what was the performance, not what was the promise. of course, this does not mean that we are to judge result wholly without regard to aim. admirable intention is still admirable as intention, even when untoward circumstance defeats it and brings deplorable results. bolshevism is not merely a body of belief and speculation. when the bolsheviki seized the government of russia and began to attempt to carry out their ideas, bolshevism became a living movement in a world of reality and subject to the acid test of pragmatic criteria. it must be judged by such a matter-of-fact standard as the extent to which it has enlarged or diminished the happiness, health, comfort, freedom, well-being, satisfaction, and efficiency of the greatest number of individuals. unless the test shows that it has increased the sum of good available for the mass, bolshevism cannot be regarded as a gain. if, on the contrary, the test shows that it has resulted in sensibly diminishing the sum of good available to the greatest number of people, bolshevism must be counted as a move in the wrong direction, as so much effort lost. nothing that can be urged on philosophical or moral grounds for or against the moral or intellectual impulses that prompted it can fundamentally change the verdict. yet, for all that, it is well to examine the theory which inspires the practice; well to know the manner and method of thinking, and the view of life, from which bolshevism as a movement of masses of men and women proceeds. theoretically, bolshevism, as such, has no necessary connection with the philosophy or the program of socialism. certain persons have established a working relation between socialism, a program, and bolshevism, a method. the connection is not inherently logical, but, on the contrary, wholly adventitious. as a matter of fact, bolshevism can only be linked to the program of socialism by violently and disastrously weakening the latter and destroying its fundamental character. we shall do well to remember this; to remember that the method of action, and, back of the method, the philosophy on which it rests and from which it springs, are separate and distinct from socialism. they are incalculably older and they have been associated with vastly different programs. all that is new in bolshevism is that a very old method of action, and a very old philosophy of action, have been seized upon by a new class which attempts to unite them to a new program. that is all that is implied in the "dictatorship of the proletariat." dictatorship by small minorities is not a new political phenomenon. all that is new when the minority attempting to establish its dictatorship is composed of poor, propertyless people, is the fact of their economic condition and status. that is the only difference between the dictatorship of russia by the romanov dynasty and the dictatorship of russia by a small minority of determined, class-conscious working-people. it is not only the precise forms of oppressive power used by them that are identically characteristic of czarism and bolshevism, but their underlying philosophy. both forms of dictatorship rest upon the philosophy of might as the only valid right. militarism, especially as it was developed under prussian leadership, has exactly the same philosophy and aims at the same general result, namely, to establish the domination and control of society by a minority class. the bolsheviki have simply inverted czarism and militarism. what really shocks the majority of people is not, after all, the methods or the philosophy of bolshevism, but the fact that the bolsheviki, belonging to a subject class, have seized upon the methods and philosophy of the most powerful ruling classes and turned them to their own account. there is a class morality and a class psychology the subtle influences of which few perceive as a matter of habit, which, however, to a great extent shape our judgments, our sympathies, and our antipathies. men who never were shocked when a czar, speaking the language of piety and religion, indulged in the most infamous methods and deeds of terror and oppression, are shocked beyond all power of adequate expression when former subjects of that same czar, speaking the language of the religion of democracy and freedom, resort to the same infamous methods of terror and oppression. ii the idea that a revolting proletarian minority might by force impose its rule upon society runs through the history of the modern working class, a note of impatient, desperate, menacing despair. the bolsheviki say that they are marxian socialists; that marx believed in and advocated the setting up, during the transitory period of social revolution, of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." they are not quite honest in this claim, however; they are indulging in verbal tricks. it is true that marx taught that the proletarian dominion of society, as a preliminary to the abolition of all class rule of every kind, must be regarded as certain and inevitable. but it is not honest to claim the sanction of his teaching for the seizure of political power by a small class, consisting of about per cent. of the population, and the imposition by force of its rule upon the majority of the population that is either unwilling or passive. that is the negation of marxian socialism. _it is the essence of marx's teaching that the social revolution must come as a historical necessity when the proletariat itself comprises an overwhelming majority of the people_. let us summarize the theory as it appears in the _communist manifesto_: marx begins by setting forth the fact that class conflict is as old as civilization itself, that history is very largely the record of conflicts between contending social classes. in our epoch, he argues, class conflict is greatly simplified; there is really only one division, that which divides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: "society as a whole is more and more splitting up into great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat." ... "with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; it becomes concentrated in great masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more." ... "the proletarian movement is the _self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority in the interests of the immense majority_." it is this "immense majority" that is to establish its dominion. marx expressly points out that "all previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities." it is the great merit of the movement of the proletariat, as he conceives it, that it is the "movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority." clearly, when lenine and his followers say that they take their doctrine of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" from marx, they pervert the truth; they take from marx only the phrase, not their fundamental policy. it is not to be denied that there were times when marx himself momentarily lapsed into the error of blanqui and the older school of utopian, conspiratory socialists who believed that they could find a short cut to social democracy; that by a surprise stroke, carefully prepared and daringly executed, a small and desperate minority could overthrow the existing social order and bring about socialism. as jaurès has pointed out,[ ] the mind of marx sometimes harked back to the dramatic side of the french revolution, and was captivated by such episodes as the conspiracy of babeuf and his friends, who in their day, while the proletariat was a small minority, even as it is in russia now, sought to establish its dominion. but it is well known that after the failure of the paris commune, in , marx once and for all abandoned all belief in this form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat," and in the possibility of securing socialism through the conspiratory action of minorities. he was even rather unwilling that the _manifesto_ should be republished after that, except as a purely historical document. it was in that spirit of reaction that he and engels wrote in that passage--to which lenine has given such an unwarranted interpretation--in which they say that the commune had shown that "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-made state machine and set it in motion for their own aims." it was no less an interpreter of marx than his great collaborator and friend, frederick engels, who, in , stated the reasons for abandoning all belief in the possibility of accomplishing anything through political surprises and through the action of small conscious and determined minorities at the head of unconscious masses: history proved that we were wrong--we and those who like us, in , awaited the speedy success of the proletariat. it became perfectly clear _that economic conditions all over the continent were by no means as yet sufficiently matured for superseding the capitalist organization of production_. this was proved by the economic revolution which commenced on the continent of europe after and developed in france, austria-hungary, poland, and, recently, also in russia, and made germany into an industrial state of the first rank--all on a capitalist basis, _which shows that in the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion_. and to-day we have a huge international army of socialists.... if this mighty proletarian army has not yet reached its goal, if it is destined to gain its ends only in a long drawn out struggle, making headway but slowly, step by step, this only proves how impossible it was in to change social conditions by forcible means ... the time for small minorities to place themselves at the head of the ignorant masses and resort to force in order to bring about revolutions, is gone. _a complete change in the organization of society can be brought about only by the conscious co-operation of the masses_; they must be alive to the aim in view; they must know what they want. the history of the last fifty years has taught us that.[ ] what engels had in mind when he stressed the fact that history showed that in "the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion" is the central marxian doctrine of historical inevitability. it is surely less than honest to claim the prestige and authority of marx's teachings upon the slender basis of a distorted version of his early thought, while completely ignoring the matured body of his doctrines. it may not matter much to the world to-day what marx thought, or how far lenine follows his teachings, but it is of importance that the claim set up by lenine and trotzky and many of their followers that they are guided by the principles of marxian socialism is itself demonstrably an evidence of moral or intellectual obliquity, which makes them very dangerous guides to follow. it is of importance, too, that the claim they make allures many socialists of trusting and uncritical minds to follow them. many times in his long life marx, together with engels, found himself engaged in a fierce war against the very things lenine and trotzky and their associates have been trying to do. he thundered against weitling, who wanted to have a "daring minority" seize the power of the state and establish its dictatorship by a _coup d'état_. he was denounced as a "reactionary" by willich and kinkel because, in , he rejected with scorn the idea of a sudden seizure of political power through conspiratory action, and had the courage to say that it would take fifty years for the workers "to fit themselves for political power." he opposed lassalle's idea of an armed insurrection in , because he was certain that the economic development had not yet reached the stage which alone could make a social change possible. he fought with all the fierce impetuousness of his nature every attempt of bakunin to lead the workers to attempt the seizure of political power and forcibly establish their rule while still a minority.[ ] he fought all these men because he had become profoundly convinced that "_no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new and higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society_."[ ] no "dictatorship of the proletariat," no action by any minority, however well armed or however desperate, can overcome that great law. the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the sense in which that term is used by the russian bolshevik leaders, and by those who in other countries are urging that their example be followed, is not a policy of marxian socialism. it is not a product of modern conditions. rather it harks back to the earlier conspiratory socialism of blanqui, with its traditions inherited from robespierre and babeuf. so far as its advocates are concerned, marx and the whole modern socialist movement might as well never have existed at all. they take us back three-quarters of a century, to the era before marx, to that past so remote in intellectual and moral character, though recent in point of time, when the working class of no country in europe possessed the right to vote--when the workers were indeed proletarians and not citizens; not only propertyless, but also "without a fatherland." in truth, it is not difficult to understand how this theory has found acceptance in russia. it was not difficult to understand why marx's doctrine of economic evolution was for many years rejected by most russian socialists; why the latter took the view that socialism must be more quickly attained, that capitalism was not a necessary precursor of socialism in russia, but that an intelligent leadership of passive masses would successfully establish socialism on the basis of the old russian communal institutions. it was quite easy to understand the change that came with russia's industrial awakening, how the development of factory production gave an impetus to the marxian theories. and, though it presents a strange paradox, in that it comes at a time when, despite everything, russian capitalism continues to develop, it is really not difficult to understand how and why pre-marxian conceptions reappear in that great land of paradoxes. politically and intellectually the position of the proletariat of russia before the recent revolution was that of the proletariat of france in . but that which baffles the mind of the serious investigator is the readiness of so many presumably intelligent people living in countries where--as in america--wholly different conditions prevail to ignore the differences and be ready to abandon all the democratic advance made by the workers. there is nothing more certain in the whole range of social and political life than the fact that the doctrine that the power of the state must be seized and used by the proletariat against the non-proletarian classes, even for a relatively brief period, _can only be carried out by destroying all the democracy thus far achieved_. iii the validity of the foregoing contention can scarcely be questioned, except by those to whom phrases are of more consequence than facts, who place theories above realities. the moment the bolsheviki tried to translate their rhetorical propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat into the concrete terms of political reality they found that they were compelled to direct their main opposition, not against the bourgeoisie, or even against capitalism, but against the newly created democracy. in the movement to create a democratic government resting upon the basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage they saw a peril to their scheme far more formidable than militarism or capitalism. it was for this reason that they set themselves to the task of suppressing the constituent assembly. only political simpletons will seriously regard the bolshevik attempt to camouflage their motive by pretending that they determined to crush the constituent assembly because its members were elected on a register that was "obsolete" and therefore no longer truly represented the people. the german spartacides, who were acting in full accord with the russian bolsheviki, had not that miserable excuse. yet they set out by force of arms to _prevent any election being held_. in this they were quite consistent; they wanted to set up a dictatorship, and they knew that the overwhelming mass of the people wanted something very different. at a dinner of the inter-collegiate socialist society in new york, in december, , a spokesman for the german variety of bolshevism blandly explained that "karl liebknecht and his comrades know that they cannot hope to get a majority, therefore they are determined that no elections shall be held. they will prevent this by force. after some time, perhaps, when a proletarian régime has existed long enough, and people have become convinced of the superiority of the socialist way, or at least grown used to it, _and it is safe to do so_, popular elections may be permitted." incredible as it seems, this declaration was received with cheers by an audience which only a few minutes before had cheered with equal fervor denunciations of "encroachments upon american democracy." curiously enough, the precise manner in which the bolsheviki have acted against democracy was set forth, as far back as , by a german, johann von miquel, in a letter to karl marx. miquel was born in hanover, but his ancestors were of french origin. he studied at heidelberg and göttingen, and became associated with the socialist movement of the period. he settled down to the practice of law, however, and when hanover was annexed by prussia he entered the prussian parliament. after the "dismissal of the pilot," bismarck, he became prussian minister of finance, holding that position for ten years. liebknecht referred to him as "my former _comrade in communismo_ and present chancellor _in re_." this miquel, while he was still a socialist, in wrote to marx as follows: the workers' party may succeed against the upper middle class and what remains of the feudal element, _but it will be attacked on its flank by the democracy_. we can perhaps give an anti-bourgeois tone to the revolution for a little while, _we can destroy the essential conditions of bourgeois production_; but we cannot possibly put down the small tradesmen and shopkeeping class, the petty bourgeoisie. my motto is to secure all we can get. we should prevent the lower and middle class from _forming any organizations for as long a time as possible_ after the first victory, and especially oppose ourselves in serried ranks to the plan of calling a constitutional assembly. partial terrorism, local anarchy, must replace for us what we lack in bulk. what a remarkable anticipation of the bolshevist methods of - is thus outlined in this letter, written sixty-seven years before the bolshevik _coup d'état!_ how literally lenine, trotzky and co. have followed herr von miquel! they have desperately tried to "give an anti-bourgeois tone to the revolution," denouncing as bourgeois reactionaries the men and women whose labors and sacrifices have made the russian socialist movement. they have destroyed "the essential conditions" of bourgeois and of any other than the most primitive production. they have set themselves in serried ranks in opposition to "the plan of calling a constitutional assembly." they have suppressed not only the organizations of the "lower and middle class," but also those of a great part of the working class, thus going beyond miquel. finally, to replace what they lack in bulk, they have resorted to "partial terrorism and local anarchy." and it is in the name of revolutionary progress, of ultra-radicalism, that we are called upon to revert to the tactics of desperation born of the discouraging conditions of nearly seventy years ago. a new philosophy has taken possession of the easily possessed minds of greenwich village philosophers and parlor revolutionists--a new philosophy of progress, according to which revolutionary progress consists in the unraveling by feverish fingers of the fabric woven through years of sacrifice; in abandoning high levels attained for the lower levels from which the struggles of the past raised us; in harking back to the thoughts and the tactics of men who shouted their despairing, defiant cries into the gloom of the blackest period of the nineteenth century! universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was a fact in russia, the first great achievement of the revolution. upon that foundation, and upon no other, it was possible to build an enduring, comprehensive social democracy. against that foundation the bolsheviki hurled their destructive power, creating a discriminating class suffrage, disfranchising a great part of the russian people--not merely the bourgeoisie, but a considerable part of the working class itself. chapter xiii of article of the constitution of the "russian socialist federated soviet republic" sets forth the qualifications for voting, as follows: the right to vote chapter thirteen . the right to vote and to be elected to the soviets is enjoyed by the following citizens, irrespective of religion, nationality, domicile, etc., of the russian socialist federated soviet republic, of both sexes, who shall have completed their eighteenth year by the day of election: a. all who have acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to society, and also persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work--i.e., laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc.; and peasants and cossack agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making profits. b. soldiers of the army and navy of the soviets. c. citizens of the two preceding categories who have to any degree lost their capacity to work. note : local soviets may, upon approval of the central power, lower the age standard mentioned herein. note : non-citizens mentioned in paragraph (article , chapter five) have the right to vote. . the following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of the categories enumerated above, namely: a. persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profits. b. persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc. c. private merchants, trade, and commercial brokers. d. monks and clergy of all denominations. e. employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps, and the okhrana (czar's secret service), also members of the former reigning dynasty. f. persons who have in legal form been declared demented or mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship. g. persons who have been deprived by a soviet of their rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the period fixed by the sentence. apparently the constitution does not provide any standard for determining what labor is "useful and productive to society," and leaves the way open for a degree of arbitrariness on the part of some authority or other that is wholly incompatible with any generally accepted ideal of freedom and democracy. it is apparent from the text of paragraph , subdivision "a" of the foregoing chapter that housekeeping as such is not included in the category of "labor that is productive and useful to society," for a separate category is made of it. the language used is that "the right to vote and to be elected to the soviets is enjoyed by.... all who have acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to society, _and also_ persons engaged in housekeeping, which enables the former to do productive work--_i.e._, laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc." this _seems_ to mean that persons engaged in housekeeping can only vote if and when they are so engaged in order to enable other persons than themselves to do "productive work." it appears that housekeeping for persons not engaged in such productive work--for children, for example--would not confer the right to vote. it is not possible to tell with certainty what it _does_ mean, however, for there is probably not a single person in russia or in the world who can tell exactly what this precious instrument actually means. what standard is to be established to determine what labor is "productive" and "useful"? is the journalist, for instance, engaged in useful and productive labor? is the novelist? is the agitator? presumably the journalist employed in defending the soviet republic against attacks by unfriendly critics would be doing useful work and be entitled to vote, but what about the journalist employed in making the criticisms? would the wife of the latter, no matter how much she might disagree with her husband's views, be barred from voting, simply because she was "engaged in housekeeping" for one whose labors were not regarded "productive and useful to society"? if the language used means anything at all, apparently she would be so disfranchised. upon what ground is it decided that the "private merchant" may not vote? certainly it is not because his labor is of necessity neither productive nor useful, for paragraph says that even though belonging to one of the categories of persons otherwise qualified to vote, the private merchant may "enjoy neither the right to vote nor to be voted for." the keeper of a little grocery store, even though his income is not greater than that of a mechanic, and despite the fact that his store meets a local need and makes his services, therefore, "useful" in the highest degree, cannot enjoy civic rights, simply because he is a "merchant"! the clergy of all denominations are excluded from the franchise. it does not matter, according to this constitution, that a minister belongs to a church independent of any connection with the state, that he is elected by people who desire his services and is paid by them, that he satisfies them and is therefore doing a "useful service"--if utility means the satisfying of needs--because he is so employed he cannot vote. it is clearly provided that "peasants and cossack agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making profits" can vote and be voted for. but no persons "who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profits" may vote or be elected to office, _even though the work they do is productive and useful to society._ a peasant who hires no assistance may vote, but if he decides that by employing a boy to help him he will be able to give better attention to certain crops and make more money, even though he pays the boy every penny that the service is worth, judged by any standard whatever, he loses his vote and his civic status because, forsooth, he has gained in his net income as a result of his enterprise. and this is seriously put forward as the basis of government in a nation needing an intense and universal stimulation of its economic production. a militant suffragist friend of mine, whose passion for universal suffrage in america is so great that it leads her to join in all sorts of demonstrations protesting against the failure of the united states senate to pass the susan b. anthony amendment--even leading her to join in the public burning of president wilson's speeches, a queer emulation of the ancient ecclesiastical bigotry of burning heretical books!--manages to unite to her passion for equal and unrestricted suffrage an equally passionate admiration for the bolsheviki, arch-enemies of equal and unrestricted suffrage. her case is not exceptional: it is rather typical of the bolshevik following in england and in america. such minds are not governed and directed by rational processes, but by emotional impulses, generally of pathological origin. what the bolshevik constitution would mean if practically applied to american life to-day can be briefly indicated. the following classes would certainly be entitled to vote and to be elected to office: . all wage-earners engaged in the production of goods and utilities regarded by some designated authority as "productive and useful to society." . teachers and educators engaged in the public service. . all farmers owning and working their own farms without hired help of any kind. . all wage-earners engaged in the public service as employees of the state, subdivisions of the state, or public service corporations-such as postal clerks, street-railway workers, electricians, and so on. . wives and others engaged in keeping the homes of the foregoing, so as to enable them to work. . the "soldiers of the army and navy"--whether all officers are included is not clear from the text. now let us see what classes would be as certainly excluded from the right to vote and to be voted for. . every merchant from the keeper of a corner grocery store to the owner of a great mercantile establishment. . every banker, every commission agent, every broker, every insurance agent, every real-estate dealer. . every farmer who hires help of any kind--even a single "hand." . every petty contractor, garage-keeper, or other person employing any hired help whatever, including the professional writer who hires a stenographer, the doctor who hires a chauffeur, and the dentist who hires a mechanic assistant. . every clergyman and minister of the gospel. . every person whose income is derived from inherited wealth or from invested earnings, including all who live upon annuities provided by gift or bequest. . every person engaged in housekeeping for persons included in any of the foregoing six categories--including the wives of such disqualified persons. there are many occupational groups whose civic status is not so easily defined. the worker engaged in making articles of luxury, enjoyed only by the privileged few, could hardly have a better claim to a vote than the housekeeper of a man whose income was derived from foreign investments, or than the chauffeur of a man whose income was derived from government bonds. all three represent, presumably, types of that parasitic labor which subjects those engaged in it to disfranchisement. apparently, though not certainly, then, the following would also be disfranchised: . all lawyers except those engaged by the public authorities for the public service. . all teachers and educators other than those engaged in the public service. . all bankers, managers of industries, commercial travelers, experts, and accountants except those employed in the public service, or whose labor is judged by a competent tribunal to be necessary and useful. . all editors, journalists, authors of books and plays, except as special provision might be provided for individuals. . all persons engaged in occupations which a competent tribunal decided to classify as non-essential or non-productive. any serious attempt to introduce such restrictions and limitations of the right of suffrage in america would provoke irresistible revolt. it would be justly and properly regarded as an attempt to arrest the forward march of the nation and to turn its energies in a backward direction. it would be just as reactionary in the political world as it would be in the industrial world to revert back to hand-tool production; to substitute the ox-team for the railway system, the hand-loom for the power-loom, the flail for the threshing-machine, the sickle for the modern harvesting-machine, the human courier for the electric telegraph. yet we find a radical like mr. max eastman giving his benediction and approval to precisely such a program in russia as a substitute for universal suffrage. we find him quoting with apparent approval an article setting forth lenine's plan, hardly disguised, to disfranchise every farmer who employs even a single hired helper.[ ] lenine's position is quite clear. "only the proletariat leading on the poorest peasants (the semi-proletariat as they are called in our program) ... may undertake the steps toward socialism that have become absolutely unavoidable and non-postponable.... the peasants want to retain their small holdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution.... so be it. no sensible socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. if the lands are confiscated, _so long as the proletarians rule in the great centers, and all political power is handed over to the proletariat_, the rest will take care of itself."[ ] yet, in spite of lenine's insistence that all political power be "handed over to the proletariat," in spite of a score of similar utterances which might be quoted, and, finally, in spite of the soviet constitution which so obviously excludes from the right to vote a large part of the adult population, an american bolshevist pamphleteer has the effrontery to insult the intelligence of his readers by the stupidly and palpably false statement that "even at the present time per cent. in russia can vote, while in the united states only about per cent. can vote."[ ] of course it is only as a temporary measure that this dictatorship of a class is to be maintained. it is designed only for the period of transition and adjustment. in time the adjustment will be made, all forms of social parasitism and economic exploitation will disappear, and then it will be both possible and natural to revert to democratic government. too simple and naïve to be trusted alone in a world so full of trickery and tricksters as ours are they who find any asurance in this promise. they are surely among the most gullible of our humankind! of course, the answer to the claim is a very simple one: it is that no class gaining privilege and power ever surrenders it until it is compelled to do so. every one who has read the pre-marxian literature dealing with the dictatorship of the proletariat knows how insistent is the demand that the period of dictatorship must be _prolonged as much as possible_. even marx himself insisted, on one occasion at least, that it must be maintained as long as possible,[ ] and in the letter of johann von miquel, already quoted, we find the same thought expressed in the same terms, "as long as possible." but even if we put aside these warnings of human experience and of recorded history, and persuade ourselves that in russia we have a wholly new phenomenon, a class possessing powers of dictatorship animated by a burning passion to relinquish those powers as quickly as possible, is it not still evident that the social adjustments that must be made to reach the stage where, according to the bolshevik standards, political democracy can be introduced, must, under the most favorable circumstances conceivable, take many, many years? even lenine admits that "a sound solution of the problem of increasing the productivity of labor" (which lies at the very heart of the problem we are now discussing) "requires at least (especially after a most distressing and destructive war) several years."[ ] from the point of view of social democracy the basis of the bolshevik state is reactionary and unsound. the true socialist policy is that set forth by wilhelm liebknecht in the following words: "the political power which the social democracy aims at and which it will win, no matter what its enemies may do, _has not for its object the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the suppression of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie_."[ ] iv democracy in government and in industry must characterize any system of society which can be justly called socialist. thirteen years ago i wrote, "socialism without democracy is as impossible as a shadow without light."[ ] that seemed to me then, as it seems to-day, axiomatic. and so the greatest socialist thinkers and leaders always regarded it. "we have perceived that socialism and democracy are inseparable," declared william liebknecht, the well-beloved, in .[ ] thirty years earlier, in , he had given lucid expression to the same conviction in these words: "socialism and democracy are not the same, but they are only different expressions of the same fundamental idea. they belong to each other, round out each other, and can never stand in contradiction to each other. socialism without democracy is pseudo-socialism, just as democracy without socialism is pseudo-democracy."[ ] democracy in industry is, as i have insisted in my writing with unfailing consistency, as inseparable from socialism as democracy in government.[ ] unless industry is brought within the control of democracy and made responsive to the common will, socialism is not attained. everywhere the organized working class aspires to attain that industrial democracy which is the counterpart of political democracy. syndicalism, with all its vagaries, its crude reversal to outworn ideas and methods, is, nevertheless, fundamentally an expression of that yearning. it is the same passion that lies back of the shop stewards' movement in england, and that inspires the much more patiently and carefully developed theories and plans of the advocates of "guild socialism." motived by the same desire, our american labor-unions are demanding, and steadily gaining, an increasing share in the actual direction of industry. joint control by boards composed of representatives of employers, employees, and the general public is, to an ever-increasing extent, determining the conditions of employment, wage standards, work standards, hours of labor, choice and conduct of foremen, and many other matters of vital importance to the wage-earners. that we are still a long way from anything like industrial democracy is all too painfully true and obvious, but it is equally obvious that we are struggling toward the goal, and that there is a serious purpose and intention to realize the ideal. impelled by the inexorable logic of its own existence as a dictatorship, the bolshevik government has had to set itself against any and every manifestation of democracy in industry with the same relentless force as it opposed democracy in government. true, owing to the fact that, following the line of industrial evolution, the trade-union movement was not strongly enough developed to even attempt any organization for the expression of industrial democracy comparable to the constituent assembly. it is equally true, however, that had such an organization existed the necessity to suppress it, as the political organization was suppressed, would have proceeded inevitably and irresistibly from the creation of a dictatorship. _there cannot be, in any country, as co-existent forces, political dictatorship and industrial democracy._ it is also true that such democratic agencies as there were existing the bolsheviki neglected. that the bolsheviki did not establish industrial democracy in its fullest sense is not to be charged to their discredit. had bolshevism never appeared, and had the constituent assembly been permitted to function unmolested and free, it would have taken many years to realize anything like a well-rounded industrial democracy, for which a highly developed industrial system is absolutely essential. the leaders of the bolshevik movement recognized from the first that the time had not yet arrived for even attempting to set up a socialist commonwealth based on the social ownership and democratic control of industry. lenine frankly declared that "socialism cannot now prevail in russia,"[ ] and trotzky said, a month after the _coup d'état_: "we are not ready yet to take over all industry.... for the present, we expect of the earnings of a factory to pay the owner or per cent. yearly on his actual investment. what we aim at now is _control_ rather than _ownership_."[ ] he did not tell professor ross, who records this statement, on what grounds the owner of the property thus controlled by the soviet government, and who thus becomes a partner of the government, is to be excluded from the exercise of the franchise. but let that pass. when the bolsheviki seized the power of the state, they found themselves confronted by a terrific task. russia was utterly demoralized. an undeveloped nation industrially, war and internal strife had wrought havoc with the industrial life she had. her railways were neglected and the whole transportation system, entirely inadequate even for peace needs, had, under the strain of the war, fallen into chaos. after the march revolution, as a natural consequence of the intoxication of the new freedom, such disciplines as had existed were broken down. production fell off in a most alarming manner. during the kerensky régime skobelev, as minister of labor, repeatedly begged the workers to prove their loyalty to the revolution by increased exertion and faithfulness in the workshops and factories. the bolsheviki, on their part, as a means of fighting the provisional government, preached the opposite doctrine, that of sabotage. in every manner possible they encouraged the workers to limit production, to waste time and materials, strike for trivial reasons, and, in short, do all that was possible to defeat the effort to place industry upon a sound basis. when they found themselves in possession of the powers of government the bolshevik leaders soon had to face the stern realities of the conditions essential to the life of a great nation. they could not escape the necessity of intensifying production. they had not only promised peace, but bread, and bread comes only from labor. every serious student of the problem has realized that the first great task of any socialist society must be _to increase the productivity of labor_. it is all very well for a popular propaganda among the masses to promise a great reduction in the hours of labor and, at the same time, a great improvement in the standards of living. the translation of such promises into actual achievements must prove to be an enormous task. to build the better homes, make the better and more abundant clothing, shoes, furniture, and other things required to fulfil the promise, will require a great deal of labor, and such an organization of industry upon a basis of efficiency as no nation has yet developed. if the working class of this or any other country should take possession of the existing organization of production, there would not be enough in the fund now going to the capitalist class to satisfy the requirements of the workers, _even if not a penny of compensation were paid to the expropriated owners_. kautsky, among others, has courageously faced this fact and insisted that "it will be one of the imperative tasks of the social revolution not simply to continue, but to increase production; the victorious proletariat must extend production rapidly if it is to be able to satisfy the enormous demands that will be made upon the new régime."[ ] from the first this problem had to be faced by the bolshevik government. we find lenine insisting that the workers must be inspired with "idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence" to turn out as large a product as possible; that the productivity of labor must be raised and a high level of industrial performance as the duty of every worker be rigorously insisted upon. it is not enough to have destroyed feudalism and the monarchy: in every socialist revolution, however, the main task of the proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry led by it--and, hence, also in the socialist revolution in russia inaugurated by us on november , , consists in the positive and constructive work of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net of newly organized relationships covering the systematic production and distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of tens of millions of people. the successful realization of such a revolution depends on the original historical creative work of the majority of the population, and first of all of the majority of the toilers. _the victory of the socialist revolution will not be assured unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry manifest sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence._ with the creation of a new--the soviet--type of state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. _the main difficulty is in the economic domain; to raise the productivity of labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution, and actually to socialize production._[ ] lenine recognizes, as every thoughtful person must, that this task of organizing production and distribution cannot be undertaken by "the proletariat and the poorest peasants." it requires a vast amount of highly developed technical knowledge and skill, the result of long training and superior education. this kind of service is so highly paid, in comparison with the wages paid to the manual workers, that it lifts those who perform the service and receive the high salaries into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. certainly, even though they are engaged in performing work of the highest value and the most vital consequence, the specialists, experts, and directing managers of industry are not of the "working class," as that term is commonly employed. and no matter how we may speculate upon the possible attainment of approximate equality of income in some future near or remote, the fact is that the labor of such men can only be secured by paying much more than is paid to the manual workers. quite wisely, the bolshevik government decided that it must have such services, no matter that they must be highly paid for; that they could only be rendered by the hated bourgeoisie and that, in consequence, certain compromises and relations with the bourgeoisie became necessary the moment the services were engaged. the bolshevik government recognized the imperative necessity of the service which only highly paid specialists could give and wisely decided that no prejudice or theory must be permitted to block the necessary steps for russia's reconstruction. in a spirit of intelligent opportunism, therefore, they subordinated shibboleths, prejudices, dogmas, and theories to russia's necessity. the sanity of this opportunistic attitude is altogether admirable, but it contrasts strangely with the refusal to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in establishing a stable democratic government--no less necessary for russia's reconstruction and for socialism. as a matter of fact, the very promptitude and sanity of their opportunism when faced by responsibility, serves to demonstrate the truth of the contention made in these pages, that in refusing to co-operate with others in building up a permanently secure democratic government, they were actuated by no high moral principle, but simply by a desire to gain power. the position of russia to-day would have been vastly different if the wisdom manifested in the following paragraphs had governed lenine and his associates in the days when kerensky was trying to save russian democracy: _without the direction of specialists of different branches of knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation toward socialism is impossible_, for socialism demands a conscious mass movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with capitalism and on the basis which had been attained by capitalism. socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by its own methods--to make it more definite, by soviet methods. but the specialists are inevitably bourgeois on account of the whole environment of social life which made them specialists.... in view of the considerable delay in accounting and control in general, although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have _not yet_ created an environment which would put at our disposal the bourgeois specialists. many sabotagers are coming into our service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can be used by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is, for a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is, by creating such an environment of universal accounting and control which would inevitably and naturally attract and gain the submission of specialists). we were forced now to make use of the old bourgeois method and agree to a very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. all those who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure on the part of the proletarian state. _it is clear that the measure is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the paris commune and of any proletarian rule, which demand the reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the average workers_--principles which demand that "career hunting" be fought by deeds, not words. furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against capitalism (for capitalism is not a quantity of money, but a definite social relationship), _but also a step backward by our socialist soviet state_, which has from the very beginning proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to the standard of wages of the average worker. ... the corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond question--both on the soviets ... and on the mass of the workers. but all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the evil heritage of capitalism.... the sooner we ourselves, workers and peasants, learn better labor discipline and a higher technique of toil, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose, the sooner we will get rid of the need of paying tribute to these specialists.[ ] we find the same readiness to compromise and to follow the line of least resistance in dealing with the co-operatives. from onward there had been an enormous growth of co-operatives in russia. they were of various kinds and animated by varied degrees of social consciousness. they did not differ materially from the co-operatives of england, belgium, denmark, italy, or germany except in the one important particular that they relied upon bourgeois intellectuals for leadership and direction to a greater extent than do the co-operatives in the countries named. they were admirably fitted to be the nuclei of a socialized system of distribution. out of office the bolsheviki had sneered at these working-class organizations and denounced them as "bourgeois corruptions of the militant proletariat." necessity and responsibility soon forced the adoption of a new attitude toward them. the bolshevik government had to accept the despised co-operatives, and even compromise bolshevist principles as the price of securing their services: a socialist state can come into existence only as a net of production and consumption communes, which keep conscientious accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor, steadily increasing its productivity and thus making it possible to lower the workday to seven, six, or even less hours. anything less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of grain and of the production of grain, and later also of all other necessary products, will not do. we have inherited from capitalism mass organizations which can facilitate the transition to mass accounting and control of distribution--the consumers' co-operatives. they are developed in russia less than in the more advanced countries, but they comprise more than , , members. the decree on consumers' associations which was recently issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity of the position and of the problem of the socialist soviet republic at the present time. the decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives and with the workmen's co-operatives adhering to the bourgeois standpoint. the agreement or compromise consists, firstly, in the fact that the representatives of these institutions not only participated in the deliberations on this decree, but had practically received a determining voice, for parts of the decree which met determined opposition from these institutions were rejected. secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the rejection by the soviet authority of the principle of free admission to the co-operatives (the only consistent principle from the proletarian standpoint), and that the whole population of a given locality should be _united in a single co-operative_. the defection from this, the only socialist principle, which is in accord with the problem of doing away with classes, allows the existence of working-class co-operatives (which in this case call themselves working-class co-operatives only because they submit to the class interests of the bourgeoisie). lastly, the proposition of the soviet government completely to exclude the bourgeoisie from the administration of the co-operatives was also considerably weakened, and only owners of capitalistic commercial and industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration. * * * * * if the proletariat, acting through the soviets, should successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale, there would be no need for such compromise. through the food departments of the soviets, through their organs of supply, we would unite the population in one co-operative directed by the proletariat, without the assistance from bourgeois co-operatives, without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which compels the labor co-operatives to remain side by side with the bourgeois co-operatives instead of wholly subjecting these bourgeois co-operatives, fusing both?[ ] v it is no mood of captious, unfriendly criticism that attention is specially directed to these compromises. only political charlatans, ineffective quacks, and irresponsible soap-box orators see crime against the revolutionary program of the masses in a wise and honest opportunism. history will not condemn the bolsheviki for the give-and-take, compromise-where-necessary policy outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. its condemnation will be directed rather against their failure to act in that spirit from the moment the first provisional government arose. had they joined with the other socialists and established a strong coalition government, predominantly socialist, but including representatives of the most liberal and democratic elements of the bourgeoisie, it would have been possible to bring the problems of labor organization and labor discipline under democratic direction. it would not have been possible to establish complete industrial democracy, fully developed socialism, nor will it be possible to do this for many years to come. but it would have been easy and natural for the state to secure to the workers a degree of economic assurance and protection not otherwise possible. it would have been possible, too, for the workers' organizations, recognized by and co-operating with the state, to have undertaken, in a large degree, the control of the conditions of their own employment which labor organizations everywhere are demanding and gradually gaining. the best features of "guild socialism" could nowhere have been so easily adopted.[ ] but instead of effort in these directions, we find the bolsheviki resorting to the _taylor system of scientific management enforced by an individual dictator whose word is final and absolute, to disobey whom is treason_! there is not a nation in the world with a working-class movement of any strength where it would be possible to introduce the industrial servitude here described: the most conscious vanguard of the russian proletariat has already turned to the problem of increasing labor discipline. for instance, the central committee of the metallurgical union and the central council of the trades unions have begun work on respective measures and drafts of decrees. this work should be supported and advanced by all means. _we should immediately introduce piece work and try it out in practice. we should try out every scientific and progressive suggestion of the taylor system_; we should compare the earnings with the general total of production, or the exploitation results of railroad and water transportation, and so on. the russian is a poor worker in comparison with the workers of the advanced nations, and this could not be otherwise under the régime of the czar and other remnants of feudalism. the last word of capitalism in this respect, the taylor system--as well as all progressive measures of capitalism--combine the refined cruelty of bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific attainments in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the most correct methods of the work, the best systems of accounting and control, etc. the soviet republic must adopt valuable and scientific and technical advance in this field. _the possibility of socialism will be determined by our success in combining the soviet rule and the soviet organization of management with the latest progressive measures of capitalism. we must introduce in russia the study and the teaching of the taylor system and its systematic trial and adaptation_. while working to increase the productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account the peculiarities of the transition period from capitalism to socialism, which require, on one hand, that we lay the foundation for the socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other hand, _require the use of compulsion so that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be weakened by the practice of a too mild proletarian government_. the resolution of the last (moscow) congress of the soviets advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. such resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. but that their realization requires compulsion, and _compulsion in the form of a dictatorship_, is ordinarily not comprehended. and yet, it would be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to suppose that the transition from capitalism to socialism is possible without compulsion and dictatorship. the marxian theory has long ago criticized beyond misunderstanding this petty bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. and russia of - confirms in this respect the marxian theory so clearly, palpably, and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still err in this respect. either a kornilov dictatorship (if kornilov be taken as russian type of a bourgeois cavaignac) or a dictatorship of the proletariat--no other alternative is possible for a country which is passing through an unusually swift development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible war.[ ] this dictatorship is to be no light affair, no purely nominal force, but a relentless iron-hand rule. lenine is afraid that the proletariat is too soft-hearted and lenient. he says: but "dictatorship" is a great word. and great words must not be used in vain. a dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary daring and swift and merciless in the suppression of the exploiters as well as of the thugs (hooligans). and our rule is too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron.[ ] and so the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the _dictatorship of a single person_, a super-boss and industrial autocrat: we must learn to combine the stormy, energetic breaking of all restraint on the part of the toiling masses _with iron discipline during work, with absolute submission to the will of one person, the soviet director, during work_.[ ] as i copy these words from lenine's book my memory recalls the days, more than twenty years ago, when as a workman in england and as shop steward of my union i joined with my comrades in breaking down the very things lenine here proposes to set up in the name of socialism. "absolute submission to the will of one person" is not a state toward which free men will strive. not willingly will men who enjoy the degree of personal freedom existing in democratic nations turn to this: with respect to ... the significance of individual dictatorial power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present period, we must say that every large machine industry--which is the material productive source and basis of socialism--requires an absolute and strict unity of the will which directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. this necessity is obvious from the technical, economical, and historical standpoint, and has always been recognized by all those who had given any thought to socialism, as its prerequisite. but how can we secure a strict unity of will? _by subjecting the will of thousands_ to the will of one. this subjection, _if the participants in the common work are ideally conscious and disciplined_, may resemble the mild leading of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a dictatorship--if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness. but at any rate, _complete submission to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of the processes of work which is organized on the type of large machine industry_. this is doubly true of the railways. and just this transition from one political problem to another, which in appearance has no resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of the present period. the revolution has just broken the oldest, the strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were compelled to submit. so it was yesterday. and to-day, the same revolution (and indeed in the interest of socialism) demands the _absolute submission_ of the masses to the _single will_ of those who direct the labor process. it is self-evident that it can be realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old; only through the greatest strain of the energy of the proletarian vanguard which is leading the people to the new order.... to the extent to which the principal problem of the soviet rule changes from military suppression to administration, suppression and compulsion will, _as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not in shooting on the spot_. and in this respect the revolutionary masses have taken, after november , , the right road and have proved the vitality of the revolution, when they started to organize their own workmen's and peasants' tribunals, before any decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial apparatus. _but our revolutionary and popular tribunals are excessively and incredibly weak. it is apparent that the popular view of the courts--which was inherited from the régime of the landowners and the bourgeoisie--as not their own, has not yet been completely destroyed_. it is not sufficiently appreciated that the courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for judicial activity is one of the functions of state administration); that the court is _an organ of the rule of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a means of training in discipline_. there is a lack of appreciation of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it in time, and to distribute it in the right way. that therefore _responsibility_ for the pangs of famine and unemployment falls on _every one who violates the labor discipline in any enterprise and in any business_. that those who are responsible should be discovered, tried, and _punished without mercy_. the petty bourgeois environment, which we will have to combat persistently now, shows particularly in the lack of comprehension of the economic and political connection between famine and unemployment and the _prevailing dissoluteness in organization and discipline_--in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor that "nothing matters, if only i gain as much as possible." a characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection with the last decree on railway management, the decree which granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual directors. the conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious) representatives of petty bourgeois dissoluteness contended that the granting of "unlimited" (_i.e._, dictatorial) power to individuals was a defection from the principle of board administration, from the democratic and other principles of the soviet rule. some of the socialist-revolutionists of the left wing carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on dictatorship, appealing to the evil instincts and to the petty bourgeois desire for personal gain. the question thus presented is of really great significance; firstly, the question of principle is, in general, the appointment of individuals endowed with unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the fundamental principles of the soviet rule; secondly, in what relation is this case--this precedent, if you wish--to the special problems of the soviet rule during the present concrete period? both questions deserve serious consideration.[ ] with characteristic ingenuity lenine attempts to provide this dictatorship with a theoretical basis which will pass muster as marxian socialism. he uses the term "soviet democracy" as a synonym for democratic socialism and says there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle" between it and "the use of dictatorial power of individuals." by what violence to reason and to language is the word _democracy_ applied to the system described by lenine? to use words with such scant respect to their meanings, established by etymology, history, and universal agreement in usage, is to invite and indeed compel the contempt of minds disciplined by reason's practices. as for the claim that there is no contradiction in principle between democratic socialism and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals, before it can be accepted every socialist teacher and leader of any standing anywhere, the programs of all the socialist parties, and their practice, must be denied and set aside. whether democratic socialism be wise or unwise, a practical possibility or an unrealizable idea, at least it has nothing in common with such reactionary views as are expressed in the following: that the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the history of revolutionary movements served as an expression and means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. with bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals has undoubtedly been compatible. but this point is always treated adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the soviet rule and by their petty bourgeois aides. on one hand, they declared the soviet rule simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, the beginning of a _socialist_ form of democracy. on the other hand, they demand of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois and argue: with your bolshevist (_i.e._, socialist, not bourgeois) democratic principles, with the soviet democratic principles, individual dictatorship is absolutely incompatible. extremely poor arguments, these. if we are not anarchists, we must admit the necessity of a state--that is, of _compulsion_, for the transition from capitalism to socialism. the form of compulsion is determined by the degree of development of the particular revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and then by the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. _there is therefore absolutely no contradiction in principle between the soviet (socialist) democracy and the use of dictatorial power of individuals_. the distinction between a proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this, that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by the organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these masses to historical creative work (the soviets belong to this kind of organization).[ ] this, then, is bolshevism, not as it is seen and described by unfriendly "bourgeois" writers, but as it is seen and described by the acknowledged intellectual and political leader of the bolsheviki, nikolai lenine. i have not taken any non-bolshevist authority; i have not even restated his views in a summary of my own, lest into the summary might be injected some reflexes of my own critical thought. bolshevism is revealed in all its reactionary repulsiveness as something between which and absolute, individual dictatorial power there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle." it will not avail for our american followers and admirers of the bolsheviki to plead that these things are temporary, compromises with the ideal due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in russia, and to beg a mitigation of the severity of our judgment on that account. the answer to the plea is twofold: in the first place, they who offer it must, if they are sincere, abandon the savagely critical attitude they have seen fit to adopt toward our own government and nation because with "extraordinary conditions prevailing" we have had introduced conscription, unusual restrictions of movement and of utterance, and so forth. how else, indeed, can their sincerity be demonstrated? if the fact that extraordinary conditions justified lenine and his associates in instituting a régime so tyrannical, what rule of reason or of morals must be invoked to refuse to count the extraordinary conditions produced in our own nation by the war as justification for the special measures of military service and discipline here introduced? but there is a second answer to the claim which is more direct and conclusive. it is not open to argument at all. it is found in the words of lenine himself, in his claim that there is absolutely no contradiction between the principle of individual dictatorship, ruling with iron hand, and the principle upon which soviet government rests. there has been no compromise here, for if there is no contradiction in principle no compromise could have been required. lenine is not afraid to make or to admit making compromises; he admits that compromises have been made. it was a compromise to employ highly salaried specialists from the bourgeoisie, "a defection from the principles of the paris commune and of any proletarian rule," as he says. it was a compromise, another "defection from the only socialist principle," to admit the right of the co-operatives to determine their own conditions of membership. having made these declarations quite candidly, he takes pains to assure us that there was no such defection from principle in establishing the absolute rule of an individual dictator, that there was absolutely no contradiction in principle in this.[ ] moreover, there is no reason for regarding this dictatorship as a temporary thing, if lenine himself is to be accepted as an authoritative spokesman. obviously, if there is nothing in the principle of an absolute individual dictatorship which is in contradiction to the bolshevik ideal, there can be no bolshevik principle which necessarily requires for its realization the ending of such dictatorship. why, therefore, may it not be continued indefinitely? certainly, if the dictatorship is abolished it will not be--if lenine is to be seriously considered--on account of its incompatibility with bolshevik principles. vi the bolshevik government of russia is credited by many of its admirers in this country with having solved the great land problem and with having satisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. it is charged, moreover, that the bitter opposition to the bolsheviki is mainly due to agitation by the bourgeoisie, led by the expropriated landowners, who want to defeat the revolution and to have their former titles to the land restored. of course, it is true that, so far as they dare to do so, the former landowners actively oppose the bolsheviki. no expropriated class ever acted otherwise, and it would be foolish to expect anything else. but any person who believes that the opposition of the great peasant socialist organizations, and especially of the socialist-revolutionists, is due to the confiscation of the land, either consciously or unconsciously, is capable of believing anything and quite immune from rationality. the facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: first, as professor ross has pointed out,[ ] the land policy of the bolshevik government was a compromise of the principles long advocated by its leaders, a compromise made for political reasons only. second, as marie spiridonova abundantly demonstrated at an all-russian soviet conference in july, , the bolshevik government did not honorably live up to its agreement with the socialist-revolutionists of the left. third, so far as the land problem was concerned there was not the slightest need or justification for the bolshevik _coup d'état_, for the reason that the problem had already been solved on the precise lines afterward followed in the soviet decree and the leaders of the peasants were satisfied. we have the authority of no less competent a witness than litvinov, bolshevist minister to england, that "the land measure had been 'lifted' bodily from the program of the socialist-revolutionists."[ ] each of these statements is amply sustained by evidence which cannot be disputed or overcome. that the "land decree" which the bolshevik government promulgated was a compromise with their long-cherished principles admits of no doubt whatever. every one who has kept informed concerning russian revolutionary movements during the past twenty or twenty-five years knows that during all that time one of the principal subjects of controversy among socialists was the land question and the proper method of solving it. the "narodniki," or peasant socialists, later organized into the socialist-revolutionary party, wanted distribution of the land belonging to the big estates among the peasant communes, to be co-operatively owned and managed. they did not want land nationalization, which was the program of the marxists--the social democrats. this latter program meant that, instead of the land being divided among the peasants' communal organizations, it should be owned, used, and managed by the state, the principles of large-scale production and wage labor being applied to agriculture in the same manner as to industry. the attitude of the social democratic party toward the peasant socialists and their program was characterized by that same certainty that small agricultural holdings were to pass away, and by the same contemptuous attitude toward the peasant life and peasant aspirations that we find in the writings of marx, engels, liebknecht, and many other marxists.[ ] lenine himself had always adopted this attitude. he never trusted the peasants and was opposed to any program which would give the land to them as they desired. mr. walling, who spent nearly three years in russia, including the whole period of the revolution of - , writes of lenine's position at that time: like alexinsky, lenine awaits the agrarian movement ... and hopes that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of communication and _the support of the peasantry_ may some day put the government of russia into the people's hands. however, i was shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects a full co-operation with the peasants on equal terms, _during the revolution_, feels toward them a very _deep distrust_, thinking them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing that they may some day shoot down the working-men as the french peasants did during the paris commune. the chief basis for this distrust is, of course, the prejudiced feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good socialists. _it is on this account that lenine and all the social democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of large agricultural estates in russia and the increase of the landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe would prove truly socialist_.[ ] the russian social democratic labor party, to which lenine belonged, and of which he was an influential leader, adopted in the following program with regard to land ownership: . confiscation of church, monastery, appanage, cabinet,[ ] and private estate lands, _except small holdings_, and turning them over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local administration, which have been democratically elected. land, however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization, together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of national importance, are to pass into the control of the democratic state. . wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation, the party declares itself in favor of a division among the peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a reasonable holding. this program was at the time regarded as a compromise. it did not wholly suit anybody. the peasant leaders feared the amount of state ownership and management involved. on the other hand, the extreme left wing of the social democrats--lenine and his friends--wanted the party to proclaim itself in favor of _the complete nationalization of all privately owned land, even that of the small peasant owners_, but were willing, provided the principle were this stated, to accept, as a temporary expedient, division of the land in certain exceptional instances. on the other hand, the socialist-revolutionists wanted, not the distribution of lands among a multitude of private owners, as is very generally supposed, but its socialization. their program provided for "the socialization of all privately owned lands--that is, the taking of them out of the private ownership of persons into the public ownership and _their management by democratically organized leagues of communities with the purpose of an equitable utilization_." they wanted to avoid the creation of a great army of what they described as "wage-slaves of the state" and, on the other hand, they wanted to build upon the basis of russian communism and, as far as possible, prevent the extension of capitalist methods--and therefore of the class struggle--into the agrarian life of russia. when the bolsheviki came into power they sought first of all to split the peasant socialist movement and gain the support of its extreme left wing. for this reason they agreed to adopt the program of the revolutionary socialist party. it was marie spiridonova who made that arrangement possible. it was, in fact, a political deal. lenine and trotzky, on behalf of the bolshevik government, agreed to accept the land policy of the socialist-revolutionists, and in return spiridonova and her friends agreed to support the bolsheviki. there is abundant evidence of the truth of the following account of professor ross: among the first acts of the bolsheviki in power was to square their debt to the left wing of the social revolutionists, their ally in the _coup d'état_. the latter would accept only one kind of currency--the expropriation of the private landowners without compensation and the transfer of all land into the hands of the peasant communes. the bolsheviki themselves, as good marxists, took no stock in the peasants' commune. as such, pending the introduction of socialism, they should, perhaps, have nationalized the land and rented it to the highest bidder, regardless of whether it was to be tilled in small parcels without hired labor or in large blocks on the capitalistic plan. the land edict of november does, indeed, decree land nationalism; however, the vital proviso is added that "the use of the land must be equalized--that is, according to local conditions and according to the ability to work and the needs of each individual," and further that "the hiring of labor is not permitted." the administrative machinery is thus described: "all the confiscated land becomes the land capital of the nation. its distribution among the working-people is to be in charge of the local and central authorities, beginning with the organized rural and urban communities and ending with the provincial central organs." such is the irony of fate. _those who had charged the rural land commune with being the most serious brake upon russia's progress, and who had stigmatized the people-ists as reactionaries and utopians, now came to enact into law most of their tenets--the equalization of the use of land, the prohibition of the hiring of labor, and everything else!_[ ] the much-praised land policy of the bolsheviki is, in fact, not a bolshevik policy at all, but one which they have accepted as a compromise for temporary political advantage. "claim everything in sight," said a noted american politician on one occasion to his followers. our followers of the bolsheviki, taught by a very clever propaganda, seem to be acting upon that maxim. they claim for the bolsheviki everything which can in the slightest manner win favor with the american public, notwithstanding that it involves claiming for the bolsheviki credit to which they are not entitled. as early as may , , it was announced by the provisional government that the "question of the transfer of the land to the toilers" was to be left to the constituent assembly, and there was never a doubt in the mind of any russian socialist how that body would settle it; never a moment when it was doubted that the constituent assembly would be controlled by the socialist-revolutionary party. when kerensky became prime minister one of the first acts of his cabinet was to create a special committee for the purpose of preparing the law for the socialization of the land and the necessary machinery for carrying the law into effect. the all-russian peasants' congress had, as early as may, five months before the bolshevik counter-revolution, adopted the land policy for which the bolsheviki now are being praised by their admirers in this country. that policy had been crystallized into a carefully prepared law which had been approved by the council of ministers. the bolsheviki did no more than to issue a crudely conceived "decree" which they have never at any time had the power to enforce in more than about a fourth of russia--in place of a law which would have embraced all russia and have been secure and permanent. on july , , marie spiridonova, in an address delivered in petrograd, protested vehemently against the manner in which the bolshevik government was departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to the land, and going back to the old social democratic ideas. she declared that she had been responsible for the decree of february, which provided for the socialization of the land. that measure provided for the abolition of private property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under the direction of the peasant communes. it was the old socialist-revolutionist program. but the bolshevik government had not carried out the law of february. instead, it had resorted to the social democratic method of nationalization. in the western governments, she said, "great estates were being taken over by government departments and were being managed by officials, on the ground that state control would yield better results than communal ownership. under this system the peasants were being reduced to the state of slaves paid wages by the state. yet the law provided that these estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled by the peasants on a co-operative system."[ ] spiridonova protested against the attitude of the bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing them into classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. she insisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating with the industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie. for our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of the bolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation was better than operation by village co-operatives. our sole concern here and now is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of the peasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as this incident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the soviet republic as descriptions of realities. the bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionary power imposing its rule upon the great mass of the russian people by armed force. there can be little doubt that if a free election could be had immediately upon the same basis as that on which the constituent assembly was elected--namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, the bolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. there can be little doubt that the great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates of the socialist-revolutionary party. it is quite true that some of the leaders of that party have consented to work with the bolshevik government. compromises have been effected; the bolsheviki have conciliated the peasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make the best of a bad situation. many have adopted a passive attitude. but there can be no greater mistake than to believe that the bolsheviki have solved the land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won their allegiance. vii this survey of the theories and practices of the bolsheviki would invite criticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in the shameful surrender to germany, the "indecent peace" as the russians call it, were passed over without mention. and yet there is no need to tell here a story with which every one is familiar. by that humiliating peace russia lost , square kilometers of territory, occupied by , , inhabitants. she lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amounting to more than , miles. she lost, also, per cent. of her iron production; per cent. of her coal production, and many thousands of factories of various kinds. these latter included sugar-refineries, textile-factories, breweries, tobacco-factories, , distilleries, chemical-factories, paper-mills, and , machine-factories.[ ] moreover, it was not an enduring peace and war against germany had to be resumed. in judging the manner in which the bolsheviki concluded peace with germany, it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war and its passions. the tragi-comedy of brest-litovsk, and the pitiable rôle of trotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in which lenine and his companions reached russia with the aid of the german government, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the bolsheviki had deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and their persistent opposition to all the efforts of kerensky to restore the fighting spirit of the army--all these things combined have convinced many thoughtful and close observers that the bolsheviki were in league with the germans against the allies. perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passing final judgment upon this matter. certainly there were ugly-looking incidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the germans. there was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the bolsheviki on seizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations with the notorious "parvus," whose rôle as an agent of the german government is now thoroughly established. "parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the most sinister figures in the history of the socialist movement, dr. alexander helfandt. born at odessa, of german-jewish descent, he studied in germany and in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific and brilliant contributor to the german socialist review, _die neue zeit_. he was early "exiled" from russia, but it was suspected by a great many socialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to cover employment in the russian secret service as a spy and informer, for which the prestige he had gained in socialist circles was a valuable aid. when the revolution of broke out helfandt returned to russia under the terms of the amnesty declared at that time. he at once joined the leninist section of the social democratic party, the bolsheviki. a scandal occurred some time later, when the connection of "parvus" with the russian government was freely charged against him. among those who attacked him and accused him of being an agent-provocateur were tseretelli, the socialist-revolutionist, and miliukov, the leader of the cadets. some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the young turk movement, "parvus" turned up in constantinople, where he was presumably engaged in work for the german government. this was commonly believed in european political circles, though denied at the time by "parvus" himself. one thing is certain, namely, that although he was notoriously poor when he went there--his financial condition was well known to his socialist associates--he returned at the beginning of a very rich man. he explained his riches by saying that he had, while at constantinople, bucharest, and sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat. he wrote this explanation in the german socialist paper, _die glocke_, and drew from hugo hasse the following observation: "i blame nobody for being wealthy; i only ask if it is the rôle of a social democrat to become a profiteer of the war."[ ] very soon we find this precious gentleman settled in copenhagen, where he established a "society for studying the social consequences of the war," which was, of course, entirely pro-german. this society is said to have exercised considerable influence among the russians in copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many danish socialists to take germany's side. according to _pravda_, the bolshevik organ, the german government, through the intermediary of german social democrats, established a working relation with danish trade-unions and the danish social democratic party, whereby the danish unions got the coal needed in copenhagen at a figure below the market price. then the danish party sent its leader, borgdjerg, to petrograd as an emissary to place before the petrograd soviet the terms of peace of the german majority socialists, which were, of course, the terms of the german government. we find "parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue, associated with one furstenberg in shipping drugs into russia and food from russia into germany.[ ] according to grumbach,[ ] he sought to induce prominent norwegian socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certain norwegian syndicates that germany would grant them a monopoly of coal consignments if the norwegian social democratic press would adopt a more friendly attitude toward germany and the social democratic members in the norwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fish exports to england. during this period "parvus" was bitterly denounced by plechanov, by alexinsky and other russian socialists as an agent of the central powers. he was denounced also by lenine and trotzky and by _pravda_. lenine described him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers." it was therefore somewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read the following communication, which appeared in the german socialist press on november , , and, later, in the british socialist organ, _justice_: stockholm, november .--the foreign relations committee of the bolsheviki makes the following communication: "the german comrade, 'parvus,' has brought to the bolshevik committee at stockholm the congratulations of the _parteivorstand_ of the majority social democrats, who declare their solidarity with the struggles of the russian proletariat and with its request to begin pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities. the foreign relations committee of the bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the central committee at petrograd, as well as to the soviets." when hugo hasse questioned philipp scheidemann about the negotiations which were going on through "parvus," scheidemann replied that it was the bolsheviki themselves who had invited "parvus" to come to stockholm for the purpose of opening up negotiations. this statement was denounced as a lie by karl radek in _pravda_. some day, doubtless, the truth will be known; for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as november the bolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the central powers as dr. alexander helfandt, otherwise "parvus," the well-known marxist! such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tended inevitably to strengthen the conviction that lenine and trotsky were the pliant and conscious tools of germany all the time, and that the protests of trotzky at brest-litovsk were simply stage-play. but for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence is forthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with the german government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemned upon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparently is. the fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. kerensky, had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separate peace, and make it quickly. only one thing could have delayed that for long--namely, the arrival of an adequate force of allied troops on the russian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting off from the russians. of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood. kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost and on almost any terms, if he remained in power. if the bolsheviki appear in the light of traitors to the allies, it should be remembered that pressure of circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the allies as kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace, practically on germany's terms, in a very little while. it was not a matter of months, but of weeks at most, probably of days. russia had to have peace. the nation was war-weary and exhausted. the allies had not understood the situation--indeed, they never have understood russia, even to this day--and had bungled right along. what made it possible for the bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the fact that they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the russian workers wanted immediate peace above everything else. they were so eager for peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the time for nothing. literally nothing else mattered. as we have seen, the bolshevik leaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace." there is little reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense that what they wanted was a _general_ peace, if that could be possibly obtained. peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. if they could not persuade their allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they were willing to make a _separate_ peace. that is quite different from _wanting_ a separate peace from the first. there was, indeed, in the demand made at the beginning of december upon the allies to restate their war aims within a period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited the suspicion that the ultimatum--for such it was--had not been conceived in good faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to prevent compliance by the allies. and it may well be the fact that lenine and trotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the russian people, and especially the russian army, that the allied nations were fighting for imperialistic ends, just as the bolsheviki had always charged. the machiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of the conspirator type. on december th the armistice was signed at brest-litovsk, to last for a period of twenty-eight days. on december th, the bolsheviki had published the terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. these terms, which the germans scornfully rejected, provided that the german forces which had been occupied on the russian front should not be sent to other fronts to fight against the allies, and that the german troops should retire from the russian islands held by them. in the armistice as it was finally signed at brest-litovsk there was a clause which, upon its face, seemed to prove that trotzky had kept faith with the allies. the clause provided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for the purpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the front between the baltic and the black sea. this, however, was, from the german point of view, merely a _pro forma_ arrangement, a "scrap of paper." grumbach wrote to _l'humanité_ that on december th berlin was full of german soldiers from the russian front en route to the western front. he said that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been called to the attention of lenine and trotzky by the independent social democrats, but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes."[ ] it is more than probable that, in the circumstances, neither lenine nor trotzky cared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but, had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? they were as helpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved. as one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of trotzky in those critical days of early december, , the justice of lenine's scornful description of his associate as a "man who blinds himself with revolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. it is easy to understand the strained relations that existed between the two men. his "neither war nor peace" gesture--it was no more!--his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffened peace terms, his desire to call all russia to arms again to fight the germans, his determination to create a vast "red army" to renew the war against germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services of american officers in training that army," all indicated a mind given to illusions and stone blind to realities. lenine at least knew that the game was up. he knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when he left switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning, was at an end and that the germans had won. the germans behaved with a perfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice they had signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless, partially demobilized and trusting russians. there was nothing left for the bolsheviki to do. they had delivered russia to the germans. in march the "indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. bolshevism had been the ally of prussian militarism. consciously or unconsciously, willingly or unwillingly, lenine, trotzky, and the other bolshevik leaders had done all that men could do to make the german military lords masters of the world. had there been a similar movement in france, england, the united states, or even italy, to-day the hohenzollerns and habsburgs would be upon their thrones, realizing the fulfilment of the pan-german vision. viii in view of the fact that so many of our american pacifists have glorified the bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, or to inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by no means reciprocated. both lenine and trotzky have spoken and written in terms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of the pacifists of england and america in particular. they have insisted that, _in present society_, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. the inclusion in the constitution, which they have forced upon russia by armed might, of _permanent universal compulsory military service_ is not by accident. they believe that only when all nations have become socialist nations will it be a proper policy for socialists to favor disarmament. it would be interesting to know how our american admirers and defenders of bolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so far as can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the bolsheviki who base their state, not as a temporary expedient, _but as a matter of principle_, upon universal, compulsory military service! what, one wonders, do these american bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of these paragraphs from an article by lenine?[ ] disarmament is a socialistic ideal. in socialist society there will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been realized. but he is not a socialist who expects the realization of socialism _without_ the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. dictatorship is a government power, depending directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means, not fists and clubs, but armies. to insert "disarmament" into our program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of arms. but such a statement would contain not a grain of marxism, any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to the use of force. * * * * * _a suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms, and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as slaves_. we cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society, except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the ruling class. in every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the oppressors is an armed class. not only the standing army of the present day, but also the present-day popular militia--even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, as in switzerland--means an armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.... how can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary social democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? _to ask this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution_. our watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat, expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. this is the only possible policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact, dictated by the evolution. only after having disarmed the bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any possibility before then. how is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentless opposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universal military service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes, and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace bolshevism with enthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so frankly stated by lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate. of course, what lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, for civil war--the war of the classes. but he is not opposed to national armaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy _until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itself freed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. there is probably not a militarist in america to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmament as a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankind reaches the happy condition of universal socialism, disarmament will then become practicable and logical. it would not be difficult for general wood to subscribe to that doctrine, i think. it would not have been difficult for mr. roosevelt to subscribe to it. not only is lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fight for the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also an attack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in the continued war against germany, he goes much farther than this _and provides a theoretical justification for a socialist policy of passive acceptance of ever-increasing militarism_. he draws a strangely forced parallel between the socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to be taken toward armaments. we know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils. against the evils we struggle, but how? not by trying to do away with the trusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. we must go onward, through the trust system to socialism. in a similar way we should not deplore "the militarization of the populations." if the bourgeoisie militarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why--so much the better! "never will the women of an oppressed class that is really revolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. on the contrary, they will encourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war." of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shoot at their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in the present war ... but in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisie in their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation, poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the path of victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie."[ ] universally the working class has taken a position the very opposite of this. universally we find the organized working class favoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposing extensions of what lenine describes as "the militarization of populations." for this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequate explanation--namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers. but, according to lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is all wrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. the workers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize and train in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys and even the women as well. some day, if this course be followed, there will be two great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur the decisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous and powerful class. socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reason and of conscience, but by brute force. obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogant gospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peaceful organization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, in general, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason and morality. there is a prussian quality in lenine's philosophy. he is the treitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, glorying in might, which is, for him, the only right. and that is what characterizes the whole bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife and struggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might is right which made prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization. and just as the world of civilized mankind recognized prussian militarism as its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, bolshevism must be overcome. and that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it in blood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the task of removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude which produce the desperation of soul that drives men to bolshevism. the remedy for bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive social democracy. postscriptum: a personal statement this book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. soon after my return from europe, in november, i spent part of a day in new york discussing bolshevism with two friends. one of these is a russian socialist, who has lived many years in america, a citizen of the united states, and a man whose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during many years have long commanded my admiration and reverence. the other friend is a native american, also a socialist. a sincere christian, he has identified his faith in the religion of jesus and his faith in democratic socialism. the two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merely different and complementary aspects of the same faith. he is a man who is universally loved and honored for his nobility of character and his generous idealism. while in europe i had spent much time consulting with russian friends in paris, rome, and other cities, and had collected a considerable amount of authentic material relating to bolshevism and the bolsheviki. i had not the slightest intention of using this material to make a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment of my time. but, in the course of the discussion, my american socialist friend asked me to "jot down" for him some of the things i had said, and, especially, to write, in a letter, what i believed to be the psychology of bolshevism. this, in an unguarded moment, i undertook to do. when i set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, i found that, in order to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explain the historical backgrounds of the russian revolutionary movement, to describe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail, and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material i had gathered. naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and i found that my response to my friend's innocent request approached the length of a small volume. even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. it left many things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. i decided then to rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available for what i hope will be a large number of readers what i had at first intended only for a dear friend. i am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. it has been written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busy life. my keenest critics will, i am sure, be less conscious of its defects than i am. it is, however, an earnest contribution to a very important discussion, and, i venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. if it aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherent wrongfulness of the bolshevist philosophy and method, i shall be rewarded. * * * * * _so here, my dear will, is the fulfilment of my promise._ appendices i. an appeal to the proletariat by the petrograd workmen's and soldiers' council ii. how the russian peasants fought for a constituent assembly--a report to the international socialist bureau iii. former socialist premier of finland on bolshevism appendix i an appeal to the proletariat by the petrograd workmen's and soldiers' council comrades: _proletarians and working-people of all countries_: we, russian workers and soldiers, united in the petrograd workmen's and soldiers' delegate council, send you our warmest greetings and the news of great events. the democracy of russia has overthrown the century-old despotism of the czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as a powerful force in the battle for our common liberation. our victory is a great victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. the principal supporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of europe," no longer exists. may the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! long live liberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its battle for the final victory! our cause is not yet entirely won. not all the shadows of the old régime have been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forces together against the russian revolution. nevertheless, our conquests are great. the peoples of russia will express their will in the constitutional convention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. and now it may already be said with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph in russia. the russian people is in possession of complete political liberty. now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government of the country and about its foreign policy. and in addressing ourselves to all the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, we declare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle against the attempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun. the time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding the questions of war and peace into their own hands. conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of russia declares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquest of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of europe to united, decisive action for peace. we appeal to our brothers, to the german-austrian coalition, and above all to the german proletariat. the first day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weapons against absolutist russia you were defending european civilization against asiatic despotism. in this many of you found the justification of the support that was accorded to the war. now also this justification has vanished. democratic russia cannot menace freedom and civilization. we shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats, whether they come from without or within. the russian revolution will not retreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself to be trampled to pieces by outside military force. we call upon you to throw off the yoke of your absolutist régime, as the russian people has shaken off the autocracy of the czars. refuse to serve as the tools of conquest and power in the hands of the kings, junkers, and bankers, and we shall, with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonors humanity and darkens the great days of the birth of russian liberty. working-men of all countries! in fraternally stretching out our hands to you across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea of innocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages, across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work of renewing and solidifying international unity. in that lies the guaranty of our future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity. working-men of all countries, unite! tchcheidze, _the president_. petrograd, _april, _. appendix ii how the russian peasants fought for a constituent assembly[ ] a report to the international socialist bureau by inna rakitnikov, vice-president of the executive committee of the soviet of delegates, placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the constituent assembly. with a letter-preface by the citizen, e. roubanovitch, member of the international socialist bureau. _to the executive committee of the international socialist bureau_: dear comrades,--the citizen inna rakitnikov has lately come from petrograd to paris for personal reasons that are peculiarly tragic. at the time of her departure the executive committee of the second soviet of peasant delegates of all-russia, of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make to the international socialist bureau a detailed report of the fights that this organization had to make against the bolsheviki in order to realize the convocation of the constituent assembly. this is the report under the title of a document that i present here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without delay to all the sections of the international. two words of explanation, only: first, i wish to draw your attention to the fact that this is the second time that the executive committee of the soviet of the peasants of all-russia addresses itself publicly to the international. at the time of my journey to stockholm in the month of september, , i made, at a session of the holland, scandinavian committee, presided over by branting, a communication in the name of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants. i handed over on this occasion to our secretary, camille huysmans, an appeal to the democrats of the entire world, in which the executive committee indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the workers' and socialist international family. i must also present to you the author of this report. the citizen rakitnikov, a member of the russian revolutionary socialist party, has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the peasants. she has known long years of prison, of siberia, of exile. before and during the war until the beginning of the revolution she lived as a political fugitive in paris. while being a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of german militarism--in which she is in perfect accord with the members of our party such as stepan sletof, iakovlef, and many other voluntary russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the ranks of the french army--the citizen rakitnikov belonged to the international group. i affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan of the russian people, and against all the other socialist parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed. yours fraternally, e. roubanovitch, _june , ._ _member of the b.s.i._ "the bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc., have not been ashamed to follow in the footsteps of czarism. it is not liberty; it is tyranny." (extract from a letter of a young russian socialist, an enthusiast of liberty who died all too soon.) i _organization of the peasants after the revolution in soviets of peasant delegates_ a short time after the revolution of february the russian peasants grouped themselves in a national soviet of peasant delegates at the first congress of the peasants of all-russia, which took place at petrograd. the executive committee of this soviet was elected. it was composed of well-known leaders of the revolutionary socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from the country. without adhering officially to the revolutionary socialist party, the soviet of peasant delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party. while co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remained an organization completely independent. the bolsheviki, who at this congress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not at the time any success. the speeches of lenine and the other members of this party did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked lively protest. the executive committee had as its organ the paper _izvestya of the national soviet of peasant delegates_. thousands of copies of this were scattered throughout the country. besides the central national soviet there existed local organizations, the soviets, the government districts who were in constant communication with the executive committee staying at petrograd. from its foundation the executive committee exercised great energy in the work of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in the development of the socialist conscience in their breasts. its members spread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of the revolutionary socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence of socialism and the history of the international explaining the sense and the importance of the revolution in russia, the history of the fight that preceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. they insisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil and the convocation of the constituent assembly. a close and living tie was created between the members of the executive committee staying at petrograd and the members in the provinces. the executive committee was truly the expression of the will of the mass of the russian peasants. the minister of agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were at this time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization of socialization of the soil; the revolutionary socialist party did not cease to press the government to act in this sense. agrarian committees were formed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by the peasants, and to take under their control large properties where exploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress of organization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus be preserved against destruction and pillage. at the same time agrarian committees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the lands of which they had been despoiled. the peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles which occurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understanding all the difficulties which its realization required and all the impossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates played in this respect an important rôle. it did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of the problem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, or to attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with the further enrichment of peasants who were already rich. such was, in its general aspect, the action of the national soviet of peasants' delegates, which, in the month of august, , addressed, through the intermediary of the international socialist bureau, an appeal to the democracies of the world. in order to better understand the events which followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions which at that time existed in russia, and in the midst of which the action of this organization was taking place. ii _the difficulties of the beginning of the revolution_ the honeymoon of the revolution had passed rapidly. joy gave place to cares and alarms. autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage: the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. taking advantage of the listlessness of the army, the bolshevist propaganda developed and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers to fight no more. the disorganization was felt more and more at the front; at the same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; production diminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour day became in fact a five or six-hour day. the strained relations between the workers and the administration were such that certain factories preferred to close. the central power suffered frequent crises; the cadets, fearing the responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power. all this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for the election of the constituent assembly, toward which the eyes of the whole country were turned. nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and from the anarchy into which further events plunged it. young russia, not accustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomous action, was far from that hopeless state to which the bolsheviki reduced it some months later. the people had confidence in the socialists, in the revolutionary socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in the municipalities, the zemstvos, and in the soviets; they had confidence in the constituent assembly which would restore order and work out the laws. all that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certain peculiarities of the existence of the russian people, which impelled them toward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the bolsheviki, who, in this respect, followed the line of least resistance. the bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken the provisional government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, to increase the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in the interior of the country. they proclaimed that the "imperialists" sent the soldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actual conditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have a revolutionary army to defend its liberty. they spoke loudly for a counter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but the propitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality the complete failure of the insurrection of kornilov showed that the counter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for it then in the life of russia. in fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. the united efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the country would have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to find a solution of the situation. iii _the insurrection of kornilov_ but now the insurrection of kornilov broke out. it was entirely unexpected by all the socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course, by the socialist ministers. petrograd was in no way prepared for an attack of this kind. in the course of the evening of the fatal day when kornilov approached petrograd, the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party received by telephone, from the palace of hiver, the news of the approach of kornilovien troops. this news revolutionized everybody. a meeting of all the organizations took place at smolny; the members of the party alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truth about the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, came there to a reunion. it was a strange picture that smolny presented that night. the human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees and commissions sat in its side apartments. they asked one another what was happening, what was to be done. news succeeded news. one thing was certain. petrograd was not prepared for the fight. it was not protected by anything, and the cossacks who followed kornilov could easily take it. the national soviet of peasants' delegates in the session that it held that same night at no. fontaka street adopted a resolution calling all the peasants to armed resistance against kornilov. the central executive committee with the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates established a special organization which was to defend petrograd and to fight against the insurrection. detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directed toward the locality where kornilov was, to get information and to organize a propaganda among the troops that followed the general, and in case of failure to fight hand to hand. as they quit in the morning they did not know how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to the issue of the insurrection for the socialists. the end of this conspiracy is known. the troops that followed kornilov left him as soon as they found out the truth. in this respect, everything ended well, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances. the acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. the cadets, compromised by their participation in the kornilov conspiracy, preferred to remain apart. the socialist-revolutionists did not see clearly what there was at the bottom of the whole affair. _it was as much as any one knew at the moment_. kerensky, in presence of the menace of the counter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extreme left, would have called to petrograd a part of the troops from the front to stem the tide. such was the rôle of different persons in this story. it is only later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can be verified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the revolutionary socialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. the conspiracy of kornilov completely freed the hands of the bolsheviki. in the pravda, and in other bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a new counter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of kerensky acting in accord or in agreement with the traitor cadets. the public was excited against the socialist-revolutionists, who were accused of having secretly helped this counter-revolution. the bolsheviki alone, said its organs, had saved the revolution; to them alone was due the failure of the kornilov insurrection. the bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. copies of the _pravda_, spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaigns against the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to the soldiers and appeals to trouble. bolsheviki meetings permeated with the same spirit were organized at petrograd, moscow, and other cities. bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies of the _pravda_ and other papers, and the bolsheviki enjoyed, during this time--as lenine himself admits--complete liberty. their chiefs, compromised in the insurrection of june d, had been given their freedom. their principal watchword was "down with the war!" "kerensky and the other conciliators," they cried, "want war and do not want peace. kerensky will give you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor constituent assembly. down with the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! they want to smother the revolution. we demand peace. we will give you peace, land to the peasants, factories and work to the workmen!" under this simple form the agitation was followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first among the soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. in the soviet of the workmen's and soldiers' delegates of petrograd the bolshevist party soon found itself strengthened and fortified. its influence was also considerable among the sailors of the baltic fleet. cronstadt was entirely in their hands. new elections of the central executive committee of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates soon became necessary; they gave a big majority to the bolsheviki. the old bureau, tchcheidze at its head, had to leave; the bolsheviki triumphed clamorously. to fight against the bolsheviki the executive committee of the national soviet of peasants' delegates decided at the beginning of december to call a second general peasants' congress. this was to decide if the peasants would defend the constituent assembly or if they would follow the bolsheviki. this congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. it showed what was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the bolsheviki. it was principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "déclassé soldiers," men taken from the country life by the war, from their natural surroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. the peasants who had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate to uphold the constituent assembly. they firmly maintained their point of view and resisted all the attempts of the bolsheviki and the "socialist-revolutionists of the left" (who followed them blindly) to make their influence prevail. the speech of lenine was received with hostility; as for trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with the guillotine all the "enemies of the revolution," they prevented him from speaking, crying out: "down with the tyrant! guillotineur! assassin!" to give his speech trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes," was obliged to repair to another hall. the second peasants' congress was thus distinctly split into two parties. the bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to the question, "does the congress wish to uphold the constituent assembly?" they prolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kind of paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thus cause a certain number of them to return home. the tiresome discussions carried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants, seeing nothing come from it, returned home. but the peasants had, in spite of all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote against pronounced themselves for the defense without reserve of the constituent assembly. any work in common for the future was impossible. the fraction of the peasants that pronounced itself for the constituent assembly continued to sit apart, named its executive committee, and decided to continue the fight resolutely. the bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to the smolny, declared to be usurpers of the soviet of peasants' delegates who pronounced themselves for the defense of the constituante, and, with the aid of soldiers, ejected the former executive committee from their premises and took possession of their goods, the library, etc. the new executive committee, which did not have at its disposition red guards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the money necessary for this purpose, etc. its members were able, with much difficulty, to place everything upon its feet and to assure the publication of an organ (the _izvestya_ of the national soviet of peasants' delegates determined to defend the constituent assembly), to send delegates into different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc. together with the peasants, workmen and socialist parties and numerous democratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of the constituent assembly: the union of postal employees, a part of the union of railway workers, the bank employees, the city employees, the food distributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, the co-operatives. these organizations believed that the _coup d'état_ of october th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation with brief delay of the constituent assembly and the restoration of the liberties that were trampled under foot by the bolsheviki. these treated them as _saboteurs_, "enemies of the people," deprived them of their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. they ordered those who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. they published lists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by the crowds. at saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers and telegraphers lasted a month and a half. the institutions whose strike would have entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest of all life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers), abstained from striking, only asking the bolsheviki not to meddle with their work. sometimes, however, the gross interference of the bolsheviki in work of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, in spite of everything, to strike. it is to be noted also that the professors of secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (the superior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well as the theatrical artistes: a talented artist, silotti, was arrested; he declared that even in the time of czarism nobody was ever uneasy on account of his political opinions. iv _the bolsheviki and the constituent assembly_ at the time of the accomplishment of their _coup d'état_, the bolsheviki cried aloud that the ministry of kerensky put off a long time the convocation of the constituante (which was a patent lie), that they would never call the assembly, and that they alone, the bolsheviki, would do it. but according as the results of the elections became known their opinions changed. in the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at petrograd and moscow. then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existence whatever. but the _pravda_ and the _izvestya_ of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates continued to treat as caluminators those who exposed the danger that was threatening the constituent assembly at the hands of the bolsheviki. they did not yet dare to assert themselves openly. they had to gain time to strengthen their power. they hastily followed up peace pourparlers, to place russia and the constituent assembly, if this met, before an accomplished fact. they hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. that was the reason which motived the "decree" of lenine on the socialization of the soil, which decree appeared immediately after the _coup d'état_. this decree was simply a reproduction of a revolutionary socialists' resolution adopted at a peasants' congress. what could the socialization of the soil be to lenine and all the bolsheviki in general? they had been, but a short time before, profoundly indifferent with regard to this socialist-revolutionist "utopia." it had been for them an object of raillery. but they knew that without this "utopia" they would have no peasants. and they threw them this mouthful, this "decree," which astonished the peasants. "is it a law? is it not a law? nobody knows," they said. it is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of the peasants that explains the union of the bolsheviki with those who are called the "socialist-revolutionists of the left" (for the name socialist-revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played the stupid and shameful rôle of followers of the bolsheviki, with a blind weapon between their hands. a part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the bolsheviki to smolny. the germans honored the bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers for peace. the bolshevist government had at its disposal the red guards, well paid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army for fear of remaining without the help of bayonets. these red guards, who later fled in shameful fashion before the german patrols, advanced into the interior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. the bolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. a campaign against the constituent assembly commenced. at first in _pravda_ and in _izvestya_ were only questions. what will this constituent assembly be? of whom will it be composed? it is possible that it will have a majority of servants of the bourgeoisie--cadets socialist-revolutionists. _can we confide to such a constituent assembly the destinies of the russian revolution? will it recognize the power of the soviets?_ then came certain hypocritical "ifs." "if," yes, "if" the personnel of the constituent assembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of the soviets, it can count on their support. _if not--it condemns itself to death_. the socialist-revolutionists of the left in their organ, _the flag of labor_, repeated in the wake of the bolsheviki, "we will uphold the constituent assembly in _the measure we_--" afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs," but distinct answers. "the majority of the constituent assembly is formed," said the bolsheviki, "of socialist-revolutionists and cadets--that is to say, enemies of the people. this composition assures it of a counter-revolutionary spirit. its destiny is therefore clear. historic examples come to its aid. _the victorious people has no need of a constituent assembly. it is above the constituante_. it has gone beyond it." the russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in a few weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of russians had fought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the most perfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in the most cultivated countries of western europe. to the constituent assembly, legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, they opposed the soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and their elections to two or three degrees,[ ] the soviets which were the revolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose rôle besides none of those who fought for the constituent assembly sought to diminish. v _the fight concentrates around the constituent assembly_ this was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. the defenders of the constituent assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. the peasants who waited with impatience the opening of the constituent assembly sent delegates to petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of the convocation. these delegates betook themselves to the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates ( kirillovskaia street), and to the socialist-revolutionist fraction of the members of the constituante ( bolotnai street). this last fraction worked actively at its proper organization. a bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged to elaborate projects of law for the constituante. the fraction issued bulletins explaining to the population the program which the socialist-revolutionists were going to defend at the constituante. active relations were undertaken with the provinces. at the same time the members of the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up an active agitation in the workshops and factories of petrograd, and among the soldiers of the preobrajenski regiment and some others. the members of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates worked in concert with them. it was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmen which had most importance in the fight against the bolsheviki. they, the true representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; people were obliged to reckon with them. it was under these conditions that the democratic conference met. called by the provisional government, it comprised representatives of the soviets, of parties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations, co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. its object was to solve the question of power until the meeting of the constituent assembly. at this conference the bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but they acted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner, all those who were not in accord with them, "kornilovist, counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" because of this attitude the conference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly deciding affairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, which lasted several days of unending twaddle. what the bolsheviki wanted was a verbal victory--to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. the same speeches were repeated every day. some upheld a power exclusively socialist, others--the majority composed of delegates from different corners of the country--sanctioned an agreement with all the democratic elements. the provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returned to their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lost opportunities, of useless debates. there remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the constituent assembly. those who voted against a government exclusively socialist did not think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they could expose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared the possible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose help could not be relied on. but they did not take into account a fact which had resulted from the kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of the working masses in presence of all the non-socialists, of those who--not being in immediate contact with them--placed themselves, were it ever so little, more on the right. the democratic conference resulted in the formation of a pre-parliament. there the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, were about the same. besides the bolsheviki soon abandoned the pre-parliament, for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed the dissolution of that institution. "we are on the eve of a bolshevik insurrection"--such was, at this time, the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "we are rushing to it with dizzy rapidity. the catastrophe is inevitable." but what is very characteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, the bolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars and calumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, and that on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated and well prepared in advance. * * * * * during the whole period that preceded the bolshevik insurrection a great creative work was being carried on in the country in spite of the undesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above. . with great difficulty there were established organs of a local, autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were to furnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. the zemstvo of former times was made up of only class representatives; _the elections to the new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, and secret_. these elections were a kind of schooling for the population, showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparing it for the elections to the constituent assembly. at the same time they laid the foundation of a local autonomous administration. . preparations for the election to the constituent assembly were made; an agitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technical order were made. this was a difficult task because of the great number of electors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate, etc. everywhere special courts had been established, in view of the elections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent in great numbers into the country. . _at the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the law concerning the socialization of the soil._ the abandonment of his post by tchernov, minister of agriculture, did not stop this work. the principal agricultural committee and the minister of agriculture, directed by rakitnikov and vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before the convocation of the constituent assembly. the revolutionary socialist party decided to keep for itself the post of minister of agriculture; for the position they named s. maslov, who had to exact from the government an immediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. _the study of this law in the council of ministers was finished. nothing more remained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. because of the excitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once, without waiting for the constituent assembly_. finally, to better realize the conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaited anxiously the elections to the constituent assembly. all believed that this was going to settle the life of russia. vi _the bolshevist insurrection_ it was under these conditions that the bolshevist _coup d'état_ happened. in the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armed force; at petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the baltic fleet, of the soldiers of the preobrajenski, semenovski, and other regiments, in other towns with the aid of the local garrisons. here, for example, is how the bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at saratov. i was a witness to these facts myself. saratov is a big university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. the zemstvo of saratov was one of the best in russia. the peasant population of this province, among whom the revolutionary socialist propaganda was carried on for several years by the revolutionary socialist party, is wide awake and well organized. the municipality and the agricultural committees were composed of socialists. the population was actively preparing for the elections to the constituent assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of the different parties. on the night of october th, by reason of an order that had come from petrograd, the bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at saratov. the following forces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to the masses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of leaders, some intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no rôle in the public life of the town. it was indeed a military _coup d'état_. the city hall, where sat the socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front and the bombardment began. this lasted a whole night; some were wounded, some killed. the municipal judges were arrested. soon after a manifesto solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people," the "counter-revolutionaries," were overthrown; that the power at saratov was going to pass into the hands of the soviet (bolshevist) of the workmen's and soldiers' delegates. the population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to the town hall socialists, men of their choice. now these men were declared "enemies of the people," were shot down or arrested by other socialists. what did all this mean? and the inhabitant of saratov felt a fear stealing into his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value of the socialist idea in general. the faith of former times gave place to doubt, disappointment, and discouragement. the _coup d'état_ was followed by divers other manifestations of bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. bands of soldiers looted the country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the people and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were also pillaged. bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause trouble there. _the sensible part of the population of saratov severely condemned these acts_ in a series of manifestos signed by the printers' union, the mill workers, the city employees' union, postal and telegraph employees, students' organizations, and many other democratic associations and organizations. the peasants received the _coup d'état_ with distinct hostility. meetings and reunions were soon organized in the villages. resolutions were voted censuring the _coup d'état_ of violence, deciding to organize to resist the bolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the bolshevist soldier members from the rural communes. the bands of soldiers, who were sent into the country, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the constituent assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the socialist-revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc. but the bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of the peasants in the constituent assembly, and in the revolutionary socialist party, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders and ways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. there were hardly any abstentions, _ per cent. of the population took part in the voting_. the day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their sunday clothes; they believed that the constituent assembly would give them order, laws, the land. in the government of saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve socialist-revolutionists; there were others (such as the government of pensa, for example) that elected _only_ socialist-revolutionists. the bolsheviki had the majority only in petrograd and moscow and in certain units of the army. the elections to the constituent assembly were a decisive victory for the revolutionary socialist party. such was the response of russia to the bolshevik _coup d'état_. to violence and conquest of power by force of arms, the population answered by the elections to the constituent assembly; the people sent to this assembly, not the bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority, socialist-revolutionists. vii _the fight against the bolsheviki_ but the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. in many places the elections had to be postponed. the bolshevik _coup d'état_ had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, and had even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itself by the arrest of the active workers. the elections which began in the middle of november were not concluded till toward the month of january. in the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against the bolsheviki. it was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight for power. if the socialist-revolutionists had wished they could have seized the power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who were called "the revolutionary socialists of the left." not only did they not follow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. a short time after the bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in this insurrection by certain revolutionary socialists of the left was found out, the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party voted to exclude them from the party for having violated the party discipline and having adopted tactics contrary to its principles. this exclusion was confirmed afterward by the fourth congress of the party, which took place in december, . soon after the _coup d'état_ of october the question was among all parties and all organizations: "what is to be done? how will the situation be remedied?" the remedy included three points. first, creation of a power composed of the representatives of all socialist organizations, with the "populist-socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express condition that the principal actors in the bolshevik _coup d'état_ would not have part in the ministry. second, immediate establishment of the democratic liberties, which were trampled under foot by the bolsheviki, without which any form of socialism is inconceivable. third, convocation without delay of the constituent assembly. such were the conditions proposed to the bolsheviki in the name of several socialist parties (the revolutionary socialist party, the mensheviki, the populist-socialists, etc.), and of several democratic organizations (railroad workers' union, postal and telegraphic employees' union, etc.). the bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold their position; certain commissaries of the people, soon after they were installed in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by the torrents of blood that were shed at moscow and by the cruelties which accompanied the _coup d'état_. the bolsheviki pretended to accept the pourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. in the mean time they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where they gained victories such as that of saratov; they actively rushed the pourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it, they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name schneur, for they had promised peace to the soldiers. for this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces, and that the germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("the german generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons and decorations," with triumph announced in their appeal to the russian people the representatives of this "socialist" government schneur & co.), for this the bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference with the other parties. for the other parties--those who did not recognize the bolshevik _coup d'état_ and did not approve of the violence that was perpetrated--there was only one alternative, the fight. it was the revolutionary socialist party and the national soviet of peasants' delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which was carried on under extremely difficult conditions. all the non-bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishments were looted. after the creation of the "revolutionary tribunal," the authors of articles that were not pleasing to the bolsheviki, as well as the directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to make amends or go to prison, etc. the premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; the red guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises disappeared. thus were looted the premises of the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party ( galernaia street), and, several times, the offices of the paper _dielo narvda_ ( litcinaia street), as well as the office of the "league for the defense of the constituent assembly," the premises of the committees of divers sections of the revolutionary socialist party, the office of the paper _volia naroda_, etc. leaders of the different parties were arrested. the arrest of the whole central committee of the revolutionary socialist party was to be carried out as well as the arrest of all the socialist-revolutionists, and of all the mensheviki in sight. the bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaiming against the "counter-revolution," against their "complicity" with kornilov and kalodine. all those who did not adhere to the bolsheviki were indignant at the sight of the crimes committed, and wished to defend the constituent assembly. knowingly, and in a premeditated manner, the bolshevist press excited the soldiers and the workmen against all other parties. and then when the unthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts of lynching, the bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! thus it was after the death of doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus it was after the dastardly assassination of the cadets, shingariev and kokochkine, after the shootings _en masse_ and the drowning of the officers. it was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the brunt of it, as i have already stated, was sustained by the revolutionary socialist party and the national soviet of peasants' delegates, and it was against these two that the bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "now it is not the cadets who are dangerous to us," said they, "but the socialist-revolutionists--these traitors, these enemies of the people." the most sacred names of the revolution were publicly trampled under foot by them. their cynicism went so far as to accuse breshkovskaya, "the grandmother of the russian revolution," of having sold out to the americans. personally i had the opportunity to hear a bolshevist orator, a member of the executive committee of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by the preobrajenski regiment. the bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush the party, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. but the central committee declared that it would continue to fight against violence--and that in an open manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title, as in the time of czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in the factories, and helped to form public opinion, etc. at the fourth congress of the party, which took place in december, the delegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the bolsheviki was particularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methods in the fight against the bolsheviki. "from the time that the party is placed in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those of czarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed to violence," they said. but the congress spurned this means; the revolutionary socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; it could not do it, because the bolsheviki were, after all, followed by the masses--unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. it is by educating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be fought against. terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression. viii _the second peasant congress_ in the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. a breach was made in the general misunderstanding. moral help was assured to the constituent assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers of petrograd. there was no longer any confidence placed in the bolsheviki. besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. the workers soon came to understand that the bolshevik tactics could only irritate and disgust the great mass of the population, that the bolsheviki were not the representatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, and other earthly goods were only a snare. the industrial production diminished more and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors and thousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. the population of petrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day (a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, while in the time of kerensky the ration was half a pound. the other products (oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely high prices. one ruble fifty copecks for a pound of potatoes, six rubles a pound of meat, etc. the transportation of products to petrograd had almost ceased. the city was on the eve of famine. the workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of the bolsheviki, and by the exploits of the red guard, well paid, enjoying all the privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst of a petrograd starving and in rags. discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the preobrajenski and litovsky regiments, and others. in this manner in the day of the meeting of the constituent assembly they were no longer very numerous. what loud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when kerensky wished to send the preobrajenski and seminovski regiments from petrograd! "what? send the revolutionary regiments from petrograd? to make easier the surrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" the soldiers of the preobrajenski regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, where the acts of the bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper, _the soldiers' cloak_, which was confiscated. on the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers of the putilov factory: the constituent assembly is the only organ expressing the will of the entire people. it alone is able to reconstitute the unity of the country. the majority of the deputies to the constituent assembly who had for some time been elected had arrived in petrograd, and the bolsheviki always retarded the opening. the socialist-revolutionist fraction started conferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day for the opening of the constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of the commissaries of the people. they chose the date, december th, but the opening could not take place on that day, the ukrainian fraction having suddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves to the bolsheviki and the revolutionary socialists of the left. finally, the government fixed the opening of the constituent assembly for the th ( th) of january. here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening of the constituante: _bulletin of members of the constituent assembly belonging to the socialist-revolutionist fraction. no. , dec. , ._ _to all the citizens_: the socialist-revolutionist fraction of the constituent assembly addresses the whole people the present exposé of the reasons for which the constituent assembly has not been opened until this day: it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the sovereign rights of the people. let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the workers, forge new chains for liberated russia, those who attempt to assassinate the constituent assembly, which alone is able to save russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has been born within. let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and their constituent assembly. for, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands. citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the constituent assembly, november th, all the socialist-revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to petrograd. you know that neither violence of a usurping power nor arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us at the taurida palace, could prevent us from assembling and fulfilling our duty. but the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded the election to the constituent assembly and the number of deputies elected was insufficient. it was necessary to postpone the opening of the constituent assembly. our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive preparatory work. we elaborated, in several commissions, projects of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the constituante would have to solve. we adopted the project of our fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the measures which the constituante would have to take from the very first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities which people russia and assure each people a national point of view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the fratricidal war. our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening of the constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread, land, and liberty. at the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of the deputies and the opening of the assembly. during this time events became more and more menacing every day, the bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its fall. from before the time when the germans had presented their conditions of peace the bolsheviki had destroyed the army, suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. actually, they recognized themselves that the german conditions were unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. in spite of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their criminal work. russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country. no delay is permissible. our fraction fixed on the th of december the last delay for the opening of the constituante; on this day more than half of the deputies could have arrived in petrograd. we entered into conference with the other fractions. the ukrainians, some other national fractions, and the menshevik social democrats adhered to our resolution. the revolutionary socialists of the left hypocritically declared themselves partizans of an early opening of the constituante. but behold, the council of the so-called "commissaries of the people" fixed the opening for the th of january. _at the same time they called for the th of january a congress of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, thus hoping to be able to trick and to cover with the name of this congress their criminal acts_. the object of this postponement is clear; they did not even hide it and threatened to dissolve the constituent assembly in case that it did not submit to the bolshevik congress of soviets. the same threat was repeated by those who are called socialist-revolutionists of the left. the delegation of the ukrainian revolutionary socialists abandoned us also and submitted to the order for the convocation on january th, considering that the fight of the bolshevik power against the constituent assembly is an internal question, which interests only greater russia. citizens! we shall be there, too, on january th, so that the least particle of responsibility for the sabotage of the constituent assembly may not fall upon us. but we do not think that we can suspend our activity with regard to the speediest possible opening of the constituent assembly. we address an energetic appeal to all the deputies; in the name of the fatherland, in the name of the revolution, in the name of the duty which devolves upon you by reason of your election, come, all, to petrograd! on the st of january all the deputies present will decide on the day for the opening of the constituent assembly. we appeal to you, citizens! remind your elected representatives of their duty. and remember that your salvation is solely in your own hands, a mortal danger threatens the constituent assembly; be all ready to rise in its defense! the revolutionary socialist fraction of the constituent assembly. on the d of january the league for the defense of the constituent assembly held a meeting at which were present delegates, representing the socialist parties as well as various democratic organizations and many factories--that of putilov, that of oboukhov, and still others from the outskirts of narva, from the districts of viborg, spassky, and petrogradsky, from the isle vassily. it was decided to organize for january th a peaceful display in honor of the opening of the constituent assembly. the bolsheviki answered this by furious articles in the _pravda_, urging the people not to spare the counter-revolutionaries, these bourgeoisie who intend, by means of their constituante, to combat the revolutionary people. they advised the people of petrograd not to go out on the streets that day. "we shall act without reserve," they added. sailors were called from cronstadt; cruisers and torpedo-boats came. an order was issued to the sailors and to the red guards who patrolled all the works of the taurida, to make use of their arms if any one attempted to enter the palace. for that day unlimited powers were accorded to the military authorities. at the same time an assembly of the representatives of the garrison at petrograd, fixed for that day, was proscribed, and the newspaper, _the soldiers' cloak_, was suppressed. a congress of soviets was called for the th of january. they prepared the dissolution of the constituent assembly and they wanted to place the congress before the accomplished fact. the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates, and the central executive committee of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates chosen at the first elections answered by the two following appeals: peasant comrades! the bolsheviki have fixed the th of january for the opening of the constituent assembly; for the th of january they call the iii congress of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, and for the th the peasant congress. the peasants are, by design, relegated to the background. an outrage against the constituent assembly is being prepared. in this historic moment the peasants cannot remain aloof. the provisional executive committee of the national soviet of peasants' delegates, which goes on duty as a guard to the constituent assembly, has decided to call, on the th of january, also, the third national congress of the soviets of peasants' delegates. the representation remains the same as before. send your delegates at once to petrograd, grand bolotnai, a. the fate of the constituent assembly is the fate of russia, the fate of the revolution. all up for the defense of the constituent assembly, for the defense of the revolution--not by word alone, but by acts! [signed] _the provisional executive committee of the national soviet of peasants' delegates, upholding the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly_. appeal of the central executive committee of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, chosen at the first elections to all the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, to all the committees of the army and of the navy, to all the organizations associated with the soviets and committees, to all the members of the socialist-revolutionist and menshevist social democratic fractions who left the second congress of soviets: comrades, workmen, and soldiers! our cry of alarm is addressed to all those to whom the work of the soviets is dear. know that a traitorous blow threatens the revolutionary fatherland, the constituent assembly, and even the work of the soviets. your duty is to prepare yourselves for their defense. the central executive committee, nominated at the october congress, calls together for the th of january a congress of soviets, destined to bungle the constituent assembly. comrades! the second congress of soviets assembled at the end of october, under conditions particularly unfavorable, at the time that the bolshevik party, won over by its leaders to a policy of adventure, a plot unbecoming a class organization, executed at petrograd a _coup d'état_ which gave it power; at a time when certain groups with the same viewpoint disorganized even the method of convocation of the second congress, thus openly aspiring to falsify the results; at this same congress the regular representatives of the army were lacking (only two armies being represented), and the soviets of the provinces were very insufficiently represented (only about out of ). under these conditions it is but natural that the central executive committee of the soviets chosen at the first election would not recognize the right of this congress to decide the politics of the soviets. however, in spite of the protestations, and even of the departure of a great number of delegates (those of the revolutionary socialist fraction, mensheviki, and populist-socialists), a new executive committee of the soviets was elected. to consider this last as the central director of all the soviets of the country was absolutely impossible. the delegates who remained in the congress formed only an assembly of a group with a little fraction of the revolutionary socialists of the left, who had given their adhesion to them. thus the central committee named by their conference could not be considered except as representatives of these two groups only. bringing to the organization of soviets an unheard-of disorder, establishing by their shameful methods of fighting its domination over the soviets, some of which were taken by surprise, the others terrorized and broken in their personnel, deceiving the working class and the army by its short-sighted policy of adventure, the new executive committee during the two months that have since passed has attempted to subject all the soviets of russia to its influence. it succeeded in part in this, in the measure in which the confidence of the groups which constituted it in the policy was not yet exhausted. but a considerable portion of the soviets, as well as fractions of other soviets, fractions composed of the most devoted and experienced fighters, continued to follow the only true revolutionary road; to develop the class organization of the working masses, to direct their intellectual and political life, to develop the political and social aspects of the revolution, to exert, by all the power of the working class organized into soviets, the necessary pressure to attain the end that it proposed. the questions of peace and of war, that of the organization of production and of food-supply, and that of the fight for the constituent assembly are in the first place. the policy of adventure of the groups which seized the power is on the eve of failure. peace could not be realized by a rupture with the allies and an entente with the imperialistic orb of the central powers. by reason of this failure of the policy of the commissaires of the people, of the disorganization of production (which, among other things, has had as a result the creation of hundreds of thousands of unemployed), by reason of the civil war kindled in the country and the absence of a power recognized by the whole people, the central powers tend to take hold in the most cynical fashion of a whole series of western provinces (poland, lithuania, courland), and to subject the whole country to their complete economic, if not political, domination. the question of provisioning has taken on an unheard-of acuteness; the gross interference in the functioning of organs already created for this object, and the civil war kindled everywhere throughout the country, have completely demoralized the provisioning of wheat in regions where they had none, the north and the army are found on the eve of famine. industry is dying. hundreds of factories and workshops are stopped. the short-sighted policy of the commissaries has caused hundreds of workmen to be thrown on the streets and become unemployed. the will of the entire people is threatened with being violated. the usurpers who in october got hold of the power by launching the word of order for a swift convocation of the constituent assembly strive hard, now that the elections are over, to retain the power in their hands by arresting the deputies and dissolving the constituante itself. _all that which the country holds of life, and in the first place all the working class and all the army, ought to rise with arms in their hands to defend the popular power represented by the constituante, which must bring peace to the people and consolidate by legislative means the revolutionary conquests of the working class._ in bringing this to your knowledge, the central committee chosen at the first elections invites you, comrades, to place yourself immediately in agreement with it. considering the congress of october as incompetent, the central committee chosen at the first elections has decided to begin a preparatory work in view of the convocation of a new congress of the soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. in the near future, while the commissaires of the people, in the persons of lenine and trotzky, are going to fight against the sovereign power of the constituent assembly, we shall have to intervene with all our energy in the conflict artificially encited by the adventurers, between that assembly and the soviets. _it will be our task to aid the soviets in taking consciousness of their rôle, in defining their political lines, and in determining their functions and those of the constituante._ comrades! the convocation of the congress for the th of january is dictated by the desire to provoke a conflict between the soviets and the constituante, and thus botch this last. anxious for the fate of the country, the executive committee chosen at the first elections decides to convoke at petrograd for the th of january an extraordinary assembly of _all the soviets, all the committees of the army and the navy, all the fractions of the soviets and military committees, all the organizations that cluster around the soviets and the committees that are standing upon the ground of the defense of the constituante._ the following are the orders of the day: . the power of the constituent assembly. . the fight for the general democratic peace and the re-establishment of the international. . the immediate problems of the policy of the soviets. comrades! assure for this extraordinary assembly of soviets the most complete representation of all the organizations of workmen and soldiers. establish at once election centers. we have a fight to uphold. in the name of the revolution, all the reason and all the energy ought to be thrown into the balance. the central executive committee of soviets of workmen's and soldiers' delegates chosen at the first elections. _ december, ._ ix _the manifestation of january th at petrograd_ from eleven o'clock in the morning cortèges, composed principally of working-men bearing red flags and placards with inscriptions such as "proletarians of all countries, unite!" "land and liberty!" "long live the constituent assembly!" etc., set out from different parts of the city. the members of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates had agreed to meet at the field, of mars where a procession coming from the petrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. it was soon learned that a part of the participants, coming from the viborg quarter, had been assailed at the liteiny bridge by gunfire from the red guards and were obliged to turn back. but that did not check the other parades. the peasant participants, united with the workers from petrogradsky quarter, came to the field of mars; after having lowered their flags before the tombs of the revolution of february and sung a funeral hymn to their memory, they installed themselves on liteinaia street. new manifestants came to join them and the street was crowded with people. at the corner of fourstatskaia street (one of the streets leading to the taurida palace) they found themselves all at once assailed by shots from the red guards. the red guard fired _without warning_, something that never before happened, even in the time of czarism. the police always began by inviting the participators to disperse. among the first victims was a member of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates, the siberian peasant, logvinov. an explosive bullet shot away half of his head (a photograph of his body was taken; it was added to the documents which were transferred to the commission of inquiry). several workmen and students and one militant of the revolutionary socialist party, gorbatchevskaia, were killed at the same time. other processions of participants on their way to the taurida palace were fired into at the same time. on all the streets leading to the palace, groups of red guards had been established; they received the order "not to spare the cartridges." on that day at petrograd there were one hundred killed and wounded. it must be noted that when, at a session of the constituent assembly, in the taurida palace, they learned of this shooting, m. steinberg, commissioner of justice, declared in the corridor that it was a lie, that he himself had visited the streets of petrograd and had found everywhere that "all was quiet." exactly as the ministers of nicholas romanov after the suppressions said "lie. lie," so cried the bolsheviki and the revolutionary socialists of the left, in response to the question formally put on the subject of the shooting by a member of the constituent assembly. the following day the bolshevik organs and those of the revolutionary socialists of the left passed over these facts in silence. this silence they kept also on the th of january, the day on which literally all petrograd assembled at the funeral of the victims. public indignation, however, obliged them in the end to admit that there had been some small groups of participants and to name a commission of inquiry concerning the street disorders which had taken place on january th. this commission was very dilatory in the performance of its duty and it is very doubtful if they ever came to any decision. analogous manifestations took place at moscow, at saratov and other cities; everywhere they were accompanied by shootings. the number of victims was particularly considerable at moscow. x _at the taurida palace on the day of the opening of the constituent assembly_ the taurida palace on that day presented a strange aspect. at every door, in the corridors, in the halls, everywhere soldiers and sailors and red guards armed with guns and hand-grenades, who at every turn demanded your pass. it was no easy matter to get into the palace. nearly all the places reserved for the public were occupied by the bolsheviki and their friends. the appearance of the taurida palace was not that of a place where the free representatives of a free people were going to assemble. the bolsheviki delayed as much as possible the opening of the session. it was only at four o'clock instead of at midday that they deigned to make up their minds. they and the revolutionary socialists of the left occupied seats of the extreme left; then came the revolutionary socialists, the mensheviki, and the other socialist fractions. the seats on the right remained vacant. the few cadets that had been chosen preferred not to come. in this manner the constituent assembly was composed at this first and last session solely of socialists. this, however, did not prevent the presence in the corridors and the session hail of a crowd of sailors and red guards armed, as if it were a question of an assembly of conspirators, enemies of the revolution. from the beginning a fight was started by the election of president. the majority nominated for the office of president chernov; the bolsheviki and the revolutionary socialists of the left voted against him. the bolsheviki did not propose any candidate of their own, and placed before the members the candidacy of a revolutionary socialist of the left, marie spiridonova, who was totally incapable of fulfilling this rôle. afterward several declarations were read--that of the bolsheviki, that of the socialist-revolutionists (read by chernov), that of the mensheviki (read by tseretelli). the partizans of each fraction greeted the reading of their own declaration with deafening applause (for the audience was one of "comrades" and did not hesitate to take part in the debates); cat-calls and shouts greeted the orators of the opposing fractions. each word of the declarations of the socialist-revolutionists and of the mensheviki (declarations which every socialist could sign) was received with a round of hisses, shouts, deafening cries, exclamations of contempt for the bolsheviki, the sailors, and the soldiers. the speech of chernov--president and member of a detested party--had above all the honor of such a greeting. as for tseretelli, he was at first greeted by an inconceivable din, but was able afterward--his speech was so full of profound sense--to capture the attention of the bolsheviki themselves. a general impression that was extremely distressing came from this historic session. the attitude of the bolsheviki was grossly unbecoming and provocative of disdain. it indicated clearly that the dissolution of the constituante was, for them, already decided. lenine, who continually kept contemptuous silence, wound up by stretching himself upon his bench and pretending to sleep. lunotcharsky from his ministerial bench pointed contemptuously with his finger toward the white hair of a veteran of the revolutionary socialist party. the sailors leveled the muzzles of their revolvers at the socialist-revolutionists. the audience laughed, whistled, and shouted. the bolsheviki finally left the assembly, followed, as might be understood, by their servants, the revolutionary socialists of the left. the fractions which remained voted the law proposed by the socialist-revolutionists on the transfer of the lands to common ownership (socialization of the soil). the sailors and red guards attempted several times to interrupt the session. at five o'clock in the morning they finally demanded with a loud voice that everybody leave. "we were obliged to go," said, later, the members of the constituent assembly at a meeting of the executive committee of the soviet of peasants' delegates in recounting these tragic moments, "not that we were afraid of being shot; we were prepared for that, and each one of us expected it, but fear of something else which is far worse: for fear of insults and gross violence. we were only a handful; what was that beside those great big fellows full of malice toward the constituante and of defiance for the 'enemies of the people,' the 'servants of the bourgeoisie,' which we were in their eyes, thanks to the lies and the calumnies of the bolsheviki? careful of our dignity, and out of respect for the place where we were, we could not permit ourselves to be cuffed, nor that they throw us out of the taurida palace by force--and that is what would have inevitably happened." it was thus that the constituent assembly ended. the socialist-revolutionist fraction maintained an attitude of surprising calm and respectful bearing, not allowing itself to be disturbed by any provocation. the correspondents of foreign newspapers congratulated the members and said to them that in this session to which the bolsheviki had wished to give the character of "any-old-kind-of-a-meeting" all the fractions maintained a truly parliamentary attitude. the bolshevik terror became rife. _all the newspapers that tried to open the eyes of the people as to what was happening were confiscated_. every attempt to circulate the _dielo naroda_ or other newspapers of the opposition was severely punished. the volunteer venders of these papers were arrested, cruelly struck down by rifle butts, and sometimes even shot. the population, indignant, gathered in groups on the streets, but the red guards dispersed all assemblages. xi _the dissolution of the third all-russian peasants' congress_ this is the course of the events which followed the dissolution of the constituante. on the th of january the members of the constituante assembled at bolotnaia; two were arrested; the premises of the fraction were occupied by the red guards. on the th of january took place the funeral of the victims, in which all petrograd took part. the bolsheviki this time did not dare to shoot into the magnificent procession preceded by a long line of coffins. the th of january they dispersed the third all-russian congress of peasants which had placed itself on the side of the constituent assembly. the congress had been at first arranged for the th of january (the same day as the bolshevik congress of the soviets), but, because of the events, it was postponed to the th. the peasants who had come to this congress knew perfectly well that they would have a fight to uphold, perhaps even to give their lives. their neighbors, their co-villagers, wept when they saw them set out, as if it were a question of men condemned to death. that alone suffices to show to what degree were conscious these peasants who had come from all corners of the country to prepare themselves for the defense of the constituent assembly. as soon as the congress was opened sailors and red guards, armed with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises ( kirillovskaia street), surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave. "in whose name do you order us, who are delegates to the peasants' congress of all-russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants. "in the name of the baltic fleet," the soldiers replied. the peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. one by one the peasant delegates ascended the tribune to stigmatize the bolsheviki in speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the constituent assembly. the sailors listened. they had come to disperse a counter-revolutionary congress, and these speeches troubled them. one sailor, not able to stand it any longer, burst into tears. "let me speak!" he shouted to the president. "i hear your speeches, peasant comrades, and i no longer understand anything.... what is going on? we are peasants, and you, too, are peasants. but we are of this side, and you are of the other.... why? who has separated us? for we are brothers.... but it is as if a barrier had been placed between us." he wept and, seizing his revolver, he exclaimed, "no, i would rather kill myself!" this session of the congress presented a strange spectacle, disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they were there; the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined them. then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. the soldiers, lowering their guns, knelt down also. the bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn to events. "enough said," declared the chief; "we have come not to speak, but to act. if they do not want to go to smolny, let them get out of here." and they set themselves to the task. in groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled on, and, on their refusal to go to smolny, pushed out of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing. members of the executive committee were arrested, the premises occupied by sailors and red guards, the objects found therein stolen. the peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality; a certain number were lodged in the barracks of the preobrajenski regiment. the sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to logvinov, and wept when they saw that they understood nothing, now became the docile executors of the orders of the bolsheviki. and when they were asked, "why do you do this?" they answered as in the time, still recent, of czarism: "it is the order. no need to talk." it was thus there was manifested the habit of servile obedience, of arbitrary power and violence, which had been taking root for several centuries; under a thin veneer of revolution one finds the servile and violent man of yesterday. in the midst of these exceptional circumstances the peasants gave proof of that obstinacy and energy in the pursuit of their rights for which they are noted. thrown out in the middle of the night, robbed, insulted, they decided, nevertheless, to continue their congress. "how, otherwise, can we go home?" said they. "we must come to an understanding as to what is to be done." the members of the executive committee who were still free succeeded in finding new premises (let it be noted that among others the workmen of the big oboukhovsky factory offered them hospitality), and during three days the peasants could assemble secretly by hiding themselves from the eyes of the red guard, and the spies in various quarters of petrograd, until such time as the decisions were given on all great questions. _a procès-verbal was prepared concerning all that had taken place on kirillovskaia street. a declaration was made protesting against the acts of the bolshevik government_. this declaration was to be read at the taurida palace when the soviets were in congress by delegates designated for that purpose. the bolsheviki, however, would not permit the delegates to enter the taurida palace. here are the texts of the declaration and of the procès-verbal: at the third national congress of soviets of peasants' delegates grouped around the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly, this declaration was sent to the congress of workmen's, soldiers' and peasants' delegates called together by the bolshevist government at the taurida palace: at the second national peasants' congress the delegates who had come together for the defense of the constituent assembly continued the work of the congress and elected a provisional executive committee, independently of the delegates who had opposed the power of the constituent assembly and adhered to the bolsheviki. we, peasant delegates, having come to petrograd, more than in number, to participate in a congress called by the provisional executive committee, which is that of those of the soviets which acknowledge the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly, declare to our electors, to the millions of the peasant population, and to the whole country, that the actual government which is called "the government of the peasants and workmen" has established in their integrity the violence, the arbitrariness, and all the horrors of the autocratic régime which was overthrown by the great revolution of february. all the liberties attained by that revolution and won by innumerable sacrifices during several generations are scouted and trodden under foot. liberty of opinion does not exist; men who under the government of the czar had paid by years of prison and exile for their devotedness to the revolutionary cause are now again thrown into the dungeons of fortresses without any accusation whatever, of anything of which they might be guilty, being made to them. again spies and informers are in action. again capital punishment is re-established in its most horrible forms; shooting on the streets and assassinations without judgment or examination. _peaceful processions, on their way to salute the constituent assembly, are greeted by a fusillade of shots upon the orders of the autocrats of smolny. the liberty of the press does not exist; the papers which displease the bolsheviki are suppressed, their printing plants and offices looted, their editors arrested._ the organizations which, during the preceding months, were established with great difficulty--zemstvos, municipalities, agricultural and food committees--are foolishly destroyed in an excess of savage fanaticism. the bolsheviki even try to kill the supreme representation, the only one legitimately established, of the popular will--the constituent assembly. to justify this violence and this tyranny they try to allege the well-being of the people, but we, peasant workers, we see well that their policy will only tighten the cord around the workers' necks, while the possibility of a democratic peace becomes more remote every day; matters have come to the point where the bolsheviki proclaim a further mobilization--of salaried volunteers, it is true--to renew the hostilities. they strive to represent the war with ukraine and with the cossacks under the aspect of a war of classes; it is not, however, the bourgeoisie, but the representatives of the working classes who are killed on one side and on the other. they promised the socialist régime, and they have only destroyed the production of the factories so as to leave the population without product and throw the workers into an army of unemployed; the horrible specter of famine occupies the void left by the broken organizations of food-supply; millions of the money of the people are squandered in maintaining a red guard--or sent to germany to keep up the agitation there, while the wives and the widows of our soldiers no longer receive an allowance, there being no money in the treasury, and are obliged to live on charity. the russian country is threatened with ruin. death knocks at the doors of the hovels of the workmen. by what forces have the bolsheviki thus killed our country? twelve days before the organization of the autonomous administration was achieved and the elections to the constituent assembly begun, at the time when there had been organized all the autonomous administrations of volosts, districts, governments, and cities, chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, thus assuring the realization of the will of the people and justifying the confidence of the population--even then they seized the power and established a régime which subjects all the institutions of the country to the unlicensed power of the commissaries of the people. _and these commissaries rely upon the soviets, which were chosen at elections that were carried out according to rank, with open balloting and inequality of vote, for therein the peasants count only as many representatives as the workmen of the cities, although in russia their number is sixty times greater_. absence of control permits every abuse of power; absence of secret voting permits that into these soviets at these suspicious elections some enter who are attracted by the political rôle of these institutions; the defeat of inequality in the suffrage restrains the expression of the will of the peasants, and, accordingly, these cannot have confidence in this system of government. the tyranny that presided at these elections was such that the bolsheviki themselves pay no attention to the results, and declare that the soviets that are opposed to themselves are bourgeoisie and capitalists. we, representing the peasant workers, must declare in the name of our constituents: if anything can save russia, it can only be the re-establishment of the organs of local autonomous administration, chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage and the resumption, without delay, of the work of the constituent assembly. the constituent assembly alone can express the exact will of the working-people, for the system of election which governs it includes every measure of precaution against violence, corruption, and other abuses, and assures the election of deputies chosen by the majority; now, in the country, the majority is composed of the working class. millions of peasants delegated us to defend the constituante, but this was dissolved as soon as it began to work for the good of the people. the work of the constituante was interrupted at the time that it was discussing the law concerning land, when a new agricultural régime was being elaborated for the country. for this reason, and for this alone, the constituante adopted only the first articles of this law, articles which established the definite transfer of all the land to the hands of the workers, without any ransom. the other articles of this law, which concerned the order of the apportionment of lots, its forms, its methods of possession, etc., could not be adopted, although they were completely elaborated in the commission and nothing remained but to sanction them. we, peasants assembled in congress, we, too, have been the object of violence and outrages, unheard of even under the czarist régime. red guards and sailors, armed, invaded our premises. we were searched in the rudest manner. our goods and the provisions which we had brought from home were stolen. several of our comrade-delegates and all the members of the committee were arrested and taken to peter and paul fortress. we ourselves were, late at night, put out of doors in a city which we did not know, deprived of shelter under which to sleep. all that, to oblige us either to go to smolny, where the bolshevist government called another congress, or to return to our homes without having attained any result. but violence could not stop us; secretly, as in the time of czarist autocracy, we found a place to assemble and to continue our work. in making known these facts to the country and the numerous millions of the peasant population, we call upon them to stigmatize the revolting policy practised by the bolshevik government with regard to all those who are not in accord with it. returned to our villages, dispersed in every corner of immense russia, we shall use all our powers to make known to the mass of peasants and to the entire country the truth concerning this government of violence; to make known in every corner of the fatherland that the actual government, which has the hardihood to call itself "government of the workmen and peasants," in reality shoots down workmen and peasants and shamelessly scoffs at the country. we shall use all our strength to induce the population of peasant workers to demand an account from this government of violence, as well as from their prodigal children, their sons and brothers, who in the army and navy give aid to these autocrats in the commission of violence. in the name of millions of peasants, by whom we were delegated, we demand that they no longer obstruct the work of the constituent assembly. we were not allowed to finish the work for which we had come; at home we shall continue this work. we shall employ all our strength to effect, as soon as possible, the convocation of a new national congress of peasants' delegates united on the principle of the defense of the constituante, and that in a place where we need not fear a new dissolution. lately we fought against autocracy and czarist violence; we shall fight with no less energy against the new autocrats who practise violence, whoever they may be, and whatever may be the shibboleths by which they cover their criminal acts. we shall fight for the constituent assembly, because it is in that alone that we see the salvation of our country, that of the revolution, and that of land and liberty. charged by our constituents to defend the constituent assembly, we cannot participate in a congress called by those who have dissolved it; who have profaned the idea which to the people is something sacred; who have shot down the defenders of true democracy; who have shed the sacred blood of our logvinov, member of the executive committee of peasant deputies, who on the th of january was killed by an explosive bullet during a peaceful manifestation, bearing the flag "land and liberty." comrade-peasants who have come by chance to this congress declare to these violators that the only executive committee that upholds the idea of the defense of the constituante forms a center around which are grouped all the peasant workers. we call the entire mass of peasants to the work that is common to all--the fight for "land and liberty," for the true government of the people. "we all come from the people, children of the same family of workers," and we all have to follow a route that leads to happiness and liberty. now this road, which leads to "land and liberty," goes through the constituent assembly alone. the constituent assembly was dissolved, but it was chosen by the entire people, and it ought to live. _long live the constituent assembly!_ _down with violence and tyranny!_ _all power to the people, through the agency of the_ _constituent assembly!_ [signed] the third national congress of soviets of peasant delegates, united on the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly. procÈs-verbal of the session of the iii national congress of soviets of peasants' delegates, united on the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly the provisional executive committee of soviets of peasants' delegates nominated by the fraction of the second national congress of these soviets, which, to the number of delegates, was organized on the basis of the principle of the defense of the constituent assembly, had addressed to all the soviets an appeal inviting those who believe in the defense of the constituante to send representatives to the third congress, fixed by the committee for the th of january, and destined to offset the congress called for the th of january by the committee of that fraction of the congress which, to the number of votes, took sides against the power of the constituent assembly and joined the bolsheviki. the peasants' congress, meeting by districts and by governments, as well as the local executive committees of soviets which have chosen us, knew well to which congress they delegated us and had given us precise mandates, expressing their confidence in the constituent assembly and their blame of the soviets and the bolshevik organs that impede the work of the constituante and call the peasants to the congress of january th. these congresses and these committees have charged us to use all our efforts to defend the constituent assembly, binding themselves, on their part, in case our efforts were insufficient, to rise in a body for its defense. by reason of the disorganization of postal and telegraphic communications, and because in different localities the calls of the committee were held up by the bolshevist organizations, the instructions concerning the congress fixed for the th of january were not received in many provinces until after considerable delay. some minutes before the opening of the conference, which was to take place on the premises of the committee ( kirillovskaia street), where the delegates on hand had lodged, there arrived a detachment of sailors and red guards armed with guns and bombs, who surrounded the house, guarding all the entrances, and occupied all the apartments. the executive committee, performing its duty toward the peasant workers, which duty was to hold their flag with a firm hand, not fearing any violence, and not allowing themselves to be intimidated by the bayonets and the bombs of the enemies of the peasant workers, opened the session at the hour indicated. the bolshevist pretorians, however, violating the freedom of assembly, broke into the hall and surrounded the office and members of the conference with bayonets drawn. their leader, kornilov, staff-commandant of the red guards of the rojdestvensky quarter, made a speech to the delegates, in which he said that they were to go to the smolny institute, to the bolshevist congress, assuring them that they had come to this congress by mistake; at the end he read a document ordering him to make a search of the premises, to confiscate all papers, and to arrest all who would offer resistance. in reply to this speech the delegates and the members of the executive committee spoke in turn; they stigmatized vehemently the criminal policy of the bolshevist government, which dissolved the constituent assembly, the true representation of the popular will, without having given it the time to register a vote on the agricultural law; which shot down workers participating in peaceful negotiations; which deprived the people of the right of assembly to discuss their needs; which destroyed freedom of speech and assembly and trampled in the dust the whole russian revolution. the delegates, one after another, tried to explain to the red guards that it was not the delegates that were deceived in coming to this conference, but those who were going to smolny to the bolshevist congress, those who, by order of the bolsheviki, kill the peasants' representatives and dissolve their congress. in the midst of these speeches kornilov declared the congress dissolved; to this comrade ovtchinnikov, president of the conference, replied that the congress would not be dissolved except by force, and, besides, that the document read by kornilov did not authorize him to pronounce its dissolution. members of the congress having entered into arguments with the sailors and the red guards, concerning the violence inflicted on the peasant delegates, the sound of the rattling of guns was heard and the leader of the pretorians declared that if the congress would not submit to his orders he would stop at nothing. all the members of the congress were forthwith searched and thrown out of doors in groups of five, with the idea that, having come from the provinces, and not knowing petrograd, they would find themselves dispersed in such a way as not to be able to assemble again anywhere, and would be obliged either to betake themselves to the railway and return home or to direct their steps toward smolny, the address of which was given to each one at the exit. at the same time, without reason, the following were arrested: minor, a deputy to the constituent assembly; rakitnikov, ovtchinnikov, roussine, sorokine, and tchernobaiev, members of the executive committee of the soviet of peasant delegates; and chmelev, a soldier. the premises of the committee, on which were various documents and papers which were to be sent into the country, were occupied by red guards, and machine-guns were placed at the entrance. the search ended about nine o'clock in the evening. some late delegates alone were authorized to spend the night on the premises under the supervision of red guards. an inquiry held among the comrades, who had come for this third national peasants' congress, established that, at the time when the premises of the executive committee were seized, january , , there were, among the sailors and red guards of the detachment that did the work, _german and austrian prisoners dressed in russian uniforms_; it also established the fact that many objects had disappeared in the course of the search. the congress decided: first, to consider as a law the socialization of the soil voted by the constituent assembly and to apply the same in the country; second, to consider that the constituent assembly, dispersed by brutal force, was nevertheless elected by the whole people and ought to exist and to assemble again as soon as that would be possible; third, to fight everywhere in the provinces in the defense of the organs of autonomous administration, which the bolsheviki dispersed by armed force. during these few days when the peasants were obliged to assemble in secret and to station patrols to protect their meetings, they followed those methods of conspiracy that the russian socialists had been obliged to employ when they fought against the tyranny of autocracy. returning to their villages, the peasants bore with them the greatest hate for the bolsheviki, whom they considered the personification of tyranny and violence. and they took with them also a firm resolution to fight against this violence. the executive committee, whose powers were confirmed by the third congress, found itself thus, for the second time, deprived of all its goods, its premises, and its pecuniary resources; it found itself obliged to lead a half-clandestine existence, to organize secret assemblies, etc. miss spiridonova, who, in this fight against the peasants that rose to the defense of the constituent assembly, gave proof of intolerance and peculiar fanaticism, found herself at the head of the "peasants in uniform," sitting at smolny, _adopting a decree whereby all the moneys that came by post to the executive committee of the soviet of peasant delegates defending the constituent assembly were to be confiscated._ the action of the executive committee was thus rendered very difficult. but it continued to fight, to publish an organ, to commission delegates, to entertain continued relations with the provinces and the country. xii _conclusion_ _morally, bolshevism was killed in the eyes of the workers in the course of these days_ when a peaceful demonstration was fired upon, the constituent assembly dissolved, the peasant congress (and, very soon, the congress of the agricultural committees) dispersed. the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party issued an order for new elections to the soviets, thinking thus to eliminate automatically the bolsheviki. and, in truth, when at petrograd and in the provinces, these elections began, the revolutionary socialists and the mensheviki received the majority and the bolsheviki were snowed under. but these new elections were thwarted by many circumstances: first, because of the lessening of production the workmen were discharged in a body and quit the factories; second, the bolsheviki put obstacles in the way of the elections and sometimes openly prohibited them. nevertheless, wherever they could be held, the results were unfavorable to the bolsheviki. finally, when the working classes clearly saw the shameful rôle played by the bolsheviki in the matter of peace, when they saw the bolsheviki humbly beg for peace at any price from the germans, they understood that it was impossible to continue to tolerate such a government. _the central committee of the revolutionary socialist party published a manifesto appealing to an armed fight against the bolshevik government and the german gangs_ that were overrunning the country. the frightful results of this "peace," so extolled by the bolsheviki, rendered even the name of the bolshevist government odious in the eyes of every conscientious and honest man. * * * * * but bolshevism still endures, for it is based on the armed force of the red guard, on the supineness of the masses deprived of a political education, and not accustomed to fight or to act, and from ancient habit of submitting to force. the causes which produced bolshevism are: first, the accumulation of all the conditions of the historic past of the russian people; second, their psychic character and their habits; third, the conditions of the present time; and fourth, the general situation of the world--that is to say, the war. we also note the vague and hesitating policy of the provisional government; the lack of political education among the people, ready to follow him who promises the most; small development of civic sentiment; the want of any attachment whatever to the state--that of the romanov having never given anything to the people and having taken all from them. czarism took from the miserable peasant his last penny under form of taxes; it took his children from him for war; for the least act of disobedience to authority he was whipped. he wallowed in misery and in ignorance, deprived of every right, human or legal. how could he, this wretched and oppressed peasant develop civic sentiments, a consciousness of his personal dignity? on the other hand, we must take into account the immense weariness caused by the war and by the disorganization which it brought into the whole cycle of existence (to an incomparably greater degree than in western europe). such were the causes which had established a favorable scope for bolshevik propaganda; to introduce their domination they knew how to make use of the shortcomings of the people and the defects of russian life. in fine, what is bolshevism in its essence? _it is an experiment, that is either criminal or that proceeds from a terrible thoughtlessness, tried, without their consent, on the living body of the russian people_. thus some attempt to apply their theories, others wish to measure the height of their personal influence, while still others (and they are found in every movement) seek to profit by the circumstances. bolshevism is a phenomenon brought about by force; it is not a natural consequence of the progress of the russian revolution. taken all in all, bolshevism is not socialism. the bolshevist _coup d'état_ was accomplished contrary to the wish of the majority of the people, who were preparing for the constituent assembly. _it was accomplished with the help of armed force, and it is because of this that the bolshevist régime holds out._ _it has against it the whole conscious portion of the peasant and working population and all the intellectuals._ _it has crushed and trampled under foot the liberty that was won by the russian people._ the bolsheviki pretend to act in the name of the people. why, then, have they dissolved the constituent assembly elected by the people? they pretend to have the majority of the people with them. why, then, this governmental terror that is being used in a manner more cruel even than in the time of czarism? they say that, to fight against the bourgeoisie, the use of violence is necessary. but their principal thrusts are directed not against the bourgeoisie, but against the socialist parties that do not agree with them. and they dare give this caricature the name of dictatorship of the proletariat! socialism must necessarily be founded on democratic principles. if not, "it cuts off the branch of the tree on which it rests," according to the expression of kautsky. socialism needs constructive elements. it does not limit itself to the destruction of ancient forms of existence; it creates new ones. but bolshevism has only destructive elements. it does nothing but destroy, always destroy, with a blind hatred, a savage fanaticism. what has it established? its "decrees" are only verbal solutions without sense, skeletons of ideas, or simply a revolutionary phraseology containing nothing real (as for example the famous shibboleth, "neither peace nor war"). during the few months of its reign bolshevism has succeeded in destroying many things; nearly everything that the effort of the russian people had established. life, disorganized almost to its foundations, has become almost impossible in russia. the railroads do not function, or function only with great difficulty; the postal and telegraphic communications are interrupted in several places. the zemstvos--bases of the life of the country--are suppressed (they are "bourgeois" institutions); the schools and hospitals, whose existence is impossible without the zemstvos, are closed. the most complete chaos exists in the food-supply. the intellectuals, who, in russia, had suffered so much from the czarist tyranny and oppression, are declared "enemies of the people" and compelled to lead a clandestine existence; they are dying of hunger. it is the intellectuals and not the bourgeois (who are hiding) that suffer most from the bolshevist régime. the soviets alone remain. but the soviets are not only revolutionary organs, they are "guardians of the revolution," but in no way legislative and administrative organs. bolshevism is an experiment tried on the russian people. the people are going to pay dearly for it. at least let not this experiment be lost, on them, as well as on other peoples! let the socialists of western europe be not unduly elated by words or by far-fetched judgments. let them look the cruel reality in the face and examine facts to find out the truth. a tyranny which is supported by bayonets is always repugnant, wherever it comes from, and under whatever name it may strut. it can have nothing in common with socialism, which is not only a doctrine of economic necessity, but also a doctrine of superior justice and truth. "all the societies or individuals adhering to the internationale will know what must be the basis of their conduct toward all men: truth, justice, morality, without distinction of color, creed, or nationality," said the statutes that were drawn up by the prime founders of our internationale. _the executive committee of the national soviet of peasant delegates placing themselves on the grounds of the defense of the constituent assembly, having had to examine, in its session of february , , the violence committed by the bolsheviki, and to pass in review the persecutions that this organization had to suffer from that party and from the government of the commissaries of the people, decided to bring the violence committed by the bolsheviki in the name of socialism to the knowledge of the socialists of western europe and of the international socialist bureau through the citizen, e. roubanovitch, representative of the revolutionary socialist party at the international socialist bureau and intrusted with international relations by the executive committee of the first soviet of peasants. the executive committee demands the expulsion, from the socialist family, of the bolshevist leaders, as well as of those of the revolutionary socialists of the left, who seized the power by force, held it by violence and compromised socialism in the eyes of the popular masses. let our brothers of western europe be judges between the socialist peasants who rose in the defense of the constituent assembly and the bolsheviki, who dispersed them by armed force, thus trampling under foot the will of the russian people._ inna rakitnikov, _vice-president of the executive committee of the soviet of peasant delegates, who stand in defense of the constituent assembly._ _may , ._ appendix iii former socialist premier of finland on bolshevism the following letter was addressed to mr. santeri nuorteva, who, it will be remembered, was appointed minister to america by the revolutionary government of finland. the author of the letter, oskar tokoi, was the first socialist prime minister in the world. he is a socialist of long standing, who has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. mr. nuorteva, it should be added, is himself a strong supporter of the bolsheviki, and is their accredited american representative. archangel, _september , ._ santeri nuorteva, _fitchburg, mass._: dear comrade,--i deem it my duty to appeal to you and to other comrades in america in order to be able to make clear to you the trend of events here. the situation here has become particularly critical. we, the finnish refugees, who, after the unfortunate revolution, had to flee from finland to russia, find ourselves to-day in a very tragic situation. a part of the former red guardists who fled here have joined the red army formed by the russian soviet government; another part has formed itself as a special finnish legion, allied with the army of the allied countries; and a third part, which has gone as far as to siberia, is prowling about there, diffused over many sections of the country, and there have been reports that a part of those finns have joined the ranks of the czecho-slovaks. the finnish masses, thus divided, may therefore at any time get into fighting each other, which indeed would be the greatest of all misfortunes. it is therefore necessary to take a clear position, and to induce all the finns to support it, and we hope that you as well, over in america, will support it as much as is in your power. during these my wanderings i have happened to traverse russia from one end to another, and i have become deeply convinced that russia is not able to rise from this state of chaos and confusion by her own strength and of her own accord. the magnificent economic revolution, which the bolsheviki in russia are trying now to bring about, is doomed in russia to complete failure. the economic conditions in russia have not even approximately reached a stage to make an economic revolution possible, and the low grade of education, as well as the unsteady character of the russian people, makes it still more impossible. it is true that magnificent theories and plans have been laid here, but their putting into practice is altogether impossible, principally because of the following reasons: the whole propertied class--which here in russia, where small property ownership mainly prevails, is very numerous--is opposing and obstructing; technically trained people and specialists necessary in the industries are obstructing; local committees and sub-organs make all systematic action impossible, as they in their respective fields determine things quite autocratically and make everything unsuccessful which should be based on a strong, coherent, and in every respect minutely conceived system as a social production should be based. but even if all these, in themselves unsurmountable obstacles, could be made away with, there remains still the worst one--and that is the workers themselves. it is already clear that in the face of such economic conditions the whole social order has been upset. naturally only a small part of the people will remain backing such an order. the whole propertied class belongs to the opponents of the government, including the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen, the small merchants, the profiteers. the whole intellectual class and a great part of the workers are also opposing the government. in comparison with the entire population only a small minority supports the government, and, what is worse to the supporters of the government, are rallying all the hooligans, robbers, and others to whom this period of confusion promises a good chance of individual action. it is also clear that such a régime cannot stay but with the help of a stern terror. but, on the other hand, the longer the terror continues the more disagreeable and hated it becomes. even a great part of those who from the beginning could stay with the government and who still are sincere social democrats, having seen all this chaos, begin to step aside, or to ally themselves with those openly opposing the government. naturally, as time goes by, there remains only the worst and the most demoralized element. terror, arbitrary rule, and open brigandage become more and more usual, and the government is not able at all to prevent it. and the outcome is clearly to be foreseen--the unavoidable failure of all this magnificently planned system. and what will be the outcome of that? my conviction is that as soon as possible we should turn toward the other road--the road of united action. i have seen, and i am convinced that the majority of the russian people is fundamentally democratic and whole-heartedly detests a reinstitution of autocracy, and that therefore all such elements must, without delay, be made to unite. but it is also clear that at first they, even united, will not be able to bring about order in this country on their own accord. i do not believe that at this time there is in russia any social force which would be able to organize the conditions in the country. for that reason, to my mind, we should, to begin with, frankly and honestly rely on the help of the allied powers. help from germany cannot be considered, as germany, because of her own interests, is compelled to support the bolshevik rule as long as possible, as germany from the bolshevik rule is pressing more and more political and economic advantages, to such an extent even that all of russia is becoming practically a colony of germany. russia thus would serve to compensate germany for the colonies lost in south africa. a question presents itself at once whether the allied powers are better. and it must be answered instantly that neither would they establish in russia any socialist society. yet the democratic traditions of these countries are some surety that the social order established by them will be a democratic one. it is clear as day that the policy of the allied powers is also imperialistic, but the geographical and economic position of these countries is such that even their own interests demand that russia should be able to develop somewhat freely. the problem has finally evolved into such a state of affairs where russia must rely on the help either of the allies or germany; we must choose, as the saying goes, "between two evils," and, things being as badly mixed as they are, the lesser evil must be chosen frankly and openly. it does not seem possible to get anywhere by dodging the issue. russia perhaps would have saved herself some time ago from this unfortunate situation if she had understood immediately after the february revolution the necessity of a union between the more democratic elements. bolshevism undoubtedly has brought russia a big step toward her misfortune, from which she cannot extricate herself on her own accord. thus there exists no more any purely socialist army, and all the fighting forces and all those who have taken to arms are fighting for the interests of the one or the other group of the great powers. the question therefore finally is only this--in the interests of which group one wants to fight. the revolutionary struggles in russia and in finland, to my mind, have clearly established that a socialist society cannot be brought about by the force of arms and cannot be supported by the force of arms, but that a socialist order must be founded on a conscious and living will by an overwhelming majority of the nations, which is able to realize its will without the help of arms. but now that the nations of the world have actually been thrown into an armed conflict, and the war, which in itself is the greatest crime of the world, still is raging, we must stand it. we must, however, destroy the originator and the cause of the war, the militarism, by its own arms, and on its ruins we must build, in harmony and in peace--not by force, as the russian bolsheviki want--a new and a better social order under the guardianship of which the people may develop peacefully and securely. i have been explaining to you my ideas, expecting that you will publish them. you over in america are not able to imagine how horrible the life in russia at the present time is. the period after the french revolution surely must have been as a life in a paradise compared with this. hunger, brigandage, arrests, and murders are such every-day events that nobody pays any attention to them. freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free press is a far-away ideal which is altogether destroyed at the present time. arbitrary rule and terror are raging everywhere, and, what is worst of all, not only the terror proclaimed by the government, but individual terror as well. my greetings to all friends and comrades. oskar tokoi. the end footnotes: [ ] plechanov never formally joined the menshevik faction, i believe, but his writings showed that he favored that faction and the mensheviki acknowledged his intellectual leadership. [ ] they had gained one member since the election. [ ] quoted by litvinov, _the bolshevik revolution: its rise and meaning_, p. . litvinov, it must be remembered, was the bolshevik minister to great britain. his authority to speak for the bolsheviki is not to be questioned. [ ] the date is russian style--march th, our style. [ ] _the state in russia--old and new_, by leon trotzky; _the class struggle_, vol. ii, no. , pp. - . [ ] this document is printed in full at the end of the volume as appendix. i [ ] the author of the present study is responsible for the use of italics in this document. [ ] litvinov, _the bolshevik revolution: its rise and meaning_, p. . [ ] lenine is not quite accurate in his statement of marx's views nor quite fair in stating the position of the "opportunists." the argument of marx in _the civil war in france_ is not that the proletariat must "break down" the governmental machinery, but that it must _modify_ it and _adapt_ it to the class needs. this is something quite different, of course. moreover, it is the basis of the policy of the "opportunists." the mensheviki and other moderate socialists in russia were trying to _modify_ and _adapt_ the political state. [ ] the reference is to karl kautsky, the great german exponent of marxian theory. [ ] _the new international_ (american bolshevik organ), june , . [ ] _the new international_, july , . [ ] litvinov, _op. cit._, p. . [ ] _the new international_, april, . [ ] see, _e.g._, the article by lenine, _new international_, april, , and litvinov, _op. cit._ [ ] see my _syndicalism, industrial unionism, and socialism_ for the i.w.w. philosophy. [ ] bryant, _six months in red russia_, p. . [ ] this appeal is published as appendix i at the end of this volume. [ ] certain soviets of soldiers at the front had decided that they would stay in their trenches for defensive purposes, but would obey no commands to go forward, no matter what the military situation. [ ] figures supplied by the russian information bureau. [ ] "it was with a deep and awful sense of the terrible failure before us that i consented to become premier at that time," kerensky told the present writer. [ ] the story was reproduced in _new europe_ (london), september, . [ ] _the new international_, april, . [ ] see p. . [ ] see the letter of e. roubanovitch, appendix ii, p. . [ ] _justice_, london, january , . [ ] _justice_, london, may , . [ ] _vide_ special memorandum to the international socialist bureau on behalf of the revolutionary socialist party of russia. [ ] see appendix iii. [ ] _pravda_, july , . [ ] february, , protest against recognition of bolshevik representative by british labor party conference. [ ] proclamation to people of the northern province, etc., december, [ ] _the new international_, april, . [ ] the dates given are according to the russian calendar. [ ] see the rakitnikov memorandum--appendix. [ ] _the new international_, april, . [ ] the number of votes was over , , . [ ] _vide_ rakitnikov report. [ ] twenty-three members of the executive committee were arrested and, without any trial, thrown into the fortress of peter and paul. [ ] from a declaration of protest by the executive committee of the third national congress of peasants' delegates (anti-bolshevist), sent to the bolshevik congress of soviets of workmen, soldiers, and peasants, but not permitted to be read to that assembly. [ ] _l'ouorier russe_, may, . [ ] _idem_. [ ] _izvestya_, july , . [ ] _pravda_, october , (no. ). [ ] "agents-provocateurs and the russian revolution," article in _justice,_, august , , by j. tchernoff. [ ] most of the information in this paragraph is based upon an article in the swiss newspaper _lausanne gazette_ by the well-known russian journalist, serge persky, carefully checked up by russian socialist exiles in paris. [ ] joseph martinek, in the _cleveland press_. [ ] _justice_ (london), january , . [ ] _justice_, london, january , . [ ] jean jaurès, _studies in socialism_. [ ] f. engels, , preface to marx's _civil war in france_. [ ] the reader is referred to my _sidelights on contemporary socialism_ and my _karl marx: his life and works_ for a fuller account of these struggles. [ ] marx, _a contribution to the critique of political economy_, p. . [ ] editorial entitled "bolshevik problems," in _the liberator_, april, . [ ] the article by lenine quoted by mr. eastman appeared in _the new international_, february, . [ ] _the bolsheviks and the soviets_, by albert rhys williams, p. . [ ] _ansprache der centralbehorde an den bund, vom marz, _: anhang ix der enthullerngen über den kommunisten-process zu koln, p. . [ ] lenine, _the soviets at work_. [ ] wilhelm liebknecht, _no compromise, no political trading_, p. . [ ] _socialism: a summary and interpretation of socialist principles_, by john spargo, p. ( st edition macmillan, ). [ ] liebknecht, _no compromise, no political trading_, p. . [ ] liebknecht, _no compromise, no political trading_, p. . [ ] this subject is treated in the following, among others, of my books: _socialism: a summary and interpretation of socialist principles_; _applied socialism_; _syndicalism, industrial unionism, and socialism_; _elements of socialism_ (spargo and arner), and _social democracy explained_. [ ] _the new international_, july , . [ ] conversation with trotzky reported by e.a. ross, _russia in upheaval_, p. . [ ] kautsky, _the social revolution_, p. . [ ] lenine, _the soviets at work_. [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] the best expositions of guild socialism are _self-government in industry_, by g.d.h. cole, and _national guilds_, by s.g. hobson, edited by a.r. orage. [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] lenine, _op. cit._ [ ] of course, trotzky's statement to professor ross about paying the capitalists " or per cent. a year" was frankly a compromise. [ ] e.a. ross, _russia in upheaval_, pp. - . [ ] litvinov, _the bolshevik revolution: its rise and meaning_, p. . [ ] marx and engels speak of the "idiocy of rural life" from which capitalism, through the concentration of agriculture and the abolition of small holdings, would rescue the peasant proprietors (_communist manifesto_). in _capital_ marx speaks of the manner in which modern industry "annihilates the peasant, _the bulwark of the old society_" (vol. i, p. ). liebknecht says that in it was the _city_ which overthrew the corrupt citizen king and the _country_ which overthrew the new republic, chose louis bonaparte and prepared the way for the empire. "the french peasantry created an empire through their blind fear of proletarian socialism" (_die grund und bodenfrage_). kautsky wrote, "peasants who feel that they are not proletarians, but true peasants, are not only not to be won over to our cause, _but belong to our most dangerous adversaries_" (_dat erfurter programm und die land-agitation_). it would be easy to compile a volume of such utterances. [ ] walling, _russia's message_, p. . the italics are mine. [ ] "cabinet lands" are the crown lands, property of the czar and royal family. [ ] ross, _op. cit._, pp. - . [ ] _justice_, london, august , . [ ] the figures given are quoted by sack, in _the birth of russian democracy_, and were originally published by the bolshevist commissaire of commerce. [ ] _parvus et le parti socialiste danois_, by p.g. la chesnais. [ ] la chesnais, _op. cit._ [ ] in "_l'humanité_," article condensed in _justice_, january , . [ ] international notes, _justice_, january , . [ ] _the disarmament cry_, by n. lenine, in _the class struggle_, may-june, . [ ] _the "disarmament" cry_, by n. lenine, _the class struggle_, may-june, . [ ] most, if not all, dates in this document are given as in the russian calendar, which is thirteen days behind ours. [ ] this refers, doubtless, to the different basis for voting applied to the peasants and the industrial workers, as provided in the soviet constitution. note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) the haskalah movement in russia by jacob s. raisin, ph.d., d.d. author of _sect, creed and custom in judaism_, etc. philadelphia the jewish publication society of america _and the "maskilim" shall shine as the brightness of the firmament ... many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased_. --dan. xii. - [illustration: tobias cohn - from the frontispiece of his ma'aseh tobiah] to aaron s. raisin your name, dear father, will not be found in the following pages, for, like "the waters of the siloam that run softly," you ever preferred to pursue your useful course in unassuming silence. yet, as it is your life, devoted entirely to meditating, learning, and teaching, that inspired me in my effort, i dedicate this book to you; and i am happy to know that i thus not only dedicate it to one of the noblest of maskilim, but at the same time offer you some slight token of the esteem and affection felt for you by your son, jacob s. raisin contents preface chapter i. the pre-haskalah period chapter ii. the period of transition chapter iii. the dawn of haskalah chapter iv. conflicts and conquests chapter v. russification, reformation, and assimilation chapter vi. the awakening notes bibliography index list of illustrations tobias cohn ( - ) frontispiece isaac bÄr levinsohn ( - ) facing page max lilienthal ( - ) " " alexander zederbaum ( - ) " " perez ben mosheh smolenskin ( - ) " " moses lÖb lilienblum ( - ) " " preface to the lover of mankind the history of the russo-jewish renaissance is an encouraging and inspiring phenomenon. seldom has a people made such rapid strides forward as the russian jews. from the melancholy regularity that marked their existence a little more than two generations ago, from the darkness of the middle ages in which they were steeped until the time of alexander ii, they emerged suddenly into the life and light of the west, and some of the most intrepid devotees of latter-day culture, both in europe and in america, have come from among them. destitute of everything that makes for enlightenment, and under the dominion of a government which sought to extinguish the few rushlights that scattered the shadows around them, they nevertheless snatched victory from defeat, sloughed off medieval superstition, and, disregarding the dejanira shirt of modern disabilities, compelled their countrymen to admit more than once that tho' i've belted you and flayed you, by the livin' gawd that made you, you're a better man than i am! similar movements were started in germany during the latter part of the eighteenth century, and in austria, notably galicia, at the beginning of the nineteenth, but none stirred the mind of the jews to the same degree as the haskalah movement in russia during the last fifty years. in the former, the removal of restrictions soon rendered attempts toward self-emancipation unnecessary on the part of jews, and the few maskilim among them, satisfied with the present, devoted themselves to investigating and elucidating the past of their people's history. in russia the past was all but forgotten on account of the immediate duties of the present. the energy and acquisitiveness that made the jews of happier and more prosperous lands prominent in every sphere of practical life, were directed toward the realm of thought, and the merciless severity with which the government excluded them from the enjoyment of things material only increased their ardor for things spiritual and intellectual. in its wide sense haskalah denotes enlightenment. those who strove to enlighten their benighted coreligionists or disseminate european culture among them, were called maskilim. a careful perusal of this work will reveal the exact ideals these terms embody. for haskalah was not only progressive, it was also aggressive, militant, sometimes destructive. from the days of mordecai günzburg to the time of asher ginzberg (ahad ha-'am), it changed its tendencies and motives more than once. levinsohn, "the father of the maskilim," was satisfied with removing the ban from secular learning; gordon wished to see his brethren "jews at home and men abroad"; smolenskin dreamed of the rehabilitation of jews in palestine; and ahad ha-'am hopes for the spiritual regeneration of his beloved people. others advocated the levelling of all distinctions between jews and gentiles, or the upliftment of mankind in general and russia in particular. to each of them haskalah implied different ideals, and through each it promulgated diverse doctrines. to trace these varying phases from an indistinct glimmering in the eighteenth century to the glorious effulgence of the beginning of the twentieth, is the main object of this book. in pursuance of my end, i have paid particular attention to the causes that retarded or accelerated russo-jewish cultural advance. as these causes originate in the social, economic, and political status of the russian jew, i frequently portray political events as well as the state of knowledge, belief, art, and morals of the periods under consideration. for this reason also i have marked the boundaries of the haskalah epochs in correspondence to the dates of the reigns of the several czars, though the correspondence is not always exact. essays have been published, on some of the topics treated in these pages, by writers in different languages: in russian, by bramson, klausner, and morgulis; in hebrew, by izgur, katz, and klausner; in german, by maimon, lilienthal, wengeroff, and weissberg; in english, by lilienthal and wiener; and in french, by slouschz. the subject as a whole, however, has not been treated. should this work stimulate further research, i shall feel amply rewarded. without prejudice and without partiality, by an honest presentation of facts drawn from what i regard as reliable sources, i have tried to unfold the story of the struggle of five millions of human beings for right living and rational thinking, in the hope of throwing light on the ideals and aspirations and the real character of the largely prejudged and misunderstood russian jew. in conclusion, i wish to express my gratitude and indebtedness to those who encouraged me to proceed with my work after some specimens of it had been published in several jewish periodicals, especially to doctor solomon schechter, rabbi max heller, and mr. a.s. freidus, for their courtesy and assistance while the work was being written. jacob s. raisin. e. las vegas, n. mex., thanksgiving day, . chapter i the pre-haskalah period ?- "there is but one key to the present," says max müller, "and that is the past." to understand fully the growth and historical development of a people's mind, one must be familiar with the conditions that have shaped its present form. it would seem necessary, therefore, to introduce a description of the haskalah movement with a rapid survey of the history of the russo-polish jews from the time of their emergence from obscurity up to the middle of the seventeenth century. among those who laid the foundations for the study of this almost unexplored department of jewish history, the settlement of jews in russia and their vicissitudes during the dark ages, the most prominent are perhaps isaac bär levinsohn, abraham harkavy, and simon dubnow. there is much to be said of each of these as writers, scholars, and men. here they concern us as russo-jewish historians. what linnaeus, agassiz, and cuvier did in the field of natural philosophy, they accomplished in their chosen province of jewish history.[ ] levinsohn was the first to express the opinion that the russian jews hailed, not from germany, as is commonly supposed, but from the banks of the volga. this hypothesis, corroborated by tradition, harkavy established as a fact. originally the vernacular of the jews of volhynia, podolia, and kiev was russian and polish, or, rather, the two being closely allied, palaeo-slavonic. the havoc wrought by the crusades in the jewish communities of western europe caused a constant stream of german-jewish immigrants to pour, since , into the comparatively free countries of the slavonians. russo-poland became the america of the old world. the jewish settlers from abroad soon outnumbered the native jews, and they spread a new language and new customs wherever they established themselves.[ ] whether the jews of russia were originally pagans from the shores of the black and caspian seas, converted to judaism under the khazars during the eighth century, or palestinian exiles subjugated by their slavonian conquerors and assimilated with them, it is indisputable that they inhabited what we know to-day as russia long before the varangian prince rurik came, at the invitation of scythian and sarmatian savages, to lay the foundation of the muscovite empire. in feodosia there is a synagogue at least a thousand years old. the greek inscription on a marble slab, dating back to - b.c.e., preserved in the imperial hermitage in st. petersburg, makes it certain that they flourished in the crimea before the destruction of the temple. in a communication to the russian geographical society, m. pogodin makes the statement, that there still exist a synagogue and a cemetery in the crimea that belong to the pre-christian era. some of the tombstones, bearing jewish names, and decorated with the seven-branched menorah, date back to b.c.e.; while chufut-kale, also known as the rock of the jews (sela' ha-yehudim), from the fortress supposed to have been built there by the jews, would prove jewish settlements to have been made there during the babylonian or persian captivity.[ ] though the same antiquity cannot be established for other jewish settlements, we know that kiev, "the mother of russian cities," had many jews long before the eighth century, who thus antedated the russians as citizens. according to joseph hakohen they came there from persia in , according to malishevsky in . it is certain that their influence was felt as early as the latter part of the tenth century. the russian chronicles ascribed to nestor relate that they endeavored, in , to induce grand duke vladimir to accept their religion. they did not succeed as they had succeeded two centuries before with the khan of the khazars.[ ] yet the grand duke, who had the greatest influence in introducing and spreading greek catholicism, and who is now worshipped as a saint, was always favorably disposed toward them. there were other places that were inhabited early by jews. there are traditions to the effect that jews lived in poland as early as the ninth century, and under the boreslavs ( - ) they are said to have enjoyed considerable privileges, carried on a lively trade, and spread as far as kiev. chernigov in little russia (the ukraine), baku in south russia (transcaucasia), kalisz and warsaw, brest and grodno, in west russia (russian poland), all possess jewish communities of considerable antiquity. in the townlet eishishki, near vilna, a tombstone set in was still in existence at the end of the last century, and khelm, government kovno, has a synagogue to which tradition ascribes an age of eight hundred years.[ ] the jewish population in all these communities was prosperous and respected. jews were in favor with the government, enjoyed equal rights with their gentile neighbors, and were especially prominent as traders and farmers of taxes. their monoxyla, or one-oared canoes, loaded with silks, furs, and precious metals, issued from the borysthanes, traversed the baltic and the euxine, the oder and the bosphorus, the danube and the black sea, and carried on the commerce between the turks and the slavonians. they were granted the honorable and lucrative privilege of directing and controlling the mints, and that of putting hebrew as well as slavonic inscriptions on their coins.[ ] in the lithuanian magna charta, granted by vitold in , the jews of brest were given many rights, and about a year later those of grodno were permitted to engage in all pursuits and occupations, and exempted from paying taxes on synagogues and cemeteries. they possessed full jurisdiction in their own affairs. some were raised to the nobility, notably the josephovich brothers, abraham and michael. under king alexander jagellon, abraham was assessor of kovno, alderman of smolensk, and prefect of minsk; he was called "sir" (jastrzhembets), was presented with the estates of voidung, grinkov, and troki ( ), and appointed secretary of the treasury in lithuania ( ). the other brother, michael, was made "fiscal agent to the king." in the eighteenth century, andrey abramovich, of the same family but not of the jewish faith, was senator and castellan of brest-litovsk.[ ] they were not unique exceptions. abraham shmoilovich of turisk is spoken of as "honorable sir" in leases of large estates. affras rachmailovich and judah bogdanovich figure among the merchant princes of livonia and lithuania; and francisco molo, who settled later in amsterdam, was financial agent of john iii of poland in . the influence of the last-named was so great with the dutch states-general that the treaty of ryswick was concluded with louis xiv, in , through his mediation.[ ] that russo-poland should have elected a jewish king on two occasions, a certain abraham prochovnik in and the famous saul wahl[ ] in the sixteenth century, sounds legendary; but that there was a jewish queen, called esterka, is probable, and that some jews attained to political eminence is beyond reasonable doubt.[ ] records have been discovered concerning two envoys, saul and joseph, who served the slavonic czar about , and an interesting story is told of two jewish soldiers, ephraim moisievich and anbal the jassin, who won the confidence of prince andrey bogolyubsky of kiev, and afterwards became leaders in a conspiracy against him ( ).[ ] henry, duke of anjou, the successor of sigismud august on the throne of poland and lithuania, owed his election mainly to the efforts of solomon ashkenazi. ivan vassilyevich, too, had many and important relations with jews, and his favorable attitude towards them is amply proved by the fact that his family physician was the jew leo ( ). throughout his reign he maintained an uninterrupted friendship with chozi kokos, a jew of the crimea, and he did not hesitate to offer hospitality and protection to zacharias de guizolfi, though the latter was not in a position to reciprocate such favors.[ ] in addition there are less prominent individuals who received honors at the hands of their non-jewish countrymen. meïr ashkenazi of kaffa, in the crimea, who was slain by pirates on a trip from "gava to dakhel," was envoy of the khan of the tatars to the king of poland in the sixteenth century. mention is made of "jewish cossacks," who distinguished themselves on the field of battle, and were elevated to the rank of major and colonel.[ ] while the common opinion regarding jews expressed itself in merry england in such ballads as "the jewish dochter," and "gernutus, the jew of venice," many a little russian song had the bravery of a jewish soldier as its burden. in everything save religion the jews were hardly distinguishable from their neighbors. there are--writes cardinal commendoni, an eye-witness--a great many jews in these provinces, including lithuania, who are not, as in other places, regarded with disrespect. they do not maintain themselves miserably by base profits; they are landed proprietors, are engaged in business, and even devote themselves to the study of literature and, above all, to medicine and astronomy; they hold almost everywhere the commission of levying customs duties, are classed among the most honest people, wear no outward mark to distinguish them from the christians, and are permitted to carry swords and walk about with their arms. in a word they have equal rights with the other citizens. a similar statement is made by joseph delmedigo, who spent many years in livonia and lithuania as physician to prince radziwill.[ ] in his inimitable manner gibbon describes the fierce struggle the greek catholic church had to wage before she obtained a foothold in russia, but he neglects to mention the fact that judaism no less than paganism was among her formidable opponents. the contest lasted several centuries, and in many places it is undecided to this day.[ ] the khazars, who had become proselytes in the eighth century, were constantly encroaching upon russian christianity. buoyant as both were with the vigor of youth, missionary zeal was at its height among the two contending religions. each made war upon the other. we read that photius of constantinople sent a message of thanks to archbishop anthony of kertch ( - ) for his efforts to convert the jews; that the first bishop of the established church ( ) was "lukas, the little jew" (luka zhidyata), who was appointed to his office by yaroslav; and that st. feodosi pechersky was fond of conversing with learned jews on matters of theology.[ ] on the other hand, the efforts of the jews were not without success. the baptism of the pious olga marks an era in russian christianity, the beginning of the "judaizing heresy," which centuries of persecution only strengthened. in , zacharias of kiev, who is reputed to have "studied astrology, necromancy, and various other magic arts," converted the priest dionis, the archbishop aleksey, and, through the latter, many more clergymen of novgorod, moscow, and pskov. aleksey became a devout jew. he called himself abraham and his wife sarah. yet, strange to say, he retained the favor of the grand duke ivan vassilyevich, even after the latter's daughter-in-law, princess helena, his secretary theodore kuritzin, the archimandrite sosima, the monk zacharias, and other persons of note had entered the fold of judaism through his influence. the "heresy" spread over many parts of the empire, and the number of its adherents constantly grew. archbishop nikk complains that in the very monastery of moscow there were presumably converted jews, "who had again begun to practice their old jewish religion and demoralize the young monks." in poland, too, proselytism was of frequent occurrence, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. the religious tolerance of casimir iv ( - ) and his immediate successors, and the new doctrines preached by huss and luther, which permeated the upper classes of society, rendered the poles more liberal on the one hand, and on the other the jews more assertive. we hear of a certain nobleman, george morschtyn, who married a jewess, magdalen, and had his daughter raised in the religion of her mother. in fact, at a time when jews in spain assumed the mask of christianity to escape persecution, russian and polish christians by birth could choose, with little fear of danger, to lead the jewish life. it was not till about the eighteenth century that the government began to resort to the usual methods of eradicating heresy. katharina weigel, a lady famous for her beauty, who embraced judaism, was decapitated in cracow at the instigation of bishop peter gamrat. on the deposition of his wife, captain vosnitzin of the polish navy was put to death by auto-da-fé (july , ). the eminent "ger zedek," count valentine pototzki, less fortunate than his comrade and fellow-convert zaremba, was burnt at the stake in vilna (may , ), and his teacher in the jewish doctrines, menahem mann, was tortured and executed a few months later, at the age of seventy. but these measures proved of little avail. according to martin bielski, the noted historian, jews saved their proselytes from the impending doom by transporting them to turkey. many of them sought refuge in amsterdam. for those who remained behind their new coreligionists provided through collections made for that purpose in russia and in germany. to this day these russian and polish proselytes adhere steadfastly to their faith, and whether they migrate to america or palestine to escape the persecution of their countrymen, they seldom, if ever, indulge in the latitudinarianism into which many of longer jewish lineage fall so readily when removed from old moorings.[ ] that the russian jews of the day were not altogether unenlightened, that they not only practiced the law devoutly, but also studied it diligently, and cultivated the learning of the time as well, we may safely infer from researches recently made. cyril, or constantine, "the philosopher," the apostle to the slavonians, acquired a knowledge of hebrew while at kherson, and was probably aided by jews in his translation of the bible into slavonic. manuscripts of russo-jewish commentaries to the scriptures, written as early as and , are still preserved in the vatican and bodleian libraries, and copyists were doing fairly good work at azov in . jewish scholars frequented celebrated seats of learning in foreign lands. before the end of the twelfth century traces of them are to be found in france, italy, and spain. that in the eleventh century judah halevi of toledo and nathan of rome should have been familiar with russian words cannot but be attributed to their contact with russian jews. however, in the case of these two scholars, it may possibly be ascribed to their great erudition or extensive travels. but the many slavonic expressions occurring in the commentaries of rashi ( - ), and employed by joseph caro (ab. ), benjamin of tudela (ab. ), and isaac of vienna (ab. ), lend color to harkavy's contention, that russian was once the vernacular of the russian jews, and they also argue in favor of our contention, that these natives of the "land of canaan"--as the country of the slavs was then called in hebrew--came into personal touch with the "lights and leaders" of other jewish communities. indeed, rabbi moses of kiev is mentioned as one of the pupils of jacob tam, the tosafist of france (d. ), and asheri, or rosh, of spain is reported to have had among his pupils rabbi asher and master (bahur) jonathan from russia. from these peripatetic scholars perhaps came the martyrs of , referred to in the _memorbuch_ of mayence. it was rabbi moses who, while still in russia, corresponded with samuel ben ali, head of the babylonian academy, and called the attention of western scholars to certain gaonic decisions. another rabbi, isaac, or itshke, of chernigov, was probably the first talmudist in england, and his decisions were regarded as authoritative on certain occasions. these and others like them wrote super-commentaries on the commentaries of rashi and ibn ezra, the most popular and profound scholars medieval jewry produced, and made copies of the works of other authors.[ ] soon the russo-polish jews established at home what they had been compelled to seek abroad. hearing of the advantages offered in the great north-east, german jews flocked thither in such numbers as to dominate and absorb the original russians and poles. a new element asserted itself. names like ashkenazi, heilperin, hurwitz, landau, luria, margolis, schapiro, weil, zarfati, etc., variously spelled, took the place, through intermarriage and by adoption, of the ancient slavonic nomenclature. the language, manners, modes of thought, and, to a certain extent, even the physiognomy of the earlier settlers, underwent a more or less radical change. in some provinces the conflict lasted longer than in others. to this day not a few russian jews would seem to be of slavonic rather than semitic extraction. as late as the sixteenth century there was still a demand in certain places for a russian translation of the hebrew book of common prayer, and in rabbi meïr ashkenazi, who came from frankfort-on-the-main to study in lublin, and was retained as rabbi in mohilev-on-the-dnieper, had cause to exclaim, "would to god that our coreligionists all spoke the same language--german."[ ] even maimon, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, mentions one, by no means an exception, who did not "understand the jewish language, and made use, therefore, of the russian."[ ] but by the middle of the seventeenth century the amalgamation was almost complete. it resulted in a product entirely new. as the invasion of england by the normans produced the anglo-saxon, so the inundation of russia by the germans produced the slav-teuton. this is the clue to the study of the haskalah, as will appear from what follows. russo-poland gradually became the cynosure of the talmudic world, the "aksanye shel torah," the asylum of the law, whence "enlargement and deliverance" arose for the traditions which the jews carried with them, through fire and water, during the dreary centuries of their dispersion. it became to jews what athens was to ancient greece, rome to medieval christendom, new england to our early colonies. with the invention and importation of the printing-press, the publication and acquisition of the bible, the talmud, and most of the important rabbinic works were facilitated. as a consequence, yeshibot, or colleges, for the study of jewish literature, were founded in almost every community. their fame reached distant lands. it became a popular saying that "from kiev shall go forth the law, and the word of god from starodub." horodno, the vulgar pronunciation of grodno, was construed to mean har adonaï, "the mount of the lord." a pious rabbi did not hesitate to write to a colleague, "be it known to the high honor of your glory that it is preferable by far to dwell in the land of the russ and promote the study of the torah in israel than in the land of israel."[ ] especially the part of poland ultimately swallowed up by russia was the new palestine of the diaspora. thither flocked all desirous of becoming adepts in the dialectics of the rabbis, "of learning how to swim in the sea of the talmud." it was there that the voluminous works of hebrew literature were studied, literally "by day and by night," and the subtleties of the talmudists were developed to a degree unprecedented in jewish history. thither was sent, from the distant netherlands, the youngest son of manasseh ben israel, and he "became mighty in the talmud and master of four languages." thither came, from prague, the afterwards famous cabbalist, author, and rabbi, isaiah horowitz (ab. - ), and there he chose to remain the rest of his days. thither also went, from frankfort, the above-mentioned meïr ashkenazi, who, according to some, was the first author of note in white russia. from everywhere they came "to pour water on the hands and sit at the feet" of the great ones of the second palestine.[ ] for jewish solidarity was more than a word in those days. "sefardim" had not yet learned to boast of aristocratic lineage, nor "ashkenazim" to look down contemptuously upon their slavonic coreligionists. it was before the removal of civil disabilities from one portion of the jewish people had sowed the seed of arrogance toward the other less favored portion. honor was accorded to whom it was due, regardless of the locality in which he happened to have been born. glückel von hameln states in her _memoirs_ that preference was sometimes given to the decisions of the "great ones of poland," and mentions with pride that her brother shmuel married the daughter of the great reb shulem of lemberg.[ ] with open arms, amsterdam, frankfort, fürth, konigsberg, metz, prague, and other communities renowned for wealth and learning, welcomed the acute talmudists of brest, grodno, kovno, lublin, minsk, and vilna, whenever they were willing or compelled to consider a call. the practice of summoning russo-polish rabbis to german posts was carried so far that it aroused the displeasure of the western scholars, and they complained of being slighted.[ ] the reverence for slavonic learning was strikingly illustrated during the years following the cossack massacres, when many russo-polish rabbis fled for safety to foreign lands. frankfort, fürth, prague, and vienna successively elected the fugitive shabbataï horowitz of ostrog as their religious guide. david taz of vladimir became rabbi of steinitz in moravia; ephraim hakohen was called to trebitsch in moravia and to ofen in hungary; david of lyda, to mayence and amsterdam, and naphtali kohen, to frankfort-on-the-main in , and later to breslau. no less personages than isaac aboab and saul morteira welcomed the merchant-talmudist moses rivkes of vilna when he sought refuge in amsterdam, and they entrusted to him the task of editing the _shulhan 'aruk_, his marginal notes to which, the _beër ha-golah_, have ever since been printed with the text. in addition to rabbis, lithuania and other provinces furnished teachers for the young, melammedim, who exerted considerable influence upon the people among whom they lived. their opinions, we are told, were highly valued in the choice of rabbis.[ ] it must not be supposed that supremacy in the talmud was secured at the cost of secular knowledge, or what was then regarded as such. their familiarity with other branches of study was not inferior to that of the jews in better-known lands. not a few of the prominent men united piety with philosophy, and thorough knowledge of the talmud with mastery of one or more of the sciences of the time. data on this phase of the subject might have been much more abundant, had not the storm of persecution suddenly swept over the communities, destroying them and their records. what we still possess indicates what may have been lost. the ukraine was famous for its scholars. among them was jehiel michael of nemirov, reputed to have been "versed in all the sciences of the world."[ ] several of them were poets and grammarians. poems of a liturgical character are still extant in which they bemoan their plight or assert their faith hopefully. such were the poems of ephraim of khelm, joseph of kobrin, solomon of zamoscz, and shabbataï kohen. the last, eminent as a talmudist, the author of commentaries on the _shulhan 'aruk_ approved by the leading rabbis of his generation, is also known as a very trustworthy historian. his _megillah 'afah_, written in classic hebrew, is a valuable source of information on the critical period in which he lived. he won the esteem of the polish nobility by his secular attainments. to judge from his correspondence, he must have been on intimate terms with vidrich of leipsic.[ ] of the grammarians, jacob zaslaver wrote on the massorah, and shabbataï sofer was the author of annotations and treatises.[ ] our taste in poetry and grammar is no longer the same, but the polemic and apologetic writings of those days, called forth by the discussions between rabbanites and karaites and by the constant attacks of christianity, are still of uncommon interest. specimens of the former kind are the polemics of moses of shavli, which caused consternation in the camp of the karaites. of the apologetic writings should be mentioned the reply, in polish, of jacob nahman of belzyc to martin chekhovic (lublin, ), and the _hizzuk emunah_ of the karaite isaac ben abraham of troki. in the latter the weakness of christianity and the strength of judaism are pointed out with trenchancy never before reached. the work stirred up heated discussions among the various christian sects, with the tenets of which the author was intimately acquainted. it was translated into latin ( , ), yiddish ( ), english ( ), and german ( , ). voltaire says that all the arguments used by free-thinkers against christianity were drawn from it.[ ] in philosophy, mathematics, and medicine, the three main branches of medieval knowledge, many slavonian jews attained eminence. devout karaites as well as diligent talmudists found secular learning a diversion and a delight. for the lovers of enlightenment italy, especially padua, was the centre of attraction, as france and spain had been before, and germany, particularly berlin, became afterwards.[ ] towards the middle of the sixteenth century we find young delacrut at the university of bologna, the philosopher and cabbalist, known for his commentaries to gikatilla's _sha'are orah_ (cracow, ) and ben avigdor's _mar'eh ha-ofanim_ ( ), and his translation of gossuin's _l'image du monde_ (amsterdam, ). his famous disciple mordecai jaffe (lebushim) spent ten years in the study of astronomy and mathematics before he occupied the rabbinate of grodno ( )[ ] at the request of yom-tob lipman heller, joseph ben isaac levi wrote a commentary on maimuni's _moreh nebukim_, which was published with the former's annotations, _gibe'at ha-moreh_ (prague, ). deservedly or not, eliezer mann was called "the hebrew socrates"; and many a maskil in his study of mathematics turned for guidance to manoah handel of brzeszticzka, volhynia, author and translator of several scientific works, who rendered seven euclidean propositions into hebrew.[ ] polyglots they were compelled to be by force of circumstances. when the exotic judeo-german finally asserted itself as the vernacular, the language in which they wrote and prayed was still the ancient hebrew, with which every one was familiar, and commercial intercourse with their gentile neighbors was hardly feasible without at least a smattering of the local slavonic dialect. "look at our brethren in poland," exclaims wessely many years later in his address to his countrymen. "they converse with their neighbors in good polish.... what excuse have we for our brogue and jargon?" he might have had still better cause for complaint, had he been aware that the yiddish of the russo-polish jews, despite its considerable slavonic admixture, was purer german than that of his contemporaries in germany, even as the english of our new england colonies was superior to the grub street style prevalent in dr. johnson's england, and the spanish of our mexican annexations to the castilian spoken at the time of coronado. but we are here concerned with their knowledge of foreign languages. we shall refer only to the hebrew-german-italian-latin-french dictionary _safah berurah_ (prague, ; amsterdam, ) by the eminent talmudist nathan hannover.[ ] in medicine jews were pre-eminent in the slavonic countries, as they were everywhere else. they were in great demand as court physicians, though several had to pay with their lives "for having failed to effect cures." doctor leo, who was at the court of moscow in , was mentioned above. jacob isaac, the "nobleman of jerusalem" (yerosalimska shlyakhta), was attached to the court of sigismund, where he was held in high esteem. prince radziwill's physician was itshe nisanovich, and among those in attendance on john sobieski were jonas casal and abraham troki, the latter the author of several works on medicine and natural philosophy.[ ] medieval jewish physicians were prone to travel, and those of russo-poland were no exception. we find them in almost every part of the civilized world, and their number increases with the disappearance of prejudice. some were noted talmudists, such as solomon luria and samuel ben mattathias. abraham ashkenazi apotheker was not only a compounder of herbs but a healer of souls, for the edification of which he wrote his _elixir of life_ (_sam hayyim_, prague, ). to the same class belong moses katzenellenbogen and his son hayyim, who was styled gaon. in hayyim visited italy. he was welcomed by the prominent jews of mantua, modena, venice, and verona, but he preferred to continue the practice of his profession in his home town lublin.[ ] nor may we omit the names of stephen von gaden and moses coën, because of their high standing among their colleagues and the honors conferred upon them for their statesmanship. stephen von gaden, who with samuel collins was physician-in-ordinary to czar aleksey mikhailovich, was instrumental in removing many disabilities from the jews of moscow and in the interior of russia. moses coën, in consequence of the cossack uprising, escaped to moldavia, and was made court physician by the hospodar vassile lupu. but for coën, lupu would have been dethroned by those who conspired against him. to his loyalty may probably be attributed the kind treatment moldavian jews later enjoyed at the hands of the prince. coën also exposed the secret alliance between russia and sweden against turkey, and his advice was sought by the doge of venice.[ ] the personage who typifies best the enlightened slavonic jew of the pre-haskalah period is tobias cohn ( - ). he was the son and grandson of physicians, who practiced at kamenetz-podolsk and byelsk, and after went to metz. after their father's death, he and his older brother returned to poland, whence tobias, in turn, emigrated first to italy and then to turkey. in adrianople he was physician-in-ordinary to five successive sultans. in the history of medicine he is remembered as the discoverer of the _plica polonica_, and as the publisher of a materia medica in three languages. to the student of haskalah he is interesting, because he marks the close of the old and the beginning of the new era. like the maskilim of a century or two centuries later, he compiled and edited an encyclopedia in hebrew, that "knowledge be increased among his coreligionists." his acquaintance with learned works in several ancient and modern languages of which he was master, enabled him to write his magnum opus, _ma'aseh tobiah_, with tolerable ease. this work is divided into eight parts, devoted respectively to theology, astronomy, pharmacy, hygiene, venereal diseases, botany, cosmography, and chemistry. it is illustrated with several plates, among them the picture of an astrolabe and one of the human body treated as a house. from the numerous editions through which it passed (venice, , , , ), we may conclude that it met with marked success.[ ] * * * * * to understand the _raison d'Être_ of the haskalah movement, it may not be superfluous to cast a glance at the inner social and religious life of the slavonic jews during pre-haskalah times. the labors of the farmer are crowned with success only when nature lends him a helping hand. his soil must be fertile, and blessed with frequent showers. nor would the maskilim have accomplished their aim, had the material they found at hand been different from what it was. the jews in the land of the slavonians were fortunate in being regarded as aliens in a country which, as we have seen, they inhabited long before those who claimed to be its possessors by divine right of conquest. if their position was precarious, their sufferings were those of a conquered nation. as the whim and fancy of the reigning prince, knyaz, varied, they were induced one day to settle in the country by the offer of the most flattering privileges, and the next day they were expelled, only to be requested to return again. now their synagogues and cemeteries were exempt from taxation, now an additional poll-tax or land-tax was levied on every jew (serebshizna); one day they were allowed to live unhampered by restrictions, then they were prohibited to wear certain garments and ornaments, and commanded to use yellow caps and kerchiefs to distinguish them from the gentiles ( ). but all this was the consequence of political subjugation. judged by the standard of the times, they were veritable freemen, freer than the huguenots of france and the puritans of england. they were left unmolested in the administration of their internal affairs, and were permitted to appoint their own judges, enforce their own laws, and support their own institutions. forming a state within a state, they developed a civilization contrasting strongly with that round about them, and comparing favorably with some of the features of ours of to-day. slavonic jewry was divided into four districts, consisting of the more important communities (kahals), to which a number of smaller ones (prikahalki) were subservient. these, known as the jewish assemblies (zbori zhidovskiye), met at stated intervals. as in our federal government, the administrative, executive, and legislative departments were kept distinct, and those who presided over them (roshim) were elected annually by ballot. these roshim, or elders, served by turns for periods of one month each. the rabbi of each community was the chief judge, and was assisted by several inferior judges (dayyanim). for matters of importance there were courts of appeal established in ostrog and lemberg, the former having jurisdiction over volhynia and the ukraine, the latter over the rest of jewish russo-poland. for inter-kahal litigation, there was a supreme court, the wa'ad arba' ha-arazot (the synod of the four countries), which held its sessions during the lublin fair in winter and the yaroslav fair in summer. in cases affecting jews and gentiles, a decision was given by the _judex judaeorum_, who held his office by official appointment of the grand duke. so far their system of self-government appears almost a prototype of our own. the same is true of their municipal administration. the rabbi, who had the deciding vote in case of a dead-lock, stood in the same relation to them as the mayor holds to us, only that his term of office, nominally limited to three years, was actually for life or during good behavior. yet the power vested in him was only delegated power. a number of selectmen, or aldermen, guarded the rights of the community with the utmost jealousy, and tolerated no innovation, unless previously sanctioned by them. there were also several honorary offices, with a one-year tenure, which none could fill who had not had experience in an inferior position. the chief duties attached to these offices were to appraise the amount of taxation, pay the salaries of the rabbi, his dayyanim, and the teachers of the public schools, provide for the poor, and, above all, intercede with the government.[ ] still more interesting and, for our purpose, more important were their public and private institutions of learning. jews have always been noted for the solicitous care they exercise in the education of the young. the slavonic jews surpassed their brethren of other countries in this respect. at times they wrenched the tender bond of parental love in their ardor for knowledge. with a republican form of government they created an aristocracy, not of wealth or of blood, but of intellect. the education of girls was, indeed, neglected. to be able to read her prayers in hebrew and to write yiddish was all that was expected of a mother in israel. it was otherwise with the boys. every jew deemed himself in duty bound to educate his son. "learning is the best merchandise"--_torah iz die beste sehorah_--was the lesson inculcated from cradle to manhood, the precept followed from manhood to old age. all the lullabies transmitted to us from earliest times indicate the pursuit of knowledge as the highest ambition cherished by mothers for their sons: patsché, patsché, little tootsies, we shall buy us little bootsies; little bootsies we shall buy, to run to heder we shall try; torah we'll learn and all good ma'alot (qualities), on our wedding eve we shall solve sha'alot (ritual problems).[ ] to have a scholarly son or son-in-law was the best passport to the highest circles, a means of rising from the lowliest to the loftiest station in life. it is no wonder, then, that schools abounded in every community. at the early age of four the child was usually sent to the heder (school; literally, room), where he studied until he was ready for the yeshibah, the higher "seat" of learning. the melammedim, teachers, were graded according to their ability, and the school year consisted of two terms, zemannim, from the first sabbath after the holy days to passover and from after passover to rosh ha-shanah. the boy's intellectual capacities were steadily, if not systematically, cultivated, sometimes at the expense of his bodily development. it was not unusual for a child of seven or eight to handle a difficult problem in the talmud, a precocity characteristic to this day of the children hailing from slavonic countries. their 'illuyim (prodigies) might furnish ample material for more than one volume of _les enfants célèbres_. nor were the children of the poor left to grow up in ignorance. learning was free, to be had for the asking. more than this, stringent measures were taken that no child be without instruction. talmud torahs were founded even in the smallest kehillot (communities), and the students were supplied, not only with books, but also with the necessaries of life. communal and individual benefactors furnished clothes, and every member (ba'al ha-bayit) had to provide food and lodging for an indigent pupil at least one day of each week. the "freitisch" (free board) was an inseparable adjunct to every school. poor young men were not regarded as "beggar students." they were looked upon as earning their living by study, even as teachers by instructing. to pray for the dead or the living in return for their support is a recent innovation, and mostly among other than slavonic jews. it is a custom adopted from medieval christianity, and practiced in england by the poor student, who, in the words of chaucer, busily 'gan for the souls to pray on them that gave him wherewith to scolay. for a faithful and vivid description of the yeshibot we cannot do better than transcribe the account given in the pages of the little pamphlet _yeven mezulah_ in which nathan hannover, mentioned above, has left us a reliable history of the cossack uprisings and the kulturgeschichte of his own time. i need bring no proof for the statement that nowhere was the study of the law so universal as in russo-poland. in every community there was a well-paid dean (rosh yeshibah), who, exempt from worry about a livelihood, devoted himself exclusively to teaching and studying by day and by night. in every kahal, many youths, maintained liberally, studied under the guidance of the dean. in turn, they instructed the less advanced, who were also supported by the community. a kahal of fifty [families] had to provide for at least thirty such. they boarded and lodged in the homes of their patrons, and frequently received pocket-money in addition. thus there was hardly a house in which the torah was not studied, either by the master of the house, a son, a son-in-law, or a student stranger. they always bore in mind the dictum of rabba, "he who loves scholars will have scholarly sons; he who welcomes scholars will have scholarly sons-in-law; he who admires scholars will become learned himself." no wonder, then, that every community swarmed with scholars, that out of every fifty of its members at least twenty were far advanced, and had the morenu (i.e. bachelor) degree. the dean was vested with absolute authority. he could punish an offender, whether rich or poor. everybody respected him, and he often received gifts of money or valuables. in all religious processions he came first. then followed the students, then the learned, and the rest of the congregation brought up the rear. this veneration for the dean prompted many a youth to imitate his example, and thus our country was rendered full of the knowledge of the law. what became of the students when they were graduated? let us turn once more to hannover's interesting narrative. the "fairs" of those days were much more than opportunities for barter; they afforded favorable and attractive occasions for other objects. zaslav and yaroslav during the summer, lemberg and lublin in the winter, were "filled with hundreds of deans and thousands of students," and one who had a marriageable daughter had but to resort thither to have his worries allayed. therefore, "jews and jewesses attended these bazaars in magnificent attire, and [each season] several hundred, sometimes as many as a thousand, alliances were consummated." that the rabbi, living in a strange land and recalling a glorious past, should have indulged in a bit of exaggeration in his sorrowful retrospect, is not more than natural; and that his picture on the whole is true is proved by similar schools which existed in russia till recently. the descriptions of these institutions by smolenskin as well as writers of less repute are graphic and intensely interesting. they constituted a unique world, in which the jewish youth lived and moved until he reached man's estate. in later years, when russian jewry became infected, so to speak, with the aufklärungs-bacilli, they became the nurseries of the new learning. but in the earlier time, too, a spirit of enlightenment pervaded them. the study of the talmud fostered in them was regarded both as a religious duty and as a means to an end, the rabbinate. even in the middle ages aristotle was a favorite with the older students, and solomon luria complained that in the prayer books of many of them he had noticed the prayer of aristotle, for which he blamed the liberal views of moses isserles![ ] another typically, though not exclusively, slavonic jewish institution was the study-hall, or bet ha-midrash. as the synagogues gradually became schulen (schools), so, by a contrary process, the bet ha-midrash assumed the function of a house of prayer. its uniqueness it has retained to this day. it was at once a library, a reading-room, and a class-room; yet those who frequented it were bound by the rigorous laws of none of the three. there were no restrictions as to when, or what, or how one should study. it was a place in which originality was admired and research encouraged. as at a spartan feast, youth and age commingled, men of all ages and diverse attainments exchanged views, and all benefited by mutual contact. those whose position precluded devotion to study availed themselves at least of the means for mutual improvement at their disposal. they organized societies for the study of certain branches of jewish lore, and for the meetings of these societies the busiest spared time and the poorest put aside his work. it was a people composed of scholars and those who maintained scholars, and the scholars, in dress and appearance, represented the aristocracy, an aristocracy of the intellect. such was the pre-haskalah period. from the meagre data at our disposal we are justified in concluding, that, left undisturbed, the slavonic jews would have evolved a civilization rivalling, if not surpassing, that of the golden era of the spanish jews. but this was not to be. their onward march met a sudden and terrific check. hetman chmielnicki at the head of his savage hordes of russians and tatars conquered the poles, and jews and catholics were subjected to the most inhuman treatment. the descendants of those who, in , had escaped the crusaders fell victims in to the more cruel cossacks. about half a million jews, it is estimated, lost their lives in chmielnicki's horrible massacres. the few communities remaining were utterly demoralized. the education of the young was neglected, both sacred and secular branches of study were abandoned. and when the storm calmed down, they found themselves deprived of the accumulations of centuries, forced, like noah after the deluge, but without his means, to start again from the very beginning. indeed, as levinsohn remarks, the wonder is that, despite the fiendish persecution they endured, these unfortunates should have preserved a spark of love of knowledge. yet a little later it was to burst into flame again and bring light and warmth to hearts crushed by "man's inhumanity to man." (notes, pp. - .) chapter ii the period of transition - the storm of persecution that had been brewing in the sixteenth century, and which burst in all its fury by the middle of the seventeenth century, was allayed but little by the rivers of blood that streamed over the length and breadth of the slavonic land. half a million jewish victims were not sufficient to satisfy the followers of a religion of love. they only whetted their insatiable appetite. the anarchy among the gentiles increased the misery of the jews. the towns fell into the hands of the lithuanians, poles, russians, and tatars successively, and it was upon the jews that the hounds of war were let loose at each defeat or conquest. determined to exterminate each other, they joined forces in exterminating the jews. when bratzlav, for instance, was destroyed by the tatars, in , more than four hundred of its six hundred jewish citizens were slain. when the city was attacked by the cossacks in , the greater number of the plundered and murdered were jews. the same happened when chmielnicki gained the upper hand in bratzlav in , again when the russians slaughtered all the inhabitants in , and when the tatars plotted against their victorious enemy, peter the great.[ ] swedish attacks without and popular uprisings within rendered the polish pan (dubbed among jews poriz, rowdy or ruffian) as reckless as he was irresponsible. the jew became for him a sponge to be squeezed for money, and a clown to contribute to his brutal amusements. the subtle and baneful influence of the jesuits succeeded, besides, in introducing religion into politics and making the jew the scapegoat for the evils of both. the _judaeus infidelis_ was the target of abuse and persecution. it was only the fear that the government's exchequer might suffer that prevented his being turned into a veritable slave. his condition, indeed, was worse than slavery; his life was worth less than a beast's. it was frequently taken for the mere fun of it, and with impunity. an overseer once ordered all jewish mothers living on the estate to climb to the tree-tops and leave their little ones below. he then fired at the children, and when the women fell from the trees at the horrible sight, he presented each with a piece of money, and thanked them for the pleasure they had afforded him.[ ] in the cities, though the pan's excesses were bound to be somewhat bridled there, the lot of the jews was equally gloomy. they were treated like outlaws, were forbidden to engage in all but a few branches of trade or handicraft, or to live with christians, or employ them as servants. in they were prohibited to build new synagogues or even repair the old ones. sometimes the synagogues were locked "by order of ..." until a stipulated amount of money bought permission to reopen them. we of to-day can hardly imagine what pain a jew of that time experienced when he hastened to the house of god on one of the great holy days only to find its doors closed by the police! their status was no better in lithuania and great russia. the accession of ivan iv, the terrible ( - ), dealt their former comparative prosperity a blow from which it has not recovered to this day. as if to remove the impression of liberalism made by his predecessor and obliterate from memory his amicable relations with doctor leo, de guizolfi, and chozi kolos, this monster czar, with the fiendishness of a caligula, but lacking the accomplishments of his heathen prototype, delighted to invent tortures for inoffensive jews. he expelled them from moscow, and deprived them of the right of travel from place to place. during his occupancy of polotsk he ordered all jews residing there either to become converts to greek catholicism or choose between being drowned in the dwina and burnt at the stake. but even the removal of the terrible czar and the dawn of the century of reason and humanitarianism failed to effect a change for the better in the condition of the slavonic jews. for a while it appeared as if the zeitgeist might penetrate even into russo-poland, and the renaissance and the reformation would not pass over the eastern portion of europe without beneficent results. in lithuania calvinism threatened to oust catholicism, science and culture began to be pursued, and jewish and gentile children attended the same schools. the successors of ivan iv were men of better breeding, and the praiseworthy attempts of peter the great to introduce western civilization are known to all.[ ] but slavonic soil has never been susceptible to the elevating influences that have transformed the rest of europe. every reformatory effort was nipped in the bud. the lot of the jews accordingly grew from bad to worse. in they were expelled from the ukraine and other provinces, and they were recalled, "for the benefit of the citizens," only at the instance of apostol, the hetman of the very cossacks that had massacred them in . baruch leibov was burned alive in st. petersburg, in , for having dared "insult the christian religion by building a synagogue in the village of zvyerovichi," an offence that was aggravated by the suspicion that he had converted the russian captain vosnitzin to judaism. the same fate was, in , meted out to moses, a jewish tailor, for refusing to accept christianity, and in a jew was quartered in grodno, though the king had declined to sign his death warrant. in some places jews had to contribute towards the maintenance of churches, and in slutsk the law, enacted there in , remains unrevoked to this day. elizabeta petrovna did not imitate ivan iii. when she discovered that sanchez, her physician, was of the jewish persuasion, she discharged him without notice, after eighteen years of faithful service. similarly, when the livonian merchants remonstrated, maintaining that the exclusion of jews from their fairs was fraught with disastrous consequences to the commerce of the country, she is reported to have replied, "from the enemies of christ i will not receive even a benefit."[ ] but worse things were yet to come, the worst since chmielnicki's massacres. the bitterness of both poles and russians against the jews grew especially intense as the days of the rozbior, the partition of poland, drew near ( ). the poles, forgetting the many examples of loyalty and self-sacrifice shown by jews in times of peace and war, suspected them of being treacherous and unreliable; while the russians, though denying the patriotism of their own jews, persisted in the accusation that polish jews spent money lavishly in fomenting rebellion and anarchy. the pupils of the jesuits found great delight in attacks upon the jews, which frequently culminated in riot and bloodshed and the payment of money by jews to catholic institutions. "what appalling spectacles," exclaims a christian writer, "must we witness in the capital [warsaw] on solemn holidays. students and even adults in noisy mobs assault the jews, and sometimes beat them with sticks. we have seen a gang waylay a jew, stop his horses, and strike him till he fell from the wagon. how can we look with indifference on such a survival of barbarism?" the commonest manifestations of hatred and superstition, however, were, as in other countries, the charge that jews were magicians, using the black art to avenge themselves on their persecutors, and that they used christian blood for their observance of the passover. the latter crime, the imputing of which was sternly prohibited by an edict of the liberal bathory, in , was so frequently laid at their door, that in the short period of sixty years ( - ) not less than twenty such accusations were brought against them, ending each time in the massacre of jews by infuriated mobs. even more shocking, if possible, was the frequent extermination of whole communities by the brigand bands known as haidamacks. they added the "massacre of uman" ( ) to the jewish calendar of misfortunes, the most terrible slaughter, equalled, perhaps, only by that of nemirov in .[ ] that all this should have left a marked impression on the mentality and intellectuality of the jews, is little to be wondered at. the marvel is that they should have maintained their superiority over their surroundings, and continued to be a law-abiding and god-fearing people. while among the russians and poles the nobles who learned to read or write formed a rare exception, there was hardly one among the jews, the very lowliest of them, who could not read hebrew, and even translate it into the vernacular. maimon tells us that in his early youth he became the family tutor of "a miserable farmer in a still more miserable village," who yet was ambitious of giving his children an education of some kind. fortunately for the jews of those times--says a writer--their civilization was by far superior to that of the christians. the rabbi, though in no way inferior to the priest mentally, was immeasurably above him morally. the students of the yeshibot, despite their exclusive devotion to the study of the talmud, yet were better equipped for intellectual work, were of broader minds and better manners, than the pupils of the jesuits. and the jewish ba'ale battim, with an education as good as that of the gentile shlyakhta, had a more ennobling and elevating object in life.[ ] it is remarkable how quickly they recuperated from the blows they received. in thousands of people were killed, whole communities exterminated, volhynia, podolia, and a great part of lithuania utterly ruined. in , in those very places, we hear again of jewish settlements, with synagogues and schools and a system of education of the kind described in the preceding chapter, and we hear of the council of lithuania struggling to re-establish and cement the shattered foundation of their self-government. yet all their efforts improved the demoralized condition of the country but little. as always in national crises, the individual was sacrificed to the community, and deprived of the few rights remaining to him. the kehillot became brutally oppressive. there were no longer men of the stamp of abraham rapoport, solomon luria, mordecai jaffe, and meïr katz, to put their feet on the neck of tyranny. without special permission no one could buy or sell, or move from one place to another, or learn a trade or practice a profession. rabbinism became synonymous with rigorism, the coercion of untold customs became unbearable, and the spirit of judaism was lost in a heap of innumerable rites. the jew's every act had to be sanctioned by religion. he knew of the outward world only from the heavy taxes he paid in order to be allowed to exist, and from the bloody riots with which his people was frequently visited. what could result from such a state of affairs but poverty, material and spiritual, with all the suffering it engenders? those at the head of the kehillot, being responsible solely to the government, often had to deliver the full tale of bricks like the jewish overseers in egypt, though no straw was given to them. on one occasion rabbi mikel of shkud was arrested because the kahal could not pay the thousand gulden it owed. in , the whole kahal of vilna went to warsaw to protest against intolerable taxation. such protests were usually of little avail. on the other hand, a few powerful families throve at the expense of their oppressed coreligionists. this aroused a spirit of animosity and a clamor for the abolition of the kahal institution. jewish autonomy was more and more encroached upon. rabbinates were bought and sold, and the aid of the government was invoked in religious controversies. a question regarding the preferable form of prayer was submitted to the decision of paul i. in , prince radziwill decided who should officiate as rabbi in so important a centre of judaism as vilna,[ ] and in the government issued a "regulation" depriving the kahal of its judicial functions altogether. what was even more disastrous was the spiritual poverty of the masses. seldom have the awful warnings of the great lawgiver been fulfilled so literally as during the eighteenth century: and upon them that remain of you, i will send a faintness into their hearts in the land of their enemies; and the sound of a shaken leaf shall chase them; and they shall flee as fleeing from a sword; and they shall fall, when none pursueth. and they shall fall one upon another, as it were before a sword, when none pursueth: and ye shall have no power to stand before your enemies (lev. : - ). but the lord shall give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind. and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day and night, and thou shalt have none assurance of thy life (deut. : - ). having learned from sad experience that there was no crime their foes were incapable of perpetrating, they gave credence to every rumor as to an established fact. a report that boys and girls were to be prohibited from marrying before a certain age resulted in behalot (panics), during which children of the tenderest ages were united as husband and wife ( , , ). mysticism became rampant. "messiah" after "messiah" "revealed" himself as the one promised to redeem israel from all his troubles. love of god began to be tinged with fear of the devil, and incantations to take the place of religious belief. the _zohar_ and works full of superstition, such as the _kab ha-yashar_, _midrash talpiyot_, and _nishmat hayyim_, the first studied by men, the others by both sexes, but mostly by women, prepared their minds for all sorts of mongrel beliefs. "in no land," says tobias cohn, "is the practice of summoning up devils and spirits by means of the cabbalistic abracadabra so prevalent, and the belief in dreams and visions so strong, as in poland."[ ] all this, though it strengthened religious fervor in some, undermined it in others. sects came into being, struggled, and, having brought added misery upon their followers, disappeared. jewish criminals escaped justice by invoking the power of the catholic priesthood and promising to become converted to christianity.[ ] and now and then even talmudists left the fold, as, for instance, carl anton, the courland pupil of eybeschütz, who became professor of hebrew at hamsted, and wrote numerous works on judaism. others hoped to win the favor of the gentiles by preaching a mixture of judaism and catholicism. in many places, especially in the ukraine, the seat of learning that had suffered most from the ravages of the cossacks, the state of morals sank very low, owing to the teaching of jacob querido, the self-proclaimed son of the pseudo-messiah shabbataï zebi, "that the sinfulness of the world can be overcome only by a super-abundance of sin." this paved the way for the last of the long list of messiahs, jacob (yankev leibovich) frank of podolia. his experiences, adventures, and hairbreadth escapes, his entire career, beginning with his return from his travels in turkey, through his conversion to catholicism ( ), to the day of his death as "baron von offenbach," would furnish material for a stirring drama. as if to counteract this demoralizing tendency, a new sect, known as hasidim, originating in lithuania and headed by judah hasid of dubno and hayyim malak, taught its devotees to hasten the advent of the messiah by doing penance for the sins of israel. they were so firmly convinced of the efficacy of fasts and prayers that they went to jerusalem by hundreds to witness the impending redemption (ab. ). but the ascetic hasidim and the epicurean frankists were alike doomed to disappear or to be swallowed up by a new hasidism, combining the teachings and aspirations of both, the sect founded by israel baal shem, or besht (ab. - ), and fully developed by bar of meseritz and jacob joseph of polonnoy. [illustration: isaac bÄr levinsohn, - ] time was when all writers on the subject, usually maskilim, thought it their duty to cast a stone at hasidism. they described it as a chinese wall shutting the jews in and shutting the world out. it is becoming more and more plainly recognized and admitted, that it was, in reality, an attempt at reform rendered imperative by the tyranny of the kahal, the rigorism of the rabbis, the superciliousness of the learned classes, and the superstition of the masses. its aim was to bring about a deep psychologic improvement, to change not so much the belief as the believer. it insisted on purity rather than profundity of thought. unable to remove the galling yoke, it gave strength to its wearers by prohibiting sadness and asceticism, and emphasizing joy and fellowship as important elements in the fabric of its theology. hasidism was thus a plant the seeds of which had been sown by the various sects. like the former hasidim, or even the assideans of nearly two thousand years before, their latter-day namesakes rigidly adhered to the laws of levitical purification, and, to a certain extent, led a communistic life. in addition they accepted, in a modified form, certain customs and beliefs of the catholic church that had been adopted by the followers of frank. the prayers to the saints (zaddikim), the conception of faith as the fountain of salvation, even the belief in a trinity consisting of the godhead, the shekinah, and the holy ghost, these and other exotic doctrines introduced by the cabbala took root and grew in the vineyard of hasidism.[ ] the founder of the sect has an interesting history. in his childhood he gave no evidence of future greatness. his education was of a low order, but his feeling heart and sympathetic soul won him the esteem of all that knew him. the woods possessed the same charm for him as for wordsworth or whitman. with the latter especially he seems to have much in common. while a child, he absented himself frequently from the narrow and noisy heder, and spent the day in the quiet of the neighboring woods. when he grew up, he accepted the menial position of a school usher. his office was to go from house to house, arouse the sleeping children, dress them, and bring them to heder. but the time soon came when humble and obscure israel "revealed" himself to the world. owing to his tact and knowledge of human nature, combined with the conditions of the times, his teachings spread rapidly. he was speedily crowned with the glory of a "good name" (baal shem tob), and in the end he was immortalized. from such a man we can expect only originality, not profundity. indeed, his whole life was a protest against the subtleties of the talmudists and the ceremonies, meaningless to him, which they introduced into judaism. his object was to remove the petrified rabbinical restrictions (gezerot) and develop the emotional side of the jew in their stead. he was primarily a man of action, and had little love for the rabbis, their passivity, world-weariness, and pride of intellect. it is said that when he "overheard the sounds of eager, loud discussions issuing from a rabbinical college, closing his ears with his hands, [he] declared that it was such disputants who delayed the redemption of israel from captivity." men like these, who study the law for the sake of knowing, not of feeling, cannot claim any merit for it. they deserve to be called "jewish devils." only he is worthy of reward who is virtuous rather than innocent, who does what he is afraid to do, who, as jacob joseph of polonnoy puts it, "acquires evil thoughts and converts them into holy ones." no asceticism for him. all kinds of human feelings deserve our respect, for it is not the body that feels but the soul, and the soul, "being a part of god on high, cannot possibly have an absolutely bad tendency." men may not be heresy-hunters and fault-finders, for none is free from heresy and faults himself: the face he brings to the mirror, he finds reflected in it. yea, even the followers of abraham possess evil propensities, and noble qualities frequently belong to the disciples of balaam himself.[ ] these democratic principles put the most ignorant jew in russia on an equality with the erudite lithuanian. no wonder that they obtained such strong hold on the people of the ukraine, the province shorn of all its glory. hasidism invaded podolia and volhynia, swept over galicia and hungary, and found adherents even in many a large community in western russia and prussia. it brought cheer and happiness in its wake, and rendered the unfortunate jew forgetful of his misery. gottlober maintains that the inspiring melodies of the hasidic hymns were largely responsible for the spread of the movement, even as moody attributed the success of his revivals to the singing of sankey. for, as doctor schechter has it, "the besht was a religious revivalist in the best sense, full of burning faith in his god and his cause; convinced of the value of his teaching and his truth."[ ] one province there was to which the besht could not penetrate, at least not without a long siege and great losses. in lithuania the inroads of hasidism were strenuously opposed, and its advance disputed step by step. the lithuanian jews, to whom the talmud was as dear as ever, could not countenance a movement sprung, as they believed, from the seed sown by shabbataï zebi, an opponent of the talmud, and by jacob frank, at whose instigation the bishop of kamenetz ordered the talmud to be publicly burnt.[ ] the opponents (mitnaggedim) of hasidism were headed by a leader who was as typical an exponent of the cause he espoused as the besht was of his. among the students of jewish literature since the close of the talmud, few have surpassed, or even equalled, elijah of vilna ( - ). not inappropriately he was called gaon and hasid, for in mental and moral attainments he was unique in his generation. as the besht was noted in his early life for dulness and indifference, so elijah was remarkable for diligence and versatility. his life, like the besht's, became the nucleus of many wonderful tales, which his biographer narrates with painstaking exactness. they present the picture of a man diametrically different from israel baal shem tob. every year, we are told, added to the marvellous development of the young intellectual giant. when he was six years old, none but rabbi moses margolioth, the renowned talmudist and author, was competent enough to teach him. at seven, he worsted the chief rabbi of his native city in a talmudic discussion. at nine, there was nothing in jewish literature with which he was not familiar, and he turned to other studies to satisfy his craving for knowledge. and at thirteen, he was acknowledged by his fellows as the greatest of talmudists.[ ] he had neither guide nor teacher. all unaided he discovered the path of truth. he held neither a rabbinical nor any other public office. he was as retiring as the besht was aggressive. nevertheless his word was law, and his influence immense. the centenary of his death ( ) was celebrated among all classes with the solemnity which the memories of "men of god" inspire.[ ] now, this gaon of vilna, or hagra, was perhaps no less dissatisfied with prevailing conditions than the besht, but his remedy for them was as different as the two personalities were unlike. he did not desire to abolish the talmud, but rather to render it more attractive, by making its acquisition easier and putting its study on a scientific basis. even in lithuania, the citadel of the talmud, the development of talmudic learning had been hampered. in accordance with a talmudic principle, mankind is continually degenerating, not only physically, but morally and mentally as well. it holds that if "the ancients were angels, we are mere men; if they were but men, we are asses." this high regard for antiquity produced a belief in the infallibility of the rabbis on the part of the mitnaggedim, similar to that in their zaddikim by the hasidim. no scholar of a later generation dared disagree with the statement of a rabbi of a previous generation. but as authorities sometimes conflict with each other, the talmudists regarded it their duty to reconcile them or to prove, in the words of the ancient sages, that "these as well as those are the words of the living god." similarly, the popes declared that, despite their contradictions, the biblical translations of sixtus v and clement viii were both correct. it is true that lithuanian talmudists were not always the slaves of authority which they ultimately became. a study of the works of the early slavonian rabbis, before and after rabbi polack, shows that they were free from unhealthy awe of their predecessors, and sometimes were audaciously independent. neither solomon luria (maharshal), samuel edels (maharsha), or meïr lublin (maharam) refrained from criticising and amending whenever they deemed it necessary. but in the course of time the casuistic method, originally a mere pastime, became the approved method of study, and produced what is known as pilpul. scholars wasted days and nights in heaping ossa upon pelion, in reconciling difficulties which no logic could harmonize. here the gaon found the first and most urgent need for reform. the talmudists, he declared, were not infallible. every one may interpret the mishnah in accordance with reason, even if the interpretation be not in keeping with the traditional meaning as construed by the amoraim.[ ] his views on religion were equally liberal. the same process of reasoning which, spun out to its logical conclusion, led to pilpul in the schools, produced, when turned into the channel of religion, the over-piety culminating in the _shulhan 'aruk_. this remarkable book, with the euphonious name _the ready table_, prescribed enough regulations to keep one busy from early morning till late at night. the jews found themselves bound hand and foot by ceremonial trammels and weighted down by a burden of innumerable customs. the spirit of freedom that had animated slavonian judaism during the middle ages had fled. the breadth of view that had marked the decision of many of its rabbis was gone.[ ] judaism was a mere mummy of its former self. here, too, the gaon came to the rescue. rightly or wrongly, he "established the importance of minhagim [religious ceremonies] according to their antiquity or primitivism, regarding those which have originated since the codification of the _shulhan 'aruk_ as not binding at all; those which have been adopted since the talmudic period to be subject to change by common consent; while those of the bible and in the talmud were to him fundamental and unalterable."[ ] but the gaon's influence on the haskalah movement by far surpassed his influence on the study of the talmud or on the ceremonials of the synagogue. many, in point of fact, regard him as the originator of the movement. as he was the first to oppose the authority of the talmudists, so he was the first to inveigh against the educational system among the jews of his day and country. the mania for distinction in rabbinical learning plunged the child into the mazes of talmudic casuistry as soon as he could read; frequently he had not read the bible or studied the rudiments of grammar. the gaon insisted that every one should first master the twenty-four books of the bible, their etymology, prosody, and syntax, then the six divisions of the mishnah with the important commentaries and the suggested emendations, and finally the talmud in general, without wasting much time on pilpul, which brings no practical result. "these few lines," says a writer, "contain a more thorough course of study than wessely suggested in his _words of peace and truth_. though they did not entirely change the system in vogue--for great is the power of habit--they produced a wholesome effect, which was visible in a short time among the people." furthermore, the gaon exhorted the talmudists to study secular science, since, "if one is ignorant of the other sciences, one is a hundredfold more ignorant of the sciences of the torah, for the two are inseparably connected." he set the example by writing, not only on the most important hebrew books, biblical, talmudic, and cabbalistic, but also on algebra, geometry, trigonometry, astronomy, and grammar.[ ] and his example served as an impetus and encouragement to the maskilim in spreading knowledge among their coreligionists. such was the man who led the crusade against the converts to hasidism. but even he could not stem the current. in their despair, the lithuanian jews turned to their coreligionists in germany, and implored their assistance in eradicating, or at least suppressing, the threatened invasion. the great learning and literary ability of the "divine philosopher, rabbi moses ben menahem" (mendelssohn, - ), were appealed to for help. not a stone was left unturned to crush the new sect (kat), so called. volumes of the _toledot ya'akob yosef_, in which rabbi jacob joseph of polonnoy set forth the principles of the besht, were burnt in the market-place in vilna. intermarriage, social intercourse of any kind, was prohibited between hasidim and mitnaggedim. in vilna, grodno, brest, slutsk, minsk, pinsk, etc., the ban was hurled against the dissenters by the most prominent rabbis. israel was divided into two hostile camps.[ ] but soon everything was changed. hasidim and mitnaggedim discovered that while they were fighting each other, a common enemy was undermining the ground on which they stood. the haskalah was steadily drawing recruits from both, and it threatened ultimately to become more dangerous to both than they were to each other. from the south had come the impulse of religious revivalism through the followers of the besht, and the north was showing signs of awakening through the reforms of the gaon. at the same time a ray of enlightenment from the west pierced through the night. to make the regeneration of slavonic judaism complete, the element of estheticism had to be added to emotionalism and reason. from the warm south came besht, from the studious north hagra, and rambman (mendelssohn) made his appearance from the enlightened west. the triumvirate was complete. not that mendelssohn ever visited or resided in russo-poland. but the gentle, cultured little savant of berlin, with whose lips, carlyle tells us, socrates spoke like socrates in german as in no other modern language, "for his own character was socratic," was at no period of his life wholly cut off from influencing slavonic jews and from being influenced by them. as a lad mendelssohn was instructed by israel moses halevi of zamoscz (ab. - ). this teacher of his, who is credited with several inventions, and of whom lessing says, in a letter to mendelssohn, that he was "one of the first to arouse a love for science in the hearts of jews," imbued him with love for philosophy. when mendelssohn emerged from obscurity, and, despite ill-health and ignorance, attained culture and breeding, his associate, who was with him the most important factor in german haskalah, was the renowned naphtali, or hartwig, wessely, whose grandfather joseph reis had been among the fugitives from the cossack massacres in . and when he became famous, and took his place among the greatest of his age, he still sought diversion and instruction among the slavonian jews, and boasted of being a descendant of one of them, moses isserles of cracow. as formerly with the talmud, the haskalah seemed, at the time of mendelssohn, to be moving from the east westward, through the agency of the slavonic jews pouring perennially into germany. positions, from the lowly melammed's to the honorable chief rabbi's in prominent communities, were filled almost exclusively by them. the cause of judaism seems to have been entrusted to them. ezekiel landau, whose tactful intercession helped greatly to establish peace between the emden-eybeschütz factions, was rabbi of prague for almost forty years ( - ); the equally prominent, but at first somewhat less liberal phinehas horowitz was rabbi and dean in frankfort-on-the-main for over thirty years ( - ); his brother shmelke, regarded as a saint, was chief rabbi of moravia ( ). another horwitz, aaron halevi, was rabbi of berlin, one of those who favored mendelssohn's translation of the pentateuch; while the cultured and profound talmudist raphael hakohen, whose grandson, gabriel riesser, became the greatest champion of jewish emancipation germany has yet produced, was offered the rabbinate of berlin ( ). he declined the post, and finally became chief rabbi ( - ) of the united congregations of altona, hamburg, and wandsbeck. it is also recorded that samuel ben avigdor, the last rabbi of vilna, held the rabbinate of königsberg,[ ] and there certainly must have been many more who, because of their inferior positions, cannot be so easily traced. besides, germany, as we have seen, was the common fatherland of the greater part of both slavonic and teutonic jews. it never remained a _terra incognita_ to the former for any length of time. its proximity to russia, the business relations between the jews of the two countries, intermarriage, and, with a few insignificant exceptions, the identity of language, made the jews of both countries come into closer contact than was possible with any other jews. for the studious, germany possessed the attraction which the "land of universities" exerts upon seekers after knowledge the world over. to whom, indeed, could the profound and abstruse speculations of leibnitz and kant make a stronger appeal than to the jew who had been initiated into metaphysical abstractions from his very childhood? it is no wonder, then, that immigration from russo-poland into germany was constantly on the increase, until, under alexander ii, the advancement of russian civilization put a stop in a measure to these roamings, to be resumed under alexander iii and nicholas ii. the russo-polish youth, therefore, found himself quite at home in the country of mendelssohn, and thither, in case of necessity, he would go. in the eleventh century jews had gone from germany to poland. in the eighteenth they retraced their steps from poland to germany. outnumbering by far those who went there from choice or by invitation, were those compelled to go in search of a livelihood. "when i reached the age of twenty, peaceful and comfortable in my father's house, i began to hope that henceforth i should pursue my studies uninterrupted. but all at once my father lost his fortune, and i was forced to go somewhere to provide for myself. so i became a melammed in berlin." this piece of autobiography in the preface to a talmudic treatise by reuben of zamoscz might have been written by many others, too. but there were also the goodly number led thither by thirst for knowledge, whose remarkable abilities attracted the admiration of jew and gentile alike. wessely the poet and linda the mathematician more than once expressed surprise at the amount of learning many of the poor immigrants were found to possess.[ ] among these immigrants were two who may justly be regarded as the conducting medium through which the haskalah currents were transmitted from germany to russo-poland: solomon dubno, the indefatigable laborer in the province of jewish science, and solomon maimon, the brilliant but unfortunate philosopher, both of them teachers in the house of mendelssohn. solomon dubno ( - ) was all his life a bee in search of flowers, to turn their sweetness into honey. having exhausted the knowledge of his volhynian instructors, he went to galicia, where he became proficient in hebrew grammar and biblical exegesis. thence, attracted by its rich collection of books, he left for amsterdam, where he spent five years in study and research. finally he settled in berlin, and earned a livelihood by teaching among others the children of mendelssohn. the gentle disposition and profound learning of the polish emigrant made a favorable impression on the berlin sage, who invited him to participate in his translation of the bible, which revolutionized the judaism of the nineteenth century more than the septuagint that of the first century. the result was the _biur_ (commentary), which he, together with his countryman, aaron yaroslav, also a teacher, wrote on several books of the bible. comparatively few of dubno's works have been published, but judging from such as are known we may safely pronounce him a master of the massorah and a scholar of unusual attainments. of his poems delitzsch says that they are "in the truest sense hebrew in expression, biblical in imagery and subject-matter, medieval in rhyme and rhythm, and in general genuinely jewish in manner of treatment,"--laudation which this exacting critic bestowed on no other hebrew poet of his time. it was mainly through the endeavors of dubno that mendelssohn's pentateuch, later regarded with suspicion, was everywhere bought and studied eagerly.[ ] one better known to the outside world than dubno, and who has engraved his name forever on the history of theology and philosophy, was solomon maimon (nieszvicz, lithuania, --niedersiegersdorf, silesia, ). in his famous autobiography is mirrored the lot of hundreds of his countrymen who, like him, left their homes and hearths, their nearest and dearest, and led a wretched and miserable existence, all because they were anxious to be _ma'amike be-hakmah_ ("delvers in knowledge"), as he himself might have said, and avail themselves of the opportunities for acquiring the truth and wisdom unattainable in their own land. but maimon was doomed to suffer abroad even more than at home. he was one of those unfortunates whose sufferings are regarded as well-deserved. his exceptional ability was never to develop to its fullest capacity. great injustice has been done to him, not only by the rabid orthodox, who denied him a grave in their cemetery, but even by the enlightened historian graetz. fortunately he left behind him his _lebensgeschichte_, among the best of its kind in german literature, in which, with the frankness of a rousseau, he described the events of his short and checkered career.[ ] from this admirable work, in which he neither hides his follies nor flaunts his talents, we learn that maimon possessed rare virtues. his sympathy for the poor, his ready helpfulness even at the sacrifice of himself, rendered him as uncommon in moral action as in philosophic speculation. to the english reader a striking parallelism suggests itself between him and his contemporary oliver goldsmith. both were afflicted with generosity above their fortunes; both had a "knack at hoping," which led frequently to their undoing; neither could subscribe easily to the "decent formalities of rigid virtue"; and, as of the latter we may also say of the former, in the language of a reviewer, "he had lights and shadows, virtues and foibles--vices you cannot call them, be you never so unkind." as goldsmith came to london, so came maimon to berlin, "without friends, recommendation, money, or impudence." his only luggage was two manuscripts: a commentary on the works of maimuni, whose name he had adopted, and to whom he paid divine reverence; and a treatise in which he attempted to rationalize the recondite doctrines of the cabbala, and which he always kept by him "as a monument of the struggle of the human mind after perfection in spite of all hindrances which were put in its way." the little bundle, which, to the zealot jewish elders of that community, seemed sufficient indication that maimon was tainted with heresy, and that his intentions were to devote himself to the study of science and philosophy, proved a great impediment to entering berlin; and when, after a long, incredible struggle, he was finally admitted, he found himself incapable of earning a livelihood. in his childlike naïveté he was betrayed by the very persons upon whom he relied most. all this could not deaden his love for knowledge and truth. by chance he obtained wolff's _metaphysics_, and this marked a new epoch in his life. "not only the sublime science in itself," says he, "but also the order and mathematical method of the celebrated author, the precision of his explanations, the exactness of his reasoning, and the scientific arrangement of his expositions--all this kindled a new light in my mind." so profound a thinker could not for long be a mere pupil. wolff's argument _a posteriori_ for the existence of god, in accordance with his philosophic hobby, the "principle of sufficient reason," displeased him wholly. a hebrew letter to mendelssohn, in which he shook the foundation of the _metaphysics_ by means of his irrefutable ontology, won him the admiration of the berlin sage, who invited him to become his daily guest. maimon's intellect unfolded from day to day, until, some time afterwards, he astonished the philosophic world by his great work, _die transcendentale philosophie_ (berlin, ), in reference to which kant wrote to his beloved disciple marcus herz: "a mere glance at it enabled me to recognize its merits, and showed me, that not only had none of my opponents understood me and the main problem so well, but very few could claim so much penetration as herr maimon in profound inquiries of this sort." he demolished the prevalent leibnitzo-wolffian system in it, and proved that even the kantian theory, though irrefutable from a dogmatic point of view, is exposed to severe attacks from the skeptic's point of view. thenceforth he became a leading figure in philosophic controversy. in he published _ueber die progresse der philosophie_; in , _versuch einer neuen logik_, and _die kategorien des aristoteles_, and, three years later, _kritische untersuchungen über den menschlichen geist_ (berlin, ), wherein he originated a speculative, monistic idealism, which pervaded not only philosophy, but all sciences during the first half of the nineteenth century, the system by which fichte, schelling, and hegel were influenced. according to bernfeld, he was the greatest jewish philosopher since the time of spinoza, with whose depth of reasoning he combined an ease and straightforwardness of illustration characteristic of benjamin franklin.[ ] with all this he remained an ardent lover of the talmud to the last. in fact, his philosophy is distinctively jewish. like spinoza, he exhibited the effects of the cabbala and of rabbinic speculation, with which he had been familiar from childhood. the honor of the talmudic sages was always dear to him, and he never mentioned them without expressing profound respect. persecuted though he was by his german coreligionists, he never bore them a grudge. as a man he loved them as brothers, but as a philosopher he could not subscribe to their views implicitly. but for friends and benefactors his affection was unusually strong. with what love he talks of mendelssohn in the chapter dedicated to him in his autobiography, even though "he could not explain the persistency of mendelssohn and the wolffians generally in adhering to their system, except as a political dodge, and a piece of hypocrisy, by which they studiously endeavored to descend to the mode of thinking common to the popular mind!" his devotion to his wife was not diminished even after he had been compelled to divorce her because of his supposed heretical proclivities. "when the subject [of his divorce] came up in conversation, it was easy," says his biographer,[ ] "to read in his face the deep sorrow he felt: his liveliness then faded away sensibly. by and by he would become perfectly silent, was incapable of further entertainment, and went home earlier than usual." of his russo-polish brethren he speaks in the highest terms. he cannot bestow too much praise on their care for the poor and the sick, and he always hoped once more to see his native land, to whose king he dedicated his _transcendental philosophy_. "for," says he, "the polish jews are, indeed, for the most part not enlightened by science; their manners and way of life are still rude, but they are loyal to the religion of their fathers and to the laws of their country."[ ] it is because i regard him as the greatest maskil of his time that i have dwelt on maimon at such length. mendelssohn's philosophy, if he had an original system, has long since passed into oblivion; maimon's will be studied as long as spinoza, leibnitz, and kant are in vogue. his importance to us does not lie in the circumstance that his autobiography--"that wonderful bit of autobiography," as george eliot speaks of it, or "that curious and rare book," as dean milman calls it--and the pictures drawn of him by berthold auerbach and israel zangwill[ ] have made him the hero of some of the world's best biographies and novels. over and above this, he is the prototype of his unfortunate countrymen during the days of transition. he embodied the aspiration, courage, and disappointments of them all, and if, as carlyle said, "the history of the world is the history of its great men," maimon's life should be studied by all interested in the kulturkampf of the russo-polish and of the german jews in the eighteenth century. what could he not have accomplished, he to whom kant and goethe, schiller and körner paid tributes of unstinted praise, had he not been doomed to suffer and to starve. only at the last moment, before he was silenced forever, was he able to say, _ich bin ruhig_ ("i am at peace"). yet, in spite of the difficulties and impediments besetting him at every step, his promise of greatness and usefulness was not belied. in the introduction to his commentary on maimuni's _guide to the perplexed (gibe'at ha-moreh)_, in which he attempted to reconcile his master's system with that of modern philosophy--even as the master had tried to reconcile judaism with aristotelianism--he gave a brief sketch of the development of modern thought. this part of his work was assiduously studied by his compatriots. among his unpublished writings was found a work on mathematical physics, _ta'alumot hokmah_, and in his talmudic treatise, _heshek shelomoh_, he inserted a dissertation, _ma'aseh hosheb_, on arithmetic, like a skilful physician putting a healing, though to some it may appear a repelling, balm into a delicious, attractive capsule. the story of maimon, as i have said, is the story of many of the peripatetic apostles of haskalah, and his experience was more or less also theirs. issachar falkensohn behr (or bär falkensohn, - ?), without funds, friends, or rudimentary knowledge of the subjects necessary for admission into a public school, left his native city of zamosez with the determination to enter the university of "little berlin," as königsberg was called. too poor to carry out his plan, he tramped to berlin. through the influence of his relatives and countrymen, israel moses halevi and daniel jaffe, he was introduced to mendelssohn, and was enabled to devote himself systematically to the study of german, the alphabet of which he had learned from wolff's treatise on mathematics, and to french, latin, physics, philosophy, and medicine. in a very short time he mastered them all, especially german. his _gedichte eines polnischen juden_ (mitau and leipsic, ) caused no little stir among the poets. lessing and goethe, close observers of symptoms of enlightenment among the jews, expressed themselves differently as to the real merit of the collection; but both concurred with boie, who, writing to knebel, the friend of goethe, remarked concerning them, "you are right; the jewish nation promises much after it is once awakened."[ ] for one reason or another we find that some slavonic jewish youths preferred other places to berlin for the pursuit of their studies. such were benjamin wolf günzberg and jacob liboschüts. the former was probably the only jew at the göttingen university. it was from there that he inquired of jacob emden "whether it was permissible to dissect on the sabbath," and his thesis for the doctor's degree was _de medica ex talmudicis illustrata_ (göttingen, ).[ ] liboschüts studied at the university of halle. after graduation, finding that as a jew he could not settle in st. petersburg, he established himself in vilna, where he became celebrated as a diplomat, philanthropist, and, more especially, expert physician. when professor frank was asked who would take care of the public health in his absence, he is reported to have said, _deus et judaeus_, "god and the jew" [liboschüts]! in their deep-rooted love for learning, they sometimes ventured even beyond the german boundaries, into countries whose language and customs had little in common with theirs. padua continued to be the resort of russo-polish jews that it had been before . moses hayyim luzzatto found an ardent admirer and zealous propagandist of his principles in the young medical student jekuthiel gordon (ab. ), who wrote concerning his master to friends in vienna and vilna.[ ] judah halevi hurwitz (d. ), whose work _'ammude bet yehudah_ (amsterdam, ) was highly recommended by mendelssohn and wessely, was a graduate of the same famous institution. in addition to his medical and philosophic attainments, he wrote a number of poems, and he was among the first to translate fables from german into hebrew.[ ] the story of zalkind hurwitz ( - ), "le fameux," as he was called by a french writer, is interesting. starting, as usual, by going to berlin, and succeeding, as usual, in gaining the friendship of mendelssohn, he then visited nancy, metz, and strasburg, and finally settled in paris. like doctor behr, he had to resort to peddling as a means for a livelihood. the rudiments of french he acquired from any book he chanced to obtain. nevertheless, he soon became proficient in the language of his adopted country, and wrote his excellent _apologie des juifs_, which, crowned by the academy of metz and quoted by mirabeau, was largely instrumental in removing the disabilities of the jews in france. clermont-tonnerre, the advocate of jewish emancipation, said of him, _le juif polonais seul avait parlé en philosophe_. he was suggested as a member of the sanhedrin convoked by napoleon in . though for some reason he never enjoyed the honor of membership in it, he was, nevertheless, the ruling spirit in the august assembly, and later generations have paid him the homage he deserves.[ ] where hurwitz failed, another of his countrymen was to succeed. judah litvack ( - ) removed from berlin to amsterdam, became prominent among the dutch mathematicians, and wrote a dutch work, _verhandeling over de profgetallen gen. ii_ (amsterdam, ), which appeared in a second edition four years after the first. the author was elected a member of the mathesis artium genetrix society, and appointed one of the deputation sent to the sanhedrin (february , ), before which he delivered a discourse in the german language. the "distant isles of the sea," the british islands, russo-polish jews seem to have frequented ever since the restoration, probably contemporaneously with the settlement of the spanish jews. the famous mystic hayyim samuel jacob falk, one of the many baal-shems who flourished in podolia at the beginning of the eighteenth century, settled in london before , and became the subject of many wonder stories. sussman shesnovzi, apparently a countryman of his, describes him, in a letter to jacob emden, as "standing alone in his generation by reason of his knowledge of holy mysteries." that this was the opinion of many and prominent personages may be inferred from the fact that among his callers were such distinguished visitors as the marchese de crona, baron de neuhoff, prince czartorisky, and the duke of orleans. the confidence of such as these brought falk a considerable fortune, a large part of which he bequeathed to a charity fund, the interest of which the overseers of the united synagogue still distribute annually among the poor.[ ] shortly before "doctor" falk's death ( ), there settled in london phinehas phillips of krotoschin, the founder of the phillips family, which has furnished two lord mayors to the city of london. it was not merely because of its business facilities that england appealed to the slavonic jews. baruch shklover, or schick ( - ), went thither to study medicine, and it was from english literature that he selected the material for his _keneh ha-middah_ (prague, ; shklov, ), on trigonometry. it would appear that the first hebrew book, _toledot ya'akob_, printed for a jew in england, was, as the name of the author, eisenstadt, suggests, that of a slavonic jew. although a silversmith by profession, israel lyons (d. ) was appointed teacher of hebrew at the university of cambridge. he acquired repute as a hebrew scholar, and published, in , the _scholar's instructor_, or _hebrew grammar_ ( th ed., ), and in a treatise printed by the cambridge press, _observations and inquiries relating to various parts of scripture history_. in the same chosen field labored hyman hurwitz ( - ), the friend of coleridge, who founded the highgate academy ( ), and wrote an _introduction to hebrew grammar_, _vindica hebraica_, and _hebrew tales_, which were translated into various languages. he finally became professor of hebrew in university college, london. a younger contemporary of abrahamson, the jewish german medallist, was solomon (yom tob) bennett ( - ), the engraver of polotsk, who spent a number of years at copenhagen and berlin in perfecting himself in his art. among his works is a highly praised bas-relief of frederick ii, which was much admired by the professors of the academy. an ardent lover of liberty, of which there was little more in germany at that time than in russia, he left for england, where he spent the remaining years of his life, in bristol. besides being an artist and an engraver he was a profound theologian, anxious to defend the cause of judaism against enemies within and without. the enemy within he attacked in his cutting criticism of solomon cohen's _rudiments of religion_, and the enemy outside, in his other work, _the constancy of israel_ (_nezah yisraël_, london, ). he also wrote expositions on many important biblical topics, such as sacrifices ( ) and the temple ( ). having pointed out the defects of the authorized version ( ), he was ambitious of publishing a complete revised translation of the bible. specimens appeared in . death intervened and frustrated his plans. as schick was the first jew to translate from english into hebrew, so bennett was the first after manasseh ben israel to write in english in behalf of his people.[ ] if the contributions of slavonic jews to latin, german, french, dutch, and english literature were not less considerable at that time than those of the jews residing in the countries where these languages were respectively used as media, they excelled them in hebrew literature. in the renaissance of the holy tongue, they played the most important part from the first. the striving for knowledge, not for the purpose of obtaining a coveted privilege, but for its own sake, became an irresistible passion, and it was accompanied by an unquenchable desire to disseminate knowledge among the masses, to make learning and wisdom common property. the hebrew language being the best vehicle for the purpose, it was soon impressed into the service of haskalah. the pioneer maskilim learned to handle it with ease and clearness that would do credit to a modern writer in a much more developed european language. from the middle of the fifteenth to the latter part of the eighteenth century, hebrew literature consisted, if a few scattered books on philosophy, mostly translations from the arabic, are excepted, mainly of talmudic disquisitions, written in the rabbinic dialect and in a euphuistic style. besides the great maimuni, there were few able or willing to write hebrew "as she should be spoke." the early german maskilim, in trying to escape the scylla of rabbinism, fell victims to the charybdis of germanism. they possessed originality neither of style nor of sentiment, neither of rhyme nor of reason. hebrew poetry was an adaptation of current german poetry. the very best the period produced, the _mosaïde_ of wessely, was influenced by and largely an imitation of klopstock and others. like english classic poetry, it is pretty in form but poor in spirit. the element of nationality, or distinctiveness, the life-giving and soul-uplifting element in all poetry, as delitzsch justly maintains it to be, was lacking in the german maskilim, anxious for naturalization as they were. it was the slavonic maskilim who mastered hebrew in its purity, as it had not been mastered since the day of judah halevi. in those days of transition the diligent student can find, in germ, what was later to develop into the resplendent poetical flowers produced by the lebensohns, the gordons, dolitzky, schapiro, mane, and bialik. the slavonic contributors to the meassef, the first hebrew literary periodical ( - ), were not conspicuous in number, but if quality can compensate for quantity, they made up for it by the value of their articles. dubno and maimon enriched the early issues, the one with poetry, the other with philosophy; and when it began to struggle for its existence, and was on the point of giving up the ghost, shalom cohen ( - ) came to the rescue, and, as editor, prolonged its existence by a few years. among the best articles in the meassef are those of isaac halevi satanov ( - ). this "conglomeration of contrasts," whom delitzsch regards as the restorer of hebrew poetry to its primitive beauty and purity, was the embodiment of the period in which he lived. "he was," we are told, "a thorough master of jewish traditional lore, and at the same time a most advanced thinker, a profound physicist, and an inspired poet; a master of the old school and at the same time the founder of the new school, the national-classical, of hebrew poetry." his pure and precise style, his good-natured, horace-like, delicate, yet unmistakable, humor, he showed in a series of books bearing the name of asaf, which still must be counted among the gems of hebrew literature.[ ] satanov was greatly in favor of expanding the hebrew language, but the first to borrow expressions from the talmud literature or coin words of his own was mendel levin, also of satanov, podolia ( - ), the friend of mendelssohn while in berlin, the inspirer of perl and krochmal while in brody, the companion of zeitlin and schick while in mohilev. the meassefim, the name generally applied to all who participated in the publication of the meassef, were shocked by what they regarded a profanation of the sacred tongue. their idea was that hebrew was to be utilized as a means of introducing western civilization. afterwards it was to be relegated once more to the holy ark. to levin hebrew had a far higher significance. not only should western civilization be introduced into jewry through its means, but hebrew itself should be so perfected as to take a place by the side of the more modern and cultivated languages. it should find adequate expressions for the new thoughts and ideas which the new learning would introduce into it directly or indirectly. the medieval translations from the arabic should be retranslated into the new hebrew, he held, and he furnished an example by recasting the first part of maimuni's _moreh nebukim_. his modernized version, lucid and fluent, printed alongside of ibn tibbon's, presents a striking contrast to the stiffness and obscurity of the provençal scholar's. levin was also the first to write in the yiddish, or judeo-german, dialect, for the instruction of the masses, which made him the butt of more than one satire. but what was generally regarded as a degrading task was fraught with the greatest consequences to the haskalah. to this day yiddish has continued an important medium for disseminating culture among russian jews, both in the old world and in the new.[ ] the century remarkable among other things for encyclopedia enterprises,--_chambers' encyclopedia_ in england, the _universal lexicon_ in germany, and that wonderful and monumental work, the _encyclopédie_ in france--saw, before its close, a similar attempt, in miniature, in hebrew and by a slavonic maskil. whether the hebrew encyclopedist was influenced by the example of dr. tobias cohn's _ma'aseh tobiah_ mentioned above, or was unconsciously imbued with the prevailing tendency of the times, it is impossible to tell. in any event, he resorted to the same means, and presented the jewish world with a volume containing a little of every science known, under the innocent name _the book of the covenant_ (_sefer ha-berit_, brünn, ). the book appeared anonymously. this, the author assures us, was due not to humbleness of spirit, but to a vow. his diligence and constant application had greatly impaired his eyes. he vowed that if god restored his sight, and enabled him to finish his task, he would publish the book without disclosing his authorship. god hearkened unto his prayers, and the work was soon completed. but an unforeseen trouble arose. his book was ascribed "by some to the sage of berlin, by others to the gaon of vilna, and by many to the united efforts of a coterie of scholars, for it could not be believed that so many and diverse sciences could be mastered by one person." moreover, the author was censured for being afraid to come out openly and boldly as a champion of haskalah.[ ] in spite of obstacles and strictures, the book met with success surpassing the author's expectations. it found its way not only into russia, poland, and germany, but even into france, italy, england, holland, and palestine. an edition of two thousand copies was entirely exhausted, unusual at a time when books were costly and money was scarce, and another edition was issued. what phinehas elijah (hurwitz) of vilna had sown in tears, he lived to reap in joy. there was a crying need in russia for a work of the sort. in germany the very government encouraged organizations and publications aiming at enlightenment. accordingly, a society for the promotion of the good and the noble was started, and the meassef was published. in russo-poland not even a hebrew printing-press was permitted, and certainly no periodical publications would have been tolerated. phinehas elijah, therefore, grasped the opportunity, and showed himself equal to it. his aim was, like that of the french encyclopedists, to lead his readers "through nature to god." he gives an account of the various sciences, natural and philosophical, as a prolegomenon to the study of theology, even of the mystic teachings of vital's _gates of holiness_. withal he evinces a sound intellect and refined, if rudimentary, taste. he decries the "ancestor worship" that rendered the jew of his day a fossil specimen of an extinct species. the present is superior to the past, "a dwarf on a giant's shoulder seeth farther than doth the giant himself." he ridicules the base and degrading habit of dedicating books to "benefactors, friends, lovers, parents, men, or women." his work was written for the glory of god, and he dedicates it to eternal, all-conquering truth.[ ] all these maskilim, so many hands reaching out into the light, were both the cause and the consequence of the longing for enlightenment characteristic at all times of the slavonic jew. graetz and his followers among the latter-day maskilim delighted in calling them "they that walk in darkness." facts, however, prove that at no time before nicholas i was education per se regarded with the least suspicion, though the talmud was given the preference. as in the pre-haskalah period, the greatest talmudists deemed it a sacred duty to perfect themselves in some branch of secular science. when, in , a terrible plague broke out in his native town, rabbi jonathan of risenci (grodno) vowed that, "if he were spared, he would disseminate a knowledge of astronomy among his countrymen." to fulfil the vow he went to germany ( ), where, though blind, he devoted himself assiduously first to the acquisition of astronomy, then to writing on it.[ ] baruch yavan of volhynia, who more than any one exposed the impostures of jacob frank, "spoke and wrote hebrew, polish, german, and probably french," and his accomplishments and address won him the admiration of count brühl, the virtual ruler of poland, and the favor of the highest officials at st. petersburg. his associate in the righteous fight, bima speir of mohilev, was also possessed of a thorough command of the language of russia, and was well posted in its literature, history, and politics. the pinczovs, descendants of rabbi polack, connected with the most eminent rabbinical families, and themselves famous for piety and erudition, produced many works on mathematics and philosophy. mendelssohn's translation of the pentateuch was at first hailed with joy, and was recommended by the most zealous rabbis. doctor hurwitz of vilna did not hesitate to dedicate his _'ammude bet yehudah_ to wessely, who was more popular in russo-poland than in germany. the whole edition of his _yen lebanon_, which fell flat in the latter country, though offered gratis, was sold when introduced into the former.[ ] joseph pesseles' correspondence concerning dubno, with david friedländer, the disciple of mendelssohn ( ), proves the high esteem in which the liberal-minded savants of berlin were held in russia. the rabbis of brest, slutsk, and lublin gave laudatory recommendations to judah löb margolioth's popular works of natural science, which form a little encyclopedia by themselves. margolioth was the grandson of mordecai jaffe, himself rabbi successively at busnov, szebrszyn, polotsk, lesla, and frankfort-on-the-oder (d. ). the writings of baruch schick of shklov, referred to above, were accorded the same welcome. his translation of euclid and his treatises on trigonometry, astronomy (_'ammude ha-shamayim_), and anatomy (_tiferet adam_) won the admiration of rabbis as well as laymen. epitaphs of the day contain the statement that the deceased was not only "at home in all the chambers of the torah," but also in "philosophy and the seven sciences." and this, exaggerated though it may be, must be seen to contain a kernel of the truth, when we recall that among maimon's intimate friends was the rabbi of kletzk, lithuania; that in the humble dwelling of his father there were works on historical, astronomical, and philosophical subjects; that the chief rabbi of a neighboring town, rabbi samson of slonim, who, according to fünn, "had in his youth lived for a while in germany, learned the german language there, and made himself acquainted in some measure with the sciences," continued his study of the sciences, and soon collected a fair library of german books.[ ] saadia, bahya, halevi, ibn ezra, crescas, bedersi, levi ben gerson (whom goldenthal calls the hebrew kant), albo, abarbanel, and others whose works deserve a high place in the history of jewish philosophy, were on the whole fairly represented in the libraries, and diligently studied in the numerous yeshibot and batte midrashim. thus the enlightenment which dawned upon france, germany, and england cast a glow even on the slavonic jews, despite the chinese wall of disabilities that hemmed them in. unfortunately, this only helped to render them dissatisfied with their wretched lot, without affording them the means of ameliorating it. while the jews in western europe profited and were encouraged by the example of their christian neighbors; while, in addition to their innate thirst for learning, they had everywhere else political and civil preferments to look forward to, in russo-poland not only were such outside stimuli absent, but the slavonic jews had to struggle against obstacles and hindrances at every step. no such heaven on earth could be dreamed of there. the country was still in a most barbarous state. those who wished to perfect themselves in any of the sciences had to leave home and all and go to a foreign land, and had to study, as they were bidden to study the talmud, "lishmah," that is, for its own sake. this is the distinguishing feature between the german and slavonic maskilim during the eighteenth century. the cry of the former was, "become learned, lest the nations say we are not civilized and deny us the wealth, respect, and especially the equality we covet!" the latter were humbly seeking after the truth, either because they could better elucidate the talmud, or because, as they held, it was _their_ truth, of which the nations had deprived them during their long exile.[ ] they were unlike their german brethren in another respect. almost all of them were "self-made men," autodidacts in the truest sense. lacking the advantages of secular schools, they culled their first information from scanty, antiquated hebrew translations. maimon learned the roman alphabet from the transliteration of the titles on the fly-leaves of some talmudic tracts; doctor behr, from wolff's _mathematics_. but no sooner was the impetus given than it was followed by an insatiable craving for more and more of the intellectual manna, for a wider and wider horizon. "look," says wessely, "look at our russian and polish brethren who immigrate hither, men great in torah, yet admirers of the sciences, which, without the guiding help of teachers, they all master to such perfection as to surpass even a gentile sage!"[ ] such self-education was, of course, not without unfavorable results. never having enjoyed the advantage of a systematic elementary training, the enthusiasts sometimes lacked the very rudiments of knowledge, though engaged in the profoundest speculations of philosophy. "as our mothers in egypt gave birth to their children before the mid-wife came," writes pinsker somewhat later,[ ] "even so it is with the intellectual products of our brethren: before one becomes acquainted with the grammar of a language, he masters its classic and scientific literature!" steadily though slowly, brighter, if not better, days were coming. "thought once awakened shall not again slumber." as carlyle says of the french of that period, it became clear for the first time to the upturned eyes of the jews, "that thought has actually a kind of existence in other kingdoms [than the talmud]; that some glimmerings of civilization had dawned here and there on the human species." they begin to try all things; they visit germany, france, denmark, holland, even england; learn their literatures, study in their universities, and contribute their quota to the apologetic, controversial, scientific, and philosophic investigations "with a candor and real love of improvement which give the best omens of a still higher success." fortune, indeed, has cast them also into a cavern, and they are groping around darkly. but this prisoner, too, is a giant, and he will, at length, burst forth as a giant into the light of day. (notes, pp. - .) chapter iii the dawn of haskalah - a glimmer of light pierced the russian sky at the accession of catherine ii ( - ). this "semiramis of the north," the admirer of buffon, montesquieu, diderot, and, more especially, voltaire, whose motto, _n'en croyez rien_, she adopted, endeavored, and for a while not without success, to introduce into her own country the spirit of tolerance which pervaded france. her ukases were intended for all alike, "without distinction of religion and nationality." her regard for her jewish citizens she showed by allowing them to settle in the interior, establish printing-presses (january , ), and become civil and government officers (april , ). in the edict promulgated by governor-general chernyshev it is stated that "religious liberty and inviolability of property are hereby granted to all subjects of russia and certainly to the jews; for the humanitarian principles of her majesty do not permit the exclusion of the jews alone from the favors shown to all, so long as they, as faithful subjects, continue to employ themselves, as hitherto, with commerce and trade, each according to his vocation." that she remained true to her promise, we see from the numerous privileges enjoyed by many jews, who began to frequent moscow and st. petersburg and reside there for business purposes. paul ( - ), too, was kindly disposed toward the jews, and permitted them to live in courland; and when alexander i ( - ) became czar, their hopes turned into certainty. alexander i did, indeed, appear a most promising ruler at his accession. the theories he had acquired from laharpe he fully intended to apply to practical life. like catherine, he wished to rule in equity and promote the welfare of his subjects irrespective of race or creed. he ordered a commission to investigate the status of the russian jews (december , ). the result was the polozheniye (enactment) of december , , according to which jews were to be eligible to one-third of all municipal offices; they were to be permitted to establish factories, become agriculturists, and either attend the schools and colleges of the empire on the same footing as subjects of the christian faith, or, if they desired, found and maintain schools of their own. the approach of the great usurper and the crushing defeat the russians sustained at the battle of friedland (june , ) also favored the advance of the jews. as the short, but troublous, reign of paul and his wars with turkey, persia, prussia, poland, and sweden had impoverished the country and depleted the treasury, the shrewd alexander was not averse from appealing to jews for help. of course, as in many more enlightened countries and in more modern times, most of the privileges were merely paper privileges. few of them ever went into effect. the noble intentions of the enlightened rulers were steadily thwarted by bigoted councillors and jealous merchants. every favor shown the jews aroused a storm of protests, which resulted in numerous infringements. the jews were compelled to pay for the good intentions of catherine with a double tax (june , ), and, during paul's reign, without the emperor's knowledge, a law was enacted requiring of jews double payment of the guild license. in spite of all efforts, the jews, instead of being emancipated politically, were burdened with additional discriminations.[ ] had not the wheel of progress suddenly stopped revolving, russian jews might have constituted one of the most useful as well as most intellectual elements in the vast empire. as it was, the kindly intention of czar or czarina sufficed to arouse them from the asthenia to which they were reduced for want of freedom. the times were rife with excitement, and the jewish atmosphere with expectancy. the mighty changes which were taking place in russia and poland; the dismemberment of the latter; the annexation of balta ( ), lithuania ( ), and courland ( ) to the former; the short-lived yet potent german rule in byelostok ( - ), and the rude but memorable contact with france ( - ), these and many other important happenings in a brief span of time had a telling effect upon the diverse races under the dominion of russia, and among them not the least upon the jewish race. everywhere the desire for "liberty, equality, and fraternity" began to manifest itself. in courland, the most german of russian provinces, georg gottfried mylich, a lutheran pastor at nerft, made a touching appeal (ab. ) in german on behalf of the jews, insisting that the word jew "should not be taken to indicate a class of people different from us, but only a different religious body; and as regards his nationality, it should not hinder him from obtaining citizen's rights and liberties equal to those of the people of sleswick, the saxons, danes, swedes, swiss, french, and italians, who also live among us." in poland, tadeusz czacki, the historian, wrote his _discourse on the jews_ (_rosprava o zhydakh_, vilna, ), in which he deplores that jews "experienced indulgence rarely, oppression often, and contempt nearly always" under the most christian governments, and suggests a plan for reforming their condition. but the main appeal for freedom came, as might have been expected, from the jews themselves. contemporaneous with, if not before, michel beer's _appel à la justice des nations et des rois_, a lithuanian jew, during his imprisonment in nieszvicz on a false charge, wrote a work in polish on the jewish problem,[ ] while in löb, or leon, nebakhovich, an intimate friend of count shakovskoy, published _the cry of the daughter of judah_ (_fopli docheri yudeyskoy_), the first defence of the russian jew in the russian language. the followers of the religion of love are implored to love a jew because he is a jew, and they are assured that the jew who preserves his religion undefiled can be neither a bad man nor a bad citizen. but the jews did not wait for their dreams to be realized. they threw themselves into the swirl of their country's ambition, as if they had never received anything other than the tenderness of a devoted mother at her hands. they were "kindled in a common blaze" of patriotism with the rest of the population. that in spite of all accusations to the contrary they remained loyal to poland, is amply proved by the history of that unfortunate country. the characteristic kapota of the polish jew, his whole garb, including the yarmulka (under cap), is simply the old polish costume, which the jews retained after the poles had adopted the german form of dress.[ ] "when, in the year ," says czacki, "despair armed the [polish] capital, the jews were not afraid of death, but, mingling with the troops and the populace, they proved that danger did not terrify them, and that the cause of the fatherland was dear to them." with the permission of kosciusko, colonel joselovich berek, later killed at the battle of kotzk ( ), formed a regiment of light cavalry consisting entirely of jews, which distinguished itself especially at the siege of warsaw. most of the members perished in defence of the suburb of praga. in the agony of death, rabbi hayyim longed for good tidings, that he might die in peace. and when the fight was over, zbitkover expended two barrels of money, one filled with gold ducats and one with silver rubles, for the live and dead soldiers who were brought to him.[ ] indeed, prince czartorisky was so convinced of their patriotism, that he always advocated the same rights for the polish jews as were claimed for the polish gentiles, entrusted his children to the care of mendel levin of satanov, and instructed his son, prince ladislaus, always to remain their friend.[ ] but when, in spite of struggle and sacrifice, the doom "finis poloniae" was sounded, and a large portion of the once powerful empire was incorporated into russia, we find the jews bearing their sorrow patiently, and willingly performing their duties as subjects to their new masters. their attachment to their czar and country was not shaken in the least when, in , napoleon made them flattering promises to secure their services in his behalf. rabbi shneor zalman, the eminent leader of the lithuanian hasidim, hearing of the invasion of the french army, spent many days in prayer and fasting for the success of the russians, and fled on the sabbath day, not to be contaminated by contact with the "godless french." when napoleon was finally defeated, the event was celebrated both at home and in the synagogue, and russian soldiers were everywhere welcomed by jews with gifts and good cheer.[ ] lilienthal relates that the jews succeeded in intercepting a courier who carried the plan of operations of the french army, and alexander declared in a dispatch that jews had opened the eyes of the russians, and the government, therefore, felt itself bound to them by eternal gratitude.[ ] it is to this proof of patriotism that some attribute alexander's interest in the jews and his order that three deputies should reside in st. petersburg to represent them in russia, and in poland a committee consisting of three christians and eight jews should be appointed to devise ways and means of ameliorating their condition.[ ] the times were promising in other respects. in that critical period, the government, reposing but little confidence in russian merchants, whose business motto was "no swindle, no sale," allowed several jews to become government contractors (podradchiki). these, while rendering valuable services, amassed considerable fortunes. notwithstanding the law restricting jewish residence to the pale of settlement, catherine ii speaks of jews who resided in st. petersburg for many years, and lodged in the house of a priest, who had been her confessor. moreover, jews contributed not a little to the liberal policy of alexander i. among them were eliezer dillon of nieszvicz (d. ), who was honored by the emperor with a gold medal "for faithful and conscientious services," and was given an audience by his majesty, at which he pleaded the cause of his coreligionists;[ ] nathan notkin, who mitigated the possible effect of senator dyerzhavin's baneful opinions concerning jews, as expressed in his report (_mnyenie_, september, ), and who suggested the establishment of schools for children and for adults in yekaterinoslav and elsewhere; abraham peretz, the personal friend of speransky, dyerzhavin, and potemkin, and a brilliant financier, whose high standing enabled him to be a power for good in the councils concerning jews;[ ] and his father-in-law, joshua zeitlin ( - ). zeitlin was a rare phenomenon, reminding one of the golden days of jewish spain. his knowledge of finance and political economy won him the admiration of prince potemkin, the protection of czarina catherine, and the esteem of alexander i, who appointed him court councillor (nadvorny sovyetnik). but his mercantile pursuits did not hinder him from study, and his high living did not interfere with his high thinking. his palatial home at ustye, in mohilev, became a refuge for all needy talmudists and maskilim, whom he helped with the liberality of a maecenas; he conducted an extensive correspondence on rabbinic literature, and for many years supported doctor schick and mendel levin. for doctor schick he built a laboratory, and filled his library with rare manuscripts and works on jewish and secular subjects.[ ] even among the conservative talmudists signs of improvement were not wanting. the gaon became the centre of a group of enlightened friends and disciples, who continued in his footsteps after his death. his son, rabbi abraham, who published and edited many of his works, a task requiring no small amount of acumen and talmudic erudition,[ ] was also the author of books on geography, mathematics, and physics. his pupils, such as doctor schick and rabbi benjamin and rabbi zelmele, influenced their contemporaries either directly, by bringing them in touch with the new learning, or indirectly, by reforming the school system and the method of talmud study.[ ] of rabbi zelmele, who like his master became the hero of a wonder-biography written by his disciple ezekiel feivel of plungian, we are told that he regarded grammar as indispensable to a thorough knowledge of the bible and the talmud, pleaded for a return to the order of study prescribed in the _pirke abot_, and complained that, owing to the neglect of aramaic, the benefits of comparative philology were lost and unknown. he declared also that while he believed in all the bible contains, the stories in the talmud are, for the most part, legends and parables used for the purpose of illustration.[ ] [illustration: max lilienthal, - ] towering above all the disciples of the gaon, the most outspoken in behalf of enlightenment is manasseh of ilye ( - ). at a very early age he attracted the attention of talmudists by his originality and boldness. in his unflinching determination to get at the truth, he did not shrink from criticising rashi and the _shulhan 'aruk_, and dared to interpret some parts of the mishnah differently from the explanation given in the gemara. with all his admiration for the gaon, but for whom, he claimed, the torah would have been forgotten, he also had points of sympathy with the hasidim, for whose leader, shneor zalman of ladi, he had the highest respect. like many of his contemporaries, he determined to go to berlin. he started on his way, but was stopped at königsberg by some orthodox coreligionists, and compelled to return to russia. this did not prevent his perfecting himself in german, polish, natural philosophy, mechanics, and even strategics. on the last subject he wrote a book, which was burnt by his friends, "lest the government suspect that jews are making preparations for war!" but it is not so much his talmudic or secular scholarship that makes him interesting to us to-day. his true greatness is revealed by his attempts, the first made in his generation perhaps, to reconcile the hasidim with the mitnaggedim, and these in turn with the maskilim. he spoke a good word for manual labor, and proved from the talmud that burdensome laws should be abolished. his _pesher dabar_ (vilna, ) and _alfe menasheh_ (ibid., , ) are monuments to the advanced views of the author. in the hebrew literature of his time, they are equalled only by the _'ammude bet yehudah_ and the _hekal 'oneg_ of doctor hurwitz.[ ] this short period of enlightenment and tolerance, inaugurated by a semblance of equality, indicates the native optimism of the slavonic jew. for a while a cessation of hostilities was evident in the camp of israel. the reforms introduced by the gaon, and propagated by his disciples, began to bear fruit. hasidism itself underwent a radical change under the leadership of rabbi shneor zalman of ladi ( - ) and jacob joseph of polonnoy, who, unlike their colleagues of the ukraine, were learned in the talmud and familiar with the sciences. protests by hasidim themselves against the irreverent spirit that developed after the death of the besht, had in fact been heard before. the saintly and retiring abraham malak (d. ) had denounced, in no uncertain terms, the gross conception held by the hasidim of the sublime teachings of their own sect. he drew a beautiful picture of the ideal zaddik, who is "so absorbed in meditation on the divine wisdom that he cannot descend to the lower steps upon which ordinary people stand."[ ] but the more active rabbi shneor, or zalman ladier, as he was usually called, insisted on putting the zaddik on a par with the rabbi, whose duty it is not to work miracles but to teach righteousness. assuming for his followers the name habad, the three letters of which are the initials of the hebrew words for wisdom, reason, and knowledge, he furthered the cause of enlightenment in the only way possible among his adherents.[ ] how well he succeeded may be inferred from the fact, trivial though it be, that the biography of the besht, _the praises of the besht_ (_shibhe ha-besht_), by dob bär, published in berdichev ( ), omits many of the legends about the master included in the version published the same year in kopys. the omission can be explained only on the ground that the editor, judah löb, who was the son of the author, did not wish to give offence, or he had outgrown the credulity of his father.[ ] the feeling of tolerance manifested itself also in the jewish attitude towards the gentiles. "o that we were identified with the nations of our time, created by the same god, children of one father, and did not hate each other because we are at variance in some views!" this exclamation of doctor hurwitz[ ] found an echo in the works of the other maskilim that wrote in hebrew, but more especially of those who used a european language. they were deeply interested in whatever marked a step forward in their country's civilization. the opening of a gymnasium in mitau ( ) was a joyful occasion, which inspired hurwitz's hebrew muse, and at the centennial celebration of the surrender of riga to peter the great (july , ), the craving of the jewish heart, avowed in a german poem, was expressed "in the name of the local hebrew community to their christian compatriots." the last stanza runs as follows: grant us, who, like you, worship the god above, also on earth to enjoy equality with you! to-day, while your hearts are open to love, let us seal our happiness with your love, too![ ] this desire for naturalization brought with it an attempt at "russification." to show the beauty of the russian language, baruch czatzskes of volhynia translated some of the poems of khersakov into hebrew, and others published manuals for the study of russian and polish.[ ] among the first books issued from the newly-established printing-press in shklov, the centre of jewish wealth, refinement, and culture at that time, was the _zeker rab_ with a german translation ( ). in an appendix thereto the shklov maskilim announced their intention to publish a weekly, the first in the hebrew tongue. yiddish was also resorted to as a medium for educating the masses, and as early as some vilna jews applied to the government for permission to publish a paper in that language, though it was not until ten years later ( - ) that a yiddish periodical, der beobachter an der weichsel, appeared in warsaw. nor do we hear of any opposition to the government decrees, issued probably at the request of dillon, notkin, peretz, or nebakhovich, that the elders of the kahals in and after , and the rabbis of the congregations in and after , be conversant with either russian, german, or polish. this sudden russification of the jews amounted sometimes to no more than a superficial imitation of russian civilization, which pious rabbis as well as liberal-minded men like schick, margolioth, ilye, and hurwitz, felt impelled to call a halt to. jews, especially the rich, aped the polish pans. their wives dressed in parisian gowns of the latest fashion, and their homes were conducted in a manner so luxurious as to arouse the envy of the noblemen. israel waxed fat and kicked. their greatest care was to become wealthy; they pampered their bodies at the expense of the impoverishment of their souls, and some feared that "with the passing away of the elder generation there would not remain a man capable of filling the position of rabbi."[ ] the privilege of attending public schools and colleges further stimulated the russification of the jews. as soon as these institutions of learning were thrown open to them, numerous jewish youths made headway in all branches taught, especially in medicine. that alexander's benign decree of november , , issued through the secretary of state speransky, was not always executed by his officials goes without saying. simeon levy wolf, one of the first russo-jewish graduates, was denied his degree of doctor of jurisprudence in dorpat unless he embraced christianity.[ ] when, in , some of the vilna graduates applied for the privilege of not paying the double tax, they were told that they must first renounce their faith, an exception being made only in favor of arthur parlovich. still the number of jewish graduate physicians was on the increase. osip yakovlevich liboschüts, who was the son of the famous physician of vilna, took his doctor degree at dorpat ( ), became court physician in st. petersburg, where he founded a hospital for children, and wrote extensively in french on the flora of his country.[ ] the medical institute of vilna ( - ), afterwards transferred to kiev, became the centre of attraction for the russian jewry. padua, berlin, königsberg, göttingen, copenhagen, halle, amsterdam, cambridge, and london were for a third of a century replaced by the home of the gaon and of doctor liboschüts. the first students were recruited from the bet ha-midrash, and they frequently joined, as in former days, knowledge of the law with the practice of their chosen profession. such were isaac markusevich, whose annotations to the _shulhan 'aruk_ (ab. ) were published fifty years later;[ ] joseph rosensohn, the promising talmudist who became rabbi of pyosk at the age of nineteen;[ ] and kusselyevsky of nieszvicz, a stipendiary of a polish nobleman and a great favorite with professor frank. because of his proficiency, he was exempted from serving as a vratch (interne), and for his piety and learning he was addressed by jews and gentiles as "rabbi."[ ] with what dreams such happenings filled the jewish heart! "thank god," writes a merchant of the first guild in reply to an inquiry from distant bokhara, "thank god, we dwell in peace under the sovereignty of our czar alexander, who has shown us his mercy, and has put us in every respect on an equality with all the inhabitants of the land."[ ] but a rude awakening was soon to make the jews aware that their visions of better days were still far from realization. in , alexander i formed the acquaintance of baroness krüdener, and since then, to the satisfaction of prince galitzin, "with what giant strides the emperor advanced in the pathway of religion!" his humanitarian deeds gave way to a profound religious mysticism. he experienced a revulsion of feeling toward reforms in his vast empire, and, as always, the jews were the first victims of an ill-boding change. the kindly monarch who, at paris, had said to a russo-jewish deputation, _j'enleverai le joug de vos épaules_, began to make their yoke heavier than he had found it. the enlightened czar, who, in striking a medal commemorating the emancipation of the jews of his empire, had anticipated napoleon by a year, suddenly became a bigoted tyrant, whose efforts were devoted to converting the same jews to christianity. he who had claimed that his greatest reward would be to produce a mendelssohn, now resorted to various expedients, to render education unpalatable to the jews. the jewish assemblymen, who, in , soon after the franco-russian war, had been convoked to st. petersburg, were not allowed to meet; and when, two years later, they did meet, their every attempt was baffled by the government. jews were expelled systematically from st. petersburg ( ). they were forbidden to employ christians as servants (may , ), to immigrate into russia from abroad (august , ), and reside in the towns and villages of mohilev and vitebsk (january , ). several years after the double poll and guild tax had been abolished in courland (november , ), it was restored with an additional impost on meat from cattle slaughtered according to the jewish rite (korobka). all this impoverished the jews to such an extent that they were forced to sell the cravats of their praying shawls (taletim), in order to defray the expense of a second deputation to st. petersburg.[ ] had alexander i been satisfied with merely restricting the jews' rights, the favorable attitude towards enlightenment we have noticed above would probably have remained unaltered. unfortunately, alexander became a fanatic conversionist. it was a time when missionary zeal became endemic, and baroness krüdener's influence was strengthened. the reverend lewis way, having founded ( ) the london society for promoting christianity among the jews, made a tour through europe, everywhere urging the gentiles to enfranchise the jews as an inducement to them to embrace christianity, the only means of hastening the advent of the apostolic millennium. his _mémoires sur l'état des israélites_ presented to the congress of aix-la-chapelle (october , ) and his visit to russia resulted in an imperial ukase (march , ) organizing a committee of guardians for israelitish christians (izrailskiye christyanye). the members of this association were to be granted land in the northern or southern provinces of russia and to enjoy special privileges. the bait proved tempting, and, as a consequence, some prominent maskilim, too weak to resist the allurements, precipitated themselves into the greek catholic fold. abraham peretz, financier and champion of jews' rights, consented to be converted, as also löb nebakhovich, the dramatist, whose plays were produced in the imperial theatre of st. petersburg and performed in the presence of the emperor.[ ] equally bad, if not worse, for the cause of haskalah was the conduct of those who, disdaining, or unable, to profess the new religion, discarded every vestige of traditional judaism, and deemed it their duty to set an example of infidelity and sometimes immorality to their less enlightened coreligionists. what leroy-beaulieu says of maimon, "that type of the most cultured jew to be found before the french revolution," might more justly be applied to many a less prominent maskil after him: "despite his learning and philosophy he sank deeper than the most degraded of his fellow-men, because in repudiating his ancestral faith he had lost the staff which, through all their humiliations, served as a prop even to the most debased of ancient jews."[ ] haskalah thus having become synonymous with apostasy or licentiousness, we can easily understand why the unsophisticated among the russian jews were so bitterly opposed to it from the time the sad truth dawned upon them, until, under alexander ii, their suspicions were somewhat dissipated. previous to the latter part of the reign of alexander i the "struggle groups" in russian jewry were at first frankists and anti-frankists, and afterwards hasidim and mitnaggedim. it was a conflict, not between religion and science, but between religion and what was regarded as superstition. secular instruction, far from being opposed, was, as we have seen, sought and disseminated. long after the pious element in germany had been aroused to the dangers that lurked in the wake of their "aufklärung," and had begun to endeavor to check its further progress by excommunication and other methods, the russian jews remained "seekers after light." they might have condemned a maskil, they had not yet condemned haskalah. mendelssohn's german translation was welcomed in russia at its first appearance no less than in germany, but when some of the children of rabbi moses ben menahem embraced the christian faith, and their father, as was natural, was suspected of skepticism, the _biur_ and the meassefim were pronounced, like libraries by sir anthony absolute, to be "an evergreen tree of diabolical knowledge." so also with wessely's epistles, which were destroyed in public, together with polonnoy's _toledot ya'akob yosef_. haskalah itself was not impugned, and as theretofore translations and original works on science were encouraged, and the wish was entertained that "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased."[ ] but the latest experiences in their own country put haskalah in a very different light from that in which they were wont to regard it. formerly the opposition to it had been limited to the very land that gave it birth. because of their determination to study, solomon maimon was denied admission to berlin, manasseh of ilye was stopped in königsberg, and abba glusk leczeka, better known as "the glusker maggid," the subject of a poem by chamisso, was persecuted everywhere. it was rabbi levin, of berlin, who prohibited the publication of wessely's works, and insisted that the author be expelled from the city.[ ] it was rabbi ezekiel landau of prague who, though approving of wessely's _yen lebanon_, opposed the translation of the pentateuch by mendelssohn, while rabbi horowitz of hamburg denounced it in unmeasured terms, admonishing his hearers to shun the work as unclean, and approving the action of those persons who had publicly burnt it in vilna ( ). moses sofer of pressburg adopted as his motto, "touch not the works of the dessauer" (mendelssohn),[ ] and seldom allowed an opportunity to pass without denouncing the maskilim of his country. now the clarion note of anti-haskalah, sounded by these luminaries in israel, found an echo among the jews in russia. they had discovered, to their great sorrow, that like elisha ben abuya, the apostate in the talmud, "those who once entered the paradise [of enlightenment] returned no more." the very name of the seat of haskalah was an abomination to the pious. to be called "berlinchick" or "deitschel" was tantamount to being called infidel and epicurean, anarchist and outlaw. the old instinct of self-preservation, which turned jews from lambs into lions, holding their ground to the last, asserted itself again. as the talmudic rabbis excluded certain books from the canon, as the study of even the jewish philosophers was later proscribed by certain french rabbis, so the russian rabbis laid the ban upon whatever savored of german "aufklärerei." thus began the bitter fight against haskalah, in which hasidim and mitnaggedim, forgetting their differences, joined hands, and stood shoulder to shoulder. for, after all, was not judaism in both these phases endangered by the new and aggressive enemy from the west? and did not the two have enough in common to become one in the hour of great need? hasidism, in fact, was judaism emotionalized, and since, beginning with rabbi shneor zalman of ladi, it, too, advocated the study of the talmud, the distinction between it and mitnaggedism was hardly perceptible. the study of the zohar and cabbala was equally cultivated by both; isaac luria and hayyim vital were equally venerated by both, and hero worship was common to both. the _ascension of elijah_ (gaon) is as full of miracles as _the praises of the besht_. it is no wonder, then, that the animosities, which reached their acme during the last few years of the gaon's life, were weakened after his death, and that the compromise, pleaded for by doctor hurwitz and manasseh ilye, was somehow effected. but it was otherwise with the haskalah. "verily," says the zaddik menahem mendel of vitebsk, "verily, grammar is useful; that our great ones indulged in the study thereof i also know; but what is to be done since the wicked and sinful have taken possession of it?" in the same manner does rabbi hayyim of volozhin inveigh against the followers of mendelssohn, because of the latitudinarian habits of the maskilim, who "despise the counsel of their betters, and go after the dictates of their hearts."[ ] both saw in haskalah a deadly foe to their dearest ideals, a blight upon their most cherished hopes, and, like elizabeta petrovna, they would not derive even a benefit from the enemies of their religion. still, alexander i approached his object only tentatively. haskalah during his reign was like the leviathan in the talmud legend which resembled an island, so that wayfarers approached it to moor under its lee and find shelter in its shade, but as soon as they began to walk and cook on it, it would turn and submerge them in the stormy and bottomless sea. the jews were invited or induced to forsake their religion, and only the less discerning were caught in the snare. it remained for the "terrible incarnation of autocracy," nicholas i ( - ), or, as his jewish subjects called him, haman ii, to fill their cup of woe to overflowing and employ every available means to convert them to his own religion. nicholas's one aim was "to diminish the number of jews in the empire," but not by expulsion, the means employed by ferdinand and isabella. he knew too well their value as citizens to allow them to migrate. he would diminish their numbers by forced baptism. baptized jews were exempted from the payment of taxes for three years; jewish criminals could have their punishment commuted or could obtain a pardon by ceasing to be jews. but as these inducements could naturally appeal only to comparatively few, more stringent measures were resorted to. hitherto the jews had been excused from military service, paying an annual sum of money for the privilege. on september , , an ukase was issued requiring them not only to pay the same amount as theretofore, but also to serve in the army; and while christians had to furnish only seven recruits per thousand, and only at certain intervals, the jews had to contribute ten recruits for each thousand, and that at every conscription. the only exception was made in the case of the karaites, who, according to nicholas's decision, had emigrated from palestine before the christian era, and could not therefore have participated in the crucifixion of jesus. jews found outside of their native towns without passports, and those in arrears with their taxes, frequently even those who, having lagged behind in their payment to the government, eventually discharged their obligations, were to be seized and sentenced to serve in the army, and this meant a lifetime, or at least twenty-five years, of the most abject slavery imaginable. this grievous measure caused the utmost misery. no jewish youth leaving home could be sure of returning and seeing his dear ones again. the scum of the jewish population (poimshchiki, or "catchers") made it their profession to ensnare helpless young men or poor itinerant students suspected of the haskalah heresy, destroy their passports, and deliver them up as poimaniki (recruits), to spare the rich who paid for the substitutes. to form an idea of the time we need but read some of the numerous folk-songs of that day. here is one of many: quietly i walk in the street, when behind me i hear the rush of feet. woes have come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. "your passport," they ask. alas, it is lost! "then serve the white czar!" that is the cost. woe has come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. there are many rooms, they take me to one, and strip from my body the poor homespun. woe has come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. they take me to another room, the uniform,--that is my doom. woe has come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. rather than wear the cap of the czar, to study the torah were better by far. woe has come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. rather than eat of the czar's black bread, i'd study the scriptures head by head. woes have come and sought me, alas, had i bethought me. yet this was not all. knowing that it is easier to convert the children than their elders, the government of nicholas i, out-heroding herod, inaugurated a system so cruel as to fill with terror and pity the heart of the most ferocious barbarian. infants were torn from their mothers, boys of the age of twelve, sometimes of ten and eight, were herded like cattle, sent to distant parts of russia, and there distributed as chattels among the officers of the army. many of these cantonists, as they were called, either died on the way, or were killed off when they resisted conversion. those who survived sometimes returned to judaism, and formed the nucleus of jewish settlements in the interior of russia. these "soldiers of nicholas" (nikolayevskiye soldati), with their uncouth demeanor and devoted, though ignorant, adherence to the faith of their fathers, furnished much material for the folk-songs of the time and the novelists of the somewhat happier reigns of nicholas's successors.[ ] one of these cantonists, the first to give a description of the life of his fellow-sufferers, was wolf nachlass, or alexander alekseyev. for many years he remained faithful to the religion of his forefathers, though he had been pressed into the service at the age of ten. about he changed his views, became an ardent greek catholic, and converted five hundred cantonists, to the great delight of nicholas i, who thanked him in person for his zeal. he lost his leg, and during the long illness that followed nachlass settled in novgorod, and wrote several works on jewish customs and on missionary topics. less horrifying, but equally aiming at disintegration, was nicholas's scheme of colonization. what better means was there for "diminishing the number of jews" than to scatter them over the wilderness of russia and leave them to shift for themselves? this, of course, was necessarily a slow process and one involving some expense, but it was fraught with great importance not only for the russian church, but for russian trade and agriculture as well. "back to the soil!" was not this the cry of the romantic maskilim in germany, in galicia, and particularly in russia? and have not country life and field labor been depicted by them in the most glowing colors? here was an opportunity to save the honor of the jewish name and also ameliorate the material condition of the russian jews. the permission given to them by alexander i to establish themselves as farmers in the frigid yet free siberian steppes was greeted with enthusiasm by all. nicholas's ukase was hailed with joy. elias mitauer and meyer mendelssohn, at the head of seventy families from courland, were the first to migrate to the new region ( ), and they were followed by hundreds more. indeed, the exodus assumed such proportions that the christians in the parts of the country abandoned by the colonists complained of the decline in business and the depreciation of property. the movement was heartily approved by the rabbis; the populace, its imagination stimulated, began to dream dreams and see visions of brighter days, and all gave vent to their hopefulness in songs of gladness and gratitude, in strains like these:[ ] who lives so free as the farmer on his land? his farm his companion is, his never-failing friend. his sleep to him is sweet after a hearty meal; neither grief nor worry the farmer-man doth feel. he rises very early to start betimes his toil, healthy and very happy on his ever-smiling soil. o blessings on our czar, czar nikolai, then be, who granted us this gladness, and bade the jews be free. alas, this joy was of short duration! very soon nicholas became suspicious of his siberian colonization scheme, that it was in reality a philanthropic measure, and in place of saving the jew's soul it only promoted his physical well-being. this suspicion grew into a conviction when he learned that the jewish community at tomsk, still faithful to the heritage of israel, applied for permission to appoint a spiritual leader. the autocrat, therefore, signed an ukase checking settlement in the hitherto free land, depriving honest men of the privilege enjoyed by the worst of criminals, and enrolling the children of those already there among the military cantonists (january , ). then began real misery. believing at first that the czar's intentions were sincere, many jews had sold their hut and land and left for siberia. no sooner were they there than they were sent, on foot, to kherson. the decree of the "little father" was executed in--no other phrase can describe it so well--russian fashion. the innocent jews who had come to siberia by invitation were seized, treated as vagabonds, and deported to their destination. want and suffering produced contagious diseases, and many became a burden to the jews of kremenchug and such christians as could not witness unmoved the infernal comedy played by the defender of the greek catholic church. help could be rendered only secretly, and those who dared complain were severely punished. at the same time that this was taking place in the wilderness of siberia, a phenomenon of rare occurrence was to be witnessed in the very heart of the jewish pale, in lithuania. aroused by the wretched condition of his coreligionists, solomon posner ( - ) determined to erect cloth factories exclusively for jews. he sent to germany for experts to teach them the trade. these jewish workingmen proved so industrious and intelligent that before the end of three years they surpassed their teachers in mechanical skill. but this attempt of posner was only prefatory to the greater and more arduous task he set himself. it was nothing less than the establishment of a colony in which some of the most utopian theories would be applied to actual life. ten years after robert owen founded his communistic settlement at new harmony, indiana, several hundred robust russian jews settled on some of the thousands of acres in lithuania that were lying fallow for want of tillers. with these farmers posner hoped to realize his utopia. he provided every family with sufficient land, the necessary agricultural implements, as well as with horses, cows, etc., free of charge, for a term of twenty-five years. in return, the members of the community pledged themselves to use simple homespun for their apparel, black on holidays, gray on week-days, not to indulge in the luxuries of city life, and to avoid trading of any sort. as time passed, posner opened coeducational technical schools for the children and batte midrashim for adults, and soon the homesteads presented the appearance of progressive and flourishing farms. posner's successful effort attracted the admiration of prince pashkevich, and was both a living protest against the accusation of nicholas that jews were unfit to be farmers and an eloquent plea for the unfortunate victims of a capricious tyrant in siberia and kherson.[ ] in his efforts to curb the stiff-necked jews by all manner of fiendish persecution, nicholas did not neglect to try the efficacy of some of the plans advocated by lewis way. undismayed by the failure of the committee of guardians for israelitish christians, in which alexander i had put so much confidence, a "jewish committee," all the members of which were christians, was organized by imperial decree (may , ). this committee established, in , a school at warsaw where christian divinity students were to be instructed in rabbinical literature and in judeo-german, in order to be fully equipped for missionary work among the jews. it appointed abbé luigi chiarini to translate, or rather expose, the babylonian talmud, to which undertaking the government contributed twelve thousand thalers. to do his work thoroughly, the abbé deemed it advisable to write a preliminary dissertation, presenting his aim and views. this he did in his _theory of judaism_ (_théorie du judaisme_, paris, ). he endeavored to show how worthless, injurious, and immoral were the teachings of the talmud. only by discarding them would the jews qualify themselves to enjoy the right of citizenship. he proved, to his own satisfaction, that ritual murder was enjoined in the talmud, and this he did at a time when many a community was harassed by this fiendish accusation. when early death cut short the abbé's effort ( ), the government, still persisting in its plans, engaged the services of ephraim moses pinner of posen, who published specimens of his intended translation in his _compendium_ (berlin, ). but the fickle or restless emperor seems to have tired of the plan, or perhaps he found pinner too jewish for his purposes. of the twenty-eight volumes planned, only one, which was dedicated to nicholas, appeared during the decade following chiarini's death, and the work was abandoned entirely.[ ] the crusade against the talmud, thus headed and backed by the government, now broke out in all its fury. anti-talmudic works in english, french, and german were imported into russia, translated into hebrew, and scattered among the people. _the old paths_, by alexander mccaul, a countryman and colleague of lewis way, but surpassing him in zeal for the conversion of jews, was translated into hebrew and german (frankfort-on-the-main, ) for the edification of those who knew no english. jews themselves, either out of revenge or because they sought to ingratiate themselves with the high authorities, joined the movement, and openly came out against the talmud in works modelled after eisenmenger's _entdecktes judenthum_. such were buchner, author of _worthlessness of the talmud_ (_der talmud in seiner nichtigkeit_, vols., warsaw, ), and temkin, who wrote _the straight road_ (_derek selulah_, st. petersburg, ). the former was instructor in hebrew and holy writ in the rabbinical seminary in warsaw; the latter was a zealous convert to the greek catholic faith, who spared no effort to make judaism disliked among his former coreligionists. all these desperate attempts proved of no avail. judaism was practiced, and the talmud was studied during the reign of nicholas i more ardently than ever before. their sacred treasures attacked by the government without and by renegades and detractors within, the russian jews nevertheless clung to them with a tenacity unparalleled even in their own history. danzig's _life of man_ (_hayye adam_, vilna, ), containing all jewish ritual ceremonies, was followed out to the least minutiae. despite the poverty of the jews and the comparatively exorbitant price the publisher had to charge for the talmud, and, aside from the many sets of former editions in the country and those continually imported, and in addition to the responsa, commentaries, midrashim, and other works directly and indirectly bearing on it, more than a dozen editions of the talmud had appeared in russia alone since the ukase of catherine ii (october , ) permitting russian jews to publish hebrew works in their own country. this ukase had been intended originally to exclude seditious literature from russia, but what was unfavorable for the rebellious poles proved, in a measure, very beneficial to the law-abiding jews. under the supervision of a censor, and with but slight interruptions, the jews published their own books, and in slavuta, in volhynia, saw the first complete edition of the talmud on russian soil. then followed another edition in the same place ( - ), a third in kopys ( - ), and a fourth in slavuta ( - ), and several others elsewhere. the story of the vilna-grodno edition of the talmud is interesting as well as illuminating. it depicts the relation of the jews among themselves and to the government. begun in , at ozar, near grodno, an imperial ukase directed the removal of the work to vilna, the metropolis of russo-poland. when the publishers, simhah ziml and menahem mann romm, had completed their work in the new quarters, the copies of the book were destroyed by incendiaries ( ). after some time, an effort was made by joseph eliasberg and mattathias strashun to continue the publication, but the warsaw censor prohibited its importation into poland, where the bulk of the subscribers lived. to add to the calamity, a feud broke out between the head of the slavuta publishing company, moses schapira ( - ), and the vilna publishers. the publication of the talmud had always been supervised by the prominent rabbis of the land, and their authorization was necessary to make an edition legal. this the rabbi never granted unless the previous edition was entirely disposed of. the slavuta publishers claimed that their edition had not been sold out when the vilna publishers started theirs. the litigation continued for some time, and was finally decided in favor of the vilna firm. the publishers of slavuta, however, having the polish rabbis and zaddikim on their side, continued to publish the talmud, regardless of the protests of rabbi akiba eger and the "great ones" of lithuania. but a terrible misfortune befell the slavuta publishers. on account of some accusation, the two brothers engaged in the business were deported to siberia, and their father, the head of the establishment, died of a broken heart. this cleared the field for the romms of vilna, who continue to prosper to this day, and have now the greatest hebrew publishing house in the world. "it is the finger of god," the pious ones said, and studied the talmud with increased devotion.[ ] the numerous talmud editions indicate the demand for the work, and the multiplicity of yeshibot explains the cause of the demand. we have seen how the yeshibot destroyed by chmielnicki were re-established soon after the massacres ceased. their number increased when the hasidic movement threatened to render the knowledge of the talmud unpopular; and when the maskilim, too, made them a target for their attacks, there was hardly a town in which such institutions were not to be found. but surpassing all the yeshibot of the nineteenth century, if not of all centuries, was the yeshibah tree of life (yeshibat 'ez hayyim) in the townlet of volozhin. there the cherished hopes of the gaon were finally realized. within its walls gathered the elect of the russo-jewish youth for almost a century. the founder of this famous yeshibah was rabbi hayyim volozhin, the greatest of the gaon's disciples ( - ). a prominent talmudist at twenty-five, he, nevertheless, left his business and household at that age, and went to vilna to become the humble pupil of the gaon, whose method he had followed from the beginning. when he felt himself proficient enough in his studies, he returned to his native place, and founded ( ) the tree of life college, with an enrollment of ten students, whom he maintained at his own expense. but soon the fame of the yeshibah and its founder spread far and wide, and students flocked to it from all corners of russia and outside of it. in response to rabbi hayyim's appeal contributions came pouring in, a new and spacious school-house was erected, and volozhin became a talmudic oxford. to be a student there was both an indication of superiority and a means to proficiency. rabbi hayyim did away with the "tag-essen," or "freitisch" custom, and introduced a stipendiary system in its stead, thus fostering the self-respect of the students. but they did not as a rule require much to satisfy them with their lot. they came to volozhin "to learn," and they well knew the talmudic statement, that "no one can attain eminence in the torah unless he is willing to die for its sake." rabbi hayyim was succeeded by his son rabbi isaac, who united knowledge of secular subjects with profound talmudic erudition, was active in worldly affairs, and played a prominent part in the jewish history of his day. he was of the leading spirits who, in , attended the rabbinical conference at st. petersburg convoked by nicholas i. the number of students increased under his leadership, according to lilienthal, to three hundred. but rabbi isaac became so engrossed in public affairs that he found he could no longer do justice to his position. his two sons-in-law, therefore, took his place, and when the older died, in , rabbi naphtali zebi judah berlin ( - ) entered on his useful career, unbroken for forty years, as the dean of the greatest seat of learning in the diaspora. under his administration the tree of life college reached both the height of its prosperity and the end of its existence ( ).[ ] thus all the schemes and machinations of the russian government respecting the jews proved ineffectual. nicholas i, with the possible exception of ivan the terrible, the greatest autocrat in russian history, at whose wish seemingly insuperable obstacles were instantly removed, the wink of whose eye was sufficient to kill or revive the millions of his crouching slaves--nicholas i, with all his herculean strength, yet found himself helpless in the presence of a handful of wretched jews. furious at his defeat, he expressed the intention to reduce all jews to governmental servitude or to make them, like the cossacks, lifelong soldiers. being advised to postpone the execution of this plan and to employ less severe measures meanwhile, he issued the exportation law of , ordering the expulsion of jews from the fifty-vyerst boundary zone and from the villages within the pale, thereby depriving fifty thousand families at once of their homes and their support. those from the country--writes a russo-jewish eye-witness of the scenes following the enforcement of this inhuman law--move first to the neighboring cities, and increase the existing poverty, rendering the difficulty of finding profitable employment still greater. god only knows how it will end when the congestion increases still further.... i must also inform you--he proceeds--that these past four months several imperial commissioners have visited the frontier towns on the lithuanian border, from which the jews are to be banished, in order that the value of the real estate may be estimated. but how is the valuation calculated? even one who is acquainted with the venality and unscrupulousness of russian officers cannot form a correct idea of how this business is conducted. if a man has no connection with those in authority, or cannot obtain powerful intercession, or is unable to give heavy bribes, his property is valued at perhaps five per cent, or is set at so low a figure as to make the appraisal differ little from downright robbery. we, however, are used to such measures, for when they banished us some time past from certain districts of the city of brest-litovsk, where for centuries celebrated scholars of our people dwelt, nothing better was done by the crown to compensate us for our houses.[ ] the same occurred at the expulsion from st. petersburg, moscow, kiev, nikolayev, alexandrov, sebastopol, etc., but as it did not affect so large a mass, nor injure us to so great an extent, we bore the injury silently. alas, this is not the case at present. we should gladly quit the country, gladly should we emigrate to america, texas, and especially to palestine under english protection, if, on the one hand, we had the means and, on the other, the government would permit us.[ ] this exportation law of nicholas i, the result of a lawsuit between a jew and a nobleman living on the eastern frontier, which had been decided by the supreme court in favor of the former, aroused much excitement in every civilized country of europe. it was before anti-semitism was in flower, and the people of the time were more responsive even than during the later kishinev massacres. indignation meetings were held. both jews and gentiles, not only abroad, but even in russia, protested. prayers were offered for the unfortunate. crémieux in france and rabbi philippson in germany appealed to the public. all to no effect. grief was especially manifest among english jews, always the first to feel when their fellow-jews in other countries suffer, and grace aguilar, like rachel weeping over her children, lamented over her russian brethren: ay, death! for such is exile--fearful doom, from homes expelled yet still to poland chain'd; till want and famine mind and life consume, and sorrow's poison'd chalice all is drained. o god, that this should be! that one frail man hath power to crush a nation 'neath his ban. at this critical period, moses montefiore, encouraged by his success in refuting the blood accusation at damascus, and stimulated by the many petitions he had received from russia, germany, france, italy, england, and america, undertook the philanthropic mission of interceding with the czar on behalf of his coreligionists. it is natural to suspect that no trouble is entirely undeserved; it is but human to sympathize with our friends, and yet regard their suffering as a judgment rather than a misfortune. but montefiore's trip to russia dispelled the last trace of suspicion against the russian jews. in spite of their poverty, he saw numerous charitable and educational institutions in every city he visited. he found the jewish men to be the cream of russia. "he had the satisfaction," doctor loewe, his secretary, tells us, "of seeing among them many well-educated wives, sons, and daughters; their dwellings were scrupulously clean, the furniture plain but suitable for the purpose, and the appearance of the family healthy." to all his pleadings count uvarov returned but a single answer: "the russian jews are different from other jews; they are orthodox, and believe in the talmud"[ ]--a reason for persecution in holy russia! montefiore's visit to russia, from which so much had been hoped, did not improve the situation in the least. for all his strenuous efforts, he was compelled to leave the jews as destitute as he had found them. nay, they might truthfully have said to the moses of england what their ancestors had said to the moses of egypt, "since thou didst come to pharaoh, the hardness of our lot has increased." from the first of may ( ) they were not allowed to continue to earn the pittance necessary to maintain life, as, for instance, by the slavish labor of breaking stones on the highways, with which three hundred families had barely earned dry bread.[ ] the great love and respect shown to the uncrowned king of israel proved to the czar's officials the existence of some artful design on the part of the jews, and convinced them especially of the disloyalty of montefiore. the latter, they maintained, was scheming to set himself up as the jewish czar. hence every movement of his was closely watched, every word he uttered carefully noted, and not a few jews were left with memorable tokens for doing homage to the english baronet. their disabilities were not removed, their condition was not improved, the hopes they entertained resolved themselves into pleasant dreams followed by a sad awakening.[ ] yet, though his visit did not, as sir moses had anticipated, "raise the jews in the estimation of the people," it was not without beneficent effect on the jews themselves. it cemented the "traditional friendship" which has always existed between anglo-jews and russo-jews more than between any sets of jews of the dispersion. it disclosed to the latter that there were happier jews and better countries than their own; that there were men who sympathized with them as effectively as could be. above all, it convinced them that a jew may be highly educated and wealthy, and take his place among the noble ones of the earth, and still remain a faithful jew and a loyal son of his persecuted people. "i leave you," sir moses called to them at parting, "but my heart will ever remain with you. when my brethren suffer, i feel it painfully; when they have reason to weep, my eyes shed tears." had montefiore's visit resulted merely in arousing his brethren's self-consciousness, he had earned a place in the history of haskalah, for self-consciousness is the most potent factor in the culture of mankind. jews from other lands also came to the rescue of their russian coreligionists. jacques isaac altaras, the ship-builder of marseilles, petitioned the czar to allow forty thousand jewish families to emigrate to algeria. rabbi ludwig philippson, editor of the allgemeine zeitung des judenthums, appealed to his countrymen to help the russian jews to settle in america, australia, africa, anywhere away from russia. but all attempts were ineffectual. though count kissilyef assured montefiore that the czar "did not wish to keep them [the jews], five or six hundred thousand might leave altogether," emigration was next to impossible. russia was constantly playing the game of the cat with the mouse. her nails were set and her eyes fixed upon her prey, and yet she made it appear to the outside world that she was anxious about the welfare of the jews. for russian tactics have always been, and still are, the despair of the diplomat, a labyrinth through which only they who hold the clue can ever hope to find their way. the condition of the jews in russo-poland was, if possible, even worse than in lithuania and russia proper. nothing, in fact, but the auto-da-fé was needed to give it the stamp of medieval spain. as before the division of poland, the poles suspected the jews of disloyalty to poland, while the russians suspected them of disloyalty to russia. hitherto too proud to soil his hand with a manual or mercantile pursuit, the polish pan, now that the glory of his country had departed, and he was deprived of his lordly estates, began to engage in business of all kinds, and, finding in the jewish trader a rival with whose skill and diligence he could seldom compete, he became embittered against the entire race. this was the cause of the innumerable restrictions, the extortion, and exploitation in russo-poland, which surpassed those of russia proper. the jewish archives--said doctor marcus jastrow, then rabbi in warsaw--were humorously known as "california" or the "mexican gold mines." jews had to pay at every step. they had to pay a tagzettel [daily tax] for permission to stay in warsaw, which permission, however, did not include the luxury of breathing. the latter had to be purchased with an additional ten kopecks per capita. the income from these taxations amounted to over a million and a half, but in spite of all this the jews were regarded as parasites, as leeches feasting upon the life-blood of their christian compatriots.[ ] such is the background upon which the picture of haskalah is to be drawn--black enough to throw into relief the faintest ray of light. the russian jews, during the reign of nicholas i, found themselves in a position possible only in russia. they were not allowed to emigrate, nor suffered to stay. in they were expelled from the farms, and had to crowd into the cities; in they were expelled from the cities, and forced to go back to the country. then siberia was opened to them, but when it was found that even the land of the outcasts was hailed as a place of refuge by the jews, they were told to go to kherson. at last arrangements were perfected to allow them to colonize lithuania--all at once even this was interdicted. they had been conquered with the poles, yet were left unprotected against the poles. could they help suspecting the tyrant of what he really intended to do--of seeking to diminish their numbers by conversion? is it surprising that when he determined to open public schools and establish rabbinical seminaries, jews looked upon these, too, as the sugared poison with which he intended to extirpate judaism? or can we blame them for being determined to the last to baffle him? nicholas did not understand the great lesson taught by the history of the jews and inculcated in the old song, to destroy all these people you should let them alone. all that tyranny could inflict, the russian jews endured. yet their number was not diminished. no coercion could make them leave, in a body, the old paths they were wont to tread. nicholas's so-called reforms only encouraged a reaction, and the more he afflicted the jews, the more they multiplied and grew. the behalot of , , and were repeated in and ; the missionary propaganda only strengthened the devotion of the faithful; and the denial of the means of support only increased the stolidity of the sufferers. and if, like some stepchildren, they were first beaten till they cried, and then beaten because they cried, like some stepchildren they rapidly forgot their lot in the happiness of home and the studies of the bet ha-midrash, and could sing[ ] without bitterness even of the behalah-days, when little boys and little girls together had been mated, tishah be-ab, the wedding day,-- not a soul invited. only the father and the mother, and also uncle elye-- in his lengthy delye (caftan), with his scanty beard-- jump and jig with each other like a colt afeared. (notes, pp. - .) chapter iv conflicts and conquests - the charges brought against the jews of russia by henchmen of the czar were grave, indeed, only they did not contain a particle of truth. in russia itself, not only jews and non-russians but even many christians testified to the innocence of the jews, and protested against their oppressors. bibikov, the governor-general of podolia and volhynia; diakov, the governor-general of smolensk; and surovyetsky, the noted statesman, all write in terms of such praise of their unfortunate countrymen of the jewish faith that their statements would sound exaggerated, were it not that many other unprejudiced russians confirm their views.[ ] the fact that nicholas thought the jews reliable as soldiers speaks against the imputation that they were mercenary and unpatriotic. neither was the conventional accusation, that they were a people of petty traders, applicable to the jews in russia. laborers of all kinds were very common among them. it was they, in fact, who rendered all manner of service to their gentile neighbors, from a cobbler's and blacksmith's to producing the most exquisite _objets d'art_ and gold and silver engraving. they were equally well represented among the clerks and bookkeepers, and the bricklayers and stone-cutters. they took up with the most laborious employments, if only they furnished them with an honest even though scanty livelihood.[ ] but most unfounded of all was the allegation that jews were opposed to education. the _memoirs_ of madame pauline wengeroff indicate that even among the very strict jews of her time children were not denied instruction in the german, polish, and russian literatures. we have seen how they availed themselves of the permission, granted to them by alexander i, to attend the schools and universities of the empire. nor did they fail to open schools of their own. no sooner was the franco-russian war over than joseph perl of galicia founded a school in tarnopol ( ), then under the russian government, and two years later he drew upon his own resources to build a school-house large enough to accommodate the great, steadily growing number of students. in we hear of a school that had been in existence for some time in uman (the ukraine). it had been established by meïr horn, moses landau, and hirsh hurwitz, all of whom were indefatigable laborers in the cause of haskalah in the ukraine. perl's school was the pattern and model for a multitude of other schools, among them the one founded by zittenfeld ( ) in odessa, in the faculty of which were simhah pinsker, elijah finkel, the grandson of elijah gaon, and abraham abele, the eminent talmudist. in a girls' department was added to it, and when lilienthal visited odessa (ab. ) it had an attendance of from four to five hundred pupils of both sexes, the annual expense being twenty-eight thousand rubles. a similar school was opened in kishinev by stern, and in the early "forties" there was hardly a jewish community of note without one or more of such jewish public institutions. several well-to-do maskilim not only founded but, like perl, also maintained such schools, and gave instruction in some or all of the subjects taught in them.[ ] the "forties" began auspiciously for haskalah in russia. on january , , the riga community, amid pomp and rejoicing, opened the first jewish school affiliated with a university. the teaching staff consisted of three jews and one christian, with doctor max lilienthal ( - ), the young, highly recommended, and recently chosen local rabbi, as its principal. in the same year, the indefatigable basilius stern succeeded in forming a committee, of which hayyim efrusi and moses lichtenstadt were members, to deliberate on founding rabbinical seminaries in russia. in , forty-five delegates, representing the six chief committees of the lovers of enlightenment, assembled in vilna, and thence issued an appeal in which they adopted as their platform the elevation of the moral standards of adults by urging them to follow useful trades and discouraging the jewish proclivity to business as much as possible; a reform of the prevailing system of the education of the young; the combating, if possible the eradication, of hasidism, the fountainhead, as they thought, of ignorance and superstition; the establishment of rabbinical seminaries, after the model of those in padua and amsterdam, to supply congregations with educated rabbis. it was further agreed that a consistory be created, to supervise jewish affairs and establish schools and technical institutes wherever necessary. to these main points were added several others of minor importance. the maskilim of besascz insisted that steps be taken to stop the prevailing custom of premature marriages. those of brest proposed that government aid be invoked to compel jews to dress in the german style, to use authorized text-books in the hadarim, and interdict the study of the talmud except by those preparing themselves for the rabbinate.[ ] even in vilna and minsk, towns which later put themselves on record as opposed to government schools, the jews yielded gladly to the innovations of such maskilim as s. perl, g. klaczke, i. bompi, and the distinguished philanthropist david luria, who took the initiative in transforming the educational system of these cities. under the superintendence of luria, the minsk talmud torah became a model institution; the training conferred there on the poor and orphaned surpassed that given to the children of the rich in their private schools. this aroused jealousy in the parents of the latter, and at their request luria organized a merchants' school, for the wealthier class. he then established what he called midrash ezrahim, or citizens' institute, in which he met with such success that he attracted the attention of the authorities, and received a special acknowledgment from the czar.[ ] russian jewry was astir with new life. in many places secular education was divorced for the first time from rabbinical speculation. knowledge became an end in itself, and learning increased greatly. an investigation by nicholas i convinced all who were interested that though the talmud remained the chief subject of study, the number of educated jews was far greater than commonly supposed. the upliftment of the masses was the beau-ideal of every maskil, and hebrew and even the much-despised yiddish were employed to effect it. ignorance was regarded as the bane of life, and enlightenment as the panacea for all the ills to which their downtrodden brethren were heirs. as their pious coreligionists deemed it the universal duty to be well-versed in the talmud, so the maskilim thought it incumbent upon everybody to be highly cultured. no obstacle was great enough to discourage them. they were willing martyrs to the goddess of wisdom, at whose shrine they worshipped, and whose cult they spread in the most adverse circumstances. had the government not interfered with the efforts of the maskilim, or had it chosen a commission from among the russian jews themselves, among whom, as soon became evident to nicholas himself, there were more than enough to do justice to an educational inquiry, the haskalah movement would have continued to spread, notwithstanding the obstacles put in its way. but nicholas was determined to reduce the number of jews also by "re-educating" them in accordance with his own ideas. every attempt made by the jews to educate themselves was, therefore, checked. even the noble efforts of luria were stopped, his schools were closed, and his only rewards were "a gold medal from the czar and a short poem by gottlober." in germany, since the time of mendelssohn, the study of the talmud had been on the wane. the great yeshibot formerly existing in metz, frankfort, hamburg, prague, fiirth, halberstadt, etc., disappeared, and the reforms introduced in the synagogue and the numerous converts to christianity impressed the outside world with the idea that judaism among german jews was writhing in the agony of death. if the same disintegrating elements were introduced among the russian jews, the government believed that they would ultimately come over to the greek catholic church of their own accord. hence it was anxious to learn the secret of this power and beamed graciously on several learned jews of germany. david friedländer ( - ) was then considered the legitimate successor of mendelssohn, whose friend he had been for more than twenty years. he resembled his master in many respects, though he lacked both his genius and his sympathy. mendelssohn translated the pentateuch and the psalms into german, friedländer translated the haftarot (selections from the prophets) and the prayer book. mendelssohn encouraged the publication of the meassef; he did likewise, and contributed several articles to the journal. but, unlike his master, or, as he claimed, like his master in secret, he held exceedingly latitudinarian views on judaism. in his later years he advocated abolishing the study of hebrew in the schools and discarding it from the prayer book. he even rejoiced that by attending the services in protestant churches many jewish families were becoming acquainted with the religion he himself would have accepted on certain conditions.[ ] it was to friedländer that bishop malchevsky, actuated, as he maintained, by a desire to render the jews worthy of the enjoyment of civil rights, applied for suggestions, in , when the missionary zeal of alexander i was first aroused. he responded in a pamphlet, _on the improvement of the israelites in the kingdom of poland_,[ ] in which he declared that the quickest way of "civilizing" the jews would be to deprive their rabbis of power and influence, to force them to dress in the german fashion, and use the polish language, to admit them to the public schools and other educational institutions, and, above all, to abrogate the laws discriminating between them and their gentile countrymen. friedländer's advice regarding the removal of civil disabilities was never executed, but his other suggestions were followed out with more vigor than was necessary or good. to do away with the rabbis, and consequently with the talmud, was just what was desired. it was partly with this end in view that alexander i permitted, that is, commanded, the establishment of the rabbinical seminary in warsaw. but when it was found that, although the seminary students were provided with all necessaries, and notwithstanding the decree that six years from the date of its opening none but seminary graduates would be eligible to the rabbinical office, few students availed themselves of the opportunity afforded, and none obtained positions, the whole plan fell into disfavor.[ ] the government, nevertheless, remained as stubbornly determined as ever, and unable to turn all the children into cantonists, it decided to have those who remained at home gradually converted by means of a method worked out by the minister of education, uvarov. they were forced to attend what became known as government schools, though maintained exclusively with jewish funds. in order to win the confidence of the jews for the project, doctor lilienthal, whose speech at the dedication of the riga school secured him a diamond ring as a token of the czar's approval, was sent from st. petersburg on a mission of investigation, more especially of persuasion. for more than three years lilienthal was one of the most popular personages in europe. the eyes of all who had the amelioration of the lot of the russian jew at heart, it may be said the eyes of the civilized world, were fixed upon him as an epoch-maker in the history of the jews. nature had formed him, physically and mentally, to be a leader among his people, and his training and temperament made it easy for him to ingratiate himself into the favor of the great. it seemed that he was just the man to be the successful executor of the czar's plan. the maskilim, above all, hailed him as the champion of the cause of haskalah. he was their moses or ezra, the god-sent redeemer of their benighted brethren out of the quagmire of fanaticism. from various cities numerous urgent appeals came to him to hasten the execution of his great plan. wherever he went, he was enthusiastically received, a truly royal welcome was extended to him. the vilna community appropriated five thousand rubles for the school fund, and pledged itself to raise more if it were found necessary; and he was invited also to minsk by the kahal of the city. unfortunately, lilienthal's tactics exposed him to suspicion, and the seed of discord was soon sown between him and his former admirers. he tried to serve two masters, the czar and the jews, and he alienated both. the pious regarded him as a mere tool in the hands of the government, for, they maintained, _education without emancipation leads to conversion_. the enlightened element also lost confidence in one who, instead of boldly attacking superstition, preferred, while in minsk, to identify himself not only with the mitnaggedim, but even with the hasidim. he was also too headstrong and too vain of his achievements. benjamin mandelstamm, who, as he tell us in his letters, considered lilienthal "as wise as solomon and as enterprising as moses," complains a little later of his arrogance, and at the last speaks of him with contempt. his assumed superiority grieved the maskilim, and their former enthusiasm was rapidly replaced by hatred and persecution. he found it necessary to put himself under the protection of the police while in minsk, and when he returned to vilna his reception was far less hearty than it had been before. in order to regain the confidence of the russian jews, lilienthal obtained a permit from the minister of education to call an assembly of prominent jews at st. petersburg, to decide for themselves how to better the condition of the existing schools and to consider the practicability of establishing rabbinical seminaries. for he, too, like the maskilim, considered the rabbis the chief menace to haskalah. rabbinical authority was supreme, and if the rabbis could be won over, all would be gained. the bell-wethers once secured, the flocks were sure to follow. it took a long time for lilienthal, and still longer for the maskilim, to find out that what they regarded as the cause was in reality the consequence. eight years later lilienthal himself admitted the sad truth, that the rabbinical seminaries in russia could not effect the coveted end. "it must not be lost sight of," says he in his _sketches of jewish life in russia_[ ] "that the russian jews live strictly in accordance with our received laws, and they are sufficiently learned in them to know that the many cases of conscience which are of constant occurrence cannot be decided understandingly by any one who has but a superficial knowledge of the talmud and of the decisions of the later doctors of the law, but that it requires the study of an entire lifetime to become thoroughly acquainted with those stupendous monuments of learning and deep research in the great concerns of life." [illustration: alexander zederbaum, - ] after several busy months at st. petersburg and frequent consultations with count uvarov, lilienthal returned to vilna, and two weeks later he published his circular letter, _maggid yeshiiah_ (_the announcer of good tidings_)[ ] the "good tidings" were that an imperial ukase (june , ) would convene a council of distinguished jews at st. petersburg, to deliberate how to "re-educate" the jews. accordingly, in the early part of april, , the notables, from different places and with diametrically opposed views, assembled in the russian capital. representing the jews, there were rabbi isaac volozhin, the dean of the tree of life yeshibah, perhaps the strongest man present; rabbi menahem mendel shneersohn of lubavich, leader of the hasidic reform sect; joseph heilprin, the financier and banker of berdichev, and bezalel (basilius) stern, principal of the jewish public schools of odessa. representing the government were count uvarov, chevalier dukstaduchinsky, and others, with de vrochenko, minister of state, as chairman and lilienthal as secretary. montefiore of england, crémieux of france, and rabbi philippson of germany had been invited, but they failed to come. the council decided to open jewish public schools in every city where jews reside, and also two rabbinical seminaries, the one in vilna, the other in zhitomir, the former being considered the jewish metropolis of the northwestern part, the latter, of the southwestern part, of russia. they also proposed to do away with the judeo-polish garb, and suggested certain alterations in the prayer book. the delegates met, deliberated, and disbanded, but the tidings announced in lilienthal's epistle did not prove to be good. in one of the fables of kryloff, the russian Æsop, we are told that once a swan, a pike, and a crab, decided to make a trip together. no sooner had they started than, in accordance with their nature, the swan began to fly, the pike to shuffle along, the crab to crawl backward. it was so with the delegation of . rabbi isaac, the rabid mitnagged, could find but little to admire in the proposals of rabbi menahem mendel, the ardent hasid, and both were bitterly opposed to the view preached by doctor lilienthal, that the salvation of the jews and judaism would be brought about by a system of education adopted in accordance with an ukase by nicholas. stern, too, had little use for lilienthal, whom he declared to be ignorant of the condition of russian jews and incapable of working in their behalf. from such discord nothing good could come. the fact is, that the few resolutions mentioned had been drawn up beforehand by the government officials, and the time and trouble and expense which the council involved were, _à la russe_, for appearance sake. finding his efforts an utter failure, lilienthal went to odessa with letters of recommendation from uvarov to vorontzov, the patron of stern, and was elected rabbi of that enlightened and wealthy community. but, for some inexplicable reason, he suddenly left the city on the plea of visiting friends in germany, and went to the united states, where he remained to the end of his life, and became one of the leading rabbis and communal workers among his coreligionists whose lines had fallen in pleasanter places than the fortunes of those he had left behind in russia.[ ] for lilienthal's disillusionment came apace, and he finally recognized the error of his ways. in his book, _my travels in russia_, published both in english and in german, he admits that the opponents of the schools he advocated were after all in the right. education without emancipation was indeed the straightest road to conversion. witness the thirty thousand jewish apostates in st. petersburg and moscow alone, most of whom hailed from the baltic provinces, where the jews were more cultured, but not less oppressed, than their brethren. those men--says he--who have acquired from study an idea of the rights of man, and that the jew ought to enjoy the same privileges as every other citizen; those men who tried, by the knowledge they had obtained, to open for themselves better prospects in life, and now saw every hope frustrated by laws inimical to them only as jews, ran, from mere despair, into the bosom of the greek church. the harassing care for a living, the terrible difficulties in surmounting them forced them, in an hour of distress, to deny their faith. i always compared them with the anusim [forced converts] of spain. among them there is no religious indifference, as is the case in western europe and germany; and i have met with many converted jews there, who, with tears in their eyes, complained of heart-burnings and pangs of conscience; and they look upon themselves as eternally lost. those tears will show a heavy balance against czar nicholas, when, bereft of his earthly power, he stands before the eternal tribunal. the other charge--he says again after refuting several accusations of the kind stated above--the other charge, that the jews are averse to secular studies, rests upon an equally erroneous foundation. for even in germany jewish parents have at length found out that it is absolute folly to let their sons devote themselves to the study of science, since they never can hope for obtaining the least office; and since many a one, after the best years of his youth are passed, tired of waiting, and fearful of not having in his old age any means of support, finds in the baptismal font the last anchor of his shattered hopes. how much more must this consideration have weight in russia? nicholas, instead of encouraging the jews to study, ordered, on the contrary, that all such of them as held offices and insignia of distinction under alexander should either resign or become apostates. i know myself several collegiate councillors and men attached to the court, who went to the synagogue on the day of atonement with the insignia of the order of st. anna around their neck, and prayed there with devotion and fervor, who still were forced into apostasy. such instances are not calculated to encourage jewish parents to let their children study; and it is but too true that many whose inclination led them to study were carried thereby into the bosom of the christian church.[ ] after almost half a decade of indefatigable labor, lilienthal finally came to understand the russian state policy, "to assign a plausible reason for every act done by the government, in order to stand justified in the estimation of europe, whilst they, by throwing dust in the eyes of the public, conceal their true purpose." the laws which seemed favorable to the jews, and apparently aimed at promoting culture among them, went hand in hand with laws of the most rigorous character. it is true that the jews were not the only unfortunates whom the fanatic autocrat wished to russify, that is, compel to see the pure light of greek orthodoxy. but they, of course, suffered the most. the slightest laws were enforced by the chinovniks (officials) with the knout and the leaden lash. when the judeo-polish gaberdine, the long side-curls (peot), and the wig or turban (knup) fell into disfavor with the government, the miserable offender caught by an officer seldom saved himself with the mere sacrifice of knup, coat, peot, and beard. and when the time arrived for the execution of the more important laws, such as the exportation act of april , , no fiendish ingenuity could surpass the cruelty of the cossacks. this ukase more than any other, it is claimed, embittered lilienthal against russia, and caused him to flee to where he could say as one awakening from a nightmare: "the horrible hatred against the jews in russia is nothing more to me than a hazy remembrance. my soul is no longer oppressed by frightful pictures of tyranny and persecution."[ ] he was in the land of the free! the lilienthal tragedy thus came to a premature close. the hero disappeared at the beginning of the play. he had the potency, but he lacked the conditions, for producing great results. his german birth and training, the very qualities which recommended him to the government, operated against him when he came to deal with russian jews. yet he succeeded in giving a strong impetus to the haskalah movement, and builded better than he knew. the statement in his address at the dedication of the riga school,[ ] "this hour we may call the hour of the renaissance of the mental education of israel," which reads like an oratorical platitude, was not entirely visionary. the real history of haskalah in russia commences with lilienthal. time helped greatly to restore, even to deepen, the affection of the maskilim for lilienthal. a modern critic speaking of "life and literature" in hebrew, pictures him in glowing colors, and finishes his description thus: i have presented to you, reader, a man of deep culture, known and respected in the highest circles, and yet inseparably connected with his race and religion, and ready to offer his life for their welfare; a man who worked with might and main for others at the sacrifice of his own comfort and advancement; an orator whose exalted phrases shattered the pillars and foundations of ignorance and superstition; a hero who in time of peril was proof against the arrows and missiles of the enemy, and who did not relax his hand from the flag. but what was the fruit he reaped? mostly ingratitude and persecution, a heart lacerated with despair, a soul writhing under the pangs of frustrated hopes. such a personality with its fine shades, and with the poetry of the artist superimposed, would afford splendid material for the hero of a novel--a hero to captivate the eye and heart of the reader by his nobility and grandeur.[ ] for a long time russian officialdom discussed the question, whether the establishment of exclusively jewish schools would prove beneficial, but nobody doubted the efficacy of rabbinical seminaries. yet it was these latter institutions that evoked the strongest protests from the jews. the advocates of haskalah gradually came to recognize the truth, which lilienthal admitted afterwards, that for a russian rabbi a thorough knowledge of the talmud was absolutely indispensable. but it was with the object of discouraging such knowledge that the seminaries had been suggested by uvarov, and it was this study that was almost entirely ignored in them. what congregation, many of whose members were profound talmudists, would accept a rabbi to whom unvocalized hebrew was a snare and a stumbling-block? moreover, the whole atmosphere of the seminaries was christian, nay, military. not a few members of their faculties or boards of governors were discharged police officers or superannuated soldiers, and at the head of the seminary in vilna, the metropolis of russian jewry, stood an apostate jew! they became, as it were, infirmaries of the bureaucracy, where, at the expense of the jews, it could stow away anyone who had proved a failure or was no longer useful. the government also undertook to provide the graduates with positions, patronage which rendered the students insolently independent of their coreligionists, and encouraged some of them to indulge in a _modus vivendi_ distasteful to their future flocks. the graduates, therefore, proved failures as rabbis, and the government was forced to provide for them by appointing them as teachers.[ ] if this was the case with the rabbinical seminaries, we can easily imagine the state of the subordinate schools. the christian principals were coarse and uneducated as a rule, and did their best to prejudice the children against their religion. scattered all over the pale were to be found jews competent to fill positions not only as teachers in inferior grades but as professors in the universities. yet lilienthal was advised ( ) to advertise for three hundred teachers in germany. finally the government decided to employ jews as teachers of hebrew only, the least important subject in the curriculum; for instruction in the secular branches none but christians were eligible. no jews were allowed to become rectors in their own schools, and their salaries were so small that they could not support themselves without teaching an additional class, which was prohibited. a jew might, indeed, become an "honorable overseer" (pochotny blyustityel), to mediate between pupils and parents, but the title was the only pay attached to the office. respectable parents, therefore, kept their children at home, or rather in the heder, and many a child's name was on the roll of attendance who was not even aware of the existence of the school. "every year in the autumn," relates a writer a quarter of a century later, "there was a kind of compulsory recruiting of jewish children for the government school, accompanied sometimes by struggles between the victims and their enemies,--scenes without a parallel, in some respects, in the civilized world. i remember how poor mothers and sisters wept with despair when some boy of the family was carried off or enlisted by the officers to be a pupil of a government school." like the poimaniki, the poor and the orphaned were compelled, or induced, to fill the class-rooms shunned by the rich and respectable, and though the government not only condemned the ancient hebrew institutions, but declared the twenty thousand teachers who imparted instruction in them to be outlaws and criminals, the melammedim pursued their vocation as ever, and the hadarim, talmud torahs, yeshibot, and batte midrashim swarmed with students of the prohibited learning.[ ] nicholas was paid measure for measure, and the cunning of his ministers was made of no avail by the shrewdness of his jewish subjects. the report of the minister of education, at the end of , shows incredible progress. it states that since the ukase of november , , i.e. in the course of a single year, more than two thousand schools of different grades were established in various cities of the pale, with more than one hundred and eighty thousand pupils, not including the technical schools in odessa, riga, kishinev, vilna, and uman, with their hundreds of students! the truth was that, instead of the reported russification, there had set in a vigorous reaction, which rendered the position more critical. both sides had become desperate.[ ] some maskilim, emboldened by the interest the government evinced in their efforts, had resorted to all manner of means to accomplish their object, and frequently allied themselves with the oppressors. the slavuta publishing house, it is claimed, was closed, and the schapiras met with their tragic end, because "as printers they scrupulously abstained from publishing haskalah literature." maskilim were employed by the authorities as tax collectors, and these, as is ever the case with rapacious farmers of taxes, besides executing the harsh laws of the tyrant, looked also to their own aggrandizement, and harassed their pious coreligionists in all ways conceivable. many of them even hindered the colonization movement, because, if allowed to mature, it would deprive them of their income.[ ] in addition to this, the jews were now burdened, through the instrumentality of the maskilim, with a tax on the candles lighted on sabbath eve, yielding annually over one million rubles, the greater part of which went into the coffers of greedy officials. another tax, also for the maintenance of the newly-organized government schools, was levied--one kopeck and a half per page!--on text-books, whether imported from abroad or published in vilna or zhitomir, and the text-books were published with unnecessarily large type and wide margins to increase the number of pages. the abridgment and translation of maimuni's _mishneh torah_ (st. petersburg, ), superintended by leon mandelstamm, cost the russian jews tens of thousands of rubles, notwithstanding the expenditure of two or three millions on their own educational institutions, and at a time when every kopeck was needed for the support of the host of victims of fire, famine, and cholera, which ravaged many a city. hence the reaction became more and more formidable. the cry grew louder and louder, _znaty nye znayem, shkolles nye zhelayem!_ ("we want no schools!"). the opposition, which began in the latter years of alexander i, reached its culmination in the last decade of the reign of nicholas i. "israel," laments mandelstamm, "seems to be even worse than formerly; he is like a sick person who has convalesced only to relapse, and the physicians are beginning to despair." it was a struggle not unlike that all over europe at the beginning of the renaissance, a struggle between liberty and authority, between this world and other-worldliness, between the spirit of the nineteenth century and that of the millenniums which preceded it. here is a description, by morgulis, of the struggles and conquests of the new, small, but zealous, group of maskilim in russia at about that time:[ ] those upon whom the sun of civilization and freedom happened to cast a ray of light, showing them the path leading to a new life, were compelled to study the european literatures and sciences in garrets, in cellars, in any nook where they felt themselves secure from interference. neither unaffiliated jews nor the outer world knew anything about them. like rebels they kept their secrets unto themselves, stealthily assembling from time to time, to consider how they might realize their ideal, and disclose to their brethren the fountainhead of the living waters out of which they drank and drew new youth and life. whatever was novel was accepted with delight. they looked with envy upon the great intellectual progress of their western brethren. fain would they have had their jewish countrymen recognize the times and their requirements, but they could not give free utterance to their thoughts. on the contrary, they found it expedient to assume the mask of religion in order to escape the suspicion of alert zealots, and gain, if possible, new recruits. in many places societies were founded under the name of lovers of the new haskalah, the members of which observed such secrecy that even their kinsmen and those among whom they dwelt were unaware of their existence. if through the discovery of some forbidden book any of them happened to be detected, he never betrayed his friends. such a one was usually compelled to marry, so that, being burdened with family cares, he might desist from his unpopular pursuits. from which it would appear that though the opposition to haskalah in russia was by no means as violent as had been the opposition to enlightenment in france, for instance, or even among the jews of germany and austria,[ ] it was a bitter and stubborn conflict between parents and children in the adjustment of old ideals to a new environment. aside from the hindrances which haskalah encountered because of nicholas's conversionist policy, it was greatly hampered by the geographical distribution of the jews. here again the czar defeated his own end by segregating the three or four million of his jewish subjects in certain districts, technically called the pale, the greatest ghetto the world has ever known. it was a judea in itself. the jews there seldom came in contact with outside civilization. the languages they used were hebrew as the literary tongue, yiddish among themselves, and the local slavonic dialect with their non-jewish neighbors. russian was strange, not only to the great majority of jews, but to the russians themselves. it was merely the state language, and even the government officials fell back on their mother tongue whenever they were at liberty to do so. it was this that made it very difficult for the jews to be russified. but even if russification had been a much easier process, russian civilization was hardly worth the having.[ ] to become russified would have meant not only religious but also intellectual suicide. whatever was good in the russia of that day was an importation. the language was scarcely beyond the barbarous state. its literature possessed neither original nor adopted writings, no profound philosophical systems, no rousseau or goethe, no franklin or kant, not even any practical information with which to reward the student. the best writers were kryloff, pushkin, zhukovsky, and dyerzhavin. the prices of books were so high as to make them unattainable. karamzin's _history of the russian empire_ sold at fifty-five rubles per copy. the royal library, which had been founded by the jewish court physician sanchez, contained only eight russian books during the reign of alexander i, and not many more were added by his successor. the dramatic art developed by the jewish playwright nebakhovich remained for a long time in the same state as when he ceased his work.[ ] if russia was the most powerful, it continued to be the most fanatical and uncivilized country in europe. all who had occasion to visit and study it during the first half of the nineteenth century testify to its deplorable intellectual status. according to a very ingenious and observing writer, quoted by buckle in his _history of civilization_, it consisted of but two ranks, the highest and the lowest, or the nobility and the serfs: _les marchands, qui formaient une classe moyenne, sont en si petit nombre qu'il ne peuvent marquer dans l'état; d'ailleurs presque tous sont étrangers_. the higher classes were distinguished for "a total absence of all rational tastes on literary topics." here [in russia]--the same writer continues--it is absolutely _mauvais genre_ to discuss a rational subject--pure _pédanterie_ to be caught upon any topics beyond dressing, dancing, and a _jolie tournure_. military prowess is ranked far above scholarly attainment, and a man in a uniform, no matter how depraved, takes precedence of one in plain clothes, whatever his achievements. all the energies of the nation are turned towards the army. commerce, the law, and the civil employments are held in no esteem; all young men of any consideration betake themselves to the profession of arms. nothing astonished them more than to see the estimation in which the civil professions, and especially the bar, are held in great britain.[ ] how different was the position of the jews in other countries, especially in germany! culture streamed upon them from all sides. as their numbers were small, and as they lived, in most cases, in the larger cities of the empire, their contact with the christian world was immediate and continuous. and then the irresistible fascination of german literature, and the easy, almost imperceptible transition from the judeo-german to the teutonic-german! all this and many minor allurements were potent enough to draw even the heretofore callous german jews out of their isolation, and their germanization by the middle of the nineteenth century was an established fact. no wonder, then, that, unlike russian jewry, the german jews experienced an unprecedented revolution; that the difference between the mendelssohnian generation and the next following was almost as great as that between the modern american jew and his brother in the orient. no wonder, also, that when haskalah finally took root in russia, it was purely german for fifty years and more; that nicholas's vigorous attempts, instead of making the slavonic jews better russians, merely helped to make those he "re-educated" greater admirers of germany. the most puissant autocrat of russia unwittingly contributed to the downfall of russian autocracy, and gregori peretz, the dekabrist, son of the financier who became converted under alexander i, was the first of those who were to endeavor, with book and bomb, to break the backbone of tyranny under nicholas ii.[ ] till about the "sixties," then, the russo-jewish maskilim were the recipients, and the german jews were the donors. the german jews wrote, the russian jews read. germany was to the jewish world, during the early haskalah movement, what france, according to guizot, was to europe during the renaissance: both received an impetus from the outside in the form of raw ideas, and modified them to suit their environment. berlin was still, as it had been during the days of mendelssohn and wessely, the sanctuary of learning, the citadel of culture. in the highly cultivated german literature they found treasures of wisdom and science. the poetical gems of goethe, schiller, lessing, and herder captivated their fancy; the philosophy of kant and fichte, schelling and hegel nourished their intellect. kant continued to be the favorite guide of maimon's countrymen, and in their love for him they interpreted the initials of his name to mean "for my soul panteth after thee."[ ] but more efficacious than all other agencies was mendelssohn's german translation of the bible, and the _biur_ commentary published therewith. renaissance and reformation, those mighty, revolutionary forces, have entered every country by side-doors, so to say. the jewish pale was no exception to the rule. what wycliffe's translation did for england, and luther's for germany, mendelssohn's did for russian jewry. like the septuagint, it marked a new epoch in the history of jewish advancement. it is said that mendelssohn's aim was chiefly to show the grandeur of the hebrew poetry found in the bible, but by the irony of fate his translation displayed to the russian jew the beauty and elegance of the german language. to the member of the lovers of the new haskalah, surreptitiously studying the bible of the "dessauer," the hebrew was rather a translation of, or commentary on, the german, and served him as a bridge to cross over into the otherwise hardly accessible field of german literature. the cities on the borders of russia were the first strongholds of haskalah, and among them, as noted before, few struggled so intensely for their intellectual and civil emancipation as those in the provinces of courland and livonia. though their lot was not better than that of their coreligionists, yet, having formerly belonged to germany, and being surrounded by a people whose culture was superior to that of the rest of russia, they were the first to adopt western customs, and were surpassed only by the jews in germany in their desire for reform. their strenuous pleadings for equal rights were, indeed, ineffectual, but this did not lessen their admiration for the beauties of civilization, nor blind them to its benefits. "long ago," remarks lilienthal, "before the peculiar jewish dress was prohibited, a great many could be seen here [in courland] dressed after the german fashion, speaking pure german, and having their whole household arranged after the german custom. the works of mendelssohn were not _trefah pasul_ [unclean and unfit], the children visited the public schools, the academies, and the universities."[ ] the beautiful city of odessa, on the black sea, at that time just out of its infancy and full of the virility and aspiration of youth, was also in the full glare of the german haskalah movement. with its wide and straight streets, its public and private parks, and its magnificent structures, it presents even to-day a marked contrast to other russian cities, and the russians, not without pride, speak of it as "our little paris." in the upbuilding of this southern metropolis jews played an exceedingly important part. for, as regards the promotion of trade and commerce, russia had outgrown the narrow policy of elizabeta petrovna, and did not begrudge her jews the privilege of taking the lead. the "enemies of christ" were permitted, even invited, to accomplish their "mission" also in odessa, and thither they accordingly came, not only from volhynia, podolia, and lithuania, but also from germany, austria, and especially galicia. erter, letteris, krochmal, perl, rapoport, eichenbaum, pinsker, and werbel became better known in russia than in their own land. as the russo-polish jews had carried their talmudic learning back to the countries whence they originally received it, so the galician jews, mostly hailing from the city of brody, where israel zamoscz, mendel levin, joseph hakohen, and others had implanted the germs of haskalah, now reimported it into russia. the jews of odessa were, therefore, more cultured than other russian jews, not excepting those of riga. prosperous in business, they lavished money on their schools, and their educational system surpassed all others in the empire. in they had the best public school for boys, in a similar one for girls, and in there existed fifty-nine public schools, eleven boarding schools, and four day schools. the children attended the richelieu lyceum and the "gymnasia" in larger proportion than children of other denominations, and they were among the first, not only in russia, but in the whole diaspora, to establish a "choir-synagogue" ( ). "in most of the families," says lilienthal, "can be found a degree of refinement which may easily bear comparison with the best french salon." even nicholas i found words of praise for the odessa jews. "yes," said he, "in odessa i have also seen jews, but they were men"; while the zaddik "rabbi yisrolze" declared that he saw "the flames of gehennah round odessa."[ ] warsaw, too, was a beneficiary of germany, having been occupied by the prussians before it fell to the lot of the russians. it was there that practically the first jewish weekly journals were published in yiddish and polish, der beobachter an der weichsel, and dostrzegacz nadvisyansky ( ). there was opened the first so-called rabbinical seminary, with anton eisenbaum as principal, and cylkov, buchner, and kramsztyk as teachers. the public schools were largely attended, owing to the efforts of mattathias rosen, and a year after a reformed synagogue had been organized in odessa another was founded in warsaw, where sermons were preached in german by abraham meïr goldschmidt. but riga on the baltic, odessa on the black sea, and warsaw on the vistula were outdone by some cities in the interior. haskalah lovers multiplied rapidly, and were found in the early "forties" in every city of any size in the pale. "the further we go from pinsk to kletzk and nieszvicz," writes a correspondent in the annalen,[ ] "the more we lose sight of the fanatics, and the greater grows the number of the enlightened." with the establishment of the rabbinical seminaries in zhitomir ( ), this former centre of hasidism became the nursery of haskalah. the movement was especially strong in vilna, the "jerusalem of lithuania," as napoleon is said to have called it. from time immemorial, long before the gaon's day, it had been famous for its talmudic scholars. "its yeshibot," says jacob emden in the middle of the eighteenth century, "were closed neither by day nor by night; many scholars came home from the bet ha-midrash but once a week. they surpassed their brethren in poland and in germany in learning and knowledge, and it was regarded of much consequence to secure a rabbi from vilna." now this "city and mother in israel" became one of the pioneers of haskalah, all the more because, in addition to the public schools and the rabbinical seminary, the jews were admitted to its university on equal terms with the gentiles. "within six years," exclaims mandelstamm, "what a change has come over vilna! youths and maidens, anxious for the new haskalah, are now to be met with everywhere, nor are any ashamed to learn a trade." the schools exerted a salutary influence on the younger generation, and the older people, too, began to view life differently, only that they were still reluctant to discard their old-fashioned garb. there also, in , the leading maskilim started a reform synagogue, which they named taharat ha-kodesh, the essence of holiness.[ ] it should not be forgotten that, if lilienthal met with mighty opposition, he also had powerful supporters. there were many who, though remaining in the background, strongly sympathized with his plan. indeed, the number of educated jews, as proved by an investigation ordered by nicholas i, was far greater than had been commonly supposed. not only in the border towns, but even in the interior of the pale, the students of german literature and secular science were not few, and doctor loewe discovered in hebron an exceptional german scholar in the person of an immigrant from vilna.[ ] the tendency of the time is well illustrated by an anecdote told by slonimsky, to the effect that when he went to ask the approval of rabbi abele of zaslava on his _mosde hokmah_, he found that those who came to be examined for ordination received their award without delay, while he was put off from week to week. ill at ease, slonimsky approached the venerable rabbi and demanded an explanation: "you grant a semikah [rabbinical diploma] so readily, why do you seem so reluctant when a mere haskamah [recommendation] is the matter at issue?" to his surprise the reason given was that the rabbi enjoyed his scientific debates so much that he would not willingly part with the young author. stories were told how the deans of the yeshibot were frequently found to have mastered the very books they confiscated because of the teachings they inculcated. before the reign of nicholas i drew to its end, haskalah centres were as numerous as the cities wherein jews resided. in byelostok the talmudist jehiel michael zabludovsky was lending german books to young slonimsky, the future inventor and publicist; in vlotslavek rabbi joseph hayyim caro was writing and preaching in classic german; in zhagory, hayyim sack helped leon mandelstamm ( - ), the first jewish "candidate," or bachelor, in philology to graduate from the st. petersburg university ( ) and the assistant and successor of lilienthal, in the expurgation and german translation of maimuni's _mishneh torah_. when, in , mandelstamm resigned, he was followed by seiberling, for fifteen years the censor of jewish books in kiev, upon whom a german university conferred the doctor's degree. the poverty-stricken wolf adelsohn, known as the hebrew diogenes, formed a group of seekers after light in dubno, while such wealthy merchants as abraham rathaus, lilienthal's secretary during his campaign in berdichev, issachar bompi, the bibliophile in minsk, leon rosenthal, financier and philanthropist in brest-litovsk, and aaron rabinovich, in kobelyaki (poltava), promoted enlightenment by precept and example. in vilna, joseph sackheim's young son acted as english interpreter when montefiore was entertained by his father, and jacob barit, the incomparable "yankele kovner" ( - ) another of montefiore's hosts, was master of russian, german, and french, and aroused the admiration of the governor-general nazimov by his learning and his ability. yes, the jews began to pay, if they had ever been in debt, for the good that had for a while been bestowed upon them by alexander i. alexander nebakhovich was a well-known theatrical director, his brother michael was the editor of the first russian comic paper yeralash, and osip rabinovich showed marked ability in serious journalism. in died abraham jacob stern, the greatest inventor russia had till then produced; and, as if to corroborate the statement of the talmud, that when one sun sets another rises, the demidoff prize of two thousand five hundred rubles was the same year awarded to his son-in-law, hayyim selig slonimsky (hazas, - ) of byelostok, for the first of his valuable inventions. stern's genius was surpassed, though in a different direction, only by that of elijah vilna. his first invention was a calculating machine, which led to his election as a member of the warsaw society of the friends of science ( ) and to his being received twice by alexander i ( , ), who bestowed upon him an annual pension of three hundred and fifty rubles. this invention was followed by another, "a topographical wagon for the measurement of level surfaces, an invention of great benefit to both civil and military engineers." he also constructed an improved threshing and harvesting machine and a sickle of immense value to agriculture.[ ] but it is scarcely possible, nor would it be profitable, to enumerate either the places or the persons who were, so to speak, inoculated with the haskalah virus. in grodno, kovno, lodz, minsk, mohilev, pinsk, zamoscz, slutsk, vitebsk, zhagory, and other places, they were toiling zealously and diligently, these anchorites in the desert of knowledge. among them were men of all classes and callings, from the cloistered talmudist to the worldly merchant. the path of haskalah was slowly yet surely cleared. the efforts of the conservative maskilim were not devoid of some good results, nor even were those of nicholas, though aimed at christianizing rather than civilizing, entirely wasted. with all their shortcomings, and though producing but few rabbis acceptable to russo-jewish congregations, the seminaries in warsaw, zhitomir, and vilna were powers for enlightenment. in them the future prominent scientists, scholars, and litterateurs were reared, and there the foundations were laid for the activities of goldfaden, gurland, harkavy, kantor, landau, levanda, mandelkern, paperna, pumpyansky, rosenberg, steinberg, and others. their fate was that of mendelssohn's bible translation. the end became a means, the means, an end. but they not only "brought forth" great men, they rendered no less important a service in "bringing out" those already great. had it not been for their professorships, men like abramovitsch, lerner, plungian, slonimsky, suchastover, and zweifel, who were not blessed with worldly goods like fünn, katzenellenbogen, luria, or strashun, would probably have sought in private teaching or petty trading a source of subsistence, and judaism in general and russian jewry in particular would have sustained a considerable loss. they helped to prepare the soil, even to implant the germ, and once the germ implanted, its growth, if slow, is sure. as the history of this period is incomplete without an acquaintance with the lives of some of the maskilim who sowed the seeds that burst into blossom under the favorable conditions of the "sixties," i shall select, as specimens out of a multitude, the two who, more than any others, furthered the cause of haskalah, isaac bär levinsohn and mordecai aaron günzburg.[ ] isaac bär levinsohn of kremenetz, volhynia (ribal, - ), was for many years a name to conjure with, not only among the maskilim of all shades, but also among their opponents. long before he reached man's estate, he had entered upon the career to which he was to dedicate his life. even in those times of numerous child prodigies, levinsohn was distinguished for his intellectual precocity. at the age of three he was ripe for the heder. at nine he was the author of a work on cabbala. at ten he mastered the talmud, and knew the entire hebrew bible by heart. but what singled him out among his classmates was his passionate love of secular knowledge. the son of judah levin, an erudite merchant who knew hebrew and polish to perfection, the grandson of jekuthiel solomon, famed for wealth and refinement, he evinced unusual ability in selecting and retaining what was good and true in everything he read. at fourteen he was familiar with the literatures of several nations, so that during the franco-russian war ( ) he easily secured an appointment as interpreter and secretary in the local police department. but excessive study caused ill-health, and at the suggestion of his physicians he went to brody in galicia, a fortunate incident in the otherwise solitary and gloomy life of the future reformer, for next to germany galicia played an important part in the haskalah movement in russia. there he met joseph perl, the noted educator; doctor isaac erter, the immortal satirist; m.h. letteris, the distinguished poet; s.l. rapoport, one of the first and profoundest of jewish historians, and nahman krochmal, the saintly philosopher. into this circle of "shining ones" levinsohn was introduced, and each and all left an impression, some greater, some less, upon his plastic soul. it was there and then, in the congenial company of friends of about his own age, that levinsohn determined to devote himself to improving the educational system of his people and began to plan his work on _learning in israel_ (_te'udah be-yisraël_), which procured for its author the foremost place in the history of the haskalah movement. the book was finished in , but, owing to levinsohn's pecuniary circumstances, it remained unpublished till . meanwhile it circulated in manuscript among the leading maskilim of russia, austria, and germany, and established its author's reputation wherever it was read. levinsohn was one of those who understand the persuasive power of the still small voice of sweet reasonableness. he knew that a few convincing arguments couched in gentle language will accomplish more for the furtherance of an ideal than the trumpet call of a hundred clamoring militants, and haskalah will make headway only when it can prove itself to be a help, and not a hindrance, to religion. accordingly, he aimed to show that the tanaim, amoraim, saboraim, geonim, and rabbis of later generations were versed in the sciences, were familiar with foreign history, and interested in the affairs of the world. but these he quotes only as exemplars of broad-mindedness, they must no longer be regarded as authorities in secular knowledge. "art and science," he says, "are steadily progressing.... to perfect ourselves in them we must resort to non-jewish sources." this was a bold statement for those times, however mildly expressed. the _te'udah_ became a bone of contention. it was torn and burnt by fanatics, exalted to the skies by friends. the new apostle of enlightenment was forced to leave the city and reside for a while in berdichev, nemirov, ostrog, and tulchin. but wherever he went, his tribulation was sweetened by the enthusiasm of his admirers and the consciousness that his toil was not entirely wasted. in warsaw and in vilna his name was great, and nicholas presented him with a thousand rubles as a mark of appreciation of the book, the fly-leaf of which bears the inscription "to science." in the midst of his more serious studies levinsohn diverted himself occasionally with lighter composition, in which many an antiquated custom served as the butt for his biting satire. in his youth he had a penchant for poetry, and his poem on the flight, or expulsion, of the french from russia was complimented by the government. his muse dealt with ephemeral themes, but his _bons mots_ are current among his countrymen to this day. a novel sort of plagiarism was the fashion of the time. authors attributed their work to others, instead of claiming the product of others as their own. levinsohn's _hefker welt_, in yiddish, and _sayings of the saints_ and _valley of the dead_, in hebrew, belong to this category. but the deep student did not persist long in this species of diversion. wittgenstein, the field-marshal, and professors at the lyceum of his town, supplied him with books, and he, an omnivorous reader, plunged again into his graver work, the result of which was the little book since translated into english, russian, and german, _efes dammim_ (_no blood!_). as the name indicates, it was intended as a defence against the blood, or ritual murder, accusation. it was the right word in the right time and place. in zaslav, volhynia, this monstrous libel had been revived, and popular fury rose to a high pitch. several years later the damascus affair stirred the jewish world to determined action, designed to stamp it out once for all. to wage war against this superstitious belief seems to have fallen to the lot of several of levinsohn's family. in , when it asserted itself in yampoly, volhynia, his great-uncle, by the unanimous consent of the council of the four countries, was sent to rome to intercede with the pope. after six years of pleading, he returned to his native land with a signed statement addressed to the polish king and nobles, which declared the accusation to be utterly false. another uncle of his had performed a similar task in . true scion of a noble family, levinsohn followed in their wake, and his effort was declared to be a "sharp sword forged by a master, to fight for our honor." everything was against levinsohn when he started on his third great work, _the house of judah_ (_bet yehudah_). he found himself poor, sick, and alone, and deprived of his fine library. in those days, and for a long time before and afterwards, hebrew authors were paid in kind. in return for their copyright they received a number of copies of their books, which they were at liberty to dispose of as best they could. now, while levinsohn's copies of his _bet yehudah_ were still at the publisher's, a fire broke out, and most of them were consumed. the _te'udah be-yisraël_ had been prompted by a desire to prove the compatibility of modern civilization with judaism. levinsohn's object in writing his _bet yehudah_ was the reverse. the impetus came from without the jewish camp. the book represents the author's views on certain jewish problems propounded by his christian friend, prince emanuel lieven, just as mendelssohn's _jerusalem_ was written at the instigation of lavater. though there is a similarity in the causes that produced the two books, there is a marked difference in their methods. mendelssohn treats his subject as an impartial non-jewish philosopher might have done. he is frequently too reserved, for fear of offending. levinsohn, in greek-catholic russia, is strictly frank. he is conscious of the difficulties under which he is laboring. to discuss religion in russia is far from agreeable. "it is," he says, "as if a master, pretending to exhibit his skill in racing, were to enter into competition publicly with his slave ... and at the same time wink at him to slacken his speed." of one thing he is certain: judaism is a progressive religion. it had been and might be reformed from time to time, but this can and must be only along the lines of its own genius. to improve the moral and material condition of the jews by weaning them away from the faith of their fathers (as was tried by nicholas) will not do. on the contrary, make them better jews, and they will be better citizens. the _bet yehudah_ may justly be called the connecting link between the _te'udah_, which preceded it, and _zerubbabel_, which followed it. the latter, though written in hebrew, was really intended exclusively for the gentile world, as the former had been mainly for the jewish world. it is a continuation, but not yet a conclusion, of the self-assigned task of levinsohn. the talmud, we have seen, was at that time the object of assaults of zealous christians and disloyal jews, and hostile works against judaism were the order of the day. most of them, however, like the fabulous snake, vented their poison and died. it was different with mccaul's poignant diatribe against the cause of judaism and the honor of the talmud, which had been translated into many languages. montefiore, while in russia, urged levinsohn to defend his people against their traducers, and the bed-ridden sage, almost blind and hardly able to hold a pen, finally consented. what _zerubbabel_ accomplished, can be judged from the fact that in the second hebrew edition of mccaul's _old paths_ ( ) are omitted many of the calumnies and aspersions of the first edition, published in . levinsohn's life was a continuous struggle against an insidious disease, which kept him confined to his bed, and prevented him from accepting any prominent position. but though, as he said, he had "neither brother, wife, child, nor even a sound body," he impressed his personality upon russian jewry as no one else, save the gaon, had before him. his breadth of view and his sympathetic disposition gradually won him the respect and love of all who knew him. the zaddikim abraham of turisk and israel rasiner were his lifelong friends; the talmudist strashun acknowledged his indebtedness to him, and rabbi abele of vilna remarked jestingly that the only fault to be found with the _te'udah_ was that its author was not the gaon elijah. he enjoyed prominence in government circles, and prince wittgenstein was passionately fond of his company. above all he endeared himself to the maskilim. to him they looked as to their teacher and guide; him they consulted in every emergency. lebensohn and gottlober, mandelstamm and gordon, equally sought his criticism and advice. for all he had words of comfort and encouragement. the younger maskilim he warned not to waste their time in idle versification, not to become intoxicated with their little learning; and the older ones he implored to respect the sentiments of their conservative coreligionists. "take it not amiss," he would say to the latter, "that the great bulk of our people hearken not as yet to our new teachings. all beginnings are difficult. the drop cannot become a deluge instantaneously. persevere in your laudable ambition, publish your good and readable books, and the result, though slow, is sure." thus lived and labored the first of the maskilim, an idealist from beginning to end. persecution did not embitter, nor poverty depress him. and when he passed away quietly (february , ) in the obscure little town in which he had been born, and which has become famous through him, it was felt that russia had had her mendelssohn, too. strange to say, he little suspected the tremendous influence he exerted upon the haskalah movement, but was quite sanguine of the success of his fight for "truth and justice among the nations." his work he modestly summed up in the epitaph which was inscribed on his tombstone at his request: out of nothing god called me to life. alas, earthly life has passed, and i must sleep again on the bosom of mother nature. witness this stone. i fought with god's foes, not with a sword, but with the word; i fought for truth and justice among the nations and _zerubbabel_ and _efes dammim_ testify thereto. contemporaneous with isaac bär levinsohn, and hardly less distinguished and influential, was mordecai aaron günzburg (remag, salanti, kovno, december , --vilna, november , ). his family had been prominent in many walks of life since the fourteenth century, and, whether in the land of the saxons or of the slavs, represented the cream of the jewries in which they lived. his father was a maskil of great repute, who had written several treatises, in hebrew, on algebra, geometry, optics, and kindred subjects. he sought to supplement his son mordecai aaron's heder education with a knowledge of secular sciences. but at that time and in that place not many were the books, outside the talmud, accessible to a lad eager for learning, the only ones available being such as the _josippon_, _zemah david_, and _sheërit yisraël_ on jewish history, the _sefer ha-berit_, and a hebrew translation of mendelssohn's _phaedon_ on general philosophy. but the precocious and clear-minded youth did not need much to stimulate his love for history and his inclination to philosophy, and his intellectual development continued in spite of the untoward circumstances in which he happened to be placed. though he was "given" in marriage at a very early age, the proverbial "millstone" weighed but lightly upon the neck of young günzburg. he never discontinued the habit of secluding himself in his study for hours, sometimes for days, at a time, and there writing down his thoughts in painstaking penmanship. these productions, with all their crudity, promised, according to a keen critic, the flowers which would one day "ripen into delicious fruit, not only pleasant to the sight but also delicious to the taste." in fact, even his religious views underwent but slight modification in later and maturer years. ceremonial laws, or minhagim, were to him a social compact among the members of a sect. he who transgresses them is, _eo ipso_, excluded from the sect, as he who disregards the social code, though not immoral, is ostracized from society. this led him to the logical conclusion that every jew must comply with the customs of his people, though his opinion as to their moral value may differ from that of the rest. he believed in freedom of thought, but would not concede freedom of action or even of expression, and would say with bolingbroke, "freedom belongs to a man as a rational creature, he lies under the restraint as a member of society." at these conclusions, günzburg arrived only after a long, severe, though silent, struggle in the seclusion of his closet. his active mind would not at first surrender unconditionally to the coercion of custom. but his conception of ceremonialism served him in good stead on many an occasion in his eventful life. being an expedient to preserve harmony, it may and must vary with change of conditions. accordingly, günzburg always accommodated himself to his environment. in vilna he subscribed to the regulations of the _shulhan 'aruk_, in mitau he quickly and completely became germanized. such adaptability rendered him conspicuous wherever he went, and as early as his name was included among the learned of livonia, esthland, and courland in the biographical dictionary then published by recke and napyersky. his claim to fame, however, consists in the influence he exerted upon russian jews. like levinsohn, he was a constructive force. in his younger days, he had inveighed against the benighted rabbis and the antiquated garb, but moderation came with discretion. he would not sweep away by force the accumulation of hundreds of years. judaism needed reforms of some sort, but these could not be brought about by the russo-german-doctor-rabbis, men who could rede the seven riddles of the world, but whose knowledge of their own people and its spiritual treasures was close to the zero point. "for a rabbi," writes he, "torah must be the integer, science the cipher. had aristotle embraced judaism, notwithstanding his unparalleled erudition, he would still remain a sage, never become a rabbi." but he was as little satisfied with the exclusively talmudistic rabbis. "o ye modern rabbis," he calls out in one of his essays, in which he stigmatizes lilienthal's plans as the "gourd of jonah," "you who stand in the place of seer and prophet of yore, is it not your duty to rise above the people, to intervene between them and the government? and how can you expect to accomplish it, if the language and regulations of our country are entirely unknown to you?" the impress günzburg left upon hebrew literature is of special importance. until his time, despite the examples set by satanov and levin, hebrew was stamped with the hallmark of medievalism. like the spanish entertainment in dryden's _mock astrologer_, at which everything at the table tasted of nothing but red pepper, so the literature of that day was dominated by the style and spirit of the talmud and saturated with its subtleties. astronomy, philosophy, mathematics, and poetry swarmed with puns, alliterations, pedantic allusions; they were overladen with irrelevant notes and interwoven with quaint and strained interpretations. günzburg was the first, with the exception of erter perhaps, to try to remedy the evil. "every writer," he maintained, "should guard himself against the fastidiousness or stiffness which results from pedantry, and take great pains not only with the content of his thoughts, but with the language in which these thoughts are couched." simplicity, perspicuity, and conciseness, these he taught by precept and example, and though he was accused of "germanizing" the hebrew language, he persisted in his labor until he attained the foremost rank among the neo-hebraic litterateurs. in günzburg we find the artistic temperament developed to a degree rare among hebraists of even more recent years. he wrote only in moments of inspiration. at times he passed weeks and months without penning a line, but when once aroused he wrote unceasingly until he finished what he had begun. he was careful in the choice of his words, careful in the choice of his books, and would recommend nothing but the best. "i may not have genius enough," he would say, "to distinguish between better and best, but i do not lack common sense, to differentiate tares from weeds." above all, he possessed a sense of honor, the greatest stimulus, as he maintained, to noble endeavors. "for as marriage is necessary to perpetuate the race, and food to sustain the individual, so is honor to the existence of the superior man." of the fifty years of his active life more than one-half was spent in literary labor. his books obtained a wide circulation, and, though they were rather expensive, became rare soon after their publication. yet, strange to say, this eminent hebraist seldom, if ever, lauds the beauties of the "daughter of eber" (hebrew) like his fellow-maskilim since the days of the meassefim, nor does he even think it incumbent on a jew to be conversant with it. three periods have passed over me--he writes to a friend--since i dedicated myself to hebrew. as a youth i loved it as a jewish lad loves his betrothed, not because he is enamored of her charms, but because his parents have chosen her for him; as i grew older, i continued to love it as a jewish man loves his wife, not because of real affection, but because she is the only one he knows; now that i am old, i still love her, as an elderly jew loves his helpmate: he is aware that she lacks many of the accomplishments of which more educated women can boast, but, for all that, remembering her faithfulness in the past, he loves her also in the present, and loves her till he dies. günzburg was different from most of his contemporaries in another respect. he was a voluminous writer, but only a few of his books and essays bear on what we now call jewish science. zunz, geiger, and jost, seeing that judaism was gradually losing its hold upon their jewish countrymen, resorted to exploring and narrating, in german, the wonderful story of their race, in the hope of renewing its ebbing strength. levinsohn, living amid a different environment, deemed it best to convince his fellow-jews that secular knowledge was necessary, and religion sanctioned their pursuit thereof. günzburg, the man of letters, determined to teach through the vehicle of hebrew the true and the beautiful wherever he found it. he felt called upon to reveal to his brethren the grandeur of the world beyond the dingy ghetto, to tell them the stories not contained in the midrash, _josippon_, or the biographies of rabbis and zaddikim. he translated campe's _discovery of the new world_, compiled a history of ancient civilization, and narrated the epochal event of the nineteenth century, the conflict between russia and france. he taught his fellow-jews to think correctly and logically, to clothe their thoughts in beautiful expressions, and revealed his innermost being to them in his autobiography, _abi'ezer_. as a writer he appears neither erudite nor profound. we cannot apply to his works what we may safely say of elijah vilna's and levinsohn's, that "there is solid metal enough in them to fit out whole circulating libraries, were it beaten into the usual filigree." but he was elegant, cultured, intelligent, honorable; one who joined a feeling heart to a love for art; a moses who struck from the rock of the hebrew tongue refreshing streams for those thirsting for knowledge; a most amiable personality, and an altogether unusual character during the century-long struggle between light and darkness in the jewry of russia. [illustration: perez ben mosheh smolenskin, - ] (notes, pp. - .) chapter v russification, reformation, and assimilation - the year will always be remembered as the _annus mirabilis_ in the history of russia. it marked at once the cessation of the crimean war and the accession of the most liberal and benevolent monarch russia ever had. on january , the heir apparent signified his consent to accept austrian intervention, which resulted in the treaty of paris (march ), granting the powers involved "peace with honor"; and in august, in the cathedral of the assumption at moscow, amidst unprecedented rejoicing, the czarevich placed the imperial crown upon his head. from that time reform followed reform. the condition of the soldiers, who had virtually been slaves under nicholas i, was greatly improved, and a proclamation was issued for the emancipation of the peasants, slaves not for a limited time only, but for life and from generation to generation. it cost the united states five years of fratricidal agony, a billion of dollars, and about half a million of lives, to liberate five or six millions of negroes; russia, in one memorable day (february , ), liberated nearly twenty-two millions of muzhiks (peasants), and gave them full freedom, by a mere stroke of the pen of the "tsar osvobodityel," the liberator czar, alexander ii ( - ). other innovations, of less magnitude but nevertheless of far-reaching importance, were introduced later. capital punishment, which still disgraces human justice in more enlightened states, was unconditionally abolished; the number of offences amenable to corporal punishment was gradually reduced, until, on april , , all the horrors of the gauntlet, the spur, the lash, the cat, and the brand, were consigned to eternal oblivion. the barbarous system of the judiciary was replaced by one that could render justice "speedy, righteous, merciful, and equitable." railway communication, postal and telegraph service, police protection, the improvement of the existing universities, the opening of many new primary schools, and the introduction of compulsory school attendance, told speedily on the intellectual development of the people. in the words of shumakr, russia experienced "a complete inward revival." old customs seemed to disappear, all things were become new. new life, new hope, new aspirations throbbed in the hearts of the subjects of the gigantic empire, and better times were knocking at their doors. _joli tout le monde, le diable est mort!_ this era of great reforms and the resuscitation of all that is good and noble in the slavonic soul brought about also a moral regeneration. the colossus who, according to turgenief, preferred to sleep an endless sleep, with a jug of vodka in his clutched fingers, proved that he, too, was human, with a feeling, human heart beating in his bosom. with the restoration of peace and the abolition of serfhood, there began a removal of prejudice even against jews. hitherto the foremost litterateurs in russia, imitating the writers of other lands, had painted the jew as a monstrosity. pushkin's prisoner, gogol's traitor, lermontoff's spy, and turgenief's zhid (jew) were caricatures and libels, equal in acrimony, and not inferior in art, to shakespeare's shylock and dickens's fagin. but now the best and ablest men of letters signed a protest against such unjust and impossible characters. two thousand years of cruel suffering and affliction--said the historian and humanitarian professor granovsky, of the university of moscow--have at last erased the bloody boundary line separating the jews from humanity. the honor of this reconciliation, which is becoming firmer from day to day, belongs to our age. the civic status of the jews is now established in most european countries, and even in the places that are still backward their condition is improved, if not by law, then by enlightenment. and law and enlightenment radiated their sunshine also upon the jews of rejuvenated russia. the cantonist system was abolished for good; the high schools and universities were opened to jews without discrimination; and the governments lying outside the pale were made accessible to jewish scholars, professional men, manufacturers, wholesale merchants, and skilled laborers (march , ; november , ).[ ] through the efforts of wolf kaplan, one of günzburg's noted pupils, the persecution of jews by germans in riga was stopped, and the eminent publicist katkoff undertook to defend them in the newspaper russkiya vyedomosti. nazimov, the governor-general of vilna, mukhlinsky, who inspected the jewish schools in western russia, artzimovich, of southern russia, and many other prominent personages arose as champions of the jews.[ ] the physician and pedagogue nikolai ivanovich pirogov ( - ), the superintendent of the odessa and kiev school districts, is especially deserving of honorable mention in the history of haskalah. of all the russians of the period who gloried in their liberal convictions, he was the most liberal. in him the last vestige of prejudice and race distinction disappeared, and he conscientiously devoted himself to the study, not only of the present, but also of the past of the jews, to be in a better position to lend them his assistance. to the jews he appealed to unite and spread enlightenment among the masses by peaceful means. to the gentiles, again, he did not hesitate to point out the good qualities of the jews, and in an article on the odessa talmud torah he held up the institution as a model for the public elementary schools. he admired especially the enthusiasm with which jewish youths devoted themselves to the acquisition of knowledge. "where are religion, morality, enlightenment, and the modern spirit," asked he, "when these jews, who, with courage and self-sacrifice, engage in the struggle against prejudices centuries old, meet no one here to sympathize with them and extend a helping hand to them?" his liberality carried him so far that he established a fund for the support of indigent jewish students at the university of kiev, and he advocated strenuously the award of prizes and scholarships to deserving jewish students. such as he were rare in any land, but nowhere so rare as in russia.[ ] pirogov took the initiative in reorganizing the jewish schools. it required little observation to understand that they had proved a failure. instead of attracting the jewish masses to secular education, they only repelled them. the remedy was not far to seek. "the abolition of these schools" said count kotzebu, "would drive the jews back to their fanaticism and isolation. it is necessary to make the jews useful citizens, and i see no other means of achieving this than by their education." pirogov's first move was to order that jewish instead of christian principals be put at their head, and he set an example by appointing rosenzweig to that office. the curriculum was changed, making the lower schools correspond with our grammar schools, and adapting their studies to the needs of those who must discontinue schooling at a comparatively early age. the higher schools were arranged so as to prepare the pupils for the gymnasium. the salaries of the teachers were raised, and books and necessaries were provided for pupils too poor to afford them. the government's attention having been directed by general zelenoy to the jewish agricultural colonies in southern russia, marcus gurovich was appointed to work out a plan to provide them with graded schools. he proposed that secular and sacred subjects alike be taught by jewish teachers, and these were to be cautioned to be careful not to offend the religious sensibilities of the parents. the plan appealed to the colonists, and they looked forward anxiously to its fulfilment. having waited in vain till , they offered to defray the expenses of the schools involved, if the government would advance the money at the first. accordingly, ten schools for boys and two for girls were opened in that year. such disinterested efforts on their behalf would have evoked the gratitude of jews at any time and in every country, how much more in russia, and following close upon the darkest period in their history! the struggle for liberty all over europe in --the spring of nations--had confirmed nicholas in his policy of exclusion. the last five years of his reign had surpassed the preceding in cruelty and tyranny. the "don quixote of politics," finding that his attempts to quarantine russia against european influences had proved futile, that the nationalities constituting the empire remained as distinct as ever, and the desired homogeneity was still far from becoming a reality, finally had lost patience and had determined to execute his conversionist policy at all hazards. he had increased the conscription duties, already unbearable (january , ; august , ), restricted the study of hebrew and hebrew subjects still further in the government schools, and, as if to embitter the lives of the jew by all means available, insisted on the use of the mitnaggedic ritual even in communities exclusively or largely hasidic.[ ] even the blood accusation had been revived, and the statements in the pamphlet entitled _information about the killing of christians by jews for the purpose of obtaining their blood_, which skripitzyn, "the manager of jewish affairs in russia," published in , found many believers in government circles, and caused the saratoff affair which, though suppressed, ruined numerous jewish families, and made the breach between jew and gentile wider than ever.[ ] now all this was changed. christians championed the cause of jews. the government, too, appeared to be sincerely anxious for the welfare of its jewish subjects. it not only promised, but frequently also performed. the jews were allowed to follow their religious predilections unhindered. the schools were reorganized with rabbinical graduates as their teachers and principals. the rabbinical assembly, which, though established by nicholas (may , ), had rarely been called together, was summoned to st. petersburg, and there spent six months in and five in in deliberating on means of improving the intellectual and material standing of the jews. the "learned jew" (uchony yevrey) moses berlin was invited to become an adviser in the department of public worship ( ), to be consulted concerning the jewish religion whenever occasion required. permission was granted to publish jewish periodicals in russian, polish, hebrew, and yiddish ( ), and on april , , the restriction was removed that limited jewish publishing houses and printing-presses to vilna and zhitomir. the russia montefiore saw on his visit in , how different from the russia he had left in ! these auspicious signs renewed the hope of the maskilim and intensified their zeal. they were convinced of the noble intentions of the liberator czar; they were confident that the emperor who emancipated the muzhiks, and expunged many a _kromye yevreyev_ ("except the jews") which his father was wont to add to the few privileges he granted his christian subjects, would ultimately remove the civil disabilities of the jews altogether. in a very popular song, written by eliakum zunser (vilna, -new york, ), then a rising and beloved badhan (bard) writing in yiddish and hebrew, alexander ii was likened to an angel of god who finds the flower of judah soiled by dirt and trampled in the dust. he rescues it, and revives it with living water, and plants it in his garden, where it flourishes once more.[ ] the poets hailed him as the savior and redeemer of israel. all that the jews needed was to make themselves deserving of his kindness, and worthy of the citizenship they saw in store for them. in russian, in hebrew, and in yiddish, in prose and in poetry, the one theme uppermost in the mind of all was enlightenment, or rather russification. from all quarters the reveille was sounded. abraham bär gottlober ( - ) exclaimed: awake, israel, and, judah, arise! shake off the dust, open wide thine eyes! justice sprouteth, righteousness is here, thy sin is forgot, thou hast naught to fear.[ ] more impressively still judah löb gordon ( - ) called: arise, my people, 'tis time for waking! lo, the night is o'er, the day is breaking! arise and see where'er thou turn'st thy face, how changed are both our time and place.[ ] and in yiddish, too, an anonymous poet echoed the strain: arise, my people, awake from thy dreaming, in foolishness be not immersed! clear is the sky, brightly the sun is beaming; the clouds are now utterly dispersed! rapid growth is sometimes the cause of disease, and sudden changes the cause of disappointment. this was true of the swift progress of haskalah during the reign of alexander ii. to comprehend fully the tragedies that took place frequently at that time, the disillusionments that embittered the lives of many of the maskilim, the breaking up of homes and bruising of hearts, one should read _youthful sins_ (_plattot neurim_, ) by moses löb lilienblum. the author lays bare a heart ulcerated and mangled by an obsolete education, a meaningless existence, and a forlorn hope. the hero of this little work, masterly less by reason of its artistic finish than the earnestness that pervades it from beginning to end, is "one of the slain of the babylonian talmud, whose spiritual life is artificially maintained by a literature itself dead." his diary and letters grant a glimpse into his innermost being; his childhood wasted in a methodless acquisition of futile learning; his boyhood blighted by a union with a wife chosen for him by his parents; his manhood mortified by the realization that in a world thrilling with life and activity he led the existence of an egyptian mummy. impatient to save the few years allotted to him on earth, and undeterred by the entreaties and the threats of his wife, he leaves for odessa, the mecca of the maskilim, and begins to prepare himself for admission into the gymnasium. "while there is a drop of blood in my veins," he writes to his forsaken wife, "i shall try to finish my course of studies. though the physicians declare that consumption and death must be the inevitable consequence of such application, i will not desist. i will rather die like a man than live like a dog." and on and on he plods over his latin, his french, his history, geography, and grammar. two more years and the university will be opened to him, and he will read law, and defend the honor of his people. but in the midst of his ceaseless toil the spectre of his simple wife and his former innocent life appears before him and "will not down." is haskalah worth the sacrifices he and his like are daily bringing on its altar? is not the materialism of the emancipated maskilim often greater than the medievalism of the fanatical hasidim? in his native town, gloomy as it was, there was at least the glow of sincerity. haskalah had to be snatched by stealth, but it was sweeter because thus snatched. in odessa, where the fruit of the tree of knowledge could be obtained for the asking, it turned into the apples of sodom. the "lishmah" ideal, the love of culture for its own sake, yielded to the greed which changes everything into a commodity to profit by. yet, since life demands it, what a pity that his early training had incapacitated him from following the beaten path! he concludes his self-indictment thus, "i have taken an inventory of the business of my life, and i am heartbroken, because i find that in striking the balance there remains on the credit side only a cipher!" but the tide of haskalah was not to be stemmed. the "blessed heritage of noble passion," the burning desire for enlightenment and improvement asserted itself at all hazards. the note of despair was lost in the call for action. odessa continued to be in the forefront. there technical institutes for boys and girls were established in addition to the previously existing public schools. a society by the name of trud (labor) was organized (october , ), for the purpose of teaching useful trades. its school has ever since been the crown of the institutions of the sort. it was provided with the most modern improvements, a workshop for mechanics and an iron foundry, and it offered a post-graduate course. a similar trade school (remeslenoye uchilishche) had been in existence since may , , in zhitomir, where, besides geometry, mechanics, chemistry, physics, etc., instruction was given in carpentry, turning, tin, copper, and blacksmith work.[ ] through the efforts of rabbi solomon zalkind minor a sabbath school and a night school for artisans were opened in minsk ( ), and a reference and circulating library for the general public ( ), and similar educational institutions were soon called into existence in many other cities. those were the days of organizing and consolidating among jews and gentiles alike. at the time when abraham lincoln was proclaiming his famous "united we stand, divided we fall," julius slovacki in poland pleaded the cause of the peasantry of his country, and the alliance israélite universelle issued a call to the entire house of israel "to defend the honor of the jewish name wherever it is attacked; to encourage, by all means at our disposal, the pursuit of useful handicrafts; to combat, where necessary, the ignorance and vice engendered by oppression; to work, by the power of persuasion and by all the moral influences at our command, for the emancipation of our brethren who still suffer under the burden of exceptional legislation; to hasten and solidify complete enfranchisement by the intellectual and moral regeneration of our brethren." a powerful movement for the upliftment of the masses was also taking hold of the educated classes among the russians. professor kostomarov started a systematic campaign for the education of the common people. a species of philanthropic intoxication seized upon the more enlightened russian youth. a society of narodniki, or common people, so-called, was organized. young men and women renounced high rank, and students came out of their seclusion and joined the people, dressed in their garb, spoke their dialect, led their life, and, having won their confidence, gradually opened their minds to value the blessings of education, and their hearts to desire them. these examples from within and without resulted in a similar attempt among the russian jews. an organization was perfected (december, ) which exercised a great civilizing influence for almost half a century, the society for the promotion of haskalah among the jews of russia. to the credit of the jewish financiers be it said that they were always the banner bearers of enlightenment. it had been so with german aufklärung, when ben-david, itzig, friedländer, and jacobson, laid the corner-stone of the intellectual rebirth of their people. it was more especially so in russia during the "sixties." odessa was the most enlightened, because it was the wealthiest, of jewish communities, as the benumbing poverty of the pale was largely to blame for the unfriendly attitude towards whatever did not bear the stamp of jewishness on its surface. the society for the promotion of haskalah, too, owes its existence to some of the most prominent russo-jewish merchants. its original officers were joseph yosel günzburg, president; his son horace günzburg, first vice-president; rabbi a. neuman, second vice-president; the brodskys, and, the most active of them all, its secretary, leon rosenthal ( - ). busy as he was with his financial affairs, rosenthal devoted considerable time to the propagation of enlightenment among his coreligionists. many a youthful maskil was indebted to him for material as well as moral support, and it was due to him that osip rabinovich finally succeeded in publishing the razsvyet (dawn, ), the first journal in russian devoted to jewish interests. the society for the promotion of enlightenment was not unlike the alliance israélite universelle, only on a smaller scale. its object was "to spread the knowledge of the russian language among the jews, to publish and assist others in publishing, in russian as well as in hebrew, useful works and journals, to aid in carrying out the purposes of the society, and, further, to assist the young in devoting themselves to the pursuit of science and knowledge." for several years, owing to the indifference of the public, it had a hard struggle to live up to its ideal. but continuously, if slowly, it gained in membership, so that in it had an affiliation of . during the first twenty years of its existence its income amounted to , rubles, its expenditures to , rubles. in it endowed an agricultural college for jewish boys. when, in the same year, medical schools for women were opened, and jewish girls in large numbers took up the study of medicine, the society set aside the sum of , rubles for the support of the needy among them. many a young man was aided in the pursuit of his chosen career by the society. it directed its activities principally to the younger generation, yet it did not neglect the older. with its assistance sabbath schools and evening schools were opened in berdichev, zhitomir, poltava, and other cities; libraries were founded; interesting hebrew books on scientific subjects were published. thus it had a two-fold object: in those who were drifting away it aimed to reawaken knowledge or love of judaism by translating some of the most important jewish books into russian (the haggadah, in , the prayer book, pentateuch, and psalms, in ) as well as text-books and catechisms; and it popularized science among those who would not or could not read on such topics in russian or other living tongues. in both directions it was a power for good among the jews of russia.[ ] these united efforts of the government, the maskilim, and the jewish financiers produced an effect the like of which had perhaps been witnessed only during the hellenistic craze, in the period of the second commonwealth of judea. russian jewry began to "progress" as never before. in almost all the large cities, particularly in odessa, st. petersburg, and moscow, the jews were fast becoming russified. heretofore cooped up, choking each other in the pale as in a black hole, they were now wild with an excessive desire for russification. what maimon said of a few, could now be applied to hundreds and thousands, they were "like starving persons suddenly treated to a delicious meal." they flocked to the institutions of learning in numbers far exceeding their due proportion. they were among the reporters, contributors, and editorial writers of some of the most influential russian journals. they entered the professions, and distinguished themselves in art.[ ] the ambition of the wealthy was no longer to have a son-in-law who was well-versed in the torah, but a graduate from a university, the possessor of a diploma, the wearer of a uniform. the bahur lost his lustre in the presence of the "gymnasiast." this ambition pervaded more or less all classes of russo-jewish society. a decade or two before, especially in the "forties," orthodoxy had been as uncompromising as it was unenlightened. "to carry a handkerchief on the sabbath," as zunser says, "to read a pamphlet of the 'new haskalah,' or commit some other transgression of the sort, was sufficient to stamp one an apikoros (heretic)."[ ] reb israel salanter, when he learned that his son had gone to berlin to study medicine, removed his shoes, and sat down on the ground to observe shivah (seven days of mourning). when mattes der sheinker (saloon-keeper) discovered that his boy motke (later famous as mark antokolsky) had been playing truant from the heder, and had hidden himself in the garret to carve figures, he beat him unmercifully, because he had broken the second commandment. this was greatly altered in the latter part of the "seventies." jacob prelooker has a different story to tell. a remarkable change--he says[ ]--had taken place in the minds of my parents since i had overcome all difficulties and become a student of a royal college. not only were they reconciled to me, but they were distinctly proud of me. old rabbi abraham now delighted in conversation and discussion with his grandson, who seemed to him almost like an inhabitant of another world, of the _terra incognita_ of modern knowledge and science. in the town inhabited chiefly by jews the very appearance of the rabbi's grandson in the uniform of a royal college created an immense sensation, and i became naturally the hero of the day. the older generation lamented that now an end would be put to the very existence of israel and the sacred synagogue, while the younger people envied me and were inspired to follow my example. such scenes occurred not only in pinsk, but, not infrequently, in other towns of the pale as well. the striving for intellectual enlightenment manifested itself in the refining of religious customs. though russian jewry "has never experienced any of the ritualistic struggles that germany has witnessed,"[ ] yet reform and haskalah always went hand in hand. the attacks on tradition by the maskilim of the "forties" and the early "fifties" were mild and guarded compared with the assaults by the generation that followed. with the appearance of the periodicals the combat was intensified. ha-meliz, and, later, ha-shahar in hebrew, and kol mebasser in yiddish were the organs of those who were dissatisfied with the old, and sought to introduce the new. it was in the latter that _dos polische yingel_ (_the polish boy_), by linetzky, first appeared, and it proved so popular that the editor published it in book form long before it was finished in the periodical. in an article on _the ways of the talmud_, by moses löb lilienblum, the prevailing jewish religious observances were vehemently attacked. this was followed by another article from the pen of gordon, _wisdom for those who wander in spirit_, with suggestions for adapting religion to the needs of the times, and a still more powerful one, _the chaotic world_, by smolenskin. the muse ceased to content herself with "flame-songs that burn their pathway" to the heart. she preferred to appeal to the head. she no longer tried in strains as sweet as angels use ... to whisper peace. in cutting criticisms and biting satires she exposed time-honored but time-worn beliefs and practices. gordon was a militant reformer in his younger days, and so were menahem mendel dolitzky and the lesser poets of the period. needless to say, the jewish-russian press was an enemy of ultra-orthodoxy. osip rabinovich, the leading russo-jewish journalist, made his debut with an article in which he denounced the superstitious customs of his people in unmeasured terms.[ ] the motto chosen for the razsvyet ( ) was "let there be light," and the platform it adopted was to elevate the masses by teaching them to lead the life of all nations, participate in their civilization and progress, and preserve, increase, and improve the national heritage of israel.[ ] yet journalists and poets were outdone by scholars and novelists in the battle for reform. lebensohn's didactic drama _emet we-emunah_ (_truth and faith_, vilna, , ), in which he attempts to reconcile true religion with the teachings of science, was mild compared with _dos polische yingel_ or shatzkes' radical interpretations of the stories of the rabbis in his _ha-mafteah_ (_the key_, warsaw, - ), and both were surpassed by raphael kohn's clever little work _hut ha-meshullash_ (_the triple cord_, odessa, ), in which many prohibited things are ingeniously proved permissible according to the talmud. but the most outspoken advocate of reform was abraham mapu ( - ), author of the first realistic novel, or novel of any kind, in hebrew literature, the _'ayit zabua'_ (_the painted vulture_). his rabbi zadok, the miracle-worker, who exploits superstition for his own aggrandizement; rabbi gaddiel, the honest but mistaken henchman of rabbi zadok; ga'al, the parvenu, who seeks to obliterate an unsavory past by fawning upon both; the shadkan, or marriage-broker, who pretends to be the ambassador of heaven, to unite men and women on earth,--in these and similar types drawn from life and depicted vividly, mapu held up to the execration of the world the hypocrites who "do the deeds of zimri and claim the reward of phinehas," whose outward piety is often a cloak for inner impurity, and whose ceremonialism is their skin-deep religion. these characters served for many years as weapons in the hands of the combatants enlisted in the army arrayed for "the struggle between light and darkness." the waves of the renaissance and the reformation sweeping over russian jewry reached even the sacred precincts of the synagogues, the batte midrashim, and the yeshibot. the tree of life college in volozhin became a foster-home of haskalah. the rendezvous of the brightest russo-jewish youths, it was the centre in which grew science and culture, and whence they were disseminated far and wide over the pale. hebrew, german, and russian were surreptitiously studied and taught. buckle and spencer, turgenief and tolstoi were secretly passed from hand to hand, and read and studied with avidity. some students advocated openly the transformation of the yeshibah into a rabbinical seminary on the order of the berlin hochschule. the new learning found an ardent supporter in zebi hirsh dainov, "the slutsker maggid" ( - ), who preached russification and reformation from the pulpits of the synagogues, and whom the society for the promotion of haskalah employed as its mouthpiece among the less advanced.[ ] in the existing reform synagogues, in riga, odessa, warsaw, and vilna, and even in more conservative communities, sermons began to be preached in russian. solomon zalkind minor, who lectured in german, acquired a reputation as a preacher in russian since his election to the rabbinate of minsk ( ). he was called "the jellinek of russia" by the maskilim.[ ] aaron elijah pumpyansky began to preach in russian at ponevezh, in kovno ( ). germanization at last gave way to russification. even in odessa, where german culture predominated during the reign of nicholas i, it was found necessary, for the sake of the younger generation, to elect, as associate to the german doctor schwabacher, doctor solomon mandelkern to preach in russian. similar changes were made in other communities. in the polish provinces the reformation was making even greater strides. there the jews, whether reform, like doctor marcus jastrow, or orthodox like rabbi berish meisels, identified themselves with the poles, and participated in their cultural and political aspirations, which were frequently antagonistic to russification. a society which called itself poles of the mosaic persuasion was organized in warsaw, an organ of extreme liberalism was founded in the weekly israelita, and, with the election of isaac kramsztyk to the rabbinate, german was replaced ( ) by the native polish as the language of the pulpit. some champions of reform did not rest satisfied with mere innovations and improvements. they went so far as to discard judaism altogether and improvise religions of their own. moses rosensohn of vilna was the first, in his works _advice and help_ (_'ezrah we-tushiah_, vilna, ) and _the peace of brothers_ (_shelom ahim_, ibid.), to suggest a way to cosmopolitanism and universalism through judaism.[ ] in , jacob gordin founded in yelisavetgrad a sort of ethical culture society called bibleitsy (also dukhovnoye bibleyskoye bratstvo, spiritual bible brotherhood), which obtained a considerable following among the workmen of the section. it advocated the abolition of ritual observances, even prayer, and the hastening of the era of the brotherhood of man. it preached, in the words of one of its leaders, that "our morality is our religion. god, the acme of highest reason, of surest truth, and of the most sublime justice, does not demand useless external forms and ceremonies."[ ] following the organization of the bibleitsy, and based on almost the same principles, branches of a jewish sect, which called itself new israel (novy izrail), were started almost simultaneously in odessa and kishinev. in the former city, the organization was headed by jacob prelooker, in the latter, by joseph rabinowitz. prelooker, who after graduating from the seminary at zhitomir became a school-master at odessa, sought to bring about a consolidation between his own people and russian dissenters (raskolniki: the molocans, stundists, and dukhobortzi). the theme of his book, _new israel_, is a "reformed synagogue, a mitigation of the cleavage between jew and christian, and recognition of a common brotherhood in religion." rabinowitz went still further, and preached on actual conversion to one of the more liberal forms of christianity.[ ] these sects, which sprang up in church and synagogue during the latter part of the "seventies," were the outcome of political and social as well as religious unrest. alexander ii fulfilled the expectation which the first years of his reign aroused in jewish hearts no more than catherine ii and alexander i. those who had hoped for equal rights were doomed to disappointment. most of the reforms of the liberator czar proved a failure owing to the antipathy and machinations of his untrustworthy officials. russia was split between two diametrically opposed parties, the extreme radicals and the extreme reactionaries, waging an internecine war with each other. the former originated with the young russians that had served in the european campaigns during the napoleonic invasion, and who, in imitation of the secret organizations which had so greatly contributed to the liberation of germany, united to throw off the yoke of autocracy in russia. these secret orders, the southern, the northern, the united slavonian, and the polish, alexander i had endeavored in vain to suppress, and the drastic measures taken by nicholas i against the dekabrists ( ) proved of no avail. nor did the reforms of alexander ii help to heal the breach. on the contrary, seeing that the constitution they expected from the liberator czar was not forthcoming, and the democracy they hoped for was far from being realized, they became desperate, and determined to demand their rights by force. the peasants, too, sobering up from the intoxication, the figurative as well as the literal, caused by the vodka drunk in honor of their newly-acquired volyushka (sweet liberty), discovered that the emancipation ukase of the czar had been craftily intercepted by the bureaucrats, and their dream of owning the land they had hitherto cultivated as serfs would never come true. russia was rife with discontent, and disaffection assumed a national range. the cry was raised for a "new freedom." a certain anton petrov impersonated the czar, and gathered around him ten thousand russians. pamphlets entitled _land and liberty_ (_zemlya i volya_) were spread broadcast among the masses, the mind of the populace was inflamed, and attempts on the life of the czar ensued. the extreme reactionaries, consisting mostly of nobles who had become impoverished by the emancipation of the serfs, grasped the opportunity to point out to the bewildered czar the evil of his liberal policy. slavophilism was rampant. men like turgenief, dostoyevsky, and tolstoi, were condemned as "westernists," or german sympathizers, the enemies of russia. at the recommendation of princess helena petrovna, the czar engaged as the teacher of his children a comparatively unknown professor of history, pobyedonostsev, who later became the soul of russian despotism. this man, meek as a dove and cunning as a serpent, easily ingratiated himself with the czar, and soon there began "a war upon ideas, a crusade of ignorance." "karakazov's pistol-shot," as turgenief says, "drove back into the shade the phantom of liberty, the appearance of which all russia had hailed with acclamations. from that moment to the end of his life, the emperor devoted himself to the undoing of all he had accomplished. if he could have cancelled with one stroke the glorious ukase that had proclaimed the emancipation of the serfs, he would have been only too glad to disgrace himself."[ ] and again, as it had been during the reign of alexander i after his acquaintance with baroness krüdener, so it was with the reign of alexander ii after his acquaintance with pobyedonostsev. the status of the jews constituted the first indication of the ill-boding change. how little the officials had been in sympathy with the reformatory efforts of their czar, even when the atmosphere had been filled with peace and good-will to all including the jews, is shown by the fact that when, in , through the efforts of doctor schwabacher, the jewish community of odessa applied for a charter to build a home for aged hebrews, the charter, though granted by the higher authorities, was withheld for over twenty years! the reaction flaunted its power once again, and sat enthroned in tsarskoye syelo. the few rights the jews had enjoyed were rescinded one by one. not satisfied with this, the slavophils tried, under every pretext, to stop the progress of the jewish people. every now and then the society for the promotion of haskalah would send some of the brighter seminary students to complete their education in breslau or berlin, but at the command of the government this was soon discontinued. it was the intention of the same organization, from its very incipiency, to have the bible translated under its auspices into russian, but it took ten long years before this praiseworthy undertaking could be begun, because of the obstacles the government placed in the way of its execution. fortunately, the indomitable courage of the maskilim could not be subdued. young men went, or were sent, to germany to prepare themselves for the rabbinate as before; the bible and the book of common prayer, too, were translated secretly by wohl, gordon, steinberg, and leon mandelstamm, and published in germany, whence they were smuggled into russia.[ ] more direct and equally inexplicable, save on the ground of animosity to whatever was not slavonic, was the ukase to close the sabbath schools and the evening schools, the only means of educating the laboring men ( ). in , the first of a series of massacres (pogromy) took place in the centre of jewish culture, odessa. in , permission was denied to the ladies of that city to organize a society for the purpose of maintaining trade schools, to teach poor jewish girls handicrafts. the two rabbinical seminaries, of vilna and zhitomir, were closed in , and replaced by institutes for teachers, which were managed in the spirit that had prevailed under nicholas i. and in the absurd blood accusation, against which four popes, innocent iv, paul iii, gregory x, and clement xiv, issued their bulls, declaring it a baseless and wicked superstition, and which not only the polish kings boreslav v, casimir iii, casimir iv, and stephen bathòry, but also alexander i (march , ), branded as a diabolic invention--that dreadful accusation which even the commission of nicholas, despite durnovo's efforts, had denounced as a disgrace and an abomination, was revived by the newspaper grazhdanin. the ghost of medievalism began to stalk abroad once more in erstwhile enlightened russia and under the aegis of the liberator czar. as often before in jewish history, the jews helped not a little to aggravate the untoward conditions. at the instigation of a number of students of the yeshibah tree of life, the doors of that noble institution were closed ( ), to open again after two years of untiring efforts on the part of its self-sacrificing dean, the renowned naphtali zebi judah berlin. but at the worst this was the result of mistaken zeal for the cause of haskalah. what was more detrimental was the disgrace brought upon the jewish name by several converts to christianity. a certain jacob brafmann, having proved a failure in all he undertook, tried at the last the business of christianity, and succeeded therein. he was appointed professor of hebrew in the seminary of minsk, and the holy synod charged him with the duty of devising means to promulgate christianity among the jews. finding the times auspicious, he devoted himself to writing libellous articles about his former coreligionists, and wound up with a _book on the kahal_ (_kniga kahala_, vilna, ), in which he quoted forged "transactions," to the effect that judaism tolerates and even recommends illegality and immorality among its adherents. in a conference of jews and gentiles convoked by governor-general kaufman ( ), barit proved the falsity and forgery of brafmann's documents. but, as usual, the defence was forgotten, the charges remained.[ ] a certain lutostansky poisoned the public mind by caricaturing the jews, and aroused an anti-semitic agitation among his countrymen. the consequence was that even the liberals began to be suspicious, and the prospect of better days was blighted by the hatred which broke out in fiendish fury, in lightnings and thunders which astounded the world under alexander iii. it was but natural that the jews that had become completely russified should enlist in the ranks of the extreme liberals. they found themselves in every way as progressive and patriotic as the christian russians. the language of russia became their language, its manners and aspirations their manners and aspirations. they contributed more than any other nationality to russifying odessa, which, owing to its great foreign population, was known as the un-russian city of russia. proportionately to their numbers, they promoted the trade and industry, the science and literature of their country more than the russians themselves. yet the coveted equality was denied them, and the emancipation granted to the degraded muzhiks was withheld from them, because of a religion they hardly professed. they were like faust when he found himself tempted but not satisfied by the pleasures of life, when food hovered before his eager lips while he begged for nourishment in vain. the liberals, on the other hand, preached and practiced the doctrine of equal rights to all. socialism, or nihilism, also appealed to the jews from its idealistic side, for never did the jews cease to be democrats and dreamers. in the schools and universities, which they were now permitted to attend, they heard the new teachings and imbibed the novel ideas. those, therefore, who disdained conversion allied themselves with the secret organizations. "the torrent which had been dammed up in one channel rushed violently into another." a hebrew monthly, ha-emet (truth, vienna, ), devoted to the cause of communism, was started by aaron liebermann ("arthur freeman"), in which, in the language of the oldest and greatest socialists, the doctrines of karl marx were inculcated among the hebrew-reading public. the more completely russified element took a leading part in the activities of the narodnaya volya (rights of the people), propagating socialism among the russian masses, either by word of mouth or as editors and coworkers in the "underground" publications. not a few went to berlin, where, though opulent, they sought employment in factories, the better to disseminate socialism among the working classes. others, like aaronson, achselrod, deutsch, horowitz, vilenkin, and zukerman, fled to switzerland, whence, under the assumed names of marx, lassalle, jacoby, etc., or united in a league for the emancipation of labor, they directed the socialistic movement in russia.[ ] chernichevsky's _what to do_, gogol's _dead souls_, turgenief's _virgin soil_ and _fathers and sons_, the doctrines of pisarev and bielinsky, and of the other writers who then had their greatest vogue, were eagerly read and frequently copied by jewish young gymnasiasts and passed on to their christian schoolmates. the revolutionary spirit seized on men and women alike. women left their husbands, girls their devoted parents, and threw themselves into the swirl of nihilism with a vigor and self-sacrifice almost incredible. when a squad of police came to disperse the crowd clamoring for "land and liberty" in front of the kazanskaya church in st. petersburg, a jewish maiden of sixteen, taking the place of the leader, inspired her comrades with such enthusiasm that the efforts of the police were ineffectual.[ ] by , russia became honeycombed with secret societies. it fell into spasms of nihilism. one general after another was assassinated. attempts were made to wreck the train on which the czar was travelling ( ) and blow up the palace in which he resided ( ). finally, on march , , after many hairbreadth escapes, the carefully laid plans of the revolutionists succeeded, and the liberator czar was no more. thus was the deep-rooted yearning for enlightenment finally let loose, and the gyves of tradition were at last removed. the maskilim of the "forties" and "fifties" were antiquated in the "sixties" and "seventies." they began to see that the fears of the orthodox and their denunciations of haskalah were not altogether unfounded. a young generation had grown up who had never experienced the strife and struggles of the fathers, and who lacked the submissive temper that had characterized their ancestors. faster and farther they rushed on their headlong way to destruction, while the parents sat and wept. when, in , in vilna, the police arrested forty jewish young men suspected of nihilistic tendencies, governor-general patapov "invited" the representatives of the community to a conference. as soon as they arrived, patapov turned on them in this wise, "in addition to all other good qualities which you jews possess, about the only thing you need is to become nihilists, too!" amazed and panic-stricken, the trembling jews denied the allegation and protested their innocence, to which the governor-general replied, "your children are, at any rate; they have become so through the bad education you have given them." "pardon me, general," was the answer of "yankele kovner" (jacob barit), who was one of the representatives, "this is not quite right. as long as _we_ educated our children there were no nihilists among us; but as soon as you took the education of our children into your hands, behold the result." the foundations of religion were undermined. parental authority was disregarded. youths and maidens were lured by the enchanting voice of the siren of assimilation. the naïve words which turgenief put into the mouth of samuel abraham, the lithuanian jew, might have been, indeed, were, spoken by many others in actual life. "our children," he complains, "have no longer our beliefs; they do not say our prayers, nor have they your beliefs; no more do they say your prayers; they do not pray at all, and they believe in nothing."[ ] the struggle between hasidim and mitnaggedim ended with the conversionist policy of nicholas i, which united them against the maskilim. the struggle between these anti-maskilim and the maskilim had ceased in the golden days of alexander ii. but the clouds were gathering and overspreading the camp of haskalah. the days in which the seekers after light united in one common aim were gone. russification, assimilation, universalism, and nihilism rent asunder the ties that held them together. judah löb gordon, the same poet who, fifteen years before, had rejoiced with exceeding joy "when haskalah broke forth like water," now laments over the effect thereof in the following strain: and our children, the coming generation, from childhood, alas, are strangers to our nation-- ah, how my heart for them doth bleed! farther and faster they are ever drifting, who knows how far they will be shifting? maybe till whence they can ne'er recede! amidst the disaffection, discord, and dejection that mark the latter part of the reign of alexander ii, one maskil stands out pre-eminently in interest and importance,--one whom assimilation did not attract nor reformation mislead, who under all the mighty changes remained loyal to the ideals ascribed to the gaon and advocated by levinsohn,--perez ben mosheh smolenskin (mohilev, february , -meran, austria, february , ).[ ] smolenskin was endowed with the ability and courage that characterize the born leader. he possessed an iron will and unflinching determination, before which obstacles had to yield, and persecution found itself powerless. his talent to grasp and appreciate the true and the beautiful rendered him the oracle of the thousands who, to this day, are proud to call themselves his disciples. to him haskalah was not merely acquaintance with general culture, or even its acquisition. it was the realization of one's individuality as a jew and a man. gordon's advice, to be a jew at home and a man abroad, found little favor in his estimation; for haskalah meant the evolution of a jewish man _sui generis_. he equally abhorred the fanaticism of the benighted orthodox and the laodicean lukewarmness of the advanced maskilim. to fight and, if possible, eradicate both, he undertook the publication of the dawn (ha-shahar, vienna, ), a magazine in which he declared "war against the darkness of the middle ages and war against the indifference of to-day!" not like the former days are these days, he says in his foreword to ha-shahar. thirty or twenty years ago we had to fight the enemy within. sanctimonious fanatics with their power of darkness sought to persecute us, lest their folly or knavery be exposed to the light of day.... now that they, who hitherto have walked in darkness, are beginning to discern the error of their ways, lo and behold, those who have seen the light are closing their eyes against it.... therefore let them know beforehand that, as i have stretched out my hand against those who, under the cloak of holiness, endeavor to exclude enlightenment from the house of jacob, even so will i lift up my hand against the other hypocrites who, under the pretext of tolerance, strive to alienate the children of israel from the heritage of their fathers! that the salvation of the jews lies in their distinctiveness, and that renationalization will prove the only solution of the jewish problem, is the central thought of smolenskin's journalistic efforts. jews are disliked, he maintains, not because of their religious persuasion, nor for their reputed wealth, but because they are weak and defenceless. what they need is strength and courage, but these they will never regain save in a land of their own. twelve years before the tornado of persecution broke out in russia he had predicted it, and even welcomed it as a means of arousing the jews to their duties as a people and their place as a nation, and that his conclusion was correct, the awakening which followed proved unmistakably. for smolenskin jews never ceased to be a nation, and to him the jew who sought refuge in assimilation was nothing less than a traitor. he was thus the forerunner of pinsker, and of herzl a decade later. indeed, in the resurrection of the national hope he was the first to remove the shroud. according to him, "the eternal people" have every characteristic that goes to make a nation. their common country is still palestine, loved by them with all the fervor of patriotism; their common language had never ceased to be hebrew; their common religion consists in the basic principles of judaism, in which they all agree. you wish--thus he addresses himself to the assimilationists--you wish to be like the other people? so do i. be, i pray you, be like them. search and find knowledge, avoid and forsake superstition, above all be not ashamed of the rock whence you were hewn. yes, be like the other peoples, proud of your literature, jealous of your self-respect, hopeful, even as all persecuted peoples are hopeful, of the speedy arrival of the day when we, too, shall reinhabit the land which once was, and still is, our own. but as the soil of palestine, however regarded, is at present inaccessible to jews as a national entity, the language once spoken in palestine is so much the more to be cherished and cultivated by the exiled people. you ask me--he calls out again--what good a dead language can do us? i will tell you. it confers honor on us, girds us with strength, unites us into one. all nations seek to perpetuate their names. all conquered peoples dream of a day when they will regain their independence.... we have neither monuments nor a country at present. only one relic still remains from the ruins of our ancient glory--the hebrew language. those, therefore, who discard the hebrew tongue betray the hebrew nation, and are traitors both to their race and their religion. no less trenchant and outspoken was he against the serried array of self-styled "reformers" of judaism. he could not forgive the german rabbis and russian maskilim for presuming to "dictate" to their coreligionists what to select and what to reject in matters religious. the whole movement he condemned as a mere imitation of protestant christianity. to renovate judaism! what a stigma on a religion that had endured through the ages, and is rich in all that makes for holiness and right living! the old garment needs no new patches. it still fits and will fit "the eternal people" till time is no more. since the reform movement in germany went back to the time of mendelssohn, smolenskin hurled the missiles of his criticism against the berlin sage, forgetting that for more than half a century his example and encouragement had served to awaken a love of knowledge in the hearts of his countrymen. but he saw that in the home of haskalah, the _biur_, and the meassefim, apostasy increased, hebrew was almost forgotten, and judaism was declining, and he blamed the pellucid water at the source of the stream for the muddy pool at its mouth. mendelssohn, however, lacked no defenders among his russo-jewish coreligionists, and their sentiments were voiced by abraham bär gottlober in an opposition periodical, the light of day (ha-boker or, lublin, ). "why," exclaimed the editor, "were it not for him and his reforms ... were it not for that grand and noble personality ... neither you nor i should have been what we are!" it was only the sad sincerity of smolenskin that mitigated the errors he had committed in regard to the history of his people and the theology of its religion. but the militant editor of ha-shahan, who wielded his pen like a halberd, to deal out blows to those of whose views he disapproved, became as tender as a father when he set out to write about the people. his love for the masses whom he knew so well was almost boundless. underlying their superstitions, crudities, and absurdities is the "prophetic consciousness," of which they have never been entirely divested. the heder is indeed far from what a school should be, and the yeshibah is hardly to be tolerated in a civilized community; yet what spiritual feasts, what noble endeavors, and what unselfish devotion are witnessed within their dingy walls! jewish observances are sometimes cumbersome and sometimes incompatible with modern life, but what beauty of holiness, what irresistible influences emanate and radiate from most of them! under an uninviting exterior and beneath the accumulated drift of countless generations he discerned the precious jewel of self-sacrifice for an ideal. it was this sympathy and broad-mindedness, expressed in his _ha-toëh_, his _simhat hanef_, _keburat hamor_, _gemul yesharim_, and _ha-yerushah_ that will ever endear him to the hebrew reader. such, in brief, was the life of the man who bore the chief part in framing and moulding the haskalah of the "eighties," which was devoted to the development of hebrew literature and the rejuvenation of the hebrew people. loving the hebrew tongue with a passion surpassing everything else, he censured the german jewish savants for writing their learned works in the vernacular, and was on the alert to discover and bring out new talent and win over the indifferent and estranged. dreaming of the redemption of his people, he paved the way for the zionistic movement, which spread with tremendous rapidity after his death. and his sincerity and ability were repaid in the only coin the poor possess--in love and admiration. pilgrimages were made, sometimes on foot, to behold the editor of ha-shahar and the author of _ha-toëh_. the greatest journalists in st. petersburg united in honoring him when he visited the russian capital in . and when he was snatched away in the midst of his usefulness, a victim of unremitting devotion to his people, not only maskilim, but mitnaggedim and hasidim felt that "a prince and a mighty one had fallen in israel!" (notes, pp. - .) chapter vi the awakening - the reign of alexander iii, like that of nicholas i, was devoid of even that faint glamor of liberalism which, in the days of alexander i and alexander ii, had aroused deceptive hopes of better times. during the thirteen years of alexander iii's autocracy ( - ) not a ray of light was permitted to penetrate into holy russia. on may , , the manifesto prohibiting the slightest infringement of the absolute power of the czar was promulgated, to continue unbroken till the russo-japanese war. the liberal current which had carried away his predecessors when they first mounted the throne was checked, the sluices of slavophilism were opened, the history of russian thinkers became again, as herzen said, "a long list of martyrs and a register of convicts." nicholas ignatiev, a rabid reactionary, a second jeffreys, became chief of the ministry of the interior; katkoff, a repentant liberal and exile, was appointed the czar's chief adviser, the richelieu behind the throne; and pobyedonostsev, whom turgenief called the "russian torquemada," obtained supremacy over melikoff, and was appointed procurator of the holy synod. with such as these at the head of the russian bureaucracy, there may have been some foundations for the rumor that an imperial ukase decreed the pillage and slaughter of the jews, and the muzhiks, obedient to the behests of the "little father," and smarting under the pain of disappointment, vented their venom on their jewish compatriots. before the new czar had been on his throne three months, russia was drenched with jewish blood. there began saturnalia of rape, plunder, and murder, the like of which had been witnessed nowhere in europe. for half a year the pogroms which began in yelisavetgrad (april , ) swept like a tornado over southern russia, visiting more than one hundred and sixty communities with fire and sword, resulting in outrages on women, in the murder of old and young, in the ruin of millions of dollars of property. the black hundreds of the nineteenth century put to shame the haidamacks of the eighteenth and the cossacks of the seventeenth. in the words of the bishop of canterbury to sir moses montefiore, it looked "as if the enemy of mankind was let loose to destroy the souls of so many christians and the bodies of so many jewish people." but it would be a vain attempt, and out of keeping with the object of this work, to describe in detail the "bloody assizes" and the infernal tragedies that ensued upon the accession of alexander iii; the moral degeneracy and the economic ruin that spread over the mighty empire; the shudder that passed over the civilized world, and was expressed in indignation meetings held everywhere, especially in great britain and in the united states (february, ), to protest, "in the name of civilization, against the spirit of medieval persecution thus revived in russia." suffice it to say that even when the mob, tired of carnage, ceased its work of extermination, the bloodthirstiness of those in authority was not assuaged. such a policy was inaugurated against the jews as would, according to pobyedonostsev, "force one-third of them to emigrate, another third to embrace christianity, and the remainder to die of starvation." with this in view, his majesty the emperor, "prompted by a desire to protect the jews against the christians," was graciously pleased to give his assent to the resolutions of the committee of ministers, on the third of may, , i.e. to the notorious "temporary measures," or "may laws," framed by ignatiev, against the will of the council of the empire. these "temporary measures" have remained in force to this day. with them was resuscitated all the inimical legislation of the past, beginning with the time of elizabeta petrovna. what was favorable was suppressed; the unfavorable was most rigorously enforced. jews living outside the pale were driven back into it on the slightest pretext and in the most inhuman manner. to increase the already unendurable congestion, the pale was made smaller than before. in accordance with the first clause of the "may laws," jews were expelled from the villages within the pale itself. in the districts of rostov and taganrog, which till then had belonged to the pale, and had been developed largely through jewish enterprise, were torn away and amalgamated with the don district, in which jews were not permitted to reside. this was followed by expulsions from st. petersburg ( ), moscow, ( ), novgorod, riga, and yalta ( ), and the abrogation of the time-honored privileges of the jews of bokhara ( ). even those who, as skilled artisans or discharged soldiers, had been privileged to reside wherever they chose, were expelled with their wives and the children born in their adopted city. their only salvation lay in conversion. converts were especially favored, and were offered liberal inducements. by becoming a convert to the orthodox russian church, a jew is immediately freed from all the degrading restrictions on his freedom of movement and his choice of a profession. converts, without distinction of sex, are helped financially by an immediate payment of sums from thirteen to thirty rubles, and until recently were granted freedom from taxation for five years. if a candidate for greek christianity is married, his conversion procures him a divorce, and, unless she likewise is converted, his wife may not marry again. by conversion, a jew may escape the consequence of any misdeed against a fellow-jew, for, to quote the russian code, "in actions concerning jews who have embraced christianity jews may not be admitted as witnesses, if any objection is raised against them as such." the penal code provides that jews shall pay twice and treble the amount of the fine to which non-jews are liable under similar circumstances. jews were excluded from the professions to which they had turned in the "sixties" and "seventies," and in which they had been eminently successful; they were not allowed to hold any civil or municipal office; they were forbidden even to be nurses in the hospitals or to give private instruction to children in the homes. and still persecution did not cease. not satisfied with starving the bodies of five millions of jews, russian legislators were determined to crush them intellectually. the slavophils could not brook seeing "non-russians" surpass their own people in the higher walks of life. the jews, finally successful in emancipating themselves from the trammels of rabbinism, had transferred their extraordinary devotion from the talmud to secular studies. they filled the schools and the universities of the empire with zealous and intelligent pupils, who carried off most of the honors. they contributed forty-eight pupils to the gymnasia out of every ten thousand, while the christians contributed only twenty-two. this was regarded an unpardonable sin. "these jews have the audacity to excel us pure russians," pobyedonostsev is reported to have exclaimed, and measures were taken to suppress their dangerous tendency. as early as a law was passed withholding from jewish students the stipends they had hitherto received from a fund set aside for that purpose. in the number of jewish students in the military academy of medicine was limited to five per cent, and later it was reduced to zero. thereafter one professional school after another adopted a percentage provision, and some excluded jews altogether. finally, "seeing that many jewish young men, eager to benefit by a higher classical, technical, or professional education," presented themselves every year for admission to the universities, that they passed their examination and continued their studies at the various schools of the empire, the government deemed it "desirable to put a stop to a state of affairs which is so unsatisfactory." consequently the ministry limited the attendance of jews residing in places within the pale to ten per cent in all schools and universities (december , ; june , ), in places without the pale to five per cent, and in moscow and st. petersburg to three per cent, of the total number of pupils in each school and university. of the four hundred young jews who had successfully passed their matriculation examination at the beginning of the scholastic year - , and had thus acquired the right of entering the university, three hundred and twenty-six were refused admission, and in many schools and universities they were denied even the small per cent the law permitted. when, nevertheless, in spite of the many restrictions, the jew at last obtained the coveted degree, the government rendered it nugatory by depriving him of the right of enjoying the fruit of his labor and self-sacrifice. he could not practice as an army physician or jurist, nor obtain a position as an engineer or a government or municipal clerk. in the army, he was not allowed to hold any office, and, though he might be an expert chemist, he could never fill the post of a dispenser (march , ). he was excluded from the schools for the training of officers, and if he passed the examination on the subjects taught there, his certificate could not contain the usual statement that there "was no objection to admitting him to the military schools."[ ] these restrictive measures were not relaxed when alexander iii was succeeded by his son nicholas ii ( ). if anything, they were more rigorously executed, and the mob was encouraged to multiply its outrages upon the defenceless jews. the closing years of the nineteenth century wiped out the promises of its opening years. blood accusations followed by riots became of frequent occurrence. irkutsk ( ), shpola, and kiev ( ), kantakuzov (kherson), vladimir, and nikolayev ( ) gave the jews a foretaste of what they had to expect when the black hundreds, encouraged by the government and incited by kruzhevan and pronin, would be let loose to enact the scenes that took place in kishinev and homel before the russo-japanese war, and in hundreds of towns after it. the difficulties in the way of securing an education were increased. russia did not believe in an "irreducible minimum" where the rights of her jews were concerned. under nicholas ii the number of jewish women admitted to medical schools was put at three per cent of the total number of students; the newly-established school for engineers in moscow was closed to jewish young men altogether; and the students of both sexes in the schools were constantly harassed by the police because of the harsh laws concerning the rights of residence. some splendidly equipped institutions of learning were allowed to remain almost empty rather than admit jewish students.[ ] this was the worst punishment of all, the most relentless vengeance wreaked on a helpless victim. "of all the laws which swept down upon them from st. petersburg and moscow," says leroy-beaulieu with characteristic insight into the soul of israel, "those which they [the jews] find hardest to bear are the regulations that block their entrance to the russian universities." the bloodless weighed heavier than the bloody pogroms. consumed with a desire for education, wealthy russian jews made an attempt to establish higher schools of their own, without even drawing upon the surplus money of the kosher-meat fund, which had originally been created for such purposes. baron de hirsch, too, offered two million dollars for the higher and technical education of the jews. but every attempt proved fruitless. baron de hirsch's munificence was flatly refused. in the school which mr. weinstein opened at vinitza, podolia, no more than eight jews were allowed to attend among eighty christians, and in the one at gorlovka, founded by another jew (polyakov), only five per cent were admitted.[ ] writers are wont to speak of this as a reactionary period. the description applies to the russians; among the jews it was a period of reawakening.[ ] they were disillusioned. they saw that russification without emancipation, as their unsophisticated fathers had told lilienthal, meant extermination. the first and worst pogroms were perpetrated in those places where the jews were like their russian neighbors in every respect, except in the eyes of the law, and with the approval of some who were devotees of the narodnaya volya. the jewish consciousness reasserted itself. if pobyedonostsev accomplished his fiendish design as regards emigration, more than a million jews having left russia within the last twenty years; if he has almost succeeded in causing them to die of starvation; yet his hope of forcing a third of them to conversion was a disappointment and a delusion. the jews showed that the traditional description applied to them, "stiff-necked," was not undeserved. while the roman catholics, lutherans, and armenians have undergone conversion in multitudes, they whose suffering by far exceeded that of any other "non-russian" nationality remained, with insignificant exceptions, loyal to the religion of their fathers.[ ] the russian jews--says zunser--sobered down from the orgies of assimilation, and its worshippers abandoned their idol. those who had almost forgotten that they were of the camp of israel began to return to its tents. the jewish physicians, jurists, technologists, and the entire so-called jewish "intelligentia," who heretofore had never cared to speak a word of yiddish to a jew, resumed their native tongue; they began to send their children to the jewish hadarim, and adopted once more jewish ways and customs. several hundred jewish university students, proverbially irreligious, sent to vilna for tefillin [phylacteries]! in many cities fasts were observed and prayers for forgiveness offered, and the prodigal sons of israel repaired to the synagogue, participated in the services, and wept with their more steadfast though equally unfortunate coreligionists. many converts, too, began to feel qualms of conscience, and endeavored to make up for their youthful indiscretions. some of them fled to places of safety, and returned to judaism. the gifted young poet simon yakovlevich nadsohn died of a broken heart. sorkin, the classmate and friend of levanda, committed suicide, while levanda, the great novelist of assimilation, was so affected by the massacres and their consequences, that he became melancholy, and died in an asylum for the insane.[ ] if this was the fate of the assimilated and estranged, one may guess the effect of the reaction on the religious. if the students of the universities sacrificed their careers, their daily bread, for the austere satisfaction of discharging their moral obligation to the best of their knowledge, the students of the law, always loyal to the heritage of their people, became more zealous than ever. lilienblum who, in , believed that life without a university education was not worth living, became a repentant sinner. russian jewry seethed with religious enthusiasm. moses isaac darshan, "the khelmer maggid," preached for six hours at a time to crowded synagogues. asher israelit, less trenchant, but equally effective, exhorted crowds to repentance. zebi hirsh masliansky, a finished orator, went from town to town, and aroused a love for whatever was connected with the history and religion of the jewish people. in kovno those who were preparing themselves for the rabbinate formed something like a new sect, the mussarnikes (moralists), which practiced asceticism and self-abnegation to an extraordinary degree.[ ] [illustration: moses lÖb lilienblum, - ] those, however, were most affected who had been misled by dreams of assimilation. they suffered most, for they lost most. their hopes were blighted, their hearts broken. the leading-strings proved to be a halter. they saw they had little to expect at the hands of those they had believed to have become fully civilized, and they were embittered toward civilization, which had showed them flowers, but had given them no fruit. in a work, _sinat 'olam le-'am 'olam_ (_eternal hatred for the eternal people_, warsaw, ), nahum sokolov proved, like smolenskin before him, that anti-semitism was ineradicable, that the fight against the jews was a fight to the death, that even emancipation helps little to remove the animosity innate in one people against another, and until the "end of days" foretold by the prophets of yore there will never cease the eternal hatred to the eternal people. this became the dominant opinion. it dawned upon many that the only salvation for the jews lay in becoming a nation once more. a yearning for a new fatherland and a new country seized young and old. the times were auspicious. cosmopolitanism was everywhere giving place to nationalism. the little balkan states had broken the yoke of ottoman rule, and become self-governing nations since . in poland, hungary, and ireland, home rule was advocated with fervor that threatened a revolution. italy and germany became united under their own king or emperor. and the russian jews, tired of the constant conflicts with the surrounding peoples, experienced the desire which had prompted their ancestors to be like all the other nations. sokolov's sentiments were reinforced in an anonymous pamphlet written by doctor leo pinsker ( - ), one of the foremost physicians of odessa. his _auto-emancipation_ (berlin, ) is now recognized as the forerunner of herzl's _judenstaat_, which appeared fifteen years later. pinsker accepts as an axiom what sokolov had tried to demonstrate as a proposition. jew-hatred, he claims, like lombroso in his work on anti-semitism, is a "platonic hatred," a hereditary mental disease, which two thousand years' duration has so aggravated as to render it incurable. as the jewish problem is international, it can be solved only by nationalism. he admits some of the charges brought against the jews by anti-semites, but jewish failings result from christian intolerance. in a land of their own they will develop into a muster-nation, a model people. the wretches--cries he--they mock the eagle that once soared sky-high, and saw divinity itself, because he can no longer fly after his wings are broken! give us but our independence, allow us to take care of ourselves, grant us but a little strip of land like that of the servians and rumanians, give us a chance to lead a national existence, and then prate about our lacking manly virtues. what we lack is not genius (genialität) but self-consciousness (selbstgefühl) and appreciation of our value as men (bewusstsein der menschenwürde), of which we were deprived by you! of course, it requires many years and a great expenditure of money to establish a nation on a firm basis. but in pinsker's dictionary the word "impossible" does not exist. "far, very far," says he, "is the haven of rest towards which our souls are turning. we know not even whether it be east or west. but be the road never so long, it cannot seem too long to the wanderers of two thousand years." pinsker's impassioned appeal made a deep impression. it was obvious that colonization would be the shortest road to renationalization. but as to the place in which the colonies should be established, no agreement could be reached. pinsker, like herzl after him, left the problem unsolved. some preferred america or even spain. in southern russia a society, 'am 'olam (the eternal nation), was organized on communistic principles. it sent an advance guard to the united states, where, as the sons of the free, they established several settlements, the best-known of which was new odessa, in oregon.[ ] the majority, however, preferred palestine, the land which, in weal or woe, in pain or pleasure, remains ever dear to the jewish heart; the land to which the ancient exiles by the waters of babylon had vowed that sooner than forget her would their right hands forget their cunning and their tongues cleave to the roofs of their mouths; the possession whereof had been held out as the most alluring promise, and to be deprived of which the prophets had regarded as the severest punishment. zionism, even territorialism, among the russian jews is by no means solely the result of modern anti-semitism. at the same time that mordecai manuel noah was planning his jewish state ararat in western new york ( ), gregori peretz, who, as a child, had been converted, with his father, to the dominant religion, and had been advanced to the rank of an officer in his majesty's army, was dreaming of the renationalization of his alienated brethren. as a leading figure in the councils of the dekabrists, he never ceased his efforts until his comrades accepted the restoration of israel to his pristine place among the nations of the earth as part of their revolutionary programme. but with the suppression of the dekabrists by nicholas i the scheme died "a-borning," and sank into oblivion. later, david gordon revived the yearnings of judah halevi by his articles in the weekly ha-maggid ( ), which he edited in lyck, prussia. smolenskin's writings resound with a love for zion from the very beginning of his literary career. and a rising young hebraist, eliezer ben yehudah, while still a student of medicine, wrote, in , and again in , stirring letters to the editor of ha-shahar, in which he advocated the return to the holy land and the revival of the holy tongue as a _conditio sine qua non_ for the realization of the jewish mission. these views, at first advocated by the hebrew-writing and hebrew-reading maskilim, gradually filtered into the various strata of russo-jewish society, and when the clouds began to gather fast in russia's sky, and the change in the monarch's policy augured the approach of evil times, zionism rapidly made enthusiastic converts even among the most russified of the jewish youth. on november , , for the first time in history, a jewish international assembly was held at kattowitz, near the russian frontier, where representatives from all classes and different countries met and decided to colonize palestine with jewish farmers. since then haskalah in russia has become nationalistic and palestinian. even those who were at first opposed to it gradually grew friendly, and finally became "lovers of zion" (hobebe zion). among the russo-jewish students in vienna, smolenskin, the militant zionist, organized an academic society, kadimah, a name which, meaning eastward and forward, contains the philosophy of zionism in a nutshell. seeing that the alliance israélite universelle encouraged emigration to america, both he and ben yehudah published violent attacks on the french society, and endeavored to thwart its plans as far as possible.[ ] the hebrew weekly ha-meliz, published in st. petersburg, was a staunch supporter of the movement, and a little later ha-zefirah, published in warsaw, which was at first indifferent, if not antagonistic, joined the ranks. in russian, too, the razsvyet and especially the buduchnost spread zionism among their readers, while books, pamphlets, and poems were published in yiddish for circulation among the masses. in addition to the hobebe zion societies formed in many cities, secret societies were organized, such as the famous bene mosheh (sons of moses), which had for its object the moral and intellectual improvement of the future citizens of the jewish republic; the bilu (initials of bet ya'akob leku we-nelekah, "o house of jacob, come and let us go"), formed by israel belkind, who went to palestine with his fellow-students of the university of kharkov, and founded the colony of gederah; and the hillul (hereb la-adonaï u-le-arzenu, "a sword for god and our land"), the members of which pledged themselves to remove any obstacle to the cause of nationalism, even at the cost of their lives. the bone zion (builders of zion), a sort of masonic fraternity, was a very potent secret society, which undertook to constitute itself a provisional jewish government, and assiduously watched the zionistic societies and their leaders in every portion of the globe.[ ] these dreamy youths, however, heartbroken and disgusted with a civilization which had failed to redeem its promises, proved but poor material for laying the foundations for a future nation. it was as with the darien company organized by william paterson when scotland was sorely distressed, and the champ d'asile, by the remnant of napoleon's grand army--a fine idea, but the men and the means were wanting to execute it. the colonies in palestine fared no better than those in america. they were opposed by the government from without and by many of the orthodox jews from within. the former, though claiming to be glad to see the jews emigrate, though declaring to the jewish delegation that pleaded for mercy, _zapadnaya graniza dlya vas otkrita_ ("the western frontier is open to you"), was still, pharaoh-like, reluctant to see so many "undesirable citizens" leave, and prohibited the formation of organizations to accomplish the end. the orthodox were against the movement on religious grounds, because it was "forcing the end" of israel's trouble before the destined day of god arrived.[ ] but with the "nineties" the movement received a strong impetus. alexander zederbaum, the publisher of ha-meliz, succeeded in obtaining a charter (february , ) for the association for the aid of colonization in palestine and syria. such eminent rabbis as mordecai eliasberg, his son jonathan, samuel mohilever, n.z.y. berlin, and mordecai joffe espoused the cause, and set the example for their less prominent colleagues. when the question arose whether jewish agriculturists in palestine are obliged to observe the biblical injunction not to till the ground in the seventh year (shemittah), rabbi isaac elhanan spector of kovno, the leading rabbi and talmudist of his time, decided, in opposition to the jerusalem rabbinate, that the law had ceased to be effective with the destruction of the temple. baron edmond de rothschild of paris also came to the rescue of the colonists, and, more important still, there began an immigration of russo-jewish farmers into palestine, of the class, numbering about ninety-five thousand souls, whom arnold white described as "an active, well set-up, sun-burnt, muscular, agricultural people, marked by all the characteristics of a peasantry of the highest character." with them the colonies began to flourish, the debts were paid off, and a better regime set in. "there was no crime or drunkenness," says bentwich, "in those settlements, and the only usurer was a russian peasant, who charged the jewish borrowers thirty-six per cent for loans. if ever i saw practical religion carried into daily life, it was among those brave and sober hebrew ploughmen."[ ] whatever may be one's views on zionism, there can be no doubt that it has proved a power for good in russia. it introduced new ideals and revived old expectations. it has accomplished, in a measure, the fond hope of the maskilim and awakened within the russian jew a feeling of self-respect and a "consciousness of human worth." different and contending elements it has coalesced into one. it has, above all, brought back to the fold the doubting thomases and careless gallios, even the avowed scoffers, among the jewish youth, and imbued them with courage and pride,[ ] and given them a new shibboleth, _meine kunst der welt, mein leben meinem volke_ ("my art for the world, my life for my people"). "we have seen our youths return to us," writes lilienblum,[ ] "and our hearts were filled with joy. in their restoration we found balm for our wounds, and with rapturous wonderment we asked 'who has borne us these?'" the poets welcomed them with songs. gordon, whose sorrow had silenced his muse, was inspired once more and called: behold our sons, of whom we despaired, return to us, the great and the small; god's grace is not ended, our power's unimpaired, again we shall live, and rise after the fall! frug sang in russian: my own nation, thou art not alone; thy sons behold coming back in crowds as in days of old! and zunser represented rachel as soliloquizing in yiddish: through the windows what am i seeing, like turtle-doves hitherward fleeing? are my joseph and benjamin knocking at my door? o heavens, o mighty wonder! those are my children yonder! yes, my dearest and my truest coming home once more! but zionism is not exclusively either a political or a religious movement. it is both plus something else; it is eminently educational. it has produced novelists and poets, whose writings are full of the virility and beauty of a rejuvenated nation. in jaffa it established a high school (bet ha-sefer), it inspired doctor chazanowicz to establish a national library, and ways and means are being considered to establish a national university in palestine. even among the devotees of the arts it has given rise to a new romantic school, young painters and sculptors who are depicting their judenschmerz. their cunning hands--says mr. leo mielziner--have mastered the technique of their art, be it in moscow or munich, or berlin, or paris, but the heart which inspires their brush or mallet pulsates in palestine. the wandering jew in them pauses, not to portray the impression of the foreign lands and stranger customs, but to depict his own suffering, his own heimweh, his own aspirations. struck, ashkenasi, maimon, hirszenberg, gottlieb, epstein, löbschütz, and schatz are the leaders of this new movement. the last-named, together with ephraim moses lilien of galicia, perhaps the greatest jewish illustrator of our time, has founded a national school, bezalel, to propagate jewish art in palestine, on the same principles on which the great national art schools of other countries are based. the language of instruction is hebrew. meanwhile the society for the promotion of haskalah continued its work of russification and general civilization. after its activity was greatly enhanced, and its members worked with renewed zeal. it opened elementary schools, and expended large sums on stipends for students, and the publication of useful and scholarly books. the branch in odessa secured two hundred and thirty-one new members in one year ( ), making the total in that city alone nine hundred and sixty-eight. it organized a bureau of information on pedagogic subjects, and through the liberality of kalonymos wissotzky instituted prizes for original works in hebrew or russian. individual philanthropists did their utmost to counterbalance the restrictions on education.[ ] trade schools were opened by the committee for the promotion of a knowledge of trade and agriculture among the jews of russia, in minsk, vilna, and vitebsk, besides fifteen manual training schools for boys and twenty for girls, in which the indigent pupils are provided with food, clothes, and books. in thirteen new schools were opened in kherson and yekaterinoslav, to supply the educational demand of the thirty-eight colonies existing in those governments. in the vicinity of minsk a junior republic was organized, and in many cities art and choral societies were formed.[ ] the desire for self-help and the tendency towards organization, to which zionism gave an impetus, was rapidly reflected in every sphere of russo-jewish activity. in a series of works and articles, jacob wolf mendlin, who studied under lassalle, pointed out the importance of the co-operative system. accordingly, a union was organized by the jewish salesmen in warsaw. in a conference of jewish workingmen was held in that city and der allgemeine jüdische arbeiterbund in littauen, polen, und russland (federation of jewish labor unions in lithuania, poland, and russia) was perfected. it published three papers as its organs, die arbeiterstimme, der jüdischer arbeiter, and, in switzerland, letzte nachrichten. soon workmen's associations and artisans' clubs appeared wherever there was a sufficient number of jewish tailors, hatters, bookbinders, etc., for the purpose of increasing and improving the value of their production, and to do away with middlemen and money-lenders. they organized a tailors', dyers', and shoemakers' union in kharkov, and a carpenters' union in minsk, for mutual support in the struggle for existence, and for the construction of sanitary workingmen's houses. the cultural desire of the handicraftsmen, constituting twelve per cent of the russo-jewish population and occasionally fifty-two per cent (odessa), seventy-three per cent (kovno), and even ninety per cent (byelostok), is phenomenal. their object is not only physical improvement. their highest aim is that their members be enabled, by means of efficient night schools and private instruction, to acquire elementary and higher education; in the words of the constitution of the carpenters' union of minsk, "to protect their material interests, raise their moral and intellectual status, and foster efforts of self-help."[ ] the hebrew teachers, a class which, though more respected, underwent as hard a struggle as the workingmen, banded themselves together in in the society for aiding hebrew teachers of the province of vilna. their president was michael wolper, the inspector of the hebrew institute and successor to wohl as censor of hebrew publications. similar attempts were made in bessarabia. rabbi shachor, chairman of the hebrew teachers' association of yekaterinoslav, was instrumental in opening a normal school conducted on chautauqua principles, and so advanced the cause of education considerably.[ ] with the establishment of the rabbinical seminaries and the ukase (may , ) that only such may officiate as rabbis as have completed a prescribed course of study, russian jewry was placed in a sore predicament. it was a very difficult task to find men who united secular knowledge with that thorough mastery of talmudic literature which the jews of russia exact from their rabbis. every community was compelled to appoint two rabbis: an orthodox rabbi (dukhovny rabbin) and a "crown," or government, rabbi (kazyony rabbin). the people recognized only the authority of the former, the government that of the latter. the consequence was that a man with a mere high-school education would apply for, and would often receive, the position of crown-rabbi. his duties consisted in merely keeping a register of marriages, births, and deaths, administering the oath, and the like. the many lawyers and physicians who were debarred from practicing their professions sought to become candidates for the rabbinate. to avoid the unpleasant results which followed, rabbi chernovich of odessa and rabbi i.j. reines of lyda established seminaries in odessa and lyda, to take the place and to continue the teaching of the vilna and the volozhin yeshibot, which had been closed, and to furnish proper rabbis for the various congregations.[ ] the century-long struggle for enlightenment had a telling effect. what the early maskilim had only dreamed of finally came to be. the metamorphosis was so great and so general as to be hardly credible. it was shown by mr. landman, in a paper read before the russo-jewish historical society of odessa, that while among the gentiles of that city the reading public constituted seven per cent of the population, among jews it was no less than thirty-three per cent, and twenty-five per cent of all readers were jewish women.[ ] by there were two yiddish and three hebrew dailies, besides several weekly, monthly, and quarterly periodicals and annuals in yiddish, hebrew, and russian, notwithstanding the fact that a numerous class depended on the general russian literary output for their mental pabulum. as the number of those who read hebrew was still considerable, abraham löb shalkovich (ben avigdor) began, with the assistance of a number of maskilim, the publication of "penny literature" (sifre agorah, warsaw, ). shortly afterwards the ahiasaf society and, a little later, the tushiyah society were founded. the object was to edit and publish "good and useful books in the hebrew language for the spread of knowledge and the teaching of morality and culture among the hebrew youth, also scientific books in all departments of learning." both these associations have done admirable work. they have published many good text-books for teaching hebrew and jewish history, an illustrated periodical for children, olam katan (the little world), and numerous works of interest to the adult. among their publications were, besides the original writings of peretz, taviov, frischman, berdichevsky, chernikhovsky, and others, also translations from bogrov, byron, frug, hugo, nordau, shakespeare, spencer, zangwill, zola, critical biographies of aristotle, copernicus, george eliot, heine, lassalle, nietzsche, rousseau, and a great many equally famous men of letters, which followed each other in promiscuous but uninterrupted succession, all handsomely printed and prettily bound, and sold at a moderate price. one evil, however, remained, in the face of which both the maskilim and the financiers found themselves utterly helpless, the evil of the exclusion of jews from the universities. they could found elementary and high schools for the young, night schools and sabbath schools for the adult working-men, but to establish a university was an absolute impossibility. jewish youths were again compelled, as in the days of tobias cohn and solomon maimon, to seek in foreign lands the education denied them in their own. austria, switzerland, france, and chiefly germany, became once more the meccas whither russo-jewish graduates repaired to finish their studies, and where they formed a sort of latin quarters of their own, and led almost a communal life. their numbers in the german universities grew to such proportions, and their material condition became so wretched, that a society was organized in berlin for the express purpose of helping them. on the other hand, the authorities protested ( ) against expending the funds granted each year for german educational institutions on the education of non-germans, and the akademischer club of berlin passed resolutions demanding a regulation against their admission. in leipsic alone, of the six hundred and sixty-two foreign students who attended the university, three hundred and forty, or over one-half, are russian jews ( ). of the five hundred and eighty-six students enrolled in the commercial university, three hundred and twenty-two are foreigners, among whom russians predominate, and of the eight hundred students who attend the royal conservatory of music, three hundred are foreigners, also mostly russians. russians constitute two hundred and two of the three hundred and forty-seven pupils in the dresden polytechnicum, and sixty out of one hundred and thirty-seven in the dresden veterinary college, while in the freiberg school of mines and in the tharand forestry academy they are in a majority, though they pay twice, and in some places three times, the amount of tuition fee required from the native students. the proportion is still greater in the swiss universities of basle, berne, geneva, lausanne, and zurich, where they sometimes constitute three-fourths of the entire student body in the medical schools (geneva, ). and as for the progress made by the russo-jewish woman, it is wonderful, indeed. it is hardly a quarter of a century since attention began to be given to her mental development, and yet she has seldom lagged behind her sisters in more enlightened lands, and has lately attained to a proud height. vilna, with her "many well-educated wives," attracted the attention of montefiore in the early "forties"; tarnopol speaks in terms of high praise of the jewish women of odessa in the "sixties"; they "charm by their culture, by the ease and precision with which they speak several european languages, by the correctness of their judgment, and the beauty of their conversation."[ ] the memoirs of madame pauline wengeroff throw a sidelight also on the accomplishments of her sisters in the less enlightened districts of russian jewry. but in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth century, their advance was prodigious.[ ] when decent jewish women were prohibited to reside in st. petersburg, some of the jewish female students, at the risk of their reputation, secured the yellow ticket of the prostitute rather than sacrifice their education. but the majority went to other countries. the press has lately been interested in what these seekers for light in foreign lands have accomplished, and reported the successes of fanny berlin, who graduated from the university of berne as doctor of law _summa cum laude_, and of miss kanyevsky of zinkoff (poltava), who was the first woman to take her degree as engineer at the ecole des pontes et chaussees, in paris. it is a curious fact--remarks a correspondent in the pall mall gazette--the majority [of lady doctors practicing in paris] are russian jewesses, just as are the greatest number of young women medical students. at a rough calculation there are three hundred ladies pursuing medical studies at the various schools, and working side by side with the male students. the reason of the invasion of the jewess is, of course, the disabilities that exist in russia for those of the faith of israel ... disabilities that are hardly lessened in germany. moreover, there exists only one university in russia, and that is in st. petersburg. some of the women who graduate in medicine do extremely well afterwards in practice, and are greatly in vogue in the highest society in paris.... the lady doctor who is also a russian subject has likewise found a field for her energies in china, where russian influence is so dominant at the present moment. another writer, in harper's bazaar, speaking of girl-students in paris, has this to say: the russian students are an interesting class in paris. there are some one hundred and thirty of them in all, nearly all hebrews, as the russian universities admit only about four jews to every hundred students. their monthly allowance from their families is often no more than twenty dollars, and out of that they must pay board, room-rent, and all outside expenses. these russian "new women" are extraordinary students. mlle. lepinska, one of the first to graduate in medicine, presented a thesis six hundred and sixty pages long to her astonished professors. with pitying admiration the world looks on the struggle for enlightenment of these brave sons and daughters of judah. their trials and tribulations, their heart-burnings and disappointments, have inspired poets and painters, novelists and playwrights. from chamisso's _abba glusk leczeka_ to korolenko's _skazanye o florye rimlyaninye_, czars have died or have been assassinated, statesmen have risen and fallen, but the russian jew, like the heroes of the poem or novel, did not wait to conquer by submitting. thanks to his indomitable spirit he has made unexampled progress. within the last twenty-five years he has not only emancipated himself, but he is now the most potent factor in the struggle for the emancipation of his countrymen. within these years he has become the recognized torch-bearer of liberty and enlightenment in darkest russia. uvarov justified his inhuman treatment of the jews by the plea that they are "orthodox and believers in the talmud." the latest excuse ( ) of von plehve was that "if we admitted jews to our universities without restriction, they would surpass our russian students and dominate our intellectual life." but neither the former prevails, nor the latter, nor their henchmen who fill the columns of the grazhdanin, kievlyanin, novoye vremya, and the like. the words and writings of such noble and world-famous russians as popoff, demidov, strogonoff, bershadsky, shchedrin, tolstoi, and the cream of the russian "intelligentia," as well as such foreigners as mommsen, gladstone, leroy-beaulieu, and michael davitt, will have their salutary effect. the consciousness of the russian people will awaken. the attitude lately manifested both in st. petersburg and the provinces against the _kontrabandisti_, a libellous play written by an apostate jew, levin, will become more and more general. then the heroic effort and the unexampled progress of the russian jews will be more fully appreciated, and a patriotic nation will gratefully acknowledge its indebtedness to that smallest but most energetic and self-sacrificing portion of its heterogeneous population, the jews, who have done so much, not only for jewish russians, but for christian russians as well, to hasten the time when "many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased." (notes, pp. - .) notes abbreviations used in the notes azj = allgemeine zeitung des judenthums, leipsic, -- fki = fünn, keneset yisraël, warsaw, . fkn = fünn, kiryah ne'emanah, vilna, . fsl = fünn, safah le-ne'emanim, vilna, . gmc = ginzberg and marek, yevreyskiya narodniya pyesni, st. petersburg, . huh = harkavy, ha-yehudim u-sefat ha-selavim, vilna, . je = jewish encyclopedia, vols., new york, - . lbj = levinsohn, bet yehudah, warsaw, . lti = levinsohn, te'udah be-yisraël, warsaw, . wmg = wengeroff, memoiren einer grossrautter, i., berlin, . chapter i the pre-haskalah period ?- (pp. - ) [footnote : mention might, indeed, be made of dr. zunz's pioneer work in his aelteste nachrichten über juden und jüdische gelehrte in polen, slavonien, russland (gesammelte schriften, berlin, , iii. - ), and firkovich, who, in his abne zikkaron (vilna, ), threw much light on the history of the crimean jews. the best contributions to the subject, however, are those of harkavy, russ i russkiye v sred. yevr. lit. (voskhod, ), and malishevsky, yevreyi v yuzhnoy rossii i kieve, v. x-xii. vyekakh, st. petersburg, .] [footnote : lti, p. , n. ; lbj, ii. , n. .] [footnote : see je, s.v. azov, and kertch. see also fishberg, the jews: a study of race and environment, new york, , pp. , - .] [footnote : see judah halevi's kuzari, introduction.] [footnote : minor, rukovodstvo, moscow, , iv; ha-pardes, st. petersburg, , p. .] [footnote : huh, pp. - , - .] [footnote : yevrey minister, voskhod, , v. f.] [footnote : je, i. , , ; viii. .] [footnote : the synagogue in brest-litovsk, which saul wahl built in memory of his wife deborah, was demolished in . wmg, p. .] [footnote : huh, pp. - .] [footnote : je, x. .] [footnote : the story of zacharias de guizolfi deserves to be given at greater length. he was a prince and ruler of the taman peninsula near the black sea ( ). after he had been unsuccessful in a war against the turks, czar ivan iii sent him a message sealed with the gold seal (march , ) as follows: "by the grace of god, the great ruler of the russian land, the grand duke ivan vassilyevich, czar of all the russias, to skariya the hebrew. "you have written to us through gabriel patrov, our guest, that you desire to come to us. it is our wish that you do so. when you are with us, we shall give you evidence of our favorable disposition toward you. should you wish to serve us, we will confer honors upon you. but should you not wish to remain with us, and prefer to return to your country, you shall be free to go." for some reason or other, zacharias never accomplished his contemplated trip, notwithstanding the many inducements repeatedly offered by the czar during a period of eighteen years. perhaps it was because of the disturbances which rendered transportation dangerous; possibly because he preferred to serve the khan rather than the czar, for we find him, in , a resident of circassia. see je, vi. - ; vi. .] [footnote : e.g. barakha, the hero ( ), ilyash karaimovich, the starosta ( ), and motve borokhovich, the colonel ( ). see je, ii. ; iv. ; ix. .] [footnote : see czacki, rosprava o zhydakh, vilna, , p. ; buchholtz, geschichte der juden in riga, riga, , p. ; mann, sheerit yisraël, vilna, , ch. ; virga, shebet yehudah, hanover, , pp. f., and graetz, geschichte der juden, ix. .] [footnote : the subbotniki, dukhobortzi, and the other dissenting, but non-jewish, sects are not referred to here, though they may have received their inspiration from jews or through judaism.] [footnote : voskhod, , i. - ; je, vii. - ; ix. ; bramson, k istorii pervonachalnaho obrazovaniya russkikh yevreyev, st. petersburg, , pp. - .] [footnote : sternberg, die proselyten im xvi. und xvii. jahrhundert, azj, , pp. - (ibid, in l'univers israelite, , pp. f.); mandelkern, dibre yeme russyah, warsaw, , pp. f.; yevreyskaya enziklopedya, s.v. zhidostvuyushchikh; bedrzhidsky in zhurnal ministerstva narodnaho prosvyeshchanya, st. petersburg, , pp. - ; jewish ledger, jan., , p. ; emden, megillat sefer, ed. cohan, p. , warsaw, . on count pototzki, see ger zedek, in yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, st. petersburg, ; gershuni, sketches of jewish life and history, new york, , pp. - (also introduction), and s.l. gordon's ballad in ha-shiloah (ger zedek), i. . on pototzki and zaremba, see gere zedek (anon.), johannisberg, . on modern russian gerim, see die welt, july , , pp. - (palestine), b'nai b'rith news, may , (united states), and leroy-beaulieu, israel among the nations, engl. transl., new york, , p. , n. ; yiddishes tageblatt, july and , , gerim in russland, and vieder vegen gerim; je, i. ; vii. - , .] [footnote : huh, pp. , f.; minor, op. cit., p. ; yevreyskiya nadpisi, st. petersburg, , p. ; sefer ha-yashar, no. ; eben ha-'ezer, no. . on [hebrew: bn'n hrogi] see monatsschrift, xxii. .] [footnote : catalogue de rossi, in. ; ha-maggid, , pp. - ; huh, pp. , .] [footnote : autobiography, p. .] [footnote : lbj, ii. , n.; ha-'ibri, new york, viii., no. ; lehem ha-panim, hil. nedarim, no. .] [footnote : nishmat hayyim, lemberg, , p. a; azulaï, shem ha-gedolim, s.v. horowitz; fkn, p. , and ha-maggid, in. . cf. sheerit yisraël, ch. , and edelman, gedulat shaül, london, . reifman, in ha-maggid, claims that to luria belongs the honor of being the first-known jewish author.] [footnote : see zikronot, ed. cohan, pp. - , , , , , passim; schechter, studies in judaism, philadelphia, , ii. .] [footnote : margoliuth, hibbure likkutim, venice, , introduction.] [footnote : horowitz, frankfurter rabbinen, frankfort-on-the-main, , pp. - ; fkn, pp. - ; emden, op. cit, p. ; and biographies.] [footnote : lti, ii. , n.; hannover, yeven mezulah, warsaw, , p. b.] [footnote : zunz, literaturgeschichte, pp. - , ; buber, anshe shem, cracow, , pp. - ; benjacob, ozar ha-sefarim, p. ; je, xi. ; bikkure ha-'ittim, , p. . jacob of gnesen, i suspect, must have lived in russia.] [footnote : steinschneider, jewish literature, pp. , ; benjacob, op. cit, p. .] [footnote : je, xii. - : "enfin les incrédules les plus déterminés n'out presque rien allégué qui ne soit dans le rampart de la foi du rabbin isaac."] [footnote : nusbaum, historya zhidóv, i. p. ; edelman, op. cit, attributes the coming of saul wahl to this cause.] [footnote : the elim (amsterdam, ), if not, as the karaites maintain, actually the work of zerah troki, was surely the result of the problems submitted by him to delmedigo.] [footnote : je, iv. ; vii. ; xii. ; ha-eshkol, iii. and iv. (r.m. jarre); lti, ii. ; benjacob, op. cit, no. .] [footnote : zunz, ritus, berlin, , p. , and gottesdienstliche vorträge, frankfort-on-the-main, , p. , n.a.; wessely, dibre shalom we-emet, ii. ; benjacob, op. cit., no. .] [footnote : voskhod, , i. ; new era illustrated magazine, v.; fni, p. f.; je, i. ; ii. , ; xii. .] [footnote : je, vii. .] [footnote : je, i. ; iv. ; ha-yekeb, , p. .] [footnote : bersohn, tobiasz cohn, warsaw, .] [footnote : cf. fkn, pp. - (vilna constitution); hannover, op. cit., p. a; ha-modia' la-hadashim, ii. i. ii, and je, s.v. council, kahal, lithuania, etc.] [footnote : see gmc, pp. f., and compare with this lermontoff's cossack cradle-song, which may be taken as a type: sleep, my child, my little darling, sleep, i sing to thee; silently the soft white moonbeams fall on thee and me. i will tell thee fairy stories in my lullaby; sleep, my child, my pretty darling, sleep, i sing to thee. lo, i see the day approaching when the warriors meet; then wilt thou grasp thy rifle and mount thy charger fleet. i will broider in thy saddle colors fair to see, sleep, my child, my little darling, sleep, i sing to thee. then my cossack boy, my hero brave and proud and gay, waves one farewell to his mother and rides far away. oh, what sorrow, pain and anguish then my soul shall fill, as i pray by day and night that god will keep thee still! thou shalt take a saint's pure image to the battlefield, look upon it when thou prayest, may it be thy shield. and when battles fierce are raging, give one thought to me; sleep, my darling, calmly, sweetly, sleep, i sing to thee. --westminster gazette. see güdemann, quellen zur geschichte des unterrichts, berlin, , pp. - ; ha-boker or, i. (on dubno); ha-meliz, , no. (on mohilev); zunz, gottesdienstliche vorträge, pp. g and a; cf. weiss, zikronotaï, warsaw, , pp. - .] [footnote : cf. güdemann, geschichte des erziehungswesens, iii. , n., and see dembitzer, kelilat yofi, introduction, and meassef, st. petersburg, , p. , n.] chapter ii days of transition - (pp. - ) [footnote : je, s.v. bratzlav.] [footnote : in the diary of a polish squire we find the following item: "jan. . as the lessee herszka had not yet paid me the rental of gulden, i went to his house to get my debt. according to the contract, i can arrest him and his wife for as long as i wish, until he settles the bill, and so i ordered him locked up in the pig-sty and left his wife and his sons in the inn. the youngest son, however, i took with me to the palace to be instructed in the rudiments of our religion. the boy is unusually bright and shall be baptized. i already wrote to our priest concerning it, and he promised to come to prepare him. leisza at first stubbornly refused to make the sign of the cross and repeat our prayers, but strelicki administered a sound whipping, and to-day he even ate ham. our venerable priest bonapari ... is inventing all manner of means to break his stiff-neckedness." meassef, st. petersburg, , pp. - .] [footnote : see wolkonsky, pictures of russian history and literature, boston, , p. .] [footnote : orshansky, in yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, ii. .] [footnote : meassef, st. petersburg, , p. ; beck and brann, yevreyskaya istoriya, p. ; je, iv. ; xi. .] [footnote : meassef, p. . on russia at the time of peter the great, see macaulay, history of england, ch. xxiii., where he describes the "savage ignorance and the squalid poverty of the barbarous country." in that country "there was neither literature nor science, neither school nor college. it was not till more than a hundred years after the invention of printing that a single printing-press had been introduced into the russian empire, and that printing-press speedily perished in a fire, which was supposed to have been kindled by priests." when pyoter vyeliki (peter the great), while in london, saw the archiepiscopal library, he declared that "he had never imagined that there were so many printed volumes in the world." see also carlyle, history of frederick the great, iv. .] [footnote : fkn, pp. - ; voskhod, ; on the hasidim and mitnaggedim see below.] [footnote : ma'aseh tobiah, p. ; meassef, pp. - ; geiger (melo hofnayim, berlin, , pp. - ) published delmedigo's corroboration of this statement.] [footnote : rapoport, etan ha-'ezrahi, ostrog, , introduction.] [footnote : cf. zederbaum, keter kehunnah, pp. - , , , etc., and ha-shiloah, xxi. ; schechter, studies in judaism, i., philadelphia, , i. f., and greenstone, the messiah idea in jewish history, pp. f. according to some, judah he-hasid and his followers went to palestine in the expectation, not of the messiah, but of shabbataï zebi, who was believed to have been in hiding for forty years, in imitation of the retirement of moses in midian for a similar period of years. "the ruins of rabbi judah he-hasid's synagogue" and yeshibah in jerusalem still keep the memory of the event fresh in the minds of palestinian jews.] [footnote : among the many wonderful episodes in the life of the master, his biographer mentions also that he could swallow down the largest gobletful in a single gulp (shibhe ha-besht, berdichev, , pp. - ). the best, though not an impartial work on hasidism is zweifel's shalom 'al yisraël, vols., zhitomir, - .] [footnote : ha-boker or, iv. - : [hebrew: h'fkormot mn nshmot m'lh hngon.]] [footnote : cf. emden, op. cit., p. , and shimush, amsterdam, , pp. - , with pardes, ii. - .] [footnote : see schechter, op. cit., pp. - ; silber, elijah gaon, ; levin, 'aliyat eliyahu, vilna, , and fkn, pp. - .] [footnote : levin, op. cit., pp. - .] [footnote : see ha-bikkurim, i. - ; ii. - ; ha-zeman (monthly), , ii. ; plungian, ben porat, vilna, , p. ; keneset yisraël, iii. seq.] [footnote : sirkes (bayit hadash, cracow, , p. ) decides that jews may employ in their synagogue melodies used in the church, since "music is neither jewish nor christian, but is governed by universal laws." see also hayyim ben bezalel's wikkuah mayim hayyim, introduction, and passim.] [footnote : see j.s. raisin, sect, creed and custom in judaism, philadelphia, , p. , and ch. viii.; ha-meliz, x. , - .] [footnote : see ha-zeman (monthly), , ii. .; shklov, euclidus, introduction; keneset yisraël, , and hagra on orah hayyim, shklov, , introduction.] [footnote : see graetz, op. cit, xi. , , . the gaon, who as a rule was very mild, lost patience with the hasidim and wielded the weapons of the kuni (or stocks and exposures) and excommunication without mercy. the hasidim were also accused of being not only religious dissenters but revolutionaries. zeitlin, quoted in yiddishes tageblatt, from the moment, march, .] [footnote : see karpeles, time of mendelssohn, p. ; kayserling, mendelssohn, p. ; ha-meliz, , nos. - .] [footnote : epstein, geburat ha-ari, vilna, , p. ; rabinovich, zunz, warsaw, ; wessely, op. cit., ii.; linda, reshit limmudim, berlin, , and ha-zeman (monthly), ii. .] [footnote : delitzsch, zur geschichte der jüdischen poesie, leipsic, , p. ; bernfeld, dor tahapukot, warsaw, , pp. f. dubno also edited luzzatto's la-yesharim tehillah, which, according to slouschz, marks the beginning of the renaissance in hebrew belles-lettres.] [footnote : published in berlin in . it was translated into english by murray (solomon maimon, boston, ) and into hebrew by taviov (warsaw, ).] [footnote : bernfeld, op. cit., ii. f. je, s.v. maimon; and autobiography (engl. transl.), p. . for maimon's system of philosophy and also for a complete bibliography of his writings, see kunz, die philosophic salomon maimons, heidelberg, , pp. xxv, .] [footnote : wolff, maimoniana, berlin, , p. .] [footnote : how touching and suggestive is the word [hebrew: shbi]] in an acrostic at the end of his introduction to his gibe'at ha-moreh, a commentary on the moreh nebukim: 'hobi ykr kor' 'bi vshm shmi hd' shbi bmlt bhtboknn] [footnote : see murray's introduction to the autobiography; auerbach, dichter und kaufmann; zangwill, nathan the wise and solomon the fool.] [footnote : fki, p. .] [footnote : maggid, toledot mishpehot ginzberg, pp. - ; emden, sheëlat ya'abez, altona, , p. a.] [footnote : fkn, pp. - , ; fki, p. .] [footnote : fki, p. ; delitzsch, op. cit, p. .] [footnote : l'univers israélite, liii. - : "c'est, vous le voyez, un juif polonais qui contribua puissamment à l'émancipation des juifs de france. et je me demande si le judaisme du monde entier ne doit pas rendre hommage à notre coreligionnaire polonais autant peut-être qu' à menasse ben israël." fki, p. ; ha-meliz, ii. no. ; shulammit, iii. ; graetz, op. cit. (engl. transl.), v. .] [footnote : see berliner, festschrift, , pp. - .] [footnote : see ha-meliz, viii. nos. , , ; fsl, p. ; monatsschrift, xxiv, - .] [footnote : delitzsch, op. cit., pp. - ; ha-zeman (monthly), ii. f.] [footnote : see meassef, , p. , and levin's ed. of moreh nebukim, zolkiev, , introduction.] [footnote : ha-meassef, , pp. - , - .] [footnote : see sefer ha-berit, introduction, and weissberg, aufklärungsliteratur, vienna, , p. .] [footnote : fki, p. .] [footnote : see emden, torat ha-kenaot, pp. - , and hitabkut (pinczov's letters); voskhod, , nos. viii-ix; fsl, pp. - ; friedrichsfeld, zeker zaddik, p. .] [footnote : maimon, autobiography, pp. - ; fsl, p. .] [footnote : see lti, ii. , n. , and yellin and abrahams, maimonides, p. , and reference on p. , n. ; ha-zeman (monthly), i. - ; margolioth, bet middot, p. . heine's admiration for these idealists or those who succeeded them is well worth quoting. in his essay on poland, he says: "in spite of the barbaric fur cap which covers his head and the even more barbaric ideas which fill it, i value the polish jew much more than many a german jew with his bolivar on his head and his jean paul inside of it.... the polish jew in his unclean furred coat, with his populous beard and his smell of garlic and his jewish jargon, is nevertheless dearer to me than many a westerner in all the glory of his stocks and bonds."] [footnote : op. cit. letter ii.] [footnote : likkute kadmoniot, vilna, , introduction.] chapter iii the dawn of haskalah - (pp. - ) [footnote : see orshansky, in yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, ii. ; drabkin, in monatsschrift, xix-xx.] [footnote : fkn, pp. , .] [footnote : je, iv. ; plungian, op. cit, p. .] [footnote : fkn, p. .] [footnote : je, iv. .] [footnote : fkn, p. ; jellinek, kuntres ha-rambam, pp. f.] [footnote : occident, v. .] [footnote : jost, culturgeschichte, berlin, , p. .] [footnote : steinschneider, 'ir vilna, , p. .] [footnote : voskhod, , ii. - ; , p. .] [footnote : fkn, pp. - .] [footnote : see rabinovitz, ma'amar 'al ha-defosat ha-talmud, munich, , p. . cf. zweifel, op. cit., iv. .] [footnote : fkn, pp. - .] [footnote : toledot adam, pp. b, b, b, b, a.] [footnote : see plungian, op cit., pp. - , ; voskhod, , ix. ; ha-zeman (monthly), , iii. - ; see also die zukunft, new york, july, , pp. f.] [footnote : voskhod, dec., , pp. f.; ha-boker or, jan., .] [footnote : voskhod, , iii. f; rodkinson, toledot 'ammude habad.] [footnote : cohan, rabbi yisraël ba'al shem tob, , p. .] [footnote : 'ammude bet yehudah, xxvii., and see ha-zeman (monthly), ii. - .] [footnote : buchholtz, op. cit., beilage , pp. - .] [footnote : see weissberg, op. cit., p. ; talmud leshon russiah, vilna, ; moda' li-bene binah, ibid., ; cf. baër heteb, introduction.] [footnote : helel ben shahar, warsaw, , introduction, and p. . see peri ha-arez yashan, letter , quoted by dubnow, pardes, ii. - .] [footnote : keneset yisraël, i. ; morgulis, voprosi yevreyskoy zhizni, pp. - .] [footnote : enziklopedichesky slovar, st. petersburg, , xvii. .] [footnote : ha-shahar, x. - ; fkn, p. ; ha-boker or, i. - .] [footnote : fsl, p. .] [footnote : see günzburg, ha-debir, warsaw, , ii. ; israelitische annalen, , p. .] [footnote : ha-zeman (monthly), iii. .] [footnote : minor, op. cit, p. ; lerner, yevreyi v novorossiskom kraye, odessa, , p. ; monatsschrift, xviii. f., f., f.] [footnote : voskhod, , i-iii; ha-zeman (monthly), iii. - .] [footnote : op. cit, pp. - .] [footnote : cf. graetz, xi. ; kayserling, op. cit, p. ; fünn, sofre yisraël, vilna, , pp. - ; wmg, p. .] [footnote : graetz, xi. , , ; annalen, xx. ; kayserling, op. cit., p. ; landshut, toledot anshe shem, p. .] [footnote : [hebrew: yd tshlhu 'l rm''d bsfri]. weiss, zikronotaï, p. , n.; ha-zeman (monthly), i. and iii. - .] [footnote : zweifel, op. cit., pp. - , and ha-hasidut we-ha-musar in ha-meliz, ; toledot mishpehot shneersohn, in ha-asif, v. - , and nefesh hayyim, iii. .] [footnote : mandelkern, dibre yeme russyah, iii. ; american israelite, nos. , , etc. (my travels in russia); gordon, ha-azamot ha-yebashot, odessa, ; azj, , p. ; zunser, biography, new york, , pp. - (engl. transl., pp. - ); shenot ra'inu ra'ah, in ha-meliz, ; sefer ha-shanah, iii. - , and gmc, nos. - . one of these songs runs as follows: on the streets in tears we're wading, in our bairns' blood we might be bathing; what a misfortune, ah, wellaway-- will never dawn the better day? little infants from heder are torn, and forced to wear the soldier's uniform; what a misfortune, etc. our leaders, rabbis, and honored elders, e'en help to impress them for the czar's soldiers; what a misfortune, etc. seven sons has zushe rakover, yet not a one for the army is over; what a misfortune, etc. leah, the widow, has an only son, and for the kahal's sins he's gone; what a misfortune, etc.] [footnote : gmc, no. . on similar enthusiasm among the galician maskilim, see erter, kol kore, in ha-zofeh le-bet yisrael, warsaw, , pp. - .] [footnote : elk, die jüdischen kolonien in russland, frankfort-on-the-main, , pp. - , - , - , - , - ; jastrow, beleuchtungen, etc., hamburg, , pp. - .] [footnote : see zunz, gesammelte schriften, berlin, , pp, - ; jost, freimüthige beleuchtung, berlin, ; and culturgeschichte, pp. - .] [footnote : rabinovitz, op. cit., pp. - .] [footnote : on volozhin, see ha-kerem, , pp. - ; bikkurim, , pp. - ; ozar ha-sifrut, iii.; ha-asif, iii.; ha-meliz, , nos. - ; schechter, op. cit., i. - ; horowitz, derek 'ez ha-hayyim, cracow, . the yeshibah was reopened under the deanship of rabbi raphael shapira of bobruisk, and still exists, though in a rather precarious condition.] [footnote : read the vivid description in wmg, p. .] [footnote : occident, ii. - .] [footnote : uvarov's opinion of the talmud was "razvrashchal i raz-vrashchayet" ("it has been degrading and is degrading"). nicholas granted special privileges to the karaites, and claimed they were the genuine israelites, chiefly because they did not follow the precepts of the talmud.] [footnote : occident, ii. - .] [footnote : see loewe, diaries of sir moses and lady montefiore, london, , i. , , - , passim; günzburg, debir, ii. - ; (dick), ha-oreah, königsberg, .] [footnote : günzburg, op. cit., pp. - , - ; leket amarim (suppl. to ha-meliz), st. petersburg, , pp. - ; azj, ix. nos. - ; x. nos. , , etc.; jastrow, op. cit., p. , lubliner, de la condition politique .... dans le royaume de pologne, brussels, (especially pp. - ).] [footnote : gmc, no. .] chapter iv conflicts and conquests - (pp. - ) [footnote : diakov states that "when the population degenerated in west russia, business and industry declined, and the number of the rich greatly diminished, while the nobles, embittered against the government, did absolutely nothing for their country, the jews formed an exception.... there is no doubt that they are doing their utmost for the regeneration of our land, despite the restrictions heaped upon them without any cause" (elk, op. cit., p. seq.). surovyetsky likewise maintains that "after the devastation of poland because of the numerous wars, the ruining of so many cities, and the almost total extermination of their inhabitants ... the jews alone effected the regeneration of our trade. they alone upheld our tottering industries .... we may safely affirm that without them, without their characteristic mobility, we should never have recovered our commerce and wealth" (jastrow, op. cit., p. ).] [footnote : see azj, april , , and orient, , p- , in which the correspondent adds: "it is a touching sight to see these laborers (as longshoremen), for the most part aged, perform their fatiguing duties in the streets during the hottest seasons, endeavoring to lighten their heavy burdens by the repetition of biblical and talmudic passages."] [footnote : ozar ha-sifrut, ; annalen, , pp. - , and , no. . bikkure ha-'ittim, , pp. - ; fsl, p. ; paperna, ha-derammah (eichenbaum's letter); ha-boker or, , pp. - ; occident, v. ; pirhe zafon, ii. - ; ha-maggid, , p. ; orient, , p. ; lapin, keset ha-sofer, berlin, , p. , and morgulis, op. cit., p. .] [footnote : jost, culturgeschichte, pp. - ; morgulis, op. cit., p. ; atlas, mah lefanim u-mah leaher, warsaw, , pp. f.] [footnote : sbornik of the minister of education, iii. ; ha-shahar, iv. .] [footnote : see an die verehrer, freunde und schüler, etc., leipsic, , pp. - .] [footnote : ueber die verbesserung der israeliten im königreich polen, berlin, .] [footnote : zunz, gesammelte schriften, pp. - ; jost, op. cit, p. ; jastrow, op. cit, pp. f.; and zederbaum, kohelet, st. petersburg, , p. .] [footnote : occident, v. .] [footnote : maggid yeshu'ah, vilna, september, . it is reproduced, together with many haskalah reminiscences, by gottlober in ha-boker or, iv. (ha-gizrah we-ha-binyah). according to gottlober the hebrew is fünn's translation from the original german. yet hebrew letters (leket amarim, st. petersburg, ) were published in lilienthal's name.] [footnote : see azj, , no. ; mandelstamm, hazon la-moëd, vienna, , pp. , , - ; leket amarim, pp. - ; kohelet, p. ; morgulis, op. cit, p. ; ha-pardes, pp. - ; nathanson, sefer ha-zikronot, warsaw, , p. ; lilienthal, in american israelite, (my travels in russia), and jüdisches volksblatt, (meine reisen in russland), and der zeitgeist, , p. .] [footnote : occident, v. , .] [footnote : wmg, pp. - ; azj, , pp. , ; , pp. - ; , p. ; american israelite, i. .] [footnote : rede, etc., riga, , p. .] [footnote : ha-pardes, i. - . see bramson, op. cit., pp. - ; wmg, p. .] [footnote : ha-kokabim, , pp. - ; ha-kerem, , pp. - ; zweifel, op. cit, pp. - .] [footnote : ha-mizpah, , p. ; kohelet, p. ; sbornik of the minister of education, , pp. , - , and supplement, pp. - ; prelooker, under the czar and queen victoria, london, pp. - ; cf. azj, , p. .] [footnote : elk, op. cit, ch. iii.] [footnote : occident, v. ; nathanson, sefat emet, p. ; mandelstamm, op. cit., pp. - , and morgulis, op. cit, pp. - . on tax collectors, cf. the english ballad quoted by macaulay (history of england, ch. iii.): like plundering soldiers they'd enter the door, and made a distress on the goods of the poor, while frightened poor children distractedly cried; this nothing abated their insolent pride. and the yiddish folk song (gmc, no. ): the excise young fellows, they are tremendously wild: they shave their beards, and ride on horses, wear overshoes, and eat with unwashed hands. their lack of confidence in the permanence of the schools is expressed in the following song (gmc, no. ): may we soon be released from the jewish goless, when we shall be expelled from the gentile scholess (schools). on the struggle to retain the so-called jewish mode of dress, see i.m. d(ick), die yiddishe kleider umwechslung, vilna, .] [footnote : op. cit., pp. - ; cf. letteris, in moreh nebuke ha-zeman, introduction, pp. xv-xvi; bramson, op. cit., pp. - , - , and levanda, ocherki proshlaho, st. petersburg, .] [footnote : cf. buckle, history of civilization, new york, , ii. - .] [footnote : "fifty years ago," says mr. rubinow (bulletin of the bureau of labor, no. , washington, sept., , p. ), "the educational standard of the [russian] jews was higher than that of the russian people at large is at present."] [footnote : mandelkern, op. cit., iii. .] [footnote : buckle, op. cit., pp. - , notes - .] [footnote : the same phenomenon was witnessed to a certain extent also in galicia, where for a while haskalah flourished in great splendor. there, too, the charm and fecundity of german literature, the similarity of yiddish to german, and the privileges the austrian government accorded them, proved too strong a temptation for the jews, and many of those who became enlightened were rapidly assimilated with their gentile countrymen. while, therefore, in galicia the haskalah movement lasted longer than in germany, it had ceased long before it reached its fullest development in russia. austrian civilization accelerated the assimilation of the educated, polish prejudice retarded the progress of the masses. so that though erter, letteris, krochmal, goldenberg, mieses, rapoport, perl, and schorr exerted a great influence in russia, their own country remained unaffected. many of them, like a. peretz, eichenbaum, feder, pinsker, werbel, and rosenfeld emigrated to russia, where they found a wider field for their activities, while others, like professor ludwig gumplowicz, the sociologist, marmorek, the physician, and scheps, the litterateur, became alienated from their former coreligionists.] [footnote : keneset yisraël, iii. ; gottlober, za'ar ba'ale hayyim, zhitomir, : [hebrew: t'rng nfshi 'lid ki] (comp. ps. xlii, and shir ha-kabod, last verse).] [footnote : occident, v. . cf. buchholtz, op. cit., pp. - .] [footnote : occident, v. ; yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, ii. - .] [footnote : , no. .] [footnote : emden, megillat sefer, p. ; günzburg, debir, ii. - ; mandelstamm, op. cit, i. - , ; annalen, , no. .] [footnote : fkn, pp. - ; günzburg, op. cit., i. . moses reines also points out the fact that the prominent rabbis did not withhold their approval of the most typical haskalah works when their authors were not suspected of heresy, as shown by abele's haskamah on levinsohn's te'udah be-yisraël, tiktin's on günzburg's toledot ha-arez, and malbim's on zweifel's sanegor (ozar ha-sifrut, , p. ).] [footnote : ha-boker or, , no. ; fki, pp. - , ; ha-lebanon, , no. ; ha-zefirah, , no. ; jewish chronicle, may , ; keneset yisraël, , pp. - ; ha-meliz, ix. ( ), nos. - , , ; jost, op. cit., p. . da'at kedoshim, st. petersburg, , pp. , , .] [footnote : these biographical sketches, first published respectively in the new era illustrated magazine ( , pp. - ) and the american israelite (april , ), are drawn from the following sources; houzner, i.b. levinsohn (russian), odessa, ; nathanson, sefer ha-zikronot (heb.), warsaw, ; yiddishe bibliotek (yid.), kiev, ; also annalen, , no. ; ha-maggid, , p. ; ha-zefirah, , p. ; maggid, op. cit., pp. - ; günzburg, debir, i. and ii., warsaw, ; kiryat sefer, vilna, (esp. letters - , - ); abi'ezer, vilna, ; lebensohn, kiryat soferim, vilna, ; pardes, i. ; recke und napyersky, allgemeines schriftsteller und gelehrten lexicon der provinzen livland, esthland und kurland, mitau, , pp. - ; and the works referred to in the text.] chapter v russification, reformation, and assimilation - (pp. - ) [footnote : san donato, the jewish question, st. petersburg, , p. .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , nos. , ; gordon, iggerot, warsaw, , ii., and russky vyestnik, , i. .] [footnote : scholz, die juden in russland, berlin, , pp. - ; hessen, galeriya, p. ; voskhod, , v. ; viii; russky yevrey, , i.] [footnote : second complete russian code, xxv, nos. , ; xxvii. nos. , .] [footnote : voskhod, october, ; chwolson, die blutanklage, frankfort-on-the-main, , p. .] [footnote : zunser, biography, p. .] [footnote : kol shire mahallalel, i. - .] [footnote : kol shire yeleg, i. .] [footnote : bramson, op. cit, pp. - ; russky yevrey, , nos. - .] [footnote : rosenthal, toledot hebrat marbe haskalah, i. , , , - ; ii. introduction.] [footnote : how happy the maskilim of that time were to save their fellows from the darkness of ignorance can be seen from the following anecdote told by a maskil in a retrospective mood (ha-shiloah, xvii., - ): "among the first of our young men to enter the gymnasium of my native town of mohilev were ackselrod and the leventhal brothers. the former began to give instruction while he was still in the third grade .... one morning he suddenly disappeared. after several days of anxious search it was discovered that he had left on foot for shklov, a distance of about thirty vyersts, and while there he succeeded in persuading fifteen boys to leave the yeshibah and come with him to mohilev, where, like a puissant warrior returning in triumph, he went with his little army to the different homes to secure board and lodging for them while they were being prepared for admission into the gymnasium."] [footnote : op. cit., p. (engl. transl., p. ).] [footnote : op. cit., p. .] [footnote : max raisin, the reform movement, etc. (reprint from the year book of the central conference of american rabbis, xvi.), introduction.] [footnote : odessky yevrey, (novaya yevreyskaya synagoga v odessa).] [footnote : hessen, op. cit., p. ; voskhod, , p. .] [footnote : rosenthal, op. cit., p. ; gordon, iggerot, nos. - ; ha-meliz, xx, nos. , , .] [footnote : voskhod, , v.; sefer ha-shanah, ii. - .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , no. .] [footnote : ben sion, yevrey reformatory, st. petersburg, . in his manifesto (ha-meliz, april , ) gordon declared: "we have discarded the dusty talmud. we cannot rest satisfied, in questions of religion, with the worm-eaten carcass, with the observances of rabbinical judaism." see ha-shiloah, ii. . see also kahan, meahore ha-pargud (reprint from ha-meliz, ), st. petersburg, .] [footnote : prelooker, op. cit., pp. f.; voskhod, feb. , ; razsvyet, , no. .] [footnote : duprey, great masters of russian literature (engl. transl. dole, new york, ), p. .] [footnote : rosenthal, op. cit, i. , , - ; ha-maggid, , p. . cf. mcclintock and strong, biblical, theological and ecclesiastical cyclopedia, new york, , ii. . the beautiful synagogue which the jews began to erect in moscow at the cost of half a million rubles was declared by pobyednostsev to be "too high and imposing," and they were compelled to destroy the cupola and deform the interior. nevertheless it had to remain a "dead" synagogue, until nicholas ii was pleased to give permission to open it.] [footnote : shereshevsky, o knigie kahala, st. petersburg, ; seiberling, gegen brafmann's buch des kahals, vienna, ; ha-shahar, iv. ; xi. .] [footnote : prelooker, heroes and heroines of russia, london, p. ; ha-shiloah, xvii. - .] [footnote : zederbaum, 'ayin zofiyah, warsaw, , pp. - ; prelooker, under the czar, etc., pp. - .] [footnote : it may not be superfluous to quote here the vivid picture given of the period i am now describing by eliakum zunser in his interesting autobiography; the more, as it is depicted very much in the style of the maskilim of to-day: "it is an accepted law in hygiene that the digestive system must not be overburdened at any one time by too much food, that eating must not be done hastily, and, above all, great care must be taken to choose wholesome and digestible food. these principles are still more important to one who is hungry, who has abstained from food for any length of time. he should select the healthy and light foods, and partake of little at first until the powers of digestion are fully restored. should he neglect to observe these simple rules, he will ruin his digestive system, the food will turn into poison, and he may contract a stubborn disease which no physician will be able to cure. "this is exactly what happened to our russian jews from to . for many long centuries they had endured an intellectual fast. the government had debarred them from the world's culture. they were closely packed together in the narrow and dark ghettos. they knew of their synagogues, yeshibot, and prayer-houses (kloisen) on the one hand, and of their little stores on the other. that there was a great world beyond and without, a world of culture, education, and civilization, of this they had only heard. a great many of them strove to break through the bounds that confined them and step into the world of light and life; but the cossack, lead-laden whip in hand, stood there ready to drive them back. "the thirst for education and civilization became daily more intense, and reached the utmost limits of endurance. five million russian jews raised their hands to the government and pleaded for mercy: 'release us from this ghetto! we, too, are human beings! give us breathing space! give us light! we are faint and starving!' and the cossack promptly answered 'nazad ('back!') here you are and here you remain--not a step further!' "and all at once, lo! there came a light! alexander ii, as soon as he ascended the throne, opened wide the doors of the ghetto, and the russian jews, young and old, men and women, rushed to the new culture. all crowded to the dainty dish, and no time was lost in making up for the intellectual fast. "but here happened what usually occurs after a long fast. the wiser partook of food with discretion. they selected the ingredients which were wholesome, and which their system could digest. all unripe, objectionable food they rejected; their main object was to select the food which the jewish system could assimilate. the governing principle was to unite jewish learning with the new culture. they knew that among the new delicacies there were many that were injurious and unhealthy, though the defects were disguised by alluring spices; but those who had not lost the innate, unerring jewish scent found no difficulty in distinguishing that which was sound from the injurious, and they remain strong and faithful jews to this day. "others, and they formed the greater part of the russian jews, seized things as they came. nay, the more dangerous the delicacy, the more the relish with which it was devoured. and these delicacies were gorged at such a rate as to cause constitutional disorder. they who were a little wiser somehow shook off the objectionable matter, and became 'whole' again; and a great number 'died,' and a still greater number are dangerously 'sick' to this very day. "the sick among our russian brethren, those who partook in dangerous quantities of the unwholesome delicacies, believed that they would solve all difficulties by 'russification,' that is, by abandoning the old jewish culture and adopting russian mannerisms and customs--by ceasing to lead jewish lives and by leading the lives of russians. a great number of jewish literary men of those times believed that if the russian jews would become 'russified,' and would adopt modern civilization, they would receive full and equal rights, on the same terms as the other nationalities. these literary men were dazzled by the little liberty alexander ii granted the russian jews, and they did not understand that he pursued the same object as his father, nicholas i. in the days of alexander ii, many more jews were converted to christianity than in the bitter days of nicholas i; and many who were not converted remained but caricatures of real jews. "the so-called 'jewish aristocracy' in russia, and especially the wealthy jews of north russia, of st. petersburg, moscow, and kharkov, russified at top speed. they removed from their homes and their home-life anything that was in the least degree jewish. they shattered all that for thousands of years had been holy and dear to the jew. like apes they imitated the manners and customs of the christians. the younger children did not even know that they were descended from jews, as was the case in the first 'pogroms,' when the children asked their parents: 'why do they beat us? are we, too, jews (razve vy tozhe yevrey)?'"] [footnote : for a full biography see brainin, perez ben mosheh smolenskin, warsaw, ; keneset yisraël, i. - ; ha-shiloah, i. - , and his works, especially ha-toëh be-darke ha-hayyim, vienna, .] chapter vi the awakening - (pp. - ) [footnote : most of this is based on persecution of the jews in russia, philadelphia, , pp. - , , , - , - ; frederick, the new exodus, london, , pp. - ; errera, les juifs russes, brussels, , pp. , f., - , - . between and , the mining institute and engineering institute for public roads adopted the five per cent limit, the kharkov technical institute a ten per cent limit, and the veterinary institute, of the same city, the only one of the sort in russia, excluded jews altogether. "my zemlyakes" (countrymen), says a reminiscent writer, "soon after they had finished their course in engineering, had taken each a different road. one became a crown-rabbi, one a flour merchant, a third a bookkeeper, but none of them could, on account of his religion, legally pursue his chosen vocation" (yiddishes tageblatt, new york, may , ).] [footnote : urussov, memoirs of a russian governor (engl. transl., new york, ), pp. , - . "out of students admitted to the kharkov university in , only were jews, though at least had 'finished the gymnasium,' not only with the 'highest possible' marks, but with gold medals. at the technological institute of the same city, were jews in a total of , though applying for admission had received the 'highest possible' marks. at the kiev university, of new students, , all of them medallists, were jews. how many applied for admission, the daily and weekly press, from which these figures are taken, did not report."] [footnote : ner ha-ma'arabi, vii, .] [footnote : "he who claims that a spirit of reaction has affected our people as a whole," says moses reines (ozar ha-sifrut, ii. ), "is greatly mistaken. that the children of the poor from whom learning cometh forth still forsake their city and country and acquire knowledge, ... that societies for the spread of haskalah are formed every day, ... that strict and pious jews send their sons and daughters to where they can obtain enlightenment, that rabbis, dayyanim, and maggidim urge their children to become proficient in the requirements of the times ... write for the press ... and deplore the gezerot (restrictions) regarding admission to schools--all this proves convincingly that they do not see right who complain that our entire nation is going backward."] [footnote : see ha-maggid, , no. . while in there were and in , converts, in - there were from to per annum, in , , in , , and in , converts. with the spread of zionism conversions continued to diminish, and, while there were relapses during the renewed pogroms of and , they decreased materially, though the jewish population is constantly on the increase.] [footnote : autobiography, pp. - . see also kahan, meahore ha-pargud, pp. - .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , no. ; luah ahiasaf, , p. ; zablotzky and massel, ha-yizhari, manchester, , introduction; ha-meliz, xxxvii, no. ; the menorah, april, .] [footnote : yalkut ma'arabi, , pp. f.] [footnote : ha-shahar, x. , ; habazelet, , no. .] [footnote : ha-le'om, , nos. - ; belkind, in ha-zefirah, no. , ; lubarsky and lewin-epstein, derek hayyim, new york, .] [footnote : greenstone, the messiah idea in jewish history, ch. viii.] [footnote : the progress of zionism, pp. - ; cf. voskhod, , iv.] [footnote : zamenhof's new universal language was primarily intended to be the international language of his people, "who are speechless, and therefore without hope, scattered over the world, and hence unable to understand one another, obliged to take their culture from strange and hostile sources."] [footnote : ahiasaf, iv.; gordon, op. cit., i. xxi; razsvyet, , i.; magil's kobez (collection), no. , p. .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , no. ; , no. ; weekly voskhod, , no. ; monthly voskhod, , iv. some jewish financiers erected gymnasia in vilna and warsaw, improved the condition of the hadarim, and turned many talmud torahs into technical schools. of the lodz talmud torah a writer says that "no jewish community, even outside of russia, possesses such an institution, not excepting the hirsch schools in galicia."] [footnote : london, unter jüdischen proletariern, , pp. - ; bramson, k istorii, etc., pp. - , - ; ha-meliz, xli., no. ( , no, ); ha-zefirah, xxix., no. ; and the jewish gazette, july , (kunst und nationalismus). the ha-zamir (a choral society), founded in lodz by nissan schapira, counts its members by the thousands.] [footnote : london, op. cit, pp. - ; ha-meliz, , nos. - ; rubinow, op. cit., pp. - , - , - .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , nos. , , , , .] [footnote : atlas, mah lefanim u-mah leaher, pp. f.; ha-meliz, , no. ; , no. .] [footnote : ha-meliz, , no. .] [footnote : réflexions sur l'état des israélites russes, odessa, , pp. - .] [footnote : kayserling, die jüdischen frauen, leipsic, , pp. - ; rubinow, op. cit., p. . the russian jewess has already produced several writers above the average (einhorn, mosessohn, ben yehudah, sarah and eva schapira) in hebrew, has given russian literature at least one novelist of note (rachel khin), has furnished leaders in the movement for the emancipation of women (maria saker), and especially for the liberation of russia (finger, helfman, levinsohn, novinsky, rabinovich). according to mr. rabinow, the russo-jewish "women and girls use every available means" to obtain an education, and at least fifty per cent of them possess a knowledge of russian in addition to their vernacular yiddish.] bibliography an asterisk (*) marks a book or periodical of especial importance. antin, the promised land, boston and new york, . atlas, mah lefanim u-mah leaher, warsaw, . baskerville, the polish jew, new york, . ben sion, yevreyi reformatory, st. petersburg, . bentwich, the progress of zionism, new york, . bernfeld, dor tahapukot, warsaw, . bershadsky, zhurnal ministerstva narodnaho prosvyeshchaniya, st. petersburg, . bersohn, tobiasz cohn, warsaw, . blaustein, memoirs, new york, , pt. i. *brafmann, kniga kahala, vilna, . *brainin, perez ben moses smolenskin, warsaw, . *bramson, k istorii pervonachalnaho obrazovaniya russkikh yevreyev, st. petersburg, . *buchholtz, geschichte der juden in riga, riga, . chwolson, die blutanklage, frankfort-on-the-main, . cohan, rabbi yisraël ba'al shem tob, . cohn, ma'aseh tobiah, venice, . *czacki, rosprava o zhydakh, vilna, . delitzsch, zur geschichte der jüdischen poesie, leipsic, . *[dick], ha-oreah, königsberg, . *d[ick], yiddishe kleider umwechslung, vilna, . *dob bär, shibhe ha-besht, berdichev, . duprey, great masters of russian literature (engl. transl.), new york, . edelman, gedulat shaül, london, . *elk, die jüdischen kolonien in russland, frankfort on-the-main, . emden, megillat sefer, ed. cohan, warsaw, . epstein, geburat ha-ari, vilna, . *errera, les juifs russes, brussels, . erter, ha-zofeh le-bet yisraël, warsaw, . ezekiel feivel, toledot adam, warsaw, . firkovich, abne zikkaron, vilna, . fishberg, the jews: a study of race and environment, new york, . *frederick, the new exodus, london, . friedländer, an die verehrer, freunde, und schüler, etc., leipsic, . *frledländer, ueber die verbesserung der israeliten im königreich polen, berlin, . friedrichsfeld, zeker zaddik, amsterdam, . *fünn, keneset yisraël, warsaw, . *fünn, kiryah ne'emanah, vilna, . fünn, safah le-ne'emanim, vilna, . fünn, sofre yisraël, vilna, . geiger, melo hofnayim, berlin, . gershuni, mein entrinung vun katorga, new york, . gershuni, sketches of jewish life and history, new york, . ger zedek, yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, st. petersburg, . *ginzberg and marek, yevreyskiya narodniya pyesni, st. petersburg, . *glückel von hameln, zikronot, ed. cohan, . gordon, ha-azamot ha-yebashot, odessa, . *gordon, iggerot, warsaw, . gordon, kol shire yeleg, vilna, . *gottlober, ha-gizrah we-ha-binyah, in ha-boker or, iv. gottlober, za'ar ba'ale hayyim, zhitomir, . gottlober, zikronot mi-yeme ne'uraï, warsaw, . graetz, geschichte der juden, leipsic, - , vols. 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engl. transl., boston, ; heb. transl., warsaw, . *malishevsky, yevreyi v yuzhnoy rossii i kieve v. x-xii. vyekakh, st. petersburg, . mandelkern, dibre yeme russyah, warsaw, . *mandelstamm, hazon la-moëd, vienna, . mann, sheërit yisrael, vilna, . *mapu, 'ayit zabua' warsaw, . margolioth, bet middot, prague, . minor, rukovodstvo, moscow, . *morgulis, voprosi yevreyskoy zhizni, st. petersburg, . nathanson, sefat emet, warsaw, . *nathanson, sefer ha-zikronot, warsaw, . nusbaum, historiya zhidóv, warsaw, - , vols. orshansky, yevreyskaya biblyotyeka, ii. paperna, ha-derammah, odessa, . *persecution of the jews in russia, philadelphia, . pinsker, auto-emancipation, berlin, . pinsker, likkute kadmoniot, vilna, . plungian, ben porat, vilna, . *polonnoy, toledot ya'akob yosef, lemberg, . prelooker, heroes and heroines of russia, london. *prelooker, under the czar and queen victoria, london. rabinovitz, ma'amar 'al ha-defosat ha-talmud, munich, . rhine, leon gordon. an appreciation, philadelphia, . rodkinson, toledot 'ammude habad, königsberg, . rosensohn, 'ezah we-tushiah, vilna, . rosensohn, shelom ahim, vilna, . *rosenthal, toledot hebrat marbe haskalah, i., st. petersburg, ; 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during his period of intolerance, - , , , , , , , , , . alexander ii, referred to, , , ; reign of reforms, - ; favorable attitude towards jews, - , - ; the narodniki, ; change of policy, - ; plotted against and assassinated, - . alexander iii, referred to, , ; restrictions, - ; pogroms, ; "may laws," - ; jews excluded from schools by, - . alexander jagellon and the jews, . allgemeine jüdische arbeiterbund, der, in littauen, polen, und russland, . alliance israélite universelle, programme of, ; criticism of, - . altaras, jacques isaac, philanthropist, . america. see united states, the. 'am 'olam society, . amsterdam, referred to, ; a place of refuge for russo-polish proselytes, ; elects russo-jewish rabbis, - ; place of study, , , , , . antokolsky, mark, sculptor, . anton, carl, author, . apostol, cossack hetman, . apotheker, abraham ashkenazi, author, . arbeiterstimme, die, . aristotle, , , . _ascension of elijah_, . ashkenazi, meïr, envoy of the khan of the tatars, . ashkenazi, meïr, rabbinical author, quoted, , . ashkenazi, solomon, statesman, . assemblies, jewish, under alexander i, , ; under nicholas i, , , - ; in vilna, ; under alexander ii, ; at kattowitz, . auerbach, berthold, on maimon, . austria, haskalah in, , ; influence on russian maskilim, ; place of study for russian jews, , . see also galicia. _auto-emancipation_, - . _'ayit zabua'_, - . baku, antiquity of, . barit, jacob ("yankele kovner"), scholar, , , . bathory, stephen, , . beer, michel, champion of jewish rights, . behalot, , . behr, issachar falkensohn, poet, - , . belkind, israel, zionist, . belzyc, jacob nahman, author, . bene mosheh society, . bennett, solomon, of polotzk, engraver, champion of jewish rights in england, - . bentwich, on jewish colonists in palestine, . ben yehudah, eliezer, hebraist, - . beobachter, der, an der weichsel, , . berdichev, , , , , . berek, joselovich, colonel, . berlin, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . berlin, moses, uchony yevrey, . berlin, naphtali zebi judah, dean of yeshibah, , , . bernfeld, on maimon, . besht, israel baal shem [tob], referred to, , , ; his life, - ; opposition to rabbinism, , , , ; his influence, ; his biography, . bet ha-midrash, description of the, - . bet ha-sefer, in jaffa, - . _bet yehudah_, by levinsohn, - . bezalel, school of art, . bibikov, on russian jews, . bible, the, ancient russo-jewish commentaries on, ; customs of (according to elijah vilna), ; the _biur_ on, , ; mendelssohn's translation, , , , translated into russian, , . bibleitsy (dukhovnoye bibleyskoye bratstvo), - . bielski, on jewish proselytes, . bilu society, . _biur_, commentary, collaborators on, ; welcomed, ; banned, ; studied, ; referred to, . blood-accusation, , , , , , , , , - . bogdanovich, judah, merchant, . bokhara, , . bolingbroke, quoted, . bompi, issachar, bibliophile, - , . bone zion society, - . book of common prayer, old translation of, ; suggested changes in, ; new russian translation, , . brafmann, jacob, delator, . bratzlav, - . brest-litovsk, jewish community in, ; granted privileges, ; talmudists of, ; persecution of hasidim in, ; haskalah in, , , . brody, . buchner's _der talmud in seiner nichtigkeit_, . buckle, on russian civilization, ; referred to, . buduchnost, . byelostok, , , , . calvinism, in poland, . cantonists, - , , , . carlyle, quoted, , . caro, joseph hayyim, rabbi, . casal, jonas, physician, . casimir iv, jews under, , . catherine ii, favors the jews, - , , , . chamisso, on "the glusker maggid," , . chaucer on "beggar students," . chazanowicz, joseph, zionist, . chernichevsky's _what to do_, . chernigov, isaac of, talmudist, . chernyshev, governor-general, proclaims religious liberty, . chiarini, abbé luigi, anti-talmudist, , . chmielnicki, cossack hetman, , , , , , , , . chozi kokos, statesman, , . chufut-kale (rock of the jews), . clement viii, pope, . clement xiv, pope, . clermont-tonnerre, on zalkind hurwitz, . coën, moses, court physician and statesman, - . cohen, shalom, litterateur, . cohn, tobias, physician, - ; on polish jews, ; referred to, , . coins, with hebrew inscriptions, . colonists, under nicholas i, - , ; under alexander ii, ; in america, ; in palestine, , - . commendoni, on lithuanian jews, . converts to christianity, , , , , , , , , - , , , , - , - , . cossacks, jews as, - . costume, jewish, origin of, ; opposition of maskilim to, , ; friedländer opposes, ; enforced change of, by government, ; in courland, . council of the four countries, , . courland, jews admitted into, ; annexed to russia, ; taxes in, ; colonists from, ; stronghold of haskalah, - . cracow, , . crémieux, adolphe, statesman, , . crimea, the, , . crusades, the, , . cyril, apostle to slavonians, . czacki, tadeusz, polish historian, defends jews, ; praises them, . czartorisky, prince, and the polish jews, , . czatzskes, baruch, translator, . dainov, zebi hirsh, "the slutsker maggid," . damascus affair, the, , . danzig's _hayye adam_, . darshan, moses isaac, "the khelmer maggid," . _dead souls_, by gogol, . delacrut, philosopher, . delitzsch, on dubno, ; on hebrew poetry, ; on satanov, . delmedigo, joseph, physician, . _derek selulah_, by temkin, . diakov, on russian jews, , (n. ). dillon, eliezer, financier, , . dob bär, biographer of besht, . dolitzky, menahem mendel, poet, , . _dos polische yingel_, by linetzky, , . dostrzegacz nadvisyansky, . dubno, , . dubno, solomon, grammarian, - , , . dubnow, simon, historian, . dyerzhavin's _mnyenie_, . edels, samuel (maharsha), talmudist, . _efes dammim_, by levinsohn, , . efrusi, hayyim, communal worker, . eger, akiba, rabbi, . eisenmenger's _entdecktes judenthum_, . eishishki, antiquity of, . eliasberg, jonathan, rabbi, . eliasberg, mordecai, rabbi, . elijah gaon, - ; his curriculum of study, , ; his appreciation of science and influence on haskalah, , ; reputed to be the author of _sefer ha-berit_, ; his disciples, - , , ; his biography, _ascension of elijah_, ; referred to, , , , , . eliot, george, on maimon's autobiography, ; referred to, . elizabeta petrovna, , , . emden, jacob, talmudist, , , , . england, russian jews in, , - , ; sympathy of, - , . _entdecktes judenthum_, by eisenmenger, . erter, isaac, satirist, , . esterka, polish jewish queen (?), . euclid, in hebrew, . exportation law of , - , . eybeschütz, jonathan, talmudist, , . falk, hayyim samuel jacob, baal shem, - . _fathers and sons_, by turgenief, . finkel, elijah, educator, . folk songs, - , , , , (n. ), (n. ). see also lullabies. france, russian jews in, , - , , , , - . franco-russian war, - , . frank, physician, , . frank, jacob (yankev leibovich), founder of the frankists, - , , , , . "freitisch," , . friedländer, david, scholar and philanthropist, referred to, , ; on the improvement of jews in poland, - . frug, simon, poet, , . fünn, joseph, historian, , . gaden, stephen von, court physician and statesman, . galicia, haskalah in, , (n. ); hasidism in, ; referred to, , , , . see also austria. germany, haskalah in, ; emigration from, ; russo-polish rabbis in, - ; russo-jewish maskilim in, - , , ; hebrew poetry of, - ; object of maskilim in, - , ; haskalah encouraged by the government, ; by jewish financiers, ; opposition to haskalah in, - , - , ; state of judaism in, - ; reason for speedy germanization of jews in, ; jewish science in, ; influence of, on russian maskilim, - ; a place of refuge, ; restrictions against refugees in, - , . gibbon, edward, referred to, . ginzberg, asher (ahad ha-'am), and haskalah, . glückel von hameln's _memoirs_, . "glusker maggid, the," , . goethe on maimon, : on behr, ; referred to, , . gogol's jewish traitor, ; influence of his _dead souls_, . gordin, jacob, ethical culturist, . gordon, david, litterateur, . gordon, j.l., and haskalah, referred to, , , ; poetry of, ; and levinsohn, ; on the new era, ; attacks the talmud, ; laments the effect of haskalah, ; on zionism, . gordon, jekuthiel, scientist, . gottlober, abraham bär, on hasidism, ; on luria, ; and levinsohn, ; on russification, ; defends mendelssohn, . graetz, on maimon, ; on slavonic jews, . granovsky, on jewish emancipation, . grazhdanin, , . gregory x, pope, . grodno, jewish community in, ; a talmudic centre, , ; scene of martyrdom, ; persecution of hasidim in, ; talmud published in, - ; maskilim, . guizolfi, zacharias de, statesman, , , (n. ). günzberg, benjamin wolf, student, . günzburg, horace, financier, . günzburg, joseph yosel, financier, . günzburg, mordecai aaron, , , ; his life, - ; on minhagim, ; his impress on hebrew literature, - ; his _abi'ezer_, . gurovich, marcus, educator, . habad, reform sect of hasidim, . ha-boker or, . ha-emet, . haggadah shel pesah, russian translation of, . haidamacks, , . hakohen, ephraim, rabbi, . hakohen, joseph, rabbi, , . hakohen, raphael, rabbi, . ha-maggid, . ha-meliz, , , . hannover, nathan, his _safah berurah_, ; his _yeven mezulah_, quotation from, - . harkavy, abraham, orientalist, , , . ha-shahar, , - , , . hasidim, ; their teachings, , , ; spread, ; persecuted by the mitnaggedim, , ; efforts at reconciliation with mitnaggedim, - , ; reformed, ; united with mitnaggedim against haskalah, ; fought by maskilim, . haskalah, definitions of, - ; writers on, ; regarded differently in germany and russia, - , ; opposition to, - , - ; in the "forties," - ; influence of germany on, - ; in galicia, ; levinsohn's advice on, ; günzburg's opinion of, ; spreads under alexander ii, - ; disappointments of, - ; and reform judaism, - ; cosmopolitan, - ; romantic and pessimistic, - ; zionistic, - . _ha-toëh be-darke ha-hayyim_, , . _hattot ne'urim_, - . _hayye adam_, by danzig, . ha-zefirah, . hebrew literature: style, , , - ; poetry, ; reform judaism in, - ; necessity of (smolenskin), . heder, , . hegel, , . heilprin, joseph, financier, . heine, referred to, ; on polish jews, (n. ). helena, princess, proselyte, . heller, yom-tob lipman, rabbi, . herz, marcus, disciple of kant, . herzl, theodore, zionist, , , . hillul society, . hirsch, baron de, . _hizzuk emunah_, voltaire's opinion on, . hobebe zion, , . horn, meïr, educator, . horowitz, isaiah, cabbalist, . horowitz, phinehas, rabbi, . horowitz, shabbataï, rabbi, . horowitz, shmelke, rabbi, . horwitz, aaron halevi, rabbi, . hurwitz, hirsh, educator, . hurwitz, hyman, professor, . hurwitz, judah halevi, translator, , , , , , . [hurwitz], phinehas elijah, encyclopedist, - , . hurwitz, zalkind, champion of jewish rights in france, - . huss, influence of, in poland, . _hut ha-meshullash_, by kohn, . ibn ezra, abraham, commentaries on his works, , . ignatiev, nicholas, . 'illuyim, . ilye, manasseh of, talmudist, - , , , . _information about the killing of christians_, etc., by skripitzyii, . innocent iv, pope, . inventions, - . israelit, asher, maggid, . israelita, polish weekly, . isserles, moses, rabbi, , . italy, a place of attraction for russian jews, , , - , , . ivan the terrible, - , . jacob isaac, court physician, . jaffe, daniel, scholar, . jaffe, mordecai (lebushim), talmudist, , , . jastrow, marcus, rabbi, , . jekuthiel, solomon, financier, . _jerusalem_, by mendelssohn, . jerusalem, pilgrimage to, . jesuits, in poland, , . joffe, mordecai, rabbi, . joseph ben isaac levi, philosopher, . josephovich, abraham, statesman, - . josephovich, michael, nobleman, - . judah halevi, poet and philosopher, , , , . judah hasid, mystic, founder of the original hasidim, . judaizing heresy. see proselytism. _judex judaeorum_, . jüdischer arbeiter, der, . _kab ha-yashar_, referred to, . kadimah society, . kahal, ; oppression by, ; denunciation of, . kalisz, antiquity of, . kamenetz-podolsk, antiquity of, . kant, favorite with maskilim, , ; on maimon, , , ; referred to, . kant, the hebrew, . kaplan, wolf, educator, . karaites, discussions with rabbanites, ; with christians, ; nicholas i on, . katkoff, defends jews under alexander ii, ; becomes a reactionary under alexander iii, . kattowitz, conference of, . katz, meir, talmudist, . katzenellenbogen, hayyim, talmudist, . katzenellenbogen, moses, . kaufman, governor-general, convokes conference, . kertch, archbishop of, tries to convert jews, . kharkov, . khazars, , , . khelm, antiquity of, . khelm, ephraim of, liturgist, . kherson, , , , , . kiev, early settlement of jews in, - ; their influence, ; proselytism in, ; talmudists of, , ; university of, ; expulsions from, ; referred to, , , , . kishinev, , , , , . kissilyef, on emigration, . klaczke, g., educator, . _kniga kahala_, - . kobrin, joseph of, liturgist, . kohen, naphtali, rabbi, . kohen, shabbataï, rabbi and historian, - . kohn's _hut ha-meshullash_, . kol mebasser, . königsberg, , , , , , . _kontrabandisti_, by levin, . körner, on maimon, . korobka, . korolenko's _skazanye o florye rimlyaninye_, . kovno, government of, ; city of, ; talmudists of, ; maskilim in, , ; mussarnikes in, ; referred to, , . kramsztyk, isaac, rabbi, . krochmal, nahman, philosopher, . krüdener, baroness, , , . kruzhevan, . kryloff, , . kuritzin, theodore, proselyte, . kusselyevsky, physician, . ladi, shneor zalman of, , - . landau, ezekiel, rabbi, , . landau, moses, educator, . lassalle, , , . lebensohn, abraham dob bar, poet, , , . leczeka, abba, "the glusker maggid," , . leibnitz, , . leibov, baruch, martyr, . lemberg, court of, ; fair at, . leo, the court physician, , , . lermontoff's spy, . leroy-beaulieu, anatole, on maimon, ; on university restrictions, - ; referred to, . lessing, ephraim, on israel zamoscz, ; on behr, ; referred to, . letteris, meïr halevi, poet, . letzte nachrichten, . levanda, lyev, novelist, , . levin, judah, merchant, . levin, mendel, hebrew and yiddish author, - , , , , . levin's _kontrabandisti_, . levinsohn, i.b., and haskalah, ; on the settlement of jews in russia, ; on the effect of chmielnicki's massacres, ; his life, - ; _te'udah be-yisraël_, - , , , ; _efes dammim_, , ; _bet yehudah_, - ; _zerubbabel_, - , ; referred to, - . liboschüts, jacob, physician and philanthropist, . liboschüts, osip yakovlevich, court physician, . lichtenstadt, moses, communal worker, . lieberman, aaron ("arthur freeman"), socialist, . lieven, prince emanuel, . lilien, ephraim moses, artist, . lilienblum, moses löb, skeptic, - ; attacks the talmud, ; repentant, ; zionist, - . lilienthal, max, referred to, , , , , , ; opens school in riga, , ; his personality, - ; his _maggid yeshu'ah_ and his efforts in behalf of russian jews, - ; his disillusionment, - ; his opinion on russia, ; how regarded by maskilim, - , - ; on the jews of courland, ; on the jews of odessa, ; his supporters, - , ; günzburg on, . linetzky's _dos polische yingel_, , . "lishmah" ideal, . lithuania, magna charta of, ; jewish merchants of, ; description by cardinal commendoni and by delmedigo, ; talmudic centre, - ; status of jews of, under ivan the terrible, ; after the massacres, ; opposition to hasidism in, , ; method of study in, - ; inclination to haskalah in, - ; annexed to russia, ; russified, - ; colonization in, - , ; talmud published in, - ; referred to, . litvack, judah, deputy, . livonia, jewish merchants of, ; gentiles remonstrate on behalf of jews of, ; stronghold of haskalah, - . loewe, louis, orientalist, quoted, , . london, , , . louis xiv, and the treaty of ryswick, . lover of enlightenment societies, . lublin, , , ; fair at, ; haskalah in, . lublin, meïr (maharam), talmudist, . lukas, "the little jew," . lullabies, russo-jewish, quoted, , (n. ). see also folk songs. luria, david, philanthropist, , , . luria, solomon, talmudist, ; censures the liberality of isserles, ; opposes the kahal, ; his method of study, . luther's doctrines in poland, . luzzatto, moses hayyim, poet, . lyons, israel, grammarian, . _ma'aseh tobiah_, . macaulay, on russian civilization, (n. ). mccaul's _old paths_, , . _maggid yeshu'ah_, by lilienthal, - . maimon, solomon, - ; quoted, , , ; autobiography, , ; his philosophy, - ; his contributions to the meassef, ; referred to, , , , , . maimuni, commentators on his _moreh nebukim_, , , ; retranslated by levin, ; his _mishneh torah_, translated, , ; his hebrew style, . malak, abraham, hasid, . malak, hayyim, hasid, . manasseh ben israel, ; his _nishmat hayyim_, ; his activity, . mandelkern, solomon, rabbi, , . mandelstamm, benjamin, on lilienthal, ; quoted, ; on vilna, ; and levinsohn, . mandelstamm, leon, graduate from university of st. petersburg, , , . mane, mordecai zebi, poet, . mann, eliezer, "the hebrew socrates," . mann, menahem, martyr, . manoah, handel, mathematician, . mapu, abraham, novelist, - . margolioth, judah löb, rabbi, , . markusevich, isaac, physician, . marx, karl, his teachings promulgated, ; his name assumed, . masliansky, zebi hirsh, maggid, . may laws, - . meassef, contributors to, - ; condemned, ; referred to, . _megillah 'afah_, . meisels, berish, rabbi, . melammedim, in germany, , , ; in russia, , . _memorbuch_ of mayence, . mendelssohn, meyer, communal worker, . mendelssohn, moses (rambman, "dessauer"), appealed to by mitnaggedim, ; his contact with russiam jews, - ; his friends and followers, - , ; his philosophy, ; referred to, ; presumed to be author of _sefer ha-berit_, ; his translation of the pentateuch, , , , , , ; post-mendelssohnian period in germany, ; in russia, , ; his _jerusalem_, ; his _phaedon_, ; alexander i's ideal jew, ; the "russian mendelssohn," ; smolenskin and gottlober on, . mendlin, jacob wolf, socialist, . meseritz, bär of, promoter of hasidism, . _midrash talpiyot_, . mielziner, leo, on zionist artists, . mikhailovich, czar aleksey, . milman, on maimon's autobiography, . minhagim, according to elijah vilna, - ; according to m.a. günzburg, . minor, solomon zalkind, "the russian jellinek," , . minsk, ; talmudists of, , persecution of hasidim in, ; schools in, - , ; reception of lilienthal in, , ; maskilim of, , - , ; referred to, , . mirabeau's reference to hurwitz, . mitau, , . mitauer, elias, communal worker, . mitnaggedim, opposition to hasidism, , ; efforts of, at reconciliation with hasidim, - ; make common cause with hasidim against maskilim, , . _mnyenie_, by dyerzhavin, . mohilev, , , , , . moldavia, - . molo, francisco, economist, . montefiore, sir moses, visits russia, - ; invited to russia, ; entertained, ; visit of to russia, ; on the pogroms, ; on russo-jewish women, . morgulis, manasseh, litterateur, , - . morschtyn, george, proselyte (?), . _mosaïde_, by wessely, . moscow, proselytism in, , ; expulsions from, , , ; jews admitted to, ; converts in, ; russification in, ; restrictions in the university of, , ; referred to, . moses, martyr, . mussarnikes, . muzhiks, emancipation of, - ; education of, - ; restlessness of, - ; socialism among, . mylich, george gottfried, lutheran champion of jewish rights, - . nachlass, wolf, cantonist, . napoleon, convokes the sanhedrin, ; his invasion of russia, , ; his defeat, - , ; on vilna, . narodnaya volya society, , . narodniki, - . nazimov, governor-general, champion of jews, , . nebakhovich, alexander, theatrical director, . nebakhovich, leon (löb), first defender of russian jews in russian, , , ; dramatist, . nebakhovich, michael, editor of comic paper, . nemirov, . nemirov, jehiel michael of, scholar, . nestor's chronicles, . nicholas i, referred to, , , , , , , , , , ; his policy, - ; his recruiting, - ; his colonization scheme, - ; attempts at conversion of jews, - , ; his exportation law, - ; his accusations refuted, - ; investigates number of learned jews, , , ; outwitted, ; on jews of odessa, . nicholas ii, referred to, , ; persecution of jews under, - . nieszvicz, , , , , . nisanovich, itshe, physician, . _nishmat hayyim_, by manasseh ben israel, . noah, mordecai manuel, statesman, . nomenclature, russo-jewish, . notkin, nathan, diplomat and philanthropist, , . novgorod, , , . novy israil society, . odessa, schools in, , ; lilienthal in, ; jewish influences in, - ; talmud torah of, ; haskalah in, - ; russification of, , , ; assimilation in, ; pogromy in, ; referred to, , , , , ; jewish women of, - . 'olam katan, . _old paths_, by mccaul, , . ostrog, , . pale, the jewish, , , , . palestine, rehabilitation of, ; settlers from, in russia, , ; longing for, , ; smolenskin on, - . parlovich, arthur, physician, . patapov, governor-general, convokes a conference, . paul i, , , . paul iii, pope, . pechersky, st. feodosi, . peretz, abraham, diplomat, , , . peretz, gregori, dekabrist, , , . perl, joseph, educator, , , . perl, s., educator, . persia, immigrants from, . peter the great, conquers the tatars, ; his attempts to civilize russia, ; surrender of riga to, . _phaedon_, by mendelssohn, . philippson, ludwig, rabbi, , , . phillips, phinehas, founder of the anglo-jewish family, . pinczows, the, scholars, - . pinner, ephraim moses, talmudist, . pinsk, , , , . pinsker, leo, nationalist, , - . pinsker, simhah, scholar, - , , . pirogov, nikolai ivanovich, liberal school superintendent, - . plehve, von, on restrictions, . plungian, ezekiel feiyel, talmudist, , . pobyedonostsev, influences alexander ii, - ; procurator of the holy synod, ; his policy regarding jews, ; on jewish superiority, . podolia, , , , , , . pogodin, on early russian jews, . pogromy, , - . poimaniki, - , , , . poimshchiki, . polack, jacob, talmudist, , . poland, early settlement of jews in, ; political eminence of, - ; proselytism in, ; after chmielnicki's massacres, - ; influence of calvinism in, - ; during the rozbior, ; after the annexation, ; jewish loyalty to, - ; under nicholas i, - ; use of polish in, ; sympathy with, and adoption of language of, - . polonnoy, jacob joseph of, follower of besht, ; his _toledot ya'akob yosef_ burnt in vilna, ; mentioned, , . polotsk, , . poltava, , , . popes, , . posner, solomon, philanthropist, - . pototzki, count valentine, proselyte, . prayer book. see book of common prayer. prelooker, jacob, - , . printing-press, permission to establish, ; first publications from, ; restrictions removed from use of, . prochovnik, abraham, jewish king of poland (?), . proselytism, , , - . public schools, admission of jews to, , , ; exclusion of jews from, - . pumpyansky, aaron elijah, rabbi, , . pushkin's prisoner, . querido, jacob, mystic, . rabbinical seminaries, - , , , , , , - . rabbis, position of, in russo-poland, - ; required to know russian, german, or polish, ; opposed by maskilim, ; lilienthal on, , ; günzburg on, - ; dukhovny and kazyony, - . rabinovich, osip, litterateur, , , . rabinowitz, joseph, assimilationist, . rachmailovich, affras, merchant, . radziwill, prince, , , . rapoport, solomon löb, rabbi, . rasiner, israel, zaddik, . raskolniki, . rathaus, abraham, merchant, . razsvyet, , - , . reform judaism, and the haskalah, - ; sermons in russian, ; smolenskin on, - . reform synagogues, in odessa, ; in warsaw, ; in vilna, . reines, isaac jacob, rabbi, . reis, joseph, grandfather of wessely, . revolutionaries, , - , - . riesser, gabriel, champion of jewish emancipation, . riga, , , , , , , , , , . risenci, jonathan of, rabbi, . rivkes, moses, commentator, . romm, menahem mann, publisher, - . rosensohn, joseph, rabbi, . rosensohn, moses, reformer, . rosenthal, leon, financier, , - . rothschild, baron edmund de, . rurik, varangian prince, . russia, haskalah in, contrasted with haskalah in galicia and germany, ; arrival of german jews in, ; antiquity of jews in, ; privileges of jews in, ; jewish envoys to, ; mentioned by medieval scholars, - ; sefardim and ashkenazim resort to, - ; scientists in, - ; physicians in, - ; status of jews of, before chmielnicki's uprising, - ; jewish self-government, school system, and mode of living in, - ; under ivan the terrible, - ; under peter the great, ; under elizabeta petrovna, ; state of civilization of, , ; favorable conditions in, under catherine ii, paul i, and alexander i, - ; jewish patriotism toward, under alexander i, ; russification of jews of, - ; opposition to haskalah in, f.; jewish colonization in, - ; crusade against the talmud in, - ; opinions of prominent gentiles on jews of, , - ; literature and civilization of, under nicholas i, - ; under alexander ii, - ; jewish contribution to civilization of, - , ; sermons in, ; defenders of jews in, - ; macaulay on civilization of, (n. ). sack, hayyim, financier, . sackheim, joseph, merchant, . _safah berurah_, by hannover, . st. petersburg, imperial hermitage in, ; scene of martyrdom, ; referred to, , , , , , ; jews permitted in, , , ; expelled from, , , ; deputation to, ; rabbinical conferences, , , - , ; converts in, ; first graduate of university of, ; restriction of students in, ; russification in, ; revolutionaries at, . salanter, israel, rabbi, . samuel ben avigdor, rabbi, . samuel ben mattathias, talmudist, . sanchez, antonio ribeiro, physician, . sanhedrin, the, and french russian jews, . satanov, isaac halevi, litterateur, , . schapira, moses, publisher, . schapiro, constantin, poet, . schechter, solomon, on hasidism, . schick, baruch (shklover), scientist, , , - , , . schiller, on maimon, ; referred to, . schools, secular, - , - , - , - , , , , , - , - , - , . _sefer ha-berit_, . seiberling, joseph, censor of hebrew books, . shabbataï zebi, pseudo-messiah, , . shalkovich, abraham lob (ben avigdor), . shatzkes' _ha-mafteah_, . shavli, moses of, writer of polemics, . _shibhe ha-besht_, , . shklov, , . shkud, mikel of, rabbi, . shneersohn, menahem mendel, zaddik, , . shmoilovich, abraham, merchant, . _shulhan 'aruk_, commentators on, , ; its effect on jewish life, ; elijah vilna on, ; criticism of, ; annotations to, ; referred to, . siberia, - , . _sin'at 'olam le-'am 'olam_, - . sixtus v, pope, . _skazanye o florye rimlyaninye_, by korolenko, . skripitzyn's _information about the killing of christians_, etc., . slonim, samson of, rabbi, . slonimsky, hayyim selig, inventor and editor, , , - , . slutsk, , , . "slutsker maggid, the," . smolensk, , . smolenskin, perez, and haskalah, ; his descriptions of the heder and yeshibah, , ; his life, - ; his conception of haskalah, ; on nationalism, - , ; on reformers, - ; attacks mendelssohn, ; on the prophetic consciousness of the jewish masses, - ; his popularity, ; organizes the kadimah, ; opposes the alliance israélite universelle, . sobieski, john, . society for the promotion of haskalah among the russian jews, - , , , - . sofer, moses, rabbi, . sofer, shabbataï, rabbi, . sokolov, nahum, publicist, . sosima, monkish proselyte, . spector, isaac elhanan, rabbi, . speir, bima, of mohilev, opponent of frank, . spinoza and maimon compared, , . stern, abraham jacob, inventor, . stern, bezalel (basilius), pedagogue, , , , . strashun, mattathias, talmudist, . surovyetsky, on russian jews, , (n. ). switzerland, , , , . _talmud, der, in seiner nichtigkeit_, by buchner, . talmud, the, the study of, , - ; burnt in public, ; customs of, according to elijah gaon, ; attacks on, - , , - ; published in russia, - ; neglected in germany, . talmud torah, the, , . talmudists, ancient russo-jewish, - ; opposed by hasidism, ; in vilna, - . tarnopol, on russo-jewish women, - . taz, david, rabbi, . temkin's _derek salulah_, . _te'udah be-yisraël_, by levinsohn, - , , , . _toledot ya'akob yosef_, by jacob joseph polonnoy, . tolstoi, , , . troki, city, . troki, abraham, author and physician, . troki, isaac ben abraham, karaite scholar, . turgenief, on russia, ; his zhid, ; referred to, , ; on alexander ii, ; his _virgin soil_, and _fathers and sons_, ; his lithuanian jewish character, - . tushiyah society, - . ukraine, the, jewish community in, ; famous for scholars, - ; jewish self-government in, ; expulsions from, - ; state of morality in, ; hasidism in, , ; first school in, . uman, , . united states, the, , , , . uvarov, on persecution, , ; on "re-education," , , , . vassile lupu, hospodar of moldavia, . vassilyevich, ivan, , . vernacular, the, , , - , , , , . vilna, scene of martyrdom, ; talmudists of, ; kahal of, ; persecution of hasidim, ; the last rabbi of, ; notables of, , , , ; first graduates from university of, - ; opposition to haskalah in, ; first publication of the talmud in, - ; first assembly of maskilim in, ; innovations in, ; reception of lilienthal in, , ; rabbinical seminary at, , , ; yeshibot of, ; haskalah in, , , , ; champions of jews in, ; referred to, , , . _virgin soil_, by turgenief, . vital, hayyim, cabbalist, , . vitebsk, , , . vitebsk, menahem mendel of, zaddik, on haskalah, . vladimir, grand duke, . volhynia, jurisdiction over, ; massacres in, ; hasidism in, , , ; first complete edition of the talmud published in, ; referred to, , ; blood accusations in, . volozhin, hayyim, dean, , - , , . volozhin, isaac of, dean, . volozhin, yeshibah of, - , , . vosnitzin, captain, martyr, , . wahl, saul, jewish polish king (?), . warsaw, jewish community in, ; persecution in, ; protest at, ; defended by jewish soldiers, ; first yiddish paper in, ; rabbinic college of, - , , ; censor in, ; condition of, ; german influence in, ; maskilim of, , , ; referred to, . way, lewis, english missionary, - , . weigel, katharina, proselyte, . wengeroff's _memoirs_, ; on russo-jewish women, . wessely, naphtali hartwig, quoted, ; course of study prescribed by, ; his ancestry, ; his opinion on russo-jewish students, , , ; his _mosaïde_, ; his _yen lebanon_, ; his epistles and _yen lebanon_ banned, , , . _what to do_, by chernichevsky, . white, on jewish farmers, . wissotzky, kalonymos, philanthropist, . wohl, censor of hebrew books, , . wolf, levy, jurist, . wolff's _metaphysics_, - ; _mathematics_, , . wolper, michael, educator, . women's education, - , , , , , , - . _words of peace and truth_, by wessely, . workingmen, russo-jewish, , - , (n. ). yankele kovner. see barit, jacob. yaroslav, fair of, . yaroslav, aaron, friend of mendelssohn, . yavan, baruch, diplomat, . yelisavetgrad, , , . _yen lebanon_, by wessely, , , , . yeralash, . yeshibat 'ez hayyim, - , , , . yeshibot, , - , . _yeven mezulah_, by hannover, - . yiddish, as spoken by russian jews, ; first used for secular instruction, - , ; first weekly in, , ; studied for missionary purposes, ; employed by maskilim, , ; by zionists, . zabludovsky, jehiel michael, talmudist, . zacharias, monkish proselyte, . zacharias of kiev, missionary, . zaddikim, , , . zamoscz, city, , . zamoscz, israel moses halevi, instructor of mendelssohn, , , . zamoscz, reuben of, quoted, . zamoscz, solomon of, liturgical poet, . zangwill, on maimon, ; referred to, . zaremba, proselyte, . zaslav, fair of, ; blood accusation in, . zaslaver, jacob, massorite, . zbitkover, samuel, financier, . zederbaum, alexander, publisher, . zeitlin, joshua, financier, - . _zeker rab_, . zelmele, talmudist, - . _zerubbabel_, by levinsohn, - , . zhagory, , . zhitomir, rabbinical seminary at, , , , , ; printing-press in, ; trade school in, ; evening and sabbath schools in, . zionism, , - : difficulties of, - ; effect of, - . _zohar_, , . zunser, eliakum, badhan, on alexander ii, ; on orthodoxy, - ; on the "intelligentia," ; on zionism, ; on the awakening, - (n. ). the lord baltimore press baltimore, md., u.s.a. * * * * * +---------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. | | for a complete list, please see the end of this | | document. | | | | bold text is marked like so: =bold text=. | | | +---------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * _second edition._ price twopence. bolshevism: a curse & danger to the workers. by h.w. lee (_editor of "justice"; author of "the first of may: international labour day"; "a socialist view of the unemployed question"; "social-democracy and the zollverein"; "the triumph of the trust under free trade"; "the great strike movement of "; and "why starve? britain's food in war--and in peace."_). with foreword by will thorne, m.p. the twentieth century press ( ), limited. (trade union and hours), , a and , clerkenwell green, london, e.c. _february, ._ foreword by will thorne, m.p. i have been asked to write a brief introduction to the pamphlet which my old friend and comrade h.w. lee has written on the undercurrent of bolshevist propaganda going on in this country, of which the recent unauthorised strike outbreaks are outward and visible signs. i do this gladly. our comrade lee, through being long associated with the social-democratic federation as its secretary, and his editorship of "justice" during the last five years, has gained a knowledge of international socialist movements in their many phases which renders his pamphlet both authoritative and reliable. i hope the pamphlet will have a wide circulation in all the large industrial centres, because i feel convinced that the majority of the rank and file of the wage-earners do not and cannot know what it is that our bolshevists are striving for. they have not the faintest idea in what direction some of them are being led. the bolshevists in certain industrial centres want to impose their own authority on the rank and file of the workers, using catch-words for that purpose. if they succeed in this direction they will set to work to undermine the trade union movement of this country, and upset, instead of making use of, the means we at present possess for improving our economic conditions. our minds go back to the leeds "convention," held in june, . the delegates at that conference declared that they were in favour of workmen's and soldiers' councils being formed in all the large industrial centres of the country. nothing whatever came of it. but the w.s.c.s then controlling the revolutionary undercurrent in russia were totally different from the bolshevist tyranny of to-day, and many of the delegates who formed the w.s.c.s in various parts of russia after the revolution have been imprisoned or shot because they opposed the domination of lenin and trotzky. last tuesday i saw two friends whom i met in petrograd in april, , and both of them absolutely confirm the statements made in the press about the hundreds of men and women who have been shot without any trial or confirmation of the charges brought against them. an article which appears in the "nineteenth century" of january, written by mr. pierson, who was imprisoned in the fortress of st. peter and st. paul last october, after being arrested at the british embassy in petrograd at the same time that captain cromie was shot, also confirms the brutalities that are taking place constantly in petrograd and other parts of russia. a letter in the "daily express," written by colonel john ward, m.p., shows the terrible hell which bolshevism is making, and the methods that are being pursued by the followers of lenin and trotzky. if the soldiers' and workmen's councils had done their duty in the latter part of april, , after lenin made his two hours' speech in the duma on april , they would have sent him back whence he came, because it is a well-known fact that he was allowed to pass through germany with thirty other companions in a first-class saloon. i am quite convinced that it was not the russian people who were paying his expenses during the time he was carrying on his pernicious propaganda work in various parts of russia. the downfall of the soldiers' and workmen's councils has been the consequence of their giving lenin and his thirty companions full freedom to spread their anarchical creed and the wiping out of duly elected assemblies. the leading men of the bolshevik movement in this country are out for the overthrow of things as they are by physical force as soon as they feel confident that they have a good number of the rank and file of the wage-earners behind them. i want to warn the wage-earners--men and women of my own class--against being associated with such people, because i know that their tactics cannot remedy the economic and industrial injustices under which the industrial workers are suffering. they can be rectified by social-democratic education, scientific organisation in the trade union movement, and by using political powers to that end. the methods adopted by the unauthorised shop stewards movement in the different parts of the country must be rigorously suppressed, and properly appointed shop stewards and works committees in all factories and workshops must be elected instead. by that method industrial and economic improvements can be brought about with the greatest benefit and the least harm to all. the pamphlet gives a very clear statement about what is taking place in connection with the bolshevist movement. that is the reason why i trust that it will have a wide circulation in all the large industrial centres of the country. will thorne. february , . "bolshevism": a curse and a danger to the workers. russia has given most countries of the world a new word. "bolshevism" is to-day known universally, though its meaning is not by any means so universal. in russia it has a very definite and often striking meaning, as many anti-bolsheviks have known and are learning to their cost. elsewhere it has a wider, if looser, significance, and is frequently employed to express or describe a number of things to which one objects. our own press, for instance, flings "bolshevik" and "bolshevism" at everybody and everything that it denounces, or against whom and which it seeks to raise prejudice. in this respect it has often overreached itself, for it is causing some to accept the russian bolsheviks at their own estimation, because they know that many of the things styled "bolshevist" are not as bad as they are made out to be. in russia "bolshevik" means majority, and "menshevik" minority. their real significance was purely an internal one for the russian social-democratic party. it is important to make this point clear, for now and again we come across british supporters of and sympathisers with the russian bolsheviks who take the name as a proof that the government of lenin and trotzky actually represents the majority of the russian people! nothing is more contrary to the fact. the bolshevist "coup de rue" of november, , was as complete a usurpation of power as that of louis napoleon in . true it was a usurpation by professed socialists, supposedly in the interests of the russian working class, but it was no less a usurpation and an attack on democracy which only success in the interests of the russian working class could possibly justify. the forcible dissolution of the constituent assembly by the bolsheviks two months afterwards, because the elections did not go in their favour, compelled them to take the road to complete domination, and they are now unable to retrace their steps, even if, as is reported, the more honest of them wish to do so. bolsheviks, mensheviks, and social revolutionaries. the terms "bolshevik" and "menshevik" (majority and minority) arose from the division in the russian social-democracy which had shown itself at the congress held in london in . the difference is generally assumed to be one of tactics--of a readiness to co-operate with other parties for certain definite objects under certain special conditions ("menshevik"), or of complete antagonism and opposition to all other parties every time and all the time ("bolshevik"). but the difference lies deeper than that. "bolshevism" is, in effect, the russian form of "impossibilism." from this the thorough-going social-democrats of all countries have to suffer at times. by divorcing the application of socialist principles and measures from the actual life of the day, and arguing and discussing "in vacuo," impossibilism drives many, who see the utter sterility of its results, into the opposite direction, that of opportunism for the moment without much thought for the future. until their "coup de rue" of november, , the russian bolsheviks regarded themselves as the extreme left of the russian social-democratic party. but latterly they have dropped the name social-democrat--so much the better for social-democracy--and have adopted that of the "russian communist party"--so much the worse for communism, for towards communism the social-democratic commonwealths of the future are bound to tend. "bolshevism" to-day, where it is honest, is in the main a revival of the anarchism of bakunine, together with a policy of armed insurrection, and a seizure of political power which shall install the "dictatorship of the proletariat." that is the dividing line between the bolsheviks and their social-democratic opponents, the mensheviks, and their far more numerous and powerful antagonists, the social revolutionaries, who obtained an overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly which the bolsheviks dissolved by force. the social revolutionaries seek the emancipation of the peasants and workers by democratic means--the only safe and sure way--though they were quite ready to use force for the overthrow of tsardom, happily effected in march, . unhappily, though, bolshevik terrorism, with its complete inability to carry out its promises of "peace and bread" for the russian people, and certain european financial interests are together rehabilitating reaction in russia, and the people and the peasants may be driven to put up with some new autocratic régime in the hope that it may shield them from the present terrorism and secure them something to eat. bolshevist intolerance. innumerable instances could be given of the bitter intolerance of the honest bolshevik fanatics towards all sections of the international socialist movement with which they have not agreed. paul axelrod, one of the founders of russian social-democracy, in a pamphlet published at zürich in , entitled "the crisis and the duties of international social-democracy," reproaches lenin with seeking to carry into the internal struggles of the socialist parties in europe "specifically russian methods" which aim directly at creating troubles and divisions, and branding without any distinction "nearly all the known and respected bodies of international social-democracy as traitors and deserters stranded in the bourgeois camp, treating these comrades, whose international conscience and sentiments are above all suspicion, as national liberals, chauvinists, philistines, traitors, etc." is this the way in which to raise the enthusiasm of the workers for the cause of socialism? is this the manner in which the spirit of self-sacrifice can be roused in the masses? it savours far too much of the old implacable bitterness of the terrorists--reasonable and natural enough in their secret conspiracies, where a fellow-conspirator might be a police agent--but utterly out of place and mischievous when introduced into open propaganda and organisation. to this jaundiced outlook of the prominent bolsheviks is added ignorance of administration. nearly all of them are refugees who have spent many years of their lives outside of russia. they have evolved theories of socialist policy from their inner consciousness without an opportunity of putting them to practical tests--until now, when the world is in the throes of a war crisis. and they attempt to apply their theories of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in a vast nation made up of various races in different stages of civilisation, only just entering upon full capitalist development, where the proletariat, the wage workers, constitute fewer than , , out of a total population of , , ! and yet there are supporters of the bolsheviks in britain who profess to be marxists--more marxist than marx, in fact--and who can countenance such a logical outrage on the "materialist conception of history"! offensive and defensive wars. nothing better illustrates the unreality of some of lenin's theories than his attitude on national self-defence. in he and zinovieff, another well-known bolshevik, published a pamphlet on "socialism and the war." one chapter dealt with "a war of defence and a war of attack." it contains this passage:--"if to-morrow, for example, morocco were to go to war against france, the indies against england, and china against russia, they would be wars of defence, just wars, independently of any question of which began the war." being "wars of defence, just wars," the people would obviously be justified in taking part in them from lenin's point of view. now let us see where the logic of this contention will land us. morocco, possibly because what capitalism is there is foreign, may justly wage war against france; but if france fights a war of defence against an aggressive attack by germany, she is engaged in an "imperialist war." similarly, if india rises against britain, the people will be fighting a just war; but if britain supports france and belgium against german imperialism, she is carrying on an "imperialist war." hence it follows that, if the central powers had won the war, and belgium had been subjugated by germany, belgium would have been fully justified in fighting to recover her independence; but in defending that independence which she would have a right to recover, if deprived of it, she was taking part in an "imperialist war "! such is leninist logic when brought down to actual facts. in short, lenin, like bakunine, loves ideas more than men. this may be said of all the honest bolshevist fanatics. there are others--many of them. and even the genuine fanatics appear to have reached a stage of mental "impossibilism" where the end not only justifies the means, but any means must necessarily help to achieve the end. we know the bolsheviks were conveyed to russia in april, , via germany in sealed carriages with the consent of the german authorities. the swiss bolshevik, platten, arranged the affair with the german government. that the german government expected that the bolshevist mission to russia would be of advantage to germany cannot be questioned; otherwise the bolshevist refugees would not have been allowed to go to petrograd through germany. the bolsheviks themselves knew that their actions in the russian revolution would help imperialist germany, for the "berner tagwacht" announced, after they had left switzerland, that they were "perfectly well aware that the german government is only permitting the transit of those persons because it believes that their presence in russia will strengthen the anti-war tendencies there." it is the same with whatever money was supplied by germany to the bolsheviks. it would all help to establish the "dictatorship of the proletariat." it is necessary to refer also to leo trotzky. some who are convinced of lenin's honesty of purpose do not hold the same view of trotzky. lenin is the implacable theorist in whose nostrils compromise of any sort stinks. trotzky is not of that character. he is much more adaptable. and he has changed opinions on war issues more than once during the war. in the autumn of or the beginning of , trotzky wrote a brilliant pamphlet, "der krieg und die internationale" ("the war and the international"). in that pamphlet he boldly declared that the break-up of the austro-hungarian empire was a necessity. while ridiculing defensive wars, he nevertheless wrote: "the more obstinate the resistance of france--and now, truly, it is her duty to protect her territory and her independence against the german attack--the more surely does she hold, and will hold, the german army on the western front." again: "the victory of germany over france--a very regrettable strategic necessity in the opinion of german social-democracy--would signify first of all not merely the defeat of the permanent army under a democratic republican régime, but the victory of the feudal and monarchical constitution over the democratic and republican constitution." thus wrote trotzky while still a social-democrat, before he became a bolshevist dictator. how, then, can he denounce france for fighting an "imperialist war," or britain for helping her to prevent a "victory of the feudal and monarchical constitution over the democratic and republican constitution"? the "dictatorship of the proletariat." the "dictatorship of the proletariat" appeals to trotzky, because he has become virtually the dictator of the proletariat and everything else in russia within the power of the "red guards" and his chinese battalions. these chinese battalions, recruited from chinese labourers employed behind the military lines while russia was in the war, may be responsible for some of the "executions" which have taken place. the bolshevist emissary, maxim litvinoff, pooh-poohs all stories of massacres. it is generally the dregs of the chinese population who are recruited for labour gangs abroad; and if "removals" of "counter-revolutionaries" can be accomplished by chinese battalions, the bolsheviks can then aver that they have not had a hand in it! since the acceptance of the brest-litovsk treaty because russia could fight no longer, trotzky has not only talked of raising bolshevik armies, but has succeeded in raising them and officering them by officers of the old tsarist régime. what trotzky would not do against the german armies he is quite prepared to do against those portions of russia that have taken advantage of the self-determination granted by the bolshevist administration. perhaps the peculiar bolshevist philosophy regarding wars of defence is also to apply to neighbouring states if they do not happen to be strong militarily. you must not prevent the "self-determination" of any portion of an existing state, but you may attack it when "self-determined," in the interests of the "international social revolution" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat." that sort of action, when undertaken by an autocracy, is usually described as an act of imperialist aggression in order to divert attention from internal difficulties; and bolshevism in russia is an autocracy--a dictatorship not of the proletariat, but over the proletariat. it cannot possibly be anything else. the russian revolution of march, , was in many respects similar to the french revolution of . it brought the downfall of absolute monarchy. it was not so bourgeois in character as the french revolution, because there was a definite proletarian class in russia, though small in comparison with its immense population, and capitalist production was established. but the russian revolution had this disadvantage compared with the french revolution--there was practically no class able to take over the administration in the interests of the revolution as with the french; and if that was so when certain bourgeois elements were with the revolution, how much less of administrative knowledge would there be in a bolshevist government over millions of ignorant workers and peasants accustomed only to a despotic régime, whose "commissaries" are mainly refugees, most of whom have lost all real touch with russian internal affairs? bolshevist inquisition. there is not the slightest need to accept the capitalist press of this or any other country as authoritative on the present condition of things in russia. consult the bolshevist organs themselves, particularly the "izvestya" and "pravda." they give quite enough evidence to prove what terrorism prevails, how all freedom of the press, speech and public meeting is ruthlessly suppressed. the following is from "pravda" of october last:-- "the absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the 'instruction' issued by the all-russian extraordinary commission to 'all provincial extraordinary commissions,' which says: 'the all-russian extraordinary commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying out house searches, arrests, executions, of which it _afterwards_ reports to the council of the people's commissaries and to the central executive council.' further, the provincial and district extraordinary commissions 'are independent in their activities, and when called upon by the local executive council present a report of their work.' in so far as house searches and arrests are concerned, a report made _afterwards_ may result in putting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. the same cannot be said of executions.... it can also be seen from the 'instruction' that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members of the government, of the central council and of the local executive committees. with the exception of these few persons, all members of the local committees of the [bolshevist] party, of the control committees, and of the executive committee of the party may be shot at any time by the decision of any extraordinary commission of a small district town if they happen to be on its territory, and a report of that made _afterwards_." "vorwärts," quoting from "pravda," says that the bolshevist organ reports that , persons have been executed within the last three months. as regards the internal economic situation in russia under bolshevist rule, a russian workman, whose experience has not been confined to petrograd and moscow, makes the following statement in the "social-demokraten" of stockholm:-- "the output of the factories has decreased by per cent., notwithstanding that the revolutionary committees stimulate production with the revolver. the condition of the railways is worse than ever. all the industrial workmen are against the bolsheviks, and the same is the case with the peasants. the so-called 'committees of the poor' are drawn from the small number of peasants who sought employment in the factories during the war and have now returned to the country. the only supporters of the bolsheviks, apart from the letts and the chinese, are those belonging to their own official caste. the european press has rather understated than exaggerated the red terror." as regards food conditions,[ ] the bolshevist administration seems to be thorough and precise in the issue of food-cards of all descriptions, according to the four categories into which the population is divided. more food-cards, in fact, appear to have been issued to the population of moscow than the population itself, which was , , last april. restaurants, dining-rooms, etc., are fully supplied with supplementary food-cards. but what of supplies? they are, after all, the main thing. translated into english money and weight, the prices last september were as follows: potatoes, - / d. a lb.; fresh cabbage, d. a lb.; fish (supply diminishing), pickled herrings from s. d. to s. d. a lb.; smoked herrings, from s. d. to s. each; meat, s. d. a lb.; pork, s. d. a lb.; boiled sausage, s. d. a lb.; smoked sausage, s. d. a lb.; milk, of which there was little, was s. d. a bottle; cream butter, s. d. a lb.; lump sugar, s. d. a lb. in petrograd meat was from s. d. a lb.; veal, s. a lb.; pork, s. d. a lb.; mutton, s. d. a lb. fish, supplies of which were limited, were about the same prices as at moscow. the figures of municipal bread-baking in petrograd for last april, may and june were , , , and , puds respectively. a pud is lbs. this indicates a most serious reduction. according to rations on the bread-cards, which are / lb. per day, with the same amount for supplementary cards for workers' categories, and / lb. a day per child, the monthly supply for petrograd should be , puds. in october reports from tambov, viatka, vladimir, tula and saratov indicate that, though supplies of all kinds of grain were fairly good, the disorganisation of transport was so great that the larger part of those supplies remained where they were. a number of delegates were sent to saratov to obtain , puds of breadstuffs for twenty-five workmen's organisations in moscow. they only succeeded in obtaining , puds, and they complained most bitterly of "bureaucracy" at the hands of the saratov provincial food committee, who kept them waiting a very long time and finally passed them on to a local committee who declined to do anything. they demanded that pressure should be brought to bear on the provincial committee to make them disgorge part of their large reserves for the starving centre. russian co-operative societies. recently reports and articles have been appearing in certain of the labour and capitalist press favourable to the bolsheviks, notably the "labour leader," concerning the co-operative movement in russia. it is alleged that the growth of the co-operative movement there is evidence that the bolshevist government is really and seriously building up a new socialist society despite the grave difficulties within and the antagonism from without. it is true that the co-operative movement is going ahead in russia, but it is not because of, but in spite of, bolshevism. the co-operative movement in russia is not the product of the bolshevist government; it existed and progressed under tsardom. the help which the co-operative societies rendered to the russian people during the war is beyond all dispute. the majority of the co-operators in the area under bolshevist domination are forced to work with the bolshevist soviets in order to save their societies from dissolution. the co-operative societies in siberia, representing two million affiliated families, a population of about ten millions, have been the backbone of the opposition to the bolshevist government east of the urals. bolshevism in russia is, in fact, a revival of the anarchism of bakunine, tinged with certain marxist theories which the bolshevik refugees have gathered during their numerous sojourns abroad. it is a worship of the revolution to which everything must be sacrificed. in its adoration of the goddess of liberty it is willing-to crush the freedom of human beings. the change from tsardom to bolshevism is, to use trotzky's cynical phrase, "the turn of the wheel." the bolshevist government has now dominated the central portion of european russia for more than a twelvemonth. it bases its demand for general recognition on the fact that it has lasted a year without being overturned, and contends that that proves it has the support of "soviet" russia. the brief statement of internal conditions at moscow and petrograd made above suggests that the reports of terrible food shortage in those great cities, which come from independent sources, are not entirely destitute of foundation. and yet the apologists of the bolsheviks here assure us that in russia at the present time we have a "socialist republic of a very high order"! these facts require to be made thoroughly well known among the working classes of these islands. the idea is being assiduously put about, more subterraneously than openly, that there is now established in russia a genuine socialist republic, or, at all events, a real and conscious attempt on the part of the workers and peasants of russia to establish such a republic. given this idea, there is every reason for a popular agitation to prevent anything being done by the british government and its allies to hamper that socialist republic in the early stages of its development. unfortunately, the utter incapacity of the recent and present coalition to come to any definite policy regarding russia, and the inclination of some of its members to back the reactionists, while standing aloof from the real democratic forces in russia which support the constituent assembly, play completely into the hands of the bolsheviks of russia and their sympathisers here. whatever bolshevist undercurrents there are in the present reckless strike movements in glasgow, belfast and elsewhere are therefore due in great part to the governments of mr. lloyd george. nevertheless it behoves the working class of these islands to take cognisance of the facts concerning russia, for they will enable them to realise clearly the grave mischief that these "unauthorised" strikes are doing, more to their own class and the country generally than to the capitalists against whom the efforts of the majority of the strikers are directed. bolshevism on the clyde. the clyde is the centre of bolshevism in britain, though the spirit of it is in other parts also. but on the clyde a number of very determined and exceedingly well meaning, but "heady," socialists of the s.l.p. "impossibilist" type have influenced by sheer persistence a good many others who do not understand whither they are being led. here, again, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" means the dictation of the proletariat by these "impossibilists," in order to bring capitalist industry to its knees. for that purpose strikes are to be brought about as frequently as possible on no matter what pretext, provided that pretext calls out enough "hands" to paralyse capitalist industry. it may be increased wages one day, shorter hours the next, shop conditions the day after, anything that will cause men to "down tools." the idea, obviously, is to reduce industry to such a state of chaos that it becomes absolutely unprofitable to the employers, and thus it will be easier for the shop committees to take over the "control of industry" by soviets from which all "bourgeois" and "counter-revolutionaries" shall be excluded. meanwhile, when the strikes have reached a certain point, the demand shall be made for government intervention, which, if granted under vague threats of terrible things to come, will redound to the power and credit of the bolshevist leaders; and if not, and disturbances take place, then the leaders will be arrested, the revolutionary fires will be lighted on the clyde, and will spread over the whole country; the leaders in question will be released from gaol by enthusiastic "revolutionary" crowds; and then will follow a glorified transformation scene as in a pantomime, with the heroes bathed in gorgeous "revolutionary" lime-light effects. i should not write in this fashion did i not know that this idea has influenced a few of the most single-minded and devoted socialists on the clyde, and we can only regret that such really noble spirits should have been unable to keep their heads in the greatest crisis in the world's history. the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in operation. the battle cry of the russian bolsheviks and their sympathisers and would-be imitators elsewhere is the "dictatorship of the proletariat." let us consider what that means. dictatorship means despotism, and whether it is that of a tsar or a kaiser, an oligarchy or a bolshevik administration, it is despotism--nothing more and nothing less. impatience with the slowness of the mass of the people is only to be expected in all who see what human existence could be made on this planet, how enjoyable and pleasurable life might be made by light and pleasant labour for all, with the vast powers which man now possesses over nature. i don't suppose there is a single socialist who has spent twenty years of his or her life in the cause of international social-democracy who has not at times wished that the social revolution could be quickly brought about by some benevolent despotism. that a similar train of thought should have entered the minds of russian refugees, driven from a land where political democracy in any form appeared almost hopeless of achievement, is only natural, and equally natural that it should have been pursued to its abstract logical conclusion, inasmuch as, unlike ourselves, they were not working actually amongst the people day in and day out to understand how impossible of realisation such a wish must be. impatience with the mass--however the mass may be worshipped--is at the bottom of the idea of the "dictatorship of the proletariat." they must be emancipated in spite of themselves. liberty and democracy can come afterwards when the socialist dictators have transformed capitalist society into the socialist state. during that transformation the mass must obey the minority which has seized power; it must accept as right and just what that minority decrees; it must abandon liberty of speech and the press, or at least it must refuse those liberties to all who do not agree with the actions of the minority in power. and if the mass don't like it, well----! are these not precisely the principles on which lenin and trotzky are striving to create this "socialist republic of a very high order"? and are they not revealed in the attempts of a small minority to impose their will on the majority during our own strike influenza? often is it observable that those who most vehemently denounce the slightest exercise of power in others have not the faintest objection to using it ruthlessly themselves. bolshevism, then, is another phase, and anything but a pleasant phase, of utopian socialism, whatever use of the name of karl marx be made in connection with its advocacy. the blind samson. the wage-earners constitute by far the largest section of the community. their votes, now more than ever, can do much to control the administration of the country if they will take the trouble to exercise that control in the direction of securing the thorough democratisation of the state, so that it may be made ready to organise the industries of the nation for the common good. the paralysis of industry will hurt the capitalist employers unquestionably, but it will certainly not benefit the workers. blind samson damaged the philistines when he pulled down their temple; but he did not come out unscathed--quite the contrary. the social revolution--i.e., the change from capitalist production for profit to social production for use--cannot be made with rose-water; but that is no reason why there should be blood-letting just for the fun of seeing if red corpuscles are present in sufficient quantity. let them be what they may, the trade unions are the only form of working-class organisation to-day which can secure for the workers a decent standard of existence under capitalist conditions of industry. anything which tends to weaken them and reduce their influence, whether in the interests of the employers or for the supposed advancement of r-r-r-revolutionary proletarian principles, whatever they may be, will be harmful to the workers. it is for the workers themselves to see that their trade unions shall be the means of securing something more than higher wages or even shorter hours of labour. war conditions have shown what a will-o'-the-wisp are mere increases of pay; and short hours of labour such as could easily be arranged under collective organisation of industry, with all the economies of effort which co-operation would effect, cannot be secured under capitalism. that surely should be obvious to all who call themselves socialists and who have even a passing acquaintance with economics; otherwise, why the necessity of the co-operative commonwealth? socialist policy towards the trade unions should be, in short, not their capture for political purposes, nor their upset for bolshevist phantasies, but one of educating the trade unionists. it is only along that line that the social-democratic movement can make real and steady progress. the policy of the strike for anything and everything is not only anti-social; it is anti-socialist. writing on the strike outbreak of ,[ ] i said: "the mass strike is rarely effective, save in a negative fashion. it is successful mostly when used against some particular object or for some definite purpose of the moment. it can be used to break an objectionable agreement; it may prevent the putting into force of an unpopular law, or the passing of some tyrannical measure; it may check an attempt to suppress popular liberties, such as they are; and it may prove the best possible means of preventing war between two countries, if action in that direction be taken equally in both countries. but as _the_ means for the overthrow of the capitalist system and the establishment of the socialist republic it is useless. those who rely upon the general strike as _the_ means for the realisation of social-democracy are like the ancient gauls, of whom it is said that they shook all states and founded none." sporadic and lightning strikes anti-social and anti-socialist. what applied to the strike movement of applies with even greater force to the present strike ebullitions, in which the presence of russian bolsheviks is to be noted. this is all in accordance with the bolshevist plan of "world revolution" for which roubles are being plentifully furnished, mainly through agents in sweden. the prevailing idea is to pull down bourgeois society, no matter what the consequences. if conditions generally in the countries of europe under capitalism to-day were like what they were here a century ago, coupled with an absolute monarchical tyranny such as that which existed until recently in russia, then there might be something to be said for the destruction of bourgeois society by any means that would bring it down. nothing under such conditions could be worse for the mass of the people. but with the destruction of the state in these islands would go the trade unions built up by years of solid labour and sacrifice, the co-operative societies, just now beginning to take a wider outlook on things than mere "divi." hunting, and the democratic political institutions of which the people can make far more use than they do when they choose to exercise their intelligence and bestir their energies. then the increasingly complicated nature of production, distribution and exchange has also to be considered. a piece of grit will often throw elaborate and delicate machinery out of gear, but we do not regard it as a revolutionary agent on that account. the control of a few engineering workshops by shop stewards, puffed out with vanity and a "little brief authority," will not provide the food necessary to feed the people of these islands. we have, too, an indication of the spirit of liberty with which they are animated in the massed picketing at glasgow, not against blacklegs and non-unionists, but against fellow trade unionists who refused to aid "unauthorised strikes." i have said that these "down tools" outbursts are anti-socialist. they are anti-socialist because they are anarchical. they may pull down, but they cannot build up. socialism and socialists have suffered enough during the war because of the freaks and cranks that the war discovered among us, and the greater number of the same genus who now profess to be socialists without understanding much, if anything, about the socialist movement. we do not want further prejudice raised against us by attempts to connect us with anarchical violence, hooliganism and looting. nothing for the benefit of the people can possibly come out of what is now going on. all it will do is to help reaction, and make even the majority of the working class ready to acquiesce in a mild military dictatorship as a lesser evil than bolshevist tyranny and violence. and there are some british generals who are popular, and who are not merely militarists! there is no royal road to the social revolution. the steady and patient work of socialist propaganda and organisation together with the pressing forward of thorough-going collectivist proposals for the ownership and control of industry for the common good, and the imagination to take advantage of everything that will help forward the great change from capitalist production for profit to socialist production for use--those are the lines we must follow. all the imaginary shortcuts of the impatient ones, which lead to anarchical deserts or reactionary morasses, serve only to retard real social-democratic progress. footnotes: [ ] comrade "r.," who has written much for "justice" on the food question abroad, has supplied these particulars.--h.w.l. [ ] "the great strike movement of , and its lessons." +----------------------------------------------------------+ | for accurate and reliable information on international | | labour and socialist movements | | and happenings read... | | | | "justice." | | | | the oldest socialist journal in great britain. | | | | =published every thursday, price twopence.= | | | | of all newsagents, or direct from the publishers, | | twentieth century press ( ) ltd., - clerkenwell | | green, london. e.c. subscription rates: weeks, | | / ; weeks, /-; weeks, /-; post free. | +----------------------------------------------------------+ printed and published by the twentieth century press ( ), ltd., - clerkenwell green, london, e.c. . trade unions and other organisations supplied with quantities at special rates, to be had on application to the manager. * * * * * +-------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page : 'whch have taken place' replaced with | | 'which have taken place' | | | +-------------------------------------------------+ * * * * * russian revolution by alexander petrunkevitch, samuel northrup, harper frank,and alfred golder the jugo-slav movement by robert joseph kerner preface whatever may be its final outcome the russian revolution of bids fair to remain one of the great events of modern history. its consequences are still immeasurable and today to many they appear as fraught with menace as with hope. they have within less than a year led a mighty empire to the brink of dissolution and no man can foretell where and how the process will end for worse or for better. the russian revolution saved the central powers at the moment when their prospect looked darkest, but on the other hand it facilitated the entrance of the united states into the war as one for liberty and democracy. time has yet to show whether the loss or the gain has been the greater for the allied cause and for mankind. it will be paid for at a heavy price but our hope cannot easily be shaken that sooner or later an event so full of promise for the misruled millions of the autocratic empire of the tsar will mark a step forward, not backward, in the progress of the world. the whole story of the sudden out-break in petrograd which in little more than a day swept away the fabric of imperial government will not soon be told, if ever. all real information on the subject is timely and valuable. we need such studies as those contained in the present volume, in order that we may understand what has happened, and why it has happened. the rise of the modern jugo-slav movement offers us a very different picture. the subject and even the name are new to most people, the scale is much smaller; the events have been less dramatic. but the unconquerable resistance which a small disjointed nationality has offered throughout the ages to ill fortune, oppression, and to attempts to obliterate it entirely arouses our admiration. the movement too was intimately connected with the outbreak of the present world war which cannot be understood without taking it into account. it still represents only an ardent hope for the future but when the day of peace and justice comes no permanent allotment can be made of the lands east of the adriatic that shall not give it at least some satisfaction. archibald cary coolidge. march , . the role of the intellectuals in the liberating movement in russia by alexander petrunkevitch in an interview dated november , and published in the _new york times_ in a special cable from petrograd, leon trotzky in defending the attitude of the people toward the bolsheviki _coup d'etat_ is reported to have said substantially the following: "all the bourgeoisie is against us. the greater part of the intellectuals is against us or hesitating, awaiting a final outcome. the working class is wholly with us. the army is with us. the peasants, with the exception of exploiters, are with us. the workmen's and soldiers' government is a government of workingmen, soldiers, and peasants against the capitalists and landowners." on the other hand my father, ivan petrunkevitch, floorleader of the constitutional democratic party in the first duma and since that time owner and publisher of the petrograd daily _rech_ writes in a private letter dated june : "... the present real government, i. e., the council of soldiers' and workmen's deputies, whose leaders are neither soldiers nor workmen, but intellectuals, etc." nothing has happened during the months intervening between the letter and the interview to change the composition of the council appreciably. it is true that kerensky who was vice-president of the council has been meanwhile deposed; that tshcheidze had to relinquish the presidency in the council to trotzky long before kerensky's downfall; but the leaders of the council still are intellectuals, are well educated men, some of them well known writers on political and economic questions and withal very different from the masses which they lead and which they purport to represent. in justice to those who had to give way to the lenine-trotzky crowd of supporters, i wish to state emphatically that i do not want to put them on the same plane. tseretelli, plekhanov, tshcheidze, and their co-workers are men of great courage, high ideals, and personal integrity. on the other hand their successors in power are men of a totally different type. the integrity of many of their number has been openly questioned, the accusations, published & broadcast, remained unanswered, and no suit for libel was brought by the men thus accused. lenine was put under suspicion of having accepted german help and of having planned with germany's agents the disorganization of the russian army. it has been even charged on apparently good evidence that the leaflets distributed at the front were printed with german money. trotzky was accused by miliukov in the _rech_ (june ) of having received $ , from german-americans for the purpose of organizing the attack on kerensky's government. ganetsky was forced to leave denmark by an order of the danish government, having been convicted of dishonest dealings in a danish court. zinoviev is accused of forgery. others are also under suspicion which has been only increased by the arrest and imprisonment of burtzev who is known for his untiring efforts to hunt down traitors to the cause of the russian revolution and who had important evidence in his possession. it is also a remarkable fact that the majority of the present leaders are known broadly only under assumed names. lenine's true name is uljanov, trotzky's--bronstein, zinoviev's--apfelbaum, sukhanov's--gimmer, kamenev's--rosenfeld, steklov's--nakhamkis, and a number of others whose identity is not even always known. trotzky's assertion that the workmen's and soldiers' government is a government of workingmen, soldiers, and peasants is therefore nothing but a perversion of facts. there is, however, nothing extraordinary in the fact itself that intellectuals are the real leaders of all russian parties. better education and wider knowledge of the affairs of the world have always appealed to the dark masses who realize only dimly their own desires and grasp at any concrete formulation of reforms which contains a tangible promise or seems to express those desires. at the same time they often put their own meaning into the words of their leaders, which is true even of factory workers in the larger cities. as for the peasants, representing about per cent of the entire population, they are still very poorly educated, questions of national import remain outside their horizon, and even their language is not the language of the educated russian, inasmuch as it lacks the rich vocabulary of modern life and is devoid of the very conceptions to which this vast treasury of words applies. their mind, great as it is in its potentialities, still moves in the furrows of familiar ideas abhorring things too much at variance with inherited traditions or actual experience. yet in the turmoil of revolutionary activity the peasants are going to have their say and may become the decisive factor, because they are voters and are casting their votes for those leaders whose words they believe to contain the greatest promise and the least menace of a general disruption of their accustomed mode of life. we are thus brought back, for the present at least, to the necessity of recognizing that even the state of anarchy under which russia is laboring, even the rule of the renowned proletariat so much trumpeted about by lenine and trotzky, is in reality the work of intellectuals, an answer of the masses to the call of their leaders, a groping for principles beyond their perception. it suffices a very casual examination of the programs and resolutions of various political parties to see the truth of this statement. they are expressive of the opinions of the leaders, not of the masses; are couched in the language of the educated russian, not in that of the workman or peasant and, except for the concluding slogans like "peace, bread, and land," are alien to the very spirit of the masses. in this respect all parties are confronted with the same difficulty since all strive to get the support of the masses, yet have to express principles evolved through careful and extensive study of national, political, and economic problems, strange to the uneducated mind. for the same reason the methods of surmounting the difficulty differ in many respects and are characteristic of each party. the conservative intellectuals of russia early realized the necessity of meeting the peasant on his own ground and the advantage of appealing to him in his own language. the idea of a benevolent ruler, an all-suffering motherland, and an all-unifying church exercised a powerful appeal upon the imagination, for a long time superseding and forcing into the background the growing, elemental, and unfulfilled longing for more land. the ideology of a perfect monarchy is so simple and its shortcomings so easily attributable to dishonesty of officials, that it answered the peasant's thoughts as long as he was not able to see the folly of distinguishing between the system and its realization, but separated in his mind the image of his loving monarch from the cruel reality of everyday life as he still distinguishes between the faith and the priest. the great mistake of all conservatives is that they seek to bring about a state of perfect justice by improving only the quality of the ruling body without changing the conditions of life of the ruled mass. yet even so the conservatives had quite a following among the peasants up to the time of the revolution of and in a way may still have a future before them. the octoberists find no support in the masses and do not make any serious attempt to gain it. they frankly acknowledged themselves as the party of industry and trade, having no wider interests at heart than the maintenance of order and law throughout the country. their leaders were forced into a revolutionary attitude only at the time when there was danger of a universal collapse of russia if the tsar's government persisted, and they may be forced to join in a counter-revolution, if their interests are again endangered. their ideology is that of a capitalistic class and their power depends entirely on the future development of industry and trade in russia. for the present they are nowhere. unable to find a new basis for their activity in place of class interest, they lack unity of purpose and are deserted by their own former supporters among their employees. trade and industry are disorganized and the party may never be resurrected. the constitutional democrats are in this respect better off. they find their support chiefly among more or less educated people of various pursuits: lawyers, bankers, brokers, journalists, teachers, artists, scientists, etc. their program embraces the interests of all classes and demands political, judicial, economic, industrial and agrarian legislation of a very radical and extensive kind. their horizon of vision includes the sufferings and aspirations of the often incongruous elements of the vast whole, but their ideology is still based on the long outworn idealistic capitalism and for this reason alone does not and cannot appeal to not-owning classes. their agrarian program is in this respect the most striking example. it is worked out in great detail and is aimed at a betterment of the condition of peasants without deep injury to the present landowners. it recognizes the right of the peasant to more land, it provides for future state ownership of land to prevent it from falling into wrong hands, but does not condemn the principle of landownership, nor the injustice of present ownership, and for that reason elaborates a method of compensation for compulsorily alienated land through universal taxation. to avoid excessive burden to the impoverished peasant the compensation is to be in the shape of bonds representing the average value of the land in each particular case, only the interest on these bonds to be paid yearly from universal taxes--a topsy-turvy mortgage system, as it were, in which the state becomes the proprietor and mortgagor of the land, while its present owners are turned into forced mortgagees. under this system the peasants will get all land available, but per cent will have to pay for what is owned by a small fraction of even the remaining per cent of the entire population. the proposed scheme proved to be too radical for the tsar's government in and caused the downfall of the first duma. it provoked at the time bitter comment in germany also, where the conservative and national-liberal press accused the russian constitutional democratic party of putting forward impossible demands and of attacking the very principle of property ownership. yet the principle underlying the proposed reform is unquestionably capitalistic and is the chief cause of the hatred and contempt which the party enjoys on the part of social-democrats. in the beginning of the sixties the conservative land committee appointed by alexander ii, composed of hereditary landowners, avowed enemies of any economic liberation of peasants, out of fear that private ownership of land might enrich the peasants and make them dangerous to the established order, devised a scheme of communal ownership of land and unconsciously taught the peasants the principles of socialism. in constitutional democrats opposed the bill of the government for the dissolution of land communities and substitution of private for communal land ownership at the request of individual peasants. the objection raised was on the ground that peasants suddenly possessed of a chance to get ready money would sell their land to a few exploiters and being unable to put it to good use would rapidly become paupers. the best men in the duma opposed stolypin's bill, and the law was introduced by stealth and promulgated during a forced recess of the duma. contrary to expectation the law neither led to the results desired by the government, nor to those feared by constitutional democrats. it remained a dead letter. few members of peasant communities applied for separation. the government tried to boost its scheme by building at its own expense model, fake peasant homes. the peasants had already their own idea as to remedies in regard to land shortage and did not want any substitute. the difficulty of making the peasant respect the principle of private ownership of land is due to many causes. the most liberal minded landowners were usually those who spent their winters in various occupations in large cities and used their estates as summer homes and a partial source of income. the work of supervision was only too often intrusted to utterly unscrupulous and uneducated managers belonging to the peasant class, while the neighboring peasants were employed as day laborers in the field and garden. this kind of labor was already available, because peasants were unable to derive sufficient income from their own land to pay the heavy taxes and to support their families. scarcely any landowners understood anything of agriculture and few paid any attention to it. i know splendid estates which brought in miserable incomes, not normal even under the antiquated system of four year crop rotation and quite absurd if measured by standards of modern american farming, yet sufficient to place at the disposal of the owners a splendid mansion in moscow or petrograd and a no less splendid summer home on their estate. there, during the hot summer days, the owners were enjoying their comfort in idleness and talking of reforms necessary for the benefit of the peasants, while peasant women were cutting the wheat for them with sickles, stooping and sweating under the scorching rays of the sun. the superintendents of those estates enriched themselves at the expense of the blind or careless and carefree owners under the very eyes of the peasants who hated the superintendents, pitied or despised the liberal owners, as the case might be, and gloomily compared their own poverty and labor with the ease and wealth of their employers. the more thrifty and less liberal owners, who remained the greater part of the year on their estates, were perhaps more respected but still less liked. any attempt at careful management of the estate was invariably considered to be a sign of stinginess or of hardheartedness. the idea of property is not clearly defined in the mind of the average peasant who considers plants that are not planted but grow wild to be a gift of god. in disputes involving such cases the line between rightful possession and theft is difficult to draw, and men who took the controversy to court were invariably hated. a glaring example of this kind was an otherwise liberal minded landowner, a well known professor of sociology, who spent three-quarters of a year in lecturing at a foreign university of which he was a member and who was finally murdered on his own estate. the home life of even liberal intellectuals was another barrier between them and the masses. not only was coarse food considered to be good enough for domestics, but they seldom, if ever, had a decent corner for themselves in the house and their miserable wages were out of all proportion with the long hours of service required. many families had guests almost daily, the company sitting around a samovar, discussing and conversing until one or two in the morning, while the sleepy domestics were stealing a nap in the anteroom, ready to appear at the call of the mistress. the table had to be cleared after the guests and the family retired for the night and the breakfast had to be prepared, boots polished, stoves heated, rooms cleaned in the early morning. for the master might rest until ten or eleven, but the children have to be at school by eight and the servants must be ready to serve them. and though many families kept professional servants, the country homes depended almost entirely in winter as well as in summer on local help. attempts to improve the condition of peasants were numerous and in some respects successful, but found an obstacle on the one hand in the attitude of the government and on the other in the conservatism and suspicion of the peasants themselves. fire insurance and cooperative enterprises helped to a certain degree, but an almost complete absence of expert agriculturists in the ranks of the landowners prevented them from demonstrating on their own estates the value of applied knowledge as well as from teaching the peasants how to increase the productivity of the land through intensive farming. thus it came to pass that the vast majority of landowners, both conservative and liberal, remained strangers to the people among whom they lived, whose labor they employed, and for whose welfare many were in earnest concerned. the constitutional democratic party is strong in the cities. in the country it has no followers and in the sweeping incendiary fires of - estates were burned which belonged in several cases to men who spent their life in fighting for freedom against the tsar's government. no less unfortunate is the party in its relation to the class of factory workers. that part of its program which relates to the labor question embraces a number of important reforms meeting almost all demands of the working class. the barrier between them is the capitalistic principle. a perusal of the lists of constitutional democrats who have subscribed large sums for the russian liberty loan will show why workmen speak of them as capitalists even though the party has accepted the principle of progressive income taxation. there is a feeling of intense hatred toward all constitutional democrats on the part of all workmen. nothing is more instructive than the rapid change in the position which the constitutional democratic party occupied in the eyes of the people after the revolution. before the outbreak of hostilities all parties were against war. but soon, under the influence of the german methods of warfare in belgium, france, and russia, the feeling changed. even the mensheviki among the social-democrats declared themselves in favor of war and the only party remaining firm in condemning all war was that of the bolsheviki. the entrance of the turks into the war was almost considered a godsend by the constitutional democrats, octoberists, and conservatives in the duma because it cleared the way for a final settlement of the balkan problem and promised the elimination of turkey from europe. long after sazonov was removed, when the consent of england and france to give russia free hand in constantinople and the straits was read in a telegram before the duma, a general outburst of enthusiasm took place, the members demanding to know why sazonov, who was justly credited with this achievement, was in retirement and not in charge of the foreign office which he should have held by right. miliukov's speeches and writings on the future settlement of the balkan problem were jokingly spoken of as his dissertation for the degree of foreign secretary. at home the party was pursuing a policy of patient endurance, postponing strife for the future until the crimes of the tsar's government made further silence impossible. at that time the whole tissue of treason was not yet known, but enough was in evidence to demand vigorous protest. not being a revolutionary party the constitutional democrats abstained from any action not strictly within the law and merely condemned the activity of the government. they desired amelioration of the fundamental laws, but even that they would have preferred to accomplish by persuasion rather than by force. in fact they considered socialist demands unreasonable, socialization of russia premature, and any violent overthrow unwise and hazardous. for the latter opinion they found support in the failure of the uprising of the working class in - , when the punitive expeditions proved the loyalty of the army to the throne. consequently the attitude of the army in the memorable days of the march revolution was a great surprise to them. at the same time they attributed to themselves the lion share in the overthrow, presumably on the ground that masses follow leaders and the constitutional \ democrats were the only ones who had a chance for open protest in the duma and made use of it. this delusion led to a series of tactical errors and cost them dearly. in all elections they polled a comparatively small vote. trying to save russia for the allies they failed to meet the russian socialists on their own ground and were forced to explain away differences of opinion much too thoroughgoing to be explained away. in a country which is in the throes of the most remarkable revolution ever witnessed, they tried to apply non-revolutionary methods and drew on themselves the suspicion of the masses of being counter-revolutionists. from the very moment when miliukov announced the passing of the supreme power from the tsar to grand duke michail, when his words were answered by angry shouts in favor of a democratic republic, the position of the party became precarious. they had either to revise their own program and to catch up with the rush of the progressive current, or else to find themselves in the rôle of inundated rocks over which the waters flow. the announcement that the party would support a demand for a republic was too late to change the first impression, while the proposition to accept unconditional expropriation of land in place of the compensation plan was defeated in heated debate at the party convention. under normal circumstances the party would have probably been steadily losing support, but the arrest and imprisonment of the best and highly honored leaders by the bolsheviki is bound to put fresh vigor into their efforts and give new life to their cause. the leaders of the bolsheviki themselves have fallen into error of a different kind. being primarily a party of the wage earning day laborers, the program of the bolsheviki puts the interest of the proletariat above everything else. from insufficient observation of peasant life and the fact that peasants want socialization of land, they jump to the conclusion that the country is ready for complete socialization. only the more educated leaders among them realize that such a conclusion is premature. but to bring about the necessary change in as near a future as possible, the leaders of the bolsheviki have fanned hatred of the proletariat toward the "bourgeois" classes. one must give them credit in this respect. they know the value of simple language when they put this hatred into words. listen to the russian marseillaise: "rise, brothers, all at once against the thieves, the curs--the rich ones! against the vampire tsar! beat them, kill them--the cursed evil-doers! glow, dawn of better life!" the simple ideology, the easy catch phrases in which the language of this ideology is couched, the primeval character of the passion aroused, contribute to the success which the party enjoys among working people and homeless paupers. therein lies the power of the bolsheviki. but reaction is bound to come and here again the peasants will play the chief rôle. all accounts of conversations with peasants tend to show that they have very vague ideas of socialism. in fact the social-democrats have not taken the trouble to acquaint the peasants with the principles of their teaching, leaving that field almost entirely to the influence of socialist-revolutionists. among the intellectuals none have come nearer to the understanding of peasant psychology than those men and women who from the first espoused the cause of the peasant. realizing the space separating educated men from their less fortunate brothers, they gave up their life as intellectuals and "went among the people." they donned peasant garb and acquired peasant tongue. from this group of workers for freedom later the socialist-revolutionary party developed. "all land for the peasant" is their slogan, while their promise to expropriate all land without any compensation naturally meets with approval on the part of the land-hungry peasants. moreover, their program does not demand immediate complete socialization of russia, leaving that to a gradual process of evolution and change of existing conditions. in the ten years preceding the first revolution thousands of young intellectuals joined the party and fought the tsar's regime. they showed a degree of self-abnegation found only in people whose heart is kindled with the true spirit of devotion to a great cause. the revolution of would never have taken place but for their organized "terror from below." the high regard held for them by the widest circles has caused their rise in power during the first two months of the revolution of . but tactical errors committed by the leaders of the party as well as dissensions within the party itself contributed to a rather rapid change of sentiment toward them on all sides. in a measure as the constitutional democrats vigorously objected to their policy to put into life as soon as possible the agrarian reforms promised by them, the social-democrats on their part attacked them for their moderation in other demands. for some reason not yet clear, kerensky was slighted in the very beginning of his political career when his nomination to the executive council of the socialist-revolutionist party was opposed by a large majority. just as the constitutional democrats made a series of tactical errors due to the fact that they thought themselves representative of the spirit of the russian people, whereas in reality they stood sponsors only for a relatively small minority, even so the socialist-revolutionists misjudged the attitude of other parties toward themselves. they overrated the ability of the masses to distinguish between their attitude toward war in general and the necessity to continue the present war. they overrated the ability of the soldiers to distinguish between slavish obedience and military discipline. they tried to play the rôle of a center. they tried to mediate between social-democrats and constitutional democrats and naturally failed in this attempt. some of their leaders, notably mr. tschernov, were accused by constitutional democrats of being pro-german if not actual german agents. others, including kerensky himself and even mme. breshkovsky, were accused by the bolsheviki of having been almost bribed by the capitalistic interests of america, england, and france. needless to say that the accusations had no basis whatever in actual facts and represent simply an ugly outgrowth of misguided jealousy of the masses to guard their dearly won right to a social revolution against those whom they consider the worst enemies of socialism, and the desire of unscrupulous leaders to profit by it. thus the socialist-revolutionists were gradually relegated in the mind of the extremists to the great body of the hated "bourgeois." only in their rightful element, among the peasants, they continue to enjoy a great deal of popularity, and the returns to the constituent assembly show that theirs will be the absolute majority even though they lost some of their popularity. the progress of the russian revolution presents a sad spectacle of an almost complete failure on the part of the majority of intellectuals to understand the spirit of the times and to guide the masses through the labyrinth of errors. in days past the russian intellectuals were the forefighters for freedom and the russian people will ever be indebted to them for this. they prepared the soil for the revolution by spreading ideas of freedom by all means at their disposal. they weakened the tsar's power and thus contributed to its overthrow by persistent attacks upon the system of autocratic government. they helped to awaken the spirit of self-consciousness in the masses. but they did not evolve new principles. they did not open wide avenues for the development of a new order of social organization. they misunderstood the masses and consequently were unable to control the forces set loose. and if russia is going to be saved from utter ruin amidst the clamor and strife of party leaders and to evolve a new democratic system, it will be due not to the intellectuals, but to the great spirit of the dark masses of the russian peasants. forces behind the russian revolution forces behind the russian revolution by samuel n. harper one was struck by the remarkable unity that characterized the short first period of the russian revolution of last march. one knew, however, that there were two distinct sets of forces behind the movement, operating through two kinds of organizations. there were first the already existing and parliamentary institutions which had become revolutionary in spirit and methods of action. on the other hand there were the institutions produced by the revolution itself, emerging from the chaos in the midst of which the other, already functioning bodies, were trying to take a new and directing line. the most prominent of the first type of institution was the duma, the legislative parliament of the old regime, and of the second type, the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies. the duma, however, was only one of several legal institutions that had developed under the old regime, and represented the first stages of parliamentary, popular government. there were the local provincial and municipal councils, and also the officially recognized war-industry committees, which had come to have semi-governmental functions. finally one could bring under this category, with a little forcing, the cooperative societies, which had assumed enormous importance during the two and a half years of war. in these institutions we had self-government, and participation in public affairs, and also the idea of cooperation between the various classes and political tendencies--the idea of coalition. the election law of the duma provided for the representation of all group interests of the community, and representation by an actual member of the group, by a _bona fide_ peasant in the case of the peasantry. the seats in the assembly were distributed specifically to landlords, manufacturers, the smaller bourgeoisie, workmen, and peasants. the election law of the local government bodies made similar provision for group representation. on the war-industry committees, the workmen had elected representatives, sitting with the representatives of the manufacturers and owners. in the coöperative movement the bourgeois-intellectual element had taken the initiative, but had always emphasized the direct participation of the workmen and peasants in the actual management of the societies, as the theory of the movement demanded. thus the broader democratic classes of the country, the workmen and peasants, were represented in the somewhat popular institutions that had developed under the old regime. but the actual control was in the hands of the less democratic elements--the landlords, the manufacturers, men of the liberal professions, and of the so-called intelligentsia class. most of these men were of liberal and democratic tendencies, but they were in actual fact, as compared with the broader masses, of the privileged classes. they had emphasized always the essentially democratic character of the activity of the institutions in which they were the leaders. they put particular stress on the fact that the activities of the local provincial councils, for example, were directed mainly toward the amelioration of conditions of life among the peasantry. but the fact that the control over these institutions, even in the cooperative movement (so far as independent control was allowed by the bureaucracy of the old regime), was secured to the less democratic elements of the community, did contradict the idea of coalition, of the bringing together of all interests and forces. these institutions had been permitted to exist and develop only because they were controlled by the more conservative groups. the cooperative societies represented more truly the idea of coalition. here in the cooperative movement the leaders of political liberalism had always noted with relief that one was gradually attaining the end toward which they knew they must work--the organic union between the so-called intelligentsia, and the "people," meaning the broader, democratic classes. when the anarchy resulting from the incompetence, stupidity and perhaps treason of the old bureaucracy reached such an acute stage in the first weeks of march that the leaders of the russian public saw that some action must be taken by some one, it was the duma that assumed the initiative, acting in a revolutionary manner, through an executive committee. the municipal and provincial councils, organized in unions for war-work, and the war-industry committees, turned without delay to the revolutionary parliament, in which many of their leading workers were members. the leaders of the coöperative movement could not act with such rapidity and precision. they had not been permitted to organize a central committee, to coordinate the work of the thousands of small and scattered societies. these first leaders of the revolution felt justified in taking the initiative because they alone were organized. also they thought they could speak in the name of all classes, including the most democratic, because the institutions through which they acted did include representatives of all classes. to emphasize its special anxiety that the more democratic groups feel their direct participation in the movement of which it had taken the leadership, the executive committee of the duma not only accepted but encouraged the development of the revolutionary institutions of the second category, of which the first to emerge was the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies. this council was organized during the very first days of the revolution; it was in fact the resurrection of a revolutionary body of the revolution. the duma invited the council to share its own convenient quarters. perhaps the invitation was an afterthought, for the workmen and soldiers of petrograd in revolt had gravitated toward the duma, had calmly entered and taken possession of the large corridors of the palace. the council was a strictly revolutionary, and a very democratic body, composed of directly elected delegates from the factories and garrison regiments of petrograd. it immediately became the organizing center for what came to be called the "revolutionary democracy," as opposed to the "bourgeoisie." the executive committee of the duma consulted with the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies on the composition of the proposed provisional government, and on the political program to be announced. for as we saw, it was the first thought of these leaders to secure unity of action. they recognized that the council did in fact represent "revolutionary democracy," at least of petrograd. as the workmen and soldiers of petrograd were completely out of hand, armed and fighting on the streets, arresting officers, ministers and police, and showing a tendency to start general and anarchic pillaging, the duma leaders saw a restraining authority in the council of these same workmen and soldiers. they therefore either did not wish, or did not dare, to object at the time to the famous order no. to the garrison of petrograd, issued by the council, and not by the executive committee of the duma. many have claimed that this particular order, which was extended to the front, was responsible for the later demoralization of the whole russian army. others, the leaders of revolutionary democracy, have insisted that this order prevented the immediate and complete collapse of the whole army. in preparing the slate for the new government, the executive committee of the duma selected one of the presiding officers of the council, kerensky. when miliukov, the duma leader, announced the composition of the new provisional government to the crowd, composed largely of workmen and soldiers gathered in the main corridors of the duma, he emphasized the cooperation between duma and council, the consent of kerensky to enter the government, and also the fact that most of the members of the new government had worked in and through institutions, in which peasants and workmen also had been represented. though the word "coalition" was not used during the first weeks of the revolution, one had constantly in mind the idea of "bringing together all the vital forces of the country." in this last expression i quote one of the first and most emphasized slogans of the revolution. but the problem proved most difficult, complicated by the fact that one had to solve at one and the same time two most stupendous tasks. one had to consolidate the conquests of the revolution, and also prosecute the war. the prosecution of the war required the acceptance of a strong authority, vested in the provisional government. but naturally the first aim of the revolution was to extend its ideas to the rest of the country, for the actual overthrow of the old order had been largely the work of petrograd. the two tasks were closely associated with one another, because one could not reorganize the country for the war until the new ideas had taken root. the first parliamentary leaders wished to use as the basis for carrying out both tasks the old institutions, the municipal and provincial councils, and the coöperative societies, at the same time taking steps gradually to democratize them. but the strictly revolutionary leaders wished to democratize immediately, and put this forward as the first object to be accomplished. so they demanded and promoted the organizing of revolutionary democracy all over the country, through councils of workmen, soldiers, and peasants, through army committees, land committees, professional unions, and so forth. the champions of this immediate democratization policy were almost exclusively members of the various socialist parties, some of them representing the most extreme views. the majority of them were not consciously striving to undermine the authority of the provisional government. they recognized and in fact advocated the compromise represented in the first group of leaders. they trusted most of them, but wished at the same time to organize revolutionary democracy, for self-protection for the moment, and perhaps for self-assertion at a later date. but a minority of the socialist leaders did not take this constructive line. from the very start they professed to distrust the first provisional government, for they did not believe in "coalition"--the co-operation between the various group interests of the community. their theory was that of class struggle; they proclaimed this to be their aim, and worked to give to the revolution this character. though a minority, they were a very active and energetic group, and tended to give the tone in the meetings and resolutions of revolutionary democracy, thus dulling the spirit of cooperation, which characterized the first period of the revolution. the extremists wished a social revolution, "permanent revolution," class struggle, and they agitated openly and with energy. the workmen and soldiers of petrograd had borne the brunt of the physical side of the revolution. only workmen and soldiers had been killed fighting for the revolution during that first week. these particular groups were therefore proclaimed the "pride and flower of the revolution," and told that they must establish the dictatorship of the proletariat, thus consolidating the conquests of the revolution, which should not be allowed to remain a mere bourgeois affair. the moderate, constructive socialists did not accept this extreme view, but they nevertheless recognized the need for an effective organization of revolutionary democracy all over the country, to ensure the adoption of truly democratic policies. so they also set about to strengthen and extend the councils and committees that had emerged with the revolution, coordinating them in conferences and formal congresses. much of the activity along these lines was in fact of a constructive character. but class and party considerations were always in the foreground at all these congresses. also the constructive socialists did not accept the idea of a formal coalition at the beginning. they did not participate as organizations in the first government. kerensky was a socialist, but he entered the first government as a member of the duma, and not as the representative of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies. the resolution of a conference of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, called during the fourth week of the revolution, summarizes the attitude of revolutionary democracy toward the problem of the moment. the full text of the resolution, given in a literal translation to preserve as far as possible the style of the original, is an interesting document: "whereas the provisional government, that was brought into power by the overthrow of the autocracy, represents the interests of the liberal and democratic bourgeoisie, but shows a tendency to follow the right line, in the declaration published by it in agreement with the representatives of the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, therefore the all-russian conference of councils of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, while insisting on the need of constant pressure being brought to bear on the provisional government to arouse it to the most energetic struggle with the counter-revolutionary forces, and to decisive measures in the direction of an immediate democratization of the entire russian life, nevertheless recognizes that political expediency dictates support of the provisional government by the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies _so long_ as the provisional government, in agreement with the council, moves inflexibly toward the consolidation of the conquests of the revolution and the extension of these conquests." the expression "so long as," emphasized in the translation of the resolution, has been one of the most far-reaching of the formulae produced by the revolution. around this phrase has centered the struggle of these last months. the extremists decided from the very start that the condition had not been fulfilled. the more moderate socialists took an attitude of constant watchfulness, and latent distrust. "revolutionary democracy" could not be organized in a week or a month, so for the first period it was represented by the revolutionary democracy of petrograd, through the petrograd council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, supplemented by delegates from similar councils of other cities, and by representatives from the army at the front. it was more difficult to organize the peasants scattered through the country, and not concentrated in barracks or factories. the workmen and soldiers of petrograd therefore assumed to represent all revolutionary democracy, and they had the physical force behind them. they were there on the spot, at the administrative and political center inherited from the old regime, ready to act without delay when they decided that the provisional government should no longer be supported. and the workmen and soldiers of petrograd were being won over gradually to the extremists, the bolsheviki. as the provisional government was aiming first of all to preserve social peace, adopting a policy of conciliation, it did not oppose the supervision exercised by the council. in fact it realized that only recognition of such supervision would ensure any measure of common action. the duma committee had been asked to efface itself, for as an institution of the old regime it aroused the suspicions of the revolutionary bodies. the efficiency of the local government bodies was sacrificed to the idea of immediate democratization. the establishment of revolutionary committees all over the country, and in the army even, was countenanced and accepted, though perhaps only because it was seen that it could not be prevented except by repressive measures, to which the first leaders were unwilling to resort. perhaps also the latter realized that physical force was not on their side. the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies acted on the principle of a direct mandate from the whole people. it issued orders to revolutionary democracy, as we saw. it insisted on the exercise of a real control, even on the right to countersign, as it were, some of the orders of the provisional government. then it definitely questioned the policy and measures of the minister of foreign affairs and the minister of war. when these two men were forced to resign, the other members of the government demanded that revolutionary democracy share in the responsibility of government, if it insisted on such a measure of control. the councils at first refused, but later agreed, and a frankly and officially recognized coalition government was formed. socialists entered the government not only as members of their respective parties, but as representatives of revolutionary democracy organized in the councils, which now contained delegates from the peasantry, hurriedly brought in by a somewhat artificial system of representation. the first coalition government drew up a program of policy. as this program was somewhat vaguely worded, coalition in the strict and true sense of the word was not secured. the socialists had entered the coalition under pressure, as we saw. some of them felt called upon to justify the step in a statement, later discovered and made public, to socialists of other countries. in the statement they explained that they had entered the government, in order to "deepen and extend the class struggle." and this is what some of them did actually start in to do, using their authority and powers as ministers to turn the organs of revolutionary democracy in this direction, promoting suspicion of and antagonism toward the bourgeoisie. the socialist ministers also held themselves directly responsible to the councils. finally the socialist members of the government tried to force immediate decisions on questions of a fundamental nature, which should be decided only by the constituent assembly, thus not adhering to the program drawn up as the basis for the coalition. the position of the non-socialist members of the government therefore became untenable, and a whole group of them resigned. the resignation of the most influential bourgeois group of the first coalition government coincided quite accidentally with an armed uprising which the extremists, the bolsheviki, had been planning for several weeks. for the extremists were again putting forward their demand, this time supported by armed force, that all the "capitalist" ministers resign, and that all authority pass into the hands of the councils. but the councils refused to take over authority, the constructive majority replying that they would not accept the responsibility. in their judgment only a government representing all the vital forces of the country, that is a coalition government, could succeed. the moderate socialists prevailed in the councils, and a second coalition was formed, this time under the presidency of a socialist, kerensky. some weeks elapsed before the new government was finally organized. the non-socialist groups were willing to enter a coalition government led by a socialist, but only on a definite program, which would exclude all fundamental legislation. objection was raised also to certain individual socialists, whose record in the first coalition government made one doubt their willingness to adhere honestly to any coalition program. this objection was withdrawn later; but the non-socialists gave only their second-best men as members of the new government. the non-socialists also had demanded that the provisional government be absolutely independent, its members not responsible to any councils or party committees. for the councils of workmen's and soldiers' deputies were as we saw exclusively socialistic, and had become mere party bodies. in the meantime the democratization of local government bodies was going on apace, and very successfully in view of the chaotic conditions produced by revolution and war. as the new local municipal and provincial councils, elected by universal suffrage, began to convene, the revolutionary committees and councils were expected gradually to disappear. the elections for the constituent assembly were to take place as soon as the new local governing bodies could verify and correct the lists of voters. the constituent assembly was to replace definitely not only all revolutionary councils and committees, but also the duma, which continued to exist legally, though without functioning. the main objective of the constructive elements was to hold the situation together until the constituent assembly could be convened; the date had been advanced, even at a sacrifice of regularity in election procedure. and a coalition government seemed to be the only possible solution, despite the difficulties already encountered in applying the principle. the councils, the land committees and the other organizations that had come into existence with and in the course of the revolution were, as we saw, almost exclusively socialist in their political affiliations. this was true even of the peasant congresses, though it was generally admitted that the bulk of the peasantry was not consciously socialistic. of all the revolutionary bodies the peasant councils were clearly the least representative. this was particularly true of the first alleged all-russian peasant congress. the peasantry, the great mass of the population, became articulate very slowly. the non-socialist groups were striving to bring about a more true expression of peasant views; and their moderate program was making headway, though they found it difficult to compete with the extremists, who made most generous promises. but the non-socialist groups were beginning to take a stronger line, as they saw the experiments of the extremists lead to disillusionment. they proposed to organize councils and congresses of the non-socialist elements. this project was immediately branded as counter-revolutionary by "revolutionary democracy." perhaps to ward off the contemplated move of the non-socialists, kerensky issued a general invitation for a state conference at moscow of all parties, groups, and organizations, at which the opinions of all could be expressed, presumably for the guidance of the coalition government. the moscow conference did in fact give to all organizations, duma, councils of workmen's and soldiers' deputies, the recently elected local-government bodies, coöperative and professional unions, in fact every group, socialist and non-socialist, revolutionary and pre-revolutionary institutions, the opportunity to express views. the speeches did perhaps help the coalition government to sense the situation with which it had to deal, though the conference showed that the coalition government was unstable, and that the extreme ideas of the bolsheviki had penetrated deeply in the broader masses. again the bolsheviki attacked the principle of coalition, and demanded that revolutionary democracy take over all authority. then came the kornilov affair, which in its conception was an effort on the part of the constructive groups, including the moderate socialists, to discredit the extremists, and establish a stronger government, free from party ties and party programs, representing a national movement to organize "all the vital forces of the country," to use again the phraseology of the revolution. but there was a misunderstanding, and also perhaps it was premature--"revolutionary democracy" was not yet sufficiently sobered to accept a program of common constructive effort. the movement had the opposite effect; it split the country into two openly hostile camps, and brought revolutionary democracy still more under the influence of the extremists. the coalition government fell to pieces, and a directorate of five, with almost dictatorial powers, still headed by kerensky, assumed authority. the bolsheviki now demanded the absolute and final renunciation of the principle of coalition, and the formation of a purely socialistic government. kerensky and the constructive socialists refused to participate in such a government, and opened negotiations with the non-socialist leaders, to attempt once more the coalition form of government. the extremists then sent out a call to "revolutionary democracy" to meet in another conference, which they called a democratic conference, as opposed to the state conference of moscow. they declared that no bourgeois, counter-revolutionary group would be admitted to the conference. kerensky allowed the conference to meet. it passed contradictory resolutions, first voting against the principle of a coalition form of government, but later seeming to advocate and support this principle. the moderate socialists fought hard for the coalition idea, and kerensky and his followers seemed at last to have won out. in any case, at the beginning of october, kerensky formed a third coalition government, and convened a preliminary parliament in which all parties were represented. this time a definitely outlined program, as the basis for coöperation, was accepted by the socialists, which made it possible for the non-socialists to give their best men to the new combination. the provisional government of october , at least the fifth since the revolution, and the third coalition government, unquestionably brought together the strongest and most representative group of men since the revolution. the bolsheviki declared their intention to break it up as quickly as possible, and there was not much optimism in non-socialist circles; one felt that it would not survive many weeks. but this third coalition government gave a greater promise of success than any previous attempt. there was hope that it would last, and hold the situation together, at least until the constituent assembly could meet. this hope was not realized, as we know, and the break-up of the government came within a month, when the bolsheviki at last accomplished their long-planned armed uprising, and by force established what they called the dictatorship of the proletariat. acting on the very eve of the opening of the constituent assembly, the elections for which were already in progress, the bolsheviki showed clearly their contempt for a really national, popular form of government. the bolshevik uprising was followed by civil war. but this was the aim of the extremists, for they were against social peace, cooperation, coalition, and were striving for class war. until this last month the russian revolution, though marked by extreme antagonisms, and much wrangling, was nevertheless comparatively peaceful in character. there was no extensive violence, such as would justify the use of the term "civil war." it was to avoid civil war that such constant, and on the whole honest, efforts were made to "unite all the vital forces of the country." for it was seen that civil war would perhaps ruin the revolution, and in any case would eliminate russia as a factor in the war, and the constructive leaders constantly emphasized that on the successful outcome of the war depended also the success of the revolution. but the efforts of the more constructive and moderate groups failed. this very short outline of the attempts to solve the problems with which revolutionary russia was confronted by applying the principle of coalition gives an interpretation of the recent events in russia from another angle. in any case one has tried to point out the forces in conflict during these last months, perhaps suggesting one of many possible issues from the present chaos. the russian revolution the russian revolution by frank alfred golder the intelligent public that has been watching the erratic courses which the russian ship of state has been sailing during the last few years suspected that something was wrong with it, but not until after the march revolution did it become fully known what incompetent and irresponsible officers were in command. it was then learned that a great part of the time the emperor was either drunk or doped, that the empress was hysterical and on the verge of a mental breakdown, and that they were assisted by senile sturmer, mentally unbalanced protopopov, and profligate rasputin, none of whom could read a compass nor lay out a course and steered the ship as they willed. all the passengers, first, second, and third class, grand dukes, intelligentsia, and laborers saw the danger and shouted warning but the officers neither saw nor heard. in order to save themselves and the vessel each class of passengers, quite independent of the other, resolved that at the first opportune moment it would throw the officers overboard and take charge of the ship; but while they were plotting the crew mutinied, arrested the officers, and left the ship to drift in sight of the breakers. nicholas romanov is to blame for the plight of his country and for his own misfortunes. he was warned, he was given his chances, but he abused them all. when he entered on his reign he was popular and had the good will of his people with him. for some reason or other it was assumed that he was liberal minded and that under him the people would breathe a little more freely than under his autocratic father. this hope was so strong that it was unconsciously accepted as a fact. stories were told that the tsar fraternized with students and workmen and that he was determined to destroy the bureaucratic wall which kept the people from him. it was on the strength of this report that the zemstvo of tver petitioned him that in the future it might have direct access to him and have a say in the government. here was a great opportunity but he turned it against himself. his reply was, "it has come to my attention that recently some people have been carried away by senseless dreams that the representatives of the zemstvos should take part in internal affairs. let it be known to all that i shall guard the autocracy as firmly as did my father." this was his program and it deeply disappointed the people. on the top of this came the tragedy at moscow on the day of his coronation when hundreds of people lost their lives in the attempt to obtain a loving cup which was promised them in commemoration of the event. then followed the wholesale killing of the factory hands at iaroslav, of the peasants in kharkov, the miners on the lena, and other such massacres and pogroms. nicholas himself withdrew to his palaces and left the affairs of state in the hands of the court clique which dragged russia into the japanese war and brought on the revolution of . before it was over the emperor promised a constitution but as soon as the disturbance was quelled he went back on his word. it was known that he was weak and he now proved that he was also a liar. he dismissed one duma after another, he created an upper house to act as a brake, he juggled with the electoral laws so that whereas according to the law of december , the working classes and the peasants were entitled to per cent of the duma's representation, by the law of june , they were allowed only per cent, poland's delegation was cut down from to per cent, caucasus' from to , siberia's from to , and central asia's from to . in fact he did everything to make the duma ineffective and a laughing stock. but that was not enough, his pride was hurt and he wanted to be revenged, and the number of people arrested, imprisoned, exiled, and executed for political crimes was greater than before. it has been said that nicholas was not cruel and the blame for the bloody deeds in his reign was laid to his ministers. indeed, there is something in his face that is kindly and makes a very good first impression. but those who knew him better had learned to distrust that smile. when the emperor was most gracious to one of his ministers it was a sign that his resignation would be called for the next day. in this respect nicholas ii was like alexander i. the following story tells something of the real character of the man who had the lives of millions of people at his mercy. the committee appointed by the duma to take charge of the papers of the tsar found that many important documents of state, such as reports from the commanders-in-chief, ministers, and others, he had never read, and some he had not even looked at. they did, however, come across a notebook which had been carefully kept and guarded. on opening it they noted that nicholas, with his own hand, wrote down the names of those revolutionists who, in - , were executed, the kind of execution, and other such details. [fn: this story was told to the writer by a member of the committee.] that interested him, but matters of state he left to his time servers, to his hysterical wife, yes, to grigory rasputin, a dirty, ignorant, and licentious peasant, until the country blushed with shame and it became a saying, "now we have grigory i [rasputin] as tsar." the present war was declared by the tsar but the people approved it because they hoped that the defeat of germany would mean the defeat of the german reactionary influence in russia, especially about the court, and a closer union with democratic england and france. i was present at the capital at the time that the war broke out and heard the cheers when the emperor made the declaration. it seemed as if nicholas by coming out against germany had redeemed himself in the eyes of his people who were willing to wipe out the past, and give him another chance. during the first months of the war he was as popular as during the first weeks of his reign. it was not like the japanese war when the soldiers refused service; in this german war, the men called to colors went without a murmur, they hoped that something good would come out of it. offers of help from individuals as well as commercial and civic bodies poured in on the government. the ministers said that everything was ready, that in a few months the russians would be in berlin. at first, all went well, but soon news came of the catastrophe in eastern prussia, of the traitorous acts of the minister of war, of the campaign in the carpathians where the russians were slaughtered like sheep because they had no guns, no ammunition, and no supplies. again the poor people were betrayed and a cry of horror and vengeance went up as on january , , bloody sunday. the tsar would probably have been overthrown there and then had it not been for the war and the hatred of germany. the liberals and patriots of all kinds thought that all was not yet lost and they went to work with a will, giving themselves, their money, their strength, and their lives, but they soon became convinced that it was all in vain so long as rasputin, the empress, and their clique ran the government. [fn: several months before the revolution the following confidential conversation took place between alexeiev, the russian commander-in-chief, and a journalist: alexeiev: i can get nothing from them [ministers]. my supplies are decreasing.... it is even necessary to think. through the duma they begged the emperor to put in ministers whom the people could trust, but he, as if to show his contempt for public opinion, selected men of low character, one worse than the other, men with whom even decent monarchists would not shake hands, and in shame withdrew from court.] [fn: about bread. we are already cutting down the allowance. they have forgotten about food for the horses....] journalist: what are you going to do about it? a. what shall i do? with these people there is nothing that can be done. j. have you said anything to the tsar about it? a. i have... but it does no good. j. why? a. while you talk to him he pays attention, gets worked up, is eager to do something... but as soon as he leaves you he forgets about it. all kinds of pressure are brought to bear upon him, he is not a free man. j. is it true that the tsarina has much influence? a. it is only too true. her influence is irresistible. what is worse she never comes out in the open. she interferes with everybody, but works behind their backs. you never can tell what she will do next. every time she comes here she makes new trouble. j. do the ministers ever consult you? a. they come, they talk. what can they do? the honest ministers leave and the worthless remain.... if it were not for the war i would resign too. if i should leave what would not they do with the army? do i not understand that sturmer and company are thinking only of an alliance with germany?... the home situation is serious. they [ministers] are purposely instigating hunger disturbances in order to provoke a revolution so as to have an excuse for breaking away from the allies and end the war. our army is now in condition to crush germany and without that there can be no real peace in europe. but a permanent peace is not wanted by sturmer and protopopov, they wish to keep the people under the heel of a strong germany. apart from the germans no one will protect them from the revolution. the pity of it all is that at the head of the government there still are men who are interested in crushing the people.] [fn: princess vasilchikov, a prominent court lady, became convinced that the empress and her ministers were ruining the country and therefore wrote her a courteous letter, pleading with her to save russia. for her pains she received an order to retire to her estate, and her husband, who held a very prominent position, left the capital with her. (_novoe vremia_, march - , .)] members of the royal family and the grand dukes urged the tsar to change his course and not ruin the country and the dynasty but he, drugged by dr. badmaev and duped by rasputin, protopopov and company, sent them all out of the capital with orders not to return until sent for. they became so desperate that they murdered rasputin but the empress remained and the government policy became more reactionary than ever and as prince iusupov said the country was drifting to destruction or to a state of anarchy. it was quite evident that the only way to save the country was through a revolution and it was merely a question whether it would come first from the top or from the bottom and when. [fn: as late as october, , the old empress saw her son at kiev and pointed to him that rasputin and the other members of the court circle would overthrow the dynasty and destroy the country but it did no good. only a few days before the outbreak of the revolution his own brother, mikhail alexandrovich, pleaded with him along the same lines and with the same success. (_rech_, march - , .)] [fn: the old and scholarly grand duke nicholas mikhailovich went to see the emperor about november , , and in order to impress him with the critical situation of the country he wrote out his ideas so as to leave them. he was received in a kindly manner by the tsar who listened to the reading of the letter and then took it over so as to read it to the empress. when he came to the place where her name was mentioned she snatched it from him and tore it up. in the course of the conversation that followed the old duke said some sharp things but he could not get anything but smiles from the tsar, and when the old man's cigarette went out the tsar lighted it for him. it was impossible to get an out and out talk, or satisfaction of any kind, and nicholas mikhailovich left the court in disgust. two days later he was requested to retire to his estate for two months. here is the grand duke's letter: "you have said more than once that you would carry on the war to a successful finish. do you believe that with the conditions as they exist at present in the rear this can be done? are you acquainted with the internal situation, not only in the interior of the empire but also on the outskirts (siberia, turkestan, caucasus)? are you told all the truth or is some of it concealed from you? where is the root of the evil? allow me to tell you briefly the essentials of the case. "so long as your method of selecting ministers was known to a limited circle only affairs went on somehow, but from the moment your system became generally known it is stupid to govern russia in that way. repeatedly you have told me that you could trust no one, that you were being deceived. if that is true then the same influences are at work on your wife, dearly beloved by you, who is led astray by [--]. [fn: the evil circle that surrounds her. you trust alexandra fedorovna--that is easy to understand. but that which comes out of her mouth is the result of clever fabrication and not the truth. if you are not strong enough to remove these influences from her, at least put yourself on guard against this steady and systematic interference of those who act through your beloved. if your persuasion is ineffective, and i am certain that you have more than once fought against this influence, try some other means so as to end with this system once for all. your first impulses and decisions are always unusually true and to the point, but as soon as another influence comes in you begin to hesitate and end up by doing something different from what you originally decided. if you should succeed in removing this continuous invasion of the dark forces there would take place at once the birth of a new russia, and there would return to you the confidence of the greater number of your subjects. all other matters would soon settle themselves. you would find people who under different conditions would be willing to work under your personal leadership. at the proper time, and that is not far distant, you can of your own free will organize a ministry which should be responsible to you and to constitutional institutions. this can be done very simply, without any force from outside as was the case with the act of october , . i hesitated a long time before venturing to tell you this truth, and i finally consented when your mother and sister urged me to do so. you are at the beginning of a new era of disturbances, i will go farther, at the beginning of a new era of attempts at assassination. believe me that in trying to loosen you from the chains that bind you i do it from no motives of personal interest and of this you and her majesty are convinced, but in the hope and in the expectation of saving you, your throne, and our dear native land from some very serious and irreparable consequences." (_rech_, march - , .) [fn: "an important rôle was played at court by dr. badmaev, rasputin's friend. there were many rumors afloat in court and it is difficult to tell the truth. but this i can say that nicholas alexandrovich was drugged with different drugs from thibet. in this rasputin took part. during the last days they brought the emperor to a state of almost total insanity and his will power was completely gone. in all matters of state he consulted the empress who led him to the edge of the precipice." interview given out by prince iusupov, in _novoe vremia_, march - , .] [fn: one of the editors of the _novoe vremia_ who has large acquaintance in the aristocratic circles of the capital told the writer that for months before the revolution it was commonly talked about in the homes of military leaders and fashionable circles that for the good of russia the empress must be killed. last fall ( ) there came to his home one of his friends, an aide-de-camp of one of the grand dukes, and confided to him that he was meditating an act of terrorism in order to get a certain person out of the way. another topic of conversation was the revolution after the war.] [fn: "i will say this--at court there reigned a kind of nightmare, each day fewer and fewer people remained there. if the revolution had not broken out from the bottom it would have from the top." interview given out by prince iusupov, in _novoe vremia_, march - , .] it is only since the political upheaval that the activities and plans of the grand dukes have become public, but the cry for a revolution on the part of the great mass of intelligent people was heard before and everywhere. on my return to russia, in february, , after an absence of a little more than two years, i noticed many changes but none greater than in the public opinion in regard to the administration. on the way across siberia, i met with many russians, some of whom were army officers, and one and all bitterly criticized the government for its mismanagement of the war, for the betrayal of russia as they called it, for its incompetency, and general worthlessness. at the capital, it was the same, everywhere, street, car, and public places, the government was denounced; there was no attempt at concealment. in the archives where i worked, which are almost under the very nose of the imperial family, the criticism was as open as in private homes. in fact there was no exception. when mention was made of the court, of rasputin, and of the empress, there was a kind of a painful smile; it was not a subject that self-respecting patriotic russians liked to talk about in public or before strangers; it was like dirty linen that ought not to be hung out for public view. there was reason enough and suffering enough to justify the complaining. petrograd was overcrowded owing to the thousands of refugees who had been driven there, rooms and apartments were difficult to find and very expensive, and the cost of living had gone up so high that it was hard for the poor to make ends meet. it was almost impossible to get about in the city, as the war had reduced the number of cabs and the few that did business asked such exorbitant fares that only the rich could afford to ride in them. the street car situation was in a hopeless tangle. even before the war there were not enough accommodations for the public, but since the opening of hostilities many of the cars had broken down and there were no mechanics to repair them and no new cars to replace them. at a time when the population increased, the transportation facilities decreased. passengers poured into the cars like a stream, filled the seats, blocked the aisles, jammed the entrance, stood on the steps, hung on behind, and clung to anything that might bear them along. difficult as it was to get into the car, it was worse to get out, and it is easier to imagine than to describe the pushing, swearing, tearing, and fighting that one witnessed. the railways were in an equally bad condition. one had to wait weeks for a ticket. men and women were crowded into the same coupés; the cars were packed so full of human beings that they suggested cattle cars, except that they were not so sanitary, for they contained people suffering from contagious diseases and were without fresh air. the food situation was very serious. for many years, russia had been the granary of europe but during the winter of - suffered from shortage of food. passengers told how in southern russia grain and flour were rotting and yet in northern russia the inhabitants were starving owing to the breakdown of the transportation system. it was pointed out that while the railway officials refused to give cars for bringing in the necessities of life, yet articles of luxury, expensive fruits, and such things did come into the city--a state of affairs which meant, of course, that some one was grafting. sugar could be obtained only by cards and in very limited quantities; flour could not be bought at all, and black, sour bread could often be had only by standing in long lines and for hours at a time. there were no shoes and people asked what became of the hides of the thousands of animals that were annually slaughtered and shot. it was said that these, like other things, were sold to germany. as usual the poorer classes suffered the most. the well-to-do sent their servants who after a time returned with bread; at the worst it was only an inconvenience, but the workman had no servants to run his errands. in the morning, the laborer left his home for his work with little or no breakfast, at noon there was no luncheon for him because his wife was standing in the bread or sugar line, and when he returned in the evening there may have been bread enough but little else. the wife was tired and discouraged, the children crying and hungry, and life became a burden. we may say that the conditions in russia were no worse than in france or germany. this is doubtless true, but there is this difference: the people of france and germany had confidence in their leaders and realized that they were doing the best that they could, while the russians knew they could put no trust in their government, that the suffering was unnecessary and was due to corruption, favoritism, and incompetency. the russians have as much patriotism and patience as any other people, but when they saw themselves abused and imposed upon they had a right to complain. in addition to the criticism of the government the other favorite topic of conversation was the revolution that would come after the war. this was discussed as openly as the problems of war; the two were bound up together, first a successful ending of the war, and then a change in government. this public denunciation and open discussion of a _coup d'état_ came as a shock to me, for i remembered quite vividly how the same people cheered the emperor when he declared war. three years ago no one would have dared to talk like that. to be sure enough was said then of the desirability of a more liberal government, but it was a far-off question, one that the next generation might have to deal with. now the talk was of an overturn immediately after the war. the court circle was not ignorant of what was being said for the spies kept them fully informed. in conversation with a journalist two months before the outbreak of the revolution, the minister of the interior, protopopov, a protégé of rasputin, said that he was aware of the revolutionary propaganda and that he was ready to face any attempt that might be made to overthrow the government. "i will not stop at anything," he remarked,... "the first thing that i shall do is to send them [revolutionaries] from the capital by the car loads. but i will strangle the revolution no matter what the cost may be." [fn: _novoe vremia_, march -april , .] he had no doubt that he could handle the situation and he inspired those about him with the same confidence, particularly the emperor whom he assured that the discontent was confined chiefly to the intelligentsia and to a small number of the gentry, and that the common people and the army were devoted to the autocracy. to the question that arises why the revolution, which was expected after the war, came off before its conclusion, the answer is that the present revolution was not planned nor desired by any one of importance; it came as a surprise to all. it just happened. if some one must have the credit or blame, it is protopopov who was at the time suspected of being queer mentally and who has since lost his reason entirely. he was so sure of himself and of his ability to put down the uprising and thereby show himself a real statesman that he concluded not to wait for the revolution to come in the ordinary course of events, but to hurry it a bit. although there is no conclusive proof for this statement, there is plenty of convincing circumstantial evidence. we know that it was proposed to have the workmen of petrograd strike on february , the day of the opening of the duma, as a protest against the government; we know also that to meet this situation, the minister of the interior had placed machine guns in the garrets, in steeples, on housetops, and other such places where they could command the important streets and shoot down the mob. the rising did not take place because miliukov, the great liberal leader, learned that the government was behind this move and that preparations had been made to slaughter the unsuspecting workmen. he, therefore, addressed them in an open letter calling on them not to make any demonstration, and they did not. for the time being the strike was off, but the air was full of discontent and restlessness, and it was difficult to say when trouble would break out again. with this in view, a number of representatives of various organizations met to discuss the situation and to determine what attitude they should take and what counsel they should give to the labor leaders. miliukov and a few others urged that all uprisings should be discouraged because they would interfere with the war, would cost the lives of many innocent persons, and would accomplish nothing. there were, however, others, especially anisimov, who argued strongly in favor of a strike, saying that this was the opportune time to overthrow the present regime and to establish a democratic government.[fn: i have this story from miliukov.] when the revolution came off and the papers of the secret police were seized, it was discovered that anisimov, who urged the revolt, was the paid agent of the government and was doubtless doing its bidding. this shows that the government instigated and abetted the uprising. but this is not all the evidence. between february and the outbreak of the revolution men impersonating miliukov went to the factories, calling on the workmen to rise against the government.[fn: i have this story from miliukov.] there is still another bit of evidence. in order to give the laboring classes cause for revolt, the food supply in the factory districts was reduced and many people suffered from hunger and in their desperation came out into the streets. during the revolutionary week little, if any, food came in, but immediately after it the soldiers found , "puds" of flour, [fn: _russkaia svoboda_, . no. , p. .] enough to last petrograd ten days, meat, besides other food hidden in police stations and elsewhere out of reach of the public. it has been said that the government instigated the uprising in order to bring about a separate peace with germany. no direct proof has as yet been produced to substantiate this charge, and the only testimony that i have bearing on this case is the statement made by commander-in-chief alexeiev in a confidential interview with a journalist already quoted. [fn: there is not the least bit of evidence to show that the emperor himself was mixed up in these intrigues. among the papers of the ministry of foreign affairs there is but one document that throws any light on the question of a separate peace during the time of the monarchy. it is a letter from the minister of the german court to the minister of the russian court insinuating a separate peace. this letter was shown, as was intended, to the tsar, who read it, put it aside, and did not answer it. this, however, does not mean that sturmer, protopopov and the clique of the empress were not planning to bring about a situation which would compel a separate peace.] these four points--the encouragement of a revolt by the secret agents, the impersonation of miliukov, the concealment of food in the factory districts, the desire of a separate peace with germany--make out a fairly good case to show that the government was behind the disturbance. aside from the reason already given for the desire of a separate peace, the other reason for the action of the ministry was this: it feared that the revolutionary movement, if permitted to take its natural course, would develop such strength that it could not be put down when it broke out, and, therefore, the minister of the interior decided to take it in hand and at the right moment crush it with such force that it would be a long time before it could raise its head again. before it was over he hoped to drag in prominent members of the duma (or the duma itself) and other revolutionary leaders, and make an end of them. this plan need not astonish us, for this method, in one form or another, had been made use of by the autocracy time and again. protopopov overreached himself, his scheme miscarried, the soldiers about the capital went back on him, and the little comedy that he had staged in which he was to play the leading part became a tragedy and the shot which was intended for the revolution hit his royal master and brought autocracy to the ground. in view of the fact that protopopov has since become insane, one wonders whether the man was mentally well balanced at the time that he was in office. but the tsar has only himself to blame for his plight; he was warned against this nominee of rasputin, but he would not take advice. early in the week of march - , , the trouble began in the factory districts. there were bread riots, car stoning, window smashing, and other such acts, which are more or less common and no one paid much attention to them. on thursday, the disturbances spread to other parts of the city and crowds began to gather on the nevski, but the throng was orderly and the police seemed to have little difficulty in keeping it on the move. friday the crowd was more bold: it marched up and down the streets, calling for bread, singing revolutionary songs, and occasionally waving a red flag and quickly snatching it back again. this, too, did not make much impression for it is well known that in russia strikes and disturbances have in view political as well as economic betterment. late friday afternoon, while i was walking on the nevski, a company of mounted police and a large number of cossacks dashed by on the way to disperse a procession that was coming towards me. when i came up to the fontanka bridge i noticed the crowd was gathered about the cossacks; it patted the horses and cheered their riders, while the police were nowhere in sight. i listened to what was being said and heard that the police tried to use their whips and swords on the people and this angered the cossacks so much that they attacked the police, killed the captain, and drove them all away. it was no secret that there was bad blood between the soldiers and the police; the former complained that while they were suffering and fighting at the front, the latter were having an easy time, enriching themselves by graft, and oppressing the soldiers' families. the soldiers and the strikers started out with one idea--hatred of the police. when the police had been dispersed, the cossacks and soldiers begged the people to move on, but they, especially the young women students who were numerous, went up to them and pleaded with them to espouse their cause. "comrades," they would say, "come over on our side, our cause is your cause." the rough, ignorant warriors were disturbed; they did not like their jobs, and in a kindly way begged the men and women to go home, but, as it did no good, for they massed again, the cossacks rode in a body into their midst and kept turning and turning until the crowd was forced from the street onto the sidewalk. in the meantime, another company of cossacks formed a line across the street, from wall to wall, and swept everybody before it into stores, courtyards, and other openings. even this did not do much good, for as soon as the horsemen passed, the mob fell in behind and cheered the cossacks. there was no roughness, but at the same time it was easy to see that the crowd did not yet know to what extent the army could be trusted. by saturday the inhabitants of the city began to feel the effect of the disorder; cars were not running, telephones were barely working, factories and shops were closed, banks and stores were locked, there was little to eat, for the only provision on hand was water; every one who could filled the tubs for fear the water mains would be blown up. the crowd on the streets was larger than ever, more red flags were in evidence, but all this failed to give the impression of a revolution. such demonstrations had been seen before; revolutionary talk was cheap and was not taken seriously. as on the day before, the soldiers and cossacks tried by gentle means to disperse the crowd, but failed, for the men and women in the crowd complained that they were hungry and pleaded with the military for the sake of their own families to stand by the people. it was easy to see that these guardians of the peace were in trouble, they knew that every word said was true, and what was more to the purpose, members of their own families were in the crowd. an officer who was sent with his company to shoot on the people told how that same morning his own sister took part in the demonstration and called for bread for her children. this was no exceptional case. but as soldiers they must do their duty and keep order. realizing that the stratagems of the day before failed in their purpose, the cossacks tried other tactics on this day. they fell behind the procession, and discharged their pistols in the air and dashed at full speed into the mob. woe unto him who did not get out of the way. but they all did; in a second there was not a person on the street. it is still a wonder how it was all done so quickly. as soon as the horsemen passed, the crowd dropped behind them and raising their hats cheered them. "comrades," they said, "come over to us, you know that the government is bad, you know how the soldiers have been killed through its incompetency, you know that our wives and children are hungry," and more such pleas. the cossacks and the other soldiers who tried to keep order were caught, they begged the crowd to break up and go home, they pointed out that they had to do their duty and that somebody might get hurt. it was reported that in some places the soldiers did fire and kill several persons. during saturday, men were sent, it is not clear by whom, to the different factories to persuade the workers to join in a great demonstration on sunday. the military commander of the city telegraphed to the emperor for orders and the latter sent word to shoot, if necessary, and to put down the uprising at any cost, and that accounts for the posters that were put up on sunday morning warning the inhabitants not to gather in the streets because the soldiers would shoot to kill. this had happened before and was no joke, and many people would not leave their homes that day. those who did had to walk; there was no other way of getting about. few people, on the whole, were on the street that morning aside from the soldiers and cossacks who were guarding the bridges and keeping an eye out for disturbances. after luncheon i started to make a call and as i passed the barracks of the volynski regiment, situated near where i lived, i saw a company of soldiers lined up, heard the command to load, to shoulder arms, to march, and off they went to the nevski. i followed them for a distance and then turned aside and went my way. in returning i had to cross the nevski and found that all avenues thither were guarded and that no one was allowed to go in that direction. i managed, however, by showing my american passport, to get through the line and reach the street. excited people were moving up and down and from them i learned that about three o'clock a number of people forced their way to the nevski and were fired upon by the soldiers and the machine guns that were concealed. among the killed of the day was a captain of police who was knocked down by a cossack. sunday night was full of excitement and fear and there were not many who slept soundly. firing was heard at different times but what it portended, none of us could tell. it became evident that the situation was becoming serious, yet we all felt that the government could handle it. when i went out on the street monday morning, the first thing i saw was the placard of the military commander announcing that unless the workmen went to the shops, they would be sent to the front the following day. groups of people were talking excitedly and from them i learned that the volynski regiment had revolted and had killed its officers, because the day before they had commanded the soldiers to shoot on the people. it seems that the soldiers returned home much excited over their deed and full of remorse. in the course of the night some of the revolutionary soldiers from the city upbraided them and they were greatly incensed with their officers and the government. they, as well as other regiments, were particularly worked up over the report that hirelings of the secret police dressed in soldiers' uniforms went about firing on the crowd and that the new recruits, under penalty of death, were commanded to shoot on the people in the streets. when in the morning the officers congratulated the men on their deed of yesterday, they jumped on them and murdered them. i heard that other regiments had also revolted; but there were so many rumors afloat that it was not easy to know what to believe. about four in the afternoon, i started for home and found the nevski full of frightened and nervous people, and hardly any soldiers. no one seemed to know what to expect. sounds of shooting were heard and they were explained as the battle between the regiments that had revolted and those that had remained loyal. in the distance columns of smoke were seen and report had it that palaces were burning. again it was difficult to know the truth. as i proceeded on my way, i was joined by the little minister of the british american church, where i had attended services the day before, where he had prayed fervently for the tsar and his family and asked god to put down the anarchists, and other lawless men. we were discussing the situation, not knowing exactly what to make of it. perhaps the word revolution passed our lips but neither of us nor those about us took it seriously. near the liteiny a gate opened and about two dozen armed soldiers led by a petty officer stepped out and marched towards the center of the street. immediately the crowd, excited and scared, scattered and ran for their lives but the soldiers motioned for them to stop and told them that they would not shoot. we left them, and proceeded on our way, trying as before to interpret what we saw. while in the midst of our discussion we were struck by a new and unfamiliar sound--tra-ta-ta, tra-ta-ta, and we instinctively knew that a machine gun was firing. in a flash the streets were cleared and my minister and i found ourselves sticking like posters against the wall. it was my first "baptism of fire" and i had enough presence of mind to observe its effect upon myself and others. physically there was no effect for no one seemed hit. i tried to locate the gun and the man behind it, but did not succeed. when the firing ceased, i went on my way. as i neared the nicholas station, there came rushing forth from around the corner a crowd of hoodlums and soldiers, with drawn swords, which they had taken from the officers, and such other weapons as they could pick up, shouting, "down with the government!" then it dawned upon me that the revolution was on in earnest, that the anarchists of yesterday's prayer had become the heroes of a great cause. what struck me most of all was the kind of men and women who made this world event. i watched them during the week, and they seemed to be in great part boys and girls, hoodlums, students, poorly dressed men and women, without organization, plans, or leaders. it is difficult to analyze the various motives that brought them out into the street. not one of the so-called revolutionists was seen, heard, shot, or wounded. when it was all over they appeared on the scene, rushing from switzerland, the united states, france, and other parts of the world, to make speeches and to divide the spoils. it was a revolution without revolutionists, unless you call the soldiers that, but they were not consciously making a revolution, and when it was done, they were thoroughly surprised and frightened. there are a number of reasons why the government collapsed so easily. it was not really overthrown but it toppled over like a rotten tree, and until it fell, the people did not realize how decayed it actually was. its misconduct of the war, scandals like that of rasputin, ministers such as protopopov discredited and disgraced the dynasty and when the end came, it had few friends who shed tears. another important factor in helping the revolution was the large number of students and liberals who served in the army. to fill the ranks and to provide educated men for officers, it was necessary to call on university students, experts in various fields of engineering, all of whom, more or less, desired a liberal government. these men worked among the soldiers and officers with a view to creating a feeling of distrust in the emperor, and the government, and its incompetence and corruption gave plenty of material for the propagandists. loyalty to the dynasty was undermined and as soon as one prop was removed, as soon as one company of soldiers went over, the others followed and the whole edifice came tumbling down. still another factor was the large number of new recruits that were stationed in the capital; they were as yet not well disciplined, obedience had not yet become a second nature to them. many of them had come from the factories, some of them were personally acquainted with the men and women who were in the demonstrations and therefore would not fire on them. had there been at the time in the city three or four old and well-disciplined regiments, or had the cossacks who were on hand not interfered with the police, the uprising would have been crushed quickly and effectively as similar affairs had been before. yet one other factor contributed to the success of the revolution and that was the over-confidence of the government. the soldiers had been loyal until now and it never occurred to those in power that they might not always be so. they made no special preparations other than placing machine guns on roofs. they did not even make use of the armored cars. when they realized that the army in the city could not be trusted, they called for troops from the front but they came too late. from the point of view of the monarchy it was unfortunate that protopopov sent the emperor to the front after having secured from him a signed blank to dismiss the duma; for if the tsar had been at tsarskoe selo, he might have been prevailed upon to make some concessions and saved the dynasty for a time at least. by tuesday morning, march , the revolution was generally accepted as a _fait accompli_; it was believed that the old despotism was gone never to return. this was followed by an outburst of idealism and patriotism such as comes but once or twice in the life of a nation. every russian was bubbling over with enthusiasm over the glorious future of his country. liberty so greatly desired, so long worked for, so much suffered for had at last come. the intelligent and persecuted russians, they who had spent years under the shadow of the police, in prison, in exile, and in siberia, had their day at last and they were eager to realize their utopia. their first demand was that all prison doors should be opened and that the oppressed the world over should be freed. the russian revolution was not a class revolution, it was brought about neither by the proletariat nor by the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy; all classes contributed, it was a national revolution. so worthless had the monarchy become that all the people were glad to get rid of it and see it go. they who helped to bring about its ruin were the first to deny it and seek safety; and even the synod, in an almost unseemly haste, took out the names of the imperial family from the prayer book. the revolution was picturesque and full of color. nearly every morning one could see regiment after regiment, soldiers, cossacks, and sailors, with their regimental colors, and bands, and revolutionary flags, marching to the duma to take the new oath of allegiance. they were cheered, they were blessed, handerchiefs were waved, hats were raised, cigarettes were distributed as mark of appreciation and gratitude to these men, without whose help there would have been no revolution. the enthusiasm became so contagious that men and women, young and old, high and low, fell in alongside or behind, joined in the singing of the marseillaise, and walked to the duma to take the oath of allegiance and having taken it they felt as purified as if they had partaken of the communion. another picturesque sight was the army trucks filled with armed soldiers, red handkerchiefs tied to their bayonets, dashing up and down the streets, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting the citizens but really for the mere joy of riding about and being cheered. one of these trucks stands out vividly in my mind: it contained about twenty soldiers, having in their midst a beautiful young woman with a red banner, and a young hoodlum astride the engine, a cigarette in one hand and a sword in the other. the streets were full of people, or "tovarishchi" (comrades), as they called one another, not only the sidewalks but in the very center, for the tramways were not running. great events were transpiring and every one who could came out to hear and to see what was going on. there were no newspapers and the street was the news center. automobiles came dashing through scattering proclamations and copies of the _izvestiia_ (a news-sheet published by a committee of newspaper men with the authority of the duma); and as the crowd made a rush to pick these up it looked for a moment as if the whole world was walking on its head and feet at the same time. those who were fortunate enough to seize a paper ran home with it to read it to the family, those who were not gathered around one of the many bonfires, made from the wooden imperial eagles, crowns, and other insignia of royalty, to listen to the reading of the news, usually by a student. the part played by the students during the revolution has not received the attention it deserves. when all others were hiding or excited it was the students who took charge of the leaderless soldiers, found food for them, collected money for their welfare, and told them what to do. it was interesting to watch with what deference the soldiers looked up to them and hung upon their words. this importance was not wholly lost upon the students, both men and women, and they read the proclamations as if they were tablets of law handed down from heaven. after the reading came the discussion. one of the favorite topics was the comparative bloodlessness of the revolution (something like killed and wounded) which proved that the russian revolution was superior to the french or any other. having started in this vein the discussion turned on the mighty and noble deeds russia was going to do now. just as it once freed europe from the yoke of napoleon so will it now liberate her from the militarism and barbarism of william and give freedom to all the world, to all nationalities, races, and creeds. the light of the world is to come from russia. the crowd meant it. the soldiers were in earnest and patriotic--the praise showered upon them and the responsibility placed upon them seemed to uplift them--the man with the hoe became a free citizen and behaved as such. on wednesday, march , the soldiers posted bulletins in different parts of the city calling on their comrades to abstain from liquor and violence and to prevent others from committing lawless deeds. not satisfied with mere words small companies of militia visited the places where drinks were sold and emptied the barrels and bottles into the gutter. for days the astoria hotel looked and smelled like a wrecked saloon after carrie nation and her associates had stoned it. for some time the whereabouts and intentions of the tsar were unknown and numerous rumors were afloat. some said that he had committed suicide, that he was in the city, that he was on the way, that he was under arrest, that he had fled the country. another interesting question was the form of the new government, should it be a republic or a constitutional monarchy. many of the educated classes and members of the duma advocated a constitutional monarchy of the english type, while others, particularly the socialistic groups, favored a republic, a democratic republic; whatever they meant by that is not clear. needless to say the great mass of people did not know the difference between one kind of government and another but they shouted as loudly as those who knew. one soldier demanded a republic like that of england, another insisted on a republic with a tsar at the head, the wife of the porter of the house where i lived cried as if her heart would break because "they wanted a republic," and some of the peasant women in the country clamored for the tsar because "if they take away the tsar they will also take away god and what will then become of the muzhik." in one place at the front several regiments almost came to blows over this question. an orator ended his eloquent speech by saying that "from now on russia will have but one monarch, the revolutionary proletariat." this phrase puzzled the soldiers, they also misunderstood the word "monarch" which they thought to be "monakh" (monk). they therefore concluded that it was planned to put a monk on the throne, and an argument arose whether they would have a monk or not. some were in favor and others opposed. by the time it got to the next regiment the question was whether they would have the monk iliodor as their ruler. it was no longer a question whether russia was to have a tsar but whether the tsar should be a monk or not, and whether it should be iliodor or some other one. strange to say, as evening came a kind of fear seized the population, particularly the more ignorant. it was difficult for them to shake off the terror of the old police; all the time that they were talking against the tsar they had a feeling that they were doing wrong, and that some one was denouncing them. it was hard for them to believe that all that they saw and heard during the day was real and that the old regime was powerless. some one would start a rumor that a monarchist general with an army was marching on the city and that he would kill and burn. early friday evening, march , as i was walking down the street, soldiers ran by me shouting for every one to get under cover for several hundred police from tsarskoe selo were coming and that there would be street fighting. frightened mothers grabbed their little ones and hurried home, storekeepers closed the shops, porters barricaded the gates, housewives extinguished the lights, and the streets became as dark and as silent as a cemetery. this lasted for an hour or more and then came more soldiers announcing that all was well, that the supposed policemen were revolutionary soldiers who had come to take the oath of allegiance. the exultation reached its highest point when the first temporary government, with prince lvov at the head, was announced. every one was pleased with the men selected, they were without doubt the ablest leaders of the country, men who had always fought for the cause of liberty and for the interests of the public. there was nothing but praise for them and assurances of support. the fact that there was a "pravitelstvo" (government) calmed the people and they gradually went back to their old occupations, but as new men, with broader outlooks and with higher aspirations. the taking of the oath of office by the new ministry was the last act of that wonderful week to be unanimously approved by the people. when the temporary government attempted to govern it was interfered with by the council of workmen's and soldiers' deputies; the cry was raised by the socialist groups that it was they who had won the revolution and that they, therefore, should have all the power. since then the country has become more and more divided against itself, love has turned into hate, joy into sorrow. the jugo-slav movement by robert j. keener [fn: as used in this paper, the term jugo-slav comprehends the serbs, croats, and slovenes, but not the bulgars. it is not necessary here to consider whether the latter are slavs or slavicized tartars, but merely to point out that since the congress of berlin in , the bulgars have taken no part in the movement which has resulted in the creation of jugo-slav nationalism. the word "jug" means "south" in slavic. it is also written "youg" and "[iu]g."] if there are miracles in history, the jugo-slav movement is a miracle. it is the story of a nation which entered its new home in the balkans in the seventh century and became divided geographically and politically, in faith and written language, and in economic and social life, until at last its spokesmen could truthfully say that it was divided into thirteen separate administrative units dependent upon fifteen legislative bodies. [fn: in the slovenes inhabiting carniola, carinthia, styria, istria, and goerz-gradisca, and the serbo-croats of istria and dalmatia, were under the direct rule of austria. trieste and its district were a part of austria. the serbs of hungary belonged to hungary proper for the most part; the croats by a fundamental agreement were entitled to autonomy in croatia. fiume, the seaport of croatia and hungary, had an administration of its own. bosnia-herzegovina possessed a diet and was under the dual rule of austria and hungary. all the provinces or districts mentioned above were governed by the two parliaments at vienna and budapest. there were, in addition, two independent serb states, serbia and montenegro. down to turkey ruled over a large number of serbs.] how did it come about that this evolution of twelve centuries, beginning with primeval unity and passing through a political, economic, and social decomposition of a most bewildering character, has once more arrived at national unity and is even now demanding the last step--political amalgamation? is it a doctrine or a dream or is it a reality? i when the jugo-slavs first occupied the western half of the balkan peninsula, they were one in speech, in social customs and ancestry, and were divided only into tribes. the slovenes, who settled in the northern end of the west balkan block, were not separated from their croat and serb kinsmen by the forces of geography, but rather by the course of political evolution. on the other hand, the croats became separated from the serbs by forces largely geographical, though partially economic and political, in nature. the slovenes gave way before the pressure of the germans who swept through the alps and down the danube and forced the slovene vojvodes to acknowledge their suzerainty and accept their religion. the germans would doubtless have succeeded in obliterating them had not the magyar invasion weakened their offensive. the slovenes, however, were left a wrecked nationality whose fate became blended with that of the habsburg possessions and who against the forces of geography--which firmly bound them to the croats--were politically riveted to the habsburg north. this division was therefore the result of forces created by man and changeable by him. the croats settled in the northwestern half of the territory south of the slovenes; the serbs roughly in the southeastern part of it. here geographical influences--the direction of the rivers and the dinaric ridges--combined with divergent political and economic possibilities, produced a dualism. the croats on the save and its tributaries naturally expanded westward and aspired to closer connection with the sea where their struggle with the remnants of roman civilization and a superior culture absorbed their energies. they developed out of their tribal state more quickly, while the serbs, further inland and amid more difficult surroundings, developed more slowly. the people who lived along the save aspired to control the dalmatian coast which military and geographical authorities claim can best be held from the mainland. the people who lived in montenegro or along the morava, which was the gateway to the peninsula, would naturally expand south and east toward the other cultural center, constantinople, and thus seek to dominate the balkan peninsula. in both cases, the attraction proved too much for feudal kings and led to the formation of cosmopolitan empires instead of strong national monarchies. the kingdoms of croatia and serbia thus parted company politically. the former became a separate kingdom attached to hungary in and to the habsburg dynasty in , while the serbs began their expansion under the nemanja dynasty late in the twelfth century and almost realized the dominion over the balkans under stephen du[s]an in the fourteenth century. this political, geographical, and economic dualism became still greater when in the serbs cast their lot with orthodoxy. the croats, like the slovenes, adopted roman catholicism, the latin alphabet, and the culture of rome. the serbs accepted greek orthodoxy, the cyrillic alphabet, and the culture of constantinople. the slovenes became a part of the austrian possessions of the habsburgs; the croats fell under the dominion of the hungarian crown and the republic of venice; and the serbs succumbed to the turks by the middle of the fifteenth century. the loss of political independence brought with it ultimately the loss of the native nobility, the sole guardians of the constitutional and historical rights of the nations down into the nineteenth century in central europe. in addition, many towns were germanized and the middle class disappeared. the jugo-slavs, like the czecho-slovaks, appeared in modern times as a nation which had lost its native nobility and had been reduced to a disarmed, untutored, and enserfed peasantry. in the absence of these leaders, the nation turned to its clergy who in order to retain their hold on the peasantry must needs ever remain national. but here again the misfortune which awaited the jugo-slavs was that historically three religions had taken deep root, the catholic among the slovenes and croats, and the mohammedan and orthodox among the serbs. we may therefore conclude the first half of the historical evolution of the jugo-slavs with the observation that political, economic, social, and geographical divisions led to their downfall as a nation and that if they ever desired to become one, each one of these chasms would have to be bridged. a solution for each of these problems--the most difficult which ever faced a nation--would have to be found; meanwhile the policy of the four masters, the german, venetian, magyar, and turk, would always be "divide and rule," in other words, to perpetuate the divergencies. ii the history of the evolution of the jugo-slavs from the sixteenth to the twentieth century has been an effort to find the means of melting down these differences until finally one--nationalism--accomplished the purpose. unity came first in the imagination and the mind, next in literature and speech, and finally in political action. the four hundred years beginning with the fifteenth and ending with the eighteenth century will be remembered by the jugo-slavs as the age of humiliation. only slavicized ragusa and indomitable montenegro kept alive the imagination of the nation which was brought back to life by the half-religious, half-national slovene poets of the sixteenth century, by the ragusan epic poet [gundulic], by the incessant demands of successive diets of the ever-weakening croatia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and by the progressive and zealous serbs of hungary, who ever since the fifteenth century in increasing numbers made their home there, refugees from the oppression of the turk, but who ever longed to push out from the frontier and rebuild serbia anew. [krizanic], a croat catholic dalmatian priest, a firm believer in jugo-slav and slavic unity in general, appealed to the rising russian empire to help save dying slavdom. while the turkish and the venetian empires decayed, the austrian and the russian gained courage. by the end of the seventeenth century the house of habsburg had won back all except the banat and in the eighteenth century aspired to divide the balkan peninsula in halves with the russians. along with this future foreign interference in the affairs of the balkans came the germanizing and centralizing "reforms" of maria theresa and joseph ii, whose result was to cripple still further the few constitutional and historical rights which remained to the jugo-slavs. but these "reforms" had nevertheless salutary effects upon the nation of peasants. the enlightened despots, spurred on by the loss of silesia--which was at the same time a great loss in revenue as well as prestige--sought to make good the loss by the economic betterment and education of the peasantry. how else could an agrarian state increase its revenue and supply able-bodied men for the numerous armies which the overarmaments of frederick ii had brought upon central europe? [fn: emphasis on this fundamental fact of habsburg history in the eighteenth century cannot be too strong. the writer of this paper hopes soon to present archival proof of the far-reaching results of the seizure of silesia. the documents are to be found in the archives of the _hofkammer_ and _ministerium des innern_ in vienna.] centralization and germanization really helped to awaken the slavs. enlightened despotism gave them the weapons of political struggle--education and economic resources. of the jugo-slavs, the serbs of hungary were the first to achieve national and cultural consciousness. in the absence of a native nobility, but with unusual economic opportunities at their command, they developed a wealthy middle class--a rare thing among slavs before the middle of the nineteenth century. this class came into contact with nationalized western europe and found that the bulwark against national oppression was education for the masses. the nation must be educated and must be economically sound in order to undertake the political struggle against the germans, the magyars, and the turks. that was the background of dositej obradovi[c]'s literary labors as he raised spoken serbian ultimately to the literary language of the jugo-slavs and of karad[z]i[c]'s efforts which resulted in that wonderful collection of serbian national poems, and which clinched for all time the literary supremacy of the _[s]to_ dialect. serbian hungary was the starting place for kara george's revolution which brought partial freedom in and autonomy in and thus planted the germ of the modern greater serbia. napoleon's illyria, created in , joined for the first time slovenes and croats in one political unit, and the excellent administration and the schools left an undying memory of what might be if the habsburgs cared. vodnik, the slovene poet, sang of illyria and her creator, but it was the meteoric croat, ljudevit gaj, in the thirties, who so eloquently idealized it as he poured heated rhetoric into the camp of the magyars, who after the diet of began their unfortunate policy of magyarization. illyria, though short-lived, became the germ of the greater croatia idea, which, with greater serbia, existed as the two, not necessarily hostile, solutions of the jugo-slav problem down to the congress of berlin. it was as yet a friendly rivalry with the possible formation of two separate units. the occupation of bosnia in led to actual friction between them. on the other hand, the annexation of the same province in had just the opposite effect, for from that time the ultimate ideal was no longer greater croatia or greater serbia in any selfish sense, but jugo-slavia, because, to use a platitude, bosnia had scrambled the eggs. evidence of the fairly amicable relations between slovenes, croats, and serbs at the time of gaj is not lacking. it was gaj who reformed croatian orthography on the basis of the serbian. bleiweis and vraz endeavored to do the same in slovene. the revolution of demonstrated still further the friendly relations of these potential rivals as national unifiers. for the first time, the croats and serbs publicly fraternized and showed that the seemingly insurmountable barrier of religious difference tended to disappear in the struggle for national independence. in this sense the events of --when the hand of the foreign master was for the while taken away--have given confident hope to those who believe that jugo-slav differences are soluble. jela[c]i[c], ban of croatia, the idol of the serbo-croats, was proclaimed dictator and supported by the croatian diet at zagreb (agram) and the serbian assembly at karlovac (karlowitz). the serb patriarch raja[c]i[c] and the young and gifted stratimirovi[c], provisional administrator of the serb vojvodina, attended the croatian diet and the high mass where bishop o[z]egovi[c] sang the te deum in old slavic. after gaj, raja[c]i[c], and stratimirovi[c] had failed at vienna and pressburg to bend the dynasty or the defiant kossuth, jela[c]i[c] was empowered to defend the monarchy and bring back the historical rights of the triune kingdom and the serb vojvodina. the dynasty and the monarchy survived, but jugo-slav hopes and the promises they had received were unfulfilled or soon withdrawn, as for instance the vojvodina in . absolutism reigned supreme from to . this disappointment led the croats and serbs to try cooperation with the magyars, who under deák and eötvös appeared to be anxious to conciliate the non-magyars in those uncertain years which began in and ended in dualism. austria lacked a great statesman, and the prusso-austrian rivalry led the fearful and impatient francis joseph into the compromise (ausgleich) of . it was a work of haste and expediency and bound with it the fate of the dynasty. thereafter, the german minority in austria and the magyar minority in hungary were the decisive factors in the problems confronting the jugo-slavs. dalmatia was handed over to austria; croatia, by a compromise, which it has never really accepted, to hungary. the ausgleich between austria and hungary and hungary and croatia opened in a period which ended in --it was a period, on the one hand of the greatest decay and decomposition in the political life of the jugo-slavs, and, on the other, of the greatest literary and intellectual unity as shaped by bishop strossmayer and peter ii and nicholas of montenegro. bishop strossmayer and the slovene, croat, and serb academies, matica, and learned societies, as well as men of literature, spoke, wrote, and pleaded for unity in this period, in vain. but they and the universities of prague and zagreb produced a younger generation which later took up the fight for national unity and which abandoned individual political foibles and looked over the boundaries of their provinces for inspiration. among the slovenes, politics degenerated into the struggle for minor concessions from the court at vienna in regard to the slovene language and schools, while political parties multiplied freely through personal and social differences. the lines which bound them to their kinsmen in the south were weakest during this period. the croats found themselves no match for the astute magyars who resorted to packed diets, gerrymandering, bribery, and forgery. the compromise (nagoda) of was as decisive as the murder of the farsighted prince michael of serbia in that year. it will be remembered that, in spite of his many faults, he had made an agreement with montenegro for the ultimate merging of their states and, after allying himself with rumania, had carried out an agreement with the bulgarian committee for the amalgamation of bulgaria with serbia, thus obtaining a commanding influence in the balkans. with his death, serbia fell into the hands of milan and alexander, whose weak and erratically despotic reigns ushered in an era in serbian history from which she emerged in , through the assassination and the extinction of the last of the obrenovics, a country without a good name, a nation which, through no special fault of its own, had become degraded. it was in the midst of this political decay that the bosnians revolted in and that serbia, montenegro, russia, and rumania became involved in the russo-turkish war. space forbids but the most hasty survey of the occupation and administration by austria of bosnia and the herzegovina by virtue of the treaty of berlin in . bismarck, francis joseph, and andrassy were swayed by differing motives whose total result was that austria was to become a balkan power--the outpost of the german _drang nach osten_--and that it was worth while making a greater serbia impossible, even at the cost of increasing the number of slavs in the habsburg monarchy, which, now reenforced by the ausgleich, could stand the strain of advancing democracy and the necessity, therefore, of granting further rights to the slavs. the occupation of bosnia led to the first real quarrels in modern times between croat and serb, for the former wanted bosnia in greater croatia in order to have connection with dalmatia; the latter wished it annexed to greater serbia, because it was serbian. magyar and german, further, quarreled as to the status of bosnia and left it unsettled. but one thing was settled by the occupation in and the annexation in . neither greater croatia nor greater serbia were any longer truly possible as a final solution, only a jugo-slavia. the greater croatia received a mortal blow by the addition of serbs up to more than one third of the number of croats in austria-hungary, and serbia faced the future either as a vassal or as a territory which must be annexed. from that time until the present the habsburg monarchy, largely owing to the predominance of the magyars in croatia, adopted a policy of prevention--jugo-slav nationality was to be prevented. viewed in that light the rule of count khuen-hedérv[a]ry, ban of croatia from to , in which time, according to croats, he corrupted a whole generation, turned serb against croat, and played out the radical demands of the party of star[c]evi[c] and frank, is intelligible. the policy of count khuen, which was based on corruption and forgery, on press-muzzling and career-exploding, has since been imitated, and its imitation has been largely responsible for this war. it was not until the serbs and croats formed their coalition in that the trial of strength had come. in serbia, peter karageorgevitch ascended the throne and reversed the pro-austrian policy of his predecessor. this it will be remembered was influenced until then by the bulgarian policy of russia and by serbia's defeat at the hands of bulgaria in . the commercial treaty with bulgaria in , and the tariff war which austria began immediately afterward, pointed out which way the wind was blowing. an era big with decisive events arrived. the jugo-slavs had learned that union meant victory, division foreign mastery. petty politics and religious fanaticism were forgotten, and jugo-slav nationality was formed in the fierce fires of austro-magyar terrorism and forgery and in the whirlwind reaped from the balkan wars. it was too late to talk of trialism unless it meant independence, and, when it meant that, it did not mean austrian trialism. the treason trial by which baron rauch hoped to split the serbo-croat coalition, and which was to furnish the cause of a war with serbia on the annexation of bosnia in , collapsed. it rested on forgeries concocted within the walls of the austro-hungarian legation in belgrade where count forgách held forth. the annexation of bosnia in completed the operation begun in and called for the completion of the policy of prevention. it was the forerunner of the press campaign in the first balkan war, the prohaska affair, the attack by bulgaria upon serbia and greece, the rebuff to masaryk and pa[s]i[c], the murder of francis ferdinand, and the austro-hungarian note to serbia. the mysteries connected with the forgeries and this chain of events will remain a fertile field for detectives and psychologists and, after that, for historians. for us, it is necessary to note that, as the hand of pan-germanism became more evident, the slovenes began to draw nearer to the croats and the serbs. it remained only for the serbs to electrify the jugo-slavs--"to avenge kossovo with kumanovo"--in order to cement their loyalty to the regenerated serbs. religious differences, political rivalries, linguistic quibbles, and the petty foibles of centuries appeared to be forgotten in the three short years which elapsed from kumanovo to the destruction of serbia in . the greater serbia idea had really perished in , as had the greater croatia idea in . in their place emerged jugo-slavia--the kingdom of the serbs, croats, and slovenes--implied by the south slav parliamentary club in austria in their declaration of may , , and formulated by the pact of corfu of july , , which pasié, premier of serbia, and trumbié, the head of the london jugo-slav committee, drew up. the evolution had been completed. nationalism had proved stronger than geography, stronger than opposing religions, more cohesive than political and economic interests. for this, the jugo-slavs have not only themselves and modern progress, like railroad-building, to thank, but also the policy of the habsburg monarchy, the hopeful, though feeble, note of the allies to president wilson, the russian revolution, and the entry of the united states into the war. for the historian, it remains to examine the depth and the character of the movement. he should neither lament that it succeeded, nor frown upon it that it did not come long ago when his own nation achieved its unity. that it is a reality is proved by the fact that the central powers believed its destruction worth this catastrophic war. a nation of eleven or twelve millions holds the path to the adriatic and the aegean and the gateway to the orient and world dominion. it can help to make impossible the dream of mid-europe or of pan-germany. the jugo-slav movement has ended in the formation of a nation which is neither a doctrine, nor a dream, but a reality. appendices declaration of the jugo-slav club of the austrian parliament on may , "the undersigned deputies, assembled as the 'jugo-slav club,' taking their stand on the principle of nationalities and on the rights of the croatian state, declare that they demand that all the countries in which slovenes, croats, and serbs live shall be united in an independent and democratic state organism, free from the domination of any foreign nation and placed under the sceptre of the dynasty habsburg-lorraine. they declare that they will employ all their forces to realize this demand of their single nation. the undersigned will take part in the parliamentary labor after having made this reserve...." [fn: referring to the declaration of the jugo-slav club, may , , in the vienna parliament j. j. grgurevich, secretary of the south slavic national council, washington, d. c., writes: "in order to understand correctly this declaration, it is necessary to state that the same was presented in the vienna parliament during war time, when each, even the most innocent, word in regard to rights, principles of nationality, and liberty of peoples, was considered and punished as a crime and treason, by imprisonment, even death. "were it not for these facts, this declaration would never contain the words: 'and placed under the sceptre of the dynasty habsburg-lorraine.' it was, therefore, necessary to insert these words in order to make possible the public announcement of this declaration; it was necessary to make a moral sacrifice for the sake of a great moral and material gain, which was secured through this declaration among the people to which it was addressed and which understood it in the sense and in the spirit of the declaration of corfu."] appendix ii the pact of corfu at the conference of the members of the late (serbian) coalition cabinet and those of the present cabinet, and also the representatives of the jugo-slav committee in london, all of whom have hitherto been working on parallel lines, views have been exchanged in collaboration with the president of the skupstina, on all questions concerning the life of the serbs, croats and slovenes in their joint future state. we are happy in being able once more on this occasion to point to the complete unanimity of all parties concerned. in the first place, the representatives of the serbs, croats and slovenes declare anew and most categorically that our people constitutes but one nation, and that it is one in blood, one by the spoken and written language, by the continuity and unity of the territory in which it lives, and finally in virtue of the common and vital interests of its national existence and the general development of its moral and material life. the idea of its national unity has never suffered extinction, although all the intellectual forces of its enemy were directed against its unification, its liberty and its national existence. divided between several states, our nation is in austria-hungary alone split up into eleven provincial administrations, coming under thirteen legislative bodies. the feeling of national unity, together with the spirit of liberty and independence, have supported it in the never-ending struggles of centuries against the turks in the east and against the germans and the magyars in the west. being numerically inferior to its enemies in the east and west, it was impossible for it to safeguard its unity as a nation and a state, its liberty and its independence against the brutal maxim of "might goes before right" militating against it both east and west. but the moment has come when our people is no longer isolated. the war imposed by german militarism upon russia, upon france and upon england for the defense of their honor as well as for the liberty and independence of small nations, has developed into a struggle for the liberty of the world and the triumph of right over might. all nations which love liberty and independence have allied themselves together for their common defense, to save civilization and liberty at the cost of every sacrifice, to establish a new international order based upon justice and upon the right of every nation to dispose of itself and so organize its independent life; finally to establish a durable peace consecrated to the progress and development of humanity and to secure the world against a catastrophe similar to that which the conquering lust of german imperialism has provoked. to noble france, who has proclaimed the liberty of nations, and to england, the hearth of liberty, the great american republic and the new, free and democratic russia have joined themselves in proclaiming as their principal war aim the triumph of liberty and democracy and as basis of the new international order the right of free self-determination for every nation. our nation of the three names, which has been the greatest sufferer under brute force and injustice and which has made the greatest sacrifices to preserve its right of self-determination, has with enthusiasm accepted this sublime principle put forward as the chief aim of this atrocious war, provoked by the violation of this very principle. the authorized representatives of the serbs, croats and slovenes, in declaring that it is the desire of our people to free itself from every foreign yoke and to constitute itself a free, national and independent state, a desire based on the principle that every nation has the right to decide its own destiny, are agreed in judging that this state should be founded on the following modern and democratic principles: ( ) the state of the serbs, croats and slovenes, who are also known as the southern slavs or jugo-slavs, will be a free and independent kingdom, with indivisible territory and unity of allegiance. it will be a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy under the karageorgevitch dynasty, which has always shared the ideas and the feelings of the nation, placing liberty and the national will above all else. ( ) this state will be named "the kingdom of the serbs, croats, and slovenes." and the style of the sovereign will be "king of the serbs, croats, and slovenes." ( ) the state will have a single coat-of-arms, a single flag, and a single crown. these emblems will be composed of the present existing emblems. the unity of the state will be symbolized by the coat-of-arms and the flag of the kingdom. ( ) the special serb, croat, and slovene flags rank equally and may be freely hoisted on all occasions. the special coat-of-arms may be used with equal freedom. ( ) the three national designations--serbs, croats, and slovenes--are equal before the law throughout the territory of the kingdom, and everyone may use them freely upon all occasions of public life and in dealing with the authorities. ( ) the two alphabets, the cyrillic and the latin, also rank equally, and everyone may use them freely throughout the territory of the kingdom. the royal authorities and the local self-governing authorities have both the right and the duty to employ both alphabets in accordance with the wishes of the citizens. ( ) all recognized religions may be freely and publicly exercised. the orthodox, roman catholic and mussulman faiths, which are those chiefly professed by our nation, shall rank equally and enjoy equal rights with regard to the state. in consideration of these principles the legislative will take special care to safeguard religious concord in conformity with the spirit and tradition of our whole nation. ( ) the calendar will be unified as soon as possible. ( ) the territory of the kingdom of the serbs, croats and slovenes will include all the territory inhabited compactly and in territorial continuity by our nation of the three names. it cannot be mutilated without detriment to the vital interests of the community. our nation demands nothing that belongs to others. it demands only what is its own. it desires to free itself and to achieve its unity. therefore it consciously and firmly refuses every partial solution of the problem of its national liberation and unification. it puts forward the proposition of its deliverance from austro-hungarian domination and its union with serbia and montenegro in a single state forming an indivisible whole. in accordance with the right of self-determination of peoples, no part of this territorial totality may without infringement of justice be detached and incorporated with some other state without the consent of the nation itself. ( ) in the interests of freedom and of the equal right of all nations, the adriatic shall be free and open to each and all. ( ) all citizens throughout the territory of the kingdom shall be equal and enjoy the same rights with regard to the state and before the law. ( ) the election of the deputies to the national representative body shall be by universal suffrage, with equal, direct and secret ballot. the same shall apply to the elections in the communes and other administrative units. elections will take place in each commune. ( ) the constitution, to be established after the conclusion of peace by a constituent assembly elected by universal suffrage, with direct and secret ballot, will be the basis of the entire life of the state; it will be the source and the consummation of all authority and of all rights by which the entire life of the nation will be regulated. the constitution will provide the nation with the possibility of exercising its special energies in local autonomies delimited by natural, social and economic conditions. the constitution must be passed in its entirety by a numerically defined majority in the constituent assembly. the constitution, like all other laws passed by the constituent assembly, will only come into force after having received the royal sanction. the nation of the serbs, croats and slovenes, thus unified, will form a state of about twelve million inhabitants. this state will be the guarantee for their independence and national development, and their national and intellectual progress in general, a mighty bulwark against the german thrust, an inseparable ally of all the civilized nations and states which have proclaimed the principle of right and liberty and that of international justice. it will be a worthy member of the new community of nations. drawn up in corfu, july / , . the prime minister of the kingdom of serbia and minister for foreign affairs (sgd.) nikola p. pashitch, the president of the jugo-slav committee (sgd.) dr. ante trumbic, advocate, deputy and leader of the croatian national party in the dalmatian diet, late mayor of split (spalato), late deputy for the district of zadar (zara) in the austrian parliament. bibliographical hints the following bibliography is nothing but a selected list and it has not seemed advisable to include material which is to be found in periodicals. [fn: for further information the investigator may consult _slavic europe: a selected bibliography in the western european languages comprising history, languages, and literature_. by r. j. kerner. in press.] perhaps the most recent and best general statement of the jugo-slav problem as a whole is to be found in a. h. e. taylor's _the future of the southern slavs_ (new york, ). another useful general work is by the serb, v. r. savi[c]. the title is, _south-eastern europe: the main problem of the present world struggle_ (new york, ). this is an american edition, revised and enlarged, of the author's english work: _the reconstruction of south-eastern europe_ (london, ). the noted french historian, to whom the western world owes much of its knowledge about slavic history, ernest denis, presents an able survey of the general problem in his _la grande serbie_ (paris, ). it is written largely around serbia, like savi[c]'s book. b. vo[s]njak in _a bulwark against germany_ (london, ), and _a dying empire_ (london, ), presents to western readers, for the first time, the development of the slovene districts of austria and their relation to that empire and to the jugo-slavs. with regard to austria-hungary and the jugo-slavs in particular, the west owes most to the penetrating studies of r. w. seton-watson, who formerly wrote under the name of scotus viator. before the war, seton-watson wrote _the southern slav problem and the habsburg monarchy_ (london, ), wherein he discusses the whole problem from the point of view of the croats, in contrast to the serbs. the author subsequently rectified this point of view in _the balkans, italy, and the adriatic_ (london, ); _german, slav, and magyar_ (london, ); and _the rise of nationality in the balkans_ (london, ). numerous writers on austrian and balkan affairs have devoted parts of their general works to the jugo-slav movement. only a few typical ones can be mentioned here. paul samassa, _der völkerstreit im habsburgerstaat_ (leipzig, ), may be taken as representative of the german of the german empire. t. von sosnosky's _die politik im habsburgerreiche_ (berlin, - , vols.) is the work of an austrophil, as is also w. von schierbrand's _austria-hungary: the polyglot empire_ (new york, ); h. w. steed's _the habsburg monarchy_ (london, , d ed.) is one of the ablest surveys in the english language. it is thoroughly worked out in the general features, but slights many of the national and provincial aspects of the austrian question. v. gayda's _la crisi di un impero_ ( d ed., ), english ed., _modern austria_ (new york, ) is an unusually able work by an italian who sees clearly on every question except that of italia irredenta. a. toynbee's _nationality and the war_ (london, ) is another very useful summary of the question. the official austro-hungarian point of view has been stated in such works, among many others, as hitter von sax, _die wahrheit über die serbische frage und das serbentum in bosnien_ (vienna, ); l. mandl, _oesterreich-ungarn und serbien_ (vienna, ); c. m. knachtbull-hugessen, _the political evolution of the hungarian nation_ (london, , vols.); and numerous official publications and dossiers. the works thus far mentioned were based on numerous studies in slavic and other languages, only a few of which can be mentioned here. for the slovenes one will look into josef apih's _slovenci in leto_ (lubla[n], ); lon[c]ar's _politi[c]no [z]ivljenje slovencei_ (in bleiweis's _zbornik._ published by the matica slovenska, lubla[n], ); and vos[n]jak's _spomini_ (lubla[n], , vols.). the following will be found useful for the croats: v. klai[c], _povjest hrvata_ (zagreb, ff., vols.); r. horvat, _najnovije doba hrvatske povjesti_ (zagreb, ); milan marjanovi[c], _hrvatski pokret_ (dubrovnik, - , vols.); l. v. berezin, _khorvatsï[ia], slavonï[ia], dalmatsï[ia] i voenna[ia] granitsa_ (st. petersburg, ); i. kulakovskï[i], _illirizm_ (warsaw, ); t. smi[c]iklas, _hrvatska narodna ideja_ (rad jugo-slavenski akad. xxx); v. zagorsky, _françois ra[c]ki et la renaissance scientifique et politique de la croatie - _ (paris, ). for the serbs, a few of the fundamental works are: l. kova[c]evi[c] and l. jovanovi[c], _istorija srpskoga naroda _(belgrade, - , vols.); s. stanojevi[c], _istorija srpskoga naroda_ (belgrade, ); j. risti[c], _diplomatska istorija srbije, - _ (belgrade, - ); v. v. ra[c]i[c], _le royaume de serbie. Ã�tude d'histoire diplomatique et de droit international_ (paris, ); f. p. kanitz, _das königreich serbien und das serbenvolk von der römerzeit bis zur gegenwart_ (leipzig, - , vols.); s. gop[c]evi[c], _geschichte von montenegro und albanien_ (gotha, ); f. s. stevenson, _a history of montenegro_ (london, ).[fn: lack of space forbids special mention of works by such scholars as loiseau, vellay, laveleye, hron, masaryk, spalajkovi[c], barré, [fn (cont.): kallay, marczali, prezzolini, sokolovi[c], novakovi[c], chéradame, evans, erdeljanovi[c]. the jugo-slav propaganda societies have published in english: _the southern slav appeal; jugo-slav nationalism_ by b. vo[s]njak; _the strategical significance of serbia_ by n. zupani[c]; _the southern slav programme; a sketch of southern slav history; southern slav culture; political and social conditions in slovene lands; austro-magyar judicial crimes--persecutions of the jugo-slavs._ in french: _ceux dont on ignore le martyre (les yougo-slaves et la guerre)_; _les yougo-slaves--leur union nationale; les slovenes_ by q. krek; and the periodical _bulletin yougoslave_. h. hinkovi[c] has written the most concise statement of the case of the jugo-slavs in _the jugo-slav problem_. reprinted from the _world court magazine_ ( ).] there is a good survey of the history of the jugo-slavs in russian: g. il'inskï[i], _kratk'ï[i] kurs istorï[i] [iu]zhnikh slav[ia]n_ (kharkov, ). tales of the wilderness by boris andreyevich vogau (boris pilniak, pseud.) with an introduction by prince d. s. mirsky translated into english by f. o'dempsey contents the snow a year of their lives a thousand years over the ravine always on detachment the snow wind the forest manor the bielokonsky estate death the heirs the crossways introduction i russian fiction since chekhov the english reading public knows next to nothing of contemporary russian literature. in the great age of the russian realistic novel, which begins with turgeniev and finishes with chekhov, the english reader is tolerably at home. but what came after the death of chekhov is still unknown or, what is worse, misrepresented. second and third- rate writers, like merezhkovsky, andreyev, and artsybashev, have found their way into england and are still supposed to be the best russian twentieth century fiction can offer. the names of really significant writers, like remizov and andrey bely, have not even been heard of. this state of affairs makes it necessary, in introducing a contemporary russian writer to the english public, to give at least a few indications of his place in the general picture of modern russian literature. the date of chekhov's death ( ) may be taken to mark the end of a long and glorious period of literary achievement. it is conveniently near the dividing line of two centuries, and it coincides rather exactly with the moment when russian literature definitely ceased to be dominated by realism and the novel. in the two or three years that followed the death of chekhov russian literature underwent a complete and drastic transformation. the principal feature of the new literature became the decisive preponderance of poetry over prose and of manner over matter--a state of things exactly opposite to that which prevailed during what we may conveniently call the victorian age. poetry in contemporary russian literature is not only of greater intrinsic merit than prose, but almost all the prose there is has to such an extent been permeated with the methods and standards of poetry that in the more extreme cases it is almost impossible to tell whether what is printed as prose is really prose or verse. contemporary russian poetry is a vigorous organic growth. it is a self-contained movement developing along logically consistent lines. it has produced much that is of the very first order. the poetry of theodore sologub, of innocent annensky, [footnote: the reader will notice the quotations from annensky in the first story of this volume.] of vyacheslav ivanov, and of alexander blok, is to our best understanding of that perennial quality that will last. they have been followed by younger poets, more debatable and more debated, many of them intensely and daringly original, but all of them firmly planted in the living tradition of yesterday. they learn from their elders and teach their juniors--the true touchstone of an organic and vigorous movement. what is perhaps still more significant--the level of minor poetry is extraordinarily high, and every verse-producer is, in varying degrees, a conscious and efficient craftsman. the case with prose is very different. the old nineteenth century realistic tradition is dead. it died, practically, very soon after chekhov. it has produced a certain amount of good, even excellent, work within these last twenty years, but this work is disconnected, sterile of influence, and more or less belated; at the best it has the doubtful privilege of at once becoming classical and above the age. such for instance was the case of bunin's solitary masterpiece _the gentleman from san francisco_, and of that wonderful series of gorky's autobiographical books, the fourth of which appeared but a few months ago. these, however, can hardly be included in the domain of fiction, any more than his deservedly famous _reminiscences of tolstoy_. but gorky, and that excellent though minor writer, kuprin, are the only belated representatives of the fine nineteenth century tradition. for even bunin is a poet and a stylist rather than a story teller: his most characteristic "stories" are works of pure atmosphere, as diffuse and as skeletonless as a picture by claude monet. the symbolists of the early twentieth century (all the great poets of the generation were symbolists) tried also to create a prose of their own. they tried many directions but they did not succeed in creating a style or founding a tradition. the masterpiece of this symbolist prose is theodore sologub's great novel _the little demon_[footnote: english translation.] (by the way a very inadequate rendering of the russian title). it is a great novel, probably the most perfect russian _novel_ since the death of dostoyevsky. it breaks away very decidedly from realism and all the traditions of the nineteenth century. it is symbolic, synthetic, and poetical. but it is so intensely personal and its achievements are so intimately conditioned by the author's idiosyncrasies that it was quite plainly impossible to imitate it, or even to learn from it. this is still more the case with the later works of sologub, like the charming but baffling and disconcerting romance of _queen ortruda_. the other symbolists produced nothing of the same calibre, and they failed to attract the public. the bestsellers of the period after were, naturally enough, hybrid writers like andreyev. the cheap effect of his cadenced prose, his dreary and monotonous rhetoric, his sensational way of treating "essential problems" were just what the intelligentsia wanted at the time; it is also just what nobody is likely to want again. another writer of "problem stories" was artsybashev. his notorious _sanin_ ( ) is very typical of a certain phase of russian life. it has acquired a somewhat unaccountable popularity among the budding english intelligentsia. from the literary point of view its value is nil. artsybashev and andreyev were very second-rate writers; they had no knowledge of their art and their taste was deplorably bad and crude, but at least they were in a way, sincere, and gave expression to the genuine vacuum and desolation of their hearts. but around them sprung up a literature which sold as well and better than they did, but was openly meretricious and, fortunately, ephemeral. if it has done nothing else the great revolution of has at least done one good thing in making a clean sweep of all this interrevolutionary ( - ) fiction. all this literature appealed to certain sides of the "intellectual" heart, but it could not slake the thirst for fiction. it was rather natural that the reading public turned to foreign novelists in preference to the native ones. it may be confidently said that three- quarters of what the ordinary russian novel-reader read in the years preceding the revolution were translated novels. the book-market was swamped with translations, polish, german, scandinavian, english, french and spanish. knut hamsun, h. g. wells, and jack london were certainly more popular than any living russian novelist, except perhaps the russian miss dell, mme. verbitsky. in writers like jack london and h. g. wells the reader found what he missed in the russian novelists--a good story thrillingly told. for no reader, be he ever so russian, will indefinitely put up with a diet of "problems" and imitation poetry. while all these things were going on on the surface of things and sharing between themselves the whole of the book-market, a secret undercurrent was burrowing out its bed, scarcely noticed at first but which turned out to be the main prolongation of the russian novel. the principal characteristic of this undercurrent was the revival of realism and of that untranslatable russian thing "byt," [footnote: "byt" is the life of a definite community at a definite time in its individual, as opposed to universally human, features.] but a revival under new forms and in a new spirit. the pioneers of this movement were andrey bely and remizov. there was little in common between the two men, except that both were possessed with a startlingly original genius, and both directed it towards the utilization of russian "byt" for new artistic ends. andrey bely was, and is, a poet rather than a novelist. his prose from the very beginning exhibits in its extreme form the symbolist tendency towards wiping away the difference between poetry and prose: in his later novels his prose becomes distinctly metrical, it is prose after all only because it cannot be devided into _lines_; it can be devided into _feet_ very easily. but, though such prose is essentially a hybrid and illegitimate form, bely has achieved with it things that have probably never been achieved with the aid of anything like his instruments. the first of the series of his big novels appeared in : it is the _silver dove_, a story of russian mystical sectarians and of an intellectual who gets entangled in their meshes. at its appearance it sold only five hundred copies. his next novel _petersburg_ ( ) had not a much greater success. the third of the series is _kotik letaev_ ( ). the three novels form a series unique in its way. those who can get over the initial difficulties and accustom themselves to the very peculiar proceedings of the author will not fail to be irresistibly fascinated by his strange genius. the first novel, the _silver dove_, is in my opinion the most powerful of the three. it combines a daring realism, which is akin to gogol both in its exaggerations and in its broad humour, with a wonderful power of suggestion and of "atmosphere." one of its most memorable passages is the vast and elemental picture of the wind driving over the russian plain; a passage familiarised to satiety by numerous more or less clever imitations. _petersburg_ is a "political" novel. it is intended to symbolise the nihilism, the geometrical irreality of petersburg and petersburg bureaucracy. the cold spirit of system of the revolutionary terrorists is presented as the natural and legitimate outcome of bureaucratic formalism. a cunningly produced atmosphere of weird irreality pervades the whole book. it is in many ways a descendant of dostoyevsky--and has in its turn again produced a numerous family of imitations, including pilniak's most characteristic tales of the revolution. _kotik letaev_, the last and up to the present the least imitated of bely's novels, is the story of a child in his very first years. in it the "poetical" methods of the author reach their full development; but at the same time he achieves miracles of vividness and illusion in the realism of his dialogue and the minute, but by no means dry, analysis of the movements of his hero's subconscious ego. in spite of the enormous difference of style, methods, and aims bely approaches in many ways the effects and the achievements of proust. remizov is very different. he is steeped in russian popular and legendary lore. his roots are deep down in the russian soil. he is the greatest living master of racy and idiomatic russian. he has also written prose that elbows poetry, and that was looked upon with surprise and bewilderment until people realised that it was poetry. but his importance in the history of the russian novel is of another kind. it is firstly in his deliberate effort to "deliteralize" russian prose, to give it the accent, the intonation, and the syntax of the _spoken_ language. he has fully achieved his ends; he has created a prose which is entirely devoid of all bookishness and even on the printed page gives the illusion of being heard, not seen. few have been able to follow him in this path; for in the present state of linguistic chaos and decomposition few writers have the necessary knowledge of russian, the taste and the sense of measure, to write anything like his pure and flexible russian. in the hands of others it degenerates into slang, or into some personal jargon closely related to double dutch. remizov, however, has been more influential in another way, by his method of treating russian _life_. the most notable of remizov's "provincial" stories [footnote: in the second edition it is called "the story of ivan semenovich stratilatov." ] _the unhushable tambourine _was written at one time with bely's _the silver dove_, in . at the time it met with even greater indifference: it was refused by the leading magazine of the literary "party" to which the author belonged, and could appear only some years later in a collection of short stories. but it at once became known and very soon began to "make school." remizov's manner was to a certain degree a reversion to the nineteenth century, but to such aspects of that century that had before him been unnoticed. one of his chief inspirers was leskov, a writer who is only now coming into his own. remizov's _tambourine_ and his other stories of this class are realistic, they are "representations of real life," of "byt", but their realism is very different from the traditional russian realism. the style is dominated not by any "social" pre-occupation, but by a deliberate bringing forward of the grotesque. it verges on caricature, but is curiously and inseparably blended with a sympathy for even the lowest and vilest specimens of mankind which is reminiscent of dostoyevsky. it would be out of place here to give any detailed account of remizov's many-sided genius, of his _tales of the russian people_, of his _dreams_ (real night-dreams), of his books written during the war and the revolution (_mara_ and _the noises of the town_). in his later work he tends towards a greater simplicity, a certain "primitiveness" of outline, and a more concentrated style. remizov's disciples, as might be expected, have been more successful in imitating the grotesqueness of his caricatures and the vivid and intense concentration of his character painting than in adopting his sympathetic and human attitude or in speaking his pure russian. the first of the new realists to win general recognition was a. n. tolstoy, who speedily caught and vulgarised remizov's knack of creating grotesque "provincial" characters. he has an easy way of writing, which is miles apart from remizov's perfect craftsmanship, a love for mere filth, characteristic of his time and audience, and water enough to make his writings palatable to the average reader. so he early became the most popular of the _literary_ novelists of the years before the revolution. a far more significant writer is michael prishvin. he belongs to an older generation and attracted some attention by good work in the line of descriptive journalism before he came in touch with remizov. a man of the soil, he was capable of following remizov's lead in making his russian more colloquial and less bookish, without slavishly imitating him. he was unfortunately too much absorbed by his journalistic work to give much time to literature. but he wrote at least one story which deserves a high rank in even the smallest selection of russian stories--_the beast of krutoyarsk_ ( ). it is the story of a dog, and is far the best "animal" story in the whole of russian literature. the animal stories of rudyard kipling and jack london were very popular in russia at that time, but prishvin is curiously free from every foreign, in fact from every bookish, influence; his story smells of the damp and acid soil of his native smolensk province, and even remizov was to him only a guide towards the right use of words and the right way of concentrating on his subject. prishvin stands alone. but in the years - the russian literary press was flooded with short stories modelled on the _unhushable tambourine_. the most promising of these provincialists was e. zamyatin, whose stories [footnote: _uyezdnoe_, which may be rendered as "something provincial."] are as intense and packed with suggestive ugliness as anything in remizov, but lack the master's unerring linguistic flair and his profound and inclusive humanness. zamyatin's stories are most emphatically _made_, manufactured, there is not an ounce of spontaneity in them, and, especially in the later work where he is more or less free from reminiscences of remizov, they produce the impression of mosaic laboriously set together. they are overloaded with pointedly suggestive metaphor and symbolically expressive detail, and in their laborious and disproportionate elaborateness they remind you of the deliberate ugliness of a painting by some german "expressionist." [footnote: zamyatin was during the war a shipbuilding engineer in the russian service at newcastle. he has written several stories of english life which are entirely in his later "expressionist" manner (_the islanders_, berlin, )]. when the revolution came and brought russia that general impoverishment and reversion to savagery and primitive manners which is still the dominant feature of life in the u.s.s.r., literature was at first faced with a severe crisis. the book market was ruined. in the years - the publication of a book became a most difficult and hazardous undertaking. during these years the novel entirely disappeared from the market. for three years at least the russian novel was dead. when it emerged again in it emerged very different from what it had been in . as i have said, the surface "literature" of pre-revolutionary date was swept away altogether. the new realism of remizov and bely was triumphant all along the line. the works of both these writers were among the first books to be reprinted on the revival of the book-trade. and it soon became apparent that practically all the young generation belonged to their progeny. the first of these younger men to draw on himself the attention of critics and readers was pilniak, the author of the present volume, on whom i shall dwell anon in greater detail. in petersburg there appeared a whole group of young novelists who formed a sort of professional and amicable confraternity and called themselves the "serapion brothers." they were all influenced by remizov; they were taught (in the very precise sense of the word-- they had regular classes) by zamyatin; and explained the general principles of art by the gifted and light-minded young "formalist" critic, victor shklovsky. other writers emerged in all ends of russia, all of them more or less obssessed by the dazzling models of bely and remizov. all the writers of this new school have many features in common. they are all of them more interested in manner than in matter. they work at their style assiduously and fastidiously. they use an indirect method of narrating by aid of symbolic detail and suggestive metaphor. this makes their stories obscure and not easy to grasp at first reading. their language is elaborate; it is as full as possible of unusual provincial words, or permeated with slang. it is coarse and crude and many a page of their writings would not have been tolerated by the editor of a pre-revolution russian magazine, not to speak of an english publisher. they choose their subjects from the revolution and the civil war. they are all fascinated by the "elemental" greatness of the events, and are in a way the bards of the revolution. but their "revolutionism" is purely aesthetical and is conspicuously empty of ideas. most of their stories appear on the pages of official soviet publications, but they are regarded with rather natural mistrust by the official bolshevik critics, who draw attention to the essentially uncivic character of their art. the exaggerated elaborateness and research of their works makes all these writers practically untranslatable; not that many of them are really worth translating. their deliberate aestheticism--using as they do revolutionary subjects only as material for artistic effect-- prevents their writings from being acceptable as reliable pictures of russian post-revolutionary life. and it is quite obvious that they have very few of the qualities that make good fiction in the eyes of the ordinary novel-reader. there are marked inequalities of talent between them, as well as considerable differences of style. pilniak is the most ambitious, he aims highest--and at his worst falls lowest. vyacheslav shishkov, a siberian, is notable for his good russian, a worthy pupil of remizov and prishvin. vsevolod ivanov, another siberian, is perhaps the most interesting for the subjects he chooses (the civil war in the backwoods of siberia), but his style is, though vigorous, diffuse and hazy, and his narrative is lost in a nebula of poetically-produced "atmosphere." nicholas nikitin, who is considered by some to be the most promising of all, is certainly the most typical of the school of zamyatin; his style, overloaded with detail which swamps the outline of the story, is disfigured by the deliberate research of unfamiliar provincial idioms. michael zoshchenko is the only one who has, in a small way, reached perfection in his rendering of the common slang of a private soldier. but his art savours too much of a pastiche; he is really a born parodist and may some day give us a russian _christmas garland_. the most striking feature of all these story-tellers is their almost complete inability to tell a story. and this in spite of their great reverence for leskov, the greatest of russian story-tellers. but of leskov they have only imitated the style, not his art of narrative. miss harrison, in her notable essay on the aspects of the russian verb, [footnote: _aspects and aorists_, by jane harrison, cambridge university press, .] makes an interesting distinction between the "perfective" and "imperfective" style in fiction. the perfective is the ordinary style of an honest narrative. the "imperfective" is where nothing definitely happens but only goes on indefinitely "becoming." russian literature (as the russian language, according to miss harrison) has a tendency towards the "imperfective." but never has this "imperfective" been so exclusively paramount as now. in all these stories of thrilling events the writers have a most cunning way of concealing the adventure under such a thick veil of detail, description, poetical effusion, idiom, and metaphor, that it can only with difficulty be discovered by the very experienced reader. to choose such adventures for subjects and then deliberately to make no use of them and concentrate all attention on style and atmosphere, is really a _tour de force_, the crowning glory and the _reductio ad absurdum_ of this imperfective tendency. these extremities, which are largely conditioned by the whole past of russian literature, must naturally lead to a reaction. the reading public cannot be satisfied with such a literature. nor are the critics. a reaction against all this style is setting in, but it remains in the domain of theory and has not produced work of any importance. and it is doubtful whether it will. if even leskov with his wonderful genius for pure narrative has failed to influence the moderns in any way except by his mannerisms of speech, the case seems indeed desperate. those who are most thirsty for good stories properly told turn their eyes westwards, towards "stevenson and dumas" and e. a. t. hoffmann. better imitate pierre bénois than go on in the way you are doing, says lev lunts, one of the serapion brothers, in a violent and well-founded invective against modern russian fiction. [footnote: in gorky's miscellany, _beseda_. n , .] but though he sees the right way out pretty clearly lunts has not seriously tried his hand at the novel. [footnote: as i write i hear of the death of lev lunts at the age of . his principal work is a good tragedy of pure action without "atmosphere" or psychology (in the same _beseda_, n ).] a characteristic sign of the times is a novel by sergey bobrov, [footnote: _the specification of iditol_. iditol being the name of an imaginary chemical discovery.] a "precious" poet and a good critic, where he adopts the methods of the film-drama with its rapid development and complicated plot, and carefully avoids everything picturesque or striking in his style. but the common run of fiction in the soviet magazines continues as it was, and it is to be feared that there is something intrinsically opposed to the "perfective" narrative in the constitution of the contemporary russian novelist. ii boris pilniak boris pilniak (or in more correct transliteration, pil'nyak) is the pseudonym of boris andreyevich wogau. he is not of pure russian blood, but a descendant of german colonists; a fact which incidently proves the force of assimilation inherent in the russian milieu and the capacity to be assimilated, so typical of germans. for it is difficult to deny pilniak the appellation of a typical russian. pilniak is about thirty-five years of age. his short stories began to appear in periodicals before the war, and his first book appeared in . it contained four stories, two of which are included in the present volume (_death_ and _over the ravine_). a second volume appeared in (including the _crossways, the bielokonsky estate, the snow wind, a year of their lives_, and _a thousand years_). these volumes attracted comparatively little attention, though considering the great scarcity of fiction in those years they were certainly notable events. but _ivan-da-marya_ and _the bare year_, published in , produced a regular boom, and pilniak jumped into the limelight of all-russian celebrity. the cause of the success of these volumes, or rather the attention attracted by them, lay in their subject- matter: pilniak was the first novelist to approach the subject of "soviet _byt_," to attempt to utilise the everyday life and routine of soviet officialdom, and to paint the new forms russian life had taken since the revolution. since editions and reprints of pilniak's stories have been numerous, and as he follows the rather regrettable usage of making up every new book of his unpublished stories with reprints of earlier work the bibliography of his works is rather complicated and entangled, besides being entirely uninteresting to the english reader. the most interesting portion of pilniak's works are no doubt his longer stories of "soviet life" written since . unfortunately they are practically untranslatable. his proceedings, imitated from bely and remizov, would seem incongruous to the english reader, and the translation would be laid aside in despair or in disgust, in spite of all its burning interest of actuality. none of the stories included in this volume belong to this last manner of pilniak's, but in order to give a certain idea of what it is like i will attempt a specimen-translation of the beginning of his story _the third metropolis_ (dated may-june ), reproducing all his typographical mannerisms, which are in their turn reproduced rather unintelligently, from his great masters, remizov and bely. the story, by the way, is dedicated "to a. m. remizov, the master in whose workshop i was an apprentice." the third metropolis chapter i now open by the district department for popinstruct [footnote: that is "district department for popular instruction"--in "russian," _uotnarobraz_.] provided with every commodity. --baths-- (former church school in garden) for public use with capacity to receive persons in an -hour working-day. hours of baths: monday--municipal children's asylums (free) tuesdays, friday, saturday--males wednesday, thursday--females price for washing adults-- kop.gold children-- kop.gold disdepopinstruct [footnote: that is "district department for popular instruction"--in "russian," _uotnarobraz_.] times: lent of the eighth year of the world war and of the downfall of european civilisation (see spengler)--and sixth lent since the great russian revolution; in other words: march, spring, breaking-up of the ice--when the russian empire exploded in the great revolution the way rupert's drops explode, casting off--estia, latvia, lithuania, poland, the monarchy, chernov, martov, the dardanelles--- russian civilisation,--russian blizzards--- --and when--- --europe-- was: --nothing but one ersatz from end to end-- (ersatz--a german word --means the adverb "instead.") _place_: there is no place of action. russia, europe, the world, fraternity. dramatis personæ: there are none. russia, europe, the world, belief, disbelief,--civilisation, blizzards, thunderstorms, the image of the holy virgin. people,--men in overcoats with collars turned up, go- alones, of course;--women;--but women are my sadness,--to me who am a romanticist-- --the only thing, the most beautiful, the greatest joy. all this does after all make itself into some sort of sense, but the process by which this is at length attained is lengthy, tedious, and full of pitfalls to the reader who is unfamiliar with some dozen modern russian writers and is innocent of "soviet life." in the impossibility of giving an intelligible english version of the _bare year_ and its companions, the stories contained in this volume have been selected from the early and less sensational part of pilniak's writings and will be considerably less staggering to the average english intelligence. * * * * * * * there are two things an english reader is in the habit of expecting when approaching a new russian writer: first he expects much--and complains when he does not get it; to be appreciated by an english reader the russian writer must be a turgenev or a chekhov, short of that he is no use. secondly in every russian book he expects to find "ideas" and "a philosophy." if the eventual english reader approaches pilniak with these standards, he will be disappointed; pilniak is not a second dostoyevsky, and he has singularly few "ideas." it is not that he has no ambition in the way of ideas, but they are incoherent and cheap. the sort of historical speculations he indulges in may be appreciated at their right value on reading _a thousand years_. in later books he is still more self-indulgent in this direction, and many of his "stories" are a sort of muddle-headed historical disquisitions rather than stories in any acceptable sense of the word. andrey bely and his famous _petersburg_ are responsible for this habit of pilniak's, as well as for many others of his perversities. pilniak is without a doubt a writer of considerable ability, but he is essentially unoriginal and derivative. even in his famous novels of "soviet life," it is only the subject matter he has found out for himself--the methods of treating it are other peoples'. but this imitativeness makes pilniak a writer of peculiar interest: he is a sort of epitome of modern russian fiction, a living literary history, and this representative quality of his is perhaps the chief claim on our attention that can be advanced on behalf of the stories included in this book. almost every one of them can be traced back to some russian or foreign writer. each of them belongs to and is eminently typical of some accepted literary genre in vogue between and . the _snow_ and _the forest manor_ belong to the ordinary psychological problem-story acted among "intellectuals"; they have for their ancestors chekhov, zenaide hippius, and the polish novelists. _always on detachment_, belongs to the progeny of a. n. tolstoy, with the inevitable blackguardly seduction of a more or less pure girl or woman at the end. _the snow wind_ and _over the ravine_ are animal stories, for which, i believe, jack london is mainly responsible. in _a year of their lives_ the same "animal" method is transfered to the treatment of primitive human life, and the shadow of knut hamsun is plainly discernible in the background. _death_, _the heirs_, and _the belokonsky estate_ are first class exercises in the manner of bunin, and only _a thousand years_ and _the crossways_ herald in, to a certain extent, pilniak's own manner of invention. from the point of view of "ideas" _the crossways_ is the most interesting in the book, for it gives expression to that which is certainly the root of all pilniak's conception of the revolution. it is--to use two terms which have been applied to russia by two very different schools of thought but equally opposed to europe--a "scythian" or an "eurasian" conception. to pilniak the revolution is essentially the "revolt" of peasant and rural russia against the alien network of european civilisation, the revolt of the "crossways" against the highroad and the railroad, of the village against the town. a conception, you will perceive, which is opposed to that of lenin and the orthodox communists, and which explains why official bolshevism is not over-enthusiastic about pilniak. the _crossways_ is a good piece of work (it can hardly be called a story) and it just gives a glimpse of that ambitious vastness of scale on which pilniak was soon to plan his bigger soviet stories. * * * * * * * but taken in themselves and apart from his later work i think the stories in the manner of bunin will be found the most satisfactory items in this volume. of these _death_ was written before the revolution and, but for an entirely irrelevant and very pilniakish allusion to lermontov and other deceased worthies, it is entirely unconnected with events and revolutions. very "imperfective" and hardly a "story," it is nevertheless done with sober and conscientious craftsmanship, very much like bunin and very unlike the usual idea we have of pilniak. the only thing pilniak was incapable of taking from his model was bunin's wonderfully rich and full russian, a shortcoming which is least likely to be felt in translation. * * * * * * * the other two buninesque stories, _the belokonsky estate_ and _the heirs_, are stories (again, can the word "story" be applied to this rampantly "imperfective" style?) of the revolution. they display the same qualities of sober measure and solid texture which are not usually associated with the name of pilniak. these two stories ought to be read side by side, for they are correlative. in _the belokonsky estate_ the representative of "the old order," prince constantine, is drawn to an almost heroical scale and the "new man" cuts a poor and contemptible figure by his side. in the other story the old order is represented by a studied selection of all its worst types. i do not think that the stories were meant as a deliberate contrast, they are just the outcome of the natural lack of preconceived idea which is typical of pilniak and of his passive, receptive, plastical mind. as long as he does not go out of his way to give expression to vague and incoherent ideas, the outcome of his muddle-headed meditations on russian history, this very shortcoming (if shortcoming it be) becomes something of a virtue, and pilniak--an honest membrana vibrating with unbiassed indifference to every sound from the outer world. * * * * * * * the reader may miss the more elaborate and sensational stories of soviet life. but i have a word of consolation for him--they are eminently unreadable, and for myself i would never have read them had it not been for the hard duties of a literary critic. in this case as in others i prefer to go direct to the fountain-source and read bely's _petersburg_ and the books of remizov, which for all the difficulties they put in the way of the reader and of the translator will at least amply repay their efforts. but pilniak has also substantial virtues: the power to make things live; an openness to life and an acute vision. if he throws away the borrowed methods that suit him as little as a peacock's feathers may suit a crow, he will no doubt develop rather along the lines of the better stories included in this volume, than in the direction of his more ambitious novels. and i imagine that his _opus magnum_, if, in some distant future he ever comes to write one, will be more like the good old realism of the nineteenth century than like the intense and troubled art of his present masters; i venture to prophesy that he will finally turn out something like a soviet (or post-soviet) trollope, rather than a vulgarised andrey bely. d. s. mirsky. _may_, . tales of the wilderness the snow i the tinkling of postillion-bells broke the stillness of the crisp winter night--a coachman driving from the station perhaps. they rang out near the farm, were heard descending into a hollow; then, as the horses commenced to trot, they jingled briskly into the country, their echoes at last dying away beyond the common. polunin and his guest, arkhipov, were playing chess in his study. vera lvovna was minding the infant; she talked with alena for a while; then went into the drawing-room, and rummaged among the books there. polunin's study was large, candles burnt on the desk, books were scattered about here and there; an antique firearm dimly shone above a wide, leather-covered sofa. the silent, moonlit night peered in through the blindless windows, through one of which was passed a wire. the telegraph-post stood close beside it, and its wires hummed ceaselessly in the room somewhere in a corner of the ceiling--a monotonous, barely audible sound, like a snow-storm. the two men sat in silence, polunin broad-shouldered and bearded, arkhipov lean, wiry, and bald. alena entered bringing in curdled milk and cheese-cakes. she was a modest young woman with quiet eyes, and wore a white kerchief. "won't you please partake of our simple fare?" she asked shyly, inclining her head and folding her hands across her bosom. silent and absent-minded, the chess-players sat down to table and supped. alena was about to join them, but just then her child began to cry, and she hurriedly left the room. the tea-urn softly simmered and seethed, emitting a low, hissing sound in unison with that of the wires. the men took up their tea and returned to their chess. vera lvovna returned from the drawing-room; and, taking a seat on the sofa beside her husband, sat there without stirring, with the fixed, motionless eyes of a nocturnal bird. "have you examined the goya, vera lvovna?" polunin asked suddenly. "i just glanced through the _history of art_; then i sat down with natasha." "he has the most wonderful devilry!" polunin declared, "and, do you know, there is another painter--bosch. _he_ has something more than devilry in _him_. you should see his temptation of st. anthony!" they began to discuss goya, bosch, and st. anthony, and as polunin spoke he imperceptibly led the conversation to the subject of st. francis d'assisi. he had just been reading the saint's works, and was much attracted by his ascetical attitude towards the world. then the conversation flagged. it was late when the arkhipovs left, and polunin accompanied them home. the last breath of an expiring wind softly stirred the pine- branches, which swayed to and fro in a mystic shadow-dance against the constellations. orion, slanting and impressive, listed across a boundless sky, his starry belt gleaming as he approached his midnight post. in the widespread stillness the murmur of the pines sounded like rolling surf as it beats on the rocks, and the frozen snow crunched like broken glass underfoot: the frost was cruelly sharp. on reaching home, polunin looked up into the overarching sky, searching the glittering expanse for his beloved cassiopeian constellation, and gazed intently at the sturdy splendour of the polar star; then he watered the horses, gave them their forage for the night, and treated them to a special whistling performance. it struck warm in the stables, and there was a smell of horses' sweat. a lantern burned dimly on the wall; from the horses' nostrils issued grey, steamy cloudlets; podubny, the stallion, rolled a great wondering eye round on his master, as though inquiring what he was doing. polunin locked the stable; then stood outside in the snow for a while, examining the bolts. in the study alena had made herself up a bed on the sofa, sat down next it in an armchair and began tending her baby, bending over it humming a wordless lullaby. polunin sat down by her when he came in and discussed domestic affairs; then took the child from alena and rocked her. pale green beams of moonlight flooded through the windows. polunin thought of st. francis d'assisi, of the arkhipovs who had lost faith and yet were seeking the law, of alena and their household. the house was wrapped in utter silence, and he soon fell into that sound, healthy sleep to which he was now accustomed, in contrast to his former nights of insomnia. the faint moon drifted over the silent fields, and the pines shone tipped with silver. a new-born wind sighed, stirred, then rose gently from the enchanted caverns of the night and soared up into the sky with the swift flutter of many-plumed wings. assuredly kseniya ippolytovna enisherlova was not asleep on such a night. ii the day dawned cold, white, pellucid--breathing forth thin, misty vapour, while a hoar-frost clothed the houses, trees, and hedges. the smoke from the village chimneypots rose straight and blue. outside the windows was an overgrown garden, a snow-covered tree lay prone on the earth; further off were snow-clad fields, the valley and the forest. sky and air were pale and transparent, and the sun was hidden behind a drift of fleecy white clouds. alena came in, made some remark about the house, then went out to singe the pig for christmas. the library-clock struck eleven; a clock in the hall answered. then there came a sudden ring on the telephone; it sounded strange and piercing in the empty stillness. "is that you, dmitri vladimirovich? dmitri vladimirovich, is that you?" cried a woman's muffled voice: it sounded a great way off through the instrument. "yes, but who is speaking?" "kseniya ippolytovna enisherlova is speaking", the voice answered quietly; then added in a higher key: "is it you, my ascetic and seeker? this is me, me, kseniya." "you, kseniya ippolytovna?" polunin exclaimed joyfully. "yes, yes ... oh yes!... i am tired of roaming about and being always on the brink of a precipice, so i have come to you ... across the fields, where there is snow, snow, snow and sky ... to you, the seeker.... will you take me? have you forgiven me that july?" polunin's face was grave and attentive as he bent over the telephone: "yes, i have forgiven," he replied. * * * * * * * one long past summer, polunin and kseniya ippolytovna used to greet the glowing dawn together. at sundown, when the birch-trees exhaled a pungent odour and the crystal sickle of the moon was sinking in the west, they bade adieu until the morrow on the cool, dew-sprinkled terrace, and polunin passionately kissed--as he believed--the pure, innocent lips of kseniya ippolytovna. but she laughed at his ardour, and her avid lips callously drank in his consuming, protesting passion, only to desert him afterwards, abandoning him for paris, and leaving behind her the shreds of his pure and passionate love. that june and july had brought joy and sorrow, good and ill. polunin was already disillusioned when he met alena, and was living alone with his books. he met her in the spring, and quickly and simply became intimate with her, begetting a child, for he found that the instinct of fatherhood had replaced that of passion within him. alena entered his house at evening, without any wedding-ceremony, placed her trunk on a bench in the kitchen, and passing quickly through into the study, said quietly: "here i am, i have come." she looked very beautiful and modest as she stood there, wiping the corner of her mouth with her handkerchief. kseniya ippolytovna arrived late when dusk was already falling and blue shadows crept over the snow. the sky had darkened, becoming shrouded in a murky blue; bullfinches chirruped in the snow under the windows. kseniya ippolytovna mounted the steps and rang, although polunin had already opened the door for her. the hall was large, bright, and cold. as she entered, the sunrays fell a moment on the windows and the light grew warm and waxy, lending to her face--as polunin thought--a greenish-yellow tint, like the skin of a peach, and infinitely beautiful. but the rays died away immediately, leaving a blue crepuscular gloom, in which kseniya ippolytovna's figure grew dim, forlorn, and decrepit. alena curtseyed: kseniya ippolytovna hesitated a moment, wondering if she should give her hand; then she went up to alena and kissed her. "good evening", she cried gaily, "you know i am an old friend of your husband's." but she did not offer her hand to polunin. kseniya ippolytovna had greatly changed since that far-off summer. her eyes, her wilful lips, her grecian nose, and smooth brows were as beautiful as ever, but now there was something reminiscent of late august in her. formerly she had worn bright costumes--now she wore dark; and her soft auburn hair was fastened in a simple plait. they entered the study and sat down on the sofa. outside the windows lay the snow, blue like the glow within. the walls and the furniture grew dim in the twilight. polunin--grave and attentive--hovered solicitously round his guest. alena withdrew, casting a long, steadfast look at her husband. "i have come here straight from paris", kseniya explained. "it is rather queer--i was preparing to leave for nice in the spring, and was getting my things together, when i found a nest of mice in my wardrobe. the mother-mouse ran off, leaving three little babes behind her; they were raw-skinned and could only just crawl. i spent my whole time with them, but on the third day the first died, and then the same night the other two.... i packed up for russia the next morning, to come here, to you, where there is snow, snow.... of course there is no snow in paris--and it will soon be christmas, the russian christmas." she became silent, folded her hands and laid them against her cheek; for a moment she had a sorrowful, forlorn expression. "continue, kseniya ippolytovna", polunin urged. "i was driving by our fields and thinking how life here is as simple and monotonous as the fields themselves, and that it is possible to live here a serious life without trivialities. you know what it is to live for trivialities. i am called--and i go. i am loved--and i let myself be loved! something in a showcase catches my eye and i buy it. i should always remain stationary were it not for those that have the will to move me.... "i was driving by our fields and thinking of the impossibility of such a life: i was thinking too that i would come to you and tell you of the mice.... paris, nice, monaco, costumes, english perfumes, wine, leonardo da vinci, neo-classicism, lovers, what are they? with you everything is just as of old." she rose and crossed to the window. "the snow is blue-white here, as it is in norway--i jilted valpyanov there. the norwegian people are like trolls. there is no better place than russia! with you nothing changes. have you forgiven me that july?" polunin approached and stood beside her. "yes, i have forgiven", he said earnestly. "but i have not forgiven you that june!" she flashed at him; then she resumed: "the library, too, is the same as ever. do you remember how we used to read maupassant together in there?" kseniya ippolytovna approached the library-door, opened it, and went in. inside were book-cases behind whose glass frames stood even rows of gilded volumes; there was also a sofa, and close to it a large, round, polished table. the last yellow rays of the sun came in through the windows. unlike that in the study, the light in here was not cold, but warm and waxy, so that again kseniya ippolytovna's face seemed strangely green to polunin, her hair a yellow-red; her large, dark, deep-sunken eyes bore a stubborn look. "god has endowed you with wonderful beauty, kseniya, ippolytovna," polunin said gravely. she gave him a keen glance; then smiled. "god has made me wonderfully tempting! by the way, you used to dream of faith; have you found it?" "yes, i have found it." "faith in what?" "in life." "but if there is nothing to believe in?" "impossible!" "i don't know. i don't know." kseniya ippolytovna raised her hands to her head. "the japanese, naburu kotokami, is still looking for me in paris and nice... i wonder if he knows about russia.... i have not had a smoke for a whole week, not since the last little mouse died; i smoked egyptians before .... yes, you are right, it is impossible not to have faith." polunin went to her quickly, took her hands, then dropped them; his eyes were very observant, his voice quiet and serious. "kseniya, you must not grieve, you must not." "do you love me?" "as a woman--no, as a fellow-creature--i do," he answered firmly. she smiled, dropped her eyes, then moved to the sofa, sat down and arranged her dress, then smiled again. "i want to be pure." "and so you are!" polunin sat down beside her, leaning forward, his elbows on his knees. they were silent. kseniya ippolytovna said at last: "you have grown old, polunin!" "yes, i have grown old. people do, but there is nothing terrible in that when they have found what they sought for." "yes, when they have found it.... but what about now? why do you say that? is it alena?" "why ask? although i am disillusioned, kseniya, i go on chopping firewood, heating the stove, living just to live. i read st. francis d'assisi, think about him, and grieve that such a life as his may not be lived again. i know he was absurd, but he had faith, and now alena--i love her, i shall love her for ever. i wish to feel god!" kseniya ippolytovna looked at him curiously: "do you know what the baby-mice smelt like?" "no, why do you ask?" "they smelt like new-born babies--like human children! you have a daughter, natasha. that is everything." the sun sank in an ocean of wine-coloured light, and a great red wound remained amidst the drift of cold clouds over the western horizon. the snow grew violet, and the room was filled with shadowy, purplish twilight. alena entered and the loud humming of the telegraph wires came through the study's open door. by nightfall battalions of fleeting clouds flecked the sky; the moon danced and quivered in their midst--a silver-horned goddess, luminous with the long-stored knowledge of the ages. the bitter snow-wind crept, wound, and whirled along in spirals, loops, and ribbons, lashing the fields, whining and wailing its age-old, dismal song over the lone desolate spaces. the land was wretched, restless, and forlorn; the sky was overcast with sombre, gaping caverns shot through with lurid lines of fire. * * * * * * * at seven o'clock the arkhipovs arrived. kseniya ippolytovna had known them a long time: they had been acquaintances even before arkhipov's marriage. as he greeted her now, he kissed her hand and began speaking about foreign countries-- principally germany, which he knew and admired. they passed into the study, where they argued and conversed: they had nothing much to talk about really. vera lvovna was silent, as usual; and soon went to see natasha. polunin also was quiet, walking about the room with his hands behind his back. kseniya ippolytovna jested in a wilful, merry, and coquettish fashion with arkhipov, who answered her in a polite, serious, and punctilious manner. he was unable to carry on a light, witty conversation, and was acutely conscious of his own awkwardness. from a mere trifle, something kseniya ippolytovna said about fortune-telling at christmas, there arose an old-standing dispute between the two men on belief and unbelief. arkhipov spoke with calmness and conviction, but polunin grew angry, confused, and agitated. arkhipov declared that faith was unnecessary and injurious, like instinct and every other sentiment; that there was only one thing immutable--intellect. only that was moral which was intelligent. polunin retorted that the intellectual and the non-intellectual were no standard of life, for was life intelligent? he asked. he contended that without faith there was only death; that the one thing immutable in life was the tragedy of faith and the spirit. "but do you know what thought is, polunin?" "yes, indeed i do!" "don't smile! do you not know that thought kills everything? reflect, think thrice over what you regard as sacred, and it will be as simple as a glass of lemonade." "but death?" "death is an exit into nothing. i have always that in reserve--when i am heart-broken. for the present i am content to live and thrive." when the dispute was over, vera lvovna said in a low voice, as calm as ever: "the only tragic thing in life is that there is nothing tragical, while death is just death, when anyone dies physically. a little less metaphysics!" kseniya ippolytovna had been listening, alert and restless. "but all the same," she answered vera lvovna animatedly, "isn't the absence of tragedy the true tragedy?" "yes, that alone." "and love?" "no, not love." "but aren't you married?" "i want my baby." kseniya ippolytovna, who was lying on the sofa, rose up on her knees, and stretching out her arms cried: "ah, a baby! is that not instinct?" "that is a law!" the women began to argue. then the dispute died down. arkhipov proposed a game of chance. they uncovered a green table, set lighted candles at its corners and commenced to play leisurely and silently as in winter. arkhipov sat erect, resting his elbows at right angles on the table. the wind whistled outside, the blizzard increased in violence, and from some far distance came the dismal, melancholy creaking and grinding of iron. alena came in, and sat quietly beside her husband, her hands folded in her lap. they were killing time. "the last time, i sat down to play a game of chance amidst the fjords in a little valley hotel; a dreadful storm raged the whole while," kseniya ippolytovna remarked pensively. "yes, there are big and little tragedies in life!" the wind shrieked mournfully; snow lashed at the windows. kseniya stayed on until a late hour, and alena invited her to remain overnight; but she refused and left. polunin accompanied her. the snow-wind blew violently, whistling and cutting at them viciously. the moon seemed to be leaping among the clouds; around them the green, snowy twilight hung like a thick curtain. the horses jogged along slowly. darkness lay over the land. polunin returned alone over a tractless road-way; the gale blew in his face; the snow blinded him. he stabled his horses; then found alena waiting up for him in the kitchen, her expression was composed but sad. polunin took her in his arms and kissed her. "do not be anxious or afraid; i love only you, no one else. i know why you are unhappy." alena looked up at him in loving gratitude, and shyly smiled. "you do not understand that it is possible to love one only. other men are not able to do that," polunin told her tenderly. the hurricane raged over the house, but within reigned peace. polunin went into his study and sat down at his desk; natasha began to cry; he rose, took a candle, and brought her to alena, who nursed her. the infant looked so small, fragile, and red that polunin's heart overflowed with tenderness towards her. one solitary, flickering candle illumined the room. there was a call on the telephone at daybreak. polunin was already up. the day slowly broke in shades of blue; there was a murky, bluish light inside the rooms and outside the windows, the panes of which were coated with snow. the storm had subsided. "have i aroused you? were you still in bed?" called kseniya. "no, i was already up." "on the watch?" "yes." "i have only just arrived home. the storm whirled madly round us in the fields, and the roads were invisible, frozen under snow ... i drove on thinking, and thinking--of the snow, you, myself, arkhipov, paris ... oh, paris...! you are not angry with me for ringing you up, are you, my ascetic?... i was thinking of our conversation." "what were you thinking?" "this.... we were speaking together, you see.... forgive me, but you could not speak like that to alena. she would not understand ... how could she?" "one need not speak a word, yet understand everything. there is something that unites--without the aid of speech--not only alena and me, but the world and me. that is a law of god." "so it is," murmured kseniya. "forgive me ... poor old alena." "i love her, and she has given me a daughter...." "yes, that is true. and we ... we love, but are childless... we rise in the morning feeling dull and depressed from our revels of overnight, while you were wisely sleeping." kseniya ippolytovna's voice rose higher. "'we are the heisha-girls of lantern-light,' you remember annensky? at night we sit in restaurants, drinking wine and listening to garish music. we love--but are childless.... and you? you live a sober, righteous and sensible life, seeking the truth.... isn't that so?' truth!" her cry was malignant and full of derision. "that is unjust, kseniya," answered polunin in a low voice, hanging his head. "no, wait," continued the mocking voice at the other end of the line; "here is something more from annensky: 'we are the heisha-girls of lantern-light!'... 'and what seemed to them music brought them torment'; and again: 'but cypris has nothing more sacred than the words _i love_, unuttered by us' ..." "that is unjust, kseniya." "unjust!" she laughed stridently; then suddenly was silent. she began to speak in a sad, scarcely audible whisper: "but cypris has nothing more sacred than the words _i love_, unuttered by us.... i love ... love.... oh, darling, at that time, in that june, i looked upon you as a mere lad. but now i seem small and little myself, and you a big man, who defends me. how miserable i was alone in the fields last night! but that is expiation.... you are the only one who has loved me devotedly. thank you, but i have no faith now." the dawn was grey, lingering, cold; the east grew red. iii kseniya ippolytovna's ancestral home had reared its columns for fully a century. it was of classic architecture, with pediment, balconied hall, echoing corridors, and furniture that seemed never to have been moved from the place it had occupied in her forefathers' time. the old mansion greeted her--the last descendant of the ancient name-- with gloomy indifference; with cold, sombre apartments that were terrible by night, and thickly covered with the accumulated dust of many years. an ancient butler remained who recalled the former times and masters, the former baronial pomp and splendour. the housemaid, who spoke no russian, was brought by kseniya. kseniya ippolytovna established herself in her mother's rooms. she told the one ancient retainer that the household should be conducted as in her parents' day, with all the old rules and regulations. he thereupon informed her that it was customary in the times of the old masters for relatives and friends to gather together on christmas eve, while for the new year all the gentry of the district considered it their duty to come, even those who were uninvited. therefore it was necessary for her to order in the provisions at once. the old butler called kseniya ippolytovna at eight; then served her with coffee. after she had taken it, he said austerely: "you will have to go round the house and arrange things, barina; then go into the study to read books and work out the expenses and write out recipes for your house-party. the old gentry always did that." she carried out all her instructions, adhering rigorously to former rules. she was wonderfully quiet, submissive, and sad. she read thick, simply-written books--those in which the old script for _sh_ is confused with that for _t_. now and then, however, she rang up polunin behind the old man's back, talking to him long and fretfully, with mingled love, grief, and hatred. in the holidays they drove about together in droskies, and told fortunes: kseniya ippolytovna was presented with a waxen cradle. they drove to town with some mummers, and attended an amateur performance in a club. polunin dressed up as a wood-spirit, kseniya as a wood- spirit's daughter--out of a birch-grove. then they visited the neighbouring landowners. the christmas holidays were bright and frosty, with a red morning glow from the east, the daylight waxy in the sun, and with long blue, crepuscular evenings. iv the old butler made a great ado in the house at the approach of the new year. in preparation for a great ball, he cleared the inlaid floors, spread carpets, filled the lamps; placed new candles here and there; took the silver and the dinner-services out of their chests, and procured all the requisites for fortune-telling. by new year's eve the house was in order, the stately rooms glittering with lights, and uniformed village-lads stood by the doors. kseniya ippolytovna awoke late on that day and did not get up, lying without stirring in bed until dinner time, her hands behind her head. it was a clear, bright day and the sun's golden rays streamed in through the windows, and were reflected on the polished floor, casting wavy shadows over the dark heavy tapestry on the walls. outside was the cold blue glare of the snow, which was marked with the imprints of birds' feet, and a vast stretch of clear turquoise sky. the bedroom was large and gloomy; the polished floor was covered with rugs; a canopied double bedstead stood against the further wall; a large wardrobe was placed in a corner. kseniya ippolytovna looked haggard and unhappy. she took a bath before dinner; then had her meal--alone, in solitary state, drowsing lingeringly over it with a book. crows, the birds of destruction, were cawing and gossiping outside in the park. at dusk the fragile new moon rose for a brief while. the frosty night was crisp and sparkling. the stars shone diamond-bright in the vast, all-embracing vault of blue; the snow was a soft, velvety green. polunin arrived early. kseniya ippolytovna greeted him in the drawing-room. a bright fire burnt on the hearth; beside it were two deep armchairs. no lamps were alight, but the fire-flames cast warm, orange reflections; the round-topped windows seemed silvery in the hoar-frost. kseniya ippolytovna wore a dark evening dress and had plaited her hair; she shook hands with polunin. "i am feeling sad to-day, polunin," she said in a melancholy voice. they sat down in the armchairs. "i expected you at five. it is now six. but you are always churlish and inconsiderate towards women. you haven't once wanted to be alone with me--or guessed that i desired it!" she spoke calmly, rather coldly, gazing obstinately into the fire, her cheeks cupped between her narrow palms. "you are so very silent, a perfect diplomat.... what is it like in the fields to-day? cold? warm? tea will be served in a moment." there was a pause. at last polunin broke the silence. "yes, it was bitterly cold, but fine." after a further pause he added: "when we last talked together you did not say all that was in your mind. say it now." kseniya ippolytovna laughed: "i have already said everything! isn't it cold? i have not been out to-day. i have been thinking about paris and of that ... that june.... tea should be ready by this time!" she rose and rung the bell, and the old butler came in. "will tea be long?" "i will bring it now, barina." he went out and returned with a tray on which were two glasses of tea, a decanter of rum, some pastries, figs, and honey, and laid them on the little table beside the armchairs. "will you have the lamps lighted, barina?" he inquired, respectfully. "no. you may go. close the door." the old butler looked at them knowingly; then withdrew. kseniya turned at once to polunin. "i have told you everything. how is it you have not understood? drink up your tea." "tell me again," he pleaded. "take your tea first; pour out the rum. i repeat i have already told you all. you remember about the mice? did you not understand that?" kseniya ippolytovna sat erect in her chair; she spoke coldly, in the same distant tone in which she had addressed the butler. polunin shook his head: "no, i haven't understood." "dear me, dear me!" she mocked, "and you used to be so quick-witted, my ascetic. still, health and happiness do not always sharpen the wits. you are healthy and happy, aren't you?" "you are being unjust again," polunin protested. "you know very well that i love you." kseniya ippolytovna gave a short laugh: "oh, come, come! none of that!" she drank her glass of tea feverishly, threw herself back in the chair, and was silent. polunin also took his, warming himself after his cold drive. she spoke again after a while in a quiet dreamy tone: "in this stove, flames will suddenly flare up, then die away, and it will become cold. you and i have always had broken conversations. perhaps the arkhipovs are right--when it seems expedient, kill! when it seems expedient, breed! that is wise, prudent, honest...." suddenly she sat erect, pouring out quick, passionate, uneven words: "do you love me? do you desire me ... as a woman?... to kiss, to caress?... you understand? no, be silent! i am purged.... i come to you as you came to me that june.... you didn't understand about the mice?... or perhaps you did. "have you noticed, have you ever reflected on that which does not change in man's life, but for ever remains the same? no, no, wait!... there have been hundreds of religions, ethics, aesthetics, sciences, philosophical systems: they have all changed and are still changing-- only one law remains unaltered, that all living things--whether men, mice, or rye--are born, breed, and die. "i was packing up for nice, where a lover expected me, when suddenly i felt an overwhelming desire for a babe, a dear, sweet, little babe of my own, and i remembered you .... then i travelled here, to russia so as to bear it in reverence.... i am able to do so now!..." polunin rose and stood close to kseniya ippolytovna: his expression was serious and alarmed. "don't beat me," she murmured. "you are innocent, kseniya," he replied. "oh, there you go again!" she cried impatiently. "always sin and innocence! i am a stupid woman, full of beliefs and superstitions-- nothing more--like all women. i want to conceive here, to breed and bear a child here. do you wish to be the father?" she stood up, looking intently into polunin's eyes. "what are you saying, kseniya?" he asked in a low, grave, pained tone. "i have told you what i want. give me a child and then go--anywhere-- back to your alena! i have not forgotten that june and july." "i cannot," polunin replied firmly; "i love alena." "i do not want love," she persisted; "i have no need of it. indeed i have not, for i do not even love you!" she spoke in a low, faint voice, and passed her hand over her face. "i must go," the man said at last. she looked at him sharply. "where to?" "how do you mean 'where to'? i must go away altogether!" "ah, those tragedies, duties, and sins again!" she cried, her eyes burning into his with hatred and contempt. "isn't it all perfectly simple? didn't you make a contract with me?" "i have never made one without love. and i love only alena. i must go." "oh, what cruel, ascetical egoism!" she cried violently. then suddenly all her rage died down, and she sat quietly in the chair, covering her face with her hands. polunin stood by, his shoulders bowed, his arms hanging limply. his face betrayed grief and anxiety. kseniya looked up at him with a wan smile: "it is all right--there is no need to go... it was only my nonsense.... i was merely venting my anger.... don't mind me .... i am tired and harassed. of course i have not been purged. i know that is impossible... we are the 'heisha-girls of lantern-light'.... you remember annensky? ... give me your hand." polunin stretched out his large hand, took her yielding one in his and pressed its delicate fingers. "you have forgiven me?" she murmured. he looked at her helplessly, then muttered: "i cannot either forgive or not forgive. but ... i cannot!" "never mind; we shall forget. we shall be cheerful and happy. you remember: 'where beauty shines amidst mire and baseness there is only torment'.... you need not mind, it is all over!" she uttered the last few words with a cry, raised herself erect, and laughed aloud with forced gaiety. "we shall tell fortunes, jest, drink, be merry--like our grandfathers ... you remember! ...had not our grandmothers their coachmen friends?" she rang the bell and the butler came in. "bring in more tea. light the fire and the lamps." the fire burnt brightly and illuminated the leather-covered chairs. the portrait frames on the walls shone golden through the darkness. polunin paced up and down the room, his hands behind his back; his footsteps were muffled in the thick carpet. sleigh bells began to ring outside. it was just ten o'clock as the guests assembled from the town and the neighbouring estates. they were received in the drawing-room. taper, the priest's son, commenced playing a polka, and the ladies went into the ballroom; the old butler and two footmen brought wax candles and basins of water, and the old ladies began to tell fortunes. a troupe of mummers tumbled in, a bear performed tricks, a little russian dulcimer-player sang songs. the mummers brought in with them the smell of frost, furs, and napthaline. one of them emitted a cock's crow, and they danced a russian dance. it was all merry and bright, a tumultuous, boisterous revel, as in the old russian aristocracy days. there was a smell of burning wax, candle-grease, and burning paper. kseniya ippolytovna was the soul of gaiety; she laughed and jested cheerfully as she waltzed with a lyceum student, a general's son. she had re-dressed her hair gorgeously, and wore a pearl necklace round her throat. the old men sat round card-tables in the lounge, talking on local topics. at half past eleven a footman opened the door leading into the dining-room and solemnly announced that supper was served. they supped and toasted, ate and drank amid the clatter of knives, forks, dishes, and spoons. kseniya made arkhipov, polunin, a general and a magistrate sit beside her. at midnight, just as they were expecting the clock to chime, kseniya ippolytovna rose to propose a toast; in her right hand was a glass; her left was flung back behind her plaited hair; she held her head high. all the guests at once rose to their feet. "i am a woman," she cried aloud. "i drink to ourselves, to women, to the gentle, to the homely, to happiness and purity! to motherhood! i drink to the sacred--" she broke off abruptly, sat down and hung her head. somebody cried: "hurrah!" to someone else it seemed that kseniya was weeping. the clock began to chime, the guests shouted "hurrah!" clinked glasses, and drank. then they sang, while some rose and carried round glasses to those of the guests who were still sober and those who were only partially intoxicated. they bowed. they sang _the goblets_, and the basses thundered: "drink to the dregs! drink to the dregs!" kseniya ippolytovna offered her first glass to polunin. she stood in front of him with a tray, curtseyed without lifting her eyes and sang. polunin rose, colouring with embarrassment: "i never drink wine," he protested. but the basses thundered: "drink to the dregs! drink to the dregs!" his face darkened, he raised a silencing arm, and firmly repeated: "i never drink wine, and i do not intend to." kseniya gazed into the depths of his eyes and said softly: "i want you to, i beg you.... do you hear?" "i will not," polunin whispered back. then she cried out: "he doesn't want to! we mustn't make him against his will!" she turned away, offered her glass to the magistrate, and after him to the lyceum student; then excused herself and withdrew, quietly returning later looking sad and as if she had suddenly aged. they lingered a long while over supper; then went into the ball-room to dance, and sing, and play old fashioned games. the men went to the buffets to drink, the older ones then sat in the drawing-room playing whist, and talked. it was nearly five o'clock when the guests departed. only the arkhipovs and polunin remained. kseniya ippolytovna ordered coffee, and all four sat down at a small table feeling worn out. the house was now wrapt in silence. the dawn had just broken. kseniya was tired to death, but endeavoured to appear fresh and cheerful. she passed the coffee round, and then fetched a bottle of liqueur. they sat almost in silence; what talk they exchanged was desultory. "one more year dropped into eternity," arkhipov said, sombrely. "yes, a year nearer to death, a year further from birth," rejoined polunin. kseniya ippolytovna was seated opposite him. her eyes were veiled. she rose now to her feet, leaned over the table and spoke to him in slow, measured accents vibrating with malice: "well, pious one! everything here is mine. i asked you to-day to give me a baby, because i am merely a woman and so desire motherhood.... i asked you to take wine... you refused. the nearer to death the further from birth, you say? well then, begone!" she broke into tears, sobbing loudly and plaintively, covering her face with her hands; then leant against the wall, still sobbing. the arkhipovs ran to her; polunin stood at the table dumbfounded, then left the room. "i didn't ask him for passion or caresses. ... i have no husband!" kseniya cried, sobbing and shrieking like a hysterical girl. they calmed her after a time, and she spoke to them in snatches between her sobs, which were less violent for a while. then she broke out weeping afresh, and sank into an armchair. the dawn had now brightened; the room was filled with a faint, flickering light. misty, vaporous, tormenting shadows danced and twisted oddly in the shifting glimmer: in the tenebrous half-light the occupants looked grey, weary, and haggard, their faces strangely distorted by the alternate rise and fall of the shadows. arkhipov's bald head with its tightly stretched skin resembled a greatly elongated skull. "listen to me, you arkhipovs," kseniya cried brokenly. "supposing a distracted woman who desired to be pure were to come and ask you for a baby--would you give her the same answer as polunin? he said it was impossible, that it was sin, that he loved someone else. would you answer like that, arkhipov, knowing it was the woman's last--her only--chance of salvation--her only love?" she looked eagerly from one to the other. "no, certainly not--i should answer in a different way," arkhipov replied quietly. "and you, vera lvovna, a wife ... do you hear? i speak in front of you?" vera lvovna nodded, laid her hand gently on kseniya's forehead, and answered softly and tenderly: "i understand you perfectly." again kseniya wept. * * * * * * * the dawn trod gently down the lanes of darkness. the light grew clearer and the candles became dim and useless. the outlines of the furniture crept out of the net of shadows. through the blue mist outside the snow, valley, forest, and fields were faintly visible. from the right of the horizon dawn's red light flushed the heavens with a cold purple. polunin drove along by the fields, trotting smoothly behind his stallion. the earth was blue and cold and ghostly, a land carved out of dreams, seemingly unsubstantial and unreal. a harsh, bitter wind blew from the north, stirring the telegraph-wires by the roadside to a loud, humming refrain. a silence as of death reigned over the land, yet life thrilled through it; and now and then piping goldfinches appeared from their winter nests in the moist green ditches, and flew ahead of polunin; then suddenly turned aside and perched lightly on the wayside brambles. night still lingered amid the calm splendour of the vast, primeval forest. as he drove through the shadowed glades the huge trees gently swayed their giant boughs, softly brushing aside the shroud of encompassing darkness. a golden eagle darted from its mist-wreathed eyrie and flew over the fields; then soared upwards in ever-widening circles towards the east--where, like a pale rose ribbon stretched across the sky, the light from the rising sun shed a delicate opalescent glow on the snow, which it transformed to an exquisite lilac, and the shadows, to which it lent a wonderful, mysterious, quivering blue tint. polunin sat in his seat, huddled together, brooding morosely, deriving a grim satisfaction from the fact that--all the same--he had not broken the law. henceforth, he never could break it; the thought of kseniya ippolytovna brought pain, but he would not condemn her. at home, alena was already up and about; he embraced her fondly, clasped her in his arms, kissed her forehead; then he took up the infant and gazed lingeringly, with infinite tenderness, upon her innocent little face. the day was glorious; the golden sunlight streamed in through the windows in a shining cataract, betokening the advent of spring, and made pools of molten gold upon the floor. but the snow still lay in all its virgin whiteness over the earth. a year of their lives i to the north, south, east, and west--in all directions for hundreds of miles--stretched forests and bogs enveloped in a wide-spread veil of lichen. brown-trunked cedars and pines towered on high. beneath there was a thick, impenetrable jungle of firs, alders, wild-berries, junipers, and low-hanging birches. pungent, deep-sunken, lichen- covered springs of reddish water were hidden amidst undergrowth in little glades, couched in layers of turf bordered by red bilberries and huckleberries. with september came the frosts--fifty degrees below zero. the snow lay everywhere--crisp and dazzling. there was daylight for three or four hours only; the remainder of the time it was night. the sky was lowering, and brooded darkly over the earth. there was a tense hush and stillness, only broken in september by the lowing of mating elks. in december came the mournful, sinister howling of the wolves; for the rest of the time--a deep, dreadful, overpowering silence! a silence that can be found only in the wastelands of the world. a village stood on the hill by the river. the bare slope descended to the water's edge, a grey-brown granite, and white slatey clay, steep, beaten by wind and rain. clumsy discoloured boats were anchored to the bank. the river was broad, dark, and cold, its surface broken by sombre, choppy, bluish waves. here and there the grey silhouettes of huts were visible; their high, projecting, boarded roofs were covered by greenish lichen. the windows were shuttered. nets dried close by. it was the abode of hunters who went long excursions into the forests in winter, to fight the wild beasts. ii in the spring the rivers--now broad, free and mighty--overflowed their banks. heavy waves broke up the face of the waters, which sent forth a deep, hoarse, subdued murmur, as restless and disquieting as the season itself. the snow thawed. the pine-trees showed resinous lights, and exhaled a strong, pungent odour. in the day-time the sky was a broad expanse of blue; at dusk it had a soft murky hue and a melancholy attraction. in the heart of the woods, now that winter was over, the first deed of the beasts was being accomplished--birth. eider-ducks, swans, and geese were crying noisily on the river. at dusk the sky became greenish and murky, merging into a vast tent of deepest blue studded with a myriad of shining golden stars. then the eider-ducks and swans grew silent and went to roost for the night, and the soft warm air was thrilled by the whines of bear-cubs and the cries of land-rails. it was then that the maidens assembled on the slope to sing of lada and to dance their ancient dances, while strapping youths came forth from their winter dwellings in the woods and listened. the slope down to the river was steep; below was the rustling sound of water among the reeds. everything was wrapt in stillness, yet everywhere the throb and flow of life could be heard. the maidens sat huddled together on the top of the slope, where the granite and slate were covered with scanty moss and yellow grass. they were dressed in gaily-coloured dresses: all of them strong and robust; they sang their love-songs--old and sad and free--and gazed into the gathering opalescent mists. their songs seemed to overflow from their hearts, and were sung to the youths who stood around them like sombre, restive shadows, ogling and lustful, like the beasts in their forest-haunts. this festive coupling-time had its law. the youths came here to choose their wives; they quarrelled and fought, while the maidens remained listless, yielding to them in all. the young men ogled and fought and he who triumphed first chose his wife. then he and she together retired from the festival. iii marina was twenty when she proceeded to the river-bank. her tall, somewhat heavy body was wonderfully moulded, with strong muscles and snowy skin. her chest, back, hips, and limbs were sharply outlined; she was strong, supple, and well developed. her round, broad breast rose high; her hair, eye-brows and eye-lashes were thick and dark. the pupils of her eyes were deep and liquid; her cheeks showed a flush of red. her lips were soft--like a beast's--large, sensuous and rosy. she walked slowly, moving her long straight legs evenly, and slightly swaying from her hips.... she joined the maidens on the river slope. they were singing their mysterious, alluring and illusive songs. marina mingled among the crowd of maidens, lay down upon her back, closed her dreamy eyes, and joined in the festive chorus. the maidens' souls became absorbed in the singing, and their song spread far and wide through all the shadowy recesses of the woods, like shining rays of sunlight. their eyes closed in langour, their full- blooded bodies ached with a delicious sensation. their hearts seemed to grow benumbed, the numbness spreading through their blood to their limbs; it deprived them of strength, and their thoughts became chaotic. marina stretched her limbs sensuously; then became absorbed in the singing, and she also sang. she felt strangely inert; only quivering at the sound of the lusty, excited voices of the youths. afterwards she lay on a couch in her suffocatingly close room; her hands were clasped behind her head; her bosom swelled. she stretched, opened her dark pensive eyes wide, compressed her lips, then sank again into the drowsy langour, lying thus for many hours. she was twenty, and had grown up free and solitary--with the hunters, the woods, and the steep and the river--from her birth. iv demid lived on his own plot of ground, which, like the village, stood on a hill above the river. but here the hill was higher and steeper, sweeping the edge of the horizon. the wood was nearer, and its grey- trunked cedars and pines rose from their beds of golden moss to shake their crests to the stars and stretch their dark-green forest hands right up to the house. the view was wide and sweeping from here: the dark, turbulent river, the marsh beyond, the deep-blue billowing woods fringing the horizon, the heavy lowering sky--all were clearly visible. the house, made of huge pines, with timbered walls, plain white- washed ceilings and floors, was bestrewn with pelts of bears, elks, wolves, foxes, and ermines. gunpowder and grape-shot lay on the tables. in the corners was a medley of lassoes, snares, and wolftraps. some rifles hung round the walls. there was a strong pungent odour, as though all the perfumes of the woods were collected here. the house contained two rooms and a kitchen. in the centre of one of the rooms stood a large, rough-hewn table; round it were some low wooden stools covered with bear-skin. this was demid's own room; in the other was the young bear, makar. demid lay motionless for a long time on his bear-skin bed, listening to the vibrations of his great body--how it lived and throbbed, how the rich blood coursed through its veins. makar, the bear, approached, laid his heavy paws on his chest, and amicably sniffed at his body. demid stroked the beast on its ear, and it seemed as if the man and animal understood each other. outside the window loomed the wood. demid was rugged and broad-shouldered, a large, quiet, dark-eyed, good man. he smelt of the woods, and was strong and healthy. like all the hunters, he dressed in furs and a rough, home-woven fabric streaked with red. he wore high, heavy boots made of reindeer hide, and his coarse, broad hands were covered with broken chilblains. makar was young, and, like all young things, he was foolish. he liked to roll about, and was often destructive--he would gnaw the nets and skins, break the traps, and lick up the gunpowder. then demid punished him, whereupon makar would turn on his heel, make foolish grimaces, and whine plaintively. v demid went to the maidens on the slope and took marina to his plot of land. she became his wife. vi the dark-green, wind-swept grass grew sweet and succulent in summer. the sun seemed to shine from out a deep blue ocean of light. the nights were silvery, the sky seemed dissolved into a pale, pellucid mist; sunset and dawn co-mingled, and a white wavering haze crept over the earth. here life was strong and swift, for it knew that its days were brief. marina was installed in makar's room, and he was transferred to demid's. makar greeted marina with an inhospitable snarl when he saw her for the first time; then, showing his teeth, he struck her with his paw. demid beat him for this behaviour, and he quieted down. then marina made friends with him. demid went into the woods in the daytime, and marina was left alone. she decorated her room in her own fashion, with a crude, somewhat exaggerated, yet graceful, taste. she hung round in symmetrical order the skins and cloth hangings, brightly embroidered with red and blue cocks and reindeers. she placed an image of the god-mother in the corner; she washed the floor; and her multi-coloured room--smelling as before of the woods--began to resemble a forest-chapel, where the forest folk pray to their gods. in the pale-greenish twilight of the illimitable night, when only horn-owls cried in the woods and bear-cubs snarled by the river, demid went in to marina. she could not think--her mind moved slowly and awkwardly like a great lumbering animal--she could only feel, and in those warm, voluptuous, star-drenched nights she yielded herself to demid, desiring to become one with him, his strength, and his passion. the nights were pale, tremulous, and mysterious. there was a deep, heavy, nocturnal stillness. white spirals of mist drifted along the ground. night-owls and wood spirits hooted. in the morning was a red blaze of glory as the great orb of day rose from the east into the azure vault of heaven. the days flew by and summer passed. vii it snowed in september. it had been noticeable, even in august, how the days drew in and darkened, how the nights lengthened and deepened. the wood all at once grew still and dumb; it seemed as though it were deserted. the air grew cold, and the river became locked in ice. the twilight was slow and lingering, its deepening shadows turning the snow and ice on the river to a keen, frosty blue. through the nights rang the loud, strange, fierce bellowing of the elks as they mated; the walls shook, and the hills re-echoed with their terrible roar. marina was with child in the autumn. one night she woke before dawn. the room was stifling from the heat of the stove, and she could smell the bear. there was a faint glimmer of dawn, and the dark walls showed the window frames in a wan blue outline. somewhere close by an old elk was bellowing: you could tell it was old by the hoarse, hissing notes of its hollow cries. marina sat up in bed. her head swam, and she felt nauseated. the bear lay beside her; he was already awake and was watching her. his eyes shone with quiet, greenish lights; from outside, the thin crepuscular light crept into the room through little crevices. again marina felt the nausea, and her head swam; the lights in makar's eyes were re-enkindled in marina's soul into a great, overwhelming joy that made her body quiver with emotion . . . her heart beat like a snared bird--all was wavering and misty, like a summer morn. she rose from her bed of bear-skin furs, and naked, with swift, awkward, uncertain steps, went in to demid. he was still asleep--she put her burning arms about him and drew his head to her deep bosom, whispering to him softly: "a child ... it is the child...." little by little, the night lifted and in through the windows came the daylight. the elk ceased his bellowing the room filled with glancing morning shadows. makar approached, sniffed, and laid his paws on the bed. demid seized his collar with his free hand and patting him fondly said: "that is right, makar ivanych--you know, don't you?" then turning to marina, he added: "what do you think, marinka? doesn't he know? doesn't the old bear know, marinka?" makar licked demid's hand, and laid his head knowingly on his forepaws. the night had gone; rays of lilac-coloured light illumined the snow and entered the house. round, red, and distant rose the sun. below the hill lay the blue, ice-bound river, and away beyond it stretched the ribbed outline of the vast, marshy siberian forest. demid did not enter it that day, nor on many of the following days. viii the winter descended. the snow lay in deep layers, blue by day and night, lilac in the brief intervals of sunrise and sunset. the pale, powerless sun seemed far away and strange during the three short hours that it showed over the horizon. the rest of the time it was night. the northern lights flashed like quivering arrows across the sky, in their sublime and awful majesty. the frost lay like a veil over the earth, enveloping all in a dazzling whiteness in which was imprisoned every shade of colour under the sun. crimsons, purples, softest yellows, tenderest greens, and exquisite blues and pinks flashed and quivered fiercely under the morning rays, shimmering in the brilliance. over all hung the hush of the trackless desert, the stillness that betokened death! marina's eyes had changed--they were no longer dark, limpid, full of intoxication; they were wonderfully bright and clear. her hips had widened, her body had increased, adding a new grace to her stature. she seldom went out, sitting for the most part in her room, which resembled a forest-chapel where men prayed to the gods. in the daytime she did her simple houskeeping--chopped wood, heated the stove, cooked meat and fish, helped demid to skin the beasts he had slain, and to weed their plot of land. during the long evenings she spun and wove clothes for the coming babe. as she sewed she thought of the child, and sung and smiled softly. an overwhelming joy possessed marina when she thought of her approaching motherhood. her heart beat faster and her happiness increased. her own possible sufferings held no place in her thoughts. in the lilac glow of dawn, when a round moon, solemn and immense, glowed in the south-western sky, demid took his rifle and finnish knife, and went on his sleigh into the forest. the pine-trees and cedars stood starkly under their raiment of snow-- mighty forest giants--beneath them clustered prickly firs, junipers and alders. the stillness was profound. demid sped from trap to trap, from snare to snare, over the silent soundless snow. he strangled the beasts; he fired, and the crack of his gun resounded through the empty space. he sought for the trail of the elks and wolf-packs. he descended to the river and watched for otters, caught bewildered fish amidst the broken ice, and set his nets afresh. the scenes all round him were old and familiar. the majesty of day died down in the west on a flaming pyre of vivid clouds, and the quivering, luminous streamers of the north re-appeared. standing in his plot of ground in the evening, he cut up the fish and meat, hung it up to freeze, threw pieces to the bear, ate some himself, washed his hands in ice-cold water, and sat down beside marina--big and rugged, his powerful legs wide apart, his hands resting heavily on his knees. the room became stifling with his presence. he smiled down quietly and good-naturedly at marina. the lamp shone cheerfully. outside was snow, frost, and peace. makar approached and lounged on the floor. there was an atmosphere of quiet joy and comfort in the chapel-like room. the walls cracked in the frost; some towels embroidered in red and blue with reindeer and cocks hung over them. outside the frozen windows was darkness, cold, and night. demid rose from his bench, took marina tenderly and firmly in his arms, and led her to the bed. the lamp flickered, and in the half- light makar's eyes glowed. he had grown up during the winter and he was now an adult bear--with a sombre, solemn air and a kind of clumsy skill. he had a large flat nose and grave, good-natured eyes. ix it was the last days of december. there had been a merry christmas festival and the snow had lain thick on house and slope. wolves were now on the trail. then marina felt the first stirring of her child; soft, gentle movements, like the touch of eiderdown upon her body. she was filled with a triumphant joy, and pressed her hands softly and tenderly to her side; then sang a lullaby of how her son should become a great hunter and slay a thousand and three hundred elks, a thousand and three hundred bears, a thousand and three hundred ermines, and take the chief village beauty as his wife! there was misty frost, the night, and stillness outside--the stillness that whispers of death. wolves crept up to the plot of land, sat on their hind-legs and howled long and dismally at the sky. in the spring the shores of the river were strewn with wild flocks of swans, geese, and eider-ducks. the forest resounded with the stir of the beasts. its woody depths echoed with the noise of bears, elks, wolves, foxes, owls, and woodcocks. the herbage began to sprout and flourish. the nights now drew in, and the days were longer. dawn and sunset were lilac and lingering. the twilight fell in pale green, shimmering floods of light, and as it deepened and spread the village maidens gathered again on the river slope and sang their songs of lada, the spring god. in the morning the sun rose in a glory of golden splendour and swam into the limpid blue heavens. there, enthroned, it spent the many hours of spring. then came the easter festival when, according to the legend, the sun smiled and the people exchanged red eggs as its symbol. x on this festival, marina became a mother. that night the bear left demid. he must surely have scented the spring and gone into the forest to find himself a mate. he left late at night, after breaking down the door. it was dark. a scarcely noticeable streak of light lay over the eastern horizon. somewhere afar the village maidens were singing their songs of lada. _a thousand years_ "let the dead bury the dead."--_matthew_, ch. vii. it was night time when prince constantine arrived at his brother's little cabin. young vilyashev himself opened the door, and throughout the brief conversation that ensued they remained in darkness--not even a candle was lighted. tall, lean, cadaverous, dressed in a much- worn day suit, his cap under his arm, constantine stonily listened to vilyashev's terse account of their sister's last moments. "she died peacefully," the young man told his brother, "and she was quite calm to the end, for she believed in god. but she could not rid herself of memories of the past. how could she when the present shows such an awful contrast? famine, scurvy, typhus, sorrow brood over the countryside. our old home is the hands of strangers: we ourselves are outcasts living in a peasant's cabin. imagine what this meant to a delicately nurtured woman! men are wild beasts, brother." "there were three of us," constantine said with quiet bitterness-- "you, natalia, and myself. it is ended! i travelled here in a cattle- truck, walking from the station on foot--and was too late for the funeral." "she was buried yesterday. she knew from the first she was dying, and would not stir a step from here." "poor girl," sighed constantine. "she had lived here all her life." he left abruptly without a word of farewell, and they did not meet again until the next evening: both had spent the day wandering about the valleys. at dawn the following morning vilyashev ascended a steep hill; on the flat summit of a tumulus that crowned it he observed an eagle tearing a pigeon to pieces. at his approach the bird flew up into the clear, empty sky, towards the east, emitting a low, deep, unforgettable cry that echoed dolefully over the fragrant fields. from the hill and tumulus could be seen a vast panorama of meadows, thickets, villages, and white steeples of churches. a golden sun rose and swung slowly above the hill, gilding the horizon, the clouds, hill-ridges, and the tumulus; steeping them in wave upon wave of shimmering yellow light. below, in wisps and long slender ribbons, a rosy mist crept over the fields; it covered everything with the softest of warmly tinted light. there was a morning frost, and thin sheets of ice crackled in the dykes. an invigorating breeze stirred gently, as if but half- awakened, and tenderly ruffled fronds of bracken, sliding softly upward from moss and roots, tremulously caressing the sweet-smelling grass, to sweep grandly over the hill-crest in ripples and eddies, increasing in volume as it sped. the earth was throbbing: it panted like a thirsty wood-spirit. cranes sent their weird, mournful cries echoing over the undulating plains and valleys; birds of passage were a-wing. it was the advent of teeming, tumultuous, perennial spring. bells tolled mournfully over the fragrant earth. typhus, famine, death spread like a poisonous vapour through the villages, through the peasants' tiny cabins. the windowless huts waved the rotting straw of their thatch in the wind as they had done five hundred years ago, when they had been taken down every spring to be carried further into the forests--ever eastward--to the chuvash tribe. in every hut there was hunger. in every hut there was death. in every one the fever-stricken lay under holy ikons, surrendering their souls to the lord in the same calm, stoical and wise spirit in which they had lived. those who survived bore the dead to the churches, and went in consternation and dread through the fields carrying crosses and banners. they dug trenches round the villages and sprinkled the dykes with holy water; they prayed for bread and for preservation from death, while the air resounded with the tolling of bells. nevertheless, at eventide the maidens came to the tumulus arrayed in their home-woven dresses, and sang their old, old songs, for it was spring and the mating season for all living things. yet they sang alone, for their youths had been given to the moloch of war: they had gone to uralsk, to ufa, and to archangel. only old men were left to plough the fields in the spring. vilyashev stood dejectedly on the crest of the hill, a solitary, lonely figure outlined darkly against the clear blue background of sky and distance. he gazed unseeingly into space; thought and movement alike were suspended. he was only conscious of pain. he knew all was ended. thus his errant forbear from the north may have stood five hundred years ago, leaning upon his lance, a sword in his chain girdle. vilyashev pictured him with a beard like constantine's. he had had glory and conquest awaiting him; he strode the world a victorious warrior! but now--little natalya who had died of famine-typhus had realized that they were no longer needed, neither she, nor constantine, nor himself! she was calling to him across the great gulf; it was as if her words were trembling on the air, telling him the hour had struck. the vilyashev's power had been great; it had been achieved by force; by force it had been overthrown, the vulture- nest was torn to pieces. men had become ravenous. the prince descended and made his way to the river oka, ten miles distant, wandering all day through the fields and dales--a giant full seven feet high, with a beard to his waist. the heavy earth clung to his boots. at last he flung himself on to the ground, burying his face in his hands, and lay motionless, abandoning himself to an anxious, sorrowful reverie. snow still lay on the lowlands, but the sky was warm, pellucid, expansive. the oka broadened out rushing in a mighty, irresistible torrent towards its outlet, and inundating its banks. purling brooks danced and sang their way through the valleys. the wind breathed a feeling of expectancy--sweet, tender, evanescent, like the day-dream of a russian maiden who has not yet known the secrets of love. with delicate gossamer fingers it gently caressed the barren hill that frowned above the oka, uttering its gentle poignantly-stirring song at the same time. larks warbled. from all around echoed the happy cries of birds; the vernal air thrilled and vibrated in great running arpeggios to the wonder-music of the winds. the river alone preserved a rigid silence. vilyashev brooded a long while beside the swiftly running waters; but at sunset's approach he rose hastily, and returned to the tumulus. the sky was wrapped in its evening shroud of deep, mysterious darkness. set brightly against the sombre background of the tumulus- crowned hill stood shining silver birch trees and dark shaggy firs: they now looked wan and spectral in the fading light. for a fleeting moment the world glowed like a huge golden ball; then the whole countryside was one vast vista of green, finally merging into a deep illimitable purple. down the valley crept the mist, trailing its filmy veils over point and peak and ridge. the air throbbed with the cries of geese and bitterns. the hush of the spring-time night set in and covered the world--that hush that is more vibrant than thunder, that gathers the forest sounds and murmurs to itself, and weaves them all into a tense, vernal harmony. prince constantine's gaunt form struck a sharp note of discord as he walked straight up to the tumulus. his presence breathed conflict and stress that accorded ill with the universal peace of nature. he greeted his brother, and began to smoke; the light from his cigarette illumined his eagle nose and bony brow; his quiet grey eyes gleamed with a wintry look. "one longs to fly away like a bird in the spring," he murmured; then added with a sharp change of tone; "how did natalya die?" "in her right mind, thank god! but, she had lived torn by a madness of hatred and contempt, loathing all, despising all." "what wonder, look around you!" cried constantine. he hesitated a moment then said softly: "to-morrow is the annunciation--the recollection of that festival made me think. look around!" the tumulus stood out sheer and stark, a grim relic of a bygone age. there was a faint rustling through last year's wormwood. the air arose from the plains in a crescendo of quivering chords, gushing upward like a welling spring. there was the scent of decaying foliage. the sky beyond had darkened, charged to the brim with mystery. the atmosphere became moist and cold; the valley lay beneath--empty, boundless, a region of illimitable space. "do you hear?" constantine asked. "hear what?" "the earth's groans." "yes, it is waking. do you hear the soft stir and shudder among the roots of the flowers and grass? the whisper of the trees, the tremor of leaves and fronds? it is the earth's joyful welcome to the spring." constantine shook his head: "not joy ... sorrow. the air is permeated with the scent of decay. to-morrow will see the annunciation, a great festival, little brother, and that recollection has set me thinking. look round you! everywhere are savages--men gone mad with blood and terror. death, famine, barbarity ride the world! idolatry is still rampant: to this day men believe in wood-spirits, witches and the devil--and god, oh yes, men still believe in god! they bury their dead when the bodies should be burnt. they seek to drive away typhus by religious processions!" he laughed mockingly. "i stood the whole time in the train to avoid infection. but the people do not even think of that: their one thought is bread. i wanted to sleep through the journey; but a wretched woman, starving before my very eyes, prevented me. she said she was going to a sister so as to get milk to drink. she made me feel sick; she could not say bread, meat, milk, and butter, but called them 'brud,' 'mate,' 'mulk,' and 'buzzer'. 'ah, for a bit of buzzer--how i will ate it and enjoy it!' she kept muttering. "i tell you, vilyashev, the people are bewildered. the world is returning to savagery. remember the history of all times and of all peoples--an endless repetition of schisms, deceptions, stupidity, superstition and cannibalism--not so long ago--as late as the thirty years war--there was cannibalism in europe; human flesh was cooked and eaten.... liberty, equality, fraternity! how fine they sound! but better for fraternity ever to remain a mere ideal than to be introduced by the butt-end of a rifle." constantine took off his cap, and his bony forehead seemed pale and green in the ghostly darkness of the night. his eyes were deep sunken, and for an instant his face resembled a skull. "i am bewildered, brother; i feel so utterly alone! i am wretched and disillusioned. in what does man transcend the beast?..." he turned towards the west, and a cruel, rapacious, predatory look flitted over his face; he took a piece of bread from his overcoat pocket and handed it to vilyashev: "eat, brother; you are hungry." from the valley uprose the muffled chime of a church bell, and a low baying of dogs could be heard round the village settlements. great gusts of wind swept over the earth, which shook and trembled beneath their rush. in thin, high, piercing notes it ascended--the song of the winds to the setting sun. "listen," continued constantine; "i was thinking of the annunciation ... and i had a dream. "the red glow of sunset was slowly fading. around stretched huge, slumbering, primeval forests, shadow-filled bogs, and wide green marshes. wolves howled mournfully through the woods and the valleys. carts were creaking; horses were neighing; men were shouting--this wild race of the ancient russians was marching to collect tribute. down a forest roadway they went, from the oka to the rivers sozh and desna. "a prince pitched his camp on a hill: his son lay dying with the slowly-sinking sunlight. they prayed to the gods to spare the princeling. they burned youths and maidens at the stake. they cast men into the river to appease the water-spirit. they invoked the ancient slavic god perun. they called on jesus and the mother of god. in vain! in the terrible, lurid light of that vernal evening the princeling died. "then they slew his horse and his wife, and raised the tumulus. "in the prince's suite was an arab scholar named ibn-sadif. he was as thin as an arrow, pliant as a bow, as dark as pitch, with the eyes and nose of an eagle under his white turban. he was a wanderer over the earth, for, learned in all else, he still sought knowledge of men and of countries. he had gone up by the volga to the kama and to the bulgarians. now he was wending his way with the russians to kiev and tsargrad. "ibn-sadif ascended the hill, and beheld a blazing pile. on a log of wood lay a maiden with her left breast ripped open; flames licked her feet. around were sombre, bearded men with swords in their hands. an ancient shaman priest was circling in front of the funeral pyre and shouting furiously. "ibn-sadif turned aside from the fire, and descended the forest pathway to the river. "the sky was thickly studded with stars that shone like points of living gold in the warm deeps of the night; the water gave back a glittering reflection. the arab gazed up at that vast space where the shining constellations swam towards the bosom of the infinite, then down at their fantastically mirrored image in the river's depths--and cried aloud: "'woe! woe!'" "in the far distance beyond the water the wolves howled. "at nightfall ibn-sadif joined the prince who was directing the ancient funeral rites. the arab raised his hands to the sky; his white garments flew round him like the wings of a bird; in a shrill, eerie voice like an eagle's he cried to the fierce bearded men gathered around: "'this night just a thousand years ago, the archangel told the mother of god in nazareth of the coming of your god, jesus. woe! a thousand years ago! can it be?' "thus spoke ibn-sadif. none in the camp knew of the annunciation, of that fair, sacred day when the birds will not even build their nests lest their labour desecrate its holiness." constantine paused; then lifted his head and listened. "do you hear, brother? bells are tolling! do you hear how the dogs are barking?... and, just as of yore, death, famine, barbarity, cannibalism shadow the earth. i am heart stricken!" the night deepened to an intense blue; a faint chill stole through the air. prince constantine sat down resting his head on his stick. suddenly he rose: "it is late and cold; let us go. i am miserable, for i have lost my faith. this reversion to savagery is horrible and bewildering. what are we? what can we do when barbarians surround us? the loneliness and desolation of our plight! i feel utterly lost, vilyashev. we are no good to anyone. not so long ago our ancestors used to flog peasants in the stables and abduct maidens on their wedding-nights. how i curse them! they were wild beasts! ibn-sadif spoke the truth ... a thousand years--and still the mark of the beast!" the prince's cry was low; but deep, and wild. vilyashev answered quietly: "i have the strength of a mailed knight, constantine. i could smash, rend, and trample the peasants underfoot as my forebears did, but they have wound themselves round my heart; they are like little children!" they went along by the hill; the tumulus was left behind. a light sparkling frost powdered the rich loamy earth. through the darkness, swimming with purple shadows, came a great continuous murmur from the ancient forests. a pair of cranes cried softly as they roosted for the night, and a pearl grey mist rolled down to the meadows and enveloped them in innumerable murkyscarves. the brothers entered a village as still as the grave. somewhere beyond, a dog barked. not a sound broke the utter, solemn silence as they walked along. "there is typhus and barbarity in every peasant's hut," constantine muttered. then he, too, lapsed into silence, listening. beyond some huts on a village by-path girls' voices could be heard singing an annunciation hymn. in the vasts depths of silence it sounded solemn, simple, sane. the two princes felt it to be as immutable as the spring with its law of birth. they remained standing there a long while, resting first on one foot, then on the other. each felt that mankind's blood and energy still flowed bright and unsullied despite the world upheaval. "good! that is infinitely touching. that will not die," declared vilyashev. "it has come down to us through the ages." "aye," replied prince constantine bitterly, "wonderfully good. pathetically good. abominably good!" from the bend in the road the girls appeared in their coloured aprons; they passed decorously in pairs, singing: "rejoice, o virgin mother! blessed art thou amongst women".... the earth was moist and exhaled a sweet, delicate odour of rich, fresh vegetation. reluctantly, at last, the two brothers resumed their way. they heard the weird midnight-crowing of the cock. a pale silvery moon--the last before easter day--rose gently in the east, letting down its luminous web from the sky, flinging back the dark shadows of the night. on reaching home, the cabin seemed damp and cold and inexpressibly dreary--as on the day natalya died; when the door had slammed incessantly. the brothers went hastily to their rooms without speaking or lighting up. constantine lay on natalya's bed. at dawn he awoke vilyashev. "i am going. goodbye! it is ended! i am going out of russia, out of europe. here, where were we born, they have called us their masters, their fathers--carrion crows, vultures! like the fierce russian tribes of old, they have let loose the hounds of destruction on wolves and hares and men alike! woe!... ibn-sadif!" constantine lighted a candle on a table, and crossed the room. in the strange blue light of dawn his livid shadow fell on the whitewashed wall. vilyashev was amazed; the shadow was so extraordinarily blue and ghastly--it seemed as if his brother were dead. over the ravine i the ravine was deep and dark. its yellow clay slopes, overgrown with red-trunked pines, presented craggy ridges; at the bottom flowed a brook. above, right and left, grew a pine forest--dark, ancient, covered with lichen and shubbery. overhead was a grey, heavy, low-hanging sky. man seldom came to this wild and savage spot. the trees had in the course of time been uprooted by storms of wind and rain, and had fallen just where they stood, strewing the earth, rotting, emitting thick pungent odours of decaying pinewood. thistles, chicory, milfoil, and wormwood had flourished there for years undisturbed, and they now covered the ground with thorny bristles. there was a den of bears at the bottom of the ravine; many wolves prowled through the forest. over the edge of the steep, yellow slope hung a fallen pine, and for many years its roots were exposed, raised on high in the air. they looked like some petrified octopus stretching up its hideous tentacles to the elements, and were already covered with lichen and juniper. in the midst of these roots two great grey birds--a male and a female--had built themselves a nest. they were large and grey, thickly covered by yellowish-grey and cinnamon-coloured feathers. their wings were short, broad, and strong; their feet, armed with great claws, were covered with black down. surmounting their short, thick necks were large quadratic heads with yellow, rapaciously curved beaks and round, fierce, heavy looking eyes. the female was the smaller. her legs were more slender and handsome, and there was a kind of rough, heavy gracefulness in the curves of her neck. the male was fierce and stiff; his left wing did not fold properly; he had injured it at the time he had fought other males for his mate. there was steepness on three sides of their nest. above it was the wide expanse of the sky. around, about, and beneath it lay bones washed and whitened by the rain. the nest itself was made of stones and mud, and overspread with down. the female always sat in the nest. the male hummed to himself on the end of a root that was suspended over the steep, alone, peering far into the distance around and below him with his heavy, pensive eyes; perched with his head sunk deep into his shoulders and his wings hanging heavily down. ii these two great birds had met here, not far from the ravine, one evening at twilight. it was spring; the snow was thawing on the slopes, whilst in the forest and valleys it became grey and mellow; the pine-trees exhaled a pungent odour; and the brook at the bottom of the ravine had awakened. the sun already gave warmth in the daytime. the twilight was verdurous, lingering, and resonant with life. wolf-packs were astir, and the males fought each other for the females. this spring, with the sun and the soft breeze, an unwonted heaviness pervaded the male-bird's body. formerly he used to fly or roost, croak or sit silent, fly swiftly or slowly, because there were causes both around and within him: when hungry he would find a hare, kill, and devour it; when the sun was too hot or the wind too keen, he would shelter from them; when he saw a crouching wolf, he would hastily fly away from it. now it was no longer so. it was not a sense of hunger or self-preservation now that induced him to fly, to roost, cry, or be silent: something outside of him and his feelings now possessed him. when the twilight came, as though befogged, not knowing why, he rose from the spot on which he had perched all day and flew from glade to glade, from crag to crag, moving his great wings softly and peering hard into the dense, verdurous darkness. in one of the glades he saw birds similar to himself, a female among them. without knowing why, he threw himself amidst them, feeling an inordinate strength within him and a great hatred for all the other males. he walked slowly round the female, treading hard on the ground, spreading out his wings, tossing back his head to look askance at the males. one, he who until now had been victor, tried to impede him-- then flew at him with beak prepared to strike, and a long silent, cruel fight began. they flew at each other, beating with their bills, chests, wings, and claws, blindly rumpling and tearing each others' feathers and body. his opponent proved the weaker and drew off; then again he threw himself towards the female and walked round her, limping a little now, and trailing his blood-stained left wing along the ground. pine-trees surrounded the glade; the earth was bestrewn with dry, withered leaves; the night sky was blue. the female was indifferent to him and to all; she strode calmly about the glade, pecked at the ground, caught a mouse and quietly swallowed it. she appeared to pay no attention to the males. it was thus all night long. but when the night began to pale and over the east lay the greenish- blue outline of dawn, she moved close to him who had conquered the rest, leaned her back against his breast, tipped his injured wing tenderly with her bill--as though she would nurse and dress it; then slowly rising from the ground, she flew towards the ravine. and he, moving his injured wing painfully but without heeding it, emitting shrill cries of joy, flew after her. she came down just by the roots of that pine where afterwards they built their nest. the male perched beside her. he was irresolute and apparently abashed. the female strutted several times round him, scenting him again. then, pressing her breast to the ground, tail uplifted, her eyes half-closed--she waited. the male threw himself towards her, seized her comb with his bill, clapping the ground with his heavy wings; and through his veins there coursed such a wonderful ecstasy, such invigorating joy, that he was dazzled, feeling nothing else save this delicious rapture, croaking hoarsely and making the ravine reverberate with a dull echo that ruffled the stillness of the early morn. the female was submissive. iii in the winter the pines stood motionless and their trunks were a greyish brown. the snow lay deep, swept into great drifts which reared in a dark pile towards the ravine. the sky was a grey stretch; the days short and almost dim. at night the tree-boles cracked in the frost and their branches broke. the pale moon shone calmly in the stillness, and seemed to make the frost still harder. the nights were weirdly horrible with the frost and the phosphorescent light of the moon; the birds sat tucked in their nest, pressing close together to keep themselves warm. yet still the frost penetrated their feathers, got into their skin and made their feet, bills, and backs feel cold. the errant light of the moon was also disquieting; it made the whole earth appear to be a great wolfish eye--that was why it shone so terribly! the birds had no sleep. they turned painfully in their nest, changing their position; their large green eyes emitted a greenish light. had they possessed the power of thought, they would certainly have longed for the advent of morning. while it was still an hour before dawn, as the moon was fading and the first faint glimmer of daylight approaching, they began to feel hungry; in their mouths there was a disagreeable, bitterish taste, and from time to time their craws painfully contracted. when the grey morning had at last come, the male bird flew off for his prey; he flew slowly, spreading his wings wide and rarely flapping them, vigilantly eying the ground beneath him. he usually hunted for hares. it was sometimes a long while before he found one; then he rose high over the ravine and set out on a distant flight from his nest, far away from the ravine into the vast white expanse of snow. when there were no hares about, he seized young foxes and magpies, although their flesh was unsavoury. the foxes would defend themselves long and stubbornly, biting viciously, and they had to be attacked cautiously and skilfully. it was necessary to strike the bill at once into the animal's neck near its head, and, immediately clutching its back with the talons, to rise into the air--for there the fox ceased all resistance. with his prey the bird flew back to his nest by the ravine, and here he and his mate at once devoured it. they ate but once in the day, and so satiated themselves that they could move only with difficulty afterwards, and their crops hung low. they even ate up the snow which had become soaked with blood. the female threw the bones that remained down the side of the steep. the male perched himself on the end of a root, ruffling his feathers in an effort to make himself more comfortable; and the blood coursed warmly through his veins after his meal. the female was sitting in the nest. towards evening the male, for some unknown reason, began to croak. "oo-hoo-hoo-oo!" he cried in guttural tones, as though the sound in his throat came from across the water. sometimes as he sat solitary on his height, the wolves would observe him, and one of the famished beasts would begin clambering up the precipitous side of the ravine. the female would then take fright, and flap her wings; but the male would look down calmly with his big, glistening eyes, watching the wolf slowly clamber, slip and fall headlong downwards, bringing a heap of snow with it, tumbling over and over and yelping in fright. the twilight crept on. iv in march, as the days lengthened, the sun grew warmer; the snow darkened and thawed; the twilight grew balmy; and the wolf-packs stirred, while prey became more abundant, for now all the forest denizens felt the overwhelming, entrancing throb of spring, and wandered through the glades, down the ravines and into the woods, powerless under the sway of the early spring-time langour; and it was easy to catch them. the male-bird brought all his kill to his mate--he ate little himself: only what she left him, usually the entrails, the flesh of the thoracic muscles, the skin and the head, although she usually pecked out the eyes as the most savoury portion. the sun was bright. there was a soft, gentle breeze. at the bottom of the ravine the dark, turbulent brook rushed gurgling between the sharp outlines of its snow-laden banks. it was cool. the male-bird sat roosting with his eyes closed, his head sunk deep into his shoulders. outwardly he bore a look of great humility, of languishing expectation, and a droll look of guiltiness wholly unbecoming to his natural severity. at dusk he grew restless. he stood up on his feet, stretched his neck, opened wide his round eyes, spread out his wings, beating the air with them: then closed them again. curling up into a ball, drawing his head into his shoulders and blinking, he croaked: "oo-hoo-hoo-hoo!" the rueful cry scared the forest denizens. and the echo in the ravine answered back: "oo-oo..." the twilight was green, merging into blue. the sky was spangled with great glowing stars. the pine-trees exhaled an oily odour. in the night-frost, the brook at the bottom of the ravine grew still. somewhere, caught in its current, birds were crying. yet all was in a state of watchful calm. when at length the night set in, the male stealthily and guiltily approached the female in the nest, cautiously spreading his big, awkward feet, which were so clumsy on the ground . . . a great and beautiful passion urged him to the side of his mate. he perched beside her, smoothing her feathers with his bill, still with that droll absurd look of guilt. the female responded to his caresses; she was very soft and tender; but behind this tenderness could be detected her great strength and power over the male: perhaps she realized it herself. in the language of instinct, she said to her mate: "yes, you may." the male succumbed to his passion, and she yielded to him. v it was thus for a week or ten days. then at last, when the male came to her one night-time, she said: "no! enough!" she spoke instinctively, for another time had come--the time for the birth of her children. the male-bird, abashed, as though conscience-stricken at not having divined the bidding of his mate earlier, went away from her only to return at the end of a year. vi from spring-time, all through the summer until september, the male and female were absorbed in the great, beautiful, indispensable task of breeding their young. in september the fledgelings took wing. the spring and summer developed in their multi-coloured glory: they burned with fiery splendour; the pine-trees glowed with a resinous phosphorescence. there was the fragrance of wormwood. chicory, blue- bells, buttercups, milfoil, and cowslip blossomed and faded; prickly thistles abounded. in may the nights were deeply blue. in june they were pale green. the dawn broke in a blood-red flare like a great conflagration, and at night pale silvery mists moved along the bottom of the ravine, washing the tops of the pines. at first the nest contained five grey eggs with green speckles. then came the little birds, big-headed, with disproportionately large yellow mouths, their bodies covered with down. they chirruped plaintively, stretching their long necks out from the nest, and they ate voraciously. they flew in june, though as yet clumsily, piping, and awkwardly fluttering their immature wings. the female was with them all the time, ruffling her feathers, solicitous and petulant. the male had no power of thought and hardly any of feeling, but within him was a sense of pride in his own work, which he carried on with joy. his whole life was dominated with an instinct which subjugated his will and his desires to the care of his young. he hunted for prey. he had to obtain a great deal, because both his fledglings and his mate were voracious. he had to fly sometimes as far as the river kama, in order to catch seagulls, which hovered over the huge, white, unfamiliar, many-eyed monsters that floated over the water, puffing, and smelling strangely like forest fires--the steamers! he fed his fledgelings himself, tearing the meat into pieces. and he watched attentively how, with wide open beaks, they seized the little lumps of meat and, rolling their eyes and almost choking in the effort, swallowed them. sometimes one of the fledgelings awkwardly fell out of the nest and rolled down the steep. then he hastily and anxiously flew after it, bustling and croaking as though he were grumbling; he would take it cautiously and clumsily in his talons and carry it, a frightened flustered atom, back to the nest. there he would smooth its feathers with his great beak for a long time, strutting round it, standing high on his legs, and continuing his anxious croaks. he dared not sleep at nights. he perched on the end of a root, vigilantly peering into the darkness, guarding his nestlings and their mother from danger. the stars were above him. at times, as though scenting the fullness and beauty of life, he fiercely and ruefully uttered his croak--scaring the night. vii he lived through the winter in order to live. through the spring and summer he lived to breed. he was unable to think. he acted instinctively, because god had so ordained it. instinct alone guided him. he lived to eat in the winter so that he should not die. the winters were cold and cruel. in the spring he bred. then the blood coursed warmly through his veins. it was calm; the sun was bright; the stars glittered; and all the time he longed to stretch himself, to close his eyes, to smite the air with his wings, and to croak with an unreasoning joy. the birdlings flew away in the autumn. the old birds and the young bade adieu for ever with indifference. rain came, mists swept by, the sky hung lowering over the earth. the nights were dreary, damp and dark. the old couple sat together in their nest, trying to cover themselves and sleep. they froze and tossed about in discomfort. their eyes gleamed with greenish-yellow lights. thus passed the thirteen years of their life together. * * * * * * * x then the male-bird died. his wing had been injured in youth, at the time he fought for his mate. as the years rolled on, he found it more and more difficult to hunt his prey: he had to fly ever farther and farther for it, and in the nights he could get no rest because of the overwhelming pain that shot right through the whole of his wing, and tormented him terribly. formerly he had not heeded the injury; now he found it grew exceedingly grave and painful. he did not sleep, but let his wing hang down as though he were thrusting it from him. and in the morning he was hardly able to use it when he flew off after his prey. his mate forsook him. she flew away from the nest at dusk one evening in early spring. he sought for her all through the night--at dawn he found her with another male, young and strong, who croaked tenderly round her. then the old bird felt life was over: he had lost all that made it beautiful. he flew to fight his younger rival, but his attack was weak and wavering. the young one rushed at him violently and passionately, tore his body, and croaked menacingly. the female watched the fray with indifference, as she had done many years before. the old bird was beaten. fluttered, blood-stained, with one eye swollen, he flew back to his nest and painfully perched himself on the end of a root. something within him told him his life was at an end. he had lived in order to eat and to breed. now he had only to die. instinct told him that. for two days he sat perched above the steep, quiet, immovable, his head sunk deep into his shoulders. then, calmly, unperceivingly, he died. he fell down from the steep and lay with his legs crooked and turned upward. this was during the night. the stars were brilliant. birds were crying in the woods and over the river. somewhere owls hooted. the male-bird lay at the bottom of the ravine for five days. his body was already decaying, and emitted a bitter, offensive odour. a wolf came and devoured it. always on detachment alexander alexandrovitch agrenev, engineer, spent all day in the quarry, laying and exploding dynamite. in the village below was a factory, its chimneys belching smoke; and creaking wagonettes sped backwards and forwards from the parapet. above on the cliff stood huge sappy pines. all day the sky was grey and cloudy, and the smoke from the chimneys spread like a low pall over the earth. the dynamite exploded with a great detonation and expulsion of smoke. the autumn darkness, with its sharp, acid, sweet tang, was already falling as agrenev proceeded homeward with the head-miner, eduardovich bitska, a lithuanian, and the lights from the engine- house shone brightly in the distance. the engineer's quarters lay in a forest-clearing on the further side of the valley; the cement structures of its small buildings stood out in monotonous uniformity; the blue light of its torches flared and hissed, throwing back dark shadows from the trunks and branches of the pine-trees, which laced, interlaced, and glided dusky and intangible between the tall straight stems, finally melting amidst the foliage. his skin jacket was sticking to agrenev's back, as, no doubt, bitska's was also. "my missus will soon be home," bitska said cheerfully--he had recently been married. he spoke in broken russian, with a foreign accent. in agrenev's house it was dark. the warm glow from the torches outside fell on the window-ledges and illuminated them, but inside the only light was that visible through the crevices of his wife's tightly closed door: his beloved wife--so aloof--so strange. the rain had started, and its drip on the roof was like the sound of water- falls: he changed, washed, took up a newspaper. the maid entered and announced that tea was ready. his wife--tall, slim, beautiful, and strange--was standing by the window, her back to him, a book in her hand; a tumbler was on the window-sill close beside her. she did not turn round as he entered, merely murmuring: "have some tea." the electric light gave a brilliant glow. the freshly varnished woodwork smelt of polish. she did not say another word, but returned to her book, her delicate fingers turning over the leaves as, standing with bent head, she read. "are you going out this evening, anna?" he asked. "eh? no, i am staying in." "is there anyone coming?" "eh? no, nobody. are _you_ going out?" "i am not sure. i am going to-morrow on detachment duty for a week." "eh? oh yes, on detachment." always the same! no interest in him; indifferent, absorbed in other things. how he longed to stay and talk to her, on and on, of everything; of the utter impossibility of life without love or sympathy, of the intensity of his own love, and the melancholy of his evenings. but he was silent. "is asya asleep?" he inquired at last. "yes, she is asleep." a nickel tea-pot and a solitary tumbler stood on the table with its white cloth falling in straight folds. the ticking of the clock sounded monotonously. "she does not deceive, nor betray, nor leave me," he thought; "but she is strange, strange--and a mother!" ii at last the earth was cloaked in darkness, the torches hung like gleaming balls of fire, the pattering of the rain echoed dismally, and above it, drowning all other sounds, was the dreary roar of the factory. he sauntered through the straight-cut avenues of the park towards his club, but near the school turned aside and went in to see nina. they had known each other from childhood, attending the same school, nina his faithful comrade and devoted slave--and ever since he had remained for her the one and only man, for she was of those who love but once. since then she had been flung about russia, striven to retain her honour, vainly tilting against the windmills of poverty and temptation--had failed, been broken, and now had crept back that she might live near him. he walked through the school's dark corridors and knocked. "come in." alone, in a grey dress, plain-featured, her cheek red where it had rested against the palm of her hand, she sat beside a little table in the bare, simple room, a book on her lap. with a pang, agrenev noted her sunken eyes. but at sight of him they brightened instantly, and she rose from her seat, putting the book aside. "you darling? welcome! is it raining?" "greeting! nina. i have just come in for a moment." "take off your coat," she urged. "you will have some tea?" her eyes and outstretched hands both said: "thank you, thank you." "how are you doing?" she asked him anxiously. "i am bored. i can do nothing. i am utterly bored." she placed the tea-urn on the table in her tiny kitchen, laid some pots of jam by her copy-book, seated him in the solitary armchair, and bustled round, all smiles, her cheeks flushing--the spot where she had rested her hand all the long evening still showing red,--all- loving, all-surrendering, yet undesired. "you musn't wait on me like this, nina," agrenev protested;"... sit down and let us talk." their hands touched caressingly, and she sat down beside him. "what is it, my dear?" she stroked his hand and its touch warmed her! "what is it?" at times indignation overcame her at the thought of life; she wrung her hands, spoke with hatred, and her eyes darkened in anger. at times she fell on her knees in tears and supplication; but with alexander alexandrovitch she was always tender, with the tenderness of unrequited love. "what is it, darling?" "i am bored, nina. she ... anna ... does not love me; she does not leave me, nor deceive me, but neither does she love me. i know you love ..." at home four walls ... coldness ... the miner, bitska, making jokes all day in the rain ... the fuse to be lighted in the quarry, the slow igniting to be watched. thirty years had been lived ... five- tenths of his life ... a half ... ten-twentieths. it was like a blank cartridge ... no kindness ... a life without feeling ... all blank ... the lamp seemed to go out and something warm lay over his eyes. the palm of a hand. nina's words were calm at first; then they grew frantic. "leave her, leave her, darling! come to me, to me who wants you! what if she doesn't love you? i do, i love you ..." he was silent. "you say nothing? i will give you all; you shall have everything! come to me, to me who will give to you so gladly! she is as dead; she needs nothing! do you hear? you have me ... i will take all the suffering on myself ..." * * * * * * * the lamp streamed forth clearly again. a little grey clod of humanity fell on to the maiden's narrow bed. it was so intensely dark that the blackness seemed to close in on one like a great wall, and it was difficult to see two paces ahead. close to the barracks some men were bawling to the music of a mouth-organ. under cover of the gloom someone whistled between his fingers, babbling insolence and nonsense. the torches glowed through the tangled network of branches and leaves like globes of fire. agrenev walked along, carrying a lantern, by the light of which he mechanically picked his steps; close to his heels, nina hurried through the darkness and puddles. on every side there was the rustling of pines, hundreds of them, their immense stems towering upwards into obscurity. although invisible, their presence could be felt. the place was wild and dreary, odours of earth, moss, and pine- sap mingled together in an overpowering perfume; it was the heart of a vast primeval forest. agrenev murmured as if to himself: "no, nina, i do not love you. i want nothing from you.... anna ... her father ordered her to marry me.... ancient blood.... anna told me she would never love.... asya is growing up under her influence.... i love my little daughter ... yet she is strange too ... she looks at me with vacant eyes ... my daughter! i stole her mother out of a void! i go home and lie down alone ... or i go to anna and she receives me with compressed lips. i do not want a daughter from you, nina ... why should i? to-morrow will ... be the same as yesterday." by the door of his house in the engineer's quarters, he remembered nina, and all at once became solicitous: "you will catch cold, my dear. it will be terrible for you getting back ..." he stood before her a moment silently; then stretched out his hand: "well, the best of luck, my dear!" a band of youths strolled by. one of them flashed a lantern-light on the doorway. "aha! sky-larking with the engineers! ha! ha! ha!" they began chattering among themselves and sang in chorus a ribald doggerel: "once upon a time a wench appeared before a judge's bench.." iii before he went to bed agrenev laid out cards to play patience, ate a cold supper, stood a long time staring at the light from under anna's door, then knocked. "come in." he entered for a moment, and found her sitting at a table with a book, which she laid down upon an open copybook diary. when, when is he to know what is written there? he spoke curtly: "i go to moscow the first thing to-morrow on detachment. here is some money for the housekeeping." "thanks. when do you return?" "in a week--that is, friday next week. is there anything you need?" "no thanks." she rose, came close and kissed him on the cheek near his lips. "a safe journey. goodbye. do not waken asya." and she turned away, sat down at the table, and took up her book again. in the early hours of the morning a horse was yoked, and agrenev drove with bitska over the main road to the station. it was wet. the sombre figures of workmen were dimly seen through the rain and darkness, hastening to the factory. the staff drove round in a motor as the shrill sound of the factory horn split the silence. bitska in a bowler-hat, red-faced, with thin whiskers such as are worn by the letts, looked gravely round: "you have not slept, robert edouardovitch?" asked agrenev. "no, i have not, and i am not in a good humour either." the man was silent a moment, then burst out; "now i am forty years, and my vife she is eighteen. i am in vants of an earnest housekeeper. but my vife, she is always jesting and dragging me by the--how do you call it--the beard! and laughing and larking...." his little narrow eyes wrinkled up into a wry smile: "ah, the larking vench!" the wolf's ravine in childhood, as a small lad, alexander alexandrovitch agrenev had heard from listening to his mother's conversation how--lo and behold! one morning at o'clock nina kallistratovna zamotkina had proceeded with her daughter to doctor chasovnikov's flat, in order to deliver a slap in the face to his wife for having broken up the family hearth by a liaison with paul alexander zamotkin, nina kallistratovna's husband. the child agrenev had vividly pictured to himself how nina kallistratovna had walked, holding her daughter with one hand, an attaché-case in the other: of course her bearing must have been singular, as she was going to the flat to administer a slap in the face; no doubt she had walked either in a squatting or a bandy-legged fashion. the family hearth must have been something extremely valuable, as she was going to deliver a slap in the face on its account--perhaps it was some kind of stove. it was highly interesting--in the child's imagination--to picture nina kallistratovna entering the flat, swinging back her arm, and delivering the slap: her gait, her arms, the flat--all had a sudden hidden and exceedingly curious meaning for the child. this had remained out of his childhood memories of the little town and province, where all had seemed unusual as childhood itself. now in the wolf's ravine agrenev recalled this incident, and he brooded bitterly over the certainty that no one would ever deliver a slap in the face on his account! what vulgarity--slaps in the face!... and a slap in the face was no solution. it was now autumn, and as he stood in the ravine waiting for olya, the cranes flew low over his head, stretching themselves out like arrows and crying discordantly. a wintry sulphurous light overspread the eastern sky, and the blue crest of the vega shone out above him tremendous and triumphant, sweeping up into the very heart of the flaming sunset. on a sudden, olya arrived, her figure darkly silhouetted an instant-- a tiny insignificant atom--against the vastness of the hill and sky as she stood poised on the brink of the ravine; then she clambered down its precipitous side to agrenev. alexander alexandrovitch agrenev, mining engineer and married man, and olya andreevna golovkina! * * * * * * * she was a school teacher, who, after passing through the eight classes of her college, now resided with her aunt. she was always known as olya golovkina, although she bore the ancient russian surname made famous in the time of peter the great by senator golovkin. but even in the time of peter the great this name had sunk into the gutter and had left in this town a street golovkinskaya, and in that same golovkinskaya street a house, by the letting of which olya's aunt made her living. agrenev knew that the aunt--whose name he had never heard--was an old maid, and that she had one joy--olya. he knew she sat at her window without a lamp throughout the evenings, waiting for olya; and that for this reason her niece, on leaving him, went round by the back- way, in order to obviate suspicion. nothing was ever said of the aunt in a personal way; the name was uttered only indirectly, as though applying to a substance and not to a human being. olya was a very charming girl, of whom it was difficult to say anything definite: such a pretty provincial maid, like a slender willow-reed. the town lay over hillocks and fields and the ancient quarries, all its energies flowing out from the factory at the further end--and a casual conversation which occured in the spring at the beginning of agrenev's acquaintance with olya was characteristic alike of the town and of her. agrenev had said apropos of something: "balmont, blok, brusov, sologub..." she interrupted him hastily--a slender little reed: "as a whole i know little of foreign writers ..." in the town--neither in the high-school, the library, nor the newspapers--did they know of balmont or blok, but olya loved to declaim by rote from kozlov, and she spoke french. the factory lived its dark, noisy, unwholesome life sunk in poverty beneath the surface, steeped in luxury above; the little town lived amid the fields, scared and pressed down by the factory, but still carrying on its own individual life. beyond it, on the side away from the factory, lay the pass called the wolf's ravine. on the right, close to the river, was a grove where couples walked. they never descended to the ravine, because it was so unpoetic, a treeless, shallow, dull, unterrifying spot. yet it skirted the hills, dominated the surrounding country; and people lying flat in the channel at its summit could survey the locality for a mile round without being seen themselves. alexander alexandrovitch was a married man. the shepherd lads tending their herds at pasture began to notice how every evening a man on a bicycle turned off the main road into the ravine, and how--soon after--a girl hurried past them following in his steps, like a reed blown in the wind. as befitted their kind, the shepherds cried out every abomination after her. all the summer olya had begged agrenev to bring her books to read; she did not notice, however, that he had never once brought her any! then one evening, early in september, after a spell of rain which had prevented their meeting for some days, there happened that which was bound to happen--which happens to a maiden only once in her life. they used always to meet at eight, but eight in september was not like eight in june. the rain was over, but a chill, desolating, autumnal wind remained. the sky was laden with heavy, leaden clouds; it was cold and wretched. that evening the cranes flew southward, gabbling in the sky. the grass in the ravine was yellow and withered. there was sunshine there in the daytime, and olya wore a white dress. it was there the two of them, agrenev and olya, usually bade each other adieu. but on that evening, agrenev accompanied olya to her home, and both were absorbed by the same thought--the aunt! was she sitting by the window without a lamp waiting for her niece, or had she already lighted it in order to prepare the supper? olya hoped desperately that her aunt would be in her usual place and the lamp unlit, so that she could slip by into her room unseen and secretly change her clothes. not only did olya and alexander alexandrovitch walk arm-in-arm but they pressed close together, their heads bent the one to the other-- whispering ... only of the aunt. olya could not think of the pain or the joy or the suffering--she was only thinking how she could pass her aunt unnoticed; agrenev felt cold and sickened at the thought of a possible scandal. they discovered there was a light at the aunt's window, and olya began to tremble like a reed, whispering hoarsely--almost crying: "i won't go in! i won't go in!" but all the same she did--a willow-reed blown in the wind. agrenev arranged to meet her the next day in the factory office, so that he might hear whether the aunt had created a scene or not, although he did not admit that reason, even to himself. in the ravine when olya--after yielding all--wept and clung to his knees, agrenev's heart had been pierced with pangs of remorse. in the pitchblack darkness overhead the wild-geese could be heard rustling their wings as they flew southward, scared by his cigarette--the tenth in succession. "southward, geese, southward!... but you shall go nowhere, slave, useless among the useless!" then he remembered that slap in the face nina kallistratovna had given for her husband--nobody would give olya golovkina one for him! "olya is a useless accidental burden," he thought. then agrenev dismissed her from his mind; and, as he bicycled from golovkinskaya street through the whole length of the town, past the factory to the engineers' quarters--there was no need to hide now it was dark--he thought only of olya's aunt: of how she was an old maid with nothing else in her life but her niece, and that olya was hiding her tragedy from her; of how she spent the entire evenings sitting alone by the window in the dark--assuredly not on olya's account, but because she was dying; all her life she had been dying, as the town was dying where kozlov was read; as he, agrenev, was dying; as the maidenhood of olya had died. how powerful is the onward rush of life! what tragedy lay in those evenings by the window in the darkness! every morning the housemaid used to bring alexander alexandrovitch in his study a cup of lukewarm coffee on a tray. then he went out to the factory--the rest of the household was still asleep. there he came into contact with the workmen, and saw their hopeless, wretched, impoverished lives; listened to bitska's jests, and to the rumbling of the wagonettes--identified himself with the life of the factory, which dominated all like some fabulous brooding monster. during the luncheon interval he went home, washed himself, and listened to his wife rattling spoons on the other side of the wall. and this made up the entire substance of his life! yes, it was certainly interesting how nina kallistratovna had entered that flat, swung back her hand--which hand had it been?--was it the one in which she held the attaché-case or was that transferred to the other hand first?--and delivered the smack to madame chasovnikova. then there was olya, darling olya golovkina, from whom--as from them all--he desired nothing. that night, when he reached home at last, his daughter came in and made him a curtsey, saying: "goodnight, daddy." alexander alexandrovitch caught her in his arms, placed her on his knees--his beloved, his only little daughter. "well, little asya, what have you been doing?" he asked. "when you went out to olya golovkina mummy and i played tig." the next morning, when olya came into the office for business as usual, she exclaimed joyfully: "my aunt has not found out anything. she opened the door for me without lighting the lamp, and as she groped through the passage i ran quickly past her. then i changed my clothes and appeared at supper as though nothing had happened!" a willow-reed blown by the wind! in the office were many telephone calls and the rattling of counting- boards. agrenev and olya sat together and arranged when to meet again. she did not want to go to the ravine because of the shepherd boys' rude remarks. alexander alexandrovitch did not tell her all was known at home. as she said goodby she clung to him like a reed in the wind and whispered: "i have been awake all night. you have noticed surely that i have not called you by any name; i have no name for you." and she begged him not to forget to bring her some books. all that was known of the town was that it lay at the intersection of such and such a latitude and longitude. but articles on the factory were printed each year in the industrial magazines, and also occasionally in the newspapers, as when the workmen struck or were buried under a fall of limestone. the factory was run by a limited company. alexander alexandrovitch agrenev made out the returns for his department; these were duly printed--not to be read, but so that beneath them might appear the signature: "a. a. agrenev, engineer." olya only kept a report-book and the name-rolls, placing in her reports so many marks opposite the pupil's names. the first day of spring mammy rose in the morning just as usual during those interminable months. i was accustomed to calling alexander alexandrovitch's mother "mammy." she always wore a dark dress and carried a large white handkerchief which she continually raised to her lips. it was bright and cheerful in the dining-room. the tea-service stood on the table and the samovar was boiling. the room always made me feel that we were going away--into the country, for all the pictures had been taken down, and a mirror that had been casually hung on the walls was now shrouded in a linen sheet. i generally rise very early, say my prayers, and immediately look at the newspapers. formerly i scarcely even thought of them and was quite indifferent to their contents; now i cannot even imagine life without them! by the time my morning cup of tea is brought, i have already read all the news of the world, and i tell it to mammy, who cannot read the papers herself. she has the room alexander alexandrovitch formerly occupied; she is tall, always dresses in black, and there is a certain severity about her general demeanour. this is quite natural. she invariably makes the sign of the cross over me, kisses me on the forehead and lips, and then--as ever--turns quickly away, bringing her handkerchief to her lips. i know, though, what it is that distresses her--it is that georgie is killed, and alexander alexandrovitch is still "out there" . . . and that i, anna, alone am left to her of her family. we are always silent at tea: we generally are at all times. she asks only a single question: "what is in the newspapers?" she always utters it in a hoarse voice, and very excitedly and clumsily i tell her all i know. after breakfast i walk about outside the window looking at the old factory and awaiting the postman's arrival. thus i pass my days one by one, watching for the post, for the newspapers, enduring the mother's grief--and my own. and whenever i wait for the letters, i recall a little episode of the war told me by a wounded subaltern at an evacuated point. he had sustained a slight head wound, and i am certain he was not normal, but was suffering from shell-shock. dark-eyed, swarthy, he was lying on a stretcher and wearing a white bandage. i offered him tea, but he would not take it; pushing aside the mug and gripping my hand he said: "do you know what war is? don't laugh! bayonets ... do you understand?"--his voice rose in a shriek--"... into bayonets ... that is, to cut, to kill, to slaughter one another--men! they turned the machine-guns on us, and this is what happened: the private kuzmin and i were together, when suddenly two bullets struck him. he fell, and, losing all sense of distinction, forgetting that i was his officer, he stretched out his arms towards me in a sort of half-conscious way, and cried: 'towny, bayonet me!' you understand? 'towny, bayonet me!' but you cannot understand.... do not laugh!" he told me this, now whispering, now shrieking. he told me that i could not understand; but i can . . . "towny, bayonet me!" those words express all the terror of war for me--georgie's death, alexander's wound, the mother's grief; all, all that the war has brought: they express it with such force that my temples ache with an almost physical sense of anguish, "towny, bayonet me!" how simple, how superhuman! i remember those words every day, especially when in the hall waiting for the post. alexander writes seldom and his letters are very dry, merely telling me that he is well, that either there are no dangers or that they have passed; he writes to us all at the same time, to mother, to asya, and to me. it was like that to-day. i was waiting for the postman. he came and brought several letters, one of them from alexander. i did not open it at once, but waited for mother. this is what he wrote: "darling anna, yesterday and to-day (a censor's erasure) i feel depressed and think of you, only of you. when things are quiet and there is little doing many a fine thing passes unobserved; i allude to the flowers, of which i am sending you specimens. they grow quite close to the trench, but it is difficult and dangerous to get them, as one may easily be killed. i have seen such flowers before, but am ignorant of their name." "goodbye. my love. forgive the 'army style'; this letter is for you alone." the letter contained two of those little blue violets which spring up directly the snow has melted. i handed the letter, as always, to his mother that she might read it too; her lips began to tremble, and her eyes filled with tears as she read, but in the midst of her tears she laughed. and we both of us, i the young woman, and mammy the old mother, laughed and cried simultaneously, tightly clasped in each other's arms. i had pictured the war hitherto in the words: "towny, bayonet me!". and now alexander had sent me from it--violets! two violets that are still unfaded. i had noticed before the phenomenon of the four seasons suddenly bursting, as it were, upon the human consciousness. i remember that happening to me in my childhood when on holiday in the country. the summer was still in full swing, everything seemed just as usual, when suddenly one morning, in a most ordinary gust of wind, the red-vine leaves, then some three weeks old, were blown into my eyes, and all at once i realized that it was autumn. my mood changed on the instant, and i prepared to go home, back to town. how many years is it since i have seen the autumn, winter, or spring-- since i felt their magic? but to-day, after a long-past summer, i have all at once felt the call of the spring. only to-day i have noticed that our windows are tightly closed, that i am wearing a dark costume, that it is already may, and that bluebells are blossoming in the fields. i had forgotten that i was young. i remembered it to-day. and i know further that i have faith, that i have love--love of georgie and alexander. i know too, although there is so much terror, so much that is foolish and ugly, there is still youth, love, and the spring--and the blue violets that grow by the trenches. after mammy and i had wept and laughed in each other's embrace, i went out alone into the fields beyond the factory--to love, to think, to dream . . . i love alexander alexandrovitch for ever and ever... the seas and hills a rainy night, trenches--not in the forest lands of lithuania, but at the vindavo-rybinsky station in moscow itself. the train is like a trench; voices are heard from the adjoining carriage. "where do you come from?" "yes, yes, that is so, truly! you remember the ravine there, all rocks, and the lake below; many met their doom there." "let me introduce you to the commander of the third division." "give me a light, old fellow! we are back from furlough." the train is going at nightfall to rzhov, velikiya luki, and polotsk. outside on the platform the brethren are lying at ease under benches, drinking tea, and full of contentment. the gas-jets shine dimly in the rain, and behind the spattered panes of glass the women's eyes gleam like lamp-lights. there is a smell of naphthaline. "where is the commandant's carriage?" "no women allowed here! men only! we're for the front!" and there is a smell of leather, tar, and leggings--a smell of men. "yes, yes, you're right! ha-ha! he is a liar, an egregious liar! no, i bet you a beauty like that isn't going headlong into an attack!" there is a sound of laughing and a deep base voice speaking with great assurance. the third bell. "where's the commandant's carriage?" "well, goodbye!" "ha-ha-ha-ha! he lies, madam, i assure you, he lies." "bah! those new boots they have issued have given me corns; i'll have to send them back." this conversation proceeded from beneath a bench and from the steps that led to a top-compartment; the men hung up their leggings which, though marked with fresh government labels, were none the less reeking with perspiration. the lamps moved along the platform and disappeared into the night; the figures of women and stretcher- bearers silently crept along; a sentry began to flirt with one of the former; the rain fell slantingly, arrow-like, in the darkness. they reached rzhov at midnight in the train; the men climbed out of the windows for tea; then clambered in again with their rifles; the carriages resounded with the rattling of canteens. it was raining heavily and there was a sound of splashing water. the brethren in the corridors grumbled bitterly as they inspected papers. under the benches there was conversation, and also garbage. then morning with its rose-coloured clouds: the sky had completely cleared; rain-drops fell from the trees; it was bright and fragrant. velikiya luki, lovat; at the station were soldiers, not a single woman. the train eludes the enemy's reconnaissance. soldiers, soldiers, soldiers!--rifles, rifles!--canteens:--the brethren! it is no longer great russia; around are pine woods, hills, lakes, and the land is everywhere strewn with cobble-stones and pebbles--- whilst at every little station from under fir-trees creep silent, sombre figures, barefooted and wearing sheep-skin coats and caps--in the summer. it is lithuania. the enemy's reconnaissance is a diversion: otherwise the day is long and dreary--all routine like a festival; already one knows the detachment, the number of wounded, the engagements with the enemy. many had alighted from the train at velikiya luki, and nobody had got in. we are quiet and idle all day long. then towards night we reach polotsk--the white walls of the monastery are left behind; we come to the dvina, and the train rumbles over a bridge. now we journey by night only, without a time-table or lights, and again under a drizzling rain. the train stops without whistling and as silently starts again. around us all is still, as in october; the country-side is shrouded by night. men alight at each stop after polotsk; no one sits down again; and at every stop thirty miles of narrow gauge railway lead to the trenches. what monotony after moscow! after the hustle and clatter of an endless day! there is the faintest glimmer of dawn, and the eastern sky looks like a huge green bottle. "get up--we have arrived!" budslav station; the roof is demolished by aeroplane bombs. soldiers sleep side by side in a little garden on asphalt steps beneath crocuses. a drowsy jew opens his bookstall on the arrival of the train: he sells books by chirikov, von vizin, and verbitskaya. and from the distance, with strange distinctness, comes a sound like muffled clapping. "what is that?" "must be the heavy artillery." "where is the commandant?" "the commandant is asleep!..." a week has passed by in the trenches, and another week has commenced. the bustle of the first few days is over; now all is in order. in a corner of a meadow, a little way from the front, hangs a man's body; the head by degrees has become severed from the trunk. but i do not see very much. we sleep in the day. it is june, and there is scarcely any night. i know when it is evening by the sound of the firing; it begins from beyond the marshes at seven o'clock. moment after moment a bullet comes--zip--into my dug-out: scarcely a second passes before there is another zip. the sound of the shot itself is lost amid the general crashing of guns; there is only the zip of the bullet as it strikes the earth or is embedded in the beams overhead. and so on all through the night, moment after moment, until seven in the morning. there are three of us in the dug-out; two are playing chess, but i am reading--the same thing over and over again, for i am tired to death of lying idle, of sleeping and walking. poor indeed are men's resources, for in three days we had exhausted all we had to say. yesterday a soldier who had lost his hand when scouting, came running in to us crying wildly: "bayonet me, towny, bayonet me!" sometimes we come out at night to enjoy the fireworks. they fire on us hoping to unnerve us, and their bullets strike--zip-zip-zip--into our earthworks. we stand and look on as though spell-bound. guns belch out in the distance, a green light begins to quiver over the whole horizon. rockets incessantly tear their way, screaming, through the air, amongst them some similar to those we ourselves used to send up over the river oka. balls of fire burst in twain, and huge discs emitting a hundred different deadly lights flare above us. soon the rockets disappear, and from behind the frost creep three gigantic luminous figures; at first they stretch up into the sky, then, quivering convulsively, they fall down upon us, upon the trenches upon our right and left. in their lurid light our uniforms show white. over the graves in the lithuanian forests stand enormous crosses--as enormous as those in gogol's "_dreadful vengance_" and now, on the hill behind us, we discern two of them, one partly shattered and overhanging the other--a bodeful grim reminder! always soldiers, soldiers, soldiers. not a single old man, not a single woman, not a single child. for three weeks now i have not seen a glimpse of a woman. that is what i want to speak of--the meaning of woman. we were dining at a spot behind the lines, and from the other side of the screen a woman laughed: i never heard sweeter music. i can find no other words "sweeter music." this sister had come up from the hospital; her dress, her veil--what a joy! she had made some remark to the commanding officer: i have never heard more beautiful poetry than those words. all that is best, most noble, most virginal--all that is within me, all that life has bestowed is woman, woman! that is what i wish to explain. i visited the staff cinema in the evening. i took a seat in a box. when the lights were switched off, i wrote in blue pencil on the railing in front of me: "i am a blonde with blue eyes. who are you? come, i am waiting." i had done a cruel thing! directly i had written those words, i felt ashamed. i could not stay in the cinema. i wandered about between the benches, went out into the little village, walked round its chapels--every window of which was smashed; and gathered a bunch of forget-me-nots from a ditch by the cemetery. on returning to the crowded cinema i noticed that the box in which i had been sitting was empty; presently an officer entered it; sat down leisurely to enjoy the pictures; read what i had written; and all at once became a different man. i had injected a deadly poison, he left the box. i walked out after him. he went straight in the direction of the chapel. ah, i had done a cruel thing! i had written of a blonde with blue eyes; and i went out, saw her, and awaited her--i who had written the message. it seemed as though hundreds of instruments were making music within me, yet my heart was sad and weighed down with oppresion--it felt crushed. more than anything, more than anything in the whole world, i loved and awaited a blonde who did not exist, to whom i would have surrendered all that was most beautiful within me. i could not stay in the cinema, but crawled through the trenches. on the hill towered the two huge crosses; sitting down beneath their shadow, i clenched my hands, and murmured: "darling, darling, darling! beloved and tender one! i am waiting." far in the distance, the green rockets soared skyward, the same as those we used to send up over the river oka. then the gargantuan fingers of a searchlight began to sweep the area, my uniform appeared white in its gleam, and all at once a shell fell by the crosses. i had been observed, i had become a target. the bullets fell zip-zip-zip into the earthworks. i lay in my bunk and buried my head in the pillow. i felt horribly alone as i lay there, murmuring to myself, and breathing all the tenderness i was capable of into my words: "darling, darling, darling!..." iii love! can one credit the romanticists that--across the seas and hills and years--there is so strange a thing as a single-hearted love, an all- conquering, all-subduing, all-renovating love? in the train at budslav--where the staff-officers were billeted--it was known that lieutenant agrenev had such a single, overmastering, life-long love. a wife--the woman, the maiden who loves only once--to whom love is the most beautiful and only thing in life, will do heroic deeds to get past all the army ordinances, the enemy's reconnaissance, and reach her beloved. to her there is but one huge heart in the world and nothing more. lieutenant agrenev's quarters were in a distant carriage, number - . the staff officers' train stood under cover. no one was allowed to strike a light there. in the evening, after curtaining the windows with blankets, the officers gathered together in the carriage of the general commanding the xxth corps, to play cards and drink cognac. someone cynically remarked that there was a close resemblance between life at the front and life in a monastery, in as much as in both the chief topic of conversation was women: there was no reason, therefore, why monks should not be sent to the front for fasting and prayer. while they were playing cards, the guard, pan ponyatsky, came in and spoke to the cavalry-captain kremnev. he told him of a woman, young and very beautiful. the captain's knees began to tremble; he sat helplessly on the step of the carriage, and fumbled in his pocket for a cigarette. pan ponyatsky warned him that he must not strike a light. in the distance could be heard the roar of cannon, like an approaching midnight storm. kremnev had never felt such a throbbing joy as he felt now, sitting on the carriage step. pan ponyatsky repeated that she was a beauty, and waiting--that the captain must not delay; and led him through the dark corridor of the train. the carriage smelt of men and leather; behind the doors of the compartments echoed a sound of laughter from those who were playing cards. the two men walked half the length of the train. as they passed from one waggon to another they saw the flare of a rocket in the distance, and in its baleful green light the number of carriage-- - --loomed in faint outline. pan ponyatsky unlocked the door and whispered: "here. only mind, be quiet." the pan closed the door after kremnev. it was an officer's compartment; there was a smell of perfume, and on one of the lower bunks was a woman--sleeping. kremnev threw off his cloak and sat down by the sleeping figure. the door opened; pan ponyatsky thrust in his head and whispered: "don't worry about her, sir; she is all right, only a little quieter now." then the head disappeared. love! love over the seas and hills and years! it had become known that a woman was to visit agrenev, and forthwith he was ordered away for twenty-four hours on detachment. who then would ever know what guard had opened the door, what officer had wrought the deed? would a woman dare scream, having come where she had no right to be? or would she dare tell ... to a husband or a lover? no, not to a husband, nor a lover, nor to anyone! and pan ponyatsky? why should he not earn an odd fifty roubles? who was he to know of love across the seas and hills? yesterday, the day before, and again to-day, continuous fighting and retreating. the staff-train moved off, but the officers went on foot. a wide array of men, wagons, horses, cannon, ordinance. all in a vast confusion. none could hear the rattling fire of the machine-guns and rifles. all was lost in a torrential downpour of rain. towards evening there was a halt. all were eager to rest. no one noticed the approaching dawn. then a russian battery commenced to thunder. they were ordered to counter-attack. they trudged back through the rain, no one knew why--agrenev, kremnev, the brethren--three women. the snow wind a cruel, biting blizzard swept across the snow; over the earth moved misty, fantastic clouds, that drifted slowly across the face of a pale troubled moon. towards night-fall, the wolves could be heard in the valley, howling a summons to their leader from the spot where the pack always assembled. the valley descended sharply to a hollow thickly overgrown with red pines. thirteen years back an unusually violent storm had swept the vicinity, and hurled an entire pine belt to the ground. now, under the wide, windy sky, spread a luxuriant growth of young firs, while little oaks, hazels, and alders here and there dotted the depression. here the leader of the wolf-pack had his lair. here for thirteen years his mate had borne his cubs. he was already old, but huge, strong, greedy, ferocious, and fearless, with lean legs, powerful snapping jaws, a short, thick neck on which the hair stood up shaggily like a short mane and terrified his younger companions. this great, gaunt old wolf had been leader for seven years, and with good reason. by day he kept to his lair. at night, terrible and relentless, he prowled the fields and growled a short summons to his mates. he led the pack on their quests for food, hunting throughout the night, racing over plains and down ravines, ravening round farms and villages. he not only slew elks, horses, bulls, and bears, but also his own wolves if they were impudent or rebellious. he lived--as every wolf must live--to hunt, to eat, and to breed. in winter the snow lay over the land like a dead white pall, and food was scarce. the wolves sat round in a circle, gnashed their teeth, and wailed long and plaintively through the night, their noses pointed at the moon. five days back, on a steep slope of the valley not far from the wolf track to a watering place, and close to a belt of young fir-trees surrounded by a snow-topped coppice, some men from a neighbouring farm had set a powerful wolf-trap, above which they had thrown a dead calf. on their nocturnal prowls the wolves discovered the carcase. for a long time they sat round it in the grey darkness, howling plaintively, hungrily gnashing their fangs, afraid to move nearer, and each one timidly jostling the other forward with cruel vicious eyes. at last one young wolf's hunger overcame his fear; he threw himself on the calf with a shrill squeal, and after him rushed the rest, whining, growling, raising their tails, bending their bony backs, bristling the hair on their short thick necks--and into the trap fell the leader's mate. they paid no attention to her, but eagerly devoured the calf, and it was only when they had finished and cleared away all traces of the orgy that they realised the she-wolf was trapped there for good. all night she howled and threw herself about, saliva falling from her dripping jaws, her eyes rolling wildly and emitting little sparks of green fire as she circled round and round on a clanking chain. in the morning two farm-hands arrived, threw her on their sleigh and drove away. the leader remained alone the whole day. then, when night again returned, he called his band together, tore one young wolf to pieces, rushed round with lowered head and bristling hair, finally leaving the pack and returning to his lair. the wolves submitted to his terrible punishment, for he was their chief, who had seized power by force, and they patiently awaited his return, thinking he had gone on a solitary food-hunt. but as the night advanced and he did not come, they began to howl their urgent summons to him, and now there was an undercurrent of menace in their cries, the lust to kill, for the code of the wild beasts prescribed only one penalty for the leader who deserted his pack--death! ii all through that night, and the following days and nights, the old wolf lay immovable in his lair. at last, with drooping head, he rose from his resting-place, stretched himself mournfully, first on his fore-paws, then on his hind-legs, arched his back, gnashed his fangs and licked the snow with his clotted tongue. the sky was still shrouded in a dense, velvety darkness: the snow was hard, and glittered like a million points of white light. the moon--a dark red orb--was blotted over with ragged masses of inky clouds and was fast disappearing on the right of the horizon; on the left, a crimson dawn full of menace was slowly breaking. the snow-wind blew and whistled overhead. around the wolf, under a bleak sky, were fallen pines and little fir trees cloaked with snow. he moved up to a lone, naked waste above the valley, emerged from the wood, and stood with lowered head by its border, listening and sniffing. here the wind blew more strongly, the trees cracked and groaned, and from the wide dark expanse of open country came a sense of dreary emptiness and bitter cold. the old wolf raised his head, pointed his nose, and uttered a prolonged howl. there was no answer. then he sped to the watering place and to the river, to the place where his mate had perished. he loped along swiftly, noiselessly, crouching on the earth, unnoticeable but for his glistening eyes, which made him terrible to encounter suddenly. from a hill by the riverside a village could be descried, its mole- like windows already alight, and not far distant loomed the dark silhouette of a lonely farm. the wolf prowled aimlessly through the quiet, snow-covered fields. although it was a still, dark night, the blue lights of the approaching dawn proclaimed that march had already come. the gale blew fiercely and bitingly, driving the snow in swirls and spirals before it. all was smooth at the place where the trap had been set; there was not a trace of the recent death, even the snow round the trap had been flattened out. the very scent of the she-wolf had been almost entirely blown away. the wolf again raised his head and uttered a deep, mournful howl; the moonlight was reflected in his expressionless eyes, which were filled with little tears, then he lowered his head to the earth and was silent. a light twinkled in the farm-house windows. the wolf went towards it, his eyes gleaming with vicious green sparks. the dogs scented him and began a loud, terrified barking. the wolf lay in the snow and howled back loudly. the red moon was swimming towards the horizon, and swift murky clouds glided over it. here by the river-side, and down at the watering-place, in the great primeval woods and in the valleys, this wolf had lived for thirteen years. now his mate lay in the yard of yonder farm-house. he howled again. a man came out into the yard and shouted savagely, thinking a pack of wolves were approaching. the night passed, but the wolf still wandered aimlessly, his broad head drooping, his ferocious eyes glaring. the moon sank, slanting and immense, behind the horizon, the dawn-light increased, a universal murmuring filled the air, shadowy vistas of pine-trees, firs and frowning ravines began to open up in all directions. the morning glow deepened into rivers and floods of delicate, interchanging colour. under the protean play the snow changed its dress to lilac. the wolf withdrew to its lair. by the fallen pine trees where grew delicate green firs, fat, clumsy little cubs, born earlier in the spring, played among the cones and the belt of young spruces that guarded the entrance to their lair. iii the morning came, its clear blue bringing an assurance that it was march to those desolate places lying in lonely grandeur beneath a smiling sky. it whispered that the winter was passed and that spring had come. soon the snow would melt and the sodden earth would throb and pulse with vernal activity, and it would be impossible not to rejoice with nature. the snow thickened into a grey shining crust under the warm rays of the sun, to deepen into blue where the shadows fell. the fir-trees, shaggy and formidable, seemed especially verdant and welcoming to the tide of sunlight that flowed to their feet, and lay there collected in the little hollows about their roots. the woodpecker could be heard amidst the pines, and daws, tomtits and bullfinches carolled merrily as they spread their wings and preened their plumage in the sun. the pines exhaled their pungent, resinous, exhilarating odour. the wolf lay under cover all day. his bed was bestrewn with decaying foliage and overgrown with moss. he rested his head on his paws, gazing solemnly before him with small tear-stained eyes; he lay there motionless, feeling a great weariness and melancholy. around him was a thick cluster of firs overspread with snow. twice the old wolf raised his head, opened his jaws wide and gave a bitter plaintive whine; then his eyes grew dim, their ferocity died down, and he wagged his tail like a cub, striking a thick branch a sharp blow with it. then again he relapsed into melancholy immobility. at last, as the day declined, as the naming splendour of the dying sun sailed majestically towards the west and sank beneath the horizon in a glory of spilled violets and purples, and as the moon uprose, a huge, glowing lantern of light, the old wolf for the first time showed himself angry and restless. he emerged from his cover and commenced a loud howling, fiercely bristling his hair; then he sat on his hind-legs and whined as though in great pain, again, as if driven wild by this agony, he began to scatter and gnaw at the snow. finally at a swift pace, and crouching, he fled into the fields, to the neighbourhood of the farm near which the wolf-traps were laid. here it was dark and cold, the snow-wind rose afresh, harsh and violent, and the crusted snow cut the animal's feet. the last scent of the she-wolf, which he had sniffed only the previous day, had completely disappeared. in some remote part of the valley the pack were howling in rage and hunger for their leader. tossing himself about and howling, the old wolf rushed madly over hill and hollow. the night passed; he dashed about the fields and valleys, went down to the river, ran into the deep fastness of the forest and whined ferociously, for there was nothing left for him to do. he had lived to eat and to breed. man, by an iron trap, had severed him from the law; now he knew only death awaited him. * * * * * * * iv while it was yet quite dark, a farm-hand rose from his warm bed to go to the village on business. he put on a wadded jacket and fur-lined cap, lighted a pipe--the glow illuminating his pock-marked hands--and went out into the yard. the dogs leaped round him, uttering timid cowardly whines. he grinned, kicked them aside, and opened the gate. outside darkness had descended softly from the heavens, and lovingly overspread a tired world; greenish clouds floated through the blue- black sea of naked space and the snow gleamed greyish blue beneath a turbid moon. the keen snow-wind swept the ground in a fury of white swirls. the man glanced up at the sky, whistled, and strode off to the village at a brisk swinging pace. he did not mark a wolf stealing along close by the road and running on ahead of him. but when he was near the village he came to a sudden halt. there, on the road in front of him, a huge, lean, much-scarred wolf sat on its hind legs by a crossway. with hideous, baleful green eyes it watched his approach. the man whistled, and waved his arm. the wolf did not stir: its eyes grew dim for a moment; then lighted up again with a cruel ferocious glare. the man struck a match and took a few steps forward: still the wolf did not stir. then the man halted, the smile left his face, and he looked anxiously about him. all around stretched fields, the village was yet in the distance. he made a snow-ball and flung it ingratiatingly at the wolf. the brute remained still, only champing its jaws and bristling the hair on its neck. a moment the man remained there; then turned back. he walked slowly at first; then he began to run. faster and faster he flew; but, as he neared his farm, he beheld the wolf again on the road before him. it was once more sitting on its haunches, and it licked its dripping jaws. now terror seized the unfortunate peasant. he shouted; then wheeled, and ran back blindly. he shrieked wildly as he ran--mad with fear, unaware what he was doing. there was a death-like hush over the snow-laden earth that lay supine beneath the cloud-ridden moon. the frenzied man alone was screaming. gasping, staggering, with froth on his lips, he reached the village at last. there stood the wolf! he dashed from the road tossing his arms, uttering hoarse terrified cries; his cap had fallen off long before, his hair and red scarf were streaming in the wind. behind him came the relentless pad, pad of the wolf; it's hot, fetid breath scorched the nape of his neck; he could hear it snapping its jaws. he stumbled, lurched forward, fell: as he was about to lift himself from the deep spongy snow, the wolf leaped upon him and struck him from behind--a short, powerful blow on the neck. the man fell--to rise no more! a moment, and then his horrible choking cries had ceased. through the vastness rang the wolf's savage, solitary howling. v at dusk when the snow-wind was rushing through the darkness of the night--a wild turbulent cataract of icy air--the wolf-pack gathered together in the valley and howled. they were calling for a leader. the sky spread above them, wan and pallid, the wind moaned and whistled through the feathery tops of the pine-trees. amid the snow the wolves sat in a circle on their haunches and howled dismally. they were hungry and had not eaten for six days; their leader had deserted them. he who had led them on their hunts and prowls, who seven years back had killed their former leader and established his own chieftainship, had now left them forlorn. sitting in a circle, howling with gleaming eyes and bristling hair, they were mournful yet vicious; like helpless slaves they did not know what to do. only one young wolf, a brother of the one their leader had recently killed, strutted about independently and gnashed his teeth, conscious of his strength and agility. in the pride of his youthful vigour he had conceived the ambition to make himself the leader; he certainly had no thought that this was a fatal step entailing in the end his doom. for it is the law of the pack that death is meted out to the usurper of power. he commenced to howl proudly, but the others paid no heed, they only drooped their heads and howled in fear and trembling. gradually the dawn broke. faint and silvery, the moon was sinking through pale, luminous veils in the west; in the east there glowed a fierce red light like that of a camp fire. the sky was still shrouded in darkness, the snow glimmered a cold pallid blue in the half-light. the old wolf, fresh from his kill, slowly descended the valley where his pack had gathered. at sight of his grey, gaunt form they rushed forward to meet him, and as they ran none seemed to know what was about to happen; they advanced fawning and cringing until the young wolf, with a savage squeal, dared to throw himself upon the leader in a sudden fierce attack: then they all suddenly remembered his desertion of them, their law which demands death for its infringement, and with glistening bared teeth they too flung themselves upon him. he made no resistance. he died and was torn to pieces which, with his bones, were quickly devoured. * * * * * * * vi the leader died seven days after the death of his mate. a week later, beneath a golden sun and a smiling blue sky, the snow was melting, cleansing the earth for the breath of spring. streamlets became abundant, twining like shining ribbons of molten light through the fields and valleys, the river grew swollen and turbid, becoming a fierce impassable flood, and the little fir trees grew still more feathery and verdant. the young wolf, like the old one before him, now became leader and took a mate; she was the daughter of the old leader, and she went into the cover to breed. the forest manor i dark, yellow snow still lay in the ravines from under which flowed icy streamlets; on the surface it was thawing, and last year's grass pointed up like stiff golden arrows to the cold heavens. here and there, in bright sunny patches, appeared the first yellow flowers. the sky was dull and overcast, laden with massy, leaden-coloured clouds. a carrion-crow flew low over the trees and the twittering birds fell silent. when the menace had passed they broke forth anew in triumphant song, once more absorbed by the joy of living, the swelling earth gurgled happily beneath the soft kiss of the warm humid wind, and from somewhere afar came reverberating sounds of spring; perchance from the people in the village across the water, or perchance from the warbling birds over the streams. ivanov the forester came out on to the door-step which had already dried, and lighted a cigarette; it burned but slowly in the moist atmosphere of the deepening twilight. "it will be hot, mitrich, thank god!" remarked the watchman, ignat, as he passed by with some buckets.... "snipe will be about to-morrow, and we will have to hunt right into easter." he went into the cow-house, then returned, sat down on a step, and rolled a cigarette. the pungent odour of his bad tobacco mingled with the sweet aroma of dying foliage and melting snow. beyond the river a church bell was ringing for the lenten festival, and there was a melancholy thrill in its notes as they crossed the water. "that must be the seventh gospel," said ignat. "they will be coming out with the candles soon." then he added abruptly: "the river won't reach to a man's waist in the summer and now it is like a torrent; they have been hardly able to cross it in the long boat ... spring, ah!... well, i shall certainly have to clean out my double-barrelled gun to-day." with a business-like air he spat into a puddle and vigorously inhaled his cigarette smoke. "the cranes will come down by the garden for the night, at dusk, judging by all portents, and to-morrow we will go after the grouse," replied ivanov, and listened intently to the myriad sounds of evening. ignat also listened, bending his shaggy head sideways to the earth and the sky. he caught some desired note and agreed: "yes, it must be so. i can hear the beat of their wings. i am truly thankful. at dawn to-morrow we must get out the drosky. we will go to the ratchinsky wood and have a look. we can get through all right by the upper road." from the right of the steps, his daughter aganka skipped gaily on to the terrace and began beating the dust out of a sheep-skin coat with thin brown sticks. it was cold and she commenced to dance for warmth, singing in a shrill voice: "the nightingale sings in the branches above-- the nightingale brings no rest to his love!" ignat gave her an indulgent look; nevertheless he said sternly: "come, come! that is sin ... it is lent and you singing!" aganka merely laughed. "there is no sin now!" she retorted, turning her back to the steps and propping up her right leg as she vigorously beat the sheepskin coat. ignat playfully threatened her--then smiled and said to ivanov: "a fine girl, isn't she?... she is not yet sixteen and is already a flirt! its no use talking to her. she won't remain in the house at night, but must go slipping off somewhere." aganka turned round sharply, tossing her head. "well, i am not a dead creature!" "you are not, my girl; indeed you are not--only hold your tongue!" ivanov glanced at her. she was like a little wild fawn with her fresh young body and sparkling eyes, always so ready to bewitch. his own weary eyes involuntarily saddened for a moment; then he said cheerily, in a louder tone than necessary: "well, isn't that the right attitude? isn't it the best way? love while you can, aganka, have a happy time." "oh, yes, let her have a happy time by all means ... it is young blood's privilege." replied ignat. the bells again rang out for the gospel. the sky grew darker and darker. ravens croaked hoarsely amidst the verdant foliage of the trees. ignat put his ear to the ground, listening. from the distance, from the garden, the ravines, and the pasturage came the low cries of cranes, barely audible amid the subdued rustling of the spring. ignat thrust forward his bearded face, it looked at first serious and attentive, then it grew cunning and became animated with joy. "the cranes have come down!" he cried in an excited whisper, as though afraid of frightening them. then he began to bustle about, muttering: "i must grease the double-barrel...." ivanov also bestirred himself. because while tracking the cranes he would be seeing her, arina's image now came vividly before him-- broad, strong, ardent, with soft sensual lips, and wearing a red handkerchief. "get the drosky out at dawn to-morrow," he ordered ignat. "we will go to the ratchinsky wood. i will go there now and have a look round." ii the panelled walls and the stove with its cracked tiles were only faintly visible in the soft twilight which filled ivanov's study. by the walls stood a sofa, and a desk whose green cloth was untidily bestrewn with the accumulated litter of years and copiously spotted with candle grease, reminiscent of the long, dreary nights ivanov had spent--a prey to loneliness. a heap of horse trappings--collars, straps, saddles, bridles--lay by the large, square, bare windows. during the winter nights wolves watched the gleam of yellow candlelight within them. now outside was the tranquil, genial atmosphere of spring with all its multi-coloured splendour. against a deep-blue sky with an orange streak like a pencil line drawn across the horizon, showed the sharp, knotted twigs of the crotegus and the lilac beneath the windows. ivanov lighted a candle and commenced manufacturing cartridges to pass away the time. lydia constantinovna entered the room. "will you have tea here or in the dining-room?" she inquired. ivanov declined tea with a wave of his hand. all through the years of the revolution lydia constantinovna had lived in the crimea, coming to marin-brod for a fortnight the previous summer, afterwards leaving for moscow. now she had returned for the easter holidays, but not alone--the artist mintz accompanied her. ivanov had never heard of him before. mintz was clean-shaven and had long fair hair; he wore steel-rimmed pince-nez over his cold grey eyes which he often took off and put on again; when he did so his eyes changed, looking helpless and malicious without the glasses, like those of little owlets in daylight; his thin, shaven lips were closely compressed, and there was often an expression of mistrust and decrepitude in his face; his conversation and movements were noisy. lydia constantinovna had arrived with mintz the day before at dusk; ivanov was not at home. they had gone for a walk in the evening, returning only at two o'clock when dawn was just about to break, and a cold mist hung over the earth like a soft grey veil. they were met by barking dogs which were quickly silenced by the lash of ignat's whip. ivanov had come home earlier, at eleven o'clock, and sat by his study window alone, listening to the gentle sounds of night and the ceaseless hootings of the owls in the park. lydia constantinovna did not come to him, nor did he go in to her. it was in the daytime that ivanov first saw the artist. mintz was sitting in the park on a dried turf-bench, and gazing intently at the river. ivanov passed him. the artist's shrunken ruffled figure had an air of desolation and abandonment. the drawing-room was next to ivanov's study. there still remained out of the ruin a carpet and some armchairs near the large, dirty windows, an old piano stood unmoved, and some portraits still hung on the walls. lydia constantinovna and mintz came in from the back-room. lydia walked with her usual brisk, even tread, carrying herself with the smooth, elastic bearing and graceful swing of her beautiful body that ivanov remembered so well. she raised the piano-cover and began playing a dashing bravura that was strikingly out of place in the dismantled room, then she closed the piano-lid with a slam. aganka entered with the tea on a tray. mintz walked about the dim room, tapping his heels on the parquet floor, and though he spoke loudly, his voice held a note of yearning pain. "i was in the park just now. that pond, those maple avenues-- disintegrating, dying, disappearing--drive me melancholy mad. the ice has already melted in the pond by the dam. why can we not bring back the romantic eighteenth century, and sit in dressing-gowns, musing with delicious sadness over our pipes? why are we not illustrious lords?" lydia constantinovna smiled as she answered: "why not indeed! that is a poetic fancy. but the reality is very much worse. marin-brod has never been a country house, it is a forest manor, a forestry-office and nothing more ... nothing more.... i always feel an interloper here. this is only my second day and i am already depressed." her tone was sad, yet it held just a perceptible note of anger. "reality and fancy? certainly i am an artist, for i always see the latter, the beautiful and spiritual side," mintz declared; and added in an undertone: "do you remember yesterday ... the park?" "oh, yes, the park," lydia replied in a tired, subdued tone. "they hold the twelfth gospel service to-day; when i was a young girl, how i used to love standing in church with a candle--i felt so good. and now i love nothing!" it was already quite dark in the drawing room. a wavering, greenish- golden light streamed in through the windows and played on the dim walls. ivanov came out of his study. he was wearing high boots and a leather jacket, and carried a rifle under his arm. he went silently to the door. lydia constantinovna stopped him. "are you going out again, sergius? is it to hunt?" "yes." ivanov stood still and lydia went up to him. she had dark shadows under her eyes, and the hand of time--already bearing away her youth and beauty--lay upon her marvellously white skin, at her lips and on her cheeks, in faint, scarcely visible wrinkles. ivanov noticed it distinctly. "does one hunt at night--in the dark? i did not know that," lydia said, repeating "i did not know...." "i am going to the wood." "i have come back here after not having seen you for months, and we have not yet spoken a word...." ivanov did not reply, but went out. his footsteps echoed through the great house, finally dying away in the distance. the front-door slammed, shaking the whole mansion, which was old and falling to pieces. lydia constantinovna remained in the middle of the room, her face turned to the door. mintz approached, took her hand, and raised it to his lips. "you must not take it to heart, lit," he said softly and kindly. she freed her hand and laid it on mintz's shoulder. "no, one should not take it to heart," she assented in a low voice, "one should not.... but listen, mintz.... how strange it all is! once he loved me very much, though i never loved him.... but my youth was spent here, and now i feel unhappy.... i remember all that happened in this drawing-room, it was the first time. if only i could have all over again! perhaps i should act differently then. i feel sorry now for my youth and inexperience, though formerly i cursed them, and i am far from regretting all that followed afterwards. but i need a refuge now.... if you only knew how much he loved me in those days!..." lydia constantinovna was silent a moment, her head bent, then flinging it back she gave a hollow sardonic laugh. "oh, what nonsense i talk! well, we will be cheerful yet. i am tired, that is all. how stuffy it is in here!... open the windows, mintz ... now let down the blinds ... they live on milk and black bread here and are happy--but i have a bottle of brandy in my trunk. get it out! light the chandelier." mintz opened the windows. from outside came a cool, refreshing breeze laden with the moist and fragrant perfumes of spring. dusk had crept over the sky, which was flecked with warm vernal clouds. iii the heavens were a glorious, triumphant, impenetrable blue; there was a faint glimmer of greenish light on the western horizon over which brooded damp low clouds. the air was humid, soft, and redolent with the aroma of earth and melting snow. from all around came a faint medley of echoing sounds.... the wind fell completely, not a tree stirred; the ferns stood motionless with all the magic of the springtime among their roots. so calm and still was the night, the earth herself, it seemed, stopped turning in that wonderful stillness. ivanov lighted a cigarette, and as the match flared between his fingers, illuminating his black beard, his trembling hands were distinctly visible. his pointer gek came out of the darkness and fawned round his legs. through the darkness of the windless night rang the church bell tolling for the last gospel service; it seemed to peal just outside the manor. the yard was silent, but once or twice aganka's voice could be heard from the cattle-shed calling to the cows, and the sound of milk falling into her pail was faintly audible. ivanov listened to the church chimes and the subdued sounds of night round the manor, then noiselessly, well accustomed to the obscurity, he descended the steps; only gek was at his side, the other dogs did not hear him. cold raindrops fell from the trees in tiny shining globules of iridescent light, close by him an owl fluttered in a tangle of branches, uttering its dreadful cry of joy as it flashed past. ivanov walked through the fields, descended by a chalky ribbon of a footpath to the ravine, crossed over it by a narrow shadow-dappled pathway hidden among a maze of trees, and made his way along its further ridge to a forest watch-house. it stood in a bare open space, exposed to the swift rushing dance of the winds, and close to the naked trunks of three ancient pines that still reared their grim, shaggy heads to the sky and spilled their pungent balsam perfumes into the air. behind it loomed the faint grey shadow of an embankment. a dog at the watch-house began to bark. gek growled in return and suddenly disappeared. the dogs became silent. a man appeared on the step with a lantern. "who is there?" he asked quietly. "it is i," said ivanov. "you, sergius mitrich?... aha! but arina is still at church ... went off there ... busy with her nonsense." the watchman paused. "shall i go in and turn off the light? the express will soon be passing. will you come in? arina will be back before long. the wife's at home." "no, i'm going into the forest." "as you wish." the watchman passed along the embankment with his lantern and approached the bridge. ivanov left the watch-house, and went into the forest, walking along the edge of the ravine towards the river slope. a train rushed out from the forest on the further side of the river, its flaming eyes reflected in the dark shiny water; it moved forward, rolling loudly and harshly over the bridge. it was that hour of spring-time when, despite the many noises, there was still an atmosphere of peace, and the burgeoning, luxuriantly- clad earth could almost be heard breathing as it absorbed the vernal moisture; the clash of the stream as it struck the rocks in the ravine was hushed for the night. nevertheless it seemed as though the bold-browed, rugged wood-demon--awakened by spring--was shaking his wings in the water. beyond the ravine and wood, beyond the river to the right, left, behind, and before, the birds still chirruped over the currents. below, not many steps away, the stream flowed almost noiselessly; only, as though immeasurably remote the confused gurgle of its waters broke the profound quiet. far away rose a soft murmur. the air hummed and shook with the roar of distant rapids. ivanov leaned against a birch tree, laid his rifle beside him, struck a match and began to smoke. the flickering light illuminated the white trunks of the trees, the withered herbage of last year's growth and a path leading down the embankment. arina had descended it many times. the church bells in the village were ringing for evensong. from the church precincts twinkled the yellow lights of candles and lanterns, then there was the hum of people's voices. many of the lights dispersed to the right and left, others moved down to the river side. there was the sound of foot-falls on the bottom of a boat and the splashing of oars. someone called out: "wai ... ait ... mitri ... ich!" there was a clanking of iron--a boat-chain; then stillness. only the lights showed that the boat had been launched into the middle of the river and was floating down stream. soon the murmur of voices again, and the plash of oars, and now these sounds were quite close to ivanov. one of the men was teasing the girls, the latter laughed at first, then all at once they were silent. the boat was made fast to the bridge, the passengers bustling about for a long time on landing. the ferryman collected his paper roubles, the men continued merry-making with the girls. their rugged forms-- their chest, knees and chins were clearly discernible in the lights they carried. they all strolled up a narrow pathway, but one light withdrew from the rest and moved along a short cut that led to the watch-house--it was arina's. ivanov held gek in tightly, the dog was straining to rush down the embankment. arina slowly ascended the steep incline, planting her broad, short heavily-shod feet firmly in the sticky mud; her breath came pantingly. she wore a red jacket, unbuttoned in the front through which her large bosom was visible in the lantern-light. the reflection shone upon her bent face, illuminating her lips, her bluish cheek-bones and dark arched brows; only her eyes were invisible in the darkness, and their cavities seemed enormous. the night's density gave way before the light of her lantern and the silvery trunks of birch trees glimmered ahead. ivanov crossed the road in front of her. arina stopped with a sudden gasp, and he felt the touch of her warm breath. "how you scared me!" she exclaimed quickly, stretching out her hand. "how are you? i have been at the church service. how you scared me!" ivanov was about to draw her hand towards him, but she withdrew it, saying sternly: "no, you musn't, i'm in a hurry to get home, i have no time. let me go." ivanov smiled faintly, and dropped her hands. "all right, it does not matter, i will come to-morrow at dusk." then in a low voice he added: "will you come?" arina moved closer to him, and she too spoke under her breath: "yes, come this way. and we will have a walk ... bother my father! but go now, i am in a hurry ... there is the house to put straight.... i feel the baby under my heart. go!" the first warm rain drops fell from the invisible sky as ivanov walked across the meadows; at first they were sparse, pattering noisily on his leather jacket; then they began to fall more heavily and he was soon enveloped in the sonorous downpour of a vernal shower. close to the manor gek darted aside and disappeared down the ravine, from whence arose the rustling of wings, and the perturbed cries of cranes. gek barked, some dogs on a neighbouring farm answered him; to these, others responded from a distant village, and then again, from far away there was borne over the earth the clear springtime baying of other dogs. on entering the main avenue of the park, ivanov noticed the glow of a cigarette suddenly disappearing down a side-walk; afterwards he encountered aganka at a gate. "you!" he exclaimed. "on the run as usual? so you have made friends with a smoker this time?" the girl giggled loudly and ran off, splashing through the mud towards the cow-shed; then she called out innocently: "i have put the milk by the window in your study." ivanov lingered a while on the doorstep scraping the mud off his boots, then stretched himself vigorously, working the muscles of his arms and reflecting that it was high time for him to be in bed, in a sound healthy sleep, so as to be up at dawn on the morrow. iv in the drawing-room a chandelier hung above the sofa and round table near the piano; it had not been lighted for many years, indeed not since the last christmas before the revolution. now once again it was illumined, and the dull yellow flare of its candles--dimly shining out of their dust-laden pendants--lit up the near side of the room and its contents; at the further side, however, where doors led into the hall and a sittingroom, there was a complete wreckage. the chairs, armchairs, and couches had vanished through the agency of unknown hands, leaving only fragments of broken furniture, and odds and ends of utensils heaped together in casual profusion in a dark corner, only penetrated by grey, ghostlike shadows. the curtains were closely drawn; outside the rain pattered drearily on the windows. lydia constantinovna played a long while on the piano, at first a bravura from the operas, then some classical pieces, liszt's "twelfth rhapsody," and finally ended with the artless music of oppel's "a summer's night in berezovka"--a piece she used to play to ivanov when she was his fiancée. she played it through twice; then broke off abruptly, rising from her seat and shaking with gusts of malicious laughter. still laughing loudly and evilly, she began to sip brandy out of a high narrow glass. her eyes were still beautiful, with the beauty of lakes in autumn when the trees are shedding their leaves. she seated herself on the sofa, and lay back among its cushions, her hands clasped behind her head, in an attitude of utter abandonment. her legs in their open- work stockings were plainly visible under her black silk skirt, and she crossed them, leisurely placing her feet, encased in their patent leather shoes, upon a low footstool. she drank a great deal of brandy in slow sips, and as she pressed her beautiful lips to the glass she vilified everybody and everything-- ivanov, the revolution, moscow, the crimea, marin-brod, mintz, and herself. then she became silent, her eyes grew dull, she began to speak quietly and sadly, with a foolish helpless smile. mintz was drinking and pacing up and down the room, speaking volubly with noisy derision. the brandy flowed through his veins, warming his sluggish blood; his thoughts grew vivid and spiteful, engendering sarcastic, malicious remarks. whenever he took a drink, he removed his pince-nez for a moment, and his eyes became evil, vacant and bemused. lydia constantinovna sat in the corner of the sofa, covered her shoulders with a plaid shawl, and crossed her legs in the turkish fashion. "what a smell of chipre there is, mintz," she murmured in a low voice. "i think i must be tipsy. yes, i must be. when i drink a great deal i always begin to think there are too many perfumes about. they suffocate me, i get their taste in my mouth, they sing in my ears and i feel ill.... what a smell of chipre ... it is my favourite perfume: do you smell it?" she looked at mintz with a half dazed stare, then continued: "in an hour's time i shall be having hysterics. it is always the way when i drink too much. i don't feel cheerful any longer, i feel melancholy now, mintz. i feel now as though ... as though i have wept on this sofa all through the night ... oh, how happy we used to be once upon a time," she sighed tearfully, then added with a giggle. "why i hardly know what i am saying!" mintz was walking up and down the room, measuring his steps extremely carefully. he halted in front of lydia constantinovna, removed his glasses and scowled: "but i, when i drink, i begin to see things with extraordinary clearness: i see that we are melancholy because the devil only knows why or for what we are living; i see that life is impossible without faith; that our hearts and minds are exhausted with the endless discussions in cafes, attics and promenades. i realise that no matter what happens, villainy will always exist. i see, too, that we have been drinking because we feel lonely and dull--yes, even though we have been joking and laughing boisterously; i see that there is now the great joy and beauty of spring outside--so different from the distorted images visible to warped minds and clouded eyes; i see, moreover, that the revolution has passed us by after throwing us aside, even though the new economic policy may put on us our feet again for a while, and that ... that ..." mintz did not finish, but turned round abruptly and strode away with an air of self-assertion, into the remote end of the room, where the debris was littered. "yes, that is true ... you are right," answered lydia constantinovna. "but then i do not love sergius, i never have done." "of course i am right," mintz retorted severely from his dim corner. "people never love others. they love themselves--through others." ivanov came in from the hall in his cap and muddy boots, carrying his rifle. without a single word he passed through the room and went into his study. mintz watched him in severe silence, then followed him. inside he leaned against the door-post with a wry smile: "you are shunning me all this time. why?" "you imagine it," returned ivanov. he lighted a candle on his desk, took off his coat, changed his boots and clothes, hung up his rifle. "that is ridiculous!" mintz replied coldly. "i very seldom imagine things. i want to say how very comfortable you seem here, because this is the very essence of comfort.... look at me! i have painted pictures, sold them, painted more in order to sell those also--though i ceased painting long ago--and i lived in garrets because i must have light, and by myself because my wife will not come to such a place.... true, she is no longer with me, she deserted me long ago! now i have only mistresses.... and i envy you because ... because it is very cold in garrets.... you understand me?" mintz took off his pince-nez and his eyes looked bewildered and malignant: "in the name of all who had been tortured, all who have exchanged the springtime beauty of the parks for the erotic atmosphere of boudoirs; all who in the soft luxury of their homes forgot, and have now lost their claim on russia--i say you are supremely comfortable, and we envy you! one may work here, one may even ... marry ... you have never painted, have you?" "no." mintz was silent, then suddenly said in a low tone: "look here! we have some brandy. shall we have a drink?" "no, thank you. i want to sleep. good night." "i want to talk!" ivanov extinguished the candle, through custom finding his bread and milk in the dark, and hastily consumed it without sitting down. mintz stood a moment by the door; then went out, slamming it behind him. lydia constantinovna now had her feet on the carpet and her head was bowed. her eyes under their long lashes were blank and limpid, like lakes amid reeds. her hands were clasped round her knees. "how was sergius?" she enquired, without raising her head. "boorish, he has gone to bed," answered mintz. he was about to sit beside her, but she rose, arranged her hair mechanically, and smiled faintly and tenderly--not at mintz, but into the empty space. "to bed? well, it is time. good rest!" she said softly. "ah, how the perfume torments me. i feel giddy." she went to the other end of the room, mintz following her, and halted on the threshold. in the stillness of the night the pattering rain could be heard distinctly. lydia constantinovna leaned against the white door, throwing back her head, and began to speak; avoiding mintz's eyes, she endeavoured to express herself simply and clearly, but the words seemed dry as they fell from her lips: "i am very tired, mintz, i am going to bed at once. you go too. goodbye until tomorrow. we shall not meet again to-night. do you understand, mintz? it is my wish." mintz stood still, his legs wide apart, his arms akimbo, his head hanging. then with a sad, submissive smile he answered in an unexpectedly mild tone: "very well, then, all right, i understand you. it is quite all right." lydia constantinovna stretched out her hand, speaking in the unaffected, friendly way she had desired earlier: "i know you are a malicious, bored, lonely cynic, like ... like an old homeless dog ... but you are kind and intelligent.... you know i will never leave you-- we are so.... but now i am going in to him ... just for the last time." mintz kissed her hand without speaking, then his tall, bony, somewhat stooping figure disappeared down the corridor. v lydia constantinovna's bedroom was cold and gloomy. as formerly, it contained a huge four-poster, a chest of drawers, a dressing table and a wardrobe. the rain beat fiercely against the window panes running down in tiny glass globules. lydia lighted two candles, and placed them beside the tarnished mirror. some toilette belongings, relics of her childhood, lay on the chest-of-drawers, and the contents of the baggage she had brought with her the previous day were scattered about the room. the candles burnt dimly, their yellow tongues flickering unsteadily over the tarnished mirror. she changed her garments and put on a loose green neglige, then re- arranged her hair into plaits, forming them into a coronet which made her head appear very small and graceful. from force of habit she opened a bottle of perfume, moistened the palms of her hands and rubbed them over her neck and bosom. at once she felt giddy, even the cold, dampish sheets on her bed seemed to smell of chipre. lydia sat down on the edge of her bed in her green negligé, listening to the sounds around her. outside, there was a continuous howling and barking of dogs, now and then she could distinguish the croaking of half-awakened crows in the park. the clock struck eleven, then half-past, someone passed along the corridor, aganka cleared up in the dining-room, mintz walked to and fro in the drawing-room, then all became quiet. lydia constantinovna went to the window and gazed out for a long time. then, quietly, she left her bedroom and crept down to ivanov's study. all around her it was dark, cold and silent as she passed through the empty, spacious rooms. a forgotten candle still burnt wanly in the drawing-room, and a rat ran out from under the table. she was again plunged in darkness when she entered ivanov's study, and she was greeted by a smell of horse trappings and joiners' glue. ivanov was asleep on the sofa. he lay on his back, his arms extended; the outlines of his body could just be discerned. lydia sat down quietly beside him and laid her hand on his breast. ivanov sighed, drew in his arms and raised his head quickly from the pillow: "who is there?" "it is i, sergius--me--lida," answered lydia constantinovna in a rapid whisper. "i know you do not wish to speak to me. i am bored ... i returned here in a happy mood, not even thinking of you, and now all at once i feel wretched.... oh, those perfumes! how they torment me...." she passed her hand over her face, then was silent. ivanov sat up. "what is the matter lida? what do you want?" he asked drowsily, and he lighted a cigarette. the light shone on them as they sat half- dressed on the sofa. ivanov had a rugged, lumbering look. "what do i want?" lydia constantinovna murmured. "age creeps on me, sergius, and a lonely old age is terrible ... i feel so weary.... i came here happy enough, now i am miserable. i can think of nothing but the time you and i spent here together ... i am always playing" a summer's night in berezovka "--do you remember? i used to play it to you in those days.... well, so there you see.... age creeps on and i am longing for a home.... to-day they had the twelfth gospel service.... surely we still have a word for each other?" her face clouded in sudden doubt. "you have been with arina then?" she questioned sharply. ivanov did not answer immediately. "i have grieved and worried greatly, lida," he said at last, "but that does not matter. these four years i have lived alone, and have placed the past behind me. it is gone for ever. these four years i have struggled against death, and struggled for my daily bread. you know nothing of all this, we are as strangers.... yes, i have been with arina. soon i shall have a son. i do not know if i am broken or merely tired, but for the moment i feel all right. i am going to bring arina here, she will be my wife and keep house for me. and i shall live.... i am keeping step with some elemental force . . . i shall have a son.... it will be a totally different life for me, lida." "and for me moscow--as ever--wine, theatres, cafes, mintz, an eternal hurly-burly ... i am sick of it!" "i cannot help you, lida. i too am sick of all that, but now i am at peace. we must all work out our own salvation." ivanov spoke very quietly and simply. lydia constantinovna sat bowed and motionless, as if fearing to move, clasping her knees with both hands. when ivanov ceased speaking she rose noiselessly and went towards the door. she stood on the threshold a brief moment then, went out. the candle still burnt fitfully in the drawing-room. the house was wrapt in silence. the bielokonsky estate ivan koloturov, president of the bielokonsky committee of the poor, had ploughed his tiny holding for twenty years. he always rose before dawn and worked--dug, harrowed, threshed, planed, repaired--with his huge, strong, pock-marked hands; he could only use his muscular strength. on rising in the morning, he prepared his hash of potatoes and bread, and went out of the hut to work--on the land, with cattle, with wood, stone and iron. he was honest, careful, and laborious. while still a lad of five he had, while driving from the station, helped a stranger in a mechanic's overalls to a seat; the man had told him all were equal in the sight of god, that the land belonged to the peasants, that the proprieters had stolen it from them, and that a time would come when he would have to "do things." ivan koloturov did not understand what he would have to do, but when the fierce wave of the revolution broke over the country and swept into the steppe, he was the first to rise to "do things." now he felt disillusioned. he had wanted to do everything honestly, but he was only able to work with his hands and muscles. they elected him to the county committee. he was accustomed to rise before dawn and set to work immediately. now he was not permitted to do anything before ten o'clock. at ten he went to the committee where, with the greatest difficulty, he put his name to papers--but this was not work: papers came in and went out independently of him. he did not understand their purport, he only signed them. he wanted to do something! in the spring he went home to the plough. he had been elected in the autumn, president of the committee of the poor, and he established himself in prince prozorovsky's domain, putting on his soldier brother's great coat and carrying a revolver in his belt. he went home in the evening. his wife met him sullenly, jerking her elbows as she prepared some mash. the children were sitting on the stove, some little pigs grunted in a corner. there was a strong smell of burning wood. "you won't care to eat with us now after the barin's meal," nagged the old woman. "you are a barin yourself now. ha, ha!" ivan remained silent, sitting down on a bench beneath the ikon. "so you mix with rascals now," she persisted, "yes, that is what they are, ivan koloturov. discontented rascals!" "peace, fool! you don't understand. be quiet, i say!" "you are ashamed of me, so you are hiding." "we will live there together--soon." "not i! i will not go there." "idiot!" "ah, you have already learnt to snarl," the old woman jibed. "ate your mash then! but perhaps you don't relish it after your barin's pork." she was right, he had already eaten--pork, and she had guessed it. ivan began to puff. "you are an idiot, i tell you," he growled. he had come home to have a business talk about their affairs, but he left without settling anything. the old woman's sharp tongue had stung him in a tender spot. it was true that all the respectable peasants had stood aside, and only those who had nothing to lose had joined the committee. ivan passed through the village. as he walked across the park, he saw a light burning in the stables and went over to discover the reason. he found some lads had assembled there and were playing cards and smoking. he watched them awhile, frowningly. "this is stupid! you will set the place alight," he grumbled. "what if we do?" the men answered sulkily. "it is for you to defend other people's property?" "not other peoples'--ours!" he retorted, then turned away. "ivan!" they shouted after him; "have you the wine-cellar key? there are spirits in there--if you don't give it to us, we shall break in...." the house was dark and silent. the huge, spacious apartments seemed strange, terrible. the prince still occupied the drawing-room. ivan entered his office--formerly the dining-room--and lighted a lamp. he went down on his knees and began to pick up the clods of earth that lay on the floor; he threw them out of the window, then fetched a brush and swept up. he could not understand why gentlemen's boots did not leave a trail of dirt behind them. then he went into the drawing-room and served the final notice on the prince while the men were accommodating themselves in the kitchen. then he joined them, lying down on a form without undressing. after a long time he fell asleep. he awoke the next morning while all were still sleeping, rose and walked round the manor. the lads were still playing cards in the stable. "why aren't you asleep?" one of them asked him. "i have had all i want," he replied. he called the cow-herd. the man came out, stood still, scratched his head, and swore angrily-- indignant at being aroused. "don't meddle in other people's affairs," he grunted. "i know when to wake." the dawn was fine, clear and chilly. a light appeared in the drawing- room, and ivan saw the prince go out, cross the terrace and depart into the steppe. at ten o'clock, the president entered the office, and set about what was, in his opinion, a torturous, useless business--the making out an inventory of the wheat and rye in each peasant's possession. it was useless because he knew, as did everyone in the village, how much each man had; it was torturous because it entailed such a great deal of writing. prince prozorovsky had risen at daybreak. the sun glared fiercely over the bare autumn-swept park and into the drawing-room windows. the wedding cry of the ravens echoed through the autumnal stillness that hung broodingly over the steppe. on such a dazzling golden day as this, the prince's ancestors had set off with their blood-hounds in by-gone days. in this house a whole generation had lived--now the old family was forced to leave it--for ever! a red notice--"the bielokonsky committee of the poor"--had been affixed to the front door the previous evening, and the intruders had bustled all night arranging something in the hall. the drawing-room had not so far been touched; the gilt backs of books still glittered from behind glass cases in the study. oh books! will not your poison and your delights still abide? prince prozorovsky went out into the fields; they were barren but for dead rye-stalks that stuck up starkly from the earth. wolves were already on the trail. he wandered all day long, drank the last wine of autumn and listened to the ravens' wedding cries. when he had beheld this bird's carnival as a child, he had clapped his hands, crying: "hurrah for my wedding! hurrah for my wedding!" he had never had a wedding. now his days were numbered. he had lived for love. he had known many affections, had felt bitter pangs. he had tasted the poison of the moscow streets, of books and of women; had been touched by the autumnal sadness of bielokonsky, where he always stayed in the autumn. now he knew grief! he walked aimlessly through the trackless fields and down into hollows; the aspens glowed in a purple hue around him; on a hill behind him the old white house stood amid the lilac shrubbery of a decaying park. the crystal clear, vast, blue vista was immeasurably distant. the hair on his temples was already growing thin and gray--there was no stopping, no returning! he met a peasant, a rough, plain man in a sheep-skin jacket, driving a cart laden with sacks. the man took off his cap and stopped his horse, to make way for the ... _gentleman_. "good morning, little father," he wheezed, then addressed his beast, pulled the reins, drove on, then stopped again and called out: "listen, barin, i want to tell you...." the prince turned round and looked at the man. the peasant was old, his face was covered with hair and wrinkles. "what will your excellency do now?" "that is difficult to say," replied the prince. "when will you go?" the old man asked. "those committees of the poor are taking away the corn. there are no matches, no manufacturers, and i am burning splinters for light.... they say no corn is to be sold.... listen, barin, i will take some secretly to the station. people are coming from moscow ... and ... and ... about thirty five of them ... thirty five i tell you!... but then, what will there be to buy with the proceeds?... well, well! it is a great time all the same ... a great time, barin! have a smoke, your excellency." prozorovsky refused the proffered pipe, and rolled himself a small cigar of an inferior brand. around was the steppe. no one saw, no one knew of the peasant's compassion. the prince shook hands with him, turned sharply on his heel and went home. the cold, clear, glassy water in the park lake was blue and limpid, for it was still too early for it to freeze all over. the sun was now sinking towards the west in an ocean of ruddy gold and amethyst. prince prozorovsky entered his study, sat down at the desk and drew out a drawer full of letters. no! he could not take all his life away with him: he laid the drawer on the desk, then went into the drawing- room. a jug of milk and some bread stood on an album-table. the prince lighted the fire, burnt some papers, and stood by the mantelpiece drinking his milk and eating the bread, for he had grown hungry during the day.... the milk was sour, the bread stale. already the room was filling with the dim shadows of evening, a purplish mist hung outside; the fire burnt with a bright yellow flame. heavy footsteps echoed through the silence of the corridor, and ivan koloturov appeared in the doorway. koloturov! as young lads they had played together, ivan had developed into a sober, sensible, thrifty, and industrious peasant. standing in the middle of the room, the president silently handed the prince his paper--it had taken him a whole hour to type it out. on the sheet was typed "to the barin prozorovsky. the bielokonsky committee of the poor order you to withdraw from the soviet estate of bielokonsky and from the district precincts. president koloturov." "very well," said the prince quietly; "i will go this evening." "you will take no horse." "i will go on foot." "as you like," koloturov replied. "you will take nothing with you." he turned round, stood a moment with his back to the prince, then went out of the room. at that instant, a clock struck three quarters of the hour. it was the work of kuvaldin, the eighteenth century master. it had been in the moscow kremlin and had afterwards travelled through the caucasus with the vadkovsky princes. how many times had its ticking sounded during the course of those centuries. prozorovsky sat down by the window and looked out at the neglected park. he remained there for about an hour, leaning his arms on the marble sill, thinking, remembering. his reflections were interrupted by koloturov. the peasant came in silently with two of his men and passed through into the office. they endeavoured silently to lift a writing-table. something cracked. the prince rose and put on his big grey overcoat, a felt hat, and went out. he walked through the rustling gold-green foliage of the park, passed close by some stables and a distillery, descended into a dell, came up on its opposite side. then, feeling tired, he decided to walk slowly--walk twenty miles on foot for the first time in his life. after all, how simple the whole thing was ... it was only terrible in its simplicity. the sun had already sunk beneath the horizon. the last ravens had flown. an autumn hush over-hung the steppe. he walked on briskly through the wide, windy, open space, walking for the first time he knew not whither, nor wherefore. he carried nothing, he possessed nothing. the night was silent, dark, autumnal, and frosty. he walked on briskly for eight miles, heedless of everything around, then he stopped a moment to tie his shoe lace. suddenly he felt an overwhelming weariness and his legs began to ache; he had covered nearly forty miles during the day. in front of him lay the village of makhmytka; he had often ridden there in his youth on secret visits to a soldier's wife; but now he would not go to her; no, not for anything in the world! the village lay pressed to the earth and was ornamented with numerous stacks which smelt of straw and dung. on its outskirts the prince was met by a pack of baying dogs, who flitted over the ground like dark, ghostly shadows as they leapt round him. at the first cabin he tapped at the little window, dimly lighted within by some smouldering splinters. "who is there?" came the tardy response. "let me in for the night, good people," called the prince. "who is it?" "a traveller." "well, just a minute," came the grudging answer. a bare-footed peasant in red drawers came out holding a lighted splinter over his head and looking round. "ah!" he exclaimed, "it is you, prince! so you were too wise to stay, were you? well, come in." an immense quantity of straw was spread over the floor. a cricket was chirruping, and there was a smell of soot and dung. "lay yourself down, barin, and god bless you!" the peasant climbed on to the stove and sighed. his old wife began to mutter something, the man grumbled, then said to the prince: "barin, you can have your sleep, only get up in the morning and leave before daylight, so that none will see you. you know yourself these are troubled times, there is no gainsaying it. you are a gentleman, barin, and gentlemen have got to be done away with. the old woman will wake you.... sleep now." prozorovsky lay down without undressing, put his cape under his head-- and at once caught a cockroach on his neck! some young pigs grunted in a corner. the hut was swarming with vermin, blackened by smoke and filled with stenches. here, where men, calves and pigs herded all together, the prince lay on his straw, tossing about and scratching. he thought of how, some centuries hence, people would be writing of this age with love, compassion, and tenderness. it would be thought of as an epoch of the most sublime and beautiful manifestation of the human spirit. a little pig came up, sniffed all round him, then trotted away again. a low, bright star peeped in through the window. how infinite the world seemed! he did not notice when he fell asleep. the old woman woke him at daybreak and led him through the backyard. the dawn was bright and cold, and the grass was covered with a light frost. he walked along briskly, swinging his stick, the collar of his overcoat turned up. the sky was marvellously deep and blue. at the station the prince squeezed himself into a warm place on the train, amongst other passengers carrying little sacks and bags of flour. thus, pressed against the sides of a truck, his clothes bedaubed with white flour, he journeyed off to--moscow. prince prozorovsky had left at evening. immediately after, furniture was pulled about and re-arranged, the veneer was chipped off the desk. the clock was about to be transferred to the office, but some one noticed that it had only one hand. none of the men realised that kuvaldin's old clocks were necessarily one-handed, and moved every five minutes simply because the minutes were not counted singly in those days. somebody suggested that the clock could be removed from its case. "take the clock out of the box," ivan koloturov ordered. "tell the joiners to put some shelves in it, it will do as a cupboard for the office.... now then, don't stamp, don't stamp!" that night an old woman came running in. there was a great turmoil in the village: a girl had been abused--no one knew by whom, whether by the villagers themselves or the people who had come from moscow for flour; the old woman began to accuse the committee men. she stood by the window and reviled them at the top of her voice. ivan koloturov drove her away with a blow on the neck, and she went off wailing bitterly. it was pitch-dark. the house was quiet. milkmaids outside were singing boisterously. ivan went into the study, sat down on the sofa, felt its softness, found a forgotten electric lamp and played with it, flashing its light on the walls as he passed through. he noticed the clock on the floor of the drawing-room and began to think what he would do with it, then he picked it up and threw it into the water- closet. a band of his men had broken their way into the other end of the house, and some one was thumping on the piano; ivan koloturov would have liked to have driven them away, to prevent them from doing damage, but he dared not. he suddenly felt sorry for himself and his old wife and he wanted to go home to his stove. a bell clanged--supper! ivan quietly stole to the wine-cellar, filled up his jug, and drank, then hurriedly locked the cellar door. on the way home he fell down in the park; he lay there a long time, trying to lift himself, wanting all the while to say something and to explain--but he fell asleep. the dark, dismal autumn night enfolded the empty, frozen, desolate steppe. death i it seemed as though the golden days of "st. martin's" summer had come to stay. the sun shone without warmth in the vast blue expanse of sky, across which swept the gabbling cranes on their annual flight southward. a hoar-frost lay in the shadow of the houses. the air was crisp and sapphire, the cold invigorating, a brooding stillness wrapped the world. the vine-wreathed columns on the terrace, the maple avenue and the ground beneath, all glowed under a purple pall of fallen leaves. the lake shone blue and smooth as a mirror, reflecting in its shining surface the white landing-stage and its boat, the swans and the statues. the fruit was already plucked in the garden and the leaves were falling. what a foolish wanton waste this stripping of the trees after summer seemed! in days such as these, the mind grows at once alert and calm. it dwells peacefully on the past and the future. the individual feels impelled by a kind of langour just to walk over the fallen leaves, to look in the gardens for unnoticed, forgotten apples, and to listen to the cries of the cranes flying south. ii ippolyte ippolytovich was a hundred years old less three months and some days. he had been a student in the moscow university with lermontov, and they had been drawn together in friendship through their mutual admiration of byron. in the "sixties,"--he was then close to his fiftieth birthday--he constantly conferred with the emperor alexander on liberative reforms, and pored over pisarev's writings in his own home. it was only by the huge, skeleton frame over which stretched the parchment skin, that it could be seen he had once been a tall, big, broad-shouldered man; his large face was covered with yellowish-white hair that crept from the nose, the cheek-bones, the forehead and the ears, while the skull was completely bald; the eyes were white and discoloured; the hands and legs shrunken, and seemed as though emaciated by nature's own design. there was a smell of wax in his room, and that peculiar fusty odour that pervades every old nobleman's home. it was a large, bare apartment containing only a massive mahogany writing-table, covered with a faded green cloth and bestrewn with a quantity of old- fashioned ornaments; there was also an armchair and a sofa. the moulded ceiling, the greenish-white marbled walls, the dragon fire-place, the inlaid flooring of speckled birch, the window panes, rounded at the tops, curtainless and with frequent intersecting of their framework, all, had become tarnished and lustreless, covered over with all the colours of the rainbow. through the windows streamed the mellow golden rays of the autumn sun, resting on the table, a part of the sofa, and on the floor. for many years the old man had ceased to sleep at night so as to sit up by day. it might truly be said that he slept almost the entire twenty-four hours, and also that he sat up during the whole of that time! he was always slumbering, lying with half-open, discoloured eyes on a large sofa tapestried in pig-skin of english make, and covered with a bear-skin rug. he lay there day and night, his right arm flung back behind his head. whenever, by day or night, he was called by his name--ippolyte ippolytovich, he would remain silent a moment collecting his wits, then answer: "eh?" he had no thoughts. all that took place round him, all that he had gone through in life, was meaningless to him now. it was all outlived, and he had nothing to think about. neither had he any feelings, for all his organs of receptivity had grown dulled. at night mice could be heard; while through the empty, columned hall out of which his room opened, rats scurried, flopping about and tumbling down from the armchairs and tables. but the old man did not hear them. iii vasilisa vasena came every morning at seven o'clock; she was a country-woman of about thirty seven, strong, healthy, red-faced, reminiscent of a july day in her floridness and vigorous health. she used to say quietly: "good morning to you, ippolyte ippolytovich." and he would give a base "eh?" in a voice like a worn-out gramophone record. vasena promptly began washing him with a sponge, then fed him with manna-gruel. the old man sat bent up on the sofa, his hands resting on his knees. he ate slowly from a spoon. they were silent, his eyes gazing inwardly, seeing nothing. sunbeams stole in through the window and glistened on his yellowish hair. "your good son, ilya ippolytovich, has come," vasena said. "eh?" ippolyte ippolytovich had married at about the age of forty; of his three sons only ilya was living. the old man called his son to memory, pictured him in his mind, but felt neither joy nor interest-- felt nothing! dimly, somewhere far away in the dark recesses of his memory, lurked a glimmering, wavering image of his son; at first he saw him as an infant, then as a boy, finally a youth. he recollected that now already he too was almost an old man. it came to him that once, long ago, this image was necessary and very dear to him, that afterwards he had lost sight of it, and that now it had become meaningless to him. dully, through inertia, the old man inquired: "he has come, you say?" "yes, came in the night, alone. he is resting now." "eh? he has come to have a look at me before i die." vasena promptly answered: "lord! you are not so young as to...." they were silent. the old man lay back on the sofa and slept. "ippolyte ippolytovich, you must take your walk!" "eh?" it was a "st. martin's summer." over the scattered blood-red vine leaves on the terrace, which was deluged in mellow autumnal sunshine, the bent-up old man walked, leaning heavily on a bamboo cane, and supported by the sturdy vasena. he had a skull-cap pulled down low over his forehead, and wore a long, black overcoat. iv sometimes the old man relapsed into a state of coma, lasting several hours. then life seemed to have ebbed from him entirely. a clay-like pallor over-spread his face, he had the lips and open, glassy eyes of a corpse, and he scarcely breathed. then they sent post-haste for the doctor, who sprinkled him with camphor, gave him oxygen and produced artificial respiration. the old man slowly came to, rolling his eyes. "another minute and it would have been death," the doctor would say in a deep, grave voice. when the old man had at length recovered, vasena used to say to him: "lord! we were so frightened, we were so frightened! ... we thought you were quite gone. yes, we did. for you know, you are not so young as to...." ippolyte ippolytovich was silent and indifferent, only at moments, half-closing and screwing up his eyes, and straightening out his lips, he laughed: "he-he! he-he!" then added, slyly: "i am dying, you say? he-he! he- he!" v ilya ippolytovich walked through the empty rooms of the dying house. how dusty and mouldy it seemed! the sun came through the tarnished window-panes and the specks of dust looked golden in its radiant light. he entered the room where he had passed his childhood. dust lay everywhere, on the window-sills, on the floor, and on the furniture. here and there fresh boot-prints were visible. a thin portmanteau--not belonging to the house and pasted over with many labels--lay on a table. a hard, icy stillness pervaded the entire place. ilya ippolytovich was stout like his father, but he still walked erect. his hair was already thinning and growing grey over the temples, but his face was clean-shaven, like a youth's. his lips were wrinkled and he had large, grey, weary eyes. he felt gloomy and unhappy, because his father's days were numbered; and he brooded miserably over the awkwardness of approaching death, wondering how one should behave towards a man who was definitely doomed. to and fro, from corner to corner, he walked, with restless, springy steps. he met his father on the terrace. "hallo, father!" he said briskly, with an intentional show of carelessness. the old man looked at him blindly, not recognising his son at first. but afterwards he smiled, went up the steps, and gave his cheek to be kissed. it smelt of wax. "eh?" said the old man. ilya kissed him, laughed hilariously, and slapped him lightly on the shoulder: "it is a long time since we met, father. how are you?" his father looked at him from beneath his cap, gave a feeble smile, then said after a pause: "eh?" vasena answered for him: "you may well ask how he is doing, ilya ippolytovich! why, we are fearing the worst every day." ilya threw her a reproachful glance and said loudly: "it is nonsense, father! you have still a hundred years to live! you are tired, let us sit down here and have a talk together." they sat down on the marble steps of the terrace. silence. no words came to ilya. try as he might, he could not think what to say. "well, i am still painting pictures," he tried at last; "i am preparing to go abroad." the old man did not hear him; he looked at his son without seeing or understanding, plunged in his own reflections. "you have come to look at me? you think i shall die soon?" he asked suddenly. ilya ippolytovich grew very pale and muttered confusedly: "what are you saying, father? what do you mean?" but his father no longer heard. he had fallen back in his chair, his eyes half-closed and glassy, his face utterly expressionless. he was asleep. vi the sun was shining, the sky was blue; in the limpid spaces above the earth there was a flood of crystal light. ilya ippolytovich strolled through the park and thought of his father. the old man had lived a full, rich, and magnificent life. it had possessed so much that was good, bright and necessary. now-- death! nothing would remain. nothing! and this nothing was terrible to ilya ippolytovitch. does not living man recognize life, the world, the sun, all that is around and within him, through himself? he reflected. a man dies, and the world dies for him. thenceforward he feels and recognises nothing. nothing! then what is the use of living, developing, working, when in the end there will be--nothing?... was there no great wisdom in his father's hundred years? nor in his fatherhood? a crane was crying somewhere overhead. the sound came from a scarcely visible dark arrow in the cloudless sky, which flew south. red, frost-covered leaves were rustling underfoot. ilya's face was pale, the wrinkles round his lips made him seem tired and feeble. he had spent his whole life alone, in the solitude of a cold studio, living arduously among pictures, for the sake of pictures. to what end? vii ippolyte ippolytovich sat in the large, bare dining-room eating chicken cutlets and broth. a napkin was tied round his neck as if he were a child. vasena fed him from a tea-spoon, and afterwards led him into his study. the old man lay down on a sofa, put his hand behind his head and fell asleep, his eyes half-open. ilya went to him in the study. he again made a pretence of being cheerful, but his tired eyes betrayed grief, and behind his clean- shaven face, his grey english coat, and yellow boots, somehow one felt there was a great shaken and puzzled soul suffering, yet seeking to conceal its anguish. he sat down at his father's feet. for a long time the old man searched his face with his eyes, then in a scraping, worn-out piping voice, said: "eh?" "it is so long since we met, father, i am longing to have a chat with you! somehow i have no one dearer to me than you! absolutely no one! how are you, sir?" the old man gazed before him with bleary eyes. he did not seem to have heard. but suddenly screwing up his eyes, straightening out his lips and opening his empty jaws, he laughed: "he-he! he-he!" he laughed, and said jovially: "i am dying soon. he- he! he-he!" however, ilya no longer felt as embarrassed as on that first occasion on the terrace. in a hasty undertone, almost under his breath, he asked: "but aren't you afraid?" "no! he-he!" "don't you believe in god?" "no! he-he!" they were silent for a long time after that. then the old man raised himself on his elbows with a sly grin. "you see," he said, "when a man is worn out ... sleep is the best thing for him ... that is so with dying ... one wants to die.... understand? when a man is worn out...." he was silent for a moment, then grinned and repeated: "he-he! he-he! understand?" ilya gave his father a long look, standing there motionless, with wide-open eyes, feeling a thrill of utter horror. but the old man was already slumbering. viii day faded. the blue autumnal twilight spread over the earth and peeped in through the windows. a purple mist filled the room with vague, spectral shadows. outside was a white frost. a silvery moon triumphantly rode the clear cold over-arching sky. ippolyte ippolytovich lay upon his sofa. he felt nothing. the space occupied by his body resembled only a great, dark, hollow bin in which there was--nothing! close by, a rat flopped across the floor, but the old man did not hear. a teasing autumnal fly settled on his eyebrow, he did not wink. from the withered toes to the withered legs, to the hips, stomach, chest, and heart, passed a faint, agreeable, scarcely noticeable numbness. it was evening now and the room was dark; the mist gathered thick and threatening through the windows. outside in the crisp, frosty moonlight, it was bright. the old man's face--all over-grown with white hair--and his bald skull, had a death-like look. vasena entered in her calm yet vigorous manner. her broad hips and deep bosom were only loosely covered by a red jacket. "ippolyte ippolytovich, it is time for your meal," she called in a matter of fact tone. but he did not reply, nor utter his usual "eh?" they sent at once for the doctor, who felt his pulse, pressed a glass to his lips, then said in a low, solemn tone: "he is dead." vasena, standing by the door, and somewhat resembling a wild animal, answered calmly: "well he wasn't so young as to.... haven't we all got to die! what is it to him now? he and his had everything in their day! dear lord, they had everything!" ix low, downy cloudlets drifted over the sky in the early hours of the morning. dark, lowering masses followed in their wake. the snow fell in large, cold, soft, feather-like flakes. st. martin's summer was past, to be succeeded by the advent of another earthly joy--the first white covering of snow, when it is so delicious to follow the fresh footprints of the beasts, a rifle in hand. the heirs i legend says that from the sokolovaya mountain--called the mountain of falcons, came stenka razin. it is written in books that from thence came also emelian pugachev. the sokolovaya mountain towers high above the volga and the plains, making a dark, precipitous descent to the pirate river below. across the volga lies an ancient town. by the glebychev ravine, close to the old cathedral guarded by one of pugachev's guns, stands a mansion with a facade of ochre-coloured-columns. in olden days, when it was the residence of the princely rastorovs' balls were held there, but decay had set in during the last twenty years, and kseniya davydovna--the mistress--old, ill, a spinster, was drawing to the end of her days. she died in october, , and now the tumbling, plundered house was occupied by--the heirs. they had been scattered over the face of russia, had spent their lives in petersburg, moscow and paris; for twenty years the house had stood vacant and moribund. then the revolution came! the instinctive fury of the masses burst forth--and the remnants of the rastorov family gathered in their old nest--to be hidden from the revolution and famine. snow-storms--galloping snowy chargers--howled over the steppe, the volga, and the town. elemental, all-devastating, as in the days of stenka razin--thundered the revolution. the rooms in the ancient mansion were damp, dark and chilly. the old cathedral could be seen from the window, and down below lay the volga, seven miles wide, wrapt in a dazzling sheet of snow, its steamers moored to their wharves. the family lived as a community at first, but their communism was nominal, for each barricaded and entrenched himself in his own room, with his own pot and samovar. they lived tedious, mean, malignant, worthless lives, execrating existence and the revolution; they lived utterly apart from the turmoil that now replaced the placid even flow of the old regime: they were outside current events, and their thoughts for ever turned back to the past, awaiting its return. general kirill lvovich awoke at seven o'clock. everything was crowded closely together in the room, which was bedroom, drawing-room and dining-room combined. the blue dusk of morning was visible through the heavy blinds of the low window. the general put on his tasselled bukhara dressing-gown and went outside, then returned coughing hoarsely. "anna," he snarled, "ask your kinsfolk which of them left the place in such a state. don't they know we have no servants? it is your turn to set the samovar to-day. are there no cigarette boxes?" he walked about the room, his hands behind his back, diamond rings glittering on his fingers. "and it is your turn to go for the rations," retorted anna andreevna. "that will do, i know it. there are four families living in the house and they cannot organise themselves so as to go in turn for the rations. give me a sheet of paper and some ink." the general sat down at the table and wrote out a notice: "ladies and gentlemen, we have no servants; we must see to things ourselves. we can't all perch like eagles, therefore, i beg you to be more careful. kirill l. lezhner." kirill lvovich was not one of the heirs, it was his wife who came of the rastorov family, and he had merely accompanied her to the ancestral mansion. lvovich took his notice and hung it on the lavatory door. then again he paced the floor, his jewels sparkling brilliantly. "why the devil do sergius and his family occupy three rooms, and we only one?" he grumbled. "i shall leave this den. they don't behave like relatives! are there no cigarettes?" anna andreevna, a quiet, weary, feeble woman, replied tonelessly: "you know there are none. but i will look for some butt-ends in a moment. lina sometimes throws away the unused cigarette wraps." "what bourgeois they are--throwing away fag-ends and keeping servants!" her husband complained. the dark twining corridor was strewn with rubbish, for no one had the will or wish to keep it neat. anna andreevna rummaged by the stove of sergius andreevich, lina's husband, looking among the papers and sweepings. she peered into the stove and discovered that leontyevna, the maid--a one-eyed cyclop--had filled it with birch-wood, whereas it had been agreed that the rotting timber from the summer-house should be used as fuel first. after enjoying a cigarette of his "own" tobacco, the general went out to the courtyard for firewood, returning with a bundle of sticks from the summer-house. the samovar was now ready and he sat down to his tea, leisurely drinking glass after glass, while anna andreevna heated her stove in the corridor. a dim, wintry dawn was gradually breaking. the family of sergius--the former head of a ministerial department--could be heard rousing themselves behind the wall. "you have had sufficient albumen; take hydrates now," rose lina's voice, calling to her children. "potatoes?" "yes." "and fat?" "you have had enough fat." the general smiled craftily, then muttered grumpily: "that is not eating, that is scientific alimentation." he cut himself a piece of bacon, ate it with some white bread, and drank more tea with sweet root and candied melon. gradually the occupants of the house roused themselves and half- dressed, sleepy--carrying their towels, empty samovars, and tooth brushes--they began to pass along the corridor in front of the general's open door. kirill lvovich eyed them maliciously as he sat drinking his tea and inwardly cursed them all. the cyclop, leontyevna, sergius andreevich's servant, tramped in heavily with her man's boots from the labour exchange; her solitary eye peered searchingly into anna andreevna's stove. "i'll see she's not deceiving us over the firewood," she shouted aggressively: "oh, what a store she's got!" "but you have used the birch-wood," the general hit back from his room. the cyclop flew into a rage and slapped her thighs. one of the periodic scenes ensued. "what?" leontyevna cried, "i am not trusted, i am being spied on! lina fedorovna, i am going to complain to the exchange." lina fedorovna joined in from behind her door. "she isn't trusted, she is being spied on," she echoed, "there must be spies in this house! and they call themselves intellectual people!" "but you took the birch-wood!" protested lvovich. "and they call themselves intellectual!" screamed lina. the general came out into the passage and said severely: "it is not for _us_ to judge, lina fedorovna. we are not the heirs here. but it seems strange to me that sergius should occupy three rooms, and anna only one--yes, very strange indeed." the quarrel became more violent. satisfied, the general put on his overcoat and went out to take his place in the ration queue. lina ran to her husband; he went to get an explanation of the scene, but lvovich was not to be found, however; he remonstrated with his sister, anna andreevna. "this spying is impossible, it must stop," he insisted. "but, can't you understand, it all began with searching for the butt- end of a cigarette?" anna pleaded in deep distress. lina had gone upstairs and was telling the whole story to ekaterina. anna appealed to her younger brother, constantine, a lyceum student, but he told her he was busy, immediately sitting down at his desk to write. soon after, however, he rose and went to sergius. "busy?" he asked. "what? yes, i am busy." "have a smoke." they began to smoke an inferior brand of tobacco known as "kepsten." they were silent. "will you have a game of chess?" constantine asked after a while. "yes...but no, i think not," sergius replied. "just one game?" "just one? well, only one!" they sat down and played chess. constantine was dressed in a rumpled lyceum uniform; he wore rings on his fingers, like the general and sergius, and an antique gold chain hung round his neck. being in constant dread of requisitioners and robbers they had divided all the jewellery between them, and wore it for safety. the brothers played one game, then a second, a fourth, a sixth-- smoking and quarrelling, disagreeing over the moves and trying to re- arrange them. the general returned from the ration queue in the market and came along the passage. he peeped in at the two players through the open door, and after some hesitation decided to enter. "greenhorns, you don't know how to play!" he said. "what do you mean? don't know how to play?" "now, now, don't fly into a rage. if i am wrong--excuse an old man ... i sent kirka for the newspaper, i gave him a twenty copeck piece for a tip." "i am not in a rage!" "very well, then that's all right. but throw over your chess. let us play a game of chance." they sat down and played it for the entire day, only interrupting the game to go to their rooms for dinner. whenever sergius had to pay a fine he would say: "anyhow, kirill lvovich, you have an objectionable manner." "now, now, greenhorn!" the general would reply. they had not a penny between them. katerina andreevna had been appointed guardian of their possessions. the men refused to recognise her authority and called it merely a "femocracy." only sergius still had some capital, the proceeds of an estate he had sold before the revolution. therefore he could well afford to keep a servant. upstairs with katerina were two girls who had thrown up their careers on principle--the one her college studies, the other her conservatoire courses. they kept up a desultory conversation while helping to clean potatoes. presently anna and lina joined them, and they all went down to the storeroom and began rummaging through their grandparents' old wardrobes. they turned over a variety of crinolines, farthingales, bustles and wigs, laying on one side the articles of silver, bronze and porcelain--for the tartars were coming after dinner. the storeroom smelt of rats. packed along its walls were boxes, coffers, trunks, and a huge pair of rusty scales. they all gathered together on the arrival of the tartars, who greeted them with handshakes. the general snorted. one of the tartars, an old man wearing new goloshes over felt boots, spoke to katerina: "how d'ye do, barina?" the general leisurely swung one leg over the other, and said stiffly: "be good enough to state your price." the two tartars looked over the old-fashioned articles, criticised them, none too well, and fixed the most ridiculous prices. the general burst out laughing and tried to be witty. katerina grew angrier and angrier, until at last she could no longer contain herself: "kirill lvovich," she shouted, "you are impossible!" "very well," came the infuriated reply; "i am not one of the heirs, i can go!" they calmed him, however, and then began bargaining with the tartars, who slung the old-fashioned articles carelessly over their arms-- laces worked by serfs, antique, hand made candle-sticks, a field- glass and an acetylene lamp. the twilight spread gently over the town, and through its dusky, star-spangled veil, loomed the old cathedral--reminiscent of stenka razin; now and then came the chime of its deep-toned bells. the tartars at length succeeding in striking a bargain, rolled the goods up into neat little packs with their customary promptitude, paid out kerensky notes from their bulging purses and left. then the heirs divided the proceeds. they were sitting in the drawing-room. blinds covered the low windows; some portraits hung on the walls, a chandelier was shrouded in a muslin wrapper that had not been changed for years. a yellow oaken piano was covered with dust, and the furniture's velvet covering was tarnished and threadbare. the house struck cold. the heirs were dressed fantastically; the general in a dressing-gown with gold embroideries and tassels; sergius wore a black hooded coat; lina a warm hare-skin jacket, and katerina, the eldest--the moustached guardian--a man's thick overcoat, a petticoat and felt shoes. on all were jewels--rings, ear-rings, bracelets and necklaces. sergius remarked ungallantly: "this is a trying time for us all, and i propose that we divide the proceeds among us according to the number of consumers." "i am not one of the heirs," the general hastily interposed. "i don't share your socialistic views." constantine informed sergius with a cold smile; "i think they should be divided according to the number of heirs." a heated argument followed, above which rang the cathedral bells. at last, with great difficulty, they came to an agreement. then katerina brought in the samovar. all fetched their own bread and sweet roots and drank the tea, thankful not to have to prepare it for themselves. suddenly--with unexpected sadness and, therefore, unusually well--the general began to speak: "when i--a lieutenant-bridegroom--met our aunt kseniya for the first time, she was wearing that bustle that you sold just now. ah, will things ever be the same again? if i were told the bolshevik tyranny would endure for another year, i should shoot myself! for, good lord, what i suffer! how my heart is wrung! and i am an old man.... life is simply not worth living." all burst into tears; the general wept as old men weep, the moustached katerina cried in a sobbing bass. neither could anna andreevna, nor the two girls who stood clasping each other in the corner, refrain from shedding tears, the girls for their youth and the sparkling joys of their maidenhood of which they had been deprived. "i would shoot them all if i could!" katerina declared. then sergius' children, kira and lira, came in and lina told them they might take some albumen. kira put butter on his. the moon rose.... the stars shone brilliantly. the snow was dead- white. the river volga was deserted. it was dark and still by the old cathedral. the frost was hard and crisp, crackling underfoot. the two young girls, kseniya and lena, with sergius and the general, were returning to the mansion to fetch their handsleighs and toboggan down the slope to the river. constantine had gone into town, to a club of cocaine-eaters, to drug himself, utter vulgar platitudes, and kiss the hands of loose women. leontyevna, the cyclop maid from the exchange, lay down on a bench in the kitchen to rest from the day's work, said her prayers, and fell into a sound sleep. the general stood on the door-steps. sergius drew up the sleighs, and they took their seats--three abreast--kseniya, elena and himself, and whirled along over the crackling snow, down to the ice-covered volga. the sleighs flew wildly down the slope, and in this impetuous flight, in the sprinkling and crackling snow, and bitter, numbing frost, kseniya dreamed of a wondrous bliss: she felt a desire to embrace the world! life suddenly seemed so joyous. the frost was harsh, cruel and penetrating. on regaining the house the general bristled up like a sparrow--he was frozen--and called out from the door-step: "sergius! there is a frost to-day that will certainly burst the water-pipes. we will have to place a guard for the night." perhaps sergius, and even the old man, had had a glimpse of wonderful happiness in the sleigh's swift flight over the snow. the former called back: "never mind!"--and again whirled wildly down from the old cathedral to the volga, where the boats and steamers plied amid the deep-blue, massive ice-floes, so sparkling and luminous in their snowy raiment. but the general had now worked himself up to a state of great excitement. he rushed indoors and roused everyone: "i tell you, it will freeze and the pipes will burst unless you let the water run a little. there are degrees of frost!" "but the tap is in the kitchen and leontyevna is sleeping there," objected lina. "well, waken her!" "impossible!" "damn rot!" snarled the general and went into the kitchen and shook leontyevna, explaining to her about the pipes. "i will go to the exchange and complain! not even letting one rest!...stealing in to an undressed woman!..." lina jabbered her words after her like a parrot. sergius ran in. "leave off, please," he begged. "it is i who am responsible. let leontyevna sleep." "certainly, i am not one of the heirs," the general retorted smoothly. the night and the frost swept over the volga, the steppe, and saratov. the general was unable to sleep. kseniya and lena were crying in the attic. constantine arrived home late, and noiselessly crept in to leontyevna. bluish patches of moonlight fell in through the windows. the water pipes froze in the night and burst. the crossways forest, thickets, marshes, fields, a tranquil sky--and the crossways! the sky is overcast at times with dove-coloured clouds; the forest now gabbles, now groans in the glittering summer sunshine. the crossways creep and crawl like a winding thread, without beginning and without end. sometimes their stretch tires and vexes-- one wants to go by a shorter route and turns aside, goes astray, comes back to the former way. two wheel-tracks, ripple grass, a foot- path and around them, besides sky or rye or snow or trees, are the crossways, without beginning or end or limit. and over them pass the peasants singing their low toned songs. at times these are sorrowful, as endless as the crossways themselves: russia was borne in these songs, born with them, from them. our ways lie through the crossways as they ever have done, and ever will. all russia is in the crossways--amid the fields, thickets marshes, and forests. but there were also those others who wanted to march over the bog- ways, who planned to throw russia on to her haunches, to press on through the marshlands, make main-roads straight as rules, and barricade themselves behind granite and steel, forgetful of russia's peasant cottages. and on they marched! sometimes the main-road is joined by the crossways, and from them to the main-road and over it passes the long vaunted rising, the people's tumult, to sweep away the unnecessary, then vanish back again into the crossways. near the main-road lies the railway. by turning aside from it, walking through a field, fording a river, penetrating first through a dark aspen grove, then through a red pine belt, skirting some ravines, threading a way across a village, trudging wearily through dried-up river-beds and on through a marsh, the village of pochinki is reached, surrounded by forest. in the village were three cottages, their backs to the forest; their rugged noses seemed to scowl from beneath the pine-trees, and their dim, tear-dribbling window-eyes looked wolfish. their grey timbers lay on them like wrinkles, their reddish-yellow thatch, like bobbed hair, hung to the ground. behind them was the forest; in front, pasture, thickets, forest again, and sky. the neighbouring crossways coiled round them in a ring, then narrowed away into the forest. in all three cottages dwelt kononovs: they were not kinsfolk, though they bore that name, closer linked through their common life than kinsmen ever were. kononov-yonov, the one-eyed, was the village elder: he no longer remembered his grandfather's name, but knew the olden times well, and remembered how his great-grandfathers and his great-great-grandfathers had lived and how it was good for men to live. from the oldest to the youngest they toiled with all their strength from spring to autumn, from autumn to spring, and from sunrise to sundown, growing grey like their hen-coops from smoke, scorching in the heat and steaming sweat like boiling tar. the kinsfolk of yonov the one-eyed made tar besides tilling the land, while yonov himself kept bee-hives in the forest. the sisters yonov barked lime-trees and made bast shoes. it was a hard, stern life, with its smoke, heat, frosts, and languour; but they loved it profoundly. the kononovs lived alone in friendship with the woods, the fields, and the sky; yet ever engaged in stubborn struggle against them. they had to remember the rise and set of the sun, the nights and the dung- mounds. they had to look into putrid corners, watch for cold blasts from the north, and give ear to the rumbling and gabbling of the forest. they knew: with january, mid-winter time, starts the year its frosty prime, blows wild the wind e'er yet'tis still, crackles the ice in the frozen rill; epiphany betimes is past, approaches now the lenten fast. in february there's a breath of heat, summer and winter at candlemas meet. in april the year grows moist and warm the air, the old folks' lives without their doors bids fair; the woodcock then comes flying from the sea, brings back the spring from its captivity. under a showery sky, bloom wide the fields of rye, ever blue and chill may will the granaries fill. it was necessary to work stubbornly, sternly, in harmony with the earth, to fight hand-to-hand with the forest, the axe, the plough and the scythe. they had learnt to keep their eyes wide open, for each had to hold his own against the wood-spirit, the rumbling forest, famine, and the marshes. they had learnt to know their mother-earth by the birds, sky, wind, and stars, like those men of whom yonov the one-eyed told them--those who of old wended their way to chuvsh tribes and the murman forest. all the kononovs were built alike, strong, rugged, with short legs and broad, heavy feet like juniper-roots, long backs, arms that hung down to their knees, shoulder-blades protruding as though made for harness, mossy green eyes that gazed with a slow stubborn look, and noses like earthen whistles. they lived with the rye, horses, cows, the sheep, the woods, and the grass. they knew that as the rye dropped seeds to the ground and reproduced in abundance so also bred beast and bird, counteracting death with birth. they knew too that to breed was also man's lot. ulyanka reached her seventeenth year, ivan his eighteenth: they bowed to the winds and went to the altar. ivan kononov did not think of death when he went to the war, for what was death when through it came birth? were there not heat-waves and drought in summer? did not the winter sweep the earth by blizzards? yet in spring all began to pulsate again with life. the war came: ivan kononov went without understanding, without reason--what concern was it of pochinki? he was dragged through towns, he pined in spittle-stained barracks; and then he was sent to the carpathians. he fired. he fought hand-to-hand: he fled; he retreated forty versts a day, resting in the woods singing his peasant-songs with the soldiers--and yearning for pochinki. he found all spoke like grandfather yonov the one-eyed; he learnt of the land in the olden time order, of the people's rising. at its approach he went on furlough to pochinki, met it there, and there remained. the rising came like happy tidings, like the cool breath of dawn, like a may-time shower: under a showery sky bloom wide the fields of rye, ever blue and chill may will the granaries fill. formerly there were the village constable, the district clerk, trumperies, requisitions, and taxations; for then it was the gentry who were the guardians. but now, yonov the one-eyed croaked exultantly: "now it's ourselves! we ourselves! in our own way! in our own world! the land is ours! we are the masters: it is the rising! _our_ rising!" there were no storms that winter; it was cold and dark, and the wolf- packs were astir. one after another the inhabitants were stricken down with typhoid--it was with typhoid that they paid for the rising! half the village succumbed and was borne on the peasants' sleighs to the churchyard. by candlemas, when winter and summer meet, all the provisions were exhausted, and the villagers drove to the station. but even that had changed. new people congregated there, some shouting, others hurrying to and fro with sacks. the villagers returned with nothing and sat down to their potatoes. in the spring prayers were offered up for the dead and a religious procession paraded round the village, the outskirts of which were bestrewn with ashes. then the villagers started to take tar and bast shoes to the station; they wanted to sell them, and with the proceeds buy ploughshares, harrows, scythes, sickles, and leather straps. but they never reached the station. their way led them through fields all lilac-coloured in the glowing sun: there they encountered an honest peasant dressed in a short fur jacket and a cap beneath which his look was calm and grave. he told them there was nothing at the station, that the townsfolk themselves were running like mice; and he urged them to go to poriechie, to give silvester the blacksmith some tar for his ploughshares, and, if he had none, to make them some of his own hand- ploughshares; then to go and sow flax. the towns were dying out. the towns were no more! it was the people's rising, and they had to live as in the olden days: there were no towns then, and there was no need for them. they turned back. to poriechie for tar.... silvester made them a hand-plough.... grandfather yonov the one eyed stalked round the fields exhorting to sow: "we have to live by ourselves! now we ourselves are the masters! ourselves alone! it is the rising!" they worked from dawn till sunset with all their strength, fastening their belts tight round their bodies to stifle the pangs of hunger. the summer passed in heat-waves, thunder and lightning. the forest gabbled in the storms at night. towards autumn it began to rustle, leafless, beneath the showers of rain. the rye, oats, millet, and buckwheat were carried into the corn-kilns and barns, and the fields lay stripped and bare. the corn had been harvested; there was enough and to spare till the fallow crop was reaped. the air in the peasants' cottages was bedimmed by the smoke from the stoves; grandfather yonov the one-eyed climbed on to his, to tell his grandchildren fairytales and to rest. the nights grew dark and damp, the forest began to rumble, and wolves approached from the marshlands. a new couple had grown up, bowed to the winds and wedded; half the village had perished the previous winter, and it was necessary to breed. the people lived in their cabins together with the calves, the sheep, and the swine. they used splinters for lights, striking the light from flint. often at night starving people from the towns brought money, clothes, foot-ware, bundles of odds-and ends--in short anything they could steal from the towns and exchange for flour. they rapped on the windows like thieves. the kononov women sat at their looms while the men went a-preying in the forest. and so they toiled on stubbornly, sternly, alone, fighting hand-to-hand with the night, with the forest and with the frost. the crossways to the forests became choked, and they made new ways to the marshlands, to the seven brothers, to the wastelands. life was hard and stern. the peasants looked out upon the world from beneath their brows, as their cottages from beneath the pines; and they lived gladsomely, as they should. they knew it was the rising. and in the rising there could be no falling back. forests, thickets, fields, a tranquil sky--and crossways!... sometimes the crossways joined the main-road that ran alongside the railway. both led to the towns where dwelt those others who had yearned to march over the crossways, who had made the main-roads straight as rules. and to the towns the elemental rising of the crossways brought death. there, lamenting the past, in terror before the people's rising, all were employed in offices filling up papers. all for safety held official positions, all to a man busying themselves over papers, documents, cards, placards, and speeches until they were lost in a whirlwind of words. the food of the towns was exhausted; the lights had gone out; there was neither fuel nor water. dogs, cats, mice, all had disappeared-- even the nettles on the outskirts had been plucked by famished urchins as vegetable for soup. into the cookhouses, whence cutlery had vanished, crowded old men in bowlers and bonneted old women, whose bony fingers clutched convulsively at plates of leavings. everywhere there were groups of miscreants selling mouldy bread at exorbitant prices. the dead in their thousands, over whom there was no time to carry out funeral rites, were borne away to the churches. famine, disease, and death swept the towns. the inhabitants grew savage in their craving for bread. they starved. they sat without light. they froze. they pulled down the hedges and wooden buildings to warm their dying hearths and their offices. the red-blood life deserted the towns; indeed it had never really existed in them; and there came a white-paper life that was death. when death means life there is no death, but the towns were still-born. there were harrowing scenes in the spring, when, like incense at funeral-rites, the smoky wood-piles smouldered on the pillaged, ransacked, and bespattered streets with their broken windows, boarded-up doors, and defaced walls, consuming carrion and enveloping the town in a stinking and stifling vapour. men with soft-skinned hands still frequented restaurants, still wooed lascivious women, still sought to pillage the towns; they even plundered the very corpses, hoping to carry loot into the country, to barter it for the bread that had been gained by horny-handed labour. thus might they postpone their deaths another month, thus might they still fill up papers, still go on wooing (legally) carnal women and await their heart's desire, the return of the decadent past. they were afraid to recognise that only one thing was left them, to rot in death--to die--that even the past they longed for was a way to death for them. ... forests, thickets, fields, a tranquil sky.... many dwelt in the towns--amongst them a certain man, no different from the rest. he had no bread, and he too went into the country to bargain for flour in exchange for his gramophone. producing all the necessary papers, permits, and licences, he proceeded to the railway, which was dying because it too was of the towns. at the station there were thousands of others with permits to travel for bread, and because of those thousands only those without permits succeeded in boarding the train. this particular man fastened himself on the lower step of a carriage, under sacks that hung from the roof, travelling thus for some forty miles. then he and his gramophone were thrown off, and for the first time in his life he tramped thirty miles on foot under the weight of a gramophone. at the next station he climbed on to the roof of a carriage and travelled a hundred miles further. then he was thrown off again, but there the main-road passed the railway; by turning aside from it, walking through a field, fording a river, making a way through the woods, skirting the ravines, trudging through river beds, and traversing the marshes he reached the village of pochinki. he arrived there with his gramophone at sundown. the red light of the sun was reflected on the windows, the women-folk were milking the cows: it was already autumn and the daylight faded rapidly. the man with the gramophone tapped at the window and kononov ivan lifted the shutter. "look, comrade, i've a gramophone here, to exchange for flour ... a gramophone, a musical instrument, and records...." throwing back his shoulders, kononov-ivan stood by the window--then stooped, looked askance at the sunset, at the fields, at the musical instrument. he reflected a moment, then muttered absently: "aint wanted.... go to poriechie...." and the shutter dropped. a sombre sky in autumnal lights--and the crossways.... two wheel- tracks, ripple-grass, a foot-path. sometimes the wanderer tired, that path seemed interminable, without beginning or ending. he turned aside, went astray, returned on his tracks--evermore to the thickets, forests, marshes.... proofreading team. by hugh walpole _studies in place_ the secret city the dark forest the golden scarecrow the wooden horse maradick at forty the gods and mr. perrin _two prologues_ the prelude to adventure fortitude _the rising city_ . the duchess of wrexe . the green mirror the secret city a novel in three parts by hugh walpole author of "fortitude," "the dark forest," "the duchess of wrexe," etc. new york george h. doran company copyright, by george h. doran company printed in the united states of america to major james annand ( th battalion th highlanders, c.e.f.) in return for the gift of his friendship in the eastern quarter dawn breaks, the stars flicker pale. the morning cock at ju-nan mounts the wall and crows. the songs are over, the clock run down, but still the feast is set. the moon grows dim and the stars are few; morning has come to the world. at a thousand gates and ten thousand doors the fish-shaped keys turn; round the palace and up by the castle, the crows and magpies are flying. _cock-crow song_. anon. ( st century b.c.). contents part i vera and nina part ii lawrence part iii markovitch and semyonov part i vera and nina the secret city vera and nina i there are certain things that i feel, as i look through this bundle of manuscript, that i must say. the first is that of course no writer ever has fulfilled his intention and no writer ever will; secondly, that there was, when i began, another intention than that of dealing with my subject adequately, namely that of keeping myself outside the whole of it; i was to be, in the most abstract and immaterial sense of the word, a voice, and that simply because this business of seeing russian psychology through english eyes has no excuse except that it _is_ english. that is its only interest, its only atmosphere, its only motive, and if you are going to tell me that any aspect of russia psychological, mystical, practical, or commercial seen through an english medium is either russia as she really is or russia as russians see her, i say to you, without hesitation, that you don't know of what you are talking. of russia and the russians i know nothing, but of the effect upon myself and my ideas of life that russia and the russians have made during these last three years i know something. you are perfectly free to say that neither myself nor my ideas of life are of the slightest importance to any one. to that i would say that any one's ideas about life are of importance and that any one's ideas about russian life are of interest... and beyond that, i have simply been compelled to write. i have not been able to help myself, and all the faults and any virtues in this story come from that. the facts are true, the inferences absolutely my own, so that you may reject them at any moment and substitute others. it is true that i have known vera michailovna, nina, alexei petrovitch, henry, jerry, and the rest--some of them intimately--and many of the conversations here recorded i have myself heard. nevertheless the inferences are my own, and i think there is no russian who, were he to read this book, would not say that those inferences were wrong. in an earlier record, to which this is in some ways a sequel,[ ] my inferences were, almost without exception, wrong, and there is no russian alive for whom this book can have any kind of value except as a happy example of the mistakes that the englishman can make about the russian. but it is over those very mistakes that the two souls, russian and english, so different, so similar, so friendly, so hostile, may meet.... and in any case the thing has been too strong for me. i have no other defence. for one's interest in life is stronger, god knows how much stronger, than one's discretion, and one's love of life than one's wisdom, and one's curiosity in life than one's ability to record it. at least, as i have said, i have endeavoured to keep my own history, my own desires, my own temperament out of this, as much as is humanly possible.... and the facts are true. [footnote : _the dark forest_.] ii they had been travelling for a week, and had quite definitely decided that they had nothing whatever in common. as they stood there, lost and desolate on the grimy platform of the finland station, this same thought must have been paramount in their minds: "thank god we shan't have to talk to one another any longer. whatever else may happen in this strange place that at least we're spared." they were probably quite unconscious of the contrast they presented, unconscious because, at this time, young bohun never, i should imagine, visualised himself as anything more definite than absolutely "right," and lawrence simply never thought about himself at all. but they were perfectly aware of their mutual dissatisfaction, although they were of course absolutely polite. i heard of it afterwards from both sides, and i will say quite frankly that my sympathy was all with lawrence. young bohun can have been no fun as a travelling companion at that time. if you had looked at him there standing on the finland station platform and staring haughtily about for porters you must have thought him the most self-satisfied of mortals. "that fellow wants kicking," you would have said. good-looking, thin, tall, large black eyes, black eyelashes, clean and neat and "right" at the end of his journey as he had been at the beginning of it, just foreign-looking enough with his black hair and pallor to make him interesting--he was certainly arresting. but it was the self-satisfaction that would have struck any one. and he had reason; he was at that very moment experiencing the most triumphant moment of his life. he was only twenty-three, and was already as it seemed to the youthfully limited circle of his vision, famous. before the war he had been, as he quite frankly admitted to myself and all his friends, nothing but ambitious. "of course i edited the _granta_ for a year," he would say, "and i don't think i did it badly.... but that wasn't very much." no, it really wasn't a great deal, and we couldn't tell him that it was. he had always intended, however, to be a great man; the _granta_ was simply a stepping-stone. he was already, during his second year at cambridge, casting about as to the best way to penetrate, swiftly and securely, the fastnesses of london journalism. then the war came, and he had an impulse of perfectly honest and selfless patriotism..., not quite selfless perhaps, because he certainly saw himself as a mighty hero, winning v.c.'s and saving forlorn hopes, finally received by his native village under an archway of flags and mottoes (the local postmaster, who had never treated him very properly, would make the speech of welcome). the reality did him some good, but not very much, because when he had been in france only a fortnight he was gassed and sent home with a weak heart. his heart remained weak, which made him interesting to women and allowed time for his poetry. he was given an easy post in the foreign office and, in the autumn of he published _discipline: sonnets and poems_. this appeared at a very fortunate moment, when the more serious of british idealists were searching for signs of a general improvement, through the stress of war, of poor humanity.... "thank god, there are our young poets," they said. the little book had excellent notices in the papers, and one poem in especial "how god spoke to jones at breakfast-time" was selected for especial praise because of its admirable realism and force. one paper said that the british breakfast-table lived in that poem "in all its tiniest most insignificant details," as no breakfast-table, save possibly that of major pendennis at the beginning of _pendennis_ has lived before. one paper said, "mr. bohun merits that much-abused word 'genius.'" the young author carried these notices about with him and i have seen them all. but there was more than this. bohun had been for the last four years cultivating russian. he had been led into this through a real, genuine interest. he read the novelists and set himself to learn the russian language. that, as any one who has tried it will know is no easy business, but henry bohun was no fool, and the russian refugee who taught him was no fool. after henry's return from france he continued his lessons, and by the spring of he could read easily, write fairly, and speak atrociously. he then adopted russia, an easy thing to do, because his supposed mastery of the language gave him a tremendous advantage over his friends. "i assure you that's not so," he would say. "you can't judge tchehov till you've read him in the original. wait till you can read him in russian." "no, i don't think the russian characters are like that," he would declare. "it's a queer thing, but you'd almost think i had some russian blood in me... i sympathise so." he followed closely the books that emphasised the more sentimental side of the russian character, being of course grossly sentimental himself at heart. he saw russia glittering with fire and colour, and russians, large, warm, and simple, willing to be patronised, eagerly confessing their sins, rushing forward to make him happy, entertaining him for ever and ever with a free and glorious hospitality. "i really think i do understand russia," he would say modestly. he said it to me when he had been in russia two days. then, in addition to the success of his poems and the general interest that he himself aroused the final ambition of his young heart was realised. the foreign office decided to send him to petrograd to help in the great work of british propaganda. he sailed from newcastle on december , .... iii at this point i am inevitably reminded of that other englishman who, two years earlier than bohun, had arrived in russia with his own pack of dreams and expectations. but john trenchard, of whose life and death i have tried elsewhere to say something, was young bohun's opposite, and i do not think that the strange unexpectedness of russia can he exemplified more strongly than by the similarity of appeal that she could make to two so various characters. john was shy, self-doubting, humble, brave, and a gentleman,--bohun was brave and a gentleman, but the rest had yet to be added to him. how he would have patronised trenchard if he had known him! and yet at heart they were not perhaps so dissimilar. at the end of my story it will be apparent, i think, that they were not. that journey from newcastle to bergen, from bergen to torneo, from torneo to petrograd is a tiresome business. there is much waiting at custom-houses, disarrangement of trains and horses and meals, long wearisome hours of stuffy carriages and grimy window-panes. bohun i suspect suffered, too, from that sudden sharp precipitance into a world that knew not _discipline_ and recked nothing of the _granta_. obviously none of the passengers on the boat from newcastle had ever heard of _discipline_. they clutched in their hands the works of mr. oppenheim, mr. compton mackenzie, and mr. o'henry and looked at bohun, i imagine, with indifferent superiority. he had been told at the foreign office that his especial travelling companion was to be jerry lawrence. if he had hoped for anything from this direction one glance at jerry's brick-red face and stalwart figure must have undeceived him. jerry, although he was now thirty-two years of age, looked still very much the undergraduate. my slight acquaintance with him had been in those earlier cambridge days, through a queer mutual friend, dune, who at that time seemed to promise so magnificently, who afterwards disappeared so mysteriously. you would never have supposed that lawrence, captain of the university rugger during his last two years, captain of the english team through all the internationals of the season - , could have had anything in common, except football, with dune, artist and poet if ever there was one. but on the few occasions when i saw them together it struck me that football was the very least part of their common ground. and that was the first occasion on which i suspected that jerry lawrence was not quite what he seemed.... i can imagine lawrence standing straddleways on the deck of the _jupiter_, his short thick legs wide apart, his broad back indifferent to everything and everybody, his rather plump, ugly, good-natured face staring out to sea as though he saw nothing at all. he always gave the impression of being half asleep, he had a way of suddenly lurching on his legs as though in another moment his desire for slumber would be too strong for him, and would send him crashing to the ground. he would be smoking an ancient briar, and his thick red hands would be clasped behind his back.... no encouraging figure for bohun's aestheticism. i can see as though i had been present bohun's approach to him, his patronising introduction, his kindly suggestion that they should eat their meals together, jerry's smiling, lazy acquiescence. i can imagine how bohun decided to himself that "he must make the best of this chap. after all, it was a long tiresome journey, and anything was better than having no one to talk to...." but jerry, unfortunately, was in a bad temper at the start. he did not want to go out to russia at all. his father, old stephen lawrence, had been for many years the manager of some works in petrograd, and the first fifteen years of jerry's life had been spent in russia. i did not, at the time when i made jerry's acquaintance at cambridge, know this; had i realised it i would have understood many things about him which puzzled me. he never alluded to russia, never apparently thought of it, never read a russian book, had, it seemed, no connection of any kind with any living soul in that country. old lawrence retired, and took a fine large ugly palace in clapham to end his days in.... suddenly, after lawrence had been in france for two years, had won the military cross there and, as he put it, "was just settling inside his skin," the authorities realised his russian knowledge, and decided to transfer him to the british military mission in petrograd. his anger when he was sent back to london and informed of this was extreme. he hadn't the least desire to return to russia, he was very happy where he was, he had forgotten all his russian; i can see him, saying very little, looking like a sulky child and kicking his heel up and down across the carpet. "just the man we want out there, lawrence," he told me somebody said to him; "keep them in order." "keep them in order!" that tickled his sense of humour. he was to laugh frequently, afterwards, when he thought of it. he always chewed a joke as a cow chews the cud. so that he was in no pleasant temper when he met bohun on the decks of the _jupiter_. that journey must have had its humours for any observer who knew the two men. during the first half of it i imagine that bohun talked and lawrence slumbered. bohun patronised, was kind and indulgent, and showed very plainly that he thought his companion the dullest and heaviest of mortals. then he told lawrence about russia; he explained everything to him, the morals, psychology, fighting qualities, strengths, and weaknesses. the climax arrived when he announced: "but it's the mysticism of the russian peasant which will save the world. that adoration of god...." "rot!" interrupted lawrence. bohun was indignant. "of course if you know better--" he said. "i do," said lawrence, "i lived there for fifteen years. ask my old governor about the mysticism of the russian peasant. he'll tell you." bohun felt that he was justified in his annoyance. as he said to me afterwards: "the fellow had simply been laughing at me. he might have told me about his having been there." at that time, to bohun, the most terrible thing in the world was to be laughed at. after that bohun asked jerry questions. but jerry refused to give himself away. "i don't know," he said, "i've forgotten it all. i don't suppose i ever did know much about it." at haparanda, most unfortunately, bohun was insulted. the swedish customs officer there, tired at the constant appearance of self-satisfied gentlemen with red passports, decided that bohun was carrying medicine in his private bags. bohun refused to open his portmanteau, simply because he "was a courier and wasn't going to be insulted by a dirty foreigner." nevertheless "the dirty foreigner" had his way and bohun looked rather a fool. jerry had not sympathised sufficiently with bohun in this affair.... "he only grinned," bohun told me indignantly afterwards. "no sense of patriotism at all. after all, englishmen ought to stick together." finally, bohun tested jerry's literary knowledge. jerry seemed to have none. he liked fielding, and a man called farnol and jack london. he never read poetry. but, a strange thing, he was interested in greek. he had bought the works of euripides and aeschylus in the loeb library, and he thought them "thundering good." he had never read a word of any russian author. "never _anna_? never _war and peace_? never _karamazov_? never tchehov?" no, never. bohun gave him up. iv it should be obvious enough then that they hailed their approaching separation with relief. bohun had been promised by one of the secretaries at the embassy that rooms would be found for him. jerry intended to "hang out" at one of the hotels. the "astoria" was, he believed, the right place. "i shall go to the 'france' for to-night," bohun declared, having lived, it would seem, in petrograd all his days. "look me up, old man, won't you?" jerry smiled his slow smile. "i will," he said. "so long." we will now follow the adventures of henry. he had in him, i know, a tiny, tiny creature with sharp ironical eyes and pointed springing feet who watched his poses, his sentimentalities and heroics with affectionate scorn. this same creature watched him now as he waited to collect his bags, and then stood on the gleaming steps of the station whilst the porters fetched an isvostchick, and the rain fell in long thundering lines of steel upon the bare and desolate streets. "you're very miserable and lonely," the creature said; "you didn't expect this." no, henry had not expected this, and he also had not expected that the isvostchick would demand eight roubles for his fare to the "france." henry knew that this was the barest extortion, and he had sworn to himself long ago that he would allow nobody to "do" him. he looked at the rain and submitted. "after all, it's war time," he whispered to the creature. he huddled himself into the cab, his baggage piled all about him, and tried by pulling at the hood to protect himself from the elements. he has told me that he felt that the rain was laughing at him; the cab was so slow that he seemed to be sitting in the middle of pools and melting snow; he was dirty, tired, hungry, and really not far from tears. poor henry was very, very young.... he scarcely looked at the neva as he crossed the bridge; all the length of the quay he saw only the hunched, heavy back of the old cabman and the spurting, jumping rain, the vast stone grave-like buildings and the high grey sky. he drove through the red square that swung in the rain. he was thinking about the eight roubles.... he pulled up with a jerk outside the "france" hotel. here he tried, i am sure, to recover his dignity, but he was met by a large, stout, eastern-looking gentleman with peacock feathers in his round cap who smiled gently when he heard about the eight roubles, and ushered henry into the dark hall with a kindly patronage that admitted of no reply. the "france" is a good hotel, and its host is one of the kindest of mortals, but it is in many ways russian rather than continental in its atmosphere. that ought to have pleased and excited so sympathetic a soul as henry. i am afraid that this moment of his arrival was the first realisation in his life of that stern truth that that which seems romantic in retrospect is only too often unpleasantly realistic in its actual experience. he stepped into the dark hall, damp like a well, with a whirring snarling clock on the wall and a heavy glass door pulled by a rope swinging and shifting, the walls and door and rack with the letters shifting too. in this rocking world there seemed to be no stable thing. he was dirty and tired and humiliated. he explained to his host, who smiled but seemed to be thinking of other things, that he wanted a bath and a room and a meal. he was promised these things, but there was no conviction abroad that the "france" had gone up in the world since henry bohun had crossed its threshold. an old man with a grey beard and the fixed and glittering eye of the "ancient mariner" told him to follow him. how well i know those strange, cold, winding passages of the "france," creeping in and out across boards that shiver and shake, with walls pressing in upon you so thin and rocky that the wind whistles and screams and the paper makes ghostly shadows and signs as though unseen fingers moved it. there is that smell, too, which a russian hotel alone, of all the hostelries in the world, can produce, a smell of damp and cabbage soup, of sunflower seeds and cigarette-ends, of drainage and patchouli, of, in some odd way, the sea and fish and wet pavements. it is a smell that will, until i die, be presented to me by those dark half-hidden passages, warrens of intricate fumbling ways with boards suddenly rising like little mountains in the path; behind the wainscot one hears the scuttling of innumerable rats. the ancient mariner showed henry to his room and left him. henry was depressed at what he saw. his room was a slip cut out of other rooms, and its one window was faced by a high black wall down whose surface gleaming water trickled. the bare boards showed large and gaping cracks; there was a washstand, a bed, a chest of drawers, and a faded padded arm-chair with a hole in it. in the corner near the window was an ikon of tinsel and wood; a little round marble-topped table offered a dusty carafe of water. a heavy red-plush bell-rope tapped the wall. he sat down in the faded arm-chair and instantly fell asleep. was the room hypnotic? why not? there are stranger things than that in petrograd.... i myself am aware of what walls and streets and rivers, engaged on their own secret life in that most secret of towns, can do to the mere mortals who interfere with their stealthy concerns. henry dreamt; he was never afterwards able to tell me of what he had dreamt, but it had been a long heavy cobwebby affair, in which the walls of the hotel seemed to open and to close, black little figures moving like ants up and down across the winding ways. he saw innumerable carafes and basins and beds, the wall-paper whistling, the rats scuttling, and lines of cigarette-ends, black and yellow, moving in trails like worms across the boards. all men like worms, like ants, like rats and the gleaming water trickling interminably down the high black wall. of course he was tired after his long journey, hungry too, and depressed.... he awoke to find the ancient mariner watching him. he screamed. the mariner reassured him with a toothless smile, gripped him by the arm and showed him the bathroom. "_pajaluista!_" said the mariner. although henry had learnt russian, so unexpected was the pronunciation of this familiar word that it was as though the old man had said "open sesame!".... v he felt happy and consoled after a bath, a shave, and breakfast. always i should think he reacted very quickly to his own physical sensations, and he was, as yet, too young to know that you cannot lay ghosts by the simple brushing of your hair and sponging your face. after his breakfast he lay down on the bed and again fell asleep, but this time not to dream; he slept like a briton, dreamless, healthy and clean. he awoke as sure of himself as ever.... the first incantation had not, you see, been enough.... he plunged into the city. it was raining with that thick dark rain that seems to have mud in it before it has fallen. the town was veiled in thin mist, figures appearing and disappearing, tram-bells ringing, and those strange wild cries in the russian tongue that seem at one's first hearing so romantic and startling, rising sharply and yet lazily into the air. he plunged along and found himself in the nevski prospect--he could not mistake its breadth and assurance, dull though it seemed in the mud and rain. but he was above all things a romantic and sentimental youth, and he was determined to see this country as he had expected to see it; so he plodded on, his coat-collar up, british obstinacy in his eyes and a little excited flutter in his heart whenever a bright colour, an eastern face, a street pedlar, a bunched-up, high-backed coachman, anything or any one unusual presented itself. he saw on his right a great church; it stood back from the street, having in front of it a desolate little arrangement of bushes and public seats and winding paths. the church itself was approached by flights of steps that disappeared under the shadow of a high dome supported by vast stone pillars. letters in gold flamed across the building above the pillars. henry passed the intervening ground and climbed the steps. under the pillars before the heavy, swinging doors were two rows of beggars; they were dirtier, more touzled and tangled, fiercer and more ironically falsely submissive than any beggars that, he had ever seen. he described one fellow to me, a fierce brigand with a high black hat of feathers, a soiled cossack coat and tall dirty red leather boots; his eyes were fires, henry said. at any rate that is what henry liked to think they were. there was a woman with no legs and a man with neither nose nor ears. i am sure that they watched henry with supplicating hostility. he entered the church and was instantly swallowed up by a vast multitude. he described to me afterwards that it was as though he had been pushed (by the evil, eager fingers of the beggars no doubt) into deep water. he rose with a gasp, and was first conscious of a strange smell of dirt and tallow and something that he did not know, but was afterwards to recognise as the scent of sunflower seed. he was pushed upon, pressed and pulled, fingered and crushed. he did not mind--he was glad--this was what he wanted. he looked about him and found that he and all the people round him were swimming in a hazy golden mist flung into the air from the thousands of lighted candles that danced in the breeze blowing through the building. the whole vast shining floor was covered with peasants, pressed, packed together. peasants, men and women--he did not see a single member of the middle-class. in front of him under the altar there was a blaze of light, and figures moved in the blaze uncertainly, indistinctly. now and then a sudden quiver passed across the throng, as wind blows through the corn. here and there men and women knelt, but for the most part they stood steadfast, motionless, staring in front of them. he looked at them and discovered that they had the faces of children--simple, trustful, unintelligent, unhumorous children,--and eyes, always kindlier than any he had ever seen in other human beings. they stood there gravely, with no signs of religious fervour, with no marks of impatience or weariness and also with no evidence of any especial interest in what was occurring. it might have been a vast concourse of sleep-walkers. he saw that three soldiers near to him were holding hands.... from the lighted altars came the echoing whisper of a monotonous chant. the sound rose and fell, scarcely a voice, scarcely an appeal, something rising from the place itself and sinking back into it again without human agency. after a time he saw a strange movement that at first he could not understand. then watching, he found that unlit candles were being passed from line to line, one man leaning forward and tapping the man in front of him with the candle, the man in front passing it, in his turn, forward, and so on until at last it reached the altar where it was lighted and fastened into its sconce. this tapping with the candles happened incessantly throughout the vast crowd. henry himself was tapped, and felt suddenly as though he had been admitted a member of some secret society. he felt the tap again and again, and soon he seemed to be hypnotised by the low chant at the altar and the motionless silent crowd and the dim golden mist. he stood, not thinking, not living, away, away, questioning nothing, wanting nothing.... he must of course finish with his romantic notion. people pushed around him, struggling to get out. he turned to go and was faced, he told me, with a remarkable figure. his description, romantic and sentimental though he tried to make it, resolved itself into nothing more than the sketch of an ordinary peasant, tall, broad, black-bearded, neatly clad in blue shirt, black trousers, and high boots. this fellow stood apparently away from the crowd, apart, and watched it all, as you so often may see the russian peasant doing, with indifferent gaze. in his mild blue eyes bohun fancied that he saw all kinds of things--power, wisdom, prophecy--a figure apart and symbolic. but how easy in russia it is to see symbols and how often those symbols fail to justify themselves! well, i let bohun have his fancies. "i should know that man anywhere again," he declared. "it was as though he knew what was going to happen and was ready for it." then i suppose he saw my smile, for he broke off and said no more. and here for a moment i leave him and his adventures. vi i must speak, for a moment, of myself. throughout the autumn and winter of and the spring and summer of i was with the russian red cross on the polish and galician fronts. during the summer and early autumn of i shared with the ninth army the retreat through galicia. never very strong physically, owing to a lameness of the left hip from which i have suffered from birth, the difficulties of the retreat and the loss of my two greatest friends gave opportunities to my arch-enemy sciatica to do what he wished with me, and in october i was forced to leave the front and return to petrograd. i was an invalid throughout the whole of that winter, and only gradually during the spring of was able to pull myself back to an old shadow of my former vigour and energy. i saw that i would never be good for the front again, but i minded that the less now in that the events of the summer of had left me without heart or desire, the merest spectator of life, passive and, i cynically believed, indifferent. i was nothing to any one, nor was any one anything to me. the desire of my heart had slipped like a laughing ghost away from my ken--men of my slow warmth and cautious suspicion do not easily admit a new guest.... moreover during this spring of petrograd, against my knowledge, wove webs about my feet. i had never shared the common belief that moscow was the only town in russia. i had always known that petrograd had its own grace and beauty, but it was not until, sore and sick at heart, lonely and bitter against fate, haunted always by the face and laughter of one whom i would never see again, i wandered about the canals and quays and deserted byways of the city that i began to understand its spirit. i took, to the derision of my few friends, two tumbledown rooms on pilot's island, at the far end of ekateringofsky prospect. here amongst tangled grass, old, deserted boats, stranded, ruined cottages and abraided piers, i hung above the sea. not indeed the sea of my glebeshire memories; this was a sluggish, tideless sea, but in the winter one sheet of ice, stretching far beyond the barrier of the eye, catching into its frosted heart every colour of the sky and air, the lights of the town, the lamps of imprisoned barges, the moon, the sun, the stars, the purple sunsets, and the strange, mysterious lights that flash from the shadows of the hovering snow-clouds. my rooms were desolate perhaps, bare boards with holes, an old cracked mirror, a stove, a bookcase, a photograph, and a sketch of rafiel cove. my friends looked and shivered; i, staring from my window on to the entrance into the waterways of the city, felt that any magic might come out of that strange desolation and silence. a shadow like the sweeping of the wing of a great bird would hover above the ice; a bell from some boat would ring, then the church bells of the city would answer it; the shadow would pass and the moon would rise, deep gold, and lie hard and sharp against the thick, impending air; the shadow would pass and the stars come out, breaking with an almost audible crackle through the stuff of the sky... and only five minutes away the shop-lights were glittering, the isvostchicks crying to clear the road, the tram-bells clanging, the boys shouting the news. around and about me marvellous silence.... in the early autumn of i met at a dinner-party nicolai leontievitch markovitch. in the course of a conversation i informed him that i had been for a year with the ninth army in galicia, and he then asked me whether i had met his wife's uncle alexei petrovitch semyonov, who was also with the ninth army. it happened that i had known alexei petrovitch very well and the sound of his name brought back to me so vividly events and persons with whom we had both been connected that i had difficulty in controlling my sudden emotion. markovitch invited me to his house. he lived, he told me, with his wife in a flat in the anglisky prospect; his sister-in-law and another of his wife's uncles, a brother of alexei petrovitch, also lived with them. i said that i would be very glad to come. it is impossible to describe how deeply, in the days that followed, i struggled against the attraction that this invitation presented to me. i had succeeded during all these months in avoiding any contact with the incidents or characters of the preceding year. i had written no letters and had received none; i had resolutely avoided meeting any members of my old atriad when they came to the town. but now i succumbed. perhaps something of my old vitality and curiosity was already creeping back into my bones, perhaps time was already dimming my memories--at any rate, on an evening early in october i paid my call. alexei petrovitch was not present; he was on the galician front, in tarnople. i found markovitch, his wife vera michailovna, his sister-in-law nina michailovna, his wife's uncle ivan petrovitch and a young man boris nicolaievitch grogoff. markovitch himself was a thin, loose, untidy man with pale yellow hair thinning on top, a ragged, pale beard, a nose with a tendency to redden at any sudden insult or unkind word and an expression perpetually anxious. vera michailovna on the other hand was a fine young woman and it must have been the first thought of all who met them as to why she had married him. she gave an impression of great strength; her figure tall and her bosom full, her dark eyes large and clear. she had black hair, a vast quantity of it, piled upon her head. her face was finely moulded, her lips strong, red, sharply marked. she looked like a woman who had already made up her mind upon all things in life and could face them all. her expression was often stern and almost insolently scornful, but also she could be tender, and her heart would shine from her eyes. she moved slowly and gracefully, and quite without self-consciousness. a strange contrast was her sister, nina michailovna, a girl still, it seemed, in childhood, pretty, with brown hair, laughing eyes, and a trembling mouth that seemed ever on the edge of laughter. her body was soft and plump; she had lovely hands, of which she was obviously very proud. vera dressed sternly, often in black, with a soft white collar, almost like a nurse or nun. nina was always in gay colours; she wore clothes, as it seemed to me, in very bad taste, colours clashing, strange bows and ribbons and lace that had nothing to do with the dress to which they were attached. she was always eating sweets, laughed a great deal, had a shrill piercing voice, and was never still. ivan petrovitch, the uncle, was very different from my semyonov. he was short, fat, and dressed with great neatness and taste. he had a short black moustache, a head nearly bald, and a round chubby face with small smiling eyes. he was a chinovnik, and held his position in some government office with great pride and solemnity. it was his chief aim, i found, to be considered cosmopolitan, and when he discovered the feeble quality of my french he insisted in speaking always to me in his strange confused english, a language quite of his own, with sudden startling phrases which he had "snatched" as he expressed it from shakespeare and the bible. he was the kindest soul alive, and all he asked was that he should be left alone and that no one should quarrel with him. he confided to me that he hated quarrels, and that it was an eternal sorrow to him that the russian people should enjoy so greatly that pastime. i discovered that he was terrified of his brother, alexei, and at that i was not surprised. his weakness was that he was inpenetrably stupid, and it was quite impossible to make him understand anything that was not immediately in line with his own experiences--unusual obtuseness in a russian. he was vain about his clothes, especially about his shoes, which he had always made in london; he was sentimental and very easily hurt. very different again was the young man boris nicolaievitch grogoff. no relation of the family, he seemed to spend most of his time in the markovitch flat. a handsome young man, strongly built, with a head of untidy curly yellow hair, blue eyes, high cheek bones, long hands with which he was for ever gesticulating. grogoff was an internationalist socialist and expressed his opinions at the top of his voice whenever he could find an occasion. he would sit for hours staring moodily at the floor, or glaring fiercely upon the company. then suddenly he would burst out, walking about, flinging up his arms, shouting. i saw at once that markovitch did not like him and that he despised markovitch. he did not seem to me a very wise young man, but i liked his energy, his kindness, sudden generosities, and honesty. i could not see his reason for being so much in this company. during the autumn of i spent more and more time with the markovitches. i cannot tell you what was exactly the reason. vera michailovna perhaps, although let no one imagine that i fell in love with her or ever thought of doing so. no, my time for that was over. but i felt from the first that she was a fine, understanding creature, that she sympathised with me without pitying me, that she would be a good and loyal friend, and that i, on my side could give her comprehension and fidelity. they made me feel at home with them; there had been as yet no house in petrograd whither i could go easily and without ceremony, which i could leave at any moment that i wished. soon they did not notice whether i were there or no; they continued their ordinary lives and nina, to whom i was old, plain, and feeble, treated me with a friendly indifference that did not hurt as it might have done in england. boris grogoff patronised and laughed at me, but would give me anything in the way of help, property, or opinions, did i need it. i was in fact by christmas time a member of the family. they nicknamed me "durdles," after many jokes about my surname and reminiscences of "edwin drood" (my russian name was ivan andreievitch). we had merry times in spite of the troubles and distresses now crowding upon russia. and now i come to the first of the links in my story. it was with this family that henry bohun was to lodge. vii some three years before, when ivan petrovitch had gone to live with the markovitches, it had occurred to them that they had two empty rooms and that these would accommodate one or two paying guests. it seemed to them still more attractive that these guests should be english, and i expect that it was ivan petrovitch who emphasised this. the british consulate was asked to assist them, and after a few inconspicuous clerks and young business men they entertained for a whole six months the hon. charles trafford, one of the junior secretaries at the embassy. at the end of those six months the hon. charles, burdened with debt, and weakened by little sleep and much liquor, was removed to a less exciting atmosphere. with all his faults, he left faithful friends in the markovitch flat, and he, on his side, gave so enthusiastic an account of mme. markovitch's attempts to restrain and modify his impetuosities that the embassy recommended her care and guidance to other young secretaries. the war came and vera michailovna declared that she could have lodgers no longer, and a terrible blow this was to ivan petrovitch. then suddenly, towards the end of , she changed her mind and announced to the embassy that she was ready for any one whom they could send her. henry bohun was offered, accepted, and prepared for. ivan petrovitch was a happy man once more. i never discovered that markovitch was much consulted in these affairs. vera michailovna "ran" the flat financially, industrially, and spiritually. markovitch meanwhile was busy with his inventions. i have, as yet, said nothing about nicolai leontievitch's inventions. i hesitate, indeed, to speak of them, although they are so essential, and indeed important a part of my story. i hesitate simply because i do not wish this narrative to be at all fantastic, but that it should stick quite honestly and obviously to the truth. it is certain moreover that what is naked truth to one man seems the falsest fancy to another, and after all i have, from beginning to end, only my own conscience to satisfy. the history of the human soul and its relation to divinity which is, i think, the only history worth any man's pursuit must push its way, again and again, through this same tangled territory which infests the region lying between truth and fantasy; one passes suddenly into a world that seems pure falsehood, so askew, so obscure, so twisted and coloured is it. one is through, one looks back and it lies behind one as the clearest truth. such an experience makes one tender to other men's fancies and less impatient of the vague and half-defined travellers' tales that other men tell. childe roland is not the only traveller who has challenged the dark tower. in the middle ages nicolai leontievitch markovitch would have been called, i suppose, a magician--a very half-hearted and unsatisfactory one he would always have been--and he would have been most certainly burnt at the stake before he had accomplished any magic worthy of the name. his inventions, so far as i saw anything of them, were innocent and simple enough. it was the man himself rather than his inventions that arrested the attention. about the time of bohun's arrival upon the scene it was a new kind of ink that he had discovered, and for many weeks the markovitch flat dripped ink from every pore. he had no laboratory, no scientific materials, nor, i think, any profound knowledge. the room where he worked was a small box-like place off the living-room, a cheerless enough abode with a little high barred window in it as in a prison-cell, cardboard-boxes piled high with feminine garments, a sewing-machine, old dusty books, and a broken-down perambulator occupying most of the space. i never could understand why the perambulator was there, as the markovitches had no children. nicolai leontievitch sat at a table under the little window, and his favourite position was to sit with the chair perched on one leg and so, rocking in this insecure position, he brooded over his bottles and glasses and trays. this room was so dark even in the middle of the day that he was often compelled to use a lamp. there he hovered, with his ragged beard, his ink-stained fingers and his red-rimmed eyes, making strange noises to himself and envolving from his materials continual little explosions that caused him infinite satisfaction. he did not mind interruptions, nor did he ever complain of the noise in the other room, terrific though it often was. he would be absorbed, in a trance, lost in another world, and surely amiable and harmless enough. and yet not entirely amiable. his eyes would close to little spots of dull, lifeless colour--the only thing alive about him seemed to be his hands that moved and stirred as though they did not belong to his body at all, but had an independent existence of their own--and his heels protruding from under his chair were like horrid little animals waiting, malevolently, on guard. his inventions were, of course, never successful, and he contributed, therefore, nothing to the maintenance of his household. vera michailovna had means of her own, and there were also the paying guests. but he suffered from no sense of distress at his impecuniosity. i discovered very quickly that vera michailovna kept the family purse, and one of the earliest sources of family trouble was, i fancy, his constant demands for money. before the war he had, i believe, been drunk whenever it was possible. because drink was difficult to obtain, and in a flood of patriotism roused by the enthusiasm of the early days of the war, he declared himself a teetotaller, and marvellously he kept his vows. this abstinence was now one of his greatest prides, and he liked to tell you about it. nevertheless he needed money as badly as ever, and he borrowed whenever he could. one of the first things that vera michailovna told me was that i was on no account to open my purse to him. i was not always able to keep my promise. on this particular evening of bohun's arrival i came, by invitation, to supper. they had told me about their englishman, and had asked me indeed to help the first awkward half-hour over the stile. it may seem strange that the british embassy should have chosen so uncouth a host as nicolai leontievitch for their innocent secretaries, but it was only the more enterprising of the young men who preferred to live in a russian family; most of them inhabited elegant flats of their own, ornamented with coloured stuffs and gaily decorated cups and bright trays from the jews' market, together with english comforts and luxuries dragged all the way from london. moreover, markovitch figured very slightly in the consciousness of his guests, and the rest of the flat was roomy and clean and light. it was, like most of the homes of the russian intelligentzia over-burdened with family history. amazing the things that russians will gather together and keep, one must suppose, only because they are too lethargic to do away with them. on the walls of the markovitch dining-room all kinds of pictures were hung--old family photographs yellow and dusty, old calendars, prints of ships at sea, and young men hanging over stiles, and old ladies having tea, photographs of the kremlin and the lavra at kieff, copies of ivan and his murdered son and serov's portrait of chaliapine as boris godounov. bookcases there were with tattered editions of pushkin and lermontov. the middle of the living-room was occupied with an enormous table covered by a dark red cloth, and this table was the centre of the life of the family. a large clock wheezed and groaned against the wall, and various chairs of different shapes and sizes filled up most of the remaining space. nevertheless, although everything in the room looked old except the white and gleaming stove, vera michailovna spread over the place the impress of her strong and active personality. it was not a sluggish room, nor was it untidy as so many russian rooms are. around the table everybody sat. it seemed that at all hours of the day and night some kind of meal was in progress there; and it was almost certain that from half-past two in the afternoon until half-past two on the following morning the samovar would be found there, presiding with sleepy dignity over the whole family and caring nothing for anybody. i can smell now that especial smell of tea and radishes and salted fish, and can hear the wheeze of the clock, the hum of the samovar, nina's shrill laugh and boris's deep voice.... i owe that room a great deal. it was there that i was taken out of myself and memories that fared no better for their perpetual resurrection. that room called me back to life. on this evening there was to be, in honour of young bohun, an especially fine dinner. a message had come from him that he would appear with his boxes at half-past seven. when i arrived vera was busy in the kitchen, and nina adding in her bedroom extra ribbons and laces to her costume; boris nicolaievitch was not present; nicolai leontievitch was working in his den. i went through to him. he did not look up as i came in. the room was darker than usual; the green shade over the lamp was tilted wickedly as though it were cocking its eye at markovitch's vain hopes, and there was the man himself, one cheek a ghastly green, his hair on end and his chair precariously balanced. i heard him say as though he repeated an incantation--"_nu vot... nu vot... nu vot_." "_zdras te_, nicolai leontievitch," i said. then i did not disturb him but sat down on a rickety chair and waited. ink dripped from his table on to the floor. one bottle lay on its side, the ink oozing out, other bottles stood, some filled, some half-filled, some empty. "ah, ha!" he cried, and there was a little explosion; a cork spurted out and struck the ceiling; there was smoke and the crackling of glass. he turned round and faced me, a smudge of ink on one of his cheeks, and that customary nervous unhappy smile on his lips. "well, how goes it?" i asked. "well enough." he touched his cheek then sucked his fingers. "i must wash. we have a guest to-night. and the news, what's the latest?" he always asked me this question, having apparently the firm conviction that an englishman must know more about the war than a man of any other nationality. but he didn't pause for an answer--"news--but of course there is none. what can you expect from this russia of ours?--and the rest--it's all too far away for any of us to know anything about it--only germany's close at hand. yes. remember that. you forget it sometimes in england. she's very near indeed.... we've got a guest coming--from the english embassy. his name's boon and a funny name too. you don't know him, do you?" no, i didn't know him. i laughed. why should he think that i always knew everybody, i who kept to myself so? "the english always stick together. that's more than can be said for us russians. we're a rotten lot. well, i must go and wash." then, whether by a sudden chance of light and shade, or if you like to have it, by a sudden revelation on the part of a beneficent providence, he really did look malevolent, standing in the middle of the dirty little room, malevolent and pathetic too, like a cross, sick bird. "vera's got a good dinner ready. that's one thing, ivan andreievitch," he said; "and vodka--a little bottle. we got it from a friend. but i don't drink now, you know." he went off and i, going into the other room, found vera michailovna giving last touches to the table. i sat and watched with pleasure her calm assured movements. she really was splendid, i thought, with the fine carriage of her head, her large mild eyes, her firm strong hands. "all ready for the guest, vera michailovna?" i asked. "yes," she answered, smiling at me, "i hope so. he won't be very particular, will he, because we aren't princes?" "i can't answer for him," i replied, smiling back at her. "but he can't be more particular than the hon. charles--and he was a great success." the hon. charles was a standing legend in the family, and we always laughed when we mentioned him. "i don't know"--she stopped her work at the table and stood, her hand up to her brow as though she would shade her eyes from the light--"i wish he wasn't coming--the new englishman, i mean. better perhaps as we were--nicholas--" she stopped short. "oh, i don't know! they're difficult times, ivan andreievitch." the door opened and old uncle ivan came in. he was dressed very smartly with a clean white shirt and a black bow tie and black patent leather shoes, and his round face shone as the sun. "ah, mr. durward," he said, trotting forward. "good health to you! what excellent weather we're sharing." "so we are, m. semyonov," i answered him. "although it did rain most of yesterday you know. but weather of the soul perhaps you mean? in that case i'm very glad to hear that you are well." "ah--of the soul?" he always spoke his words very carefully, clipping and completing them, and then standing back to look at them as though they were china ornaments arranged on a shining table. "no--my soul to-day is not of the first rank, i'm afraid." it was obvious that he was in a state of the very greatest excitement; he could not keep still, but walked up and down beside the long table, fingering the knives and forks. then nina burst in upon us in one of her frantic rages. her tempers were famous both for their ferocity and the swiftness of their passing. in the course of them she was like some impassioned bird of brilliant plumages, tossing her feathers, fluttering behind the bars of her cage at some impertinent, teasing passer-by. she stood there now in the doorway, gesticulating with her hands. "_nu, tznaiesh schto?_ michael alexandrovitch has put me off--says he is busy all night at the office. he busy all night! don't i know the business he's after? and it's the third time--i won't see him again--no, i won't. he--" "good-evening, nina michailovna," i said, smiling. she turned to me. "durdles--mr. durdles--only listen. it was all arranged for to-night--the _parisian_, and then we were to come straight back--" "but your guest--" i began. however the torrent continued. the door opened and boris grogoff came in. instantly she turned upon him. "there's your fine friend!" she cried; "michael alexandrovitch isn't coming. put me off at the last moment, and it's the third time. and i might have gone to musikalnaya drama. i was asked by--" "well, why not?" grogoff interrupted calmly. "if he had something better to do--" then she turned upon him, screaming, and in a moment they were at it, tooth and nail, heaping up old scores, producing fact after fact to prove, the one to the other, false friendship, lying manners, deceitful promises, perjured records. vera tried to interrupt, markovitch said something, i began a remonstrance--in a moment we were all at it, and the room was a whirl of noise. in the tempest it was only i who heard the door open. i turned and saw henry bohun standing there. i smile now when i think of that moment of his arrival, go fitting to the characters of the place, so appropriate a symbol of what was to come. bohun was beautifully dressed, spotlessly neat, in a bowler hat a little to one side, a light-blue silk scarf, a dark-blue overcoat. his face wore an expression of dignified self-appreciation. it was as though he stood there breathing blessings on the house that he had sanctified by his arrival. he looked, too, with it all, such a boy that my heart was touched. and there was something good and honest about his eyes. he may have spoken, but certainly no one heard him in the confusion. i just caught nina's shrill voice: "listen all of you! there you are! you hear what he says! that i told him it was to be tuesday when, everybody knows--verotchka! ah--verotchka! he says--" then she paused; i caught her amazed glance at the door, her gasp, a scream of stifled laughter, and behold she was gone! then they all saw. there was instant silence, a terrible pause, and then bohun's polite gentle voice: "is this where mr. markovitch lives? i beg your pardon--" great awkwardness followed. it is quite an illusion to suppose that russians are easy, affable hosts. i know of no people in the world who are so unable to put you at your ease if there is something unfortunate in the air. they have few easy social graces, and they are inclined to abandon at once a situation if it is made difficult for them. if it needs an effort to make a guest happy they leave him alone and trust to a providence in whose powers, however, they entirely disbelieve. bohun was led to his room, his bags being carried by old sacha, the markovitch's servant, and the dvornik. his bags, i remember, were very splendid, and i saw the eyes of uncle ivan grow large as he watched their progress. then with a sigh he drew a chair up to the table and began eating zakuska, putting salt-fish and radishes and sausage on to his place and eating them with a fork. "dyadya, ivan!" vera said reproachfully. "not yet--we haven't begun. ivan andreievitch, what do you think? will he want hot water?" she hurried after him. the evening thus unfortunately begun was not happily continued. there was a blight upon us all. i did my best, but i was in considerable pain and very tired. moreover, i was not favourably impressed with my first sight of young bohun. he seemed to me foolish and conceited. uncle ivan was afraid of him. he made only one attack. "it was a very fruitful journey that you had, sir, i hope?" "i beg your pardon," said bohun. "a very fruitful journey--nothing burdensome nor extravagant?" "oh, all right, thanks," bohun answered, trying unsuccessfully to show that he was not surprised at my friend's choice of words. but uncle ivan saw that he had not been successful and his lip trembled. markovitch was silent and boris nicolaievitch sulked. only once towards the end of the meal bohun interested me. "i wonder," he asked me, "whether you know a fellow called lawrence? he travelled from england with me. a man who's played a lot of football." "not jerry lawrence, the international!" i said. "surely he can't have come out here?" of course it was the same. i was interested and strangely pleased. the thought of lawrence's square back and cheery smile was extremely agreeable just then. "oh! i'm very glad," i answered. "i must get him to come and see me. i knew him pretty well at one time. where's he to be found?" bohun, with an air of rather gentle surprise, as though he could not help thinking it strange that any one should take an interest in lawrence's movements, told me where he was lodging. "and i hope you also will find your way to me sometime," i added. "it's an out-of-place grimy spot, i'm afraid. you might bring lawrence round one evening." soon after that, feeling that i could do no more towards retrieving an evening definitely lost, i departed. at the last i caught markovitch's eye. he seemed to be watching for something. a new invention perhaps. he was certainly an unhappy man. viii i was to meet jerry lawrence sooner than i had expected. and it was in this way. two days after the evening that i have just described i was driven to go and see vera michailovna. i was driven, partly by my curiosity, partly by my depression, and partly by my loneliness. this same loneliness was, i believe, at this time beginning to affect us all. i should be considered perhaps to be speaking with exaggeration if i were to borrow the title of one of mrs. oliphant's old-fashioned and charming novels and to speak of petrograd as already "a beleaguered city"--beleaguered, moreover, in very much the same sense as that other old city was. from the very beginning of the war petrograd was isolated--isolated not by the facts of the war, its geographical position or any of the obvious causes, but simply by the contempt and hatred with which it was regarded. from very old days it was spoken of as a german town. "if you want to know russia don't go to petrograd." "simply a cosmopolitan town like any other." "a smaller berlin"--and so on, and so on. this sense of outside contempt influenced its own attitude to the world. it was always at war with moscow. it showed you when you first arrived its nevski, its ordered squares, its official buildings as though it would say: "i suppose you will take the same view as the rest. if you don't wish to look any deeper here you are. i'm not going to help you." as the war developed it lost whatever gaiety and humour it had. after the fall of warsaw the attitude of the russian people in general became fatalistic. much nonsense was talked in the foreign press about "russia coming back again and again." "russia, the harder she was pressed the harder she resisted," and the ghost of napoleon retreating from moscow was presented to every home in europe; but the plain truth was that, after warsaw, the temper of the people changed. things were going wrong once more as they had always gone wrong in russian history, and as they always would go wrong. then followed bewilderment. what to do? whose fault was it all? shall we blame our blood or our rulers? our rulers, certainly, as we always, with justice, have blamed them--our blood, too, perhaps. from the fall of warsaw, in spite of momentary flashes of splendour and courage, the russians were a blindfolded, naked people, fighting a nation fully armed. now, europe was vast continents away, and only germany, that old germany whose soul was hateful, whose practical spirit was terribly admirable, was close at hand. the russian people turned hither and thither, first to its czar, then to its generals, then to its democratic spirit, then to its idealism--and there was no hope anywhere. they appealed for liberty. in the autumn of a great prayer from the whole country went up that the bandage might be taken from its eyes, and soon, lest when the light did at last come the eyes should be so unused to it that they should see nothing. nicholas had his opportunity--the greatest opportunity perhaps ever offered to man. he refused it. from that moment the easiest way was closed, and only a most perilous rocky path remained. with every week of that winter of , petrograd stepped deeper and deeper into the darkness. its strangeness grew and grew upon me as the days filed through. i wondered whether my illness and the troubles of the preceding year made me see everything at an impossible angle--or it was perhaps my isolated lodging, my crumbling rooms, with the grey expanse of sea and sky in front of them that was responsible. whatever it was, petrograd soon came to be to me a place with a most terrible secret life of its own. there is an old poem of pushkin's that alexandre benois has most marvellously illustrated, which has for its theme the rising of the river neva in november . on that occasion the splendid animal devoured the town, and in pushkin's poem you feel the devastating power of the beast, and in benois' pictures you can see it licking its lips as it swallowed down pillars and bridges and streets and squares with poor little fragments of humanity clutching and crying and fruitlessly appealing. this poem only emphasised for me the suspicion that i had originally had, that the great river and the marshy swamp around it despised contemptuously the buildings that man had raised beside and upon it, and that even the buildings in their turn despised the human beings who thronged them. it could only be some sense of this kind that could make one so repeatedly conscious that one's feet were treading ancient ground. the town, raised all of a piece by peter the great, could claim no ancient history at all; but through every stick and stone that had been laid there stirred the spirit and soul of the ground, so that out of one of the sluggish canals one might expect at any moment to see the horrid and scaly head of some palaeolithic monster with dead and greedy eyes slowly push its way up that it might gaze at the little black hurrying atoms as they crossed and recrossed the grey bridge. there are many places in petrograd where life is utterly dead; where some building, half-completed, has fallen into red and green decay; where the water lies still under iridescent scum and thick clotted reeds seem to stand at bay, concealing in their depths some terrible monster. at such a spot i have often fancied that the eyes of countless inhabitants of that earlier world are watching me, and that not far away the waters of neva are gathering, gathering, gathering their mighty momentum for some instant, when, with a great heave and swell, they will toss the whole fabric of brick and mortar from their shoulders, flood the streets and squares, and then sink tranquilly back into great sheets of unruffled waters marked only with reeds and the sharp cry of some travelling bird. all this may be fantastic enough, i only know that it was sufficiently real to me during that winter of to be ever at the back of my mind; and i believe that some sense of that kind had in all sober reality something to do with that strange weight of uneasy anticipation that we all of us, yes, the most unimaginative amongst us, felt at this time. upon this afternoon when i went to pay my call on vera michailovna, the real snow began to fall. we had had the false preliminary attempt a fortnight before; now in the quiet persistent determination, the solid soft resilience beneath one's feet, and the patient aquiescence of roofs and bridges and cobbles one knew that the real winter had come. already, although it was only four o'clock in the afternoon, there was darkness, with the strange almost metallic glow as of the light from an inverted looking-glass that snow makes upon the air. i had not far to go, but the long stretch of the ekateringofsky canal was black and gloomy and desolate, repeating here and there the pale yellow reflection of some lamp, but for the most part dim and dead, with the hulks of barges lying like sleeping monsters on its surface. as i turned into anglisky prospect i found stretched like a black dado, far down the street, against the wall, a queue of waiting women. they would be there until the early morning, many of them, and it was possible that then the bread would not be sufficient. and this not from any real lack, but simply from the mistakes of a bungling, peculating government. no wonder that one's heart was heavy. i found vera michailovna to my relief alone. when sacha brought me into the room she was doing what i think i had never seen her do before, sitting unoccupied, her eyes staring in front of her, her hands folded on her lap. "i don't believe that i've ever caught you idle before, vera michailovna," i said. "oh, i'm glad you've come!" she caught my hand with an eagerness very different from her usual calm, quiet greeting. "sit down. it's an extraordinary thing. at that very moment i was wishing for you." "what is it i can do for you?" i asked. "you know that i would do anything for you." "yes, i know that you would. but--well. you can't help me because i don't know what's the matter with me." "that's very unlike you," i said. "yes, i know it is--and perhaps that's why i am frightened. it's so vague; and you know i long ago determined that if i couldn't define a trouble and have it there in front of me, so that i could strangle it--why i wouldn't bother about it. but those things are so easy to say." she got up and began to walk up and down the room. that again was utterly unlike her, and altogether i seemed to be seeing, this afternoon, some quite new vera michailovna, some one more intimate, more personal, more appealing. i realised suddenly that she had never before, at any period of our friendship, asked for my help--not even for my sympathy. she was so strong and reliant and independent, cared so little for the opinion of others, and shut down so closely upon herself her private life, that i could not have imagined her asking help from any one. and of the two of us, she was the man, the strong determined soul, the brave and self-reliant character. it seemed to me ludicrous that she should ask for my help. nevertheless i was greatly touched. "i would do anything for you," i said. she turned to me, a splendid figure, her head, with its crown of black hair, lifted, her hands on her hips, her eyes gravely regarding me. "there are three things," she said, "perhaps all of them nothing.... and yet all of them disturbing. first my husband. he's beginning to drink again." "drink?" i said; "where can he get it from?" "i don't know. i must discover. but it isn't the actual drinking. every one in our country drinks if he can. only what has made my husband break his resolve? he was so proud of it. you know how proud he was. and he lies about it. he says he is not drinking. he never used to lie about anything. that was not one of his faults." "perhaps his inventions," i suggested. "pouf! his inventions! you know better than that, ivan andreievitch. no, no. it is something.... he's not himself. well, then, secondly, there's nina. the other night did you notice anything?" "only that she lost her temper. but she's always doing that." "no, it's more than that. she's unhappy, and i don't like the life she's leading. always out at cinematographs and theatres and restaurants, and with a lot of boys who mean no harm, i know--but they're idiotic, they're no good.... now, when the war's like this and the suffering.... to be always at the cinematograph! but i've lost my authority over her, ivan andreievitch. she doesn't care any longer what i say to her. once, and not so long ago, i meant so much to her. she's changed, she's harder, more careless, more selfish. you know, ivan andreievitch, that nina's simply everything to me. i don't talk about myself, do i? but at least i can say that since--oh, many, many years, she's been the whole world and more than the whole world to me. our mother and father were killed in a railway accident coming up from odessa when nina was very small, and since then nina's been mine--all mine!" she said that word with sudden passion, flinging it at me with a fierce gesture of her hands. "do you know what it is to want that something should belong to you, belong entirely to you, and to no one else? i've been too proud to say, but i've wanted that terribly all my life. i haven't had children, although i prayed for them, and perhaps now it is as well. but nina! she's known she was mine, and, until now, she's loved to know it. but now she's escaping from me, and she knows that too, and is ashamed. i think i could bear anything but that sense that she herself has that she's being wrong--i hate her to be ashamed." "perhaps," i suggested, "it's time that she went out into the world now and worked. there are a thousand things that a woman can do." "no--not nina. i've spoilt her, perhaps; i don't know. i always liked to feel that she needed my help. i didn't want to make her too self-reliant. that was wrong of me, and i shall be punished for it." "speak to her," i said. "she loves you so much that one word from you to her will be enough." "no," vera michailovna said slowly. "it won't be enough now. a year ago, yes. but now she's escaping as fast as she can." "perhaps she's in love with some one," i suggested. "no. i should have seen at once if it had been that. i would rather it were that. i think she would come back to me then. no, i suppose that this had to happen. i was foolish to think that it would not. but it leaves one alone--it--" she pulled herself up at that, regarding me with sudden shyness, as though she would forbid me to hint that she had shown the slightest emotion, or made in any way an appeal for pity. i was silent, then i said: "and the third thing, vera michailovna?" "uncle alexei is coming back." that startled me. i felt my heart give one frantic leap. "alexei petrovitch!" i cried. "when? how soon?" "i don't know. i've had a letter." she felt in her dress, found the letter and read it through. "soon, perhaps. he's leaving the front for good. he's disgusted with it all, he says. he's going to take up his petrograd practice again." "will he live with you?" "no. god forbid!" she felt then, perhaps, that her cry had revealed more than she intended, because she smiled and, trying to speak lightly, said: "no. we're old enemies, my uncle and i. we don't get on. he thinks me sentimental, i think him--but never mind what i think him. he has a bad effect on my husband." "a bad effect?" i repeated. "yes. he irritates him. he laughs at his inventions, you know." i nodded my head. yes, with my earlier experience of him i could understand that he would do that. "he's a cynical, embittered man," i said. "he believes in nothing and in nobody. and yet he has his fine side--" "no, he has no fine side," she interrupted me fiercely. "none. he is a bad man. i've known him all my life, and i'm not to be deceived." then in a softer, quieter tone she continued: "but tell me, ivan andreievitch. i've wanted before to ask you. you were with him on the front last year. we have heard that he had a great love affair there, and that the sister whom he loved was killed. is that true?" "yes," i said, "that is true." "was he very much in love with her?" "i believe terribly." "and it hurt him deeply when she was killed?" "desperately deeply." "but what kind of woman was she? what type? it's so strange to me. uncle alexei... with his love affairs!" i looked up, smiling. "she was your very opposite, vera michailovna, in everything. like a child--with no knowledge, no experience, no self-reliance--nothing. she was wonderful in her ignorance and bravery. we all thought her wonderful." "and she loved _him?_" "yes--she loved him." "how strange! perhaps there is some good in him somewhere. but to us at any rate he always brings trouble. this affair may have changed him. they say he is very different. worse perhaps--" she broke out then into a cry: "i want to get away, ivan andreievitch! to get away, to escape, to leave russia and everything in it behind me! to escape!" it was just then that sacha knocked on the door. she came in to say that there was an englishman in the hall inquiring for the other englishman who had come yesterday, that he wanted to know when he would be back. "perhaps i can help," i said. i went out into the hall and there i found jerry lawrence. he stood there in the dusk of the little hall looking as resolute and unconcerned as an englishman, in a strange and uncertain world, is expected to look. not that he ever considered the attitudes fitting to adopt on certain occasions. he would tell you, if you inquired, that "he couldn't stand those fellows who looked into every glass they passed." his brow wore now a simple and innocent frown like that of a healthy baby presented for the first time with a strange and alarming rattle. it was only later that i was to arrive at some faint conception of lawrence's marvellous acceptance of anything that might happen to turn up. vice, cruelty, unsuspected beauty, terror, remorse, hatred, and ignorance--he accepted them all once they were there in front of him. he sometimes, as i shall on a later occasion, show, allowed himself a free expression of his views in the company of those whom he could trust, but they were never the views of a suspicious or a disappointed man. it was not that he had great faith in human nature. he had, i think, very little. nor was he without curiosity--far from it. but once a thing was really there he wasted no time over exclamations as to the horror or beauty or abomination of its actual presence. there was as he once explained to me, "precious little time to waste." those who thought him a dull, silent fellow--and they were many--made of course an almost ludicrous mistake, but most people in life are, i take it, too deeply occupied with their own personal history to do more than estimate at its surface value the appearance of others... but after all such a dispensation makes, in all probability for the general happiness.... on this present occasion jerry lawrence stood there exactly as i had seen him stand many times on the football field waiting for the referee's whistle, his thick short body held together, his mouth shut and his eyes on guard. he did not at first recognise me. "you've forgotten me," i said. "i beg your pardon," he answered in his husky good-natured voice, like the rumble of an amiable bull-dog. "my name is durward," i said, holding out my hand. "and years ago we had a mutual friend in olva dune." that pleased him. he gripped my hand very heartily and smiled a big ugly smile. "why, yes," he said. "of course. how are you? feeling fit? damned long ago all that, isn't it? hope you're really fit?" "oh, i'm all right," i answered. "i was never a hercules, you know. i heard that you were here from bohun. i was going to write to you. but it's excellent that we should meet like this." "i was after young bohun," he explained. "but it's pleasant to find there's another fellow in the town one knows. i've been a bit at sea these two days. to tell you the truth i never wanted to come." i heard a rumble in his throat that sounded like "silly blighters." "come in," i said. "you must meet madame markovitch with whom bohun is staying--and then wait a bit. he won't be long, i expect." the idea of this seemed to fill jerry with alarm. he turned back toward the door. "oh! i don't think... she won't want... better another time..." his mouth was filled with indistinct rumblings. "nonsense." i caught his arm. "she is delightful. you must make yourself at home here. they'll be only too glad." "does she speak english?" he asked. "no," i answered. "but that's all right." he backed again towards the door. "my russian's so slow," he said. "never been here since i was a kid. i'd rather not, really--" however, i dragged him in and introduced him. i had quite a fatherly desire, as i watched him, that "he should make good." but i'm afraid that that first interview was not a great success. vera michailovna was strange that afternoon, excited and disturbed as i had never known her, and i could see that it was only with the greatest difficulty that she could bring herself to think about jerry at all. and jerry himself was so unresponsive that i could have beaten him. "why, you're duller than you used to be," i thought to myself, and wondered how i could have suspected, in those days, subtle depths and mysterious comprehensions. vera michailovna asked him questions about france and london but, quite obviously, did not listen to his answers. after ten minutes he pulled himself up slowly from his chair: "well, i must be going," he said. "tell young bohun i shall be waiting for him to-night-- . --astoria--" he turned to vera michailovna to say good-bye, and then, suddenly, as she rose and their eyes met, they seemed to strike some unexpected chord of sympathy. it took both of them, i think, by surprise; for quite a moment they stared at one another. "please come whenever you want to see your friend," she said, "we shall be delighted." "thank you," he answered simply, and went. when he had gone she said to me: "i like that man. one could trust him." "yes, one could," i answered her. ix i must return now to young henry bohun. i would like to arouse your sympathy for him, but sympathy's a dangerous medicine for the young, who are only too ready, so far as their self-confidence goes, to take a mile if you give them an inch. but with bohun it was simply a case of re-delivering, piece by piece, the mile that he had had no possible right to imagine in his possession, and at the end of his relinquishment he was as naked and impoverished a soul as any life with youth and health on its side can manage to sustain. he was very miserable during these first weeks, and then it must be remembered that petrograd was, at this time, no very happy place for anybody. bohun was not a coward--he would have stood the worst things in france without flinching--but he was neither old enough nor young enough to face without a tremor the queer world of nerves and unfulfilled expectation in which he found himself. in the first place, petrograd was so very different from anything that he had expected. its size and space, its power of reducing the human figure to a sudden speck of insignificance, its strange lights and shadows, its waste spaces and cold, empty, moonlit squares, its jumble of modern and mediaeval civilisation, above all, its supreme indifference to all and sundry--these things cowed and humiliated him. he was sharp enough to realise that here he was nobody at all. then he had not expected to be so absolutely cut off from all that he had known. the western world simply did not seem to exist. the papers came so slowly that on their arrival they were not worth reading. he had not told his friends in england to send his letters through the embassy bag, with the result that they would not, he was informed, reach him for months. of his work i do not intend here to speak,--it does not come into this story,--but he found that it was most complicated and difficult, and kicks rather than halfpence would be the certain reward. and bohun hated kicks.... finally, he could not be said to be happy in the markovitch flat. he had, poor boy, heard so much about russian hospitality, and had formed, from the reading of the books of mr. stephen graham and others, delightful pictures of the warmest hearts in the world holding out the warmest hands before the warmest samovars. in its spirit that was true enough, but it was not true in the way that bohun expected it. the markovitches, during those first weeks, left him to look after himself because they quite honestly believed that that was the thing that he would prefer. uncle ivan tried to entertain him, but bohun found him a bore, and with the ruthless intolerance of the very young, showed him so. the family did not put itself out to please him in any way. he had his room and his latchkey. there was always coffee in the morning, dinner at half-past six, and the samovar from half-past nine onwards. but the markovitch family life was not turned from its normal course. why should it be? and then he was laughed at. nina laughed at him. everything about him seemed to nina ridiculous--his cold bath in the morning, his trouser-press, the little silver-topped bottles on his table, the crease in his trousers, his shining neat hair, the pearl pin in his black tie, his precise and careful speech, the way that he said "_nu tak... spasebo... gavoreet... gariachy_..." she was never tired of imitating him; and very soon he caught her strutting about the dining-room with a man's cap on her head, twisting a cane and bargaining with an isvostchick--this last because, only the evening before, he had told them with great pride of his cleverness in that especial direction. the fun was good-natured enough, but it was, as russian chaff generally is, quite regardless of sensitive feelings. nina chaffed everybody and nobody minded, but bohun did not know this, and minded very much indeed. he showed during dinner that evening that he was hurt, and sat over his cabbage soup very dignified and silent. this made every one uncomfortable, although vera told me afterwards that she found it difficult not to laugh. the family did not make themselves especially pleasant, as henry felt they ought to have done--they continued the even tenor of their way. he was met by one of those sudden cold horrible waves of isolated terror with which it pleases russia sometimes to overwhelm one. the snow was falling; the town was settling into a suspicious ominous quiet. there was no light in the sky, and horrible winds blew round the corners of abandoned streets. henry was desperately homesick. he would have cut and run, had there been any possible means of doing it. he did not remember the wild joy with which he had heard, only a few weeks before, that he was to come to petrograd. he had forgotten even the splendours of _discipline_. he only knew that he was lonely and frightened and home-sick. he seemed to be without a friend in the world. but he was proud. he confided in nobody. he went about with his head up, and every one thought him the most conceited young puppy who had ever trotted the petrograd streets. and, although he never owned it even to himself, jerry lawrence seemed to him now the one friendly soul in all the world. you could be sure that lawrence would be always the same; he would not laugh at you behind your back, if he disliked something he would say so. you knew where you were with him, and in the uncertain world in which poor bohun found himself that simply was everything. bohun would have denied it vehemently if you told him that he had once looked down on lawrence, or despised him for his inartistic mind. lawrence was "a fine fellow"; he might seem a little slow at first, "but you wait and you will see what kind of a chap he is." nevertheless bohun was not able to be for ever in his company; work separated them, and then lawrence lodged with baron wilderling on the admiralty quay, a long way from anglisky prospect. therefore, at the end of three weeks, henry bohun discovered himself to be profoundly wretched. there seemed to be no hope anywhere. even the artist in him was disappointed. he went to the ballet and saw tchaikowsky's "swan lake"; but bearing diagilev's splendours in front of him, and knowing nothing about the technique of ballet-dancing he was bored and cross and contemptuous. he went to "eugen onyegin" and enjoyed it, because there was still a great deal of the schoolgirl in him; but after that he was flung on to glinka's "russlan and ludmilla," and this seemed to him quite interminable and to have nothing to do with the gentleman and lady mentioned in the title. he tried a play at the alexander theatre; it was, he saw, by andréeff, whose art he had told many people in england he admired, but now he mixed him up in his mind with kuprin, and the play was all about a circus--very confused and gloomy. as for literature, he purchased some new poems by balmont, some essays by merejkowsky, and andré biely's _st. petersburg,_ but the first of these he found pretentious, the second dull, and the third quite impossibly obscure. he did not confess to himself that it might perhaps be his ignorance of the russian language that was at fault. he went to the hermitage and the alexander galleries, and purchased coloured post-cards of the works of somov, benois, douboginsky, lançeray, and ostroymova--all the quite obvious people. he wrote home to his mother "that from what he could see of russian art it seemed to him to have a real future in front of it"--and he bought little painted wooden animals and figures at the peasants' workshops and stuck them up on the front of his stove. "i like them because they are so essentially russian," he said to me, pointing out a red spotted cow and a green giraffe. "no other country could have been responsible for them." poor boy, i had not the heart to tell him that they had been made in germany. however, as i have said, in spite of his painted toys and his operas he was, at the end of three weeks, a miserable man. anybody could see that he was miserable, and vera michailovna saw it. she took him in hand, and at once his life was changed. i was present at the beginning of the change. it was the evening of rasputin's murder. the town of course talked of nothing else--it had been talking, without cessation, since two o'clock that afternoon. the dirty, sinister figure of the monk with his magnetic eyes, his greasy beard, his robe, his girdle, and all his other properties, brooded gigantic over all of us. he was brought into immediate personal relationship with the humblest, most insignificant creature in the city, and with him incredible shadows and shapes, from dostoeffsky, from gogol, from lermontov, from nekrasov--from whom you please--all the shadows of whom one is eternally subconsciously aware in russia--faced us and reminded us that they were not shadows but realities. the details of his murder were not accurately known--it was only sure that, at last, after so many false rumours of attempted assassination, he was truly gone, and this world would be bothered by his evil presence no longer. pictures formed in one's mind as one listened. the day was fiercely cold, and this seemed to add to the horror of it all--to the hoffmannesque fantasy of the party, the lights, the supper, and the women, the murder with its mixture of religion and superstition and melodrama, the body flung out at last so easily and swiftly, on to the frozen river. how many souls must have asked themselves that day--"why, if this is so easy, do we not proceed further? a man dies more simply than you thought--only resolution... only resolution." i know that that evening i found it impossible to remain in my lonely rooms; i went round to the markovitch flat. i found vera michailovna and bohun preparing to go out; they were alone in the flat. he looked at me apprehensively. i think that i appeared to him at that time a queer, moody, ill-disposed fellow, who was too old to understand the true character of young men's impetuous souls. it may be that he was right.... "will you come with us, ivan andreievitch?" vera michailovna asked me. "we're going to the little cinema on ekateringofsky--a piece of local colour for mr. bohun." "i'll come anywhere with you," i said. "and we'll talk about rasputin." bohun was only too ready. the affair seemed to his romantic soul too good to be true. because we none of us knew, at that time, what had really happened, a fine field was offered for every rumour and conjecture. bohun had collected some wonderful stories. i saw that, apart from rasputin, he was a new man--something had happened to him. it was not long before i discovered that what had happened was that vera michailovna had been kind to him. vera's most beautiful quality was her motherliness. i do not intend that much-abused word in any sentimental fashion. she did not shed tears over a dirty baby in the street, nor did she drag decrepit old men into the flat to give them milk and fifty kopecks,--but let some one appeal to the strength and bravery in her, and she responded magnificently. i believe that to be true of very many russian women, who are always their most natural selves when something appeals to the best in them. vera michailovna had a strength and a security in her protection of souls weaker than her own that had about it nothing forced or pretentious or self-conscious--it was simply the natural woman acting as she was made to act. she saw that bohun was lonely and miserable and, now that the first awkwardness was passed and he was no longer a stranger, she was able, gently and unobtrusively, to show him that she was his friend. i think that she had not liked him at first; but if you want a russian to like you, the thing to do is to show him that you need him. it is amazing to watch their readiness to receive dependent souls whom they are in no kind of way qualified to protect--but they do their best, and although the result is invariably bad for everybody's character, a great deal of affection is created. as we walked to the cinema she asked him, very gently and rather shyly, about his home and his people and english life. she must have asked all her english guests the same questions, but bohun, i fancy, gave her rather original answers. he let himself go, and became very young and rather absurd, but also sympathetic. we were, all three of us, gay and silly, as one very often suddenly is, in russia, in the middle of even disastrous situations. it had been a day of most beautiful weather, the mud was frozen, the streets clean, the sky deep blue, the air harshly sweet. the night blazed with stars that seemed to swing through the haze of the frost like a curtain moved, very gently, by the wind. the ekateringofsky canal was blue with the stars lying like scraps of quicksilver all about it, and the trees and houses were deep black in outline above it. i could feel that the people in the street were happy. the murder of rasputin was a sign, a symbol; his figure had been behind the scenes so long that it had become mythical, something beyond human power--and now, behold, it was not beyond human power at all, but was there like a dead stinking fish. i could see the thought in their minds as they hurried along: "ah, he is gone, the dirty fellow--_slava bogu_--the war will soon be over." i, myself, felt the influence. perhaps now the war would go better, perhaps stunner and protopopoff and the rest of them would be dismissed, and clean men... it was still time for the czar.... and i heard bohun, in his funny, slow, childish russian: "but you understand, vera michailovna, that my father knows nothing about writing, nothing at all--so that it wouldn't matter very much what he said.... yes, he's military--been in the army always...." along the canal the little trees that in the spring would be green flames were touched now very faintly by silver frost. a huge barge lay black against the blue water; in the middle of it the rain had left a pool that was not frozen and under the light of a street lamp blazed gold--very strange the sudden gleam.... we passed the little wooden shelter where an old man in a high furry cap kept oranges and apples and nuts and sweets in paper. one candle illuminated his little store. he looked out from the darkness behind him like an old prehistoric man. his shed was peaked like a cocked hat, an old fat woman sat beside him knitting and drinking a glass of tea.... "i'm sorry, vera michailovna, that you can't read english...." bohun's careful voice was explaining, "only wells and locke and jack london...." i heard vera michailovna's voice. then bohun again: "no, i write very slowly--yes, i correct an awful lot...." we stumbled amongst the darkness of the cobbles; where pools had been the ice crackled beneath our feet, then the snow scrunched.... i loved the sound, the sharp clear scent of the air, the pools of stars in the sky, the pools of ice at our feet, the blue like the thinnest glass stretched across the sky. i felt the poignancy of my age, of the country where i was, of bohun's youth and confidence, of the war, of disease and death--but behind it all happiness at the strange sense that i had to-night, that came to me sometimes from i knew not where, that the undercurrent of the river of life was stronger than the eddies and whirlpools on its surface, that it knew whither it was speeding, and that the purpose behind its force was strong and true and good.... "oh," i heard bohun say, "i'm not really very young, vera michailovna. after all, it's what you've done rather than your actual years...." "you're older than you'll ever be again, bohun, if that's any consolation to you," i said. we had arrived. the cinema door blazed with light, and around it was gathered a group of soldiers and women and children, peering in at a soldiers' band, which, placed on benches in a corner of the room, played away for its very life. outside, around the door were large bills announcing "the woman without a soul, drama in four parts," and there were fine pictures of women falling over precipices, men shot in bedrooms, and parties in which all the guests shrank back in extreme horror from the heroine. we went inside and were overwhelmed by the band, so that we could not hear one another speak. the floor was covered with sunflower seeds, and there was a strong smell of soldiers' boots and bad cigarettes and urine. we bought tickets from an old jewess behind the pigeon-hole and then, pushing the curtain aside, stumbled into darkness. here the smell was different, being, quite simply that of human flesh not very carefully washed. although, as we stumbled to some seats at the back, we could feel that we were alone, it had the impression that multitudes of people pressed in upon us, and when the lights did go up we found that the little hall was indeed packed to its extremest limit. no one could have denied that it was a cheerful scene. soldiers, sailors, peasants, women, and children crowded together upon the narrow benches. there was a great consumption of sunflower seeds, and the narrow passage down the middle of the room was littered with fragments. two stout and elaborate policemen leaned against the wall surveying the public with a friendly if superior air. there was a tremendous amount of noise. mingled with the strains of the band beyond the curtain were cries and calls and loud roars of laughter. the soldiers embraced the girls, and the children, their fingers in their mouths, wandered from bench to bench, and a mangy dog begged wherever he thought that he saw a kindly face. all the faces were kindly--kindly, ignorant, and astoundingly young. as i felt that youth i felt also separation; i and my like could emphasise as we pleased the goodness, docility, mysticism even of these people, but we were walking in a country of darkness. i caught a laugh, the glance of some women, the voice of a young soldier--i felt behind us, watching us, the thick heavy figure of rasputin. i smelt the eastern scent of the sunflower seeds, i looked back and glanced at the impenetrable superiority of the two policemen, and i laughed at myself for the knowledge that i thought i had, for the security upon which i thought that i rested, for the familiarity with which i had fancied i could approach my neighbours.... i was not wise, i was not secure, i had no claim to familiarity.... the lights were down and we were shown pictures of paris. because the cinema was a little one and the prices small the films were faded and torn, so that the opera and the place de la concorde and the louvre and the seine danced and wriggled and broke before our eyes. they looked strange enough to us and only accented our isolation and the odd semi-civilisation in which we were living. there were comments all around the room in exactly the spirit of children before a conjurer at a party.... the smell grew steadily stronger and stronger... my head swam a little and i seemed to see rasputin, swelling in his black robe, catching us all into its folds, sweeping us up into the starlight sky. we were under the flare of the light again. i caught bohun's happy eyes; he was talking eagerly to vera michailovna, not removing his eyes from her face. she had conquered him; i fancied as i looked at her that her thoughts were elsewhere. there followed a vaudeville entertainment. a woman and a man in peasants' dress came and laughed raucously, without meaning, their eyes narrowly searching the depths of the house, then they stamped their feet and whirled around, struck one another, laughed again, and vanished. the applause was half-hearted. then there was a trainer of dogs, a black-eyed tartar with four very miserable little fox-terriers, who shivered and trembled and jumped reluctantly through hoops. the audience liked this, and cried and shouted and threw paper pellets at the dogs. a stout perspiring jew in a shabby evening suit came forward and begged for decorum. then there appeared a stout little man in a top hat who wished to recite verses of, i gathered, a violent indecency. i was uncomfortable about vera michailovna, but i need not have been. the indecency was of no importance to her, and she was interested in the human tragedy of the performer. tragedy it was. the man was hungry and dirty and not far from tears. he forgot his verses and glanced nervously into the wings as though he expected to be beaten publicly by the perspiring jew. he stammered; his mouth wobbled; he covered it with a dirty hand. he could not continue. the audience was sympathetic. they listened in encouraging silence; then they clapped; then they shouted friendly words to him. you could feel throughout the room an intense desire that he should succeed. he responded a little to the encouragement, but could not remember his verses. he struggled, struggled, did a hurried little breakdown dance, bowed and vanished into the wings, to be beaten, i have no doubt, by the jewish gentleman. we watched a little of the "drama of the woman without a soul," but the sense of being in a large vat filled with boiling human flesh into whose depths we were pressed ever more and more deeply was at last too much for us, and we stumbled our way into the open air. the black shadow of the barge, the jagged outline of the huddled buildings against the sky, the black tower at the end of the canal, all these swam in the crystal air. we took deep breaths of the freshness and purity; cheerful noises were on every side of us, the band and laughter; a church bell with its deep note and silver tinkle; the snow was vast and deep and hard all about us. we walked back very happily to anglisky prospect. vera michailovna said good-night to me and went in. before he followed her, bohun turned round to me: "isn't she splendid?" he whispered. "by god, durward, i'd do anything for her.... do you think she likes me?" "why not?" i asked. "i want her to--frightfully. i'd do anything for her. do you think she'd like to learn english?" "i don't know," i said. "ask her." he disappeared. as i walked home i felt about me the new interaction of human lives and souls--ambitions, hopes, youth. and the crisis, behind these, of the world's history made up, as it was, of the same interactions of human and divine. the fortunes and adventures of the soul on its journey towards its own country, its hopes and fears, struggles and despairs, its rejections and joy and rewards--its death and destruction--all this in terms of human life and the silly blundering conditions of this splendid glorious earth.... here was vera michailovna and her husband, nina and boris grogoff, bohun and lawrence, myself and semyonov--a jumbled lot--with all our pitiful self-important little histories, our crimes and virtues so insignificant and so quickly over, and behind them the fine stuff of the human and divine soul, pushing on through all raillery and incongruity to its goal. why, i had caught up, once more, that interest in life that i had, i thought, so utterly lost! i stopped for a moment by the frozen canal and laughed to myself. the drama of life was, after all, too strong for my weak indifference. i felt that night as though i had stepped into a new house with lighted rooms and fires and friends waiting for me. afterwards, i was so closely stirred by the sense of impending events that i could not sleep, but sat at my window watching the faint lights of the sky shift and waver over the frozen ice.... x we were approaching christmas. the weather of these weeks was wonderfully beautiful, sharply cold, the sky pale bird's-egg blue, the ice and the snow glittering, shining with a thousand colours. there began now a strange relationship between markovitch and myself. there was something ineffectual and pessimistic about me that made russians often feel in me a kindred soul. at the front, russians had confided in me again and again, but that was not astonishing, because they confided in every one. nevertheless, they felt that i was less english than the rest, and rather blamed me in their minds, i think, for being so. i don't know what it was that suddenly decided markovitch to "make me part of his life." i certainly did not on my side make any advances. one evening he came to see me and stayed for hours. then he came two or three times within the following fortnight. he gave me the effect of not caring in the least whether i were there or no, whether i replied or remained silent, whether i asked questions or simply pursued my own work. and i, on my side, had soon in my consciousness his odd, irascible, nervous, pleading, shy and boastful figure painted permanently, so that his actual physical presence seemed to be unimportant. there he was, as he liked to stand up against the white stove in my draughty room, his rather dirty nervous hands waving in front of me, his thin hair on end, his ragged beard giving his eyes an added expression of anxiety. his body was a poor affair, his legs thin and uncertain, an incipient stomach causing his waistcoat suddenly to fall inwards somewhere half-way up his chest, his feet in ill-shapen boots, and his neck absurdly small inside his high stiff collar. his stiff collar jutting sharply into his weak chin was perhaps his most striking feature. most russians of his careless habits wore soft collars or students' shirts that fastened tight about the neck, but this high white collar was with markovitch a sign and a symbol, the banner of his early ambitions; it was the first and last of him. he changed it every day, it was always high and sharp, gleaming and clean, and it must have hurt him very much. he wore with it a shabby black tie that ran as far up the collar as it could go, and there was a sense of pathos and struggle about this tie as though it were a wild animal trying to escape over an imprisoning wall. he would stand clutching my stove as though it assured his safety in a dangerous country; then suddenly he would break away from it and start careering up and down my room, stopping for an instant to gaze through my window at the sea and the ships, then off again, swinging his arms, his anxious eyes searching everywhere for confirmation of the ambitions that still enflamed him. for the root and soul of him was that he was greatly ambitious. he had been born, i learnt, in some small town in the moscow province, and his father had been a schoolmaster in the place--a kind of perodonov, i should imagine, from the things that markovitch told me about him. the father, at any rate, was a mean, malicious, and grossly sensual creature, and he finally lost his post through his improper behaviour towards some of his own small pupils. the family then came to evil days, and at a very early age young markovitch was sent to petrograd to earn what he could with his wits. he managed to secure the post of a secretary to an old fellow who was engaged in writing the life of his grandfather--a difficult book, as the grandfather had been a voluminous letter-writer, and this correspondence had to be collected and tabulated. for months, and even years, young markovitch laboriously endeavoured to arrange these old yellow letters, dull, pathetic, incoherent. his patron grew slowly imbecile, but through the fogs that increasingly besieged him saw only this one thing clearly, that the letters must be arranged. he kept markovitch relentlessly at his table, allowing him no pleasures, feeding him miserably and watching him personally undress every evening lest he should have secreted certain letters somewhere on his body. there was something almost sadist apparently in the old gentleman's observation of markovitch's labours. it was during these years that markovitch's ambitions took flame. he was always as he told me having "amazing ideas." i asked him--what kind of ideas? "ideas by which the world would be transformed.... those letters were all old, you know, and dusty, and yellow, and eaten, some of them, by rats, and they'd lie on the floor and i'd try to arrange them in little piles according to their dates.... there'd be rows of little packets all across the floor..., and then somehow, when one's back was turned, they'd move, all of their own wicked purpose--and one would have to begin all over again, bending with one's back aching, and seeing always the stupid handwriting.... i hated it, ivan andreievitch, of course i hated it, but i had to do it for the money. and i lived in his house, too, and as he got madder it wasn't pleasant. he wanted me to sleep with him because he saw things in the middle of the night, and he'd catch hold of me and scream and twist his fat legs round me... no, it wasn't agreeable. _on ne sympatichne saff-szem_. he wasn't a nice man at all. but while i was sorting the letters these ideas would come to me and i would be on fire.... it seemed to me that i was to save the world, and that it would not be difficult if only one might be resolute enough. that was the trouble--to be resolute. one might say to oneself, 'on friday october th i will do so and so, and then on saturday november rd i will do so and so, and then on december th it will be finished.' but then on october th one is, may be, in quite another mood--one is even ill possibly--and so nothing is done and the whole plan is ruined. i would think all day as to how i would make myself resolute, and i would say when old feodor stepanovitch would pinch my ear and deny me more soup, 'ah ha, you wait, you old pig-face--you wait until i've mastered my resolution--and then i'll show you!' i fancied, for instance, that if i could command myself sufficiently i could just go to people and say, 'you must have bath-houses like this and this'--i had all the plans ready, you know, and in the hottest room you have couches like this, and you have a machine that beats your back--so, so, so--not those dirty old things that leave bits of green stuff all over you--and so on, and so on. but better ideas than that, ideas about poverty and wealth, no more kings, you know, nor police, but not your cheap socialism that fellows like boris nicolaievitch shout about; no, real happiness, so that no one need work as i did for an old beast who didn't give you enough soup, and have to keep quiet, all the same and say nothing. ideas came like flocks of birds, so many that i couldn't gather them all but had sometimes to let the best ones go. and i had no one to talk to about them--only the old cook and the girl in the kitchen, who had a child by old feodor that he wouldn't own,--but she swore it was his, and told every one the time when it happened and where it was and all.... then the old man fell downstairs and broke his neck, and he'd left me some money to go on with the letters...." at this point markovitch's face would become suddenly triumphantly malevolent, like the face of a schoolboy who remembers a trick that he played on a hated master. "do you think i went on with them, ivan andreievitch? no, not i... but i kept the money." "that was wrong of you," i would say gravely. "yes--wrong of course. but hadn't he been wrong always? and after all, isn't everybody wrong? we russians have no conscience, you know, about anything, and that's simply because we can't make up our minds as to what's wrong and what's right, and even if we do make up our minds it seems a pity not to let yourself go when you may be dead to-morrow. wrong and right.... what words!... who knows? perhaps it would have been the greatest wrong in the world to go on with the letters, wasting everybody's time, and for myself, too, who had so many ideas, that life simply would never be long enough to think them all out." it seemed that shortly after this he had luck with a little invention, and this piece of luck was, i should imagine, the ruin of his career, as pieces of luck so often are the ruin of careers. i could never understand what precisely his invention was, it had something to do with the closing of doors, something that you pulled at the bottom of the door, so that it shut softly and didn't creak with the wind. a jew bought the invention, and gave markovitch enough money to lead him confidently to believe that his fortune was made. of course it was not, he never had luck with an invention again, but he was bursting with pride and happiness, set up house for himself in a little flat on the vassily ostrov--and met vera michailovna. i wish i could give some true idea of the change that came over him when he reached this part of his story. when he had spoken of his childhood, his father, his first struggles to live, his life with his old patron, he had not attempted to hide the evil, the malice, the envy that there was in his soul. he had even emphasised it, i might fancy, for my own especial benefit, so that i might see that he was not such a weak, romantic, sentimental creature as i had supposed--although god knows i had never fancied him romantic. now when he spoke of his wife his whole body changed. "she married me out of pity," he told me. "i hated her for that, and i loved her for that, and i hate and love her for it still." here i interrupted him and told him that perhaps it was better that he should not confide in me the inner history of his marriage. "why not?" he asked me suspiciously. "because i'm only an acquaintance, you scarcely know me. you may regret it afterwards when you're in another mood." "oh, you english!" he said contemptuously; "you're always to be trusted. as a nation you're not, but as one man to another you're not interested enough in human nature to give away secrets." "well, tell me what you like," i said. "only i make no promises about anything." "i don't want you to," he retorted; "i'm only telling you what every one knows. wasn't i aware from the first moment that she married me out of pity, and didn't they all know it, and laugh and tell her she was a fool. she knew that she was a fool too, but she was very young, and thought it fine to sacrifice herself for an idea. i was ill and i talked to her about my future. she believed in it, she thought i could do wonderful things if only some one looked after me. and at the same time despised me for wanting to be looked after.... and then i wasn't so ugly as i am now. she had some money of her own, and we took in lodgers, and i loved her, as i love her now, so that i could kiss her feet and then hate her because she was kind to me. she only cares for her sister, nina; and because i was jealous of the girl and hated to see vera good to her i had her to live with us, just to torture myself and show that i was stronger than all of them if i liked.... and so i am, than her beastly uncle the doctor and all the rest of them--let him do what he likes...." it was the first time that he had mentioned semyonov. "he's coming back," i said. "oh, is he?" snarled markovitch. "well, he'd better look out." then his voice, his face, even the shape of his body, changed once again. "i'm not a bad man, ivan andreievitch. no, i'm not.... you think so of course, and i don't mind if you do. but i love vera, and if she loved me i could do great things. i could astonish them all. i hear them say, 'ah, that nicholas markovitch, he's no good... with his inventions. what did a fine woman like that marry such a man for?' i know what they say. but i'm strong if i like. i gave up drink when i wished. i can give up anything. and when i succeed they'll see--and then we'll have enough money not to need these people staying with us and despising us...." "no one despises you, nicolai leontievitch," i interrupted. "and what does it matter if they do?" he fiercely retorted. "i despise them--all of them. it's easy for them when everything goes well with them, but with me everything goes wrong. everything!... but i'm strong enough to make everything go right--and i will." this was, for the time, the end of his confidences. he had, i was sure, something further to tell me, some plan, some purpose, but he decided suddenly that he would keep it to himself, although i am convinced that he had only told me his earlier story in order that i might understand this new idea of his. but i did not urge him to tell me. my interest in life had not yet sufficiently revived; it was, after all, none of my business. for the rest, it seemed that he had been wildly enthusiastic about the war at its commencement. he had had great ideas about russia, but now he had given up all hope. russia was doomed; and germany, whom he hated and admired, would eat her up. and what did it matter? perhaps germany would "run russia," and then there would be order and less thieving, and this horrible war would stop. how foolish it had been to suppose that any one in russia would ever do anything. they were all fools and knaves and idle in russia--like himself. and so he left me. xi on christmas eve, late in the evening, i went into a church. it was my favourite church in petrograd, rising at the english prospect end of the quay, with its white rounded towers pure and quiet and modest. i had been depressed all day. i had not been well, and the weather was harsh, a bitterly cold driving wind beating down the streets and stroking the ice of the canal into a dull grey colour. christmas seemed to lift into sharper, bitterer irony the ghastly horrors of this end endless war. last christmas i had been too ill to care, and the christmas before i had been at the front when the war had been young and full of hope, and i had seen enough nobility and self-sacrifice to be reassured about the true stuff of the human soul. now all that seemed to be utterly gone. on the one side my mind was filled with my friends, john trenchard and marie ivanovna. the sacrifice that they had made seemed to be wicked and useless. i had lost altogether that conviction of the continuance and persistence of their souls that i had, for so long, carried with me. they were dead, dead... simply dead. there at the front one had believed in many things. here in this frozen and starving town, with every ghost working against every human, there was assurance of nothing--only deep foreboding and an ominous silence. the murder of rasputin still hung over every head. the first sense of liberty had passed, and now his dirty malicious soul seemed to be watching us all, reminding us that he had not left us, but was waiting for the striking of some vast catastrophe that the friends whom he had left behind him to carry on his work were preparing. it was this sense of moving so desperately and so hopelessly in the dark that was with me. any chance that there had seemed to be of russia rising from the war with a free soul appeared now to be utterly gone. before our eyes the powers that ruled us were betraying us, laughing at us, selling us. and we did not know who was our enemy, who our friend, whom to believe, of whom to take counsel. peculation and lying and the basest intrigue was on every side of us, hunger for which there was no necessity, want in a land packed with everything. i believe that there may have been very well another side to the picture, but at that time we could not see; we did not wish to see, we were blindfolded men.... i entered the church and found that the service was over. i passed through the aisle into the little rounded cup of dark and gold where the altars were. here there were still collected a company of people, kneeling, some of them, in front of the candles, others standing there, motionless like statues, their hands folded, gazing before them. the candles flung a mist of dim embroidery upon the walls, and within the mist the dark figures of the priests moved to and fro. an old priest with long white hair was standing behind a desk close to me, and reading a long prayer in an unswerving monotonous voice. there was the scent of candles and cold stone and hot human breath in the little place. the tawdry gilt of the ikons glittered in the candle-light, and an echo of the cold wind creeping up the long dark aisle blew the light about so that the gilt was like flashing piercing eyes. i wrapped my shuba closely about me, and stood there lost in a hazy, indefinite dream. i was comforted and touched by the placid, mild, kindly faces of those standing near me. "no evil here...." i thought. "only ignorance, and for that others are responsible." i was lost in my dream and i did not know of what i was dreaming. the priest's voice went on, and the lights flickered, and it was as though some one, a long way off, were trying to give me a message that it was important that i should hear, important for myself and for others. there came over me, whence i know not, a sudden conviction of the fearful power of evil, a sudden realisation, as though i had been shown something, a scene or a picture or writing which had brought this home to me.... the lights seemed to darken, the priest's figure faded, and i felt as though the message that some one had been trying to deliver to me had been withdrawn. i waited a moment, looking about me in a bewildered fashion, as though i had in reality just woken from sleep. then i left the church. outside the cold air was intense. i walked to the end of the quay and leaned on the stone parapet. the neva seemed vast like a huge, white, impending shadow; it swept in a colossal wave of frozen ice out to the far horizon, where tiny, twinkling lights met it and closed it in. the bridges that crossed it held forth their lights, and there were the gleams, like travelling stars, of the passing trams, but all these were utterly insignificant against the vast body of the contemptuous ice. on the farther shore the buildings rose in a thin, tapering line, looking as though they had been made of black tissue paper, against the solid weight of the cold, stony sky. the peter and paul fortress, the towers of the mohammedan mosque were thin, immaterial, ghostly, and the whole line of the town was simply a black pencilled shadow against the ice, smoke that might be scattered with one heave of the force of the river. the neva was silent, but beneath that silence beat what force and power, what contempt and scorn, what silent purposes? i saw then, near me, and gazing, like myself, on to the river the tall, broad figure of a peasant, standing, without movement, black against the sky. he seemed to dominate the scene, to be stronger and more contemptuous than the ice itself, but also to be in sympathy with it. i made some movement, and he turned and looked at me. he was a fine man, with a black beard and noble carriage. he passed down the quay and i turned towards home. xii about four o'clock on christmas afternoon i took some flowers to vera michailovna. i found that the long sitting-room had been cleared of all furniture save the big table and the chairs round it. about a dozen middle-aged ladies were sitting about the table and solemnly playing "lotto." so serious were they that they scarcely looked up when i came in. vera michailovna said my name and they smiled and some of them bowed, but their eyes never left the numbered cards. "_dvar... peedecat... cheteeriy... zurock tree... semdecet voisim_"... came from a stout and good-natured lady reading the numbers as she took them from the box. most of the ladies were healthy, perspiring, and of a most amiable appearance. they might, many of them, have been the wives of english country clergymen, so domestic and unalarmed were they. i recognised two markovitch aunts and a semyonov cousin. there was a hush and a solemnity about the proceedings. vera michailovna was very busy in the kitchen, her face flushed and her sleeves rolled up; sacha, the servant, malevolently assisting her and scolding continually the stout and agitated country girl who had been called in for the occasion. "all goes well," vera smilingly assured me. "half-past six it is--don't be late." "i will be in time," i said. "do you know, i've asked your english friend. the big one." "lawrence?... is he coming?" "yes. at least i understood so on the telephone, but he sounded confused. do you think he will want to come?" "i'm sure he will," i answered. "afterwards i wasn't sure. i thought he might think it impertinent when we know him so little. but he could easily have said if he didn't want to come, couldn't he?" there seemed to me something unusual in the way that she asked me these questions. she did not usually care whether people were offended or no. she had not time to consider that, and in any case she despised people who took offence easily. i would perhaps have said something, but the country girl dropped a plate and sacha leapt upon the opportunity. "drunk!... what did i say, having such a girl? is it not better to do things for yourself? but no--of course no one cares for my advice, as though last year the same thing...." and so on. i left them and went home to prepare for the feast. i returned punctually at half-past six and found every one there. many of the ladies had gone, but the aunts remained, and there were other uncles and some cousins. we must have been in all between twenty and thirty people. the table was now magnificently spread. there was a fine glittering father christmas in the middle, a father christmas of german make, i am afraid. ribbons and frosted strips of coloured paper ran in lines up and down the cloth. the "zakuska" were on a side-table near the door--herrings and ham and smoked fish and radishes and mushrooms and tongue and caviare and, most unusual of all in those days, a decanter of vodka. no one had begun yet; every one stood about, a little uneasy and awkward, with continuous glances flung at the "zakuska" table. of the company markovitch first caught my eye. i had never seen him so clean and smart before. his high, piercing collar was of course the first thing that one saw; then one perceived that his hair was brushed, his beard trimmed, and that he wore a very decent suit of rather shiny black. this washing and scouring of him gave him a curiously subdued and imprisoned air; i felt sympathetic towards him; i could see that he was anxious to please, happy at the prospect of being a successful host, and, to-night, most desperately in love with his wife. that last stood out and beyond all else. his eyes continually sought her face; he had the eyes of a dog watching and waiting for its master's appreciative word. i had never before seen vera michailovna so fine and independent and, at the same time, so kind and gracious. she was dressed in white, very plain and simple, her shining black hair piled high on her head, her kind, good eyes watching every one and everything to see that all were pleased. she, too, was happy to-night, but happy also in a strange, subdued, quiescent way, and i felt, as i always did about her, that her soul was still asleep and untouched, and that much of her reliance and independence came from that. uncle ivan was in his smart clothes, his round face very red and he wore his air of rather ladylike but inoffensive superiority. he stood near the table with the "zakuska," and his eyes rested there. i do not now remember many of the markovitch and semyonov relations. there was a tall thin young man, rather bald, with a short black moustache; he was nervous and self-assertive, and he had a high, shrill voice. he talked incessantly. there were several delightful, middle-aged women, quiet and ready to be pleased with everything--the best russian type of all perhaps, women who knew life, who were generously tolerant, kind-hearted, with a quiet sense of humour and no nonsense about them. there was one fat red-faced man in a very tight black coat, who gave his opinion always about food and drink. he was from moscow--his name paul leontievitch rozanov--and i met him on a later occasion of which i shall have to tell in its place. then there were two young girls who giggled a great deal and whispered together. they hung around nina and stroked her hair and admired her dress, and laughed at boris grogoff and any one else who was near them. nina was immensely happy. she loved parties of course, and especially parties in which she was the hostess. she was like a young kitten or puppy in a white frock, with her hair tumbling over her eyes. she was greatly excited, and as joyous as though there were no war, and no afflicted russia, and nothing serious in all the world. this was the first occasion on which i suspected that grogoff cared for her. outwardly he did nothing but chaff and tease her, and she responded in that quick rather sharp and very often crudely personal way at which foreigners for the first time in russian company so often wonder. badinage with russians so quickly passes to lively and noisy quarrelling, which in its turn so suddenly fades into quiet contented amiability that it is little wonder that the observer feels rather breathless at it all. grogoff was a striking figure, with his fine height and handsome head and bold eyes, but there was something about him that i did not like. immensely self-confident, he nevertheless seldom opened his mouth without betraying great ignorance about almost everything. he was hopelessly ill-educated, and was the more able therefore from the very little knowledge that he had to construct a very simple socialist creed in which the main statutes were that everything should be taken from the rich and given to the poor, the peasants should have all the land, and the rulers of the world be beheaded. he had no knowledge of other countries, although he talked very freely of what he called his "international principles." i could not respect him as i could many russian revolutionaries, because he had never on any occasion put himself out or suffered any inconvenience for his principles, living as he did, comfortably, with all the food and clothes that he needed. at the same time he was, on the other hand, kindly and warm-hearted, and professed friendship for me, although he despised what he called my "capitalistic tendencies." had he only known, he was far richer and more autocratic than i! in the midst of this company henry bohun was rather shy and uncomfortable. he was suspicious always that they would laugh at his russian (what mattered it if they did?), and he was distressed by the noise and boisterous friendliness of every one. i could not help smiling to myself as i watched him. he was learning very fast. he would not tell any one now that "he really thought that he did understand russia," nor would he offer to put his friends right about russian characteristics and behaviour. he watched the young giggling girls, and the fat rozanov, and the shrill young man with ill-concealed distress. very far these from the lizas and natachas of his literary imagination--and yet not so far either, had he only known. he pinned all his faith, as i could see, to vera michailovna, who did gloriously fulfil his self-instituted standards. and yet he did not know her at all! he was to suffer pain there too. at dinner he was unfortunately seated between one of the giggling girls and a very deaf old lady who was the great-aunt of nina and vera. this old lady trembled like an aspen leaf, and was continually dropping beneath the table a little black bag that she carried. she could make nothing of bohun's russian, even if she heard it, and was under the impression that he was a frenchman. she began a long quivering story about paris to which she had once been, how she had lost herself, and how a delightful frenchman had put her on her right path again.... "a chivalrous people, your countrymen".... she repeated, nodding her head so that her long silver earrings rattled again--"gay and chivalrous!" bohun was not, i am afraid, as chivalrous as he might have been, because he knew that the girl on his other side was laughing at his attempts to explain that he was not a frenchman. "stupid old woman!" he said to me afterwards. "she dropped her bag under the table at least twenty times!" meanwhile the astonishing fact was that the success of the dinner was jerry lawrence. he was placed on vera michailovna's left hand, rozanov, the moscow merchant near to him, and i did not hear him say anything very bright or illuminating, but every one felt, i think, that he was a cheerful and dependable person. i always felt, when i observed him, that he understood the russian character far better than any of us. he had none of the self-assertion of the average englishman and, at the same time, he had his opinions and his preferences. he took every kind of chaff with good-humoured indifference, but i think it was above everything else his tolerance that pleased the russians. nothing shocked him, which did not at all mean that he had no code of honour or morals. his code was severe and stern, but his sense of human fallibility, and the fine fight that human nature was always making against stupendous odds stirred him to a fine and comprehending clarity. he had many faults. he was obstinate, often dull and lethargic, in many ways grossly ill-educated and sometimes wilfully obtuse--but he was a fine friend, a noble enemy, and a chivalrous lover. there was nothing mean nor petty in him, and his views of life and the human soul were wider and more all-embracing than in any englishman i have ever known. you may say of course that it is sentimental nonsense to suppose at all that the human soul is making a fine fight against odds. even i, at this period, was tempted to think that it might be nonsense, but it is a view as good as another, after all, and so ignorant are all of us that no one has a right to say that anything is impossible! after drinking the vodka and eating the "zakuska," we sat down to table and devoured crayfish soup. every one became lively. politics of course, were discussed. i heard rozanov say, "ah, you in petrograd! what do you know of things? don't let me hurt any one's feelings, pray.... most excellent soup, vera michailovna--i congratulate you.... but you just wait until moscow takes things in hand. why only the other day maklakoff said to a friend of mine--'it's all nonsense,' he said." and the shrill-voiced young man told a story--"but it wasn't the same man at all. she was so confused when she saw what she'd done, that i give you my word she was on the point of crying. i could see tears... just trembling--on the edge. 'oh, i beg your pardon,' she said, and the man was such a fool...." markovitch was busy about the drinks. there was some sherry and some light red wine. markovitch was proud of having been able to secure it. he was beaming with pride. he explained to everybody how it had been done. he walked round the table and stood, for an instant, with his hand on vera michailovna's shoulder. the pies with fish and cabbage in them were handed round. he jested with the old great-aunt. he shouted in her ear: "now, aunt isabella... some wine. good for you, you know--keep you young...." "no, no, no..." she protested, laughing and shaking her earrings, with tears in her eyes. but he filled her glass and she drank it and coughed, still protesting. "thank you, thank you," she chattered as bohun dived under the table and found her bag for her. i saw that he did not like the crayfish soup, and was distressed because he had so large a helping. he blushed and looked at his plate, then began again to eat and stopped. "don't you like it?" one of the giggling girls asked him. "but it's very good. have another 'pie!'" the meal continued. there were little suckling pigs with "kasha," a kind of brown buckwheat. every one was gayer and gayer. now all talked at once, and no one listened to anything that any one else said. of them all, nina was by far the gayest. she had drunk no wine--she always said that she could not bear the nasty stuff, and although every one tried to persuade her, telling her that now when you could not get it anywhere, it was wicked not to drink it, she would not change her mind. it was simply youth and happiness that radiated from her, and also perhaps some other excitement for which i could not account. grogoff tried to make her drink. she defied him. he came over to her chair, but she pushed him away, and then lightly slapped his cheek. every one laughed. then he whispered something to her. for an instant the gaiety left her eyes. "you shouldn't say that!" she answered almost angrily. he went back to his seat. i was sitting next to her, and she was very charming to me, seeing that i had all that i needed and showing that she liked me. "you mustn't be gloomy and ill and miserable," she whispered to me. "oh! i've seen you! there's no need. come to us and we'll make you as happy as we can--vera and i.... we both love you." "my dear, i'm much too old and stupid for you to bother about!" she put her hand on my arm. "i know that i'm wicked and care only for pleasure.... vera's always saying so. but i can be better if you want me to be." this was flattering, but i knew that it was only her general happiness that made her talk like that. and at once she was after something else. "your englishman," she said, looking across the table at lawrence, "i like his face. i should be frightened of him, though." "oh no, you wouldn't," i answered. "he wouldn't hurt any one." she continued to look at him and he, glancing up, their eyes met. she smiled and he smiled. then he raised his glass and drank. "i mustn't drink," she called across the table. "it's only water and that's bad luck." "oh, you can challenge any amount of bad luck--i'm sure," he called back to her. i fancied that grogoff did not like this. he was drinking a great deal. he roughly called nina's attention. "nina... ah--nina!" but she, although i am certain that she heard him, paid no attention. he called again more loudly: "nina... nina!" "well?" she turned towards him, her eyes laughing at him. "drink my health." "i can't. i have only water." "then you must drink wine." "i won't. i detest it." "but you must." he came over to her and poured a little red wine into her water. she turned and emptied the glass over his hand. for an instant his face was dark with rage. "i'll pay you for that," i heard him whisper. she shrugged her shoulders. "he's tiresome, boris...." she said, "i like your englishman better." we were ever gayer and gayer. there were now of course no cakes nor biscuits, but there was jam with our tea, and there were even some chocolates. i noticed that vera and lawrence were getting on together famously. they talked and laughed, and her eyes were full of pleasure. markovitch came up and stood behind them, watching them. his eyes devoured his wife. "vera!" he said suddenly. "yes!" she cried. she had not known that he was behind her; she was startled. she turned round and he came forward and kissed her hand. she let him do this, as she let him do everything, with the indulgence that one allows a child. he stood, afterwards, half in the shadow, watching her. and now the moment for the event of the evening had arrived. the doors of markovitch's little work-room were suddenly opened, and there--instead of the shabby untidy dark little hole--there was a splendid christmas tree blazing with a hundred candles. coloured balls and frosted silver and wooden figures of red and blue hung all about the tree--it was most beautifully done. on a table close at hand were presents. we all clapped our hands. we were childishly delighted. the old great-aunt cried with pleasure. boris grogoff suddenly looked like a happy boy of ten. happiest and proudest of them all was markovitch. he stood there, a large pair of scissors in his hand, waiting to cut the string round the parcels. we said again and again, "marvellous!" "wonderful!" "splendid!"... "but this year--however did you find it, vera michailovna?" "to take such trouble!..." "splendid! splendid!" then we were given our presents. vera, it was obvious had chosen them, for there was taste and discrimination in the choice of every one. mine was a little old religious figure in beaten silver--lawrence had a silver snuff-box.... every one was delighted. we clapped our hands. we shouted. some one cried "cheers for our host and hostess!" we gave them, and in no half measure. we shouted. boris grogoff cried, "more cheers!" it was then that i saw markovitch's face that had been puckered with pleasure like the face of a delighted child suddenly stiffen, his hand moved forward, then dropped. i turned and found, standing in the doorway, quietly watching us, alexei petrovitch semyonov. xiii i stared at him. i could not take my eyes away. i instantly forgot every one else, the room, the tree, the lights.... with a force, with a poignancy and pathos and brutality that were more cruel than i could have believed possible that other world came back to me. ah! i could see now that all these months i had been running away from this very thing, seeking to pretend that it did not exist, that it had never existed. all in vain--utterly in vain. i saw semyonov as i had just seen him, sitting on his horse outside the shining white house at o----. then semyonov operating in a stinking room, under a red light, his arms bathed in blood; then semyonov and trenchard; then semyonov speaking to marie ivanovna, her eyes searching his face; then that day when i woke from my dream in the orchard to find his eyes staring at me through the bright green trees, and afterwards when we went in to look at her dead; then worst of all that ride back to the "stab" with my hand on his thick, throbbing arm.... semyonov in the forest, working, sneering, hating us, despising us, carrying his tragedy in his eyes and defying us to care; semyonov that last time of all, vanishing into the darkness with his "nothing!" that lingering echo of a defiant desperate soul that had stayed with me, against my bidding, ever since i had heard it. what a fool had i been to know these people! i had felt from the first to what it must lead, and i might have avoided it and i would not. i looked at him, i faced him, i smiled. he was the same as he had been. a little stouter, perhaps, his pale hair and square-cut beard looking as though it had been carved from some pale honey-coloured wood, the thick stolidity of his long body and short legs, the squareness of his head, the coldness of his eyes and the violent red of his lips, all were just as they had been--the same man, save that now he was in civilian clothes, in a black suit with a black bow tie. there was a smile on his lips, that same smile half sneer half friendliness that i knew so well. his eyes were veiled.... he was, i believe, as violently surprised to see me as i had been to see him, but he held himself in complete control! he said, "why, durward!... ivan andreievitch!" then he greeted the others. i was able, now, to notice the general effect of his arrival. it was as though a cold wind had suddenly burst through the windows, blown out all the candles upon the tree and plunged the place into darkness. those who did not know him felt that, with his entrance, the gaiety was gone. markovitch's face was pale, he was looking at vera who, for an instant, had stood, quite silently, staring at her uncle, then, recovering herself, moved forward. "why, uncle alexei!" she cried, holding out her hand. "you're too late for the tree! why didn't you tell us? then you could have come to dinner... and now it is all over. why didn't you tell us?" he took her hand, and, very solemnly, bent down and kissed it. "i didn't know myself, dear vera michailovna. i only arrived in petrograd yesterday; and then in my house everything was wrong, and i've been busy all day. but i felt that i must run in and give you the greetings of the season.... ah, nicholas, how are you? and you, ivan?... i telephoned to you.... nina, my dear...." and so on. he went round and shook hands with them all. he was introduced to bohun and lawrence. he was very genial, praising the tree, laughing, shouting in the ears of the great-aunt. but no one responded. as so frequently happens in russia the atmosphere was suddenly changed. no one had anything to say. the candles on the tree were blown out. of course, the evening was not nearly ended. there would be tea and games, perhaps--at any rate every one would sit and sit until three or four if, for no other reason, simply because it demanded too much energy to rise and make farewells. but the spirit of the party was utterly dead.... the samovar hissed at the end of the table. vera michailovna sat there making tea for every one. semyonov (i should now in the heart of his relations, have thought of him as alexei petrovitch, but so long had he been semyonov to me that semyonov he must remain) was next to her, and i saw that he took trouble, talking to her, smiling, his stiff strong white fingers now and then stroking his thick beard, his red lips parting a little, then closing so firmly that it seemed that they would never open again. i noticed that his eyes often wandered towards me. he was uneasy about my presence there, i thought, and that disturbed me. i felt as i looked at him the same confusion as i had always felt. i did not hate him. his strength of character, his fearlessness, these things in a country famous for neither quality i was driven to admire and to respect. and i could not hate what i admired. and yet my fear gathered and gathered in volume as i watched him. what would he do with these people? what plans had he? what purpose? what secret, selfish ambitions was he out now to secure? markovitch was silent, drinking his tea, watching his wife, watching us all with his nervous frowning expression. i rose to go and then, when i had said farewell to every one and went towards the door, semyonov joined me. "well, ivan andreievitch," he said. "so we have not finished with one another yet." he looked at me with his steady unswerving eyes; he smiled. i also smiled as i found my coat and hat in the little hall. sacha helped me into my shuba. he stood, his lips a little apart, watching me. "what have you been doing all this time?" he asked me. "i've been ill," i answered. "not had, i hope." "no, not had. but enough to keep me very idle." "as much of an optimist as ever?" "was i an optimist?" "why, surely. a charming one. do you love russia as truly as ever?" i laughed, my hand on the door. "that's my affair, alexei petrovitch," i answered. "certainly," he said, smiling. "you're looking older, you know." "you too," i said. "yes, perhaps. would i still think you sentimental, do you suppose?" "it is of no importance, alexei petrovitch," i said. "i'm sure you have other better things to do. are you remaining in petrograd?" he looked at me then very seriously, his eyes staring straight into mine. "i hope so." "you will work at your practice?" "perhaps." he nodded to me. "strange to find you here...." he said. "we shall meet again. good-night." he closed the door behind me. xiv next day i fell ill. i had felt unwell for several weeks, and now i woke up to a bad feverish cold, my body one vast ache, and at the same time impersonal, away from me, floating over above me, sinking under me, tied to me only by pain.... i was too utterly apathetic to care. the old woman who looked after my rooms telephoned to my doctor, a stout, red-faced jolly man, who came and laughed at me, ordered me some medicine, said that i was in a high fever, and left me. after that, i was, for several days, caught into a world of dreams and nightmares. no one, i think, came near me, save my old woman, marfa, and a new acquaintance of mine, the rat. the rat i had met some weeks before outside my house. i had been returning one evening, through the dark, with a heavy bag of books which i had fetched from an english friend of mine who lodged in the millionnaya. i had had a cab for most of the distance, but that had stopped on the other side of the bridge--it could not drive amongst the rubbish pebbles and spars of my island. as i staggered along with my bag a figure had risen, as it seemed to me, out of the ground and asked huskily whether he could help me. i had only a few steps to go, but he seized my burden and went in front of me. i submitted. i told him my door and he entered the dark passage, climbed the rickety stairs and entered my room. here we were both astonished. he, when i had lighted my lamp, was staggered by the splendour and luxury of my life, i, as i looked at him, by the wildness and uncouthness of his appearance. he was as a savage from the centre of africa, thick ragged hair and beard, a powerful body in rags, and his whole attitude to the world primeval and utterly primitive. his mouth was cruel; his eyes, as almost always with the russian peasant, mild and kindly. i do not intend to take up much space here with an account of him, but he did, after this first meeting, in some sort attach himself to me. i never learned his name nor where he lived; he was i should suppose an absolutely abominable plunderer and pirate and ruffian. he would appear suddenly in my room, stand by the door and talk--but talk with the ignorance, naïvete, brutal simplicity of an utterly abandoned baby. nothing mystical or beautiful about the rat. he did not disguise from me in the least that there was no crime that he had not committed--murder, rape, arson, immorality of the most hideous, sacrilege, the basest betrayal of his best friends--he was not only savage and outlaw, he was deliberate anarchist and murderer. he had no redeeming point that i could anywhere discover. i did not in the least mind his entering my room when he pleased. i had there nothing of any value; he could take my life even, had he a mind to that.... the naïve abysmal depths of his depravity interested me. he formed a kind of attachment to me. he told me that he would do anything for me. he had a strange tact which prevented him from intruding upon me when i was occupied. he was as quick as any cultured civilised cosmopolitan to see if he was not wanted. he developed a certain cleanliness; he told me, with an air of disdainful superiority, that he had been to the public baths. i gave him an old suit of mine and a pair of boots. he very seldom asked for anything; once and again he would point to something and say that he would like to have it; if i said that he could not he expressed no disappointment; sometimes he stole it, but he always acknowledged that he had done so if i asked him, although he would lie stupendously on other occasions for no reason at all. "now you must bring that back," i would say sternly. "oh no, barin.... why? you have so many things. surely you will not object. perhaps i will bring it--and perhaps not." "you must certainly bring it," i would say. "we will see," he would say, smiling at me in the friendliest fashion. he was the only absolutely happy russian i have ever known. he had no passages of despair. he had been in prison, he would be in prison again. he had spasms of the most absolute ferocity. on one occasion i thought that i should be his next victim, and for a moment my fate hung, i think, in the balance. but he changed his mind. he had a real liking for me, i think. when he could get it, he drank a kind of furniture polish, the only substitute in these days for vodka. this was an absolutely killing drink, and i tried to prove to him that frequent indulgence in it meant an early decease. that did not affect him in the least. death had no horror for him although, i foresaw, with justice as after events proved, that if he were faced with it he would be a very desperate coward. he liked very much my cigarettes, and i gave him these on condition that he did not spit sunflower seeds over my floor. he kept his word about this. he chatted incessantly, and sometimes i listened and sometimes not. he had no politics and was indeed comfortably ignorant of any sort of geography or party division. there were for him only the rich and the poor. he knew nothing about the war, but he hoped, he frankly told me, that there would be anarchy in petrograd, so that he might rob and plunder. "i will look after you then, barin," he answered me, "so that no one shall touch you." i thanked him. he was greatly amused by my russian accent, although he had no interest in the fact that i was english, nor did he want to hear in the least about london or any foreign town. marfa, my old servant, was, of course, horrified at this acquaintanceship of mine, and warned me that it would mean both my death and hers. he liked to tease and frighten her, but he was never rude to her and offered sometimes to help her with her work, an offer that she always indignantly refused. he had some children, he told me, but he did not know where they were. he tried to respect my hospitality, never bringing any friends of his with him, and only once coming when he was the worse for drink. on that occasion he cried and endeavoured to embrace me. he apologised for this the next day. they would try to take him soon, he supposed, for a soldier, but he thought that he would be able to escape. he hated the police, and would murder them all if he could. he told me great tales of their cruelty, and he cursed them most bitterly. i pointed out to him that society must be protected, but he did not see why this need be so. it was, he thought, wrong that some people had so much and others so little, but this was as far as his social investigations penetrated. he was really distressed by my illness. marfa told me that one day when i was delirious he cried. at the same time he pointed out to her that, if i died, certain things in my rooms would be his. he liked a silver cigarette case of mine, and my watch chain, and a signet ring that i wore. i saw him vaguely, an uncertain shadow in the mists of the first days of my fever. i was not, i suppose, in actual fact, seriously ill, and yet i abandoned myself to my fate, allowing myself to slip without the slightest attempt at resistance, along the easiest way, towards death or idiocy or paralysis, towards anything that meant the indifferent passivity of inaction. i had bad, confused dreams. the silence irritated me. i fancied to myself that the sea ought to make some sound, that it was holding itself deliberately quiescent in preparation for some event. i remember that marfa and the doctor prevented me from rising to look from my window that i might see why the sea was not roaring. some one said to me in my dreams something about "ice," and again and again i repeated the word to myself as though it were intensely significant. "ice! ice! ice!... yes, that was what i wanted to know!" my idea from this was that the floor upon which i rested was exceedingly thin, made only of paper in fact, and that at any moment it might give way and precipitate me upon the ice. this terrified me, and the way that the cold blew up through the cracks in the floor was disturbing enough. i knew that my doctor thought me mad to remain in such a place. but above all i was overwhelmed by the figure of semyonov. he haunted me in all my dreams, his presence never left me for a single instant. i could not be sure whether he were in the room or no, but certainly he was close to me... watching me, sneering at me as he had so often done before. i was conscious also of petrograd, of the town itself, in every one of its amazingly various manifestations. i saw it all laid out as though i were a great height above it--the fashionable streets, the nevski and the morskaia with the carriages and the motor-cars and trams, the kiosks and the bazaars, the women with their baskets of apples, the boys with the newspapers, the smart cinematographs, the shop in the morskaia with the coloured stones in the window, the oculist and the pastry-cook's and the hairdressers and the large "english shop" at the corner of the nevski, and pivato's the restaurant, and close beside it the art shop with popular post cards and books on serov and vrubel, and the astoria hotel with its shining windows staring on to s. isaac's square. and i saw the nevski, that straight and proud street, filled with every kind of vehicle and black masses of people, rolling like thick clouds up and down, here and there, the hum of their talk rising like mist from the snow. and there was the kazan cathedral, haughty and proud, and the book shop with the french books and complete sets of tchekov and merejkowsky in the window, and the bridges and the palaces and the square before the alexander theatre, and elisseieff's the provision shop, and all the banks, and the shops with gloves and shirts, all looking ill-fitting as though they were never meant to be worn, and then the little dirty shops poked in between the grand ones, the shop with rubber goods and the shop with an aquarium, gold-fish and snails and a tortoise, and the shop with oranges and bananas. then, too, there was the arcade with the theatre where they acted _romance_ and _potash and perlmutter_ (almost as they do in london), and on the other side of the street, at the corner of the sadovia, the bazaar with all its shops and its trembling mist of people. i watched the nevski, and saw how it slipped into the neva with the red square on one side of it, and s. isaac's square on the other, and the great station at the far end of it, and about these two lines the neva and the nevski, the whole town sprawled and crept, ebbed and flowed. away from the splendour it stretched, dirty and decrepit and untended, here piles of evil flats, there old wooden buildings with cobbled courts, and the canals twisting and creeping up and down through it all. it was all bathed, as i looked down upon it, in coloured mist. the air was purple and gold and light blue, fading into the snow and ice and transforming it. everywhere there were the masts of ships and the smell of the sea and rough deserted places--and shadows moved behind the shadows, and yet more shadows behind _them_, so that it was all uncertain and unstable, and only the river knew what it was about. over the whole town semyonov and i moved together, and the ice and snow silenced our steps, and no one in the whole place spoke a word, so that we had to lower our voices and whispered.... xv suddenly i was better. i quite recovered from my fever and only lay still on my bed, weak, and very hungry. i was happy, happy as i had not been since i came to petrograd. i felt all the luxury of convalescence creeping into my bones. all that i need do was to lie there and let people feed me and read a little if it did not make my head ache. i had a water-colour painted by alexander benois on the wall opposite me, a night in the caucasus, with a heavy sweep of black hill, a deep blue steady sky, and a thin grey road running into endless distance. a pleasing picture, with no finality in its appeal--intimate too, so that it was one's own road and one's own hill. i had bought it extravagantly, at last year's "_mir eskoustva_," and now i was pleased at my extravagance. marfa was very good to me, feeding me, and being cross with me to make me take an interest in things, and acting with wonderful judgement about my visitors. numbers of people, english and russian, came to see me--i had not known that i had so many friends. i felt amiable to all the world, and hopeful about it, too. i looked back on the period before my illness as a bad dream. people told me i was foolish to live out in this wretched place of mine, where it was cold and wild and lonely. and then when they came again they were not so sure, and they looked out on the ice that shone in waves and shadows of light under the sun, and thought that perhaps they too would try. but of course, i knew well that they would not.... as i grew stronger i felt an intense and burning interest in the history that had been developing when i fell ill. i heard that vera michailovna and nina had called many times. markovitch had been, and henry bohun and lawrence. then, one sunny afternoon, henry bohun came in and i was surprised at my pleasure at the sight of him. he was shocked at the change in me, and was too young to conceal it. "oh, you do look bad!" were his first words as he sat down by my bed. "i say, are you comfortable here? wouldn't you rather be somewhere with conveniences--telephone and lifts and things?" "not at all!" i answered. "i've got a telephone. i'm very happy where i am." "it is a queer place," he said. "isn't it awfully unhealthy?" "quite the reverse--with the sea in front of it! about the healthiest spot in petrograd!" "but i should get the blues here. so lonely and quiet. petrograd is a strange town! most people don't dream there's a queer place like this." "that's why i like it," i said. "i expect there are lots of queer places in petrograd if you only knew." he wandered about the room, looking at my few pictures and my books and my writing-table. at last he sat down again by my bed. "now tell me all the news," i said. "news?" he asked. he looked uncomfortable, and i saw at once that he had come to confide something in me. "what sort of news? political?" "anything." "well, politics are about the same. they say there's going to be an awful row in february when the duma meets--but then other people say there won't be a row at all until the war is over." "what else do they say?" "they say protopopoff is up to all sorts of tricks. that he says prayers with the empress and they summon rasputin's ghost.... that's all rot of course. but he does just what the empress tells him, and they're going to enslave the whole country and hand it over to germany." "what will they do that for?" i asked. "why, then, the czarevitch will have it--under germany. they say that none of the munitions are going to the front, and protopopoff's keeping them all to blow up the people here with." "what else?" i asked sarcastically. "no, but really, there's something in it, i expect." henry looked serious and important. "then on the other hand, clutton-davies says the czar's absolutely all right, dead keen on the war and hates germany... _i_ don't know--but clutton-davies sees him nearly every day." "anything else?" i asked. "oh, food's worse than ever! going up every day, and the bread queues are longer and longer. the germans have spies in the queues, women who go up and down telling people it's all england's fault." "and people are just the same?" "just the same; donons' and the bear are crowded every day. you can't get a table. so are the cinematographs and the theatres. i went to the ballet last night." "what was it?" "'la fille mal gardée'--karsavina dancing divinely. every one was there." this closed the strain of public information. i led him further. "well, bohun, what about our friends the markovitches?" i asked. "how are you getting on there?" he blushed and looked at his boots. "all right," he said. "they're very decent." then he burst out with: "i say, durward, what do you think of this uncle that's turned up, the doctor chap?" "nothing particular. why?" "you were with him at the front, weren't you?" "i was." "was he a good doctor?" "excellent." "he had a love affair at the front, hadn't he?" "yes." "and she was killed?" "yes." "poor devil...." then he added: "did he mind very much?" "very much." "funny thing, you wouldn't think he would." "why not," i asked. "oh, he looks a hard sort of fellow--as though he'd stand anything. i wouldn't like to have a row with him." "has he been to the markovitches much lately?" "yes--almost every evening." "what does he do there?" "oh, just sits and talks. markovitch can't bear him. you can see that easily enough. he teases him." "how do you mean?" i asked. "oh, he laughs at him all the time, at his inventions and that kind of thing. markovitch gets awfully wild. he is bit of an ass, isn't he?" "do you like semyonov?" i asked. "i do rather," said henry. "he's very decent to me. i had a walk with him one afternoon. he said you were awfully brave at the front." "thank him for nothing," i said. "and he said you didn't like him--don't you?" "ah, that's too old a story," i answered. "we know what we feel about one another." "well, lawrence simply hates him," continued bohun. "he says he's the most thundering cad, and as bad as you make them. i don't see how he can tell." this interested me extremely. "when did he tell you this?" i asked. "yesterday. i asked him what he had to judge by and he said instinct. i said he'd no right to go only by that." "has lawrence been much to the markovitches?" "yes--once or twice. he just sits there and never opens his mouth." "very wise of him if he hasn't got anything to say." "no, but really--do you think so? it doesn't make him popular." "why, who doesn't like him?" "nobody," answered henry ungrammatically. "none of the english anyway. they can't stand him at the embassy or the mission. they say he's fearfully stuck-up and thinks about nothing but himself.... i don't agree, of course--all the same, he might make himself more agreeable to people." "what nonsense!" i answered hotly. "lawrence is one of the best fellows that ever breathed. the markovitches don't dislike him, do they?" "no, he's quite different with them. vera michailovna likes him i know." it was the first time that he had mentioned her name to me. he turned towards me now, his face crimson. "i say--that's really what i came to talk about, durward. i care for her madly!... i'd die for her. i would really. i love her, durward. i see now i've never loved anybody before." "well, what will you do about it?" "do about it?... why nothing, of course. it's all perfectly hopeless. in the first place, there's markovitch." "yes. there's markovitch," i agreed. "she doesn't care for him--does she? you know that--" he waited, eagerly staring into my face. i had a temptation to laugh. he was so very young, so very helpless, and yet--that sense of his youth had pathos in it too, and i suddenly liked young bohun--for the first time. "look here, bohun," i said, trying to speak with a proper solemnity. "don't be a young ass. you know that it's hopeless, any feeling of that kind. she _does_ care for her husband. she could never care for you in that way, and you'd only make trouble for them all if you went on with it.... on the other hand, she needs a friend badly. you can do that for her. be her pal. see that things are all right in the house. make a friend of markovitch himself. look after _him!_" "look after markovitch!" bohun exclaimed. "yes... i don't want to be melodramatic, but there's trouble coming there; and if you're the friend of them all, you can help--more than you know. only none of the other business--" bohun flushed. "she doesn't know--she never will. i only want to be a friend of hers, as you put it. anything else is hopeless, of course. i'm not the kind of fellow she'd ever look at, even if markovitch wasn't there. but if i can do anything... i'd be awfully glad. what kind of trouble do you mean?" he asked. "probably nothing," i said; "only she wants a friend. and markovitch wants one too." there was a pause--then bohun said, "i say, durward--what an awful ass i was." "what about?" i asked. "about my poetry--and all that. thinking it so important." "yes," i said, "you were." "i've written some poetry to her and i tore it up," he ended. "that's a good thing," said i. "i'm glad i told you," he said. he got up to go. "i say, durward--" "well," i asked. "you're an awfully funny chap. not a bit what you look--" "that's all right," i said; "i know what you mean." "well, good-night," he said, and went. xvi i thought that night, as i lay cosily in my dusky room, of those old stories by wilkie collins that had once upon a time so deeply engrossed my interest--stories in which, because some one has disappeared on a snowy night, or painted his face blue, or locked up a room and lost the key, or broken down in his carriage on a windy night at the cross-roads, dozens of people are involved, diaries are written, confessions are made, and all the characters move along different roads towards the same lighted, comfortable inn. that is the kind of story that intrigues me, whether it be written about out-side mysteries by wilkie collins or inside mysteries by the great creator of "the golden bowl" or mysteries of both kinds, such as henry galleon has given us. i remember a friend of mine, james maradick, once saying to me, "it's no use trying to keep out of things. as soon as they want to put you in--you're in. the moment you're born, you're done for." it's just that spectacle of some poor innocent being suddenly caught into some affair, against his will, without his knowledge, but to the most serious alteration of his character and fortunes, that one watches with a delight almost malicious--whether it be _the woman in white, the wings of the dove,_ or _the roads_ that offer it us. well, i had now to face the fact that something of this kind had happened to myself. i was drawn in--and i was glad. i luxuriated in my gladness, lying there in my room under the wavering, uncertain light of two candles, hearing the church bells clanging and echoing mysteriously beyond the wall. i lay there with a consciousness of being on the very verge of some adventure, with the assurance, too, that i was to be of use once more, to play my part, to fling aside, thank god, that old cloak of apathetic disappointment, of selfish betrayal, of cynical disbelief. semyonov had brought the old life back to me and i had shrunk from the impact of it; but he had brought back to me, too, the presences of my absent friends who, during these weary months, had been lost to me. it seemed to me that, in the flickering twilight, john and marie were bringing forward to me vera and nina and jerry and asking me to look after them.... i would do my best. and while i was thinking of these things vera michailovna came in. she was suddenly in the room, standing there, her furs up to her throat, her body in shadow, but her large, grave eyes shining through the candlelight, her mouth smiling. "is it all right?" she said, coming forward. "i'm not in the way? you're not sleeping?" i told her that i was delighted to see her. "i've been almost every day, but marfa told me you were not well enough. she _does_ guard you--like a dragon. but to-night nina and i are going to rozanov's, to a party, and she said she'd meet me here.... shan't i worry you?" "worry me! you're the most restful friend i have--" i felt so glad to see her that i was surprised at my own happiness. she sat down near to me, very quietly, moving, as she always did, softly and surely. i could see that she was distressed because i looked ill, but she asked me no tiresome questions, said nothing about my madness in living as i did (always so irritating, as though i were a stupid child), praised the room, admired the benois picture, and then talked in her soft, kindly voice. "we've missed you so much, nina and i," she said. "i told nina that if she came to-night she wasn't to make a noise and disturb you." "she can make as much noise as she likes," i said. "i like the right kind of noise." we talked a little about politics and england and anything that came into our minds. we both felt, i know, a delightful, easy intimacy and friendliness and trust. i had never with any other woman felt such a sense of friendship, something almost masculine in its comradeship and honesty. and to-night this bond between us strengthened wonderfully. i blessed my luck. i saw that there were dark lines under her eyes and that she was pale. "you're tired," i said. "yes, i am," she acknowledged. "and i don't know why. at least, i do know. i'm going to use you selfishly, durdles. i'm going to tell you all my troubles and ask your help in every possible way. i'm going to let you off nothing." i took her hand. "i'm proud," i said, "now and always." "do you know that i've never asked any one's help before? i was rather conceited that i could get on always without it. when i was very small i wouldn't take a word of advice from any one, and mother and father, when i was tiny, used to consult me about everything. then they were killed and i _had_ to go on alone.... and after that, when i married nicholas, it was i again who decided everything. and my mistakes taught me nothing. i didn't want them to teach me." she spoke that last word fiercely, and through the note that came into her voice i saw suddenly the potentialities that were in her, the other creature that she might be if she were ever awakened. she talked then for a long time. she didn't move at all; her head rested on her hand and her eyes watched me. as i listened i thought of my other friend marie, who now was dead, and how restless she was when she spoke, moving about the room, stopping to demand my approval, protesting against my criticism, laughing, crying out.... vera was so still, so wise, too, in comparison with marie, braver too--and yet the same heart, the same charity, the same nobility. but she was my friend, and marie i had loved.... the difference in that! and how much easier now to help than it had been then, simply because one's own soul _was_ one's own and one stood by oneself! how happy a thing freedom is--and how lonely! she told me many things that i need not repeat here, but, as she talked, i saw how, far more deeply than i had imagined, nina had been the heart of the whole of her life. she had watched over her, protected her, advised her, warned her, and loved her, passionately, jealously, almost madly all the time. "when i married nicholas," she said, "i thought of nina more than any one else. that was wrong.... i ought to have thought most of nicholas; but i knew that i could give her a home, that she could have everything she wanted. and still she would be with me. nicholas was only too ready for that. i thought i would care for her until some one came who was worthy of her, and who would look after her far better than i ever could. "but the only person who had come was boris grogoff. he loved nina from the first moment, in his own careless, conceited, opinionated way." "why did you let him come so often to the house if you didn't approve of him?" i asked. "how could i prevent it?" she asked me. "we russians are not like the english. in england i know you just shut the door and say, 'not at home.' "here if any one wanted to come he comes. very often we hate him for coming, but still there it is. it is too much trouble to turn him out, besides it wouldn't be kind--and anyway they wouldn't go. you can be as rude as you like here and nobody cares. for a long while nina paid no attention to boris. she doesn't like him. she will never like him, i'm sure. but now, these last weeks, i've begun to be afraid. in some way, he has power over her--not much power, but a little--and she is so young, so ignorant--she knows nothing. "until lately she always told me everything. now she tells me nothing. she's strange with me; angry for nothing. then sorry and sweet again--then suddenly angry.... she's excited and wild, going out all the time, but unhappy too.... i _know_ she's unhappy. i can feel it as though it were myself." "you're imagining things," i said. "now when the war's reached this period we're all nervous and overstrung. the atmosphere of this town is enough to make any one fancy that they see anything. nina's all right." "i'm losing her! i'm losing her!" vera cried, suddenly stretching out her hand as though in a gesture of appeal. "she must stay with me. i don't know what's happening to her. ah, and i'm so lonely without her!" there was silence between us for a little, and then she went on. "durdles, i did wrong to marry nicholas--wrong to nina, wrong to nicholas, wrong to myself, i thought it was right. i didn't love nicholas--i never loved him and i never pretended to. he knew that i did not. but i thought then that i was above love, that knowledge was what mattered. ideas--saving the world--and he had _such_ ideas! wonderful! there was, i thought, nothing that he would not be able to do if only he were helped enough. he wanted help in every way. he was such a child, so unhappy, so lonely, i thought that i could give him everything that he needed. don't fancy that i thought that i sacrificed myself. i felt that i was the luckiest girl in all the world--and still, now when i see that he is not strong enough for his ideas i care for him as i did then, and i would never let any trouble touch him if i could help it. but if--if--" she paused, turned away from me, looking towards the window. "if, after all, i was wrong. if, after all, i was meant to love. if love were to come now... real love... now...." she broke off, suddenly stood up, and very low, almost whispering, said: "i have fancied lately that it might come. and then, what should i do? oh, what should i do? with nicholas and nina and all the trouble there is now in the world--and russia--i'm afraid of myself--and ashamed...." i could not speak. i was utterly astonished. could it be bohun of whom she was speaking? no, i saw at once that the idea was ludicrous. but if not--. i took her hand. "vera," i said. "believe me. i'm much older than you, and i know. love's always selfish, always cruel to others, always means trouble, sorrow, and disappointment. but it's worth it, even when it brings complete disaster. life isn't life without it." i felt her hand tremble in mine. "i don't know," she said, "i know nothing of it, except my love for nina. it isn't that now there's anybody. don't think that. there is no one--no one. only my self-confidence is gone. i can't see clearly any more. my duty is to nina and nicholas. and if they are happy nothing else matters--nothing. and i'm afraid that i'm going to do them harm." she paused as though she were listening. "there's no one there, is there?" she asked me--"there by the door?" "no--no one." "there are so many noises in this house. don't they disturb you?" "i don't think of them now. i'm used to them--and in fact i like them." she went on: "it's uncle alexei of course. he comes to see us nearly every day. he's very pleasant, more pleasant than he has ever been before, but he has a dreadful effect on nicholas--" "i know the effect he can have," i said. "i know that nicholas has been feeling for a long time that his inventions are no use. he will never own it to me or to any one--but i can tell. i know it so well. the war came and his new feeling about russia carried him along. he put everything into that. now that has failed him, and he despises himself for having expected it to do otherwise. he's raging about, trying to find something that he can believe in, and uncle alexei knows that and plays on that.... he teases him; he drives him wild and then makes him happy again. he can do anything with him he pleases. he always could. but now he has some plan. i used to think that he simply laughed at people because it amused him to see how weak they can be. but now there's more than that. he's been hurt himself at last, and that has hurt his pride, and he wants to hurt back.... it's all in the dark. the war's in the dark... everything...." then she smiled and put her hand on my arm. "that's why i've come to you, because i trust you and believe you and know you say what you mean." once before marie had said those same words to me. it was as though i heard her voice again. "i won't fail you," i said. there was a knock on the door, it was flung open as though by the wind, and nina was with us. her face was rosy with the cold, her eyes laughed under her little round fur cap. she came running across the room, pulled herself up with a little cry beside the bed, and then flung herself upon me, throwing her arms around my neck and kissing me. "my dear nina!" cried vera. she looked up, laughing. "why not? poor durdles. are you better? _biédnie_... give me your hands. but--how cold they are! and there are draughts everywhere. i've brought you some chocolates--and a book." "my dear!..." vera cried again. "he won't like _that_," pointing to a work of fiction by a modern russian literary lady whose heart and brain are of the succulent variety. "why not? she's very good. it's lovely! all about impossible people! durdles, _dear_! i'll give up the party. we won't go. we'll sit here and entertain you. i'll send boris away. we'll tell him we don't want him." "boris!" cried vera. "yes," nina laughed a little uneasily, i thought. "i know you said he wasn't to come. he'll quarrel with rozanov of course. but he said he would. and so how was one to prevent him? you're always so tiresome, vera.... i'm not a baby now, nor is boris. if he wants to come he shall come." vera stood away from us both. i could see that she was very angry. i had never seen her angry before. "you know that it's impossible, nina," she said. "you know that rozanov hates him. and besides--there are other reasons. you know them perfectly well, nina." nina stood there pouting, tears were in her eyes. "you're unfair," she said. "you don't let me do anything. you give me no freedom, i don't care for boris, but if he wants to go he shall go. i'm grown up now. you have your lawrence. let me have my boris." "my lawrence?" asked vera. "yes. you know that you're always wanting him to come--always looking for him. i like him, too. i like him very much. but you never let me talk to him. you never--" "quiet, nina." vera's voice was trembling. her face was sterner than i'd ever seen it. "you're making me angry." "i don't care how angry i make you. it's true. you're impossible now. why shouldn't i have my friends? i've nobody now. you never let me have anybody. and i like mr. lawrence--" she began to sob, looking the most desolate figure. vera turned. "you don't know what you've said, nina, nor how you've hurt.... you can go to your party as you please--" and before i could stop her she was gone. nina turned to me a breathless, tearful face. she waited; we heard the door below closed. "oh, durdles, what have i done?" "go after her! stop her!" i said. nina vanished and i was alone. my room was intensely quiet. xvii they didn't come to see me again together. vera came twice, kind and good as always, but with no more confidences; and nina once with flowers and fruit and a wild chattering tongue about the cinemas and smyrnov, who was delighting the world at the narodny dom, and the wonderful performance of lermontov's "masquerade" that was shortly to take place at the alexander theatre. "are you and vera friends again?" i asked her. "oh yes! why not?" and she went on, snapping a chocolate almond between her teeth--"the one at the 'piccadilly' is the best. it's an italian one, and there's a giant in it who throws people all over the place, out of windows and everywhere. ah! how lovely!... i wish i could go every night." "you ought to be helping with the war," i said severely. "oh, i hate the war!" she answered. "we're all terribly tired of it. tanya's given up going to the english hospital now, and is just meaning to be as gay as she can be; and zinaida fyodorovna had just come back from her otriad on the galician front, and she says it's shocking there now--no food or dancing or anything. why doesn't every one make peace?" "do you want the germans to rule russia?" i asked. "why not?" she said, laughing. "we can't do it ourselves. we don't care who does it. the english can do it if they like, only they're too lazy to bother. the german's aren't lazy, and if they were here we'd have lots of theatres and cinematographs." "don't you love your country?" i asked. "this isn't our country," she answered. "it just belongs to the empress and protopopoff." "supposing it became your country and the emperor went?" "oh, then it would belong to a million different people, and in the end no one would have anything. can't you see how they'd fight?"... she burst out laughing: "boris and nicholas and uncle alexei and all the others!" then she was suddenly serious. "i know, durdles, you consider that i'm so young and frivolous that i don't think of anything serious. but i can see things like any one else. can't you see that we're all so disappointed with ourselves that nothing matters? we thought the war was going to be so fine--but now it's just like the japanese one, all robbery and lies--and we can't do anything to stop it." "perhaps some day some one will," i said. "oh yes!" she answered scornfully, "men like boris." after that she refused to be grave for a moment, danced about the room, singing, and finally vanished, a whirlwind of blue silk. * * * * * a week later i was out in the world again. that curious sense of excitement that had first come to me during the early days of my illness burnt now more fiercely than ever. i cannot say what it was exactly that i thought was going to happen. i have often looked back, as many other people must have done, to those days in february and wondered whether i foresaw anything of what was to come, and what were the things that might have seemed to me significant if i had noticed them. and here i am deliberately speaking of both public and private affairs. i cannot quite frankly dissever the two. at the front, a year and a half before, i had discovered how intermingled the souls of individuals and the souls of countries were, and how permanent private history seemed to me and how transient public events; but whether that was true or no before, it was now most certain that it was the story of certain individuals that i was to record,--the history that was being made behind them could at its best be only a background. i seemed to step into a city ablaze with a sinister glory. if that appears melodramatic i can only say that the dazzling winter weather of those weeks was melodramatic. never before had i seen the huge buildings tower so high, never before felt the shadows so vast, the squares and streets so limitless in their capacity for swallowing light and colour. the sky was a bitter changeless blue; the buildings black; the snow and ice, glittering with purple and gold, swept by vast swinging shadows as though huge doors opened and shut in heaven, or monstrous birds hovered, their wings spread, motionless in the limitless space. and all this had, as ever, nothing to do with human life. the little courtyards with their woodstacks and their coloured houses, carts and the cobbled squares and the little stumpy trees that bordered the canals and the little wooden huts beside the bridges with their candles and fruit--these were human and friendly and good, but they had their precarious condition like the rest of us. on the first afternoon of my new liberty i found myself in the nevski prospect, bewildered by the crowds and the talk and trams and motors and carts that passed in unending sequence up and down the long street. standing at the corner of the sadovia and the nevski one was carried straight to the point of the golden spire that guarded the farther end of the great street. all was gold, the surface of the road was like a golden stream, the canal was gold, the thin spire caught into its piercing line all the colour of the swiftly fading afternoon; the wheels of the carriages gleamed, the flower-baskets of the women glittered like shining foam, the snow flung its crystal colour into the air like thin fire dim before the sun. the street seemed to have gathered on to its pavements the citizens of every country under the sun. tartars, mongols, little russians, chinamen, japanese, french officers, british officers, peasants and fashionable women, schoolboys, officials, actors and artists and business men and priests and sailors and beggars and hawkers and, guarding them all, friendly, urbane, filled with a pleasant self-importance that seemed at that hour the simplest and easiest of attitudes, the police. "rum--rum--rum--whirr--whirr--whirr--whirr"--like the regular beat of a shuttle the hum rose and fell, as the sun faded into rosy mist and white vapours stole above the still canals. i turned to go home and felt some one touch my elbow. i swung round and there, his broad face ruddy with the cold, was jerry lawrence. i was delighted to see him and told him so. "well, i'm damned glad," he said gruffly. "i thought you might have a grudge against me." "a grudge?" i said. "why?" "haven't been to see you. heard you were ill, but didn't think you'd want me hanging round." "why this modesty?" i asked. "no--well--you know what i mean." he shuffled his feet. "no good in a sick-room." "mine wasn't exactly a sick-room," i said. "but i heard that you did come." "yes. i came twice," he answered, looking at me shyly. "your old woman wouldn't let me see you." "never mind that," i said; "let's have an evening together soon." "yes--as soon as you like." he looked up and down the street. "there are some things i'd like to ask your advice about." "certainly," i said. "what do you say to coming and dining at my place? ever met wilderling?" "wilderling?" i could not remember for the moment the name. "yes--the old josser i live with. fine old man--got a point of view of his own!" "delighted," i said. "to-morrow. eight o'clock. don't dress." he was just going off when he turned again. "awfully glad you're better," he said. he cleared his throat, looked at me in a very friendly way, then smiled. "_awfully_ glad you're better," he repeated, then went off, rolling his broad figure into the evening mist. i turned towards home. xviii i arrived at the baron's punctually at eight o'clock. his flat was in a small side street off the english quay. i paused for a moment, before turning into its dark recesses, to gather in the vast expanse of the frozen river and the long white quay. it was as though i had found my way behind a towering wall that now closed me in with a smile of contemptuous derision. there was no sound in the shining air and the only figure was a guard who moved monotonously up and down outside the winter palace. i rang the bell and the "schwitzer," bowing very ceremoniously, told me the flat was on the second floor. i went up a broad stone staircase and found a heavy oak door with brass nails confronting me. when this slowly swung open i discovered a very old man with white hair bowing before me. he was a splendid figure in a uniform of dark blue, his tall thin figure straight and slim, his white moustaches so neat and fierce that they seemed to keep guard over the rest of his face as though they warned him that they would stand no nonsense. there was an air of hushed splendour behind him, and i could hear the heavy, solemn ticking of a clock keeping guard over all the austere sanctities of the place. when i had taken off my shuba and goloshes i was ushered into a magnificent room with a high gold clock on the mantlepiece, gilt chairs, heavy dark carpets and large portraits frowning from the grey walls. the whole room was bitterly silent, save for the tick of the clock. there was no fire in the fireplace, but a large gleaming white stove flung out a close scented heat from the further corner of the room. there were two long glass bookcases, some little tables with gilt legs, and a fine japanese screen of dull gold. the only other piece of furniture was a huge grand piano near the window. i sat down and was instantly caught into the solemn silence. there was something threatening in the hush of it all. "we do what we're told," the clock seemed to say, "and so must you." i thought of the ice and snow beyond the windows, and, in spite of myself, shivered. then the door opened and the baron came in. he stood for a moment by the door, staring in front of him as though he could not penetrate the heavy and dusky air, and seen thus, under the height and space of the room, he seemed so small as to be almost ridiculous. but he was not ridiculous for long. as he approached one was struck at once by the immaculate efficiency that followed him like a protecting shadow. in himself he was a scrupulously neat old man with weary and dissipated eyes, but behind the weariness, the neatness, and dissipation was a spirit of indomitable determination and resolution. he wore a little white imperial and a long white moustache. his hair was brushed back and his forehead shone like marble. he wore a black suit, white spats, and long, pointed, black patent-leather shoes. he had the smallest feet i have ever seen on any man. he greeted me with great courtesy. his voice was soft, and he spoke perfect english, save for a very slight accent that was rather charming; this gave his words a certain naïvete. he rubbed his hands and smiled in a gentle but determined way, as though he meant no harm by it, but had decided that it was a necessary thing to do. i forget of what we talked, but i know that i surrendered myself at once to an atmosphere that had been strange to me for so long that i had almost forgotten its character--an atmosphere of discipline, order, comfort, and above all, of security. my mind flew to the markovitches, and i smiled to myself at the thought of the contrast. then, strangely, when i had once thought of the markovitch flat the picture haunted me for the rest of the evening. i could see the baron's gilt chairs and gold clock, his little imperial and shining shoes only through the cloudy disorder of the markovitch tables and chairs. there was poor markovitch in his dark little room perched on his chair with his boots, with his hands, with his hair... and there was poor uncle and there poor vera.... why was i pitying them? i gloried in them. that is russia... this is.... "allow me to introduce you to my wife," the baron said, bending forward, the very points of his toes expressing amiability. the baroness was a large solid lady with a fine white bosom and strong white arms. her face was homely and kind; i saw at once that she adored her husband; her placid smile carried beneath its placidity a tremulous anxiety that he should be pleased, and her mild eyes swam in the light of his encouragement. i was sure, however, that the calm and discipline that i felt in the things around me came as much from her domesticity as from his discipline. she was a fortunate woman in that she had attained the ambition of her life--to govern the household of a man whom she could both love and fear. lawrence came in, and we went through high folding doors into the dining-room. this room had dark-blue wall-paper, electric lights heavily shaded, and soft heavy carpets. the table itself was flooded with light--the rest of the room was dusk. i wondered as i looked about me why the wilderlings had taken lawrence as a paying guest. before my visit i had imagined that they were poor, as so many of the better-class russians were, but here were no signs of poverty. i decided that. our dinner was good, and the wine was excellent. we talked, of course, politics, and the baron was admirably frank. "i won't disguise from you, m. durward," he said, "that some of us watch your english effort at winning the heart of this country with sympathy, but also, if i am not offending you, with some humour. i'm not speaking only of your propaganda efforts. you've got, i know, one or two literary gentlemen here--a novelist, i think, and a professor and a journalist. well, soon you'll find them inefficient, and decide that you must have some commercial gentlemen, and then, disappointed with them, you'll decide for the military... and still the great heart of russia will remain untouched." "yes," i said, "because your class are determined that the peasant shall remain uneducated, and until he is educated he will be unable to approach any of us." "quite so," said the baron smiling at me very cheerfully. "i perceive, m. durward, that you are a democrat. so are we all, these days.... you look surprised, but i assure you that the good of the people in the interests of the people is the only thing for which any of us care. only some of us know russia pretty well, and we know that the russian peasant is not ready for liberty, and if you were to give him liberty to-night you would plunge his country into the most desperate torture of anarchy and carnage known in history. a little more soup?--we are offering you only a slight dinner." "yes, but, baron," i said, "would you tell me when it is intended that the russian peasant shall begin his upward course towards light and learning? if that day is to be for ever postponed?" "it will not be for ever postponed," said the baron gently. "let us finish the war, and education shall be given slowly, under wise direction, to every man, woman, and child in the country. our czar is the most liberal ruler in europe--and he knows what is good for his children." "and protopopoff and stürmer?" i asked. "protopopoff is a zealous, loyal liberal, but he has been made to see during these last months that russia is not at this moment ready for freedom. stürmer--well, m. stürmer is gone." "so you, yourself, baron," i asked, "would oppose at this moment all reform?" "with every drop of blood in my body," he answered, and his hand flat against the tablecloth quivered. "at this crisis admit one change and your dyke is burst, your land flooded. every russian is asked at this moment to believe in simple things--his religion, his czar, his country. grant your reforms, and in a week every babbler in the country will be off his head, talking, screaming, fighting. the germans will occupy russia at their own good time, you will be beaten on the west and civilisation will be set back two hundred years. the only hope for russia is unity, and for unity you must have discipline, and for discipline, in russia at any rate, you must have an autocracy." as he spoke the furniture, the grey walls, the heavy carpets, seemed to whisper an echo of his words: "unity... discipline... discipline... autocracy... autocracy... autocracy...." "then tell me, baron," i said, "if it isn't an impertinent question, do you feel so secure in your position that you have no fears at all? does such a crisis, as for instance milyukoff's protest last november, mean nothing? you know the discontent.... is there no fear....?" "fear!" he interrupted me, his voice swift and soft and triumphant. "m. durward, are you so ignorant of russia that you consider the outpourings of a few idealistic intelligentzia, professors and teachers and poets, as important? what about the people, m. durward? you ask any peasant in the moscow government, or little russia, or the ukraine whether he will remain loyal to his little father or no! ask--and the question you suggested to me will be answered." "then, you feel both secure and justified?" i said. "we feel both secure and justified"--he answered me, smiling. after that our conversation was personal and social. lawrence was very quiet. i observed that the baroness had a motherly affection for him, that she saw that he had everything that he wanted, and that she gave him every now and then little friendly confidential smiles. as the meal proceeded, as i drank the most excellent wine and the warm austerity of my surroundings gathered ever more closely around me, i wondered whether after all my apprehensions and forebodings of the last weeks had not been the merest sick man's cowardice. surely if any kingdom in the world was secure, it was this official russia. i could see it stretching through the space and silence of that vast land, its servants in every village, its paths and roads all leading back to the central citadel, its whispered orders flying through the air from district to district, its judgements, its rewards, its sins, its virtues, resting upon a basis of superstition and ignorance and apathy, the three sure friends of autocracy through history! and on the other side--who? the rat, boris grogoff, markovitch. yes, the baron had reason for his confidence.... i thought for a moment of that figure that i had seen on christmas eve by the river--the strong grave bearded peasant whose gaze had seemed to go so far beyond the bounds of my own vision. but no! russia's mystical peasant--that was an old tale. once, on the front, when i had seen him facing the enemy with bare hands, i had, myself, believed it. now i thought once more of the rat--_that_ was the type whom i must now confront. i had a most agreeable evening. i do not know how long it had been since i had tasted luxury and comfort and the true fruits of civilisation. the baron was a most admirable teller of stories, with a capital sense of humour. after dinner the baroness left us for half an hour, and the baron became very pleasantly rabelaisian, speaking of his experiences in paris and london, vienna and berlin so easily and with so ready a wit that the evening flew. the baroness returned and, seeing that it was after eleven, i made my farewells. lawrence said that he would walk with me down the quay before turning into bed. my host and hostess pressed me to come as often as possible. the baron's last words to me were: "have no fears, m. durward. there is much talk in this country, but we are a lazy people." the "we" rang strangely in my ears. "he's of course no more a russian than you or i," i said to lawrence, as we started down the quay. "oh yes, he is!" lawrence said. "quite genuine--not a drop of german blood in spite of the name. but he's a prussian at heart--a prussian of the prussians. by that i don't mean in the least that he wants germany to win the war. he doesn't--his interests are all here, and you mayn't believe me, but i assure you he's a patriot. he loves russia, and he wants what's best for her--and believes that to be autocracy." after that lawrence shut up. he would not say another word. we walked for a long time in silence. the evening was most beautiful. a golden moon flung the snow into dazzling relief against the deep black of the palaces. across the neva the line of towers and minarets and chimneys ran like a huge fissure in the golden, light from sky to sky. "you said there was something you wanted to ask my advice about?" i broke the silence. he looked at me with his long slow considering stare. he mumbled something; then, with a sudden gesture, he gripped my arm, and his heavy body quivering with the urgency of his words he said: "it's vera markovitch.... i'd give my body and soul and spirit for her happiness and safety.... god forgive me, i'd give my country and my honour.... i ache and long for her, so that i'm afraid for my sanity. i've never loved a woman, nor lusted for one, nor touched one in my whole life, durward--and now... and now... i've gone right in. i've spoken no word to any one; but i couldn't stand my own silence.... durward, you've got to help me!" i walked on, seeing the golden light and the curving arc of snow and the little figures moving like dolls from light to shadow. lawrence! i had never thought of him as an urgent lover; even now, although i could still feel his hand quivering on my arm, i could have laughed at the ludicrous incongruity of romance, and that stolid thick-set figure. and at the same time i was afraid. lawrence in love was no boy on the threshold of life like bohun... here was no trivial passion. i realised even in that first astonished moment the trouble that might be in store for all of us. "look here, lawrence!" i said at last. "the first thing that you may as well realise is that it is hopeless. vera michailovna has confided in me a good deal lately, and she is devoted to her husband, thinks of nothing else. she's simple, naïve, with all her sense and wisdom...." "hopeless!" he interrupted, and he gave a kind of grim chuckle of derision. "my dear durward, what do you suppose i'm after?... rape and adultery and markovitch after us with a pistol? i tell you--" and here he spoke fiercely, as though he were challenging the whole ice-bound world around us--"that i want nothing but her happiness, her safety, her comfort! do you suppose that i'm such an ass as not to recognise the kind of thing that my loving her would lead to? i tell you i'm after nothing for myself, and that not because i'm a fine unselfish character, but simply because the thing's too big to let anything into it but herself. she shall never know that i care twopence about her, but she's got to be happy and she's got to be safe.... just now, she's neither of those things, and that's why i've spoken to you.... she's unhappy and she's afraid, and that's got to change. i wouldn't have spoken of this to you if i thought you'd be so short-sighted...." "all right! all right!" i said testily. "you may be a kind of galahad, lawrence, outside all natural law. i don't know, but you'll forgive me if i go for a moment on my own experience--and that experience is, that you can start on as highbrow an elevation as you like, but love doesn't stand still, and the body's the body, and to-morrow isn't yesterday--not by no means. moreover, markovitch is a russian and a peculiar one at that. finally, remember that i want vera michailovna to be happy quite as much as you do!" he was suddenly grave and almost boyish in his next words. "i know that--you're a decent chap, durward--i know it's hard to believe me, but i just ask you to wait and test me. no one knows of this--that i'd swear--and no one shall; but what's the matter with her, durward, what's she afraid of? that's why i spoke to you. you know her, and i'll throttle you here where we stand if you don't tell me just what the trouble is. i don't care for confidences or anything of the sort. you must break them all and tell me--" his hand was on my arm again, his big ugly face, now grim and obstinate, close against mine. "i'll tell you," i said slowly, "all i know, which is almost nothing. the trouble is semyonov, the doctor. why or how i can't say, although i've seen enough of him in the past to know the trouble he _can_ be. she's afraid of him, and markovitch is afraid of him. he likes playing on people's nerves. he's a bitter, disappointed man, who loved desperately once, as only real sensualists can... and now he's in love with a ghost. that's why real life maddens him." "semyonov!" lawrence whispered the name. we had come to the end of the quay. my dear church with its round grey wall stood glistening in the moonlight, the shadows from the snow rippling up its sides, as though it lay under water. we stood and looked across the river. "i've always hated that fellow," lawrence said. "i've only seen him about twice, but i believe i hated him before i saw him.... all right, durward, that's what i wanted to know. thank you. good-night." and before i could speak he had gripped my hand, had turned back, and was walking swiftly away, across the golden-lighted quay. xix from the moment that lawrence left me, vanishing into the heart of the snow and ice, i was obsessed by a conviction of approaching danger and peril. it has been one of the most disastrous weaknesses of my life that i have always shrunk from precipitate action. before the war it had seemed to many of us that life could be jockeyed into decisions by words and theories and speculations. the swift, and, as it were, revengeful precipitancy of the last three years had driven me into a self-distrust and cowardice which had grown and grown until life had seemed veiled and distant and mysteriously obscure. from my own obscurity, against my will, against my courage, against my own knowledge of myself, circumstances were demanding that i should advance and act. it was of no avail to myself that i should act unwisely, that i should perhaps only precipitate a crisis that i could not help. i was forced to act when i would have given my soul to hold aloof, and in this town, whose darkness and light, intrigue and display, words and action, seemed to derive some mysterious force from the very soil, from the very air, the smallest action achieved monstrous proportions. when you have lived for some years in russia you do not wonder that its citizens prefer inaction to demonstration--the soil is so much stronger than the men who live upon it. nevertheless, for a fortnight i did nothing. private affairs of an especially tiresome kind filled my days--i saw neither lawrence nor vera, and, during that period, i scarcely left my rooms. there was much expectation in the town that february th, when the duma was appointed to meet, would be a critical day. fine things were said of the challenging speeches that would be made, of the firm stand that the cadet party intended to take, of the crisis with which the court party would be faced. of course nothing occurred. it may be safely said that, in russian affairs, no crisis occurs, either in the place or at the time, or in the manner in which it is expected. time with us here refuses to be caught by the throat. that is the revenge that it takes on the scorn with which, in russia, it is always covered. on the th of february i received an invitation to nina's birthday party. she would be eighteen on the th. she scribbed at the bottom of vera's note: dear durdles--if you don't come i will never forgive you.--your loving nina. the immediate problem was a present. i knew that nina adored presents, but petrograd was now no easy place for purchases, and i wished, i suppose as a kind of tribute to her youth and freshness and colour, to give her something for which she would really care. i sallied out on a wonderful afternoon when the town was a blaze of colour, the walls dark red, dark brown, violet, pink, and the snow a dazzling glitter of crystal. the bells were ringing for some festival, echoing as do no other bells in the world from wall to wall, roof to roof, canal to canal. everybody moved as though they were inspired with a gay sense of adventure, men and women laughing; the isvostchicks surveying possible fares with an eye less patronising and lugubrious than usual, the flower women and the beggars and the little chinese boys and the wicked old men who stare at you as though they were dreaming of eastern debauches, shared in the sun and tang of the air and high colour of the sky and snow. i pushed my way into the shop in the morskaia that had the coloured stones--the blue and azure and purple stones--in the window. inside the shop, which had a fine gleaming floor, and an old man with a tired eye, there were stones of every colour, but there was nothing there for nina--all was too elaborate and grand. near the nevski is a fine shop of pictures with snow scenes and blue rivers and italian landscapes, and copies of repin and verestchagin, and portraits of the czar. i searched here, but all were too sophisticated in their bright brown frames, and their air of being the latest thing from paris and london. then i crossed the road, threading my way through the carriages and motor cars, past the old white-bearded sweeper with the broom held aloft, gazing at the sky, and plunged into the english shop to see whether i might buy something warm for nina. here, indeed, i could fancy that i was in the high street in chester, or leicester, or truro, or canterbury. a demure english provincialism was over everything, and a young man in a high white collar and a shiny black coat, washed his hands as he told me that "they hadn't any in stock at the moment, but they were expecting a delivery of goods at any minute." russian shopmen, it is almost needless to say, do not care whether they have goods in stock or no. they have other things to think about. the air was filled with the chatter of english governesses, and an english clergyman and his wife were earnestly turning over a selection of woollen comforters. nothing here for nina--nothing at all. i hurried away. with a sudden flash of inspiration i realised that it was in the jews' market that i would find what i wanted. i snatched at the bulging neck of a sleeping coachman, and before he was fully awake was in his sledge, and had told him my destination. he grumbled and wished to know how much i intended to pay him, and when i said one and a half roubles, answered that he would not take me for less than three. i threatened him then with the fat and good-natured policeman who always guarded the confused junction of the morskaia and nevski, and he was frightened and moved on. i sighed as i remembered the days not so long before, when that same coachman would have thought it an honour to drive me for half a rouble. down the sadovya we slipped, bumping over the uneven surface of the snow, and the shops grew smaller and the cinemas more stringent, and the women and men with their barrows of fruit and coloured notepaper and toys more frequent. then through the market with the booths and the church with its golden towers, until we stood before the hooded entrance to the jews' paradise. i paid him, and without listening to his discontented cries pushed my way in. the jews' market is a series of covered arcades with a square in the middle of it, and in the middle of the square a little church with some doll-like trees. these arcades are western in their hideous covering of glass and the ugliness of the exterior of the wooden shops that line them, but the crowd that throngs them is eastern, so that in the strange eyes and voices, the wild gestures, the laughs, the cries, the singing, and the dancing that meets one here it is as though a new world was suddenly born--a world offensive, dirty, voluble, blackguardly perhaps, but intriguing, tempting, and ironical. the arcades are generally so crowded that one can move only at a slow pace and, on every side one is pestered by the equivalents of the old english cry: "what do you lack? what do you lack?" every mixture of blood and race that the world contains is to be seen here, but they are all--tartars, jews, chinese, japanese, indians, arabs, moslem, and christian--formed by some subtle colour of atmosphere, so that they seem all alike to be citizens of some secret little town, sprung to life just for a day, in the heart of this other city. perhaps it is the dull pale mist that the glass flings down, perhaps it is the uncleanly dust-clogged air; whatever it be, there is a stain of grey shadowy smoke upon all this world, and ikons and shabby jewels, and piles of eastern clothes, and old brass pots, and silver, hilted swords, and golden-tasselled tartar coats gleam through the shadow and wink and stare. to-day the arcades were so crowded that i could scarcely move, and the noise was deafening. many soldiers were there, looking with indulgent amusement upon the scene, and the jews with their skull-caps and the fat, huge-breasted jewish women screamed and shrieked and waved their arms like boughs in a storm. i stopped at many shops and fingered the cheap silver toys, the little blue and green ikons, the buckles and beads and rosaries that thronged the trays, but i could not find anything for nina. then suddenly i saw a square box of mother-of-pearl and silver, so charming and simple, the figures on the silver lid so gracefully carved that i decided at once. the jew in charge of it wanted twice as much as i was ready to give, and we argued for ten minutes before a kindly and appreciative crowd. at last we arranged a compromise, and i moved away, pleased and satisfied. i stepped out of the arcade and faced the little square. it was, at that instant, fantastic and oddly coloured; the sun, about to set, hung in the misty sky a perfect round crimson globe, and it was perched, almost maliciously, just above the tower of the little church. the rest of the world was grey. the square was a thick mass of human beings so tightly wedged together that it seemed to move backwards and forwards like a floor of black wood pushed by a lever. one lamp burnt behind the window of the church, the old houses leaned forward as though listening to the babel below their eaves. but it was the sun that seemed to me then so evil and secret and cunning. its deep red was aloof and menacing, and its outline so sharp that it was detached from the sky as though it were human, and would presently move and advance towards us. i don't know what there was in that crowd of struggling human beings and that detached red sun.... the air was cruel, and through all the arcades that seemed to run like veins to this heart of the place i could feel the cold and the dark and the smoky dusk creeping forward to veil us all with deepest night. i turned away and then saw, advancing towards me, as though he had just come from the church, pushing his way, and waving a friendly hand to me, semyonov. xx his greeting was most amiable. he was wearing a rather short fur coat that only reached to a little below his knees, and the fur of the coat was of a deep rich brown, so that his pale square yellow beard contrasted with this so abruptly as to seem false. his body was as ever thick and self-confident, and the round fur cap that he wore was cocked ever so slightly to one side. i did not want to see him, but i was caught. i fancied that he knew very well that i wanted to escape, and that now, for sheer perversity, he would see that i did not. indeed, he caught my arm and drew me out of the market. we passed into the dusky streets. "now, ivan andreievitch," he said, "this is very pleasant... very.... you elude me, you know, which is unkind with two so old acquaintances. of course i know that you dislike me, and i don't suppose that i have the highest opinion of _you_, but, nevertheless, we should be interested in one another. our common experience...." he broke off with a little shiver, and pulled his fur coat closer around him. i knew that all that i wanted was to break away. we had passed quickly on leaving the market into some of the meanest streets of petrograd. this was the petrograd of dostoeffsky, the petrograd of "poor folk" and "crime and punishment" and "the despised and rejected."... monstrous groups of flats towered above us, and in the gathering dusk the figures that slipped in and out of the doors were furtive shadows and ghosts. no one seemed to speak; you could see no faces under the spare pale-flamed lamps, only hear whispers and smell rotten stinks and feel the snow, foul and soiled under one's feet.... "look here, semyonov," i said, slipping from the control of his hand, "it's just as you say. we don't like one another, and we know one another well enough to say so. neither you nor i wish to revive the past, and there's nothing in the present that we have in common." "nothing!" he laughed. "what about my delightful nieces and their home circle? you were always one to shrink from the truth, ivan andreievitch. you fancy that you can sink into the bosom of a charming family and escape the disadvantages.... not at all. there are always disadvantages in a russian family. _i_ am the disadvantage in this one." he laughed again, and insisted on taking my arm once more. "if you feel so strongly about me, durward" (when he used my surname he always accented the second syllable very strongly) "all you have to do is to cut my niece vera out of your visiting list. that, i imagine, is the last thing that you wish. well, then--" "vera michailovna is my friend," i said hotly--it was foolish of me to be so easily provoked, but i could not endure his sneering tone. "if you imply--" "nonsense," he answered sharply, "i imply nothing. do you suppose that i have been more than a month here without discovering the facts? it's your english friend lawrence who is in love with vera--and vera with him." "that is a lie!" i cried. he laughed. "you english," he said, "are not so unobservant as you seem, but you hate facts. vera and your friend lawrence have been in love with one another since their first meeting, and my dear nephew-in-law markovitch knows it." "that's impossible," i cried. "he--" "no," semyonov replied, "i was wrong. he does not know it--he suspects. and my nephew-in-law in a state of suspicion is a delightful study." by now we were in a narrow street, so dark that we stumbled at every step. we seemed to be quite alone. it was i who now caught his arm. "semyonov!" i said, and my urgency stopped him so that he stood where he was. "leave them alone! leave them alone! they've done no harm to you, they can offer you nothing, they are not intelligent enough for you nor amusing enough. even if it is true what you say it will pass--lawrence will go away. i will see that he does. only leave them alone! for god's sake, let them be!" his face was very close to mine, and, looking at it in the gathering dark, it was as though it were a face of glass behind which other faces passed and repassed. i cannot hope to give any idea of the strange mingling of regret, malice, pride, pain, scorn, and humour that those eyes showed. his red lips parted as though he would speak, for a moment he turned away from me and looked down the black tunnel of the street, then he walked forward again. "you are wrong, my friend," he said, "if you imagine that there is no amusement for me in the study of my family. it _is_ my family, you know. i have none other. perhaps it has never occurred to you, durward, that possibly i am a lonely man." as he spoke i heard again the echo of that voice as it vanished into the darkness.... "no one?" and the answer: "no one."... "don't imagine," he continued, "that i am asking for your pity. that indeed would be humorous. i pity no one, and i despise the men who have it to bestow... but there are situations in life that are intolerable, ivan andreievitch, and any man who _is_ a man will see that he escapes from such a thing. may i not find in the bosom of my family such an escape?" he laughed. "i know nothing about that," i began hotly. "all i know is--" but he went on as though he had not heard me. "have you ever thought about death since you came away from the front, durward? it used to occupy your mind a good deal while you were there, i remember--in a foolish, romantic, sentimental way of course. you'll forgive my saying that your views of death were those of a second-hand novelist--all the same i'll do you the justice of acknowledging that you had studied it at first hand. you're not a coward, you know." i was struck most vividly with a sense of his uneasiness. during those other days uneasy was the very last thing that i ever would have said that he was--even after his catastrophe his grip of his soul did not loosen. it was just that loosening that i felt now; he had less control of the beasts that dwelt beneath the ground of his house, and he could hear them snarl and whine, and could feel the floor quiver with the echo of their movements. i suddenly knew that i was afraid of him no longer. "now, see, alexei petrovitch," i said, "it isn't death that we want to talk about now. it is a much simpler thing. it is, that you shouldn't for your own amusement simply go in and spoil the lives of some of my friends for nothing at all except your own stupid pride. if that's your plan i'm going to prevent it." "why, ivan andreievitch," he cried, laughing, "this is a challenge." "you can take it as what you please," i answered gravely. "but, incorrigible sentimentalist," he went on, "tell me--are you, english and moralist and believer in a good and righteous god as you are, are you really going to encourage this abominable adultery, this open, ruthless wrecking of a good man's home? you surprise me; this is a new light on your otherwise rather uninteresting character." "never mind my character," i answered him; "all you've got to do is to leave vera michailovna alone. there'll be no wrecking of homes, unless you are the wrecker." he put his hand on my arm again. "listen, durward," he said, "i'll tell you a little story. i'm a doctor you know, and many curious things occur within my province. well, some years ago i knew a man who was very miserable and very proud. his pride resented that he should be miserable, and he was always suspecting that people saw his weakness, and as he despised human nature, and thought his companions fools and deserving of all that they got, and more, he couldn't bear the thought that they should perceive that he allowed himself to be unhappy. he coveted death. if it meant extinction he could imagine nothing pleasanter than so restful an aloofness, quiet and apart and alone, whilst others hurried and scrambled and pursued the future.... "and if death did not mean extinction then he thought that he might snatch and secure for himself something which in life had eluded him. so he coveted death. but he was too proud to reach it by suicide. that seemed to him a contemptible and cowardly evasion, and such an easy solution would have denied the purpose of all his life. so he looked about him and discovered amongst his friends a man whose character he knew well, a man idealistic and foolish and romantic, like yourself, ivan andreievitch, only caring more for ideas, more impulsive and more reckless. he found this man and made him his friend. he played with him as a cat does with a mouse. he enjoyed life for about a year and then he was murdered...." "murdered!" i exclaimed. "yes--shot by his idealistic friend. i envy him that year. he must have experienced many breathless sensations. when the murderer was tried his only explanation was that he had been irritated and disappointed. "'disappointed of what?' asked the judge. "'of everything in which he believed....' said the man. "it seemed a poor excuse for a murder; he is still, i have no doubt, in siberia. "but i envy my friend. that was a delightful death to die.... good-night, ivan andreievitch." he waved his hand at me and was gone. i was quite alone in the long black street, engulfed by the high, overhanging flats. xxi late on the afternoon of nina's birthday, when i was on the point of setting out for the english prospect, the rat appeared. i had not seen him for several weeks; but there he was, stepping suddenly out of the shadows of my room, dirty and disreputable and cheerful. he had been, i perceived, drinking furniture polish. "good-evening, barin." "good-evening," i said sternly. "i told you not to come here when you were drunk." "i'm not drunk," he said, offended, "only a little. it's not much that you can get these days. i want some money, barin." "i've none for you," i answered. "it's only a little--god knows that i wouldn't ask you for much, but i'm going to be very busy these next days, and it's work that won't bring pay quickly. there'll be pay later, and then i will return it to you." "there's nothing for you to-night," i said. he laughed. "you're a fine man, barin. a foreigner is fine--that's where the poor russian is unhappy. i love you, barin, and i will look after you, and if, as you say, there isn't any money here, one must pray to god and he will show one the way." "what's this work you're going to do?" i asked him. "there's going to be trouble the other side of the river in a day or two," he answered, "and i'm going to help." "help what?" i asked. "help the trouble," he answered, smiling. "behave like a blackguard, in fact." "ah, blackguard, barin!" he protested, using a russian word that is worse than blackguard. "why these names?... i'm not a good man, god have mercy on my soul, but then i pretend nothing. i am what you see.... if there's going to be trouble in the town i may as well be there. why not i as well as another? and it is to your advantage, barin, that i should be." "why to my advantage?" i asked him. "because i am your friend, and we'll protect you," he answered. "i wouldn't trust you a yard," i told him. "well, perhaps you're right," he said. "we are as god made us--i am no better than the rest." "no, indeed you're not," i answered him. "why do you think there'll be trouble?" "i know.... perhaps a lot of trouble, perhaps only a little. but it will be a fine time for those of us who have nothing to lose.... so you have no money for me?" "nothing." "a mere rouble or so?" "nothing." "well, i must be off.... i am your friend. don't forget," and he was gone. it had been arranged that nina and vera, lawrence and bohun and i should meet outside the giniselli at five minutes to eight. i left my little silver box at the flat, paid some other calls, and just as eight o'clock was striking arrived outside the giniselli. this is petrograd's apology for a music-hall--in other words, it is nothing but the good old-fashioned circus. then, again, it is not quite the circus of one's english youth, because it has a very distinct russian atmosphere of its own. the point really is the enthusiasm of the audience, because it is an enthusiasm that in these sophisticated, twentieth-century days is simply not to be found in any other country in europe. i am an old-fashioned man and, quite frankly, i adore a circus; and when i can find one with the right sawdust smell, the right clown, and the right enthusiasm, i am happy. the smart night is a saturday, and then, if you go, you will see, in the little horse-boxes close to the arena, beautiful women in jewellery and powder, and young officers, and fat merchants in priceless shubas. but to-night was not a saturday, and therefore the audience was very democratic, screaming cat-calls from the misty distances of the gallery, and showering sunflower seeds upon the heads of the bourgeoisie, who were, for the most part, of the smaller shopkeeper kind. nina, to-night, was looking very pretty and excited. she was wearing a white silk dress with blue bows, and all her hair was piled on the top of her head in imitation of vera--but this only had the effect of making her seem incredibly young and naïve, as though she had put her hair up just for the evening because there was to be a party. it was explained that markovitch was working but would be present at supper. vera was quiet, but looked happier, i thought, than i had seen her for a long time. bohun was looking after her, and lawrence was with nina. i sat behind the four of them, in the back of the little box, like a presiding benevolence. mostly i thought of how lovely vera was to-night, and why it was, too, that more people did not care for her. i knew that she was not popular, that she was considered proud and reserved and cold. as she sat there now, motionless, her hands on her lap, her whole being seemed to me to radiate goodness and gentleness and a loving heart. i knew that she could be impatient with stupid people, and irritated by sentimentality, and infuriated by meanness and cruelty, but the whole size and grandeur of her nobility seemed to me to shine all about her and set her apart from the rest of human beings. she was not a woman whom i ever could have loved--she had not the weaknesses and naïveties and appealing helplessness that drew love from one's heart. nor could i have ever dared to face the depth and splendour of the passion that there was in her--i was not built on that heroic scale. god forgive me if, as i watched them, i felt a sudden glow of almost eager triumph at the thought of lawrence as her lover! i checked it. my heart was suddenly heavy. such a development could only mean tragedy, and i knew it. i had even sworn to semyonov that i would prevent it. i looked at them and felt my helpless weakness. who was i to prevent anything? and who was there now, in the whole world, who would be guided by my opinion? they might have me as a confidant because they trusted me, but after that... no, i had no illusions. i was pushed off the edge of the world, hanging on still with one quivering hand--soon my grip would loosen--and, god help me, i did not want to go. nina turned back to me and, with a little excited clap of her hands, drew my attention to the gallant madame gineselli, who, although by no means a chicken, arrayed in silver tights and a large black picture-hat, stood on one foot on the back of her white horse and bowed to the already hysterical gallery. mr. gineselli cracked his whip, and the white horse ambled along and the sawdust flew up into our eyes, and madame bent her knees first in and then out, and the bourgeoisie clapped their hands and the gallery shouted "brava." gineselli cracked his whip and there was the clown "jackomeno, beloved of his russian public," as it was put on the programme; and indeed so he seemed to be, for he was greeted with roars of applause. there was nothing very especially russian about him, however, and when he had taken his coat off and brushed a place on which to put it and then flung it on the ground and stamped on it, i felt quite at home with him and ready for anything. he called up one of the attendants and asked him whether he had ever played the guitar. i don't know what it was that the attendant answered, because something else suddenly transfixed my attention--the vision of nina's little white-gloved hand resting on lawrence's broad knee. i saw at once, as though she had told me, that she had committed herself to a most desperate venture. i could fancy the resolution that she had summoned to take the step, the way that now her heart would be furiously beating, and the excited chatter with which she would try to cover up her action. vera and bohun could not, from where they were sitting, see what she had done; lawrence did not move, his back was set like a rock; he stared steadfastly at the arena. nina never ceased talking, her ribbons fluttering and her other hand gesticulating. i could not take my eyes from that little white hand. i should have been, i suppose, ashamed of her, indignant for her, but i could only feel that she was, poor child, in for the most desperate rebuff. i could see from where i sat her cheek, hot and crimson, and her shrill voice never stopped. the interval arrived, to my intense relief, and we all went out into the dark passage that smelt of sawdust and horses. almost at once nina detached me from the others and walked off with me towards the lighted hall. "you saw," she said. "saw what?" i asked. "saw what i was doing." i felt that she was quivering all over, and she looked so ridiculously young, with her trembling lip and blue hat on one side and burning cheeks, that i felt that i wanted to take her into my arms and kiss and pet her. "i saw that you had your hand on his knee," i said. "that was silly of you, nina." "why shouldn't i?" she answered furiously. "why shouldn't i enjoy life like every one else? why should vera, have everything?" "vera!" i cried. "what has it to do with vera?" she didn't answer my question. she put her hand on my arm, pressing close up to me as though she wanted my protection. "durdles, i want him for my friend. i do--i do. when i look at him and think of boris and the others i don't want to speak to any one of them again. i only want him for my friend. i'm getting old now, and they can't treat me as a child any longer. i'll show them. i know what i'll do if i can't have the friends i want and if vera is always managing me--i'll go off to boris." "my dear nina," i said, "you mustn't do that. you don't care for him." "no, i know i don't--but i will go if everybody thinks me a baby. and durdles--durdles, please--make him like me--your mr. lawrence." she said his name with the funniest little accent. "nina, dear," i said, "will you take a little piece of advice from me?" "what is it?" she asked doubtfully. "well, this.... don't you make any move yourself. just wait and you'll see he'll like you. you'll make him shy if you--" but she interrupted me furiously in one of her famous tempers. "oh, you englishmen with your shyness and your waiting and your coldness! i hate you all, and i wish we were fighting with the germans against you. yes, i do--and i hope the germans win. you never have any blood. you're all cold as ice.... and what do you mean spying on me? yes, you were--sitting behind and spying! you're always finding out what we're doing, and putting it all down in a book. i hate you, and i won't ever ask your advice again." she rushed off, and i was following her when the bell rang for the beginning of the second part. we all went in, nina chattering and laughing with bohun just as though she had never been in a temper in her life. then a dreadful thing happened. we arrived at the box, and vera, bohun, and nina sat in the seats they had occupied before. i waited for lawrence to sit down, but he turned round to me. "i say, durward--you sit next to nina michailovna this time. she'll be bored having me all the while." "no, no!" i began to protest, but nina, her voice shaking, cried: "yes, durdles, you sit down next to me--please." i don't think that lawrence perceived anything. he said very cheerfully, "that's right--and i'll sit behind and see that you all behave." i sat down and the second part began. the second part was wrestling. the bell rang, the curtains parted, and instead of the splendid horses and dogs there appeared a procession of some of the most obese and monstrous types of humanity. almost naked, they wandered round the arena, mountains of flesh glistening in the electric light. a little man, all puffed up like a poulter pigeon, then advanced into the middle of the arena, and was greeted with wild applause from the gallery. to this he bowed and then announced in a terrific voice, "gentlemen, you are about to see some of the most magnificent wrestling in the world. allow me to introduce to you the combatants." he then shouted out the names: "ivan strogoff of kiev--paul rosing of odessa--jacob smyerioff of petrograd--john meriss from africa (this the most hideous of negroes)--karl tubiloff of helsingfors...." and so on. the gentlemen named smirked and bowed. they all marched off, and then, in a moment, one couple returned, shook hands, and, under the breathless attention of the whole house, began to wrestle. they did not, however, command my attention. i could think of nothing but the little crushed figure next to me. i stole a look at her and saw that a large tear was hanging on one eyelash ready to fall. i looked hurriedly away. poor child! and her birthday! i cursed lawrence for his clumsiness. what did it matter if she had put her hand on his knee? he ought to have taken it and patted it. but it was more than likely, as i knew very well, that he had never even noticed her action. he was marvellously unaware of all kinds of things, and it was only too possible that nina scarcely existed for him. i longed to comfort her, and i did then a foolish thing. i put out my hand and let it rest for a moment on her dress. instantly she moved away with a sharp little gesture. five minutes later i heard a little whisper: "durdles, it's so hot here--and i hate these naked men. shall we go? ask vera--" the first bout had just come to an end. the little man with the swelling chest was alone, strutting up and down, and answering questions hurled at him from the gallery. "uncle vanya, where's michael of odessa?" "ah, he's a soldier in the army now." "uncle vanya... uncle vanya... uncle vanya..." "well, well, what is it?" "why isn't _chornaya maska_, wrestling to-night?" "ah, he's busy." "what's he busy with?" "never mind, he's busy." "what's he busy with?... uncle vanya... uncle vanya..." "_shto?_" "isn't it true that michael's dead now?" "so they say." "is it true?" "uncle vanya... uncle vanya...." the message had passed along that nina was tired and wanted to go. we all moved out through the passage and into the cold fresh air. "it was quite time," said vera. "i was going to suggest it myself." "i hope you liked it," said lawrence politely to nina. "no, i hated it," she answered furiously, and turned her back on him. it could not be said that the birthday party was promising very well. xxii and yet for the first half-hour it really seemed that it would "go" very well indeed. it had been agreed that it was to be absolutely a "family" party, and uncle ivan, semyonov, and boris grogoff were the only additions to our number. markovitch was there of course, and i saw at once that he was eager to be agreeable and to be the best possible host. as i had often noticed before, there was something pathetic about markovitch when he wished to be agreeable. he had neither the figure nor the presence with which to be fascinating, and he did not know in the least how to bring out his best points. especially when he tried, as he was sometimes ill-advised enough to do, to flirt with young girls, he was a dismal failure. he was intended, by nature, to be mysterious and malevolent, and had he only had a malevolent spirit there would have been no tragedy--but in the confused welter that he called his soul, malevolence was the least of the elements, and other things--love, sympathy, twisted self-pity, ambition, courage, and cowardice--drowned it. he was on his best behaviour to-night, and over the points of his high white collar his peaked, ugly, anxious face peered, appealing to the fates for generosity. but the fates despise those who appeal. i very soon saw that he was on excellent terms with semyonov, and this could only be, i was sure, because semyonov had been flattering him. very soon i learnt the truth. i was standing near the table, watching the company, when i found markovitch at my side. "very glad you've come, ivan andreievitch," he said. "i've been meaning to come and see you, only i've been too busy." "how's the ink getting along?" i asked him. "oh, the ink!" he brushed my words scornfully aside. "no, that's nothing. we must postpone that to a more propitious time. meanwhile--meanwhile, ivan andreievitch, i've hit it at last!" "what is it this time?" i asked. he could hardly speak for his excitement. "it's wood--the bark--the bark of the tree, you know--a new kind of fibre for cloth. if i hadn't got to look after these people here, i'd take you and show you now. you're a clever fellow--you'd understand at once. i've been showing it to alexei" (he nodded in the direction of semyonov), "and he entirely agrees with me that there's every kind of possibility in it. the thing will be to get the labour--that's the trouble nowadays--but i'll find somebody--one of these timber men...." so that was it, was it? i looked across at semyonov, who was now seated on vera's right hand just opposite boris grogoff. he was very quiet, very still, looking about him, his square pale beard a kind of symbol of the secret immobility of his soul. i fancied that i detected behind his placidity an almost relieved self-satisfaction, as though things were going very much better than he had expected. "so alexei petrovitch thinks well of it, does he?" i asked. "most enthusiastic," answered markovitch eagerly. "he's gone into the thing thoroughly with me, and has made some admirable suggestions.... ivan andreievitch, i think i should tell you--i misjudged him. i wasn't fair on what i said to you the other day about him. or perhaps it is that being at the front has changed him, softened him a bit. his love affair there, you know, made him more sympathetic and kindly. i believe he means well to us all. vera won't agree with me. she's more cynical than she used to be. i don't like that in her. she never had a suspicious nature before, but now she doesn't trust one." "you don't tell her enough," i interrupted. "tell her?" he looked at me doubtfully. "what is there i should tell her?" "everything!" i answered. "everything?" his eyes suddenly narrowed, his face was sharp and suspicious. "does she tell me everything? answer me that, ivan andreievitch. there was a time once--but now--i give my confidences where i'm trusted. if she treated me fairly--" there was no chance to say more; they called us to the table. i took my place between nina and ivan. as i have said, the supper began very merrily. boris grogoff was, i think, a little drunk when he arrived; at any rate he was noisy from the very beginning. i have wondered often since whether he had any private knowledge that night which elated and excited him, and was responsible in part, perhaps, for what presently occurred. it may well have been so, although at the time, of course, nothing of the kind occurred to me. nina appeared to have recovered her spirits. she was sitting next to lawrence, and chattered and laughed with him in her ordinary fashion. and now, stupidly enough, when i try to recall exactly the steps that led up to the catastrophe, i find it difficult to see things clearly. i remember that very quickly i was conscious that there was danger in the air. i was conscious of it first in the eyes of semyonov, those steady, watching, relentless eyes so aloof as to be inhuman. he was on the other side of the table, and suddenly i said to myself, "he's expecting something to happen." then, directly after that i caught vera's eye, and i saw that she too was anxious. she looked pale and tired and sad. i caught myself in the next instant saying to myself, "well, she's got lawrence to look after her now"--so readily does the spirit that is beyond one's grasp act above and outside one's poor human will. i saw then that the trouble was once again, as it had often been before, grogoff. he was drinking heavily the rather poor claret which markovitch had managed to secure from somewhere. he addressed the world in general. "i tell you that we're going to stop this filthy war," he cried. "and if our government won't do it, we'll take things into our own hands...." "well," said semyonov, smiling, "that's a thing that no russian has ever said before, for certain." every one laughed, and grogoff flushed. "oh, it's easy to sneer!" he said. "just because there've been miserable cowards in russian history, you think it will always be so. i tell you it is not so. the time is coming when tyranny will topple from its throne, and we'll show europe the way to liberty." "by which you mean," said semyonov, "that you'll involve russia in at least three more wars in addition to the one she's at present so magnificently losing." "i tell you," screamed grogoff, now so excited that he was standing on his feet and waving his glass in the air, "that this time you have not cowards to deal with. this will not be as it was in ; i know of what i'm speaking." semyonov leant over the table and whispered something in markovitch's ear. i had seen that markovitch had already been longing to speak. he jumped up on to his feet, fiercely excited, his eyes flaming. "it's nonsense that you are talking, sheer nonsense!" he cried. "russia's lost the war, and all we who believed in her have our hearts broken. russia won't be mended by a few vapouring idiots who talk and talk without taking action." "what do you call me?" screamed grogoff. "i mention no names," said markovitch, his little eyes dancing with anger. "take it or no as you please. but i say that we have had enough of all this vapouring talk, all this pretence of courage. let us admit that freedom has failed in russia, that she must now submit herself to the yoke." "coward! coward!" screamed grogoff. "it's you who are the coward!" cried markovitch. "call me that and i'll show you!" "i do call you it!" there was an instant's pause, during which we all of us had, i suppose, some idea of trying to intervene. but it was too late. grogoff raised his hand and, with all his force, flung his glass at markovitch. markovitch ducked his head, and the glass smashed with a shattering tinkle on the wall behind him. we all cried out, but the only thing of which i was conscious was that lawrence had sprung from his seat, had crossed to where vera was standing, and had put his hand on her arm. she glanced up at him. that look which they exchanged, a look of revelation, of happiness, of sudden marvellous security, was so significant that i could have cried out to them both, "look out! look out!" but if i had cried they would not have heard me. my next instinct was to turn to markovitch. he was frowning, coughing a little, and feeling the top of his collar. his face was turned towards grogoff and he was speaking--could catch some words: "no right... in my own house... boris... i apologise... please don't think of it." but his eyes were not looking at boris at all; they were turned towards vera, staring at her, begging her, beseeching her.... what had he seen? how much had he understood? and nina? and semyonov? but at once, in a way most truly russian, the atmosphere had changed. it was nina who controlled the situation. "boris," she cried, "come here!" we all waited in silence. he looked at her, a little sulkily, his head hanging, but his eyes glancing up at her. he seemed nothing then but a boy caught in some misdemeanour, obstinate, sulky, but ready to make peace if a chance were offered him. "boris, come here!" he moved across to her, looking her full in the face, his mouth sulky, but his eyes rebelliously smiling. "well... well...." she stood away from the table, drawn to her full height, her eyes commanding him: "how dare you! boris, how dare you! my birthday--_mine_--and you've spoilt it, spoilt it all. come here--up close!" he came to her until his hands were almost on her body; he hung his head, standing over her. she stood back as though she were going to strike him, then suddenly with a laugh she sprang upon the chair beside her, flung her arms round his neck and kissed him; then, still standing on the chair, turned and faced us all. "now, that's enough--all of you. michael, uncle ivan, uncle alexei, durdles--how dare you, all of you? you're all as bad--every one of you. i'll punish all of you if we have any more politics. beastly politics! what do they matter? it's my birthday. my _birthday_, i tell you. it _shan't_ be spoilt." she seemed to me so excited as not to know what she was saying. what had she seen? what did she know?... meanwhile grogoff was elated, wildly pleased like a boy who, contrary to all his expectations, had won a prize. he went up to markovitch with his hand out: "nicholas--forgive me--_prasteete_--i forgot myself. i'm ashamed--my abominable temper. we are friends. you were right, too. we talk here in russia too much, far too much, and when the moment comes for action we shrink back. we see too far perhaps. who knows? but you were right and i am a fool. you've taught me a lesson by your nobility. thank you, nicholas. and all of you--i apologise to all of you." we moved away from the table. vera came over to us, and then sat on the sofa with her arm around nina's neck. nina was very quiet now, sitting there, her cheeks flushed, smiling, but as though she were thinking of something quite different. some one proposed that we should play "petits cheveaux." we gathered around the table, and soon every one was laughing and gambling. only once i looked up and saw that markovitch was gazing at vera; and once again i looked at vera and saw that she was staring before her, seeing nothing, lost in some vision--but it was not of markovitch that she was thinking.... i was the first to leave--i said good-night to every one. i could hear their laughter as i waited at the bottom of the stairs for the dvornik to let me out. but when i was in the street the world was breathlessly still. i walked up the prospect--no soul was in sight, only the scattered lamps, the pale snow, and the houses. at the end of the canal i stopped. the silence was intense. it seemed to me then that in the very centre of the canal the ice suddenly cracked, slowly pulled apart, leaving a still pool of black water. the water slowly stirred, rippled, then a long, horned, and scaly head pushed up. i could see the shining scales on its thick side and the ribbed horn on the back of the neck. beneath it the water stirred and heaved. with dead glazed eyes it stared upon the world, then slowly, as though it were drawn from below, it sank. the water rippled in narrowing circles--then all was still.... the moon came out from behind filmy shadow. the world was intensely light, and i saw that the ice of the canal had never been broken, and that no pool of black water caught the moon's rays. it was fiercely cold and i hurried home, pulling my shuba more closely about me. part ii lawrence lawrence i of some of the events that i am now about to relate it is obvious that i could not have been an eye-witness--and yet, looking back from the strange isolation that is now my world i find it incredibly difficult to realise what i saw and what i did not. was i with nina and vera on that tuesday night when they stood face to face with one another for the first time? was i with markovitch during his walk through that marvellous new world that he seemed himself to have created? i know that i shared none of these things..., and yet it seems to me that i was at the heart of them all. i may have been told many things by the actors in those events--i may not. i cannot now in retrospect see any of it save as my own personal experience, and as my own personal experience i must relate it; but, as i have already said at the beginning of this book, no one is compelled to believe either my tale or my interpretation. every man would, i suppose, like to tell his story in the manner of some other man. i can conceive the events of this part of my narration being interpreted in the spirit of the wildest farce, of the genteelest comedy, of the most humorous satire--"other men, other gifts." i am a dull and pompous fellow, as semyonov often tells me; and i hope that i never allowed him to see how deeply i felt the truth of his words. meanwhile i will begin with a small adventure of henry bohun's. apparently, one evening soon after nina's party, he found himself about half-past ten in the evening, lonely and unhappy, walking down the nevski. gay and happy crowds wandered by him, brushing him aside, refusing to look at him, showing in fact no kind of interest in his existence. he was suddenly frightened, the distances seemed terrific and the nevski was so hard and bright and shining--that it had no use at all for any lonely young man. he decided suddenly that he would go and see me. he found an isvostchick, but when they reached the ekaterinsgofsky canal the surly coachman refused to drive further, saying that his horse had gone lame, and that this was as far as he had bargained to go. henry was forced to leave the cab, and then found himself outside the little people's cinema, where he had once been with vera and myself. he knew that my rooms were not far away, and he started off beside the white and silent canal, wondering why he had come, and wishing he were back in bed. there was still a great deal of the baby in henry, and ghosts and giants and scaly-headed monsters were not incredibilities to his young imagination. as he left the main thoroughfare and turned down past the widening docks, he suddenly knew that he was terrified. there had been stories of wild attacks on rich strangers, sand-bagging and the rest, often enough, but it was not of that kind of thing that he was afraid. he told me afterwards that he expected to see "long thick crawling creatures" creeping towards him over the ice. he continually turned round to see whether some one were following him. when he crossed the tumbledown bridge that led to my island it seemed that he was absolutely alone in the whole world. the masts of the ships dim through the cold mist were like tangled spiders' webs. a strange hard red moon peered over the towers and chimneys of the distant dockyard. the ice was limitless, and of a dirty grey pallor, with black shadows streaking it. my island must have looked desolate enough, with its dirty snow-heaps, old boards and scrap-iron and tumbledown cottages. again, as on his first arrival in petrograd, henry was faced by the solemn fact that events are so often romantic in retrospect, but grimly realistic in experience. he reached my lodging and found the door open. he climbed the dark rickety stairs and entered my sitting-room. the blinds were not drawn, and the red moon peered through on to the grey shadows that the ice beyond always flung. the stove was not burning, the room was cold and deserted. henry called my name and there was no answer. he went into my bedroom and there was no one there. he came back and stood there listening. he could hear the creaking of some bar beyond the window and the melancholy whistle of a distant train. he was held there, as though spellbound. suddenly he thought that he heard some one climbing the stairs. he gave a cry, and that was answered by a movement so close to him that it was almost at his elbow. "who's there?" he cried. he saw a shadow pass between the moon and himself. in a panic of terror he cried out, and at the same time struck a match. some one came towards him, and he saw that it was markovitch. he was so relieved to find that it was a friend that he did not stop to wonder what markovitch should be doing hiding in my room. it afterwards struck him that markovitch looked odd. "like a kind of conspirator, in old shabby shuba with the collar turned up. he looked jolly ill and dirty, as though he hadn't slept or washed. he didn't seem a bit surprised at seeing me there, and i think he scarcely realised that it _was_ me. he was thinking of something else so hard that he couldn't take me in." "oh, bohun!" he said in a confused way. "hullo, nicolai leontievitch," bohun said, trying to be unconcerned. "what are you doing here?" "came to see ivan andreievitch," he said. "wasn't here; i was going to write to him." bohun then lit a candle and discovered that the place was in a very considerable mess. some one had been sifting my desk, and papers and letters were lying about the floor. the drawers of my table were open, and one chair was over-turned. markovitch stood back near the window, looking at bohun suspiciously. they must have been a curious couple for such a position. there was an awkward pause, and then bohun, trying to speak easily, said: "well, it seems that durward isn't coming. he's out dining somewhere i expect." "probably," said markovitch drily. there was another pause, then markovitch broke out with: "i suppose you think i've been here trying to steal something." "oh no--oh no--no--" stammered bohun. "but i have," said markovitch. "you can look round and see. there it is on every side of you. i've been trying to find a letter." "oh yes," said bohun nervously. "well, that seems to you terrible," went on markovitch, growing ever fiercer. "of course it seems to you perfect englishmen a dreadful thing. but why heed it?... you all do things just as bad, only you are hypocrites." "oh yes, certainly," said bohun. "and now," said markovitch with a snarl. "i'm sure you will not think me a proper person for you to lodge with any longer--and you will be right. i am not a proper person. i have no sense of decency, thank god, and no russian has any sense of decency, and that is why we are beaten and despised by the whole world, and yet are finer than them all--so you'd better not lodge with us any more." "but of course," said bohun, disliking more and more this uncomfortable scene--"of course i shall continue to stay with you. you are my friends, and one doesn't mind what one's friends do. one's friends are one's friends." suddenly, then, markovitch jerked himself forward, "just as though," bohun afterwards described it to me, "he had shot himself out of a catapault." "tell me," he said, "is your english friend in love with my wife?" what bohun wanted to do then was to run out of the room, down the dark stairs, and away as fast as his legs would carry him. he had not been in russia so long that he had lost his english dislike of scenes, and he was seriously afraid that markovitch was, as he put it, "bang off his head." but at this critical moment, he remembered, it seems, my injunction to him, "to be kind to markovitch--to make a friend of him." that had always seemed to him before impossible enough, but now, at the very moment when markovitch was at his queerest, he was also at his most pathetic, looking there in the mist and shadows too untidy and dirty and miserable to be really alarming. henry then took courage. "that's all nonsense, markovitch," he said. "i suppose by 'your english friend' you mean lawrence. he thinks the world of your wife, of course, as we all do, but he's not the fellow to be in love. i don't suppose he's ever been really in love with a woman in his life. he's a kindly good-hearted chap, lawrence, and he wouldn't do harm to a fly." markovitch peered into bohun's face. "what did you come here for, any of you?" he asked. "what's russia over-run with foreigners for? we'll clear the lot of you out, all of you...." then he broke off, with a pathetic little gesture, his hand up to his head. "but i don't know what i'm saying--i don't mean it, really. only things are so difficult, and they slip away from one so. "i love russia and i love my wife, mr. bohun--and they've both left me. but you aren't interested in that. why should you be? only remember when you're inclined to laugh at me that i'm like a man in a cockle-shell boat--and it isn't my fault. i was put in it." "but i'm never inclined to laugh," said bohun eagerly. "i may be young and only an englishman--but i shouldn't wonder if i don't understand better than you think. you try and see.... and i'll tell you another thing, nicolai leontievitch, i loved your wife myself--loved her madly--and she was so good to me and so far above me, that i saw that it was like loving one of the angels. that's what we all feel, nicolai leontievitch, so that you needn't have any fear--she's too far above all of us. and i only want to be your friend and hers, and to help you in any way i can." (i can see bohun saying this, very sincere, his cheeks flushed, eager.) markovitch held out both his hands. "you're right," he cried. "she's above us all. it's true that she's an angel, and we are all her servants. you have helped me by saying what you have, and i won't forget it. you are right; i am wasting my time with ridiculous suspicions when i ought to be working. concentration, that's what i want, and perhaps you will give it me." he suddenly came forward and kissed bohun on both cheeks. he smelt, bohun thought, of vodka. bohun didn't like the embrace, of course, but he accepted it gracefully. "now we'll go away," said markovitch. "we ought to put things straight," said bohun. "no; i shall leave things as they are," said markovitch, "so that he shall see exactly what i've done. i'll write a note." he scribbled a note to me in pencil. i have it still. it ran: dear ivan andreievitch--i looked for a letter from my wife to you. in doing so i was i suppose contemptible. but no matter. at least you see me as i am. i clasp your hand, n. markovitch. they went away together. ii i was greatly surprised to receive, a few days later, an invitation from baron wilderling; he asked me to go with him on one of the first evenings in march to a performance of lermontov's "masquerade" at the alexandra theatre. i say lermontov, but heaven knows that that great russian poet was not supposed to be going to have much to say in the affair. this performance had been in preparation for at least ten years, and when such delights as gordon craig's setting of "hamlet," or benois' dresses for "la locandiera" were discussed, the wise ones said: "ah,--all very well--just wait until you see 'masquerade.'" these manifestations of the artistic spirit had not been very numerous of late in petrograd. at the beginning of the war there had been many cabarets--"the cow," "the calf," "the dog," "the striped cat"--and these had been underground cellars, lighted by chinese lanterns, and the halls decorated with futurist paintings by yakkolyeff or some other still more advanced spirit. it seemed strange to me as i dressed that evening. i do not know how long it was since i had put on a dinner-jacket. with the exception of that one other visit to baron wilderling this seemed to be my one link with the old world, and it was curious to feel its fascination, its air of comfort and order and cleanliness, its courtesy and discipline. "i think i'll leave these rooms," i thought as i looked about me, "and take a decent flat somewhere." it is a strange fact, behind which there lies, i believe, some odd sort of moral significance, that i cannot now recall the events of that evening in any kind of clear detail. i remember that it was bitterly cold, with a sky that was flooded with stars. the snow had a queer metallic sheen upon it as though it were coloured ice, and i can see now the nevski like a slab of some fiercely painted metal rising out of the very smack of our horses' hoofs as my sleigh sped along--as though, silkworm-like, i spun it out of the entrails of the sledge. it was all light and fire and colour that night, with towers of gold and frosted green, and even the black crowds that thronged the nevski pavements shot with colour. somewhere in one of shorthouse's stories--in _the little schoolmaster mark_, i think--he gives a curious impression of a whirling fantastic crowd of revellers who evoke by their movements some evil pattern in the air around them, and the boy who is standing in their midst sees this dark twisted sinister picture forming against the gorgeous walls and the coloured figures until it blots out the whole scene and plunges him into darkness. i will not pretend that on this evening i discerned anything sinister or ominous in the gay scene that the alexandra theatre offered me, but i was nevertheless weighed down by some quite unaccountable depression that would not let me alone. for this i can see now that lawrence was very largely responsible. when i met him and the wilderlings in the foyer of the theatre i saw at once that he was greatly changed. the clear open expression of his eyes was gone; his mind was far away from his company--and it was as though i could see into his brain and watch the repetition of the old argument occurring again and again and again with always the same questions and answers, the same reproaches, the same defiances, the same obstinacies. he was caught by what was perhaps the first crisis of his life. he had never been a man for much contact with his fellow-beings, he had been aloof and reserved, generous in his judgements of others, severe and narrow in his judgement of himself. above all, he had been proud of his strength.... now he was threatened by something stronger than himself. he could have managed it so long as he was aware only of his love for vera.... now, when, since nina's party, he knew that also vera loved him, he had to meet the tussle of his life. that, at any rate, is the kind of figure that i give to his mood that evening. he has told me much of what happened to him afterwards, but nothing of that particular night, except once. "do you remember that 'masquerade' evening?... i was in hell that night...." which, for lawrence, was expressive enough. both the baron and his wife were in great spirits. the baron was more than ever the evocation of the genius of elegance and order; he seemed carved out of some coloured ivory, behind whose white perfection burnt a shining resolute flame. his clothes were so perfect that they would have expressed the whole of him even though his body had not been there. he was happy. his eyes danced appreciatively; he waved his white gloves at the scene as though blessing it. "of course, mr. durward," he said to me, "this is nothing compared with what we could do before the war--nevertheless here you see, for a moment, a fragment of the old petersburg--petersburg as it shall be, please god, again one day...." i do not in the least remember who was present that evening, but it was, i believe, a very distinguished company. the lights blazed, the jewels flashed, and the chatter was tremendous. the horseshoe-shaped seats behind the stalls clustered in knots and bunches of colour under the great glitter of electricity about the royal box. artists--somoff and benois and dobujinsky; novelists like sologub and merejkowsky; dancers like karsavina--actors from all over petrograd--they were there, i expect, to add criticism and argument to the adulation of friends and of the carelessly observant rich jews and merchants who had come simply to display their jewellery. petrograd, like every other city in the world, is artistic only by the persistence of its minority. i'm sure that there were princesses and grand dukes and grand duchesses for any one who needed them, and it was only in the gallery where the students and their girl-friends were gathered that the name of lermontov was mentioned. the name of the evening was "meyerhold," the gentleman responsible for the production. at last the event that had been brewing ceaselessly for the last ten years--ever since the last revolution in fact--was to reach creation. the moment of m. meyerhold's life had arrived--the moment, had we known it, of many other lives also; but we did not know it. we buzzed and we hummed, we gasped and we gaped, we yawned and we applauded; and the rustle of gold tissue, the scent of gold leaf, the thick sticky substance of gold paint, filled the air, flooded the arena, washed past us into the street outside. meanwhile m. meyerhold, white, perspiring, in his shirt-sleeves with his collar loosened and his hair damp, is in labour behind the gold tissue to produce the child of his life... and behold, the child is produced! and such a child! it was not i am sure so fantastic an affair in reality as in my rememberance of it. i have, since then, read lermontov's play, and i must confess that it does not seem, in cold truth, to be one of his finest works. it is long and old-fashioned, melodramatic and clumsy--but then it was not on this occasion lermontov's play that was the thing. but it was a masquerade, and that in a sense far from the author's intention. as i watched i remember that i forgot the bad acting (the hero was quite atrocious), forgot the lapses of taste in the colour and arrangement of the play, forgot the artifices and elaborate originalities and false sincerities; there were, i have no doubt, many things in it all that were bad and meretricious--i was dreaming. i saw, against my will and outside my own agency, mingled with the gold screens, the purple curtains, the fantasies and extravagances of the costumes, the sudden flashes of unexpected colour through light or dress or backcloth--pictures from those galician days that had been, until semyonov's return, as i fancied, forgotten. a crowd of revellers ran down the stage, and a shimmering cloud of gold shot with red and purple was flung from one end of the hall to the other, and behind it, through it, between it, i saw the chill light of the early morning, and nikitin and i sitting on the bench outside the stinking but that we had used as an operating theatre, watching the first rays of the sun warm, the cold mountain's rim. i could hear voices, and the murmurs of the sleeping men and the groans of the wounded. the scene closed. there was space and light, and a gorgeous figure, stiff with the splendour of his robes, talked in a dark garden with his lady. their voices murmured, a lute was played, some one sang, and through the thread of it all i saw that moment when, packed together on our cart, we hung for an instant on the top of the hill and looked back to a country that had suddenly crackled into flame. there was that terrific crash as of the smashing of a world of china, the fierce crackle of the machine-guns, and then the boom of the cannon from under our very feet... the garden was filled with revellers, laughing, dancing, singing, the air was filled again with the air of gold paint, the tenor's voice rose higher and higher, the golden screens closed--the act was ended. it was as though i had received, in some dim, bewildered fashion, a warning. when the lights went up, it was some moments before i realised that the baron was speaking to me, that a babel of chatter, like a sudden rain storm on a glass roof, had burst on every side of us, and that a huge jewess, all bare back and sham pearls, was trying to pass me on her way to the corridor. the baron talked away: "very amusing, don't you think? after reinhardt, of course, although they say now that reinhardt got all his ideas from your man craig. i'm sure i don't know whether that's so.... i hope you're more reassured to-night, mr. durward. you were full of alarms the other evening. look around you and you'll see the true russia...." "i can't believe this to be the true russia," i said. "petrograd is not the true russia. i don't believe that there _is_ a true russia." "well, there you are," he continued eagerly. "no true russia! quite so. very observant. but we have to pretend there is, and that's what you foreigners are always forgetting. the russian is an individualist--give him freedom and he'll lose all sense of his companions. he will pursue his own idea. myself and my party are here to prevent him from pursuing his own idea, for the good of himself and his country. he may be discontented, he may grumble, but he doesn't realise his luck. give him his freedom, and in six months you'll see russia back in the middle ages." "and another six months?" i asked. "the stone age." "and then?" "ah," he said, smiling, "you ask me too much, mr. durward. we are speaking of our own generation." the curtain was up again and i was back in my other world. i cannot tell you anything of the rest of the play--i remember nothing. only i know that i was actually living over again those awful days in the forest--the heat, the flies, the smells, the glassy sheen of the trees, the perpetual rumble of the guns, the desolate whine of the shells--and then marie's death, trenchard's sorrow, trenchard's death, that last view of semyonov... and i felt that i was being made to remember it all for a purpose, as though my old friend, rich now with his wiser knowledge, was whispering to me, "all life is bound up. you cannot leave anything behind you; the past, the present, the future are one. you had pushed us away from you, but we are with you always for ever. i am your friend for ever, and marie is your friend, and now, once more, you have to take your part in a battle, and we have come to you to share it with you. do not be confused by history or public events or class struggle or any big names; it is the individual and the soul of the individual alone that matters. i and marie and vera and nina and markovitch--our love for you, your love for us, our courage, our self-sacrifice, our weakness, our defeat, our progress--these are the things for which life exists; it exists as a training-ground for the immortal soul...." with a sweep of colour the stage broke into a mist of movement. masked and hooded figures in purple and gold and blue and red danced madly off into a forest of stinking, sodden leaves and trees as thin as tissue-paper burnt by the sun. "oh--aye! oh--aye! oh--aye!" came from the wounded, and the dancers answered, "tra-la-la-la! tra-la-la-la,'" the golden screens were drawn forward, the lights were up again, and the whole theatre was stirring like a coloured paper ant heap. outside in the foyer i found lawrence at my elbow. "go and see her," he whispered to me, "as soon as possible! tell her--tell her--no, tell her nothing. but see that she's all right and let me know. see her to-morrow--early!" i could say nothing to him, for the baron had joined us. "good-night! good-night! a most delightful evening!... most amusing!... no, thank you, i shall walk!" "come and see us," said the baroness, smiling. "very soon," i answered. i little knew that i should never see either of them again. iii i awoke that night with a sudden panic that i must instantly see vera. i, even in the way that one does when, one is only half awake, struggled out of bed and felt for my clothes. then i remembered and climbed back again, but sleep would not return to me. the self-criticism and self-distrust that were always attacking me and paralysing my action sprang upon me now and gripped me. what was i to do? how was i to act? i saw vera and nina and lawrence and, behind them, smiling at me, semyonov. they were asking for my help, but they were, in some strange, intangible way, most desperately remote. when i read now in our papers shrill criticisms on our officials, our cabinet, our generals, our propagandists, our merchants, for their failure to deal adequately with russia, i say: deal adequately? first you must catch your bird... and no western snare has ever caught the russian bird of paradise, and i dare prophesy that no western snare ever will. had i not broken my heart in the pursuit, and was i not as far as ever from attainment? the secret of the mystery of life is the isolation that separates every man from his fellow--the secret of dissatisfaction too; and the only purpose in life is to realise that isolation, and to love one's fellow-man because of it, and to show one's own courage, like a flag to which the other travellers may wave their answer; but we westerners have at least the waiting comfort of our discipline, of our materialism, of our indifference to ideas. the russian, i believe, lives in a world of loneliness peopled only by ideas. his impulses towards self-confession, towards brotherhood, towards vice, towards cynicism, towards his belief in god and his scorn of him, come out of this world; and beyond it he sees his fellow-men as trees walking, and the mountain of god as a distant peak, placed there only to emphasise his irony. i had wanted to be friends with nina and vera--i had even longed for it--and now at the crisis when i must rise and act they were so far away from me that i could only see them, like coloured ghosts, vanishing into mist. i would go at once and see vera and there do what i could. lawrence must return to england--then all would be well. markovitch must be persuaded.... nina must be told.... i slept and tumbled into a nightmare of a pursuit, down endless streets, of flying figures. next day i went to vera. i found her, to my joy, alone. i realised at once that our talk would be difficult. she was grave and severe, sitting back in her chair, her head up, not looking at me at all, but beyond through the window to the tops of the trees feathery with snow against the sky of egg-shell blue. i am always beaten by a hostile atmosphere. to-day i was at my worst, and soon we were talking like a couple of the merest strangers. she asked me whether i had heard that there were very serious disturbances on the other side of the river. "i was on the nevski early this afternoon," i said, "and i saw about twenty cossacks go galloping down towards the neva. i asked somebody and was told that some women had broken into the bakers' shops on vassily ostrov...." "it will end as they always end," said vera. "some arrests and a few people beaten, and a policeman will get a medal." there was a long pause. "i went to 'masquerade' the other night," i said. "i hear it's very good...." "pretentious and rather vulgar--but amusing all the same." "every one's talking about it and trying to get seats...." "yes. meyerhold must be pleased." "they discuss it much more than they do the war, or even politics. every one's tired of the war." i said nothing. she continued: "so i suppose we shall just go on for years and years.... and then the empress herself will be tired one day and it will suddenly stop." she showed a flash of interest, turning to me and looking at me for the first time since i had come in. "ivan andreievitch, what do you stay in russia for? why don't you go back to england?" i was taken by surprise. i stammered, "why do i stay? why, because--because i like it." "you can't like it. there's _nothing_ to like in russia." "there's _everything_!" i answered. "and i have friends here," i added. but she didn't answer that, and continued to sit staring out at the trees. we talked a little more about nothing at all, and then there was another long pause. at last i could endure it no longer, i jumped to my feet. "vera michailovna," i cried, "what have i done?" "done?" she asked me with a look of self-conscious surprise. "what do you mean?" "you know what i mean well enough," i answered. i tried to speak firmly, but my voice trembled a little. "you told me i was your friend. when i was ill the other day you came to me and said that you needed help and that you wanted me to help you. i said that i would--" i paused. "well?" she said, in a hard, unrelenting voice. "well--" i hesitated and stammered, cursing myself for my miserable cowardice. "you are in trouble now, vera--great trouble--i came here because i am ready to do anything for you--anything--and you treat me like a stranger, almost like an enemy." i saw her lip tremble--only for an instant. she said nothing. "if you've got anything against me since you saw me last," i went on, "tell me and i'll go away. but i had to see you and also lawrence--" at the mention of his name her whole body quivered, but again only for an instant. "lawrence asked me to come and see you." she looked up at me then gravely and coldly, and without the sign of any emotion either in her face or voice. "thank you, ivan andreievitch, but i want no help--i am in no trouble. it was very kind of mr. lawrence, but really--" then i could endure it no longer. i broke out: "vera, what's the matter. you know all this isn't true.... i don't know what idea you have now in your head, but you must let me speak to you. i've got to tell you this--that lawrence must go back to england, and as soon as possible--and i will see that he does--" that did its work. in an instant she was upon me like a wild beast, springing from her chair, standing close to me, her head flung back, her eyes furious. "you wouldn't dare!" she cried. "it's none of your business, ivan andreievitch. you say you're my friend. you're not. you're my enemy--my enemy. i don't care for him, not in the very least--he is nothing to me--nothing to me at all. but he mustn't go back to england. it will ruin his career. you will ruin him for life, ivan andreievitch. what business is it of yours? you imagine--because of what you fancied you saw at nina's party. there was nothing at nina's party--nothing. i love my husband, ivan andreievitch, and you are my enemy if you say anything else. and you pretend to be his friend, but you are his enemy if you try to have him sent back to england.... he must not go. for the matter of that, i will never see him again--never--if that is what you want. see, i promise you never--never--" she suddenly broke down--she, vera michailovna, the proudest woman i had ever known, turning from me, her head in her hands, sobbing, her shoulders bent. i was most deeply moved. i could say nothing at first, then, when the sound of her sobbing became unbearable to me, i murmured, "vera, please. i have no power. i can't make him go. i will only do what you wish. vera, please, please--" then, with her back still turned to me, i heard her say, "please, go. i didn't mean--i didn't... but go now... and come back--later." i waited a minute, and then, miserable, terrified of the future, i went. iv next night (it was friday evening) semyonov paid me a visit. i was just dropping to sleep in my chair. i had been reading that story of de la mare's _the return_--one of the most beautiful books in our language, whether for its spirit, its prose, or its poetry--and something of the moon-lit colour of its pages had crept into my soul, so that the material world was spun into threads of the finest silk behind which other worlds were more and more plainly visible. i had not drawn my blind, and a wonderful moon shone clear on to the bare boards of my room, bringing with its rays the mother-of-pearl reflections of the limitless ice, and these floated on my wall in trembling waves of opaque light. in the middle of this splendour i dropped slowly into slumber, the book falling from my hands, and i, on my part, seeming to float lazily backwards and forwards, as though, truly, one were at the bottom of some crystal sea, idly and happily drowned. from all of this i was roused by a sharp knock on my door, and i started up, still bewildered and bemused, but saying to myself aloud, "there's some one there! there's some one there!..." i stood for quite a while, listening, on the middle of my shining floor, then the knock was almost fiercely repeated. i opened the door and, to my surprise, found semyonov standing there. he came in, smiling, very polite of course. "you'll forgive me, ivan andreievitch," he said. "this is terribly unceremonious. but i had an urgent desire to see you, and you wouldn't wish me, in the circumstances, to have waited." "please," i said. i went to the window and drew the blinds. i lit the lamp. he took off his shuba and we sat down. the room was very dim now, and i could only see his mouth and square beard behind the lamp. "i've no samovar, i'm afraid," i said. "if i'd known you were coming i'd have told her to have it ready. but it's too late now. she's gone to bed." "nonsense," he said brusquely. "you know that i don't care about that. now we'll waste no time. let us come straight to the point at once. i've come to give you some advice, ivan andreievitch--very simple advice. go home to england." before he had finished the sentence i had felt the hostility in his voice; i knew that it was to be a fight between us, and strangely, at once the self-distrust and cowardice from which i had been suffering all those weeks left me. i felt warm and happy. i felt that with semyonov i knew how to deal. i was afraid of vera and nina, perhaps, because i loved them, but of semyonov, thank god, i was not afraid. "well, now, that's very kind of you," i said, "to take so much interest in my movements. i didn't know that it mattered to you so much where i was. why must i go?" "because you are doing no good here. you are interfering in things of which you have no knowledge. when we met before you interfered, and you must honestly admit that you did not improve things. now it is even more serious. i must ask you to leave my family alone, ivan andreievitch." "your family!" i retorted, laughing. "upon my word, you do them great honour. i wonder whether they'd be very proud and pleased if they knew of your adoption of them. i haven't noticed on their side any very great signs of devotion." he laughed. "no, you haven't noticed, ivan andreievitch. but there, you don't really notice very much. you think you see the devil of a lot and are a mighty clever fellow; but we're russians, you know, and it takes more than sentimental mysticism to understand us. but even if you did understand us--which you don't--the real point is that we don't want you, any of you, patronising, patting us on the shoulder, explaining us to ourselves, talking about our souls, our unpunctuality, and our capacity for drink. however, that's merely in a general way. in a personal, direct, and individual way, i beg you not to visit my family again. stick to your own countrymen." although he spoke obstinately, and with a show of assurance, i realised, behind his words, his own uncertainty. "see here, semyonov," i said. "it's just my own englishmen that i am going to stick to. what about lawrence? and what about bohun? will you prevent me from continuing my friendship with them?" "lawrence... lawrence," he said slowly, in a voice quite other than his earlier one, and as though he were talking aloud to himself. "now, that's strange... there's a funny thing. a heavy, dull, silent englishman, as ugly as only an englishman can be, and the two of them are mad about him--nothing in him--nothing--and yet there it is. it's the fidelity in the man, that's what it is, durward...." he suddenly called out the word aloud, as though he'd made a discovery. "fidelity... fidelity... that's what we russians admire, and there's a man with not enough imagination to make him unfaithful. fidelity!--lack of imagination, lack of freedom--that's all fidelity is.... but i'm faithful.... god knows i'm faithful--always! always!" he stared past me. i swear that he did not see me, that i had vanished utterly from his vision. i waited. he was leaning forward, pressing both his thick white hands on the table. his gaze must have pierced the ice beyond the walls, and the worlds beyond the ice. then quite suddenly he came back to me and said very quietly, "well, there it is, ivan andreievitch.... you must leave vera and nina alone. it isn't your affair." we continued the discussion then in a strange and friendly way. "i believe it to be my affair," i answered quietly, "simply because they care for me and have asked me to help them if they were in trouble. i still deny that vera cares for lawrence.... nina has had some girl's romantic idea perhaps... but that is the extent of the trouble. you are trying to make things worse, alexei petrovitch, for your own purposes--and god only knows what they are." he now spoke so quietly that i could scarcely hear his words. he was leaning forward on the table, resting his head on his hands and looking gravely at me. "what i can't understand, ivan andreievitch," he said, "is why you're always getting in my way. you did so in galicia, and now here you are again. it is not as though you were strong or wise--no, it is because you are persistent. i admire you in a way, you know, but now, this time, i assure you that you are making a great mistake in remaining. you will be able to influence neither vera michailovna nor your bullock of an englishman when the moment comes. at the crisis they will never think of you at all, and the end of it simply will be that all parties concerned will hate you. i don't wish you any harm, and i assure you that you will suffer terribly if you stay.... by the way, ivan andreievitch," his voice suddenly dropped, "you haven't ever had--by chance--just by chance--any photograph of marie ivanovna with you, have you? just by chance, you know...." "no," i said shortly, "i never had one." "no--of course--not. i only thought.... but of course you wouldn't--no--no.... well, as i was saying, you'd better leave us all to our fate. you can't prevent things--you can't indeed." i looked at him without speaking. he returned my gaze. "tell me one thing," i said, "before i answer you. what are you doing to markovitch, alexei petrovitch?" "markovitch!" he repeated the name with an air of surprise as though he had never heard it before. "what do you mean?" "you have some plan with regard to him," i said. "what is it?" he laughed then. "i a plan! my dear durward, how romantic you always insist on being! i a plan! your plunges into russian psychology are as naïve as the girl who pays her ten kopecks to see the fat woman at the fair! markovitch and i understand one another. we trust one another. he is a simple fellow, but i trust him." "do you remember," i said, "that the other day at the jews' market you told me the story of the man who tortured his friend, until the man shot him--simply because he was tired of life and too proud to commit suicide. why did you tell me that story?" "did i tell it you?" he asked indifferently. "i had forgotten. but it is of no importance. you know, ivan andreievitch, that what i told you before is true.... we don't want you here any more. i tell you in a perfectly friendly way. i bear you no malice. but we're tired of your sentimentality. i'm not speaking only for myself--i'm not indeed. we feel that you avoid life to a ridiculous extent, and that you have no right to talk to us russians on such a subject. what, for instance, do you know about women? for years i slept with a different woman every night of the week--old and young, beautiful and ugly, some women like men, some like god, some like the gutter. that teaches you something about women--but only something. afterwards i found that there was only one woman--i left all the others like dirty washing--i was supremely faithful... so i learnt the rest. now you have never been faithful nor unfaithful--i'm sure that you have not. then about god? when have you ever thought about him? why, you are ashamed to mention his name. if an englishman speaks of god when other men are present every one laughs--and yet why? it is a very serious and interesting question. god exists undoubtedly, and so we must make up our minds about him. we must establish some relationship--what it is does not matter--that is our individual 'case'--but only the english establish no relationship and then call it a religion.... and so in this affair of my family. what does it matter what they do? that is the only thing of which you think, that they should die or disgrace their name or be unhappy or quarrel.... pooh! what are all those things compared with the idea behind them? if they wish to sacrifice happiness for an idea, that is their good luck, and no russian would think of preventing them. but you come in with your english morality and sentiment, and scream and cry.... no, ivan andreievitch, go home! go home!" i waited to be quite sure that he had finished, and then i said, "that's all as it may be, alexei petrovitch. it may be as you say. the point is, that i remain here." he got up from his chair. "you are determined on that?" "i am determined," i answered. "nothing will change you?" "nothing." "then it is a battle between us?" "if you like." "so be it." i helped him on with his shuba. he said, in an ordinary conversational tone, "there may be trouble to-morrow. there's been shooting by the nicholas station this afternoon, i hear. i should avoid the nevski to-morrow." i laughed. "i'm not afraid of that kind of death, alexei petrovitch," i said. "no," he said, looking at me. "i will do you justice. you are not." he pulled his shuba close about him. "good-night, ivan andreievitch," he said. "it's been a very pleasant talk." "very," i answered. "good-night," after he had gone i drew back the blinds and let the moonlight flood the room. v i feel conscious, as i approach the centre of my story, that there is an appearance of uncertainty in the way that i pass from one character to another. i do not defend that uncertainty. what i think i really feel now, on looking back, is that each of us--myself, semyonov, vera, nina, lawrence, bohun, grogoff, yes, and the rat himself--was a part of a mysterious figure who was beyond us, outside us, and above us all. the heart, the lungs, the mouth, the eyes... used against our own human agency, and yet free within that domination for the exercise of our own free will. have you never felt when you have been swept into the interaction of some group of persons that you were being employed as a part of a figure that without you would be incomplete? the figure is formed.... for an instant it remains, gigantic, splendid, towering above mankind, as a symbol, a warning, a judgement, an ideal, a threat. dimly you recognise that you have played some part in the creation of that figure, and that living for a moment, as you have done, in some force outside your individuality, you have yet expressed that same individuality more nobly than any poor assertion of your own small lonely figure could afford. you have been used and now you are alone again.... you were caught up and united to your fellowmen. god appeared to you--not, as you had expected, in a vision cut off from the rest of the world, but in a revelation that you shared and that was only revealed because you were uniting with others. and yet your individuality was still there, strengthened, heightened, purified. and the vision of the figure remains.... when i woke on saturday morning, after my evening with semyonov, i was conscious that i was relieved as though i had finally settled some affair whose uncertainty had worried me. i lay in bed chuckling as though i had won a triumph over semyonov, as though i said to myself, "well, i needn't be afraid of him any longer." it was a most beautiful day, crystal clear, with a stainless blue sky and the snow like a carpet of jewels, and i thought i would go and see how the world was behaving. i walked down the morskaia, finding it quiet enough, although i fancied that the faces of the passers-by were anxious and nervous. nevertheless, the brilliant sunshine and the clear peaceful beauty of the snow reassured me--the world was too beautiful and well-ordered a place to allow disturbance. then at the corner of the english shop where the morskaia joins the nevski prospect, i realised that something had occurred. it was as though the world that i had known so long, and with whom i felt upon such intimate terms, had suddenly screwed round its face and showed me a new grin. the broad space of the nevski was swallowed up by a vast crowd, very quiet, very amiable, moving easily, almost slothfully, in a slowly stirring stream. as i looked up the nevski i realised what it was that had given me the first positive shock of an altered world. the trams had stopped. i had never seen the nevski without its trams; i had always been forced to stand on the brink, waiting whilst the stream of isvostchicks galloped past and the heavy, lumbering, coloured elephants tottered along, amiable and slow and good-natured like everything else in that country. now the elephants were gone; the isvostchicks were gone. so far as my eye could see, the black stream flooded the shining way. i mingled with the crowd and found myself slowly propelled in an amiable, aimless manner up the street. "what's the matter?" i asked a cheerful, fat little "chinovnik," who seemed to be tethered to me by some outside invincible force. "i don't know...." he said. "they're saying there's been some shooting up by the nicholas station--but that was last night. some women had a procession about food.... _tak oni gavoryat_--so they say.... but i don't know. people have just come out to see what they can see...." and so they had--women, boys, old men, little children. i could see no signs of ill-temper anywhere, only a rather open-mouthed wonder and sense of expectation. a large woman near me, with a shawl over her head and carrying a large basket, laughed a great deal. "no, i wouldn't go," she said. "you go and get it for yourself--i'm not coming. not i, i was too clever for that." then she would turn, shrilly calling for some child who was apparently lost in the crowd. "sacha!... ah! sacha!" she cried--and turning again, "eh! look at the cossack!... there's a fine cossack!" it was then that i noticed the cossacks. they were lined up along the side of the pavement, and sometimes they would suddenly wheel and clatter along the pavement itself, to the great confusion of the crowd who would scatter in every direction. they were fine-looking men, and their faces expressed childish and rather worried amiability. the crowd obviously feared them not at all, and i saw a woman standing with her hand on the neck of one of the horses, talking in a very friendly fashion to the soldier who rode it. "that's strange," i thought to myself; "there's something queer here." it was then, just at the entrance of the "malaia koniushennaia," that a strange little incident occurred. some fellow--i could just see his shaggy head, his pale face, and black beard--had been shouting something, and suddenly a little group of cossacks moved towards him and he was surrounded. they turned off with him towards a yard close at hand. i could hear his voice shrilly protesting; the crowd also moved behind, murmuring. suddenly a cossack, laughing, said something. i could not hear his words, but every one near me laughed. the little chinovnik at my side said to me, "that's right. they're not going to shoot, whatever happens--not on their brothers, they say. they'll let the fellow go in a moment. it's only just for discipline's sake. that's right. that's the spirit!" "but what about the police?" i asked. "ah, the police!" his cheery, good-natured face was suddenly dark and scowling. "let them try, that's all. it's protopopoff who's our enemy--not the cossacks." and a woman near him repeated. "yes, yes, it's protopopoff. hurrah for the cossacks!" i was squeezed now into a corner, and the crowd swirled and eddied about me in a tangled stream, slow, smiling, confused, and excited. i pushed my way along, and at last tumbled down the dark stone steps into the "cave de la grave," a little restaurant patronised by the foreigners and certain middle-class russians. it was full, and every one was eating his or her meal very comfortably as though nothing at all were the matter. i sat down with a young american, an acquaintance of mine attached to the american embassy. "there's a tremendous crowd in the nevski," i said. "guess i'm too hungry to trouble about it," he answered. "do you think there's going to be any trouble?" i asked. "course not. these folks are always wandering round. m. protopopoff has it in hand all right." "yes, i suppose he has," i answered with a sigh. "you seem to want trouble," he said, suddenly looking up at me. "no, i don't want trouble," i answered. "but i'm sick of this mess, this mismanagement, thievery, lying--one's tempted to think that anything would be better--" "don't you believe it," he said brusquely. "excuse me, durward, i've been in this country five years. a revolution would mean god's own upset, and you've got a war on, haven't you?" "they might fight better than ever," i argued. "fight!" he laughed. "they're dam sick of it all, that's what they are. and a revolution would leave 'em like a lot of silly sheep wandering on to a precipice. but there won't be no revolution. take my word." it was at that moment that i saw boris grogoff come in. he stood in the doorway looking about him, and he had the strangest air of a man walking in his sleep, so bewildered, so rapt, so removed was he. he stared about him, looked straight at me, but did not recognise me; finally, when a waiter showed him a table, he sat down still gazing in front of him. the waiter had to speak to him twice before he ordered his meal, and then he spoke so strangely that the fellow looked at him in astonishment. "guess that chap's seen the millennium," remarked my american. "or he's drunk, maybe." this appearance had the oddest effect on me. it was as though i had been given a sudden conviction that after all there was something behind this disturbance. i saw, during the whole of the rest of that day, grogoff's strange face with the exalted, bewildered eyes, the excited mouth, the body tense and strained as though waiting for a blow. and now, always when i look back i see boris grogoff standing in the doorway of the "cave de la grave" like a ghost from another world warning me. in the afternoon i had a piece of business that took me across the river. i did my business and turned homewards. it was almost dark, and the ice of the neva was coloured a faint green under the grey sky; the buildings rose out of it like black bubbles poised over a swamp. i was in that strange quarter of petrograd where the river seems, like some sluggish octopus, to possess a thousand coils. always you are turning upon a new bend of the ice, secretly stretching into darkness; strange bridges suddenly meet you, and then, where you had expected to find a solid mass of hideous flats, there will be a cluster of masts and the smell of tar, and little fierce red lights like the eyes of waiting beasts. i seemed to stand with ice on every side of me, and so frail was my trembling wooden bridge that it seemed an easy thing for the ice, that appeared to press with tremendous weight against its banks, to grind the supports to fragments. there was complete silence on every side of me. the street to my left was utterly deserted. i heard no cries nor calls--only the ice seemed once and again to quiver as though some submerged creature was moving beneath it. that vast crowd on the nevski seemed to be a dream. i was in a world that had fallen into decay and desolation, and i could smell rotting wood, and could fancy that frozen blades of grass were pressing up through the very pavement stones. suddenly an isvostchick stumbled along past me, down the empty street, and the bumping rattle of the sledge on the snow woke me from my laziness. i started off homewards. when i had gone a little way and was approaching the bridge over the neva some man passed me, looked back, stopped and waited for me. when i came up to him i saw to my surprise that it was the rat. he had his coat-collar turned over his ears and his dirty fur cap pulled down over his forehead. his nose was very red, and his thin hollow cheeks a dirty yellow colour. "good-evening, barin," he said, grinning. "good-evening," i said. "where are you slipping off to so secretly?" "slipping off?" he did not seem to understand my word. i repeated it. "oh, i'm not slipping off," he said almost indignantly. "no, indeed. i'm just out for a walk like your honour, to see the town." "what have they been doing this afternoon?" i asked. "there's been a fine fuss on the nevski." "yes, there has...." he said, chuckling. "but it's nothing to the fuss there will be." "nonsense," i said. "the police have got it all in control already. you'll see to-morrow...." "and the soldiers, barin?" "oh, the soldiers won't do anything. talk's one thing--action's another." he laughed to himself and seemed greatly amused. this irritated me. "well, what do you know?" i asked. "i know nothing," he chuckled. "but remember, barin, in a week's time, if you want me i'm your friend. who knows? in a week i may be a rich man." "some one else's riches," i answered. "certainly," he said. "and why not? why should he have things? is he a better man than i? possibly--but then it is easy for a rich man to keep within the law. and then russia's meant for the poor man. however," he continued, with great contempt in his voice, "that's politics--dull stuff. while the others talk i act." "and what about the germans?" i asked him. "does it occur to you that when you've collected your spoils the germans will come in and take them?" "ah, you don't understand us, barin," he said, laughing. "you're a good man and a kind man, but you don't understand us. what can the germans do? they can't take the whole of russia. russia's a big country.... no, if the germans come there'll be more for us to take." we stood for a moment under a lamp-post. he put his hand on my arm and looked up at me with his queer ugly face, his sentimental dreary eyes, his red nose, and his hard, cruel little mouth. "but no one shall touch you--unless it's myself if i'm very drunk. but you, knowing me, will understand afterwards that i was at least not malicious--" i laughed. "and this mysticism that they tell us about in england. are you mystical, rat? have you a beautiful soul?" he sniffed and blew his nose with his hand. "i don't know what you're talking about, barin--i suppose you haven't a rouble or two on you?" "no, i haven't," i answered. he looked up and down the bridge as though he were wondering whether an attack on me was worth while. he saw a policeman and decided that it wasn't. "well, good-night, barin," he said cheerfully. he shuffled off. i looked at the vast neva, pale green and dim grey, so silent under the bridges. the policeman, enormous under his high coat, the sure and confident guardian of that silent world, came slowly towards me, and i turned away home. vi the next day, sunday, i have always called in my mind nina's day, and so i propose to deal with it here, describing it as far as possible from her point of view and placing her in the centre of the picture. the great fact about nina, at the end, when everything has been said, must always be her youth. that russian youthfulness is something that no western people can ever know, because no western people are accustomed, from their very babyhood, to bathe in an atmosphere that deals only with ideas. in no russian family is the attempt to prevent children from knowing what life really is maintained for long; the spontaneous impetuosity of the parents breaks it down. nevertheless the russian boy and girl, when they come to the awkward age, have not the least idea of what life really is. dear me, no! they possess simply a bundle of incoherent ideas, untested, ill-digested, but a wonderful basis for incessant conversation. experience comes, of course, and for the most part it is unhappy experience. life is a tragedy to every russian simply because the daily round is forgotten by him in his pursuit of an ultimate meaning. we in the west have learnt to despise ultimate meanings as unpractical and rather priggish things. nina had thought so much and tested so little. she loved so vehemently that her betrayal was the more inevitable. for instance, she did not love boris grogoff in the least, but he was in some way connected with the idea of freedom. she was, i am afraid, beginning to love lawrence desperately--the first love of her life--and he too was connected with the idea of freedom because he was english. we english do not understand sufficiently how the russians love us for our easy victory over tyranny, and despise us for the small use we have made of our victory--and then, after all, there is something to be said for tyranny too.... but nina did not see why she should not capture lawrence. she felt her vitality, her health, her dominant will beat so strongly within her that it seemed to her that nothing could stop her. she loved him for his strength, his silence, his good-nature, yes, and his stupidity. this last gave her a sense of power over him, and of motherly tenderness too. she loved his stiff and halting russian--it was as though he were but ten years old. i am convinced, too, that she did not consider that she was doing any wrong to vera. in the first place she was not as yet really sure that vera cared for him. vera, who had been to her always a mother rather than a sister, seemed an infinite age. it was ridiculous that vera should fall in love--vera so stately and stern and removed from passion. those days were over for vera, and, with her strong sense of duty and the fitness of things, she would realise that. moreover nina could not believe that lawrence cared for vera. vera was not the figure to be loved in that way. vera's romance had been with markovitch years and years ago, and now, whenever nina looked at markovitch, it made it at once impossible to imagine vera in any new romantic situation. then had come the night of the birthday party, and suspicion had at once flamed up again. she was torn that night and for days afterwards with a raging jealousy. she hated vera, she hated lawrence, she hated herself. then again her mood had changed. it was, after all, natural that he should have gone to protect vera; she was his hostess; he was english, and did not know how trivial a russian scene of temper was. he had meant nothing, and poor vera, touched that at her matronly age any one should show her attention, had looked at him gratefully. that was all. she loved vera; she would not hurt her with such ridiculous suspicions, and, on that friday evening when semyonov had come to see me, she had been her old self again, behaving to vera with all the tenderness and charm and affection that were her most delightful gifts. on this sunday morning she was reassured; she was gay and happy and pleased with the whole world. the excitement of the disturbances of the last two days provided an emotional background, not too thrilling to be painful, because, after all, these riots would, as usual, come to nothing, but it was pleasant to feel that the world was buzzing, and that without paying a penny one might see a real cinematograph show simply by walking down the nevski. i do not know, of course, what exactly happened that morning until semyonov came in, but i can see the markovitch family, like ten thousand other petrograd families, assembling somewhere about eleven o'clock round the samovar, all in various stages of undress, all sleepy and pale-faced, and a little befogged, as all good russians are when, through the exigencies of sleep, they've been compelled to allow their ideas to escape from them for a considerable period. they discussed, of course, the disturbances, and i can imagine markovitch portentously announcing that "it was all over, he had the best of reasons-for knowing...." as he once explained to me, he was at his worst on sunday, because he was then so inevitably reminded of his lost youth. "it's a gloomy day, ivan andreievitch, for all those who have not quite done what they expected. the bells ring, and you feel that they ought to mean something to you, but of course one's gone past all that.... but it's a pity...." nina's only thought that morning was that lawrence was coming in the afternoon to take her for a walk. she had arranged it all. after a very evident hint from her he had suggested it. vera had refused, because some aunts were coming to call, and finally it had been arranged that after the walk lawrence should bring nina home, stay to half-past six dinner, and that then they should all go to the french theatre. i also was asked to dinner and the theatre. nina was sure that something must happen that afternoon. it would be a crisis.... she felt within her such vitality, such power, such domination, that she believed that to-day she could command anything.... she was, poor child, supremely confident, and that not through conceit or vanity, but simply because she was a fatalist and believed that destiny had brought lawrence to her feet.... it was the final proof of her youth that she saw the whole universe working to fulfil her desire. the other proof of her youth was that she began, for the first time, to suffer desperately. the most casual mention of lawrence's name would make her heart beat furiously, suffocating her, her throat dry, her cheeks hot, her hands cold. then, as the minute of his arrival approached, she would sit as though she were the centre of a leaping fire that gradually inch by inch was approaching nearer to her, the flames staring like little eyes on the watch, the heat advancing and receding in waves like hands. she hoped that no one would notice her agitation. she talked nonsense to whomsoever was near to her with little nervous laughs; she seemed to herself to be terribly unreal, with a fierce hostile creature inside her who took her heart in his hot hands and pressed it, laughing at her. and then the misery! that little episode at the circus of which i had been a witness was only the first of many dreadful ventures. she confessed to me afterwards that she did not herself know what she was doing. and the final result of these adventures was to encourage her because he had not repelled her. he _must_ have noticed, she thought, the times when her hand had touched his, when his mouth had been, so close to hers that their very thoughts had mingled, when she had felt the stuff of his coat, and even for an instant stroked it. he _must_ have noticed these things, and still he had never rebuffed her. he was always so kind to her; she fancied that his voice had a special note of tenderness in it when he spoke to her, and when she looked at his ugly, quiet, solid face, she could not believe that they were not meant for one another. he _must_ want her, her gaiety, happiness, youth--it would be wrong for him _not_ to! there could be no girls in that stupid, practical, far-away england who would be the wife to him that she would be. then the cursed misery of that waiting! they could hear in their sitting-room the steps coming up the stone stairs outside their flat, and every step seemed to be his. ah, he had come earlier than he had fixed. vera had stupidly forgotten, perhaps, or he had found waiting any longer impossible. yes, surely that was his footfall; she knew it so well. there, now he was turning towards the door; there was a pause; soon there would be the tinkle of the bell!... no, he had mounted higher; it was not lawrence--only some stupid, ridiculous creature who was impertinently daring to put her into this misery of disappointment. and then she would wonder suddenly whether she had been looking too fixedly at the door, whether they had noticed her, and she would start and look about her self-consciously, blushing a little, her eyes hot and suspicious. i can see her in all these moods; it was her babyhood that was leaving her at last. she was never to be quite so spontaneously gay again, never quite so careless, so audacious, so casual, so happy. in russia the awkward age is very short, very dramatic, often enough very tragic. nina was as helpless as the rest of the world. at any rate, upon this sunday, she was sure of her afternoon. her eyes were wild with excitement. any one who looked at her closely must have noticed her strangeness, but they were all discussing the events of the last two days; there were a thousand stories, nearly all of them false and a few; true facts. no one in reality knew anything except that there had been some demonstrations, a little shooting, and a number of excited speeches. the town on that lovely winter morning seemed absolutely quiet. somewhere about mid-day semyonov came in, and without thinking about it nina suddenly found herself sitting in the window talking to him. this conversation, which was in its results to have an important influence on her whole life, continued the development which that eventful sunday was to effect in her. its importance lay very largely in the fact that her uncle had never spoken to her seriously like a grown-up woman before. semyonov was, of course, quite clever enough to realise the change which was transforming her, and he seized it, at once, for his own advantage. she, on her side, had always, ever since she could remember, been intrigued by him. she told me once that almost her earliest memory was being lifted into the air by her uncle and feeling the thick solid strength of his grasp, so that she was like a feather in the air, poised on one of his stubborn fingers; when he kissed her each hair of his beard seemed like a pale, taut wire, so stiff and resolute was it. her uncle ivan was a flabby, effeminate creature in comparison. then, as she had grown older, she had realised that he was a dangerous man, dangerous to women, who loved and feared and hated him. vera said that he had great power over them and made them miserable, and that he was, therefore, a bad, wicked man. but this only served to make him, in nina's eyes, the more a romantic figure. however, he had never treated her in the least seriously, had tossed her in the air spiritually just as he had done physically when she was a baby, had given her chocolates, taken her once or twice to the cinema, laughed at her, and, she felt, deeply despised her. then came the war and he had gone to the front, and she had almost forgotten him. then came the romantic story of his being deeply in love with a nurse who had been killed, that he was heartbroken and inconsolable and a changed man. was it wonderful that on his return to petrograd she should feel again that old byronic (every russian is still brought up on byron) romance? she did not like him, but--well--vera was a staid old-fashioned thing.... perhaps they all misjudged him; perhaps he really needed comfort and consolation. he certainly seemed kinder than he used to be. but, until to-day, he had never talked to her seriously. how her heart leapt into her throat when he began, at once, in his quiet soft voice, "well, nina dear, tell me all about it. i know, so you needn't be frightened. i know and i understand." she flung a terrified glance around her, but uncle ivan was reading the paper at the other end of the room, her brother-in-law was cutting up little pieces of wood in his workshop, and vera was in the kitchen. "what do you mean?" she said in a whisper. "i don't understand." "yes, you do," he answered, smiling at her. "you know, nina, you're in love with the englishman, and have been for a long time. well, why not? don't be so frightened about it. it is quite time that you should be in love with some one, and he's a fine strong young man--not over-blessed with brains, but you can supply that part of it. no, i think it's a very good match. i like it. believe me, i'm your friend, nina." he put his hand on hers. he looked so kind, she told me afterwards, that she felt as though she had never known him before; her eyes were filled with tears, so overwhelming a relief was it to find some one at last who sympathised and understood and wanted her to succeed. i remember that she was wearing that day a thin black velvet necklet with a very small diamond in front of it. she had been given it by uncle ivan on her last birthday, and instead of making her look grown-up it gave her a ridiculously childish appearance as though she had stolen into vera's bedroom and dressed up in her things. then, with her fair tousled hair and large blue eyes, open as a rule with a startled expression as though she had only just awakened into an astonishingly exciting world, she was altogether as unprotected and as guileless and as honest as any human being alive. i don't know whether semyonov felt her innocence and youth--i expect he considered very little beside the plans that he had then in view.... and innocence had never been very interesting to him. he spoke to her just as a kind, wise, thoughtful uncle ought to speak to a niece caught up into her first love-affair. from the moment of that half-hour's conversation in the window nina adored him, and believed every word that came from his mouth. "you see, nina dear," he went on, "i've not spoken to you before because you neither liked me nor trusted me. quite rightly you listened to what others said about me--" "oh no," interrupted nina. "i never listen to anybody." "well then," said semyonov, "we'll say that you were very naturally influenced by them. and quite right--perfectly right. you were only a girl then--you are a woman now. i had nothing to say to you then--now i can help you, give you a little advice perhaps--" i don't know what nina replied. she was breathlessly pleased and excited. "what i want," he went on, "is the happiness of you all. i was sorry when i came back to find that nicholas and vera weren't such friends as they used to be. i don't mean that there's anything wrong at all, but they must be brought closer together--and that's what you and i, who know them and love them, can do--" "yes, yes," said nina eagerly. semyonov then explained that the thing that really was, it seemed to him, keeping them apart were nicholas's inventions. of course vera had long ago seen that these inventions were never going to come to anything, that they were simply wasting nicholas's time when he might, by taking an honest clerkship or something of the kind, be maintaining the whole household, and the very thought of him sitting in his workshop irritated her. the thing to do, semyonov explained, was to laugh nicholas out of his inventions, to show him that it was selfish nonsense his pursuing them, to persuade him to make an honest living. "but i thought," said nina, "you approved of them. i heard you only the other day telling him that it was a good idea, and that he must go on--" "ah!" said semyonov. "that was my weakness, i'm afraid. i couldn't bear to disappoint him. but it was wrong of me--and i knew it at the time." now nina had always rather admired her brother-in-law's inventions. she had thought it very clever of him to think of such things, and she had wondered why other people did not applaud him more. now suddenly she saw that it was very selfish of him to go on with these things when they never brought in a penny, and vera had to do all the drudgery. she was suddenly indignant with him. in how clear a light her uncle placed things! "one thing to do," said semyonov, "is to laugh at him about them. not very much, not unkindly, but enough to make him see the folly of it." "i think he does see that already, poor nicholas," said nina with wisdom beyond her years. "to bring nicholas and vera together," said semyonov, "that's what we have to do, you and i. and believe me, dear nina, i on my side will do all i can to help you. we are friends, aren't we?--not only uncle and niece." "yes," said nina breathlessly. that was all that there was to the conversation, but it was quite enough to make nina feel as though she had already won her heart's desire. if any one as clever as her uncle believed in this, then it _must_ be true. it had not been only her own silly imagination--lawrence cared for her. her uncle had seen it, otherwise he would never have encouraged her--lawrence cared for her.... suddenly, in the happy spontaneity of the moment she did what she very seldom did, bent forward and kissed him. she told me afterwards that that kiss seemed to displease him. he got up and walked away. vii i do not know exactly what occurred during that afternoon. neither lawrence nor nina spoke about it to me. i only know that nina returned subdued and restrained. i can imagine them going out into that quiet town and walking along the deserted quay; the quiet that afternoon was, i remember, marvellous. the whole world was holding its breath. great events were occurring, but we were removed from them all. the ice quivered under the sun and the snowclouds rose higher and higher into the blue, and once and again a bell chimed and jangled.... there was an amazing peace. through this peaceful world nina and lawrence walked. his mind must, i know, have been very far away from nina, probably he saw nothing of her little attempts at friendship; her gasping sentences that seemed to her so daring and significant he scarcely heard. his only concern was to endure the walk as politely as possible and return to vera. perhaps if she had not had that conversation with her uncle she would have realised more clearly how slight a response was made to her, but she thought only that this was his english shyness and gaucherie--she must go slowly and carefully. he was not like a russian. she must not frighten him. ah, how she loved him as she walked beside him, seeing and not seeing the lovely frozen colours of the winter day, the quickly flooding saffron sky! the first bright star, the great pearl-grey cloud of the neva as it was swept into the dark. in the dark she put, i am sure, her hand on his arm, and felt his strength and took her small hurried steps beside his long ones. he did not, i expect, feel her hand on his sleeve at all. it was vera whom he saw through the dusk. vera watching the door for his return, knowing that his eyes would rush to hers, that every beat of his heart was for her.... i found them all seated at dinner when i entered. i brought them the news of the shooting up at the nicholas station. "perhaps, we had better not go to the theatre," i said. "a number of people were killed this afternoon, and all the trams are stopped." still it was all remote from us. they laughed at the idea of not going to the theatre. the tickets had been bought two weeks ago, and the walk would be pleasant. of course we would go. it would be fun, too, to see whether anything were happening. with how strange a clarity i remember the events of that evening. it is detached and hangs by itself among the other events of that amazing time, as though it had been framed and separated for some especial purpose. my impression of the colour of it now is of a scene intensely quiet. i saw at once on my arrival that vera was not yet prepared to receive me back into her friendship. and i saw, too, that she included lawrence in this ostracism. she sat there, stiff and cold, smiling and talking simply because she was compelled, for politeness sake, to do so. she would scarcely speak to me at all, and when i saw this i turned and devoted myself to uncle ivan, who was always delighted to make me a testing-ground for his english. but poor jerry! had i not been so anxious lest a scene should burst upon us all i could have laughed at the humour of it. vera's attitude was a complete surprise to him. he had not seen her during the preceding week, and that absence from her had heightened his desire until it burnt his very throat with its flame. one glance from her, when he came in, would have contented him. he could have rested then, happily, quietly; but instead of that glance she had avoided his eye, her hand was cold and touched his only for an instant. she had not spoken to him again after the first greeting. i am sure that he had never known a time when his feelings threatened to be too much for him. his hold on himself and his emotions had been complete. "these fellers," he once said to me about some russians, "are always letting their feelings overwhelm them--like women. and they like it. funny thing!" well, funny or no, he realised it now; his true education, like nina's, like vera's, like bohun's, like markovitch's, perhaps like my own, was only now beginning. funny and pathetic, too, to watch his broad, red, genial face struggling to express a polite interest in the conversation, to show nothing but friendliness and courtesy. his eyes were as restless as minnows; they darted for an instant towards vera, then darted off again, then flashed back. his hand moved for a plate, and i saw that it was shaking. poor jerry! he had learnt what suffering was during those last weeks. but the most silent of us all that evening was markovitch. he sat huddled over his food and never said a word. if he looked up at all he glowered, and so soon as he had finished eating he returned to his workshop, closing the door behind him. i caught semyonov looking at him with a pleasant, speculative smile.... at last vera, nina, lawrence, and i started for the theatre. i can't say that i was expecting a very pleasant evening, but the deathlike stillness, both of ourselves and the town did, i confess, startle me. scarcely a word was exchanged by us between the english prospect and saint isaac's square. the square looked lovely in the bright moonlight, and i said something about it. it was indeed very fine, the cathedral like a hovering purple cloud, the old sentry in his high peaked hat, the black statue, and the blue shadows over the snow. it was then that lawrence, with an air of determined strength, detached vera from us and walked ahead with her. i saw that he was talking eagerly to her. nina said, with a little shudder, "isn't it quiet, durdles? as though there were ghosts round every corner." "hope you enjoyed your walk this afternoon," i said. "no, it was quiet then. but not like it is now. let's walk faster and catch the others up. do you believe in ghosts, durdles?" "yes, i think i do." "so do i. was it true, do you think, about the people being shot at the nicholas station to-day?" "i daresay." "perhaps all the dead people are crowding round here now. why isn't any one out walking?" "i suppose they are all frightened by what they've heard, and think it better to stay at home." we were walking down the morskaia, and our feet gave out a ringing echo. "let's keep up with them," nina said. when we had joined the others i found that they were both silent--lawrence very red, vera pale. we were all feeling rather weary. a woman met us. "you aren't allowed to cross the nevski," she said; "the cossacks are stopping everybody." i can see her now, a stout, red-faced woman, a shawl over her head, and carrying a basket. another woman, a prostitute i should think, came up and joined us. "what is it?" she asked us. the stout woman repeated in a trembling, agitated voice, "you aren't allowed to cross the nevski. the cossacks are stopping everybody." the prostitute shook her head in her alarm, and little flakes of powder detached themselves from her nose. "_bozhe moi_--_bozhe moi_!" she said, "and i promised not to be late." vera then, very calmly and quietly, took command of the situation. "we'll go and see," she said, "what is really the truth." we turned up the side street to the moika canal, which lay like powdered crystal under the moon. not a soul was in sight. there arrived then one of the most wonderful moments of my life. the nevski prospect, that broad and mighty thoroughfare, stretched before us like a great silver river. it was utterly triumphantly bare and naked. under the moon it flowed, with proud tranquillity, so far as the eye could see between its high black banks of silent houses. at intervals of about a hundred yards the cossack pickets, like ebony statues on their horses, guarded the way. down the whole silver expanse not one figure was to be seen; so beautiful was it under the high moon, so still, so quiet, so proud, that it was revealing now for the first time its real splendour. at no time of the night or day is the nevski deserted. how happy it must have been that night!... for us, it was as though we hesitated on the banks of a river. i felt a strange superstition, as though something said to me, "you cross that and you are plunged irrevocably into a new order of events. go home, and you will avoid danger." nina must have had something of the same feeling, because she said: "let's go home. they won't let us cross. i don't want to cross. let's go home." but vera said firmly, "nonsense! we've gone so far. we've got the tickets. i'm going on." i felt the note in her voice, superstitiously, as a kind of desperate challenge, as though she had said: "well, you see nothing worse can happen to me than has happened." lawrence said roughly, "of course, we're going on." the prostitute began, in a trembling voice, as though we must all of necessity understand her case: "i don't want to be late this time, because i've been late so often before.... it always is that way with me... always unfortunate...." we started across, and when we stepped into the shining silver surface we all stopped for an instant, as though held by an invisible force. "that's it," said vera, speaking it seemed to herself. "so it always is with us. all revolutions in russia end this way--" an unmounted cossack came forward to us. "no hanging about there," he said. "cross quickly. no one is to delay." we moved to the other side of the moika bridge. i thought of the cossacks yesterday who had assured the people that they would not fire--well, that impulse had passed. protopopoff and his men had triumphed. we were all now in the shallows on the other bank of the canal. the prostitute, who was still at our side, hesitated for a moment, as though she were going to speak. i think she wanted to ask whether she might walk with us a little way. suddenly she vanished without sound, into the black shadows. "come along," said vera. "we shall be dreadfully late." she seemed to be mastered by an overpowering desire not to be left alone with lawrence. she hurried forward with nina, and lawrence and i came more slowly behind. we were now in a labyrinth of little streets and black overhanging flats. not a soul anywhere--only the moonlight in great broad flashes of light--once or twice a woman hurried by keeping in the shadow. sometimes, at the far end of the street, we saw the shining, naked nevski. lawrence was silent, then, just as we were turning into the square where the michailovsky theatre was he began: "what's the matter?... what's the matter with her, durward? what have i done?" "i don't know that you've done anything," i answered. "but don't you see?" he went on. "she won't speak to me. she won't look at me. i won't stand this long. i tell you i won't stand it long. i'll make her come off with me in spite of them all. i'll have her to myself. i'll make her happy, durward, as she's never been in all her life. but i must have her.... i can't live close to her like this, and yet never be with her. never alone, never alone. why is she behaving like this to me?" he spoke really like a man in agony. the words coming from him in little tortured sentences as though they were squeezed from him desperately, with pain at every breath that he drew. "she's afraid of herself, i expect, not of you." i put my hand on his sleeve. "lawrence," i said, "go home. go back to england. this is becoming too much for both of you. nothing can come of it, but unhappiness for everybody." "no!" he said. "it's too late for any of your platonic advice, durward. i'm going to have her, even though the earth turns upside down." we went up the steps and into the theatre. there was, of course, scarcely any one there. the michailovsky is not a large theatre, but the stalls looked extraordinarily desolate, every seat watching one with a kind of insolent wink as though, like the nevski ten minutes before it said, "well, now you humans are getting frightened, you're all stopping away. we're coming back to our own!" there was some such malicious air about the whole theatre. above, in the circle, the little empty boxes were dim and shadowy, and one fancied figures moved there, and then saw that there was no one. someone up in the gallery laughed, and the laugh went echoing up and down the empty spaces. a few people came in and sat nervously about, and no one spoke except in a low whisper, because voices sounded so loud and impertinent. then again the man in the gallery laughed, and every one looked up frowning. the play began. it was, i think, _les idées de françoise_, but of that i cannot be sure. it was a farce of the regular french type, with a bedroom off, and marionettes who continually separated into couples and giggled together. the giggling to-night was of a sadly hollow sort. i pitied and admired the actors, spontaneous as a rule, but now bravely stuffing any kind of sawdust into the figures in their hands, but the leakage was terrible, and the sawdust lay scattered all about the stage. the four of us sat as solemn as statues--i don't think one of us smiled. it was during the second act that i suddenly laughed. i don't know that anything very comic was happening on the stage, but i was aware, with a kind of ironic subconsciousness, that some of the superior spirits in their superior heaven must be deriving a great deal of fun from our situation. there was vera thinking, i suppose, of nothing but lawrence, and lawrence thinking of nothing but vera, and nina thinking of nothing but lawrence, and the audience thinking of their safety, and the players thinking of their salaries, and protopopoff at home thinking of his victory, and the czar in tsarskoe thinking of his godsent autocracy, and europe thinking of its ideals, and germany thinking of its militarism--all self-justified, all mistaken, and all fulfilling some deeper plan at whose purpose they could not begin to guess. and how intermingled we all were! vera and nina, m. robert and mdlle. flori on the other side of the footlights, trenchard and marie killed in galicia, the kaiser and hindenburg, the archbishop of canterbury and the postmaster of my village in glebeshire. the curtain is coming down, the fat husband is deceived once again, the lovers are in the bedroom listening behind the door, the comic waiter is winking at the chamber-maid.... the lights are up and we are alone again in the deserted theatre. towards the end of the last interval i went out into the passage behind the stalls to escape from the chastened whispering that went trembling up and down like the hissing of terrified snakes. i leaned against the wall in the deserted passage and watched the melancholy figure of the cloak-room attendant huddled up on a chair, his head between his hands. suddenly i saw vera. she came up to me as though she were going to walk past me, and then she stopped and spoke. she talked fast, not looking at me, but beyond, down the passage. "i'm sorry, ivan andreievitch," she said. "i was cross the other day. i hurt you. i oughtn't to have done that." "you know," i said, "that i never thought of it for a minute." "no, i was wrong. but i've been terribly worried during these last weeks. i've thought it all out to-day and i've decided--" there was a catch in her breath and she paused; she went on--"decided that there mustn't be any more weakness. i'm much weaker than i thought. i would be ashamed if i didn't think that shame was a silly thing to have. but now i am quite clear; i must make nicholas and nina happy. whatever else comes i must do that. it has been terrible, these last weeks. we've all been angry and miserable, and now i must put it right. i can if i try. i've been forgetting that i chose my own life myself, and now i mustn't be cowardly because it's difficult. i will make it right myself...." she paused again, then she said, looking me straight in the face, "ivan andreievitch, does nina care for mr. lawrence?" she was looking at me, with large black eyes so simply, with such trust in me, that i could only tell her the truth. "yes," i said, "she does." her eyes fell, then she looked up at me again. "i thought so," she said. "and does he care for her?" "no," i said, "he does not." "he must," she said. "it would be a very happy thing for them to marry." she spoke very low, so that i could scarcely hear her words. "wait, vera," i said. "let it alone. nina's very young. the mood will pass. lawrence, perhaps, will go back to england." she drew in her breath and i saw her hand tremble, but she still looked at me, only now her eyes were not so clear. then she laughed. "i'm getting an old woman, ivan andreievitch. it's ridiculous...." she broke off. then held out her hand. "but we'll always be friends now, won't we? i'll never be cross with you again." i took her hand. "i'm getting old too," i said. "and i'm useless at everything. i only make a bungle of everything i try. but i'll be your true friend to the end of my time--" the bell rang and we went back into the theatre. viii and yet, strangely enough, when i lay awake that night in my room on my deserted island, it was of markovitch that i was thinking. of all the memories of the preceding evening that of markovitch huddled over his food, sullen and glowering, with semyonov watching him, was predominant. markovitch was, so to speak, the dark horse of them all, and he was also when one came to look at it all the way round the centre of the story. and yet it was markovitch with his inconsistencies, his mysteries, his impulses, and purposes, whom i understood least of them all. he makes, indeed, a very good symbol of my present difficulties. in that earlier experience of marie in the forests of galicia the matter had been comparatively easy. i had then been concerned with the outward manifestation of war--cannon, cholera, shell, and the green glittering trees of the forest itself. but the war had made progress since then. it had advanced out of material things into the very souls of men. it was no longer the forest of bark and tinder with which the chiefs of this world had to deal, but, to adapt the russian proverb itself, "with the dark forest of the hearts of men." how much more baffling and intangible this new forest, and how deeply serious a business now for those who were still thoughtlessly and selfishly juggling with human affairs. "there is no ammunition," i remember crying desperately in galicia. we had moved further than the question of ammunition now. i had a strange dream that night. i saw my old forest of two years before--the very woods of buchatch with the hot painted leaves, the purple slanting sunlight, the smell, the cries, the whirr of the shell. but in my dream the only inhabitant of that forest was markovitch. he was pursued by some animal. what beast it was i could not see, always the actual vision was denied to me, but i could hear it plunging through the thickets, and once i caught a glimpse of a dark crouching body like a shadow against the light. but markovitch i saw all the time, sweating with heat and terror, his clothes torn, his eyes inflamed, his breath coming in desperate pants, turning once and again as though he would stop and offer defiance, then hasting on, his face and hands scratched and bleeding. i wanted to offer him help and assistance, but something prevented me; i could not get to him. finally he vanished from my sight and i was left alone in the painted forest.... all the next morning i sat and wondered what i had better do, and at last i decided that i would go and see henry bohun. i had not seen bohun for several weeks. i myself had been, of late, less to the flat in the english prospect, but i knew that he had taken my advice that he should be kind to nicholas markovitch with due british seriousness, and that he had been trying to bring some kind of relationship about. he had even asked markovitch to dine alone with him, and markovitch, although he declined the invitation was, i believe, greatly touched. so, about half-past one, i started off for bohun's office on the fontanka. i've said somewhere before, i think, that bohun's work was in connection with the noble but uphill task of enlightening the russian public as to the righteousness of the war, the british character, and the anglo-russian alliance. i say "uphill," because only a few of the _real_ population of russia showed the slightest desire to know anything whatever about any country outside their own. their interest is in ideas not in boundaries--and what i mean by "real" will be made patent by the events of this very day. however, bohun did his best, and it was not his fault that the british government could only spare enough men and money to cover about one inch of the whole of russia--and, i hasten to add, that if that same british government had plastered the whole vast country from archangel to vladivostock with pamphlets, orators, and photographs it would not have altered, in the slightest degree, after events. to make any effect in russia england needed not only men and money but a hundred years' experience of the country. that same experience was possessed by the germans alone of all the western peoples--and they have not neglected to use it. i went by tram to the fontanka, and the streets seemed absolutely quiet. that strange shining nevski of the night before was a dream. some one in the tram said something about rifle-shots in the summer garden, but no one listened. as vera had said last night we had, none of us, much faith in russian revolutions. i went up in the lift to the propaganda office and found it a very nice airy place, clean and smart, with coloured advertisements by shepperson and others on the walls, pictures of hampstead and st. albans and kew gardens that looked strangely satisfactory and homely to me, and rather touching and innocent. there were several young women clicking away at typewriters, and maps of the western front, and a colossal toy map of the london tube, and a nice english library with all the best books from chaucer to d.h. lawrence and from the _religio medici_ to e.v. lucas' _london_. everything seemed clean and simple and a little deserted, as though the heart of the russian public had not, as yet, quite found its way there. i think "guileless" was the adjective that came to my mind, and certainly burrows, the head of the place--a large, red-faced, smiling man with glasses--seemed to me altogether too cheerful and pleased with life to penetrate the wicked recesses of russian pessimism. i went into bohun's room and found him very hard at work in a serious, emphatic way which only made me feel that he was playing at it. he had a little bookcase over his table, and i noticed the _georgian book of verse_, conrad's _nostromo_, and a translation of ropshin's _pale horse_. "altogether too pretty and literary," i said to him; "you ought to be getting at the peasant with a pitchfork and a hammer--not admiring the intelligentzia." "i daresay you're right," he said, blushing. "but whatever we do we're wrong. we have fellows in here cursing us all day. if we're simple we're told we're not clever enough; if we're clever we're told we're too complicated. if we're militant we're told we ought to be tender-hearted, and if we're tender-hearted we're told we're sentimental--and at the end of it all the russians don't care a damn." "well, i daresay you're doing some good somewhere," i said indulgently. "come and look at my view," he said, "and see whether it isn't splendid." he spoke no more than the truth. we looked across the canal over the roofs of the city--domes and towers and turrets, grey and white and blue, with the dark red walls of many of the older houses stretched like an arabian carpet beneath white bubbles of clouds that here and there marked the blue sky. it was a scene of intense peace, the smoke rising from the chimneys, isvostchicks stumbling along on the farther banks of the canal, and the people sauntering in their usual lazy fashion up and down the nevski. immediately below our window was a skating-rink that stretched straight across the canal. there were some figures, like little dolls, skating up and down, and they looked rather desolate beside the deserted band-stands and the empty seats. on the road outside our door a cart loaded with wood slowly moved along, the high hoop over the horse's back gleaming with red and blue. "yes, it _is_ a view!" i said. "splendid!--and all as quiet as though there'd been no disturbances at all. have you heard any news?" "no," said bohun. "to tell the truth i've been so busy that i haven't had time to ring up the embassy. and we've had no one in this morning. monday morning, you know," he added; "always very few people on monday morning"--as though he didn't wish me to think that the office was always deserted. i watched the little doll-like men circling placidly round and round the rink. one bubble cloud rose and slowly swallowed up the sun. suddenly i heard a sharp crack like the breaking of a twig. "what's that?" i said, stepping forward on to the balcony. "it sounded like a shot." "i didn't hear anything," said bohun. "you get funny echoes up here sometimes." we stepped back into bohun's room and, if i had had any anxieties, they would at once, i think, have been reassured by the unemotional figure of bohun's typist, a gay young woman with peroxide hair, who was typing away as though for her very life. "look here, bohun, can i talk to you alone for a minute?" i asked. the peroxide lady left us. "it's just about markovitch i wanted to ask you," i went on. "i'm infernally worried, and i want your help. it may seem ridiculous of me to interfere in another family like this, with people with whom i have, after all, nothing to do. but there are two reasons why it isn't ridiculous. one is the deep affection i have for nina and vera. i promised them my friendship, and now i've got to back that promise. and the other is that you and i are really responsible for bringing lawrence into the family. they never would have known him if it hadn't been for us. there's danger and trouble of every sort brewing, and semyonov, as you know, is helping it on wherever he can. well, now, what i want to know is, how much have you seen of markovitch lately, and has he talked to you?" bohun considered. "i've seen very little of him," he said at last. "i think he avoids me now. he's such a weird bird that it's impossible to tell of what he's really thinking. i know he was pleased when i asked him to dine with me at the bear the other night. he looked _most awfully_ pleased. but he wouldn't come. it was as though he suspected that i was laying a trap for him." "but what have you noticed about him otherwise?" "well, i've seen very little of him. he's sulky just now. he suspected lawrence, of course--always after that night of nina's party. but i think that he's reassured again. and of course it's all so ridiculous, because there's nothing to suspect, absolutely nothing--is there?" "absolutely nothing," i answered firmly. he sighed with relief. "oh, you don't know how glad i am to hear that," he said. "because, although i've _known_ that it was all right, vera's been so odd lately that i've wondered--you know how i care about vera and--" "how do you mean--odd?" i sharply interrupted. "well--for instance--of course i've told nobody--and you won't tell any one either--but the other night i found her crying in the flat, sitting up near the table, sobbing her heart out. she thought every one was out--i'd been in my room and she hadn't known. but vera, durward--vera of all people! i didn't let her see me--she doesn't know now that i heard her. but when you care for any one as i care for vera, it's awful to think that she can suffer like that and one can do nothing. oh, durward, i wish to god i wasn't so helpless! you know before i came out to russia i felt so old; i thought there was nothing i couldn't do, that i was good enough for anybody. and now i'm the most awful ass. fancy, durward! those poems of mine--i thought they were wonderful. i thought--" he was interrupted by a sudden sharp crackle like a fire bursting into a blaze quite close at hand. we both sprang to the windows, threw them open (they were not sealed, for some unknown reason), and rushed out on to the balcony. the scene in front of us was just what it had been before--the bubble clouds were still sailing lazily before the blue, the skaters were still hovering on the ice, the cart of wood that i had noticed was vanishing slowly into the distance. but from the liteiny--just over the bridge--came a confused jumble of shouts, cries, and then the sharp, unmistakable rattle of a machine-gun. it was funny to see the casual life in front of one suddenly pause at that sound. the doll-like skaters seemed to spin for a moment and then freeze; one figure began to run across the ice. a small boy came racing down our street shouting. several men ran out from doorways and stood looking up into the sky, as though they thought the noise had come from there. the sun was just setting; the bubble clouds were pink, and windows flashed fire. the rattle of the machine-gun suddenly stopped, and there was a moment's silence when the only sound in the whole world was the clatter of the wood-cart turning the corner. i could see to the right of me the crowds in the nevski, that had looked like the continual unwinding of a ragged skein of black silk, break their regular movement and split up like flies falling away from an opening door. we were all on the balcony by now--the stout burrows, peroxide, and another lady typist, watson, the thin and most admirable secretary (he held the place together by his diligence and order), two russian clerks, henry, and i. we all leaned over the railings and looked down into the street beneath us. to our left the fontanka bridge was quite deserted--then, suddenly, an extraordinary procession poured across it. at that same moment (at any rate it seems so now to me on looking back) the sun disappeared, leaving a world of pale grey mist shot with gold and purple. the stars were, many of them, already out, piercing with their sharp cold brilliance the winter sky. we could not at first see of what exactly the crowd now pouring over the bridge was composed. then, as it turned and came down our street, it revealed itself as something so theatrical and melodramatic as to be incredible. incredible, i say, because the rest of the world was not theatrical with it. that was always to be the amazing feature of the new scene into which, without knowing it, i was at that moment stepping. in galicia the stage had been set--ruined villages, plague-stricken peasants, shell-holes, trenches, roads cut to pieces, huge trees levelled to the ground, historic châteaux pillaged and robbed. but here the world was still the good old jog-trot world that one had always known; the shops and hotels and theatres remained as they had always been. there would remain, i believe, for ever those dull jaeger undergarments in the windows of the bazaar, and the bound edition of tchekov in the book-shop just above the moika, and the turtle and the gold-fish in the aquarium near elisseieff; and whilst those things were there i could not believe in melodrama. and we did not believe. we dug our feet into the snow, and leaned over the balcony railings absorbed with amused interest. the procession consisted of a number of motor lorries, and on these lorries soldiers were heaped. i can use no other word because, indeed, they seemed to be all piled upon one another, some kneeling forward, some standing, some sitting, and all with their rifles pointing outwards until the lorries looked like hedgehogs. many of the rifles had pieces of red cloth attached to them, and one lorry displayed proudly a huge red flag that waved high in air with a sort of flaunting arrogance of its own. on either side of the lorries, filling the street, was the strangest mob of men, women, and children. there seemed to be little sign of order or discipline amongst them as they were all shouting different cries: "down the fontanka!" "no, the duma!" "to the nevski!" "no, no, _tovaristchi_ (comrades), to the nicholas station!" such a rabble was it that i remember that my first thought was of pitying indulgence. so this was the grand outcome of boris grogoff's eloquence, and the rat's plots for plunder!--a fitting climax to such vain dreams. i saw the cossack, that ebony figure of sunday night. ten such men, and this rabble was dispersed for ever! i felt inclined to lean over and whisper to them, "quick! quick! go home!... they'll be here in a moment and catch you!" and yet, after all, there seemed to be some show of discipline. i noticed that, as the crowd moved forward, men dropped out and remained picketing the doorways of the street. women seemed to be playing a large part in the affair, peasants with shawls over their heads, many of them leading by the hand small children. burrows treated it all as a huge joke. "by jove," he cried, speaking across to me, "durward, it's like that play martin harvey used to do--what was it?--about the french revolution, you know." "'the only way,'" said peroxide, in a prim strangled voice. "that's it--'the only way'--with their red flags and all. don't they look ruffians, some of them?" there was a great discussion going on under our windows. all the lorries had drawn up together, and the screaming, chattering, and shouting was like the noise of a parrots' aviary. the cold blue light had climbed now into the sky, which was thick with stars; the snow on the myriad roofs stretched like a filmy cloud as far as the eye could see. the moving, shouting crowd grew with every moment mistier. "oh, dear! mr. burrows," said the little typist, who was not peroxide. "do you think i shall ever be able to get home? we're on the other side of the river, you know. do you think the bridges will be up? my mother will be so terribly anxious." "oh, you'll get home all right," answered burrows cheerfully. "just wait until this crowd has gone by. i don't expect there's any fuss down by the river..." his words were cut short by some order from one of the fellows below. others shouted in response, and the lorries again began to move forward. "i believe he was shouting to us," said bohun. "it sounded like 'get off' or 'get away.'" "not he!" said burrows; "they're too busy with their own affairs." then things happened quickly. there was a sudden strange silence below; i saw a quick flame from some fire that had apparently been lit on the fontanka bridge; i heard the same voice call out once more sharply, and a second later i felt rather than heard a whizz like the swift flight of a bee past my ear; i was conscious that a bullet had struck the brick behind me. that bullet swung me into the revolution.... ix ...we were all gathered together in the office. i heard one of the russians say in an agitated whisper, "don't turn on the light!... don't turn on the light! they can see!" we were all in half-darkness, our faces mistily white. i could hear peroxide breathing in a tremulous manner, as though in a moment she would break into hysteria. "we'll go into the inside room. we can turn the light on there," said burrows. we all passed into the reception-room of the office, a nice airy place with the library along one wall and bright coloured maps on the other. we stood together and considered the matter. "it's real!" said burrows, his red, cheery face perplexed and strained. "who'd have thought it?" "of course it's real!" cried bohun impatiently (burrows' optimism had been often difficult to bear with indulgence). "now you see! what about your beautiful russian mystic now?" "oh dear!" cried the little russian typist. "and my mother!... what ever shall i do? she'll hear reports and think that i'm being murdered. i shall never get across." "you'd better stay with me to-night, miss peredonov," said peroxide firmly. "my flat's quite close here in gagarinsky. we shall be delighted to have you." "you can telephone to your mother, miss peredonov," said burrows. "no difficulty at all." it was then that bohun took me aside. "look here!" he said. "i'm worried. vera and nina were going to the astoria to have tea with semyonov this afternoon. i should think the astoria might be rather a hot spot if this spreads. and i wouldn't trust semyonov. will you come down with me there now?" "yes," i said, "of course i'll come." we said a word to burrows, put on our shubas and goloshes, and started down the stairs. at every door there were anxious faces. out of one flat came a very fat jew. "gentlemen, what is this all about?" "riots," said bohun. "is there shooting?" "yes," said bohun. "_bozhe moi! bozhe moi!_ and i live over on vassily ostrov! what do you advise, _gaspoda_? will the bridges be up?" "very likely," i answered. "i should stay here." "and they are shooting?" he asked again. "they are," i answered. "gentlemen, gentlemen--stay for a moment. perhaps together we could think.... i am all alone here except for a lady... most unfortunate...." but we could not stay. the world into which we stepped was wonderful. the background of snow under the star-blazing sky made it even more fantastic than it naturally was. we slipped into the crowd and, becoming part of it, were at once, as one so often is, sympathetic with it. it seemed such a childish, helpless, and good-natured throng. no one seemed to know anything of arms or directions. there were, as i have already said, many women and little children, and some of the civilians who had rifles looked quite helpless. i saw one boy holding his gun upside down. no one paid any attention to us. there was as yet no class note in the demonstration, and the only hostile cries i heard were against protopopoff and the police. we moved back into the street behind the fontanka, and here i saw a wonderful sight. some one had lighted a large bonfire in the middle of the street and the flames tossed higher and higher into the air, bringing down the stars in flights of gold, flinging up the snow until it seemed to radiate in lines and circles of white light high over the very roofs of the houses. in front of the fire a soldier, mounted on a horse, addressed a small crowd of women and boys. on the end of his rifle was a ragged red cloth. i could not see his face. i saw his arms wave, and the fire behind him exaggerated his figure and then dropped it into a straggling silhouette against the snow. the street seemed deserted except for this group, although now i could hear distant shouting on every side of me, and the monotonous clap-clap-clap-clap of a machine-gun. i heard him say, "_tovaristchi!_ now is your time! don't hesitate in the sacred cause of freedom! as our brethren did in the famous days of the french revolution, so must we do now. all the army is coming over to our side. the preobrojenski have come over to us and have arrested their officers and taken their arms. we must finish with protopopoff and our other tyrants, and see that we have a just rule. _tovaristchi_! there will never be such a chance again, and you will repent for ever if you have not played your part in the great fight for freedom!" so it went on. it did not seem that his audience was greatly impressed. it was bewildered and dazed. but the fire leapt up behind him giving him a legendary splendour, and the whole picture was romantic and unreal like a gaudy painting on a coloured screen. we hurried through into the nevski, and this we found nearly deserted. the trams of course had stopped, a few figures hurried along, and once an isvostchick went racing down towards the river. "well, now, we seem to be out of it," said bohun, with a sigh of relief. "i must say i'm not sorry. i don't mind france, where you can tell which is the front and which the back, but this kind of thing does get on one's nerves. i daresay it's only local. we shall find them all as easy as anything at the astoria, and wondering what we're making a fuss about." at that moment we were joined by an english merchant whom we both knew, a stout elderly man who had lived all his life in russia. i was surprised to find him in a state of extreme terror. i had always known him as a calm, conceited, stupid fellow, with a great liking for russian ladies. this pastime he was able as a bachelor to enjoy to the full. now, however, instead of the ruddy, coarse, self-confident merchant there was a pallid, trembling jelly-fish. "i say, you fellows," he asked, catching my arm. "where are you off to?" "we're off to the astoria," i answered. "let me come with you. i'm not frightened, not at all--all the same i don't want to be left alone. i was in the affair. that was enough for me. where are they firing--do you know?" "all over the place," said bohun, enjoying himself. "they'll be down here in a minute." "good god! do you really think so? it's terrible--these fellows--once they get loose they stick at nothing.... i remember in .... good heavens! where had we better go? it's very exposed here, isn't it?" "it's very exposed everywhere," said bohun. "i doubt whether any of us are alive in the morning." "good heavens! you don't say so! why should they interfere with us?" "oh, rich, you know, and that kind of thing. and then we're englishmen. they'll clear out all the english." "oh, i'm not really english. my mother was russian. i could show them my papers...." bohun laughed. "i'm only kidding you, watchett," he said. "we're safe enough. look, there's not a soul about!" we were at the corner of the moika now; all was absolutely quiet. two women and a man were standing on the bridge talking together. a few stars clustered above the bend of the canal seemed to shift and waver ever so slightly through a gathering mist, like the smoke of blowing candles. "it seems all right," said the merchant, sniffing the air suspiciously as though he expected to smell blood. we turned towards the morskaia. one of the women detached herself from the group and came to us. "don't go down the morskaia," she said, whispering, as though some hostile figure were leaning over her shoulder. "they're firing round the telephone exchange." even as she spoke i heard the sharp clatter of the machine-gun break out again, but now very close, and with an intimate note as though it were the same gun that i had heard before, which had been tracking me down round the town. "do you hear that?" said the merchant. "come on," said bohun. "we'll go down the moika. that seems safe enough!" how strangely in the flick of a bullet the town had changed! yesterday every street had been friendly, obvious, and open; they were now no longer streets, but secret blind avenues with strange trees, fantastic doors, shuttered windows, a grinning moon, malicious stars, and snow that lay there simply to prevent every sound. it was a town truly beleaguered as towns are in dreams. the uncanny awe with which i moved across the bridge was increased when the man with the women turned towards me, and i saw that he was--or seemed to be--that same grave bearded peasant whom i had seen by the river, whom henry had seen in the cathedral, who remained with one, as passing strangers sometimes do, like a symbol or a message or a threat. he stood, with the nevski behind him, calm and grave, and even it seemed a little amused, watching me as i crossed. i said to bohun, "did you ever see that fellow before?" bohun turned and looked. "no," he said. "don't you remember? the man that first day in the kazan?" "they're all alike," bohun said. "one can't tell...." "oh, come on," said the merchant. "let's get to the astoria." we started down the moika, past that faded picture-shop where there are always large moth-eaten canvases of cornfields under the moon and russian weddings and italian lakes. we had got very nearly to the little street with the wooden hoardings when the merchant gripped my arm. "what's that?" he gulped. the silence now was intense. we could not hear the machine-gun nor any shouting. the world was like a picture smoking under a moon now red and hard. against the wall of the street two women were huddled, one on her knees, her head pressed against the thighs of the other, who stood stretched as though crucified, her arms out, staring on to the canal. beside a little kiosk, on the space exactly in front of the side street, lay a man on his face. his bowler-hat had rolled towards the kiosk; his arms were stretched out so that he looked oddly like the shadow of the woman against the wall. instead of one hand there was a pool of blood. the other hand with all the fingers stretched was yellow against the snow. as we came up a bullet from the morskaia struck the kiosk. the woman, not moving from the wall, said, "they've shot my husband... he did nothing." the other woman, on her knees, only cried without ceasing. the merchant said, "i'm going back--to the europe," and he turned and ran. "what's down that street?" i said to the woman, as though i expected her to say "hobgoblins." bohun said, "this is rather beastly.... we ought to move that fellow out of that. he may be alive still." and how silly such a sentence when only yesterday, just here, there was the beggar who sold boot-laces, and just there, where the man lay, an old muddled isvostchick asleep on his box! we moved forward, and instantly it was as though i were in the middle of a vast desert quite alone with all the hosts of heaven aiming at me malicious darts. as i bent down my back was so broad that it stretched across petrograd, and my feet were tiny like frogs. we pulled at the man. his head rolled and his face turned over, and the mouth was full of snow. it was so still that i whispered, whether to bohun or myself, "god, i wish somebody would shout!" then i heard the wood of the kiosk crack, ever so slightly, like an opening door, and panic flooded me as i had never known it do during all my time at the front. "i've no strength," i said to bohun. "pull for god's sake!" he answered. we dragged the body a little way; my hand clutched the thigh, which was hard and cold under the stuff of his clothing. his head rolled round, and his eyes now were covered with snow. we dragged him, and he bumped grotesquely. we had him under the wall, near the two women, and the blood welled out and dripped in a spreading pool at the women's feet. "now," said bohun, "we've got to run for it." "do you know," said i, as though i were making a sudden discovery, "i don't think i can." i leaned back against the wall and looked at the pool of blood near the kiosk where the man had been. "oh, but you've got to," said bohun, who seemed to feel no fear. "we can't stay here all night." "no, i know," i answered. "but the trouble is--i'm not myself." and i was not. that _was_ the trouble. i was not john durward at all. some stranger was here with a new heart, poor shrivelled limbs, an enormous nose, a hot mouth with no eyes at all. this stranger had usurped my clothes and he refused to move. he was tied to the wall and he would not obey me. bohun looked at me. "i say, durward, come on, it's only a step. we must get to the astoria." but the picture of the astoria did not stir me. i should have seen nina and vera waiting there, and that should have at once determined me. so it would have been had i been myself. this other man was there.... nina and vera meant nothing to him at all. but i could not explain that to bohun. "i can't go..." i saw bohun's eyes--i was dreadfully ashamed. "you go on..." i muttered. i wanted to tell him that i did not think that i could endure to feel again that awful expansion of my back and the turning my feet into toads. "of course i can't leave you," he said. and suddenly i sprang back into my own clothes again. i flung the charlatan out and he flumped off into air. "come on," i said, and i ran. no bullets whizzed past us. i was ashamed of running, and we walked quite quietly over the rest of the open space. "funny thing," i said, "i was damned frightened for a moment." "it's the silence and the houses," said bohun. strangely enough i remember nothing between that moment and our arrival at the astoria. we must have skirted the canal, keeping in the shadow of the wall, then crossed the saint isaac's square. the next thing i can recall is our standing, rather breathless, in the hall of the astoria, and the first persons i saw there were vera and nina, together at the bottom of the staircase, saying nothing, waiting. in front of them was a motley crowd of russian officers all talking and gesticulating together. i came nearer to vera and at once i said to myself, "lawrence is here somewhere." she was standing, her head up, watching the doors, her eyes glowed with anticipation, her lips were a little parted. she never moved at all, but was so vital that the rest of the people seemed dolls beside her. as we came towards them nina turned round and spoke to some one, and i saw that it was semyonov who stood at the bottom of the staircase, his thick legs apart, stroking his beard with his hand. we came forward and nina began at once-- "durdles--tell us! what's happened?" "i don't know," i answered. the lights after the dark and the snow bewildered me, and the noise and excitement of the russian officers were deafening. nina went on, her face lit. "can't you tell us anything? we haven't heard a word. we came just in an ordinary way about four o'clock. there wasn't a sound, and then, just as we were sitting down to tea, they all came bursting in, saying that all the officers were being murdered, and that protopopoff was killed, and that--" "that's true anyway," said a young russian officer, turning round to us excitedly. "i had it from a friend of mine who was passing just as they stuck him in the stomach. he saw it all; they dragged him out of his house and stuck him in the stomach--" "they say the czar's been shot," said another officer, a fat, red-faced man with very bright red trousers, "and that rodziancko's formed a government..." i heard on every side such words as "people--rodziancko --protopopoff--freedom," and the officer telling his tale again. "and they stuck him in the stomach just as he was passing his house..." through all this tale vera never moved. i saw, to my surprise, that lawrence was there now, standing near her but never speaking. semyonov stood on the stairs watching. suddenly i saw that she wanted me. "ivan andreievitch," she said, "will you do something for me?" she spoke very low, and her eyes did not look at me, but beyond us all out to the door. "certainly," i said. "will you keep alexei petrovitch here? mr. lawrence and mr. bohun can see us home. i don't want him to come with us. will you ask him to wait and speak to you?" i went up to him. "semyonov," i said, "i want a word with you, if i may--" "certainly," he said, with that irritating smile of his, as though he knew exactly of what i was thinking. we moved up the dark stairs. as we went i heard vera's clear, calm voice: "will you see us home, mr. lawrence?... i think it's quite safe to go now." we stopped on the first floor under the electric light. there were two easy-chairs there, with a dusty palm behind them. we sat down. "you haven't really got anything to say to me," he began. "oh yes, i have," i said. "no... you simply suggested conversation because vera asked you to do so." "i suggested a conversation," i answered, "because i had something of some seriousness to tell you." "well, she needn't have been afraid," he went on. "i wasn't going home with them. i want to stop and watch these ridiculous people a little longer.... what had you got to say, my philosophical, optimistic friend?" he looked quite his old self, sitting stockily in the chair, his strong thighs pressing against the cane as though they'd burst it, his thick square beard more wiry than ever, and his lips red and shining. he seemed to have regained his old self-possession and confidence. "what i wanted to say," i began, "is that i'm going to tell you once more to leave markovitch alone. i know the other day--that alone--" "oh _that_!" he brushed it aside impatiently. "there are bigger things than that just now, durward. you lack, as i have always said, two very essential things, a sense of humour and a sense of proportion. and you pretend to know russia whilst you are without those two admirable gifts! "however, let us forget personalities.... there are better things here!" as he spoke two young russian officers came tumbling up the stairs. they were talking excitedly, not listening to one another, red in the face and tripping over their swords. they went up to the next floor, their voices very shrill. "so much for your sentimental russia," said semyonov. he spoke very quietly. "how i shall love to see these fools all toppled over, and then the fools who toppled them toppled in their turn. "durward, you're a fool too, but you're english, and at least you've got a conscience. i tell you, you'll see in these next months such cowardice, such selfishness, such meanness, such ignorance as the world has never known--and all in the name of freedom! why, they're chattering about freedom already downstairs as hard as they can go!" "as usual, semyonov," i answered hotly, "you believe in the good of no one. if there's really a revolution coming, which i still doubt, it may lead to the noblest liberation." "oh, you're an ass!" he interrupted quietly. "nobility and the human race! i tell you, ivan andreievitch of the noble character, that the human race is rotten; that it is composed of selfishness, vice, and meanness; that it is hypocritical beyond the bounds of hypocrisy, and that of all mean cowardly nations on this earth the russian nation is the meanest and most cowardly!... that fine talk of ours that you english slobber over!--a mere excuse for idleness, and you'll know it before another year is through. i despise mankind with a contempt that every day's fresh experience only the more justifies. only once have i found some one who had a great soul, and she, too, if i had secured her, might have disappointed me.... no, my time is coming. i shall see at last my fellowmen in their true colours, and i shall even perhaps help them to display them. my worthy markovitch, for example--" "what about markovitch?" i asked sharply. he got up, smiling. he put his hand on my shoulder. "he shall be driven by ghosts," he answered, and turned off to the stairs. he looked back for a moment. "the funny thing is, i like you, durward," he said. x i remember very little of my return to my island that night. the world was horribly dark and cold, the red moon had gone, and a machine-gun pursued me all the way home like a barking dog. i crossed the bridge frankly with nerves so harassed, with so many private anxieties and so much public apprehension, with so overpowering a suspicion that every shadow held a rifle that my heart leapt in my breast, and i was suddenly sick with fear when some one stepped across the road and put his hand on my arm. you see i have nothing much to boast about myself. my relief was only slightly modified when i saw that it was the rat. the rat had changed! he stood, as though on purpose under the very faint grey light of the lamp at the end of the bridge, and seen thus, he did in truth seem like an apparition. he was excited of course, but there was more in his face than that. the real truth about him was, that he was filled with some determination, some purpose. he was like a child who is playing at being a burglar, his face had exactly that absorption, that obsessing pre-occupation. "i've been waiting for you, barin," he said in his hoarse musical voice. "what is it?" i asked. "this is where i live," he said, and he showed me a very dirty piece of paper. "i think you ought to know." "why?" i asked him. "_kto snaiet_? (who knows?) the czar's gone and we are all free men...." i felt oddly that suddenly now he knew himself my master. that was now in his voice. "what are you going to do with your freedom?" i asked. he sighed. "i shall have my duties now," he said. "i'm not a free man at all. i obey orders for the first time. the people are going to rule. i am the people." he paused. then he went on very seriously. "that is why, barin, i give you that paper. i have friendly feelings towards you. i don't know what it is, but i am your brother. they may come and want to rob your house. show them that paper." "thank you very much," i said. "but i'm not afraid. there's nothing i mind them stealing. all the same i'm very grateful." he went on very seriously. "there'll be no czar now and no police. we will stop the war and all be rich." he sighed. "but i don't know that it will bring happiness." he suddenly seemed to me forlorn and desolate and lonely, like a lost dog. i knew quite well that very soon, perhaps directly he had left me, he would plunder and murder and rob again. but that night, the two of us alone on the island and everything so still, waiting for great events, i felt close to him and protective. "don't get knocked on the head, rat," i said, "during one of your raids. death is easily come by just now. look after yourself." he shrugged his shoulders. "_shto boodet, boodet_ (what will be, will be). _neechevo_ (it's of no importance)." he had vanished into the shadows. xi i realise that the moment has come in my tale when the whole interest of my narrative centres in markovitch. markovitch is really the point of all my story as i have, throughout, subconsciously, recognised. the events of that wonderful tuesday when for a brief instant the sun of freedom really did seem to all of us to break through the clouds, that one day in all our lives when hopes, dreams, utopias, fairy tales seemed to be sober and realistic fact, those events might be seen through the eyes of any of us. vera, nina, grogoff, semyonov, lawrence, bohun and i, all shared in them and all had our sensations and experiences. but my own were drab and ordinary enough, and from the others i had no account so full and personal and true as from markovitch. he told me all about that great day afterwards, only a short time before that catastrophe that overwhelmed us all, and in his account there was all the growing suspicion and horror of disillusion that after-events fostered in him. but as he told me, sitting through the purple hours of the night, watching the light break in ripples and circles of colour over the sea, he regained some of the splendours of that great day, and before he had finished his tale he was right back in that fantastic world that had burst at the touch like bubbles in the sun. i will give his account, as accurately as possible in his own words. i seldom interrupted him, and i think he soon forgot that i was there. he had come to me that night in a panic, for reasons which will he given later and i, in trying to reassure him, had reminded him of that day, when the world was suddenly utopia. "that _did_ exist, that world," i said. "and once having existed it cannot now be dead. believe, believe that it will come back." "come back!" he shook his head. "even if it is still there i cannot go back to it. i will tell you, ivan andreievitch, what that day was... and why now i am so bitterly punished for having believed in it. listen, what happened to me. it occurred, all of it, exactly as i tell you. you know that, just at that time, i had been worrying very much about vera. the revolution had come i suppose very suddenly to every one; but truly to myself, because i had been thinking of vera, it was like a thunder-clap. it's always been my trouble, ivan andreievitch, that i can't think of more than one thing at once, and the worry of it has been that in my life there has been almost invariably more than one thing that i ought to think of.... i would think of my invention, you know, that i ought to get on with it a little faster. because really--it was making a sort of cloth out of bark that i was working at; as every day passed, i could see more and more clearly that there was a great deal in this particular invention, and that it only needed real application to bring it properly forward. only application as you know is my trouble. if i could only shut my brain up...." he told me then, i remember, a lot about his early childhood, and then the struggle that he had had to see one thing at once, and not two or three things that got in the way and hindered him from doing anything. he went on about vera. "you know that one night i had crept up into your room, and looked to see whether there were possibly a letter there. that was a disgraceful thing to do, wasn't it? but i felt then that i had to satisfy myself. i wonder whether i can make you understand. it wasn't jealousy exactly, because i had never felt that i had had any very strong right over vera, considering the way that she had married me; but i don't think i ever loved her more than i did during those weeks, and she was unattainable. i was lonely, ivan andreievitch, that's the truth. everything seemed to be slipping away from me, and in some way alexei petrovitch semyonov seemed to accentuate that. he was always reminding me of one day or another when i had been happy with vera long ago--some silly little expedition we had taken--or he was doubtful about my experiments being any good, or he would recall what i had felt about russia at the beginning of the war.... all in a very kindly way, mind you. he was more friendly than he had ever been, and seemed to be altogether softer-hearted. but he made me think a great deal about vera. he talked often so much. he thought that i ought to look after her more, and i explained that that wasn't my right. "the truth is that ever since nina's birthday-party i had been anxious. i knew really that everything was right. vera is of course the soul of honour--but something had occurred then which made me.... "well, well, that doesn't matter now. the only point is that i was thinking of vera a great deal, and wondering how i could make her happy. she wasn't happy. i don't know how it was, but during those weeks just before the revolution we were none of us happy. we were all uneasy as though we expected something were going to happen--and we were all suspicious.... "i only tell you this because then you will see why it was that the revolution broke upon me with such surprise. i had been right inside myself, talking to nobody, wanting nobody to talk to me. i get like that sometimes, when words seem to mean so much that it seems dangerous to throw them about.... and perhaps it is. but silence is dangerous too. everything is dangerous if you are unlucky by nature.... "i had been indoors all that monday working at my invention, and thinking about vera, wondering whether i'd speak to her, then afraid of my temper (i have a bad temper), wanting to know what was the truth, thinking at one moment that if she cared for some one else that i'd go away...and then suddenly angry and jealous, wishing to challenge him, but i am a ludicrous figure to challenge any one, as i very well know. semyonov had been to see me that morning, and he had just sat there without saying anything. i couldn't endure that very long, so i asked him what he came for and he said, 'oh, nothing.' i felt as though he were spying and i became uneasy. why should he come so often now? and i was beginning to think of him when he wasn't there. it was as though he thought he had a right over all of us, and that irritated me.... well, that was monday. they all came late in the afternoon and told me all the news. they had been at the astoria. the whole town seemed to be in revolt, so they said. "but even then i didn't realise it. i was thinking of vera just the same. i looked at her all the evening just as semyonov had looked at me. and didn't say anything.... i never wanted her so badly before. i made her sleep with me all that night. she hadn't done that for a long time, and i woke up early in the morning to hear her crying softly to herself. she never used to cry. she was so proud. i put my arms round her, and she stopped crying and lay quite still. it wasn't fair what i did, but i felt as though alexei petrovitch had challenged me to do it. he always hated vera i knew. i got up very early and went to my wood. you can imagine i wasn't very happy.... "then suddenly i thought i'd go out into the streets, and see what was happening. i couldn't believe really that there had been any change. so i went out. "do you know of recent years i've walked out very seldom? what was it? a kind of shyness. i knew when i was in my own house, and i knew whom i was with. then i was never a man who cared greatly about exercise, and there was no one outside whom i wanted very much to see. so when i went out that morning it was as though i didn't know petrograd at all, and had only just arrived there. i went over the ekateringofsky bridge, through the square, and to the left down the sadovaya. "of course the first thing that i noticed was that there were no trams, and that there were multitudes of people walking along and that they were all poor people and all happy.' and i _was_ glad when i saw that. of course i'm a fool, and life can't be as i want it, but that's always what i had thought life ought to be--all the streets filled with poor people, all free and happy. and here they were!... with the snow crisp under their feet, and the sun shining, and the air quite still, so that all the talk came up, and up into the sky like a song. but of course they were bewildered as well as happy. they didn't know where to go, they didn't know what to do--like birds let out suddenly from their cages. i didn't know myself. that's what sudden freedom does--takes your breath away so that you go staggering along, and get caught again if you're not careful. no trams, no policemen, no carriages filled with proud people cursing you.... oh, ivan andreievitch, i'd be proud myself if i had money, and servants to put on my clothes, and new women every night, and different food every day.... i don't blame them--but suddenly proud people were gone, and i was crying without knowing it--simply because that great crowd of poor people went pushing along, all talking under the sunny sky as freely as they pleased. "i began to look about me. i saw that there were papers posted on the walls. they were those proclamations, you know, of rodziancko's new government, saying that while everything was unsettled, milyukoff, rodziancko, and the others would take charge in order to keep order and discipline. it seemed to me that there was little need to talk about discipline. had beggars appeared there in the road i believed that the crowd would have stripped off their clothes and given them, rather than that they should want. "i stood by one proclamation and read it out to the little crowd. they repeated the names to themselves, but they did not seem to care much. 'the czar's wicked they tell me,' said one man to me. 'and all our troubles come from him.' "'it doesn't matter,' said another. 'there'll be plenty of bread now.' "and indeed what did names matter now? i couldn't believe my eyes or my ears, ivan andreievitch. it looked too much like paradise and i'd been deceived so often. so i determined to be very cautious. 'you've been taken in, nicolai leontievitch, many many times. don't you believe this?' but i couldn't help feeling that if only this world would continue, if only the people could always be free and happy and the sun could shine, perhaps the rest of the world would see its folly and the war would stop and never begin again. this thought would grow in my mind as i walked, although i refused to encourage it. "motor lorries covered with soldiers came dashing down the street. the soldiers had their guns pointed, but the crowd cheered and cheered, waving hands and shouting. i shouted too. the tears were streaming down my face. i couldn't help myself. i wanted to hold the sun and the snow and the people all in my arms fixed so that it should never change, and the world should see how good and innocent life could be. "on every side people had asked what had really happened, and of course no one knew. but it did not matter. every one was so simple. a soldier, standing beside one of the placards was shouting: '_tovaristchi!_ what we must have is a splendid republic and a good czar to look after it.' "and they all cheered him and laughed and sang. i turned up one of the side streets on to the fontanka, and here i saw them emptying the rooms of one of the police. that was amusing! i laugh still when i think of it. sending everything out of the windows,--underclothes, ladies' bonnets, chairs, books, flower-pots, pictures, and then all the records, white and yellow and pink paper, all fluttering in the sun like so many butterflies. the crowd was perfectly peaceful, in an excellent temper. isn't that wonderful when you think that for months those people had been starved and driven, waiting all night in the street for a piece of bread, and that now all discipline was removed, no more policemen except those hiding for their lives in houses, and yet they did nothing, they touched no one's property, did no man any harm. people say now that it was their apathy, that they were taken by surprise, that they were like animals who did not know where to go, but i tell you, ivan andreievitch, that it was not so. i tell you that it was because just for an hour the soul could come up from its dark waters and breathe the sun and the light and see that all was good. oh, why cannot that day return? why cannot that day return?..." he broke off and looked at me like a distracted child, his brows puckered, his hands beating the air. i did not say anything. i wanted him to forget that i was there. he went on: "... i could not be there all day, i thought that i would go on to the duma. i flowed on with the crowd. we were a great river swinging without knowing why, in one direction and only interrupted, once and again, by the motor lorries that rattled along, the soldiers shouting to us and waving their rifles, and we replying with cheers. i heard no firing that morning at all. they said, in the crowd, that many thousands had been killed last night. it seemed that on the roof of nearly every house in petrograd there was a policeman with a machine-gun. but we marched along, without fear, singing. and all the time the joy in my heart was rising, rising, and i was checking it, telling myself that in a moment i would be disappointed, that i would soon be tricked as i had been so often tricked before. but i couldn't help my joy, which was stronger than myself.... "it must have been early afternoon, so long had i been on the road, when i came at last to the duma. you saw yourself, ivan andreievitch, that all that week the crowd outside the duma was truly a sea of people with the motor lorries that bristled with rifles for sea-monsters and the gun-carriages for ships. and such a babel! every one talking at once and nobody listening to any one. "i don't know now how i pushed through into the court, but at last i was inside and found myself crushed up against the doors of the palace by a mob of soldiers and students. here there was a kind of hush. "when the door of the palace opened there was a little sigh of interest. at intervals armed guards marched up with some wretched pale dirty gorodovoi whom they had taken prisoner--" nicholas markovitch paused again and again. he had been looking out to the sea over whose purple shadows the sky pale green and studded with silver stars seemed to wave magic shuttles of light, to and fro, backwards and forwards. "you don't mind all these details, ivan andreievitch? i am trying to discover, for my own sake, all the details that led me to my final experience. i want to trace the chain link by link...nothing is unimportant..." i assured him that i was absorbed by his story. and indeed i was. that little, uncouth, lost, and desolate man was the most genuine human being whom i had ever known. that quality, above all others, stood forth in him. he had his secret as all men have their secret, the key to their pursuit of their own immortality....but markovitch's secret was a real one, something that he faced with real bravery, real pride, and real dignity, and when he saw what the issue of his conduct must be he would, i knew, face it without flinching. he went on, but looking at me now rather than the sea--looking at me with his grave, melancholy, angry eyes. "...after one of these convoys of prisoners the door remained for a moment open, and i seeing my chance slipped in after the guards. here i was then in the very heart of the revolution; but still, you know, ivan andreievitch, i couldn't properly seize the fact, i couldn't grasp the truth that all this was really occurring and that it wasn't just a play, a pretence, or a dream... yes, a dream... especially a dream... perhaps, after all, that was what it was. the circular hall was piled high with machine-guns, bags of flour, and provisions of all kinds. there were some armed soldiers of course and women, and beside the machine guns the floor was strewn with cigarette ends and empty tins and papers and bags and cardboard boxes and even broken bottles. dirt and desolation! i remember that it was then when i looked at that floor that the first little suspicion stole into my heart--not a suspicion so much as an uneasiness. i wanted at once myself to set to work to clean up all the mess with my own hands. "i didn't like to see it there, and no one caring whether it were there or no. "in the catherine hall into which i peered there was a vast mob, and this huge mass of men stirred and coiled and uncoiled like some huge ant-heap. many of them, as i watched, suddenly turned into the outer hall. men jumped on to chairs and boxes and balustrades, and soon, all over the place there were speakers, some shouting, some shrieking, some with tears rolling down their cheeks, some swearing, some whispering as though to themselves... and all the regiments came pouring in from the station, tumbling in like puppies or babies with pieces of red cloth tied to their rifles, some singing, some laughing, some dumb with amazement... thicker and thicker and thicker... standing round the speakers with their mouths open and their eyes wide, pushing and jostling, but good-naturedly, like young dogs. "everywhere, you know, men were forming committees, committees for social right, for a just peace, for women's suffrage, for finnish independence, for literature and the arts, for the better treatment of prostitutes, for education, for the just division of the land. i had crept into my corner, and soon as the soldiers came thicker and thicker, the noise grew more and more deafening, the dust floated in hazy clouds. the men had their kettles and they boiled tea, squatting down there, sometimes little processions pushed their way through, soldiers shouting and laughing with some white-faced policeman in their midst. once i saw an old man, his shuba about his ears, stumbling with his eyes wide open, and staring as though he were sleep-walking. that was stürmer being brought to judgement. once i saw a man so terrified that he couldn't move, but must be prodded along by the rifles of the soldiers. that was pitirim.... "and the shouting and screaming rose and rose like a flood. once rodziancko came in and began shouting, '_tovaristchi! tovaristchi!_...' but his voice soon gave away, and he went back into the salle catherine again. the socialists had it their way. there were so many, and their voices were so fresh and the soldiers liked to listen to them. 'land for everybody!' they shouted. 'and bread and peace! hurrah! hurrah!' cried the soldiers. "'that's all very well,' said a huge man near me. 'but nicholas is coming, and to-morrow he will eat us all up!' "but no one seemed to care. they were all mad, and i was mad too. it was the drunkenness of dust. it got in our heads and our brains. we all shouted. i began to shout too, although i didn't know what it was that i was shouting. "a grimy soldier caught me round the neck and kissed me. 'land for everybody!' he cried. 'have some tea, _tovaristch_!' and i shared his tea with him. "then through the dust and noise i suddenly saw boris grogoff! that was an astonishing thing. you see i had dissociated all this from my private life. i had even, during these last hours, forgotten vera, perhaps for the very first moment since i met her. she had seemed to have no share in this,--and then suddenly the figure of boris showed me that one's private life is always with one, that it is a secret city in which one must always live, and whose gates one will never pass through, whatever may be going on in the world outside. but grogoff! what a change! you know, i had always patronised him, ivan andreievitch. it had seemed to me that he was only a boy with a boy's crude ideas. you know his fresh face with the way that he used to push back his hair from his forehead, and shout his ideas. he never considered any one's feelings. he was a complete egoist, and a man, it seemed to me, of no importance. but now! he stood on a bench and had around him a large crowd of soldiers. he was shouting in just his old way that he used in the english prospect, but he seemed to have grown in the meantime, into a man. he did not seem afraid any more. i saw that he had power over the men to whom he was speaking.... i couldn't hear what he said, but through the dust and heat he seemed to grow and grow until it was only him whom i saw there. "'he will carry off nina' was my next thought--ludicrous there at such a time, in such a crowd, but it is exactly like that that life shifts and shifts until it has formed a pattern. i was frightened by grogoff. i could not believe that the new freedom, the new russia, the new world would be made by such men. he waved his arms, he pushed back his hair, the men shouted. grogoff was triumphant: 'the new world... _novaya jezn, novaya jezn_!' (new life!) i heard him shout. "the sun before it set flooded the hall with light. what a scene through the dust! the red flags, the women and the soldiers and the shouting! "i was suddenly dismayed. 'how can order come out of this?' i thought. 'they are all mad.... terrible things are going to happen.' i was dirty and tired and exhausted. i fought my way through the mob, found the door. for a moment i looked back, to that sea of men lit by the last light of the sun. then i pushed out, was thrown, it seemed to me, from man to man, and was at last in the air.... quiet, fires burning in the courtyard, a sky of the palest blue, a few stars, and the people singing the 'marseillaise.' "it was like drinking great draughts of cold water after an intolerable thirst.... "...hasn't tchekov said somewhere that russians have nostalgia but no patriotism? that was never true of me--can't remember how young i was when i remember my father talking to me about the idea of russia. i've told you that he was by any kind of standard a bad man. he had, i think, no redeeming points at all--but he had, all the same, that sense of russia. i don't suppose that he put it to any practical use, or that he even tried to teach it to his pupils, but it would suddenly seize him and he would let himself go, and for an hour he would be a fine master--of words. and what russian is ever more than that at the end? "he spoke to me and gave me a picture of a world inside a world, and this inside world was complete in itself. it had everything in it--beauty, wealth, force, power; it could be anything, it could do anything. but it was held by an evil enchantment as though a wicked magician had it in thrall, and everything slept as in tchaikowsky's ballet. but one day, he told me, the prince would come and kill the enchanter, and this great world would come into its own. i remember that i was so excited that i couldn't bear to wait, but prayed that i might be allowed to go out and find the enchanter... but my father laughed and said that there were no enchanter now, and then i cried. all the same i never lost my hope. i talked to people about russia, but it was never russia itself they seemed to care for--it was women or drink or perhaps freedom and socialism, or perhaps some part of russia, siberia, or the caucasus--but my world they none of them believed in. it didn't exist they said. it was simply my imagination that had painted it, and they laughed at me and said it was held together by the lashes of the knout, and when those went russia would go too. as i grew up some of them thought that i was revolutionary, and they tried to make me join their clubs and societies. but those were no use to me. they couldn't give me what i wanted. they wanted to destroy, to assassinate some one, or to blow up a building. they had no thought beyond destruction, and that to me seemed only the first step. and they never think of russia, our revolutionaries. you will have noticed that yourself, ivan andreievitch. nothing so small and trivial as russia! it must be the whole world or nothing at all. democracy... freedom... the brotherhood of man! oh, the terrible harm that words have done to russia! had the russians of the last fifty years been born without the gift of speech we would be now the greatest people on the earth! "but i loved russia from end to end. the farthest villages in siberia, the remotest hut beyond archangel, from the shops in the sadovaya to the lavra at kieff, from the little villages on the bank of the volga to the woods round tarnopol--all, all one country, one people, one world within a world. the old man to whom i was secretary discovered this secret hope of mine. i talked one night when i was drunk and told him everything. i mentioned even the enchanter and the sleeping beauty! how he laughed at me! he would never leave me alone. 'nicolai leontievitch believes in holy russia!' he would say. 'not so much holy, you understand, as bewitched. a fairy garden, ladies, with a sleeping beauty in the middle of it. dear me, nicolai leontievitch, no wonder you are heart-free!' "how i hated him and his yellow face and his ugly stomach! i would have stamped on it with delight. but that made me shy. i was afraid to speak of it to any one, and i kept to myself. then vera came and she didn't laugh at me. the two ideas grew together in my head. vera and russia! the two things in my life by which i stood--because man must have something in life round which he may nestle as a cat curls up by the fire. "but even vera did not seem to care for russia as russia. 'what can siberia be to me?' she would say. 'why, nicholas, it is no more than china.' "but it was more than china; when i looked at it on the map i recognised it as though it were my own country. then the war came and i thought the desire of my heart was fulfilled. at last men talked about russia as though she truly existed. for a moment all russia was united, all classes, rich and poor, high and low. men were patriotic together as though one heart beat through all the land. but only for a moment. divisions came, and quickly things were worse than before. there came tannenburg and afterwards warsaw. "all was lost.... russia was betrayed, and i was a sentimental fool. you know yourself how cynical even the most sentimental russians are--that is because if you stick to facts you know where you are, but ideas are always betraying you. life simply isn't long enough to test them, that's all, and man is certainly not a patient animal. "at first i watched the war going from bad to worse, and then i shut myself in and refused to look any longer. i thought only of vera and my work. i would make a great discovery and be rich, and then vera at last would love me. idiot! as though i had not known that vera would not love for that kind of reason.... i determined that i would think no more of russia, that i would be a man of no country. then during those last weeks before the revolution i began to be suspicious of vera and to watch her. i did things of which i was ashamed, and then i despised myself for being ashamed. "i am a man, i can do what i wish. even though i am imprisoned i am free.... i am my own master. but all the same, to be a spy is a mean thing, ivan andreievitch. you englishmen, although you are stupid, you are not mean. it was that day when your young friend, bohun, found me looking in your room for letters, that in spite of myself i was ashamed. "he looked at me in a sort of way as though, down to his very soul he was astonished at what i had done. well, why should i mind that he should be astonished? he was very young and all wrong in his ideas of life. nevertheless that look of his influenced me. i thought about it afterwards. then came alexei petrovitch. i've told you already. he was always hinting at something. he was always there as though he were waiting for something to happen. he hinted things about vera. it's strange, ivan andreievitch, but there was a day just a week before the revolution, when i was very nearly jumping up and striking him. just to get rid of him so that he shouldn't be watching me....why even when i wasn't there he.... "but what's that got to do with my walk? nothing perhaps. all the same, it was all these little things that made me, when i walked out of the duma that evening so queer. you see i'd been getting desperate. all that i had left was being taken from me, and then suddenly this revolution had come and given me back russia again. i forgot alexei petrovitch and your englishman lawrence and the failure of my work--i remembered, once again, just as i had those first days of the war, vera and russia. "there, in the clear evening air, i forgot all the talk there had been inside the duma, the mess and the noise and the dust. i was suddenly happy again, and excited, and hopeful.... the enchanter had come after all, and russia was to awake. "ah, what a wonderful evening that was! you know that there have been times--very, very rare occasions in one's life--when places that one knows well, streets and houses so common and customary as to be like one's very skin--are suddenly for a wonderful half-hour places of magic, the trees are gold, the houses silver, the bricks jewelled, the pavement of amber. or simply perhaps they are different, a new country of new colour and mystery... when one is just in love or has won some prize, or finished at last some difficult work. petrograd was like that to me that night; i swear to you, ivan andreievitch, i did not know where i was. i seem now on looking back to have been in places that night, magical places, that by the morning had flown away. i could not tell you where i went. i know that i must have walked for miles. i walked with a great many people who were all my brothers. i had drunk nothing, not even water, and yet the effect on me was exactly as though i were drunk, drunk with happiness, ivan andreievitch, and with the possibility of all the things that might now be. "we, many of us, marched along, singing the 'marseillaise' i suppose. there was firing i think in some of the streets, because i can remember now on looking back that once or twice i heard a machine-gun quite close to me and didn't care at all, and even laughed.... not that i've ever cared for that. bullets aren't the sort of things that frighten me. there are other terrors....all the same it was curious that we should all march along as though there were no danger and the peace of the world had come. there were women with us--quite a number of them i think--and, i believe, some children. i remember that some of the way i carried a child, fast asleep in my arms. how ludicrous it would be now if i, of all men in the world, carried a baby down the nevski! but it was quite natural that night. the town seemed to me blazing with light. of course that it cannot have been; there can have only been the stars and some bonfires. and perhaps we stopped at the police-courts which were crackling away. i don't remember that, but i know that somewhere there were clouds of golden sparks opening into the sky and mingling with the stars--a wonderful sight, flocks of golden birds and behind them a roar of sound like a torrent of water... i know that, most of the night, i had one man especially for my companion. i can see him quite clearly now, although, whether it is all my imagination or not i can't say. certainly i've never seen him since and never will again. he was a peasant, a bigly made man, very neatly and decently dressed in a workman's blouse and black trousers. he had a long black beard and was grave and serious, speaking very little but watching everything. kindly, our best type of peasant--perhaps the type that will one day give russia her real freedom... one day... a thousand years from now.... "i don't know why it is that i can still see him so clearly, because i can remember no one else of that night, and even this fellow may have been my imagination. but i think that, as we walked along, i talked to him about russia and how the whole land now from archangel to vladivostock might be free and be one great country of peace and plenty, first in all the world. "it seemed to me that every one was singing, men and women and children.... "we must, at last, have parted from most of the company. i had come with my friend into the quieter streets of the city. then it was that i suddenly smelt the sea. you must have noticed how petrograd is mixed up with the sea, how suddenly, where you never would expect it, you see the masts of ships all clustered together against the sky. i smelt the sea, the wind blew fresh and strong and there we were on the banks of the neva. everywhere there was perfect silence. the neva lay, tranquil, bound under its ice. the black hulks of the ships lay against the white shadows like sleeping animals. the curve of the sky, with its multitude of stars, was infinite. "my friend embraced me and left me and i stayed alone, so happy, so sure of the peace of the world that i did what i had not done for years, sent up a prayer of gratitude to god. then with my head on my hands, looking down at the masts of the ships, feeling petrograd behind me with its lights as though it were the city of god, i burst into tears--tears of happiness and joy and humble gratitude.... i have no memory of anything further." xii so much for the way that one russian saw it. there were others. for instance vera.... i suppose that the motive of vera's life was her pride. quite early, i should imagine, she had adopted that as the sort of talisman that would save her from every kind of ill. she told me once that when she was a little girl, the story of the witch who lured two children into the wood and then roasted them in her oven had terrified her beyond all control, and she would lie awake and shiver for hours because of it. it became a symbol of life to her--the forest was there and the oven and the witch--and so clever and subtle was the witch that the only way to outwit her was by pride. then there was also her maternal tenderness; it was through that that markovitch won her. she had not of course loved him--she had never pretended to herself that she had--but she had seen that he wanted caring for, and then, having taken the decisive step, her pride had come to her aid, had shown her a glimpse of the witch waiting in the forest darkness, and had proved to her that here was her great opportunity. she had then, with the easy superiority of a young girl, ignorant of life, dismissed love as of something that others might care for but that would, in no case, concern herself. did love for a moment smile at her or beckon to her pride came to her and showed her nina and nicholas, and that was enough. but love knows its power. he suddenly put forth his strength and vera was utterly helpless--far more helpless than a western girl with her conventional code and traditional training would have been. vera had no convention and no tradition. she had only her pride and her maternal instinct and these, for a time, fought a battle for her... then they suddenly deserted her. i imagine that they really deserted her on the night of nina's birthday-party, but she would not admit defeat so readily, and fought on for a little. on this eventful week when the world, as we knew it, was tumbling about our ears, she had told herself that the only thing to which she must give a thought was her fixed loyalty to nina and nicholas. she would not think of lawrence....she would not think of him. and so resolving, thought of him all the more. by wednesday morning her nerves were exhausted. the excitements of this week came as a climax to many months of strain. with the exception of her visit to the astoria she had been out scarcely at all and, although the view from her flat was peaceful enough she could imagine every kind of horror beyond the boundaries of the prospect--and in every horror lawrence figured. there occurred that morning a strange little conversation between vera, semyonov, nicholas markovitch, and myself. i arrived about ten o'clock to see how they were and to hear the news. i found vera sitting quietly at the table sewing. markovitch stood near to her, his anxious eyes and trembling mouth perched on the top of his sharp peaky collar and his hands rubbing nervously one within another. he was obviously in a state of very great excitement. semyonov sat opposite vera, leaning his thick body on his arms, his eyes watching his niece and every once and again his firm pale hand stroking his beard. when i joined them he said to me: "well, ivan andreievitch, what's the latest news of your splendid revolution?" "why my revolution?" i asked. i felt an especial dislike this morning of his sneering eyes and his thick pale honey-coloured beard. "whose ever it was he should be proud of it. to see thousands of people who've been hungry for months wandering about as i've seen them this morning and none of them touching a thing--it's stupendous!" semyonov smiled but said nothing. his smile irritated me. "oh, of course you sneer at the whole thing, alexei petrovitch!" i said. "anything fine in human nature excites your contempt as i know of old." i think that that was the first time that vera had heard me speak to him in that way, and she looked up at me with sudden surprise and i think gratitude. semyonov treated me with complete contempt. he answered me slowly: "no, ivan andreievitch, i don't wish to deprive you of any kind of happiness. i wouldn't for worlds. but do you know our people, that's the question? you haven't been here very long; you came loaded up with romantic notions, some of which you've discarded but only that you may pick up others....i don't want to insult you at all, but you simply don't know that the christian virtues that you are admiring just now so extravagantly are simply cowardice and apathy....wait a little! wait a little! and then tell me whether i've not been right." there was a moment's pause like the hush before the storm, and then markovitch broke in upon us. i can see and hear him now, standing there behind vera with his ridiculous collar and his anxious eyes. the words simply pouring from him in a torrent, his voice now rising into a shrill scream, now sinking into a funny broken bass like the growl of a young baby tiger. and yet he was never ridiculous. i've known other mortals, and myself one of the foremost, who, under the impulse of some sudden anger, enthusiasm, or regret, have been simply figures of fun.... markovitch was never that. he was like a dying man fighting for possession of the last plank. i can't at this distance of time remember all that he said. he talked a great deal about russia; while he spoke i noticed that he avoided semyonov's eyes, which never for a single instant left his face. "oh, don't you see, don't you see?" he cried. "russia's chance has come back to her? we can fight now a holy, patriotic war. we can fight, not because we are told to by our masters, but because we, of our own free will, wish to defend the soil of our sacred country. _our_ country! no one has thought of russia for the last two years--we have thought only of ourselves, our privations, our losses--but now--now. o god! the world may be set free again because russia is at last free!" "yes," said semyonov quietly (his eyes covered markovitch's face as a searchlight finds out the running figure of a man). "and who has spoken of russia during the last few days? russia! why, i haven't heard the word mentioned once. i may have been unlucky, i don't know. i've been out and about the streets a good deal... i've listened to a great many conversations.... democracy, yes, and brotherhood and equality and fraternity and bread and land and peace and idleness--but russia! not a sound...." "it will come! it will come!" markovitch urged. "it _must_ come! you didn't walk, alexei, as i did last night, through the streets, and see the people and hear their voices and see their faces.... oh! i believe that at last that good has come to the world, and happiness and peace; and it is russia who will lead the way.... thank god! thank god!" even as he spoke some instinct in me urged me to try and prevent him. i felt that semyonov would not forget a word of this, and would make his own use of it in the time to come. i could see the purpose in semyonov's eyes. i almost called out to nicholas, "look out! look out!" just as though a man were standing behind him with a raised weapon.... "you really mean this?" asked semyonov. "of course i mean it!" cried markovitch. "do i not sound as though i did?" "i will remind you of it one day," said semyonov. i saw that markovitch was trembling with excitement from head to foot. he sat down at the table near vera and put one hand on the tablecloth to steady himself. vera suddenly covered his hand with hers as though she were protecting him. his excitement seemed to stream away from him, as though semyonov were drawing it out of him. he suddenly said: "you'd like to take my happiness away from me if you could, alexei. you don't want me to be happy." "what nonsense!" semyonov said, laughing. "only i like the truth--i simply don't see the thing as you do. i have my view of us russians. i have watched since the beginning of the war. i think our people lazy and selfish--think you must drive them with a whip to make them do anything. i think they would be ideal under german rule, which is what they'll get if their revolution lasts long enough... that's all." i saw that markovitch wanted to reply, but he was trembling so that he could not. he said at last: "you leave me alone, alexei; let me go my own way." "i have never tried to prevent you," said semyonov. there was a moment's silence. then, in quite another tone, he remarked to me: "by the way, ivan andreievitch, what about your friend mr. lawrence? he's in a position of very considerable danger where he is with wilderling. they tell me wilderling may be murdered at any moment." some force stronger than my will drove me to look at vera. i saw that nicolai leontievitch also was looking at her. she raised her eyes for an instant, her lips moved as though she were going to speak, then she looked down again at her sewing. semyonov watched us all. "oh, he'll be all right," i answered. "if any one in the world can look after himself it's lawrence." "that's all very well," said semyonov, still looking at markovitch. "but to be in wilderling's company this week is a very unhealthy thing for any one. and that type of englishman is not noted for cowardice." "i tell you that lawrence can look after himself," i insisted angrily. semyonov knew and markovitch knew that i was speaking to vera. no one then said a word. there was a long pause. at last semyonov saw fit to go. "i'm off to the duma," he said. "there's a split, i believe. and i want to hear whether it's true that the czar's abdicated." "i believe you'd rather he hadn't, alexei petrovitch," markovitch broke in fiercely. he laughed at us all and said, "whose interests am i studying? my own?... holy russia's?... yours?... when will you learn, nicholas my friend, that i am a spectator, not a participator?" vera was alone during most of that day; and even now, after the time that has passed, i cannot bear to think of what she suffered. she realised quite definitely and now, with no chance whatever of self-deception, that she loved lawrence with a force that no denial or sacrifice on her part could alter. she told me afterwards that she walked up and down that room for hours, telling herself again and again that she must not go and see whether he were safe. she did not dare even to leave the room. she felt that if she entered her bedroom the sight of her hat and coat there would break down her resolution, that if she went to the head of the stairs and listened she must then go farther and then farther again. she knew quite well that to go to him now would mean complete surrender. she had no illusions about that. the whole of her body was quivering with desire for his embrace, for the warm strength of his body, for the kindness in his eyes, and the compelling mastery of his hands. she had never loved a man before; but it seemed to her now that she had known all these sensations always, and that she was now, at last, her real self, and that the earlier vera had been a ghost. and what ghosts were nina and markovitch! she told me afterwards that, on looking back, this seemed to her the most horrible part of the horrible afternoon. these two, who had been for so many years the very centre of her life, whom she had forced to hold up, as it were, the whole foundation of her existence, now simply were not real at all. she might call to them, and their voices were like far echoes or the wind. she gazed at them, and the colours of the room and the street seemed to shine through them.... she fought for their reality. she forced herself to recall all the many things that they had done together, nina's little ways, the quarrels with nicholas, the reconciliations, the times when he had been ill, the times when they had gone to the country, to the theatre... and through it all she heard semyonov's voice, "by the way, what about your friend lawrence?... he's in a position of very considerable danger... considerable danger... considerable danger..." by the evening she was almost frantic. nina had been with a girl friend in the vassily ostrov all day. she would perhaps stay there all night if there were any signs of trouble. no one returned. only the clock ticked on. old sacha asked whether she might go out for an hour. vera nodded her head. she was then quite alone in the flat. suddenly, about seven o'clock, nina came in. she was tired, nervous, and unhappy. the revolution had not come to _her_ as anything but a sudden crumbling of all the life that she had known and believed in. she had had, that afternoon, to run down a side street to avoid a machine-gun, and afterwards on the morskaia she had come upon a dead man huddled up in the snow like a piece of offal. these things terrified her and she did not care about the larger issues. her life had been always intensely personal--not selfish so much as vividly egoistic through her vitality. and now she was miserable, not because she was afraid for her own safety, but because she was face to face, for the first time, with the unknown and the uncertain. she came in, sat down at the table, put her head into her arms and burst into tears. she must have looked a very pathetic figure with her little fur hat askew, her hair tumbled--like a child whose doll is suddenly broken. vera was at her side in a moment. she put her arms around her. "nina, dear, what is it?... has somebody hurt you? has something happened? is anybody--killed?" "no!" nina sobbed. "nobody--nothing--only--i'm frightened. it all looks so strange. the streets are so funny, and--there was--a dead man on the morskaia." "you shouldn't have gone out, dear. i oughtn't to have let you. but now we can just be cosy together. sacha's gone out. there's no one here but ourselves. we'll have supper and make ourselves comfortable." nina looked up, staring about her. "has sacha gone out? oh, i wish she hadn't!... supposing somebody came." "no one will come. who could? no one wants to hurt _us!_ i've been here all the afternoon, and no one's come near the flat. if anybody did come we've only got to telephone to nicholas. he's with rozanov all the afternoon." "nicholas!" nina repeated scornfully. "as though he could help anybody." she looked up. vera told me afterwards that it was at that moment, when nina looked such a baby with her tumbled hair and her flushed cheeks stained with tears, that she realised her love for her with a fierceness that for a moment seemed to drown even her love for lawrence. she caught her to her and hugged her, kissing her again and again. but nina was suspicious. there were many things that had to be settled between vera and herself. she did not respond, and vera let her go. she went into her room, to take off her things. afterwards they lit the samovar and boiled some eggs and put the caviare and sausage and salt fish and jam on the table. at first they were silent, and then nina began to recover a little. "you know, vera, i've had an extraordinary day. there were no trams running, of course, and i had to walk all the distance. when i got there i found katerina ivanovna in a terrible way because their masha--whom they've had for years, you know--went to a revolutionary meeting last evening, and was out all night, and she came in this morning and said she wasn't going to work for them any more, that every one was equal now, and that they must do things for themselves. just fancy! when she's been with them for years and they've been so good to her. it upset katerina ivanovna terribly, because of course they couldn't get any one else, and there was no food in the house." "perhaps sacha won't come back again." "oh, she must! _she's_ not like that... and we've been so good to her. _nu... patom_, some soldiers came early in the afternoon and they said that some policeman had been firing from katya's windows and they must search the flat. they were very polite--quite a young student was in charge of them, he was rather like boris--and they went all over everything. they were very polite, but it wasn't nice seeing them stand there with their rifles in the middle of the dining-room. katya offered them some wine. but they wouldn't touch it. they said they had been told not to, and they looked quite angry with her for offering it. they couldn't find the policeman anywhere of course, but they told katya they might have to burn the house down if they didn't find him. i think they just said it to amuse themselves. but katya believed it, and was in a terrible way and began collecting all her china in the middle of the floor, and then ivan came in and told her not to be silly." "weren't you frightened to come home?" asked vera. "ivan wanted to come with me but i wouldn't let him. i felt quite brave in the flat, as though i'd face anybody. and then every step i took outside i got more and more frightened. it was so strange, so quiet with the trams not running and the shops all shut. the streets are quite deserted except that in the distance you see crowds, and sometimes there were shots and people running.... then suddenly i began to run. i felt as though there were animals in the canals and things crawling about on the ships. and then, just as i thought i was getting home, i saw a man, dead on the snow.... i'm not going out alone again until it's over. i'm so glad i'm back, vera darling. we'll have a lovely evening." they both discovered then how hungry they were, and they had an enormous meal. it was very cosy with the curtains drawn and the wood crackling in the stove and the samovar chuckling. there was a plateful of chocolates, and nina ate them all. she was quite happy now, and sang and danced about as they cleared away most of the supper, leaving the samovar and the bread and the jam and the sausage for nicholas and bohun when they came in. at last vera sat down in the old red arm-chair that had the holes and the places where it suddenly went flat, and nina piled up some cushions and sat at her feet. for a time they were happy, saying very little, vera softly stroking nina's hair. then, as vera afterwards described it to me, "some fright or sudden dread of loneliness came into the room. it was exactly as though the door had opened and some one had joined us... and, do you know, i looked up and expected to see uncle alexei." however, of course, there was no one there; but nina moved away a little, and then vera, wanting to comfort her, tried to draw her closer, and then of course, nina (because she was like that) with a little peevish shrug of the shoulders drew even farther away. there was, after that, silence between them, an awkward ugly silence, piling up and up with discomfort until the whole room seemed to be eloquent with it. both their minds were, of course, occupied in the same direction, and suddenly nina, who moved always on impulse and had no restraint, burst out: "i must know how andrey stepanovitch (their name for lawrence, because jeremy had no russian equivalent) is--i'm going to telephone." "you can't," vera said quietly. "it isn't working--i tried an hour ago to get on to nicholas." "well then, i shall go off and find out," said nina, knowing very well that she would not. "oh, nina, of course you mustn't.... you know you can't. perhaps when nicholas comes in he will have some news for us." "why shouldn't i?" "you know why not. what would he think? besides, you're not going out into the town again to-night." "oh, aren't i? and who's going to stop me?" "i am," said vera. nina sprang to her feet. in her later account to me of this quarrel she said, "you know, durdles, i don't believe i ever loved vera more than i did just then. in spite of her gravity she looked so helpless and as though she wanted loving so terribly. i could just have flung my arms round her and hugged her to death at the very moment that i was screaming at her. why are we like that?" at any rate nina stood up there and stamped her foot, her hair hanging all about her face and her body quivering. "oh, you're going to keep me, are you? what right have you got over me? can't i go and leave the flat at any moment if i wish, or am i to consider myself your prisoner?... _tzuineeto, pajalueesta_... i didn't know. i can only eat my meals with your permission, i suppose. i have to ask your leave before going to see my friends.... thank you, i know now. but i'm not going to stand it. i shall do just as i please. i'm grown up. no one can stop me...." vera, her eyes full of distress looked helplessly about her. she never could deal with nina when she was in these storms of rage, and to-day she felt especially helpless. "nina, dear... don't.... you know that it isn't so. you can go where you please, do what you please." "thank you," said nina, tossing her head. "i'm glad to hear it." "i know i'm tiresome very often. i'm slow and stupid. if i try you sometimes you must forgive me and be patient.... sit down again and let's be happy. you know how i love you. nina, darling... come again." but nina stood there pouting. she was loving vera so intensely that it was all that she could do to hold herself back, but her very love made her want to hurt.... "it's all very well to say you love me, but you don't act as though you do. you're always trying to keep me in. i want to be free. and andrey stepanovitch...." they both paused at lawrence's name. they knew that that was at the root of the matter between them, that it had been so for a long time, and that any other pretence would be false. "you know i love him--" said nina, "and i'm going to marry him." i can see then vera taking a tremendous pull upon herself as though she suddenly saw in front of her a gulf into whose depths, in another moment, she would fall. but my vision of the story, from this point, is nina's. vera told me no more until she came to the final adventure of the evening. this part of the scene then is witnessed with nina's eyes, and i can only fill in details which, from my knowledge of them both, i believe to have occurred. nina, knew, of course, what the effect of her announcement would be upon vera, but she had not expected the sudden thin pallor which stole like a film over her sister's face, the withdrawal, the silence. she was frightened, so she went on recklessly. "oh, i know that he doesn't care for me yet.... i can see that of course. but he will. he must. he's seen nothing of me yet. but i am stronger than he, i can make him do as i wish. i _will_ make him. you don't want me to marry him and i know why." she flung that out as a challenge, tossing her head scornfully, but nevertheless watching with frightened eyes her sister's face. suddenly vera spoke, and it was in a voice so stern that it was to nina a new voice, as though she had suddenly to deal with some new figure whom she had never seen before. "i can't discuss that with you, nina. you can't marry because, as you say, he doesn't care for you--in that way. also if he did it would be a very unhappy marriage. you would soon despise him. he is not clever in the way that you want a man to be clever. you'd think him slow and dull after a month with him.... and then he ought to beat you and he wouldn't. he'd be kind to you and then you'd be ruined. i can see now that i've always been too kind to you--indeed, every one has--and the result is, that you're spoilt and know nothing about life at all--or men. you are right. i've treated you as a child too long. i will do so no longer." nina turned like a little fury, standing back from vera as though she were going to spring upon her. "that's it, is it?" she cried. "and all because you want to keep him for yourself. i understand. i have eyes. you love him. you are hoping for an intrigue with him.... you love him! you love him! you love him!... and he doesn't love you and you are so miserable...." vera looked at nina, then suddenly turned and burying her head in her hands sobbed, crouching in her chair. then slipping from the chair, knelt catching nina's knees, her head against her dress. nina was aghast, terrified--then in a moment overwhelmed by a surging flood of love so that she caught vera to her, caressing her hair, calling her by her little name, kissing her again and again and again. "verotchka--verotchka--i didn't mean anything. i didn't indeed. i love you. i love you. you know that i do. i was only angry and wicked. oh, i'll never forgive myself. verotchka--get up--don't kneel to me like that...!" she was interrupted by a knock on the outer hall door. to both of them that sound must have been terribly alarming. vera said afterwards, that "at once we realised that it was the knock of some one more frightened than we were." in the first place, no one ever knocked, they always rang the rather rickety electric bell--and then the sound was furtive and hurried, and even frantic; "as though," said vera, "some one on the other side of the door was breathless." the sisters stood, close together, for quite a long time without moving. the knocking ceased and the room was doubly silent. then suddenly it began again, very rapid and eager, but muffled, almost as though some one were knocking with a gloved hand. vera went then. she paused for a moment in the little hall, for again there was silence and she fancied that perhaps the intruder had given up the matter in despair. but, no--there it was again--and this third time seemed to her, perhaps because she was so close to it, the most urgent and eager of all. she went to the door and opened it. there was no light in the passage save the dim reflection from the lamp on the lower floor, and in the shadow she saw a figure cowering back into the corner behind the door. "who is it?" she asked. the figure pushed past her, slipping into their own little hall. "but you can't come in like that," she said, turning round on him. "shut the door!" he whispered. "_bozhe moi! bozhe moi_.... shut the door." she recognised him then. he was the policeman from the corner of their street, a man whom they knew well. he had always been a pompous little man, stout and short of figure, kindly so far as they knew, although they had heard of him as cruel in the pursuit of his official duties. they had once talked to him a little and he explained: "i wouldn't hurt a fly, god knows," he had said, "of myself, but a man likes to do his work efficiently--and there are so many lazy fellows about here." he prided himself, they saw, on a punctilious attention to duty. when he had to come there for some paper or other he was always extremely polite, and if they were going away he helped them about their passports. he told them on another occasion that "he was pleased with life--although one never knew of course when it might come down upon one--" well, it had come down on him now. a more pitiful object vera had never seen. he was dressed in a dirty black suit and wore a shabby fur cap, his padded overcoat was torn. but the overwhelming effect of him was terror. vera had never before seen such terror, and at once, as though the thing were an infectious disease, her own heart began to beat furiously. he was shaking so that the fur cap, which was too large for his head, waggled up and down over his eye in a ludicrous manner. his face was dirty as though he had been crying, and a horrid pallid grey in colour. his collar was torn, showing his neck between the folds of his overcoat. vera looked out down the stairs as though she expected to see something. the flat was perfectly still. there was not a sound anywhere. she turned back to the man again, he was crouching against the wall. "you can't come in here," she repeated. "my sister and i are alone. what do you want?... what's the matter?" "shut the door!... shut the door!... shut the door!..." he repeated. she closed it. "now what is it?" she asked, and then, hearing a sound, turned to find that nina was standing with wide eyes, watching. "what is it?" nina asked in a whisper. "i don't know," said vera, also whispering. "he won't tell me." he pushed past them then into the dining-room, looked about him for a moment, then sank into a chair as though his legs would no longer support him, holding on to the cloth with both hands. the sisters followed him into the dining-room. "don't shiver like that!" said vera, "tell us why you've come in here?"... his eyes looked past them, never still, wandering from wall to wall, from door to door. "they're after me..." he said. "that's it--i was hiding in our cupboard all last night and this morning. they were round there all the time breaking up our things.... i heard them shouting. they were going to kill me. i've done nothing--o god! what's that?" "there's no one here," said vera, "except ourselves." "i saw a chance to get away and i crept out. but i couldn't get far.... i knew you would be good-hearted... good-hearted. hide me somewhere--anywhere!... and they won't come in here. only until the evening. i've done no one any harm.... only my duty...." he began to snivel, taking out from his coat a very dirty pocket-handkerchief and dabbing his face with it. the odd thing that they felt, as they looked at him, was the incredible intermingling of public and private affairs. five minutes before they had been passing through a tremendous crisis in their personal relationship. the whole history of their lives together, flowing through how many years, through how many phases, how many quarrels, and happiness and adventures had reached here a climax whose issue was so important that life between them could never be the same again. so urgent had been the affair that during that hour they had forgotten the revolution, russia, the war. moreover, always in the past, they had assumed that public life was no affair of theirs. the russo-japanese war, even the spasmodic revolt in , had not touched them except as a wind of ideas which blew so swiftly through their private lives that they were scarcely affected by it. now in the person of that trembling, shaking figure at their table, the revolution had come to them, and not only the revolution, but the strange new secret city that petrograd was... the whole ground was quaking beneath them. and in the eyes of the fugitive they saw what terror of death really was. it was no tale read in a story-book, no recounting of an adventure by some romantic traveller, it was _here_ with them in the flat and at any moment.... it was then that vera realised that there was no time to lose--something must be done at once. "who's pursuing you?" she asked, quickly. "where are they?" he got up and was moving about the room as though he was looking for a hiding-place. "all the people.... everybody!" he turned round upon them, suddenly striking, what seemed to them, a ludicrously grand attitude. "abominable! that's what it is. i heard them shouting that i had a machine-gun on the roof and was killing people. i had no machine-gun. of course not. i wouldn't know what to do with one if i had one. but there they were. that's what they were shouting! and i've always done my duty. what's one to do? obey one's superior officer? of course, what he says one does. what's life for?... and then naturally one expects a reward. things were going well with me, very well indeed--and then this comes. it's a degrading thing for a man to hide for a day and a night in a cupboard." his teeth began to chatter then so that he could scarcely speak. he seemed to be shaking with ague. he caught vera's hand. "save me--save me!" he said. "put me somewhere.... i've done nothing disgraceful. they'll shoot me like a dog--" the sisters consulted. "what are we to do?" asked nina. "we can't let him go out to be killed." "no. but if we keep him here and they come in and find him, we shall all be involved.... it isn't fair to nicholas or uncle ivan...." "we can't let him go out." "no, we can't," vera replied. she saw at once how impossible that was. were he caught outside and shot they would feel that they had his death for ever on their souls. "there's the linen cupboard," she said. she turned round to nina. "i'm afraid," she said, "if you hide here, you'll have to go into another cupboard. and it can only be for an hour or two. we couldn't keep you here all night." he said nothing except "quick. take me." vera led him into her bedroom and showed him the place. without another word he pressed in amongst the clothes. it was a deep cupboard, and, although he was a fat man, the door closed quite evenly. it was suddenly as though he had never been, vera went back to nina. they stood close to one another in the middle of the room, and talked in whispers. "what are we going to do?" "we can only wait!" "they'll never dare to search your room, vera." "one doesn't know now... everything's so different." "vera, you _are_ brave. forgive me what i said just now.... i'll help you if you want--" "hush, nina dear. not that now. we've got to think--what's best...." they kissed very quietly, and then they sat down by the table and waited. there was simply nothing else to do. vera said that, during that pause, she could see the little policeman everywhere. in every part of the room she found him, with his fat legs and dirty, streaky face and open collar. the flat was heavy, portentous with his presence, as though it stood with a self-important finger on its lips saying, "i've got a secret in here. _such_ a secret. you don't know what _i've_ got...." they discussed in whispers as to who would come in first. nicholas or uncle ivan or bohun or sacha? and supposing one of them came in while the soldiers were there? who would be the most dangerous? sacha? she would scream and give everything away. suppose they had seen him enter and were simply waiting, on the cat-and-mouse plan, to catch him? that was an intolerable thought. "i think," said nina, "i must go and see whether there's any one outside." but there was no need for her to do that. even as she spoke they heard the steps on the stairs; and instantly afterwards there came the loud knocking on their door. vera pressed nina's hand and went into the hall. "_kto tam_... who's there?" she asked. "open the door!... the workmen and soldiers' committee demand entrance in the name of the revolution." she opened the door at once. during those first days of the revolution they cherished certain melodramatic displays. whether consciously or no they built on all the old french revolution traditions, or perhaps it is that every revolution produces of necessity the same clothing with which to cover its nakedness. a strange mixture of farce and terror were those detachments of so-called justice. at their head there was, as a rule, a student, often smiling and bespectacled. the soldiers themselves, from one of the petrograd regiments, were frankly out for a good time and enjoyed themselves thoroughly, but, as is the slavonic way, playfulness could pass with surprising suddenness to dead earnest--with, indeed, so dramatic a precipitance that the actors themselves were afterwards amazed. of these "little, regrettable mistakes" there had already, during the week, been several examples. to vera, with the knowledge of the contents of her linen-cupboard, the men seemed terrifying enough. their leader was a fat and beaming student--quite a boy. he was very polite, saying "_zdrastvuite,"_ and taking off his cap. the men behind him--hulking men from one of the guards regiments--pushed about in the little hall like a lot of puppies, joking with one another, holding their rifles upside down, and making sudden efforts at a seriousness that they could not possibly sustain. only one of them, an older man with a thick black beard, was intensely grave, and looked at vera with beseeching eyes, as though he longed to tell her the secret of his life. "what can i do for you?" she asked the student. "_prosteete_... forgive us." he smiled and blinked at her, then put on his cap, clicked his heels, gave a salute, and took his cap off again. "we wish to be in no way an inconvenience to you. we are simply obeying orders. we have instructions that a policeman is hiding in one of these flats.... we know, of course, that he cannot possibly be here. nevertheless we are compelled... _prosteete_.... what nice pictures you have!" he ended suddenly. it was then that vera discovered that they were by this time in the dining-room, crowded together near the door and gazing at nina with interested eyes. "there's no one here, of course," said vera, very quietly. "no one at all." "_tak tochno_ (quite so)," said the black-bearded soldier, for no particular reason, suddenly. "you will allow me to sit down?" said the student, very politely. "i must, i am afraid, ask a few questions." "certainly," said vera quietly. "anything you like." she had moved over to nina, and they stood side by side. but she could not think of nina, she could not think even of the policeman in the cupboard.... she could think only of that other house on the quay where, perhaps even now, this same scene was being enacted. they had found wilderling.... they had dragged him out.... lawrence was beside him.... they were condemned together.... oh! love had come to her at last in a wild, surging flood! of all the steps she had been led until at last, only half an hour before in that scene with nina, the curtains had been flung aside and the whole view revealed to her. she felt such a strength, such a pride, such a defiance, as she had not known belonged to human power. she had, for many weeks, been hesitating before the gates. now, suddenly, she had swept through. his death now was not the terror that it had been only an hour before. nina's accusation had shown her, as a flash of lightning flings the mountains into view, that now she could never lose him, were he with her or no, and that beside that truth nothing mattered. something of her bravery and grandeur and beauty must have been felt by them all at that moment. nina realised it.... she told me that her own fear left her altogether when she saw how vera was facing them. she was suddenly calm and quiet and very amused. the student officer seemed now to be quite at home. he had taken a great many notes down in a little book, and looked very important as he did so. his chubby face expressed great self-satisfaction. he talked half to himself and half to vera. "yes... yes... quite so. exactly. and your husband is not yet at home, madame markovitch.... _nu da...._ of course these are very troublesome times, and as you say things have to move in a hurry. "you've heard perhaps that nicholas romanoff has abdicated entirely--and refused to allow his son to succeed. makes things simpler.... yes.... very pleasant pictures you have--and ostroffsky--six volumes. very agreeable. i have myself acted in ostroffsky at different times. i find his plays very enjoyable. i am sure you will forgive us, madame, if we walk through your charming flat." but indeed by this time the soldiers themselves had begun to roam about on their own account. nina remembers one soldier in especial--a large dirty fellow with ragged moustache--who quite frankly terrified her. he seemed to regard her with particular satisfaction, staring at her, and, as it were, licking his lips over her. he wandered about the room fingering things, and seemed to be immensely interested in nicholas's little den, peering through the glass window that there was in the door and rubbing the glass with his finger. he presently pushed the door open and soon they were all in there. then a characteristic thing occurred. apparently nicholas's inventions--his little pieces of wood and bark and cloth, his glass bottles, and tubes--seemed to them highly suspicious. there was laughter at first, and then sudden silence. nina could see part of the room through the open door and she watched them as they gathered round the little table, talking together in excited whispers. the tall, rough-looking fellow who had frightened her before picked up one of the tubes, and then, whether by accident or intention, let it fall, and the tinkling smash of the glass frightened them all so precipitately that they came tumbling out into the larger room. the big fellow whispered something to the student, who at once became more self-important than ever, and said very seriously to vera: "that is your husband's room, madame, i understand?" "yes," said vera quietly, "he does his work in there." "what kind of work?" "he is an inventor." "an inventor of what?" "various things.... he is working at present on something to do with the making of cloth." unfortunately this serious view of nicholas's inventions suddenly seemed to nina so ridiculous that she tittered. she could have done nothing more regrettable. the student obviously felt that his dignity was threatened. he looked at her very severely: "this is no laughing matter," he said. he himself then got up and went into the inner room. he was there for some time, and they could hear him fingering the tubes and treading on the broken glass. he came out again at last. he was seriously offended. "you should have told us your husband was an inventor." "i didn't think it was of importance," said vera. "everything is of importance," he answered. the atmosphere was now entirely changed. the soldiers were angry--they had, it seemed, been deceived and treated like children. the melancholy fellow with the black beard looked at vera with eyes of deep reproach. "when will your husband return?" asked the student. "i am afraid i don't know," said vera. she realised that the situation was now serious, but she could not keep her mind upon it. in that house on the quay what was happening? what had, perhaps, already happened?... "where has he gone?" "i don't know." "why didn't he tell you where he was going?" "he often does not tell me." "ah, that is wrong. in these days one should always say where one is going." he stood up very stiff and straight. "search the house," he said to his men. suddenly then vera's mind concentrated. it was as though, she told me "i came back into the room and saw for the first time what was happening." "there is no one in the rest of the flat," she said, "and nothing that can interest you." "that is for me to judge," said the little officer grimly. "but i assure you there is nothing," she went on eagerly. "there is only the kitchen and the bath-room and the five bedrooms." "whose bedrooms?" said the officer. "my husband's, my own, my sister's, my uncle's, and an englishman's," she answered, colouring a little. "nevertheless we must do our duty.... search the house," he repeated. "but you must not go into our bedrooms," she said, her voice rising. "there is nothing for you there. i am sure you will respect our privacy." "our orders must be obeyed," he answered angrily. "but--" she cried. "silence, madame," he said, furiously, staring at her as though she were his personal, deadly enemy. "very well," said vera proudly. "please do as you wish." the officer walked past her with his head up, and the soldiers followed him, their eyes malicious and inquisitive and excited. the sisters stood together waiting. of course the end had come. they simply stood there fastening their resolution to the extreme moment. "i must go with them," said vera. she followed them into her bedroom. it was a very little place and they filled it, they looked rather sheepish now, whispering to one another. "what's in there?" said the officer, tapping the cupboard. "only some clothes," said vera. "open it!" he ordered. then the world did indeed stand still. the clock ceased to tick, the little rumble in the stove was silenced, the shuffling feet of one of the soldiers stayed, the movement of some rustle in the wall paper was held. the world was frozen. "now i suppose we shall all be shot," was vera's thought, repeated over and over again with a ludicrous monotony. then she could see nothing but the little policeman, tumbling out of the cupboard, dishevelled and terrified. terrified! what that look in his eyes would be! that at any rate she could not face and she turned her head away from them, looking out through the door into the dark little passage. she heard as though from an infinite distance the words: "well, there's nobody there." she did not believe him of course. he said that whoever he was, to test her, to tempt her to give herself away. but she was too clever for them. she turned back and faced them, and then saw, to the accompaniment of an amazement that seemed like thunder in her ears, that the cupboard was indeed empty. "there is nobody," said the black-bearded soldier. the student looked rather ashamed of himself. the white clothes, the skirts, and the blouses in the cupboard reproached him. "you will of course understand, madame," he said stiffly, "that the search was inevitable. regrettable but necessary. i'm sure you will see that for your own satisfaction...." "you are assured now that there is no one here?" vera interrupted him coldly. "assured," he answered. but where was the man? she felt as though she were in some fantastic nightmare in which nothing was as it seemed. the cupboard was not a cupboard, the policeman not a policeman.... "there is the kitchen," she said. in the kitchen of course they found nothing. there was a large cupboard in one corner but they did not look there. they had had enough. they returned into the dining-room and there, looking very surprised, his head very high above his collar was markovitch. "what does this mean?" he asked. "i regret extremely," said the officer pompously. "i have been compelled to make a search. duty only... i regret. but no one is here. your flat is at liberty. i wish you good-afternoon." before markovitch could ask further questions the room was emptied of them all. they tramped out, laughing and joking, children again, the hall door closed behind them. nina clutched vera's arm. "vera.... vera, where is he?" "i don't know," said vera. "what's all this?" asked nicholas. they explained to him but he scarcely seemed to hear. he was radiant--smiling in a kind of ecstasy. "they have gone? i am safe?" in the doorway was the little policeman, black with grime and dust, so comical a figure that in reaction from the crisis of ten minutes before, they laughed hysterically. "oh look! look!..." cried nina. "how dirty he is!" "where have you been?" asked vera. "why weren't you in the cupboard?" the little man's teeth were chattering, so that he could scarcely speak.... "i heard them in the other room. i knew that the cupboard would be the first place. i slipped into the kitchen and hid in the fireplace." "you're not angry, nicholas?" vera asked. "we couldn't send him out to be shot." "what does that matter?" he almost impatiently brushed it aside. "there are other things more important." he looked at the trembling dirty figure. "only you'd better go back and hide again until it's dark. they might come back...." he caught vera by the arm. his eyes were flames. he drew her with him back into her little room. he closed the door. "the revolution has come--it has really come," he cried. "yes," she answered, "it has come into this very house. the world has changed." "the czar has abdicated.... the old world has gone, the old wicked world! russia is born again!" his eyes were the eyes of a fanatic. her eyes, too, were alight. she gazed past him. "i know--i know," she whispered as though to herself. "russia--russia," he went on coming closer and closer, "russia and you. we will build a new world. we will forget our old troubles. oh, vera, my darling, my darling, we're going to be happy now! i love you so. and now i can hope again. all our love will be clean in this new world. we're going to be happy at last!" but she did not hear him. she saw into space. a great exultation ran through her body. all lost for love! at last she was awakened, at last she lived, at last, at last, she knew what love was. "i love him! i love him... him," her soul whispered. "and nothing now in this world or the next can separate us." "vera--vera," nicholas cried, "we are together at last--as we have never been. and now we'll work together again--for russia." she looked at the man whom she had never loved, with a great compassion and pity. she put her arms around him and kissed him, her whole maternal spirit suddenly aware of him and seeking to comfort him. at the touch of her lips his body trembled with happiness. but he did not know that it was a kiss of farewell.... xiii i have no idea at all what lawrence did during the early days of that week. he has never told me, and i have never asked him. he never, with the single exception of the afternoon at the astoria, came near the markovitches, and i know that was because he had now reached a stage where he did not dare trust himself to see vera--just as she at that time did not trust herself to see him.... i do not know what he thought of those first days of the revolution. i can imagine that he took it all very quietly, doing his duty and making no comment. he had of course his own interest in it, but it would be, i am sure, an entirely original interest, unlike any one else's. i remember dune once, in the long-dead days, saying to me, "it's never any use guessing what lawrence is thinking. when you think it's football it's euripides, and when you think it's euripides it's marie corelli." of all the actors in this affair he remains to me to the last as the most mysterious. i know that he loved vera with the endurance of the rock, the heat of the flame, the ruthlessness of a torrent, but behind that love there sat the man himself, invisible, silent, patient, watching. he may have had semyonov's contempt for the revolutionary idealist, he may have had wilderling's belief in the czar's autocracy, he may have had boris grogoff's enthusiasm for freedom and a general holiday. i don't know. i know nothing at all about it. i don't think that he saw much of the wilderlings during the earlier part of the week. he himself was a great deal with the english military mission, and wilderling was with _his_ party whatever that might be. he could see of course that wilderling was disturbed, or perhaps indignant is the right word. "as though you know," he said, "some dirty little boy had been pullin' snooks at him." nevertheless the baroness was the human link. lawrence would see from the first--that is, from the morning of the sunday--that she was in an agony of horror. she confided in nobody, but went about as though she was watching for something, and at dinner her eyes never left her husband's face for a moment. those evening meals must have been awful. i can imagine the dignity, the solemn heavy room with all the silver, the ceremonious old man-servant and wilderling himself behaving as though nothing at all were the matter. to do him all justice he was as brave as a lion, and as proud as a gladiator, and as conceited as a prussian. on the wednesday evening he did not return home. he telephoned that he was kept on important business. the baroness and lawrence had the long slow meal together. it was almost more than jerry could stand having, of course, his own private tortures to face. "it was as though the old lady felt that she had been deputed to support the honour of the family during her husband's absence. she must have been wild with anxiety, but she showed no sign except that her hand trembled when she raised her glass." "what did you talk about?" i asked him. "oh, about anything! theatres and her home, when she was a girl and england.... awful, every minute of it!" there was a moment towards the end of the meal, when the good lady nearly broke down. the bell in the hall rang and there was a step; she thought it was her husband and half rose. it was, however, the dvornik with a message of no importance. she gave a little sigh. "oh, i do wish he would come!... i do wish he would come!" she murmured to herself. "oh, he'll come," lawrence reassured her, but she seemed indignant with him for having overheard her. afterwards, sitting together desolately in the magnificent drawing-room, she became affectionately maternal. i have always wondered why lawrence confided to me the details of their very intimate conversation. it was exactly the kind of thing he was most reticent about. she asked him about his home, his people, his ambitions. she had asked him about these things before, but to-night there was an appeal in her questions, as though she said: "take my mind off that other thing. help me to forget, if it's only for a moment." "have you ever been in love?" she asked. "yes. once," he said. "was he in love now?" "yes." "with some one in russia?" "yes." she hoped that he would be happy. he told her that he didn't think happiness was quite the point in this particular case. there were other things more important--and, anyway, it was inevitable. "he had fallen in love at first sight?" "yes. the very first moment." she sighed. so had she. it was, she thought, the only real way. she asked him whether it might not, after all, turn out better than he expected. no, he did not think that it could. but he didn't mind how it turned out--at least he couldn't look that far. the point was that he was in it, up to the neck, and he was never going to be out of it again. there was something boyish about that that pleased her. she put her plump hand on his knee and told him how she had first met the baron, down in the south, at kieff, how grand he had looked; how, seeing her across a room full of people, he had smiled at her before he had ever spoken to her or knew her name. "i was quite pretty then," she added. "i have never regretted our marriage for a single moment," she said. "nor, i know, has he." "we hoped there would he children...." she gave a pathetic little gesture. "we will get away down to the south again as soon as the troubles are over," she ended. i don't suppose he was thinking much of her--his mind was on vera all the time--but after he had left her and lay in bed, sleepless, his mind dwelt on her affectionately, and he thought that he would like to help her. he realised, quite clearly, that wilderling was in a very dangerous position, but i don't think that it ever occurred to him for a moment that it would be wise for him to move to another flat. on the next day, thursday, lawrence did not return until the middle of the afternoon. the town was, by now, comparatively quiet again. numbers of the police had been caught and imprisoned, some had been shot and others were in hiding; most of the machine-guns shooting from the roofs had ceased. the abdication of the czar had already produced the second phase of the revolution--the beginning of the struggle between the provisional government and the council of workmen and soldiers' deputies, and this was proceeding, for the moment, inside the walls of the duma rather than in the streets and squares of the town. lawrence returned, therefore, that afternoon with a strange sense of quiet and security. "it was almost, you know, as though this tommy-rot about a white revolution might be true after all--with this jolly old duma and their jolly old kerensky runnin' the show. of course i'd seen the nonsense about their not salutin' the officers and all that, but i didn't think any fellers alive would be such dam fools.... i might have known better." he let himself into the flat and found there a death-like stillness--no one about and no sound except the tickings of the large clock in the drawing-room. he wandered into that horribly impressive place and suddenly sat down on the sofa with a realisation of extreme physical fatigue. he didn't know why he was so tired, he had felt quite "bobbish" all the week; suddenly now his limbs were like water, he had a bad ache down his spine and his legs were as heavy as lead. he sat in a kind of trance on that sofa, he was not asleep, but he was also, quite certainly, not awake. he wondered why the place was so "beastly still" after all the noise there had been all the week. there was no one left alive--every one dead--except himself and vera... vera... vera. then he was conscious that some one was looking at him through the double-doors. at first he didn't realise who it was, the face was so white and the figure so quiet, then, pulling himself together, he saw that it was the old servant. "what is it, andre?" he asked, sitting up. the old man didn't answer, but came into the room, carefully closing the door behind him. lawrence saw that he was trembling with fright, but was still endeavouring to behave with dignity. "barin! barin!" he whispered, as though lawrence were a long way from him. "paul konstantinovitch! (that was wilderling). he's mad.... he doesn't know what he's doing. oh, sir, stop him, stop him, or we shall all be murdered!" "what is he doing?" asked lawrence, standing up. "in the little hack room," andre whispered, as though now he were confiding a terrible secret. "come quickly...!" lawrence followed him; when he had gone a few steps down the passage he heard suddenly a sharp, muffled report. "what's that?" andre came close to him, his old, seamed face white like plaster. "he has a rifle in there..." he said. "he's shooting at them!" then as lawrence stepped up to the door of the little room that was wilderling's dressing-room, andre caught his arm--. "be careful, barin.... he doesn't know what he's about. he may not recognise you." "oh, that's all right!" said lawrence. he pushed the door open and walked in. to give for a moment his own account of it: "you know that room was the rummiest thing. i'd never been into it before. i knew the old fellow was a bit of a dandy, but i never expected to see all the pots and jars and glasses there were. you'd have thought one wouldn't have noticed a thing at such a time, but you couldn't escape them,--his dressing-table simply covered,--white round jars with pink tops, bottles of hair-oil with ribbons round the neck, manicure things, heaps of silver things, and boxes with chinese patterns on them, and one thing, open, with what was mighty like rouge in it. and clothes all over the place--red silk dressing-gown with golden tassels, and red leather slippers! "i don't remember noticing any of this at the moment, but it all comes back to me as soon as i begin to think of it--and the room stank of scent!" but of course it was the old man in the corner who mattered. it was, i think, very significant of lawrence's character and his unenglish-english tradition that the first thing that he felt was the pathos of it. no other englishman in petrograd would have seen that at all. wilderling was crouched in the corner against a piece of gold japanese embroidery. he was in the shadow, away from the window, which was pushed open sufficiently to allow the muzzle of the rifle to slip between the woodwork and the pane. the old man, his white hair disordered, his clothes dusty, and his hands grimy, crept forward just as lawrence entered, fired down into the side-street, then moved swiftly back into his corner again. he muttered to himself without ceasing in french, "chiens! chiens!... chiens!" he was very hot, and he stopped for a moment to wipe the sweat from his forehead, then he saw lawrence. "what do you want?" he asked, as though he didn't recognize him. lawrence moved down the side of the room, avoiding the window. he touched the little man's arm. "i say, you know," he said, "this won't do." wilderling smelt of gunpowder, and he was breathing hard as though he had been running desperately. he quivered when lawrence touched him. "go away!" he said, "you mustn't come here.... i'll get them yet--i tell you i'll get them yet--i tell you i'll get them--let them dare... chiens... chiens..." he jerked his rifle away from the window and began, with trembling fingers, to load it again. lawrence gripped his arm. "when i did that," he said, "it felt as though there wasn't an arm there at all, but just a bone which i could break if i pressed a bit harder." "come away!" he said. "you damn fool--don't you see that it's hopeless?" "and i'd always been so respectful to him...." he added in parenthesis. wilderling hissed at him, saying no words, just drawing in his breath. "i've got two of them," he whispered suddenly. "i'll get them all." then a bullet crashed through the window, burying itself in the opposite wall. after that things happened so quickly that it was impossible to say in what order they occurred. there was suddenly a tremendous noise in the flat. "it was just as though the whole place was going to tumble about our ears. all the pots and bottles began to jump about, and then another bullet came through, landed on the dressing-table, and smashed everything. the looking-glass crashed, and the hair-oil was all over the place. i rushed out to see what was happening in the hall...." what "was happening" was that the soldiers had broken the hall door in. lawrence saw then a horrible thing. one of the men rushed forward and stuck andre, who was standing, paralysed, by the drawing-room door, in the stomach. the old man cried out "just like a shot rabbit," and stood there "for what seemed ages," with the blood pouring out of his middle. that finished lawrence. he rushed forward, and they would certainly have "stuck" him too if someone hadn't cried out, "look out, he's an englishman--an _anglichanin_--i know him." after that, for a time, he was uncertain of anything. he struggled; he was held. he heard noises around him--shouts or murmurs or sighs--that didn't seem to him to be connected with anything human. he could not have said where he was nor what he was doing. then, quite suddenly, everything cleared. he came to himself with a consciousness of that utter weariness that he had felt before. he was able to visualise the scene, to take it all in, but as a distant spectator. "it was like nothing so much as watching a cinematograph," he told me. he could do nothing; he was held by three soldiers, who apparently wished him to be a witness of the whole affair. andre's body lay there, huddled up in a pool of drying blood, that glistened under the electric light. one of his legs was bent crookedly under him, and lawrence had a strange mad impulse to thrust his way forward and put it straight. it was then, with a horrible sickly feeling, exactly like a blow in the stomach, that he realised that the baroness was there. she was standing, quite alone, at the entrance of the hall, looking at the soldiers, who were about eight in number. he heard her say, "what's happened? who are you?..." and then in a sharper, more urgent voice, "where's my husband?" then she saw andre.... she gave a sharp little cry, moved forward towards him, and stopped. "i don't know what she did then," said lawrence. "i think she suddenly began to run down the passage. i know she was crying, 'paul! paul! paul!'... i never saw her again." the officer--an elderly kindly-looking man like a doctor or a lawyer (i am trying to give every possible detail, because i think it important)--then came up to lawrence and asked him some questions: "what was his name?" "jeremy ralph lawrence." "he was an englishman." "yes." "working at the british embassy?" "no, at the british military mission." "he was officer?" "yes." "in the british army?" "yes. he had fought for two years in france." "he had been lodging with baron wilderling?" "yes. ever since he came to russia." the officer nodded his head. they knew about him, had full information. a friend of his, a mr. boris grogoff, had spoken of him. the officer was then very polite, told him that they regretted extremely the inconvenience and discomfort to which he might be put, but that they must detain him until this affair was concluded--"which will be very soon" added the officer. he also added that he wished lawrence to be a witness of what occurred so that he should see that, under the new regime in russia, everything was just and straightforward. "i tried to tell him," said lawrence to me, "that wilderling was off his head. i hadn't the least hope, of course.... it was all quite clear, and, at such a time, quite just. wilderling had been shooting them out of his window.... the officer listened very politely, but when i had finished he only shook his head. that was their affair he said. "it was then that i realised wilderling. he was standing quite close to me. he had obviously been struggling a bit, because his shirt was all torn, and you could see his chest. he kept moving his hand and trying to pull his shirt over; it was his only movement. he was as straight as a dart, and except for the motion of his hand as still as a statue, standing between the soldiers, looking directly in front of him. he had been mad in that other room, quite dotty. "he was as sane as anything now, grave and serious and rather ironical, just as he always looked. well it was at that moment, when i saw him there, that i thought of vera. i had been thinking of her all the time of course. i had been thinking of nothing else for weeks. but that minute, there in the hall, settled me. callous, wasn't it? i ought to have been thinking only of wilderling and his poor old wife. after all, they'd been awfully good to me. she'd been almost like a mother all the time.... but there it was. it came over me like a storm. i'd been fighting for nights and days and days and nights not to go to her--fighting like hell, trying to play the game the sentimentalists would call it. i suppose seeing the old man there and knowing what they were going to do to him settled it. it was a sudden conviction, like a blow, that all this thing was real, that they weren't playing at it, that any one in the town was as near death as winking.... and so there it was! vera! i'd got to get to her--at once--and never leave her again until she was safe. i'd got to get to her! i'd got to get to her! i'd got to get to her!... nothing else mattered. not wilderling's death nor mine either, except that if i was dead i'd be out of it and wouldn't be able to help her. they talk about men with one idea. from that moment i had only one idea in all the world--i don't know that i've had any other one since. they talk about scruples, moralities, traditions. they're all right, but there just are moments in life when they simply don't count at all.... vera was in danger--well, that was all that mattered. "the officer said something to wilderling. i heard wilderling answer: "you're rebels against his majesty.... i wish i'd shot more of you!" fine old boy, you know, whatever way you look at it. "they moved him forward then. he went quite willingly, without any kind of resistance. they motioned to me to follow. we walked out of the flat down the stairs, no one saying a word. we went out on to the quay. there was no one there. they stood him up against the wall, facing the river. it was dark, and when he was against the wall he seemed to vanish,--only i got one kind of gesture, a sort of farewell, you know, his grey hair waving in the breeze from the river. "there was a report, and it was as though a piece of the wall slowly unsettled itself and fell forward. no sound except the report. oh, he was a fine old boy! "the officer came up to me and said very politely: "'you are free now, sir,' and something about regretting incivility, and something, i think, about them perhaps wanting me again to give some sort of evidence. very polite he was. "i was mad, i suppose, i don't know. i believe i said something to him about vera, which of course he didn't understand. "i know i wanted to run like hell to vera to see that she was safe. "but i didn't. i walked off as slowly as anything. it was awful. they'd been so good to me, and yet i wasn't thinking of wilderling at all...." xiv markovitch on that same afternoon came back to the flat early. he also, like lawrence, felt the strange peace and tranquillity of the town, and it seemed inevitably like the confirmation of all his dearest hopes. the czar was gone, the old regime was gone, the people, smiling and friendly, were maintaining their own discipline--above all, vera had kissed him. he did not go deeper into his heart and see how strained all their recent relations must have been for this now to give him such joy. he left that--it simply was that at last he and vera understood one another, she had found that she cared for him after all, and that he was necessary to her happiness. what that must mean for their future life together he simply dared not think.... it would change the world for him. he felt like the man in the story from whom the curse is suddenly lifted.... he walked home through the quiet town, humming to himself. he fancied that there was a warmth in the air, a strange kindly omen of spring, although the snow was still thick on the ground, and the neva a grey carpet of ice. he came into the flat and found it empty. he went into his little room and started on his inventions. he was so happy that he hummed to himself as he worked and cut slices off his pieces of wood, and soaked flannel in bottles, and wrote funny little sentences in his abominable handwriting in a red notebook. one need not grudge it him, poor markovitch. it was the last happy half-hour of his life. he did not turn on his green-shaded lamp, but sat there in the gathering dusk, chipping up the wood and sometimes stopping, idly lost in happy thoughts. some one came in. he peered through his little glass window and saw that it was nina. she passed quickly through the dining-room, beyond, towards her bedroom, without stopping to switch on the light. nina had broken the spell. he went back to his table, but he couldn't work now, and he felt vaguely uneasy and cold. he was just going to leave his work and find the _retch_ and settle down to a comfortable read, when he heard the hall door close. he stood behind his little glass window and watched; it was vera, perhaps... it must be... his heart began eagerly to beat. it _was_ vera. at once he saw that she was strangely agitated. before she had switched on the light he realised it. with a click the light was on. markovitch had intended to open his door and go out to her, smiling. he saw at once that she was waiting for some one.... he stood, trembling, on tiptoe, his face pressed against the glass of the pane. lawrence came in. he had the face, markovitch told me many weeks afterwards, "of a triumphant man." they had obviously met outside, because vera said, as though continuing a conversation: "and it's only just happened?" "i've come straight from there," lawrence answered. then he went up to her. she let herself at once go to him and he half carried her to a chair near the table and exactly opposite markovitch's window. they kissed "like people who had been starving all their lives." markovitch was trembling so that he was afraid lest he should tumble or make some noise. the two figures in the chair were like statues in their immobile, relentless, unswerving embrace. suddenly he saw that nina was standing in the opposite doorway "like a ghost." she was there for so brief a moment that he could not be sure that she had been there at all. only her white, frightened face remained with him. one of his thoughts was: "this is the end of my life." another was: "how could they be so careless, with the light on, and perhaps people in the flat!" and after that: "they need it so much that they don't care who sees--starved people...." and after that: "i'm starved too." he was so cold that his teeth were chattering, and he crept back from his window, crept into the farthest farthest corner of his little room, and crouched there on the floor, staring and staring, but seeing nothing at all. part iii markovitch and semyonov markovitch and semyonov. i on the evening of that very afternoon, thursday, i again collapsed. i was coming home in the dusk through a whispering world. all over the streets, everywhere on the broad shining snow, under a blaze of stars so sharp and piercing that the sky seemed strangely close and intimate, the talk went on. groups everywhere and groups irrespective of all class distinction--a well-to-do woman in rich furs, a peasant woman with a shawl over her head, a wild, bearded soldier, a stout, important officer, a maid-servant, a cab-driver, a shopman--talking, talking, talking, talking.... the eagerness, the ignorance, the odd fairy-tale world spun about those groups, so that the coloured domes of the churches, the silver network of the stars, the wooden booths, the mist of candles before the ikons, the rough painted pictures on the shops advertising the goods sold within--all these things shared in that crude idealistic, cynical ignorance, in that fairy-tale of brutality, goodness, cowardice, and bravery, malice and generosity, superstition and devotion that was so shortly to be offered to a materialistic, hard-fighting, brave and unthinking europe!... that, however, was not now my immediate business--enough of that presently. my immediate business, as i very quickly discovered, was to pluck up enough strength to drag my wretched body home. the events of the week had, i suppose, carried me along. i was to suffer now the inevitable reaction. i felt exactly as though i had been shot from a gun and landed, suddenly, without breath, without any strength in any of my limbs in a new and strange world. i was standing, when i first realised my weakness, beside the wooden booths in the sadovaya. they were all closed of course, but along the pavement women and old men had baskets containing sweets and notepaper and red paper tulips offered in memory of the glorious revolution. right across the square the groups of people scattered in little dusky pools against the snow, until they touched the very doors of the church.... i saw all this, was conscious that the stars and the church candles mingled... then suddenly i had to clutch the side of the booth behind me to prevent myself from falling. my head swam, my limbs were as water, and my old so well-remembered friend struck me in the middle of the spine as though he had cut me in two with his knife. how was i ever to get home? no one noticed me--indeed they seemed to my sick eyes to have ceased to be human. ghosts in a ghostly world, the snow gleaming through them so that they only moved like a thin diaphanous veil against the wall of the sky... i clutched my booth. in a moment i should be down. the pain in my back was agony, my legs had ceased to exist, and i was falling into a dark, dark pool of clear jet-black water, at the bottom of which lay a star.... the strange thing is that i do not know who it was who rescued me. i know that some one came. i know that to my own dim surprise an isvostchick was there and that very feebly i got into it. some one was with me. was it my black-bearded peasant? i fancy now that it was. i can even, on looking back, see him sitting up, very large and still, one thick arm holding me. i fancy that i can still smell the stuff of his clothes. i fancy that he talked to me, very quietly, reassuring me about something. but, upon my word, i don't know. one can so easily imagine what one wants to be true, and now i want, more than i would then ever have believed to be possible, to have had actual contact with him. it is the only conversation between us that can ever have existed: never, before or after, was there another opportunity. and in any case there can scarcely have been a conversation, because i certainly said nothing, and i cannot remember anything that he said, if indeed he said anything at all. at any rate i was there in the sadovaya, i was in a cab, i was in my bed. the truth of the rest of it any one may decide for himself.... ii that thursday was march . i was conscious of my existence again on sunday, april st. i opened my eyes and saw that there was a thaw. that was the first thing of which i was aware--that water was apparently dripping on every side of me. it is a strange sensation to lie on your bed very weak, and very indifferent, and to feel the world turning to moisture all about you.... my ramshackle habitation had never been a very strong defence against the outside world. it seemed now to have definitely decided to abandon the struggle. the water streamed down the panes of my window opposite my bed. one patch of my ceiling (just above my only bookcase, confound it!) was coloured a mouldy grey, and from this huge drops like elephant's tears, splashed monotonously. (already _the spirit of man_ was disfigured by a long grey streak, and the green back of galleon's _roads_ was splotched with stains.) some one had placed a bucket near the door to catch a perpetual stream flowing from the corner of the room. down into the bucket it pattered with a hasty, giggling, hysterical jiggle. i rather liked the companionship of it. i didn't mind it at all. i really minded nothing whatever.... i sighed my appreciation of my return to life. my sigh brought some one from the corner of my room and that some one was, of course, the inevitable eat. he came up to my bed in his stealthy, furtive fashion, and looked at me reproachfully. i asked him, my voice sounding to myself strange and very far away, what he was doing there. he answered that if it had not been for him i should be dead. he had come early one morning and found me lying in my bed and no one in the place at all. no one--because the old woman had vanished. yes, the neighbours had told him. apparently on that very thursday she had decided that the revolution had given her her freedom, and that she was never going to work for anybody ever again. she had told a woman-neighbour that she heard that the land now was going to be given back to everybody, and she was returning therefore to her village somewhere in the moscow province. she had not been back there for twenty years. and first, to celebrate her liberty, she would get magnificently drunk on furniture polish. "i did not see her of course," said the rat. "no. when i came, early in the morning, no one was here. i thought that you were dead, barin, and i began collecting your property, so that no one else should take it. then you made a movement, and i saw that you were alive--so i got some cabbage soup and gave it you. that certainly saved you.... i'm going to stay with you now." i did not care in the least whether he went or stayed. he chattered on. by staying with me he would inevitably neglect his public duties. perhaps i didn't know that he had public duties? yes, he was now an anarchist, and i should be astonished very shortly, by the things the anarchists would do. all the same, they had their own discipline. they had their own processions, too, like any one else. only four days ago he had marched all over petrograd carrying a black flag. he must confess that he was rather sick of it. but they must have processions.... even the prostitutes had marched down the nevski the other day demanding shorter hours. but of course i cannot remember all that he said. during the next few days i slowly pulled myself out of the misty dead world in which i had been lying. pain came back to me, leaping upon me and then receding, finally, on the third day suddenly leaving me altogether. the rat fed me on cabbage soup and glasses of tea and caviare and biscuits. during those three days he never left me, and indeed tended me like a woman. he would sit by my bed and with his rough hand stroke my hair, while he poured into my ears ghastly stories of the many crimes that he had committed. i noticed that he was cleaner and more civilised. his beard was clipped and he smelt of cabbage and straw--a rather healthy smell. one morning he suddenly took the pail, filled it with water and washed himself in front of my windows. he scrubbed himself until i should have thought that he had no skin left. "you're a fine big man, rat," i said. he was delighted with that, and came quite near my bed, stretching his naked body, his arms and legs and chest, like a pleased animal. "yes, i'm a fine man, barin," he said; "many women have loved me, and many will again..." then he went back, and producing clean drawers and vest from somewhere (i suspect that they were mine but i was too weak to care), put them on. on the second and third days i felt much better. the thaw was less violent, the wood crackled in my stove. on the morning of wednesday april i got up, dressed, and sat in front of my window. the ice was still there, but over it lay a faint, a very faint, filmy sheen of water. it was a day of gleams, the sun flashing in and out of the clouds. just beneath my window a tree was pushing into bud. pools of water lay thick on the dirty melting snow. i got the rat to bring a little table and put some books on it. i had near me _the spirit of man_, keats's _letters_, _the roads_, beddoes, and _pride and prejudice_. a consciousness of the outer world crept, like warmth, through my bones. "rat," i said, "who's been to see me?" "no one," said he. i felt suddenly a ridiculous affront. "no one?" i asked, incredulous. "no one," he answered. "they've all forgotten you, barin," he added maliciously, knowing that that would hurt me. it was strange how deeply i cared. here was i who, only a short while before, had declared myself done with the world for ever, and now i was almost crying because no one had been to see me! indeed, i believe in my weakness and distress i actually did cry. no one at all? not vera nor nina nor jeremy nor bohun? not young bohun even...? and then slowly my brain realised that there was now a new world. none of the old conditions held any longer. we had been the victims of an earthquake. now it was--every man for himself! quickly then there came upon me an eager desire to know what had happened in the markovitch family. what of jerry and vera? what of nicholas? what of semyonov...? "rat," i said, "this afternoon i am going out!" "very well, barin," he said, "i, too, have an engagement." in the afternoon i crept out like an old sick man. i felt strangely shy and nervous. when i reached the corner of ekateringofsky canal and the english prospect i decided not to go in and see the markovitches. for one thing i shrank from the thought of their compassion. i had not shaved for many days. i was that dull sickly yellow colour that offends the taste of all healthy vigorous people. i did not want their pity. no.... i would wait until i was stronger. my interest in life was reviving with every step that i took. i don't know what i had expected the outside world to be. this was april . it was nearly a month since the outburst of the revolution, and surely there should be signs in the streets of the results of such a cataclysm. there were, on the surface, no signs. there was the same little cinema on the canal with its gaudy coloured posters, there was the old woman sitting at the foot of the little bridge with her basket of apples and bootlaces, there was the same wooden hut with the sweets and the fruit, the same figures of peasant women, soldiers, boys hurrying across the bridge, the same slow, sleepy isvostchick stumbling along carelessly. one sign there was. exactly opposite the little cinema, on the other side of the canal, was a high grey block of flats. this now was starred and sprayed with the white marks of bullets. it was like a man marked for life with smallpox. that building alone was witness to me that i had not dreamt the events of that week. the thaw made walking very difficult. the water poured down the sides of the houses and gurgled in floods through the pipes. the snow was slippery under the film of gleaming wet, and there were huge pools at every step. across the middle of the english prospect, near the baths, there was quite a deep lake.... i wandered slowly along, enjoying the chill warmth of the soft spring sun. the winter was nearly over! thank god for that! what had happened during my month of illness? perhaps a great revolutionary army had been formed, and a mighty, free, and united russia was going out to save the world! oh, i did hope that it was so! surely that wonderful white week was a good omen. no revolution in history had started so well as this one.... i found my way at last very slowly to the end of the quay, and the sight of the round towers of my favourite church was like the reassuring smile of an old friend. the sun was dropping low over the neva. the whole vast expanse of the river was coloured very faintly pink. here, too, there was the film of the water above the ice; the water caught the colour, but the ice below it was grey and still. clouds of crimson and orange and faint gold streamed away in great waves of light from the sun. the long line of buildings and towers on the farther side was jet-black; the masts of the ships clustering against the quay were touched at their tips with bright gold. it was all utterly still, not a sound nor a movement anywhere; only one figure, that of a woman, was coming slowly towards me. i felt, as one always does at the beginning of a russian spring, a strange sense of expectation. spring in russia is so sudden and so swift that it gives an overwhelming impression of a powerful organising power behind it. suddenly the shutters are pulled back and the sun floods the world! upon this afternoon one could feel the urgent business of preparation pushing forward, arrogantly, ruthlessly. i don't think that i had ever before realised the power of the neva at such close quarters. i was almost ashamed at the contrast of its struggle with my own feebleness. i saw then that the figure coming towards me was nina. iii as she came nearer i saw that she was intensely preoccupied. she was looking straight in front of her but seeing nothing. it was only when she was quite close to me that i saw that she was crying. she was making no sound. her mouth was closed; the tears were slowly, helplessly, rolling down her cheeks. she was very near to me indeed before she saw me; then she looked at me closely before she recognised me. when she saw that it was i, she stopped, fumbled for her handkerchief, which she found, wiped her eyes, then turned away from me and looked out over the river. "nina, dear," i said, "what's the matter?" she didn't answer; at length she turned round and said: "you've been ill again, haven't you?" one cheek had a dirty tear-stain on it, which made her inexpressibly young and pathetic and helpless. "yes," i said, "i have." she caught her breath, put out her hand, and touched my arm. "oh, you _do_ look ill!... vera went to ask, and there was a rough-looking man there who said that no one could see you, but that you were all right.... one of us ought to have forced a way in--m. bohun wanted to--but we've all been thinking of ourselves." "what's the matter, nina?" i asked. "you've been crying." "nothing's the matter. i'm all right." "no, you're not. you ought to tell me. you trusted me once." "i don't trust any one," she answered fiercely. "especially not englishmen." "what's the matter?" i asked again. "nothing.... we're just as we were. except," she suddenly looked up at me, "uncle alexei's living with us now." "semyonov!" i cried out sharply, "living with you!" "yes," she went on, "in the room where nicholas had his inventions is uncle alexei's bedroom." "why, in heaven's name?" i cried. "uncle alexei wanted it. he said he was lonely, and then he just came. i don't know whether nicholas likes it or not. vera hates it, but she agreed at once." "and do you like it?" i asked. "i like uncle alexei," she answered. "we have long talks. he shows me how silly i've been." "oh!" i said... "and what about nicholas' inventions?" "he's given them up for ever." she looked at me doubtfully, as though she were wondering whether she could trust me. "he's so funny now--nicholas, i mean. you know he was so happy when the revolution came. now he's in a different mood every minute. something's happened to him that we don't know about." "what kind of thing?" i asked. "i don't know. he's seen something or heard something. it's some secret he's got. but uncle alexei knows." "how can you tell?" "because he's always saying things that make nicholas angry, and we can't see anything in them at all.... uncle alexei's very clever." "yes, he is," i agreed. "but you haven't told me why you were crying just now." she looked at me. she gave a little shiver. "oh, you do look ill!... everything's going wrong together, isn't it?" and with that she suddenly left me, hurrying away from me, leaving me miserable and apprehensive of some great trouble in store for all of us. iv it is impossible to explain how disturbed i was by nina's news. semyonov living in the flat! he must have some very strong reason for this, to leave his big comfortable flat for the pokiness of the markovitches'! and then that the markovitches should have him! there were already inhabitants enough--nicholas, vera, nina, uncle ivan, bohun. then the inconvenience and discomfort of nicholas's little hole as a bedroom! how semyonov must loathe it! from that moment the markovitches' flat became for me the centre of my drama. looking back i could see now how all the growing development of the story had centred round those rooms. i did not of course know at this time of that final drama of the thursday afternoon, but i knew of the adventure with the policeman, and it seemed to me that the flat was a cup into which the ingredients were being poured one after another until at last the preparation would be complete, and then.... oh, but i cared for nina and vera and nicholas--yes, and jerry too! i wanted to see them happy and at peace before i left them--in especial nicholas. and semyonov came closer to them and closer, following some plan of his own and yet, after all, finally like a man driven by a power, constructed it might be, out of his own very irony. i made a kind of bet with fate that by easter day every one should be happy by then. next day, the th of april, was the great funeral for the victims of the revolution. i believe, although of course at that time i had heard nothing, that there had been great speculation about the day, many people thinking that it would be an excuse for further trouble, the monarchists rising, or the "soviet" attacking the provisional government, or milyukoff and his followers attacking the soviet. they need not have been alarmed. no one had as yet realised the lengths that slavonic apathy may permit itself.... i went down about half-past ten to the square at the end of the sadovaya and found it filled with a vast concourse of peasants, not only the square was filled, but the sadovaya as far as the eye could see. they were arranged in perfect order, about eight in a row, arm in arm. every group carried its banner, and far away into the distance one could see the words "freedom," "brotherhood," "the land for all," "peace of the world," floating on the breeze. nevertheless, in spite of these fine words, it was not a very cheering sight. the day was wretched--no actual rain, but a cold damp wind blowing and the dirty snow, half ice and half water; the people themselves were not inspiring. they were all, it seemed, peasants. i saw very few workmen, although i believe that multitudes were actually in the procession. those strange, pale, eastern faces, passive, apathetic, ignorant, childish, unreasoning, stretched in a great cloud under the grey overhanging canopy of the sky. they raised if once and again a melancholy little tune that was more wail than anything else. they had stood there, i was told, in pools of frozen water for hours, and were perfectly ready to stand thus for many hours more if they were ordered to do so. as i regarded their ignorance and apathy i realised for the first time something of what the revolution had already done. a hundred million of these children--ignorant, greedy, pathetic, helpless, revengeful--let loose upon the world! where were their leaders? who, indeed, would their leaders be? the sun sometimes broke through for a moment, but the light that it threw on their faces only made them more pallid, more death-like. they did not laugh nor joke as our people at home would have done.... i believe that very few of them had any idea why they were there.... suddenly the word came down the lines to move forward. very slowly, wailing their little tune, they advanced. but the morning was growing old and i must at once see vera. i had made up my mind, during the night, to do anything that lay in my power to persuade vera and nina to leave their flat. the flat was the root of all their trouble, there was something in its atmosphere, something gloomy and ominous. they would be better at the other end of the town, or, perhaps, over on the vassily ostrov. i would show vera that it was a fatal plan to have semyonov to live with them (as in all probability she herself knew well enough), and their leaving the flat was a very good excuse for getting rid of him. i had all this in my head as i went along. i was still feeling ill and feeble, and my half-hour's stand in the market-place had seriously exhausted me. i had to lean against the walls of the houses every now and then; it seemed to me that, in the pale watery air, the whole world was a dream, the high forbiding flats looking down on to the dirty ice of the canals, the water dripping, dripping, dripping.... no one was about. every one had gone to join in the procession. i could see it, with my mind's eye, unwinding its huge tails through the watery-oozing channels of the town, like some pale-coloured snake, crawling through the misty labyrinths of a marsh. in the flat i found only uncle ivan sitting very happily by himself at the table playing patience. he was dressed very smartly in his english black suit and a black bow tie. he behaved with his usual elaborate courtesy to me but, to my relief, on this occasion, he spoke russian. it appeared that the revolution had not upset him in the least. he took, he assured me, no interest whatever in politics. the great thing was "to live inside oneself," and by living inside oneself he meant, i gathered, that one should be entirely selfish. clothes were important, and food and courteous manners, but he must say that he could not see that one would be very much worse off even though one were ruled by the germans--one might, indeed, be a great deal more comfortable. and as to this revolution he couldn't really understand why people made such a fuss. one class or another class what did it matter? (as to this he was, i fear, to be sadly undeceived. he little knew that, before the year was out, he would be shovelling snow in the morskaia for a rouble an hour.) so centred was he upon himself that he did not notice that i looked ill. he offered me a chair, indeed, but that was simply his courteous manners. very ridiculous, he thought, the fuss that nicholas made about the revolution--very ridiculous the fuss that he made about everything.... alexei had been showing nicholas how ridiculous he was. "oh, has he?" said i. "how's he been doing that?" laughing at him, apparently. they all laughed at him. it was his own fault. "alexei's living with us now, you know." "yes, i know," i said, "what's he doing that for?" "he wanted to," said uncle ivan simply. "he's always done what he's wanted to, all his life." "it makes it a great many of you in one small flat." "yes, doesn't it?" said uncle ivan amiably. "very pleasant--although, ivan andreievitch, i will admit to you quite frankly that i've always been frightened of alexei. he has such a very sharp tongue. he discovers one's weak spots in a marvellous manner.... we all have weak spots you know," he added apologetically. "yes, we have," i said. then, to my relief, vera came in. she was very sweet to me, expressing much concern about my illness, asking me to stay and have my meal with them.... she suddenly broke off. there was a letter lying on the table addressed to her. i saw at once that it was in nina's handwriting. "nina! writing to _me_!" she picked it up, stood back looking at the envelope before she opened it. she read it, then turned on me with a cry. "nina!... she's gone!" "gone!" i repeated, starting at once. "yes.... read!" she thrust it into my hand. in nina's sprawling schoolgirl hand i read: dear vera--i've left you and nicholas for ever.... i have been thinking of this for a long time, and now uncle alexei has shown me how foolish i've been, wanting something i can't have. but i'm not a child any longer. i must lead my own life.... i'm going to live with boris who will take care of me. it's no use you or any one trying to prevent me. i will not come back. i must lead my own life now. nina. vera was beside herself. "quick! quick! some one must go after her. she must be brought back at once. quick! _scora! scora_!... i must go. no, she is angry with me. she won't listen to me. ivan andreievitch, you must go. at once! you must bring her back with you. darling, darling nina!... oh, my god, what shall i do if anything happens to her!" she clutched my arm. even as she spoke, she had got my hat and stick. "this is alexei petrovitch," i said. "never mind who it is," she answered. "she must be brought back at once. she is so young. she doesn't know.... boris--oh! it's impossible. don't leave without bringing her back with you." even old uncle ivan seemed distressed. "dear, dear..." he kept repeating, "dear, dear.... poor little nina. poor little nina--" "where does grogoff live?" i asked. " gagarinskaya.... flat . quick. you must bring her back with you. promise me." "i will do my best," i said. i found by a miracle of good fortune an isvostchick in the street outside. we plunged along through the pools of water in the direction of the gagarinskaya. that was a horrible drive. in the sadovaya we met the slow, winding funeral procession. on they went, arm in arm, the same little wailing tune, monotonously repeating, but sounding like nothing human, rather exuding from the very cobbles of the road and the waters of the stagnant canals. the march of the peasants upon petrograd! i could see them from all the quarters of the town, converging upon the marsovoie pole, stubborn, silent, wraiths of earlier civilisation, omens of later dominations. i thought of boris grogoff. what did he, with all his vehemence and conceit, intend to do with these? first he would flatter them--i saw that clearly enough. but then when his flatteries failed, what then? could he control them? would they obey him? would they obey anybody until education had shown them the necessities for co-ordination and self-discipline? the river at last was overflowing its banks--would not the savage force of its power be greater than any one could calculate? the stream flowed on.... my isvostchick took his cab down a side street, and then again met the strange sorrowful company. from this point i could see several further bridges and streets, and over them all i saw the same stream flowing, the same banners blowing--and all so still, so dumb, so patient. the delay was maddening. my thoughts were all now on nina. i saw her always before me as i had beheld her yesterday, walking slowly along, her eyes fixed on space, the tears trickling down her face. "life," nikitin once said to me, "i sometimes think is like a dark room, the door closed, the windows bolted and your enemy shut in with you. whether your enemy or yourself is the stronger who knows?... nor does it matter, as the issue is always decided outside.... knowing that you can at least afford to despise him." i felt something of that impotence now. i cursed the isvostchick, but wherever he went this slow endless stream seemed to impede our way. poor nina! such a baby! what was it that had driven her to this? she did not love the man, and she knew quite well that she did not. no, it was an act of defiance. but defiance to whom--to vera? to lawrence?... and what had semyonov said to her? then, thank heaven, we crossed the nevski, and our way was clear. the old cabman whipped up his horse and, in a minute or two we were outside gagarinskaya. i will confess to very real fears and hesitations as i climbed the dark stairs (the lift was, of course, not working). i was not the kind of man for this kind of job. in the first place i hated quarrels, and knowing grogoff's hot temper i had every reason to expect a tempestuous interview. then i was ill, aching in every limb and seeing everything, as i always did when i was unwell, mistily and with uncertainty. then i had a very shrewd suspicion that there was considerable truth in what semyonov had said, that i was interfering in what only remotely concerned me. at any rate, that was certainly the view that grogoff would take, and nina, perhaps also. i felt, as i rang the bell of no. , that unpleasant pain in the pit of the stomach that tells you that you're going to make a fool of yourself. well, it would not be for the first time. "boris nicolaievitch, _doma_?" i asked the cross-looking old woman who opened the door. "_doma_," she answered, holding it open to let me pass. i was shown into a dark, untidy sitting-room. it seemed at first sight to be littered with papers, newspapers, revolutionary sheets and proclamations, the _pravda_, the _novaya jezn_, the _soldatskaya mwyssl_.... on the dirty wall-paper there were enormous dark photographs, in faded gilt frames, of family groups; on one wall there was a large garishly coloured picture of grogoff himself in student's dress. the stove was unlighted and the room was very cold. my heart ached for nina. a moment after grogoff came in. he came forward to me very amiably, holding out his hand. "nu, ivan andreievitch.... what can i do for you?" he asked, smiling. and how he had changed! he was positively swollen with self-satisfaction. he had never been famous for personal modesty, but he seemed now to be physically twice his normal size. he was fat, his cheeks puffed, his stomach swelling beneath the belt that bound it. his fair hair was long, and rolled in large curls on one side of his head and over his forehead. he spoke in a loud, overbearing voice. "nu, ivan andreievitch, what can i do for you?" he repeated. "can i see nina?" i asked. "nina?..." he repeated as though surprised. "certainly--but what do you want to say to her?" "i don't see that that's your business," i answered. "i have a message for her from her family." "but of course it's my business," he answered. "i'm looking after her now." "since when?" i asked. "what does that matter?... she is going to live with me." "we'll see about that," i said. i knew that it was foolish to take this kind of tone. it could do no good, and i was not the sort of man to carry it through. but he was not at all annoyed. "see, ivan andreievitch," he said, smiling. "what is there to discuss? nina and i have long considered living together. she is a grown-up woman. it's no one's affair but her own." "are you going to marry her?" i asked. "certainly not," he answered; "that would not suit either of us. it's no good your bringing your english ideas here, ivan andreievitch. we belong to the new world, nina and i." "well, i want to speak to her," i answered. "so you shall, certainly. but if you hope to influence her at all you are wasting your time, i assure you. nina has acted very rightly. she found the home life impossible. i'm sure i don't wonder. she will assist me in my work. the most important work, perhaps, that man has ever been called on to perform...." he raised his voice here as though he were going to begin a speech. but at that moment nina came in. she stood in the doorway looking across at me with a childish mixture of hesitation and boldness, of anger and goodwill in her face. her cheeks were pale, her eyes heavy. her hair was done in two long plaits. she looked about fourteen. she came up to me, but she didn't offer me her hand. boris said: "nina dear, ivan andreievitch has come to give you a message from your family." there was a note of scorn in his voice as he repeated my earlier sentence. "what is it?" she asked, looking at me defiantly. "i'd like to give it you alone," i said. "whatever you say to me it is right that boris should hear," she answered. i tried to forget that grogoff was there. i went on: "well then, nina, you must know what i want to say. they are heartbroken at your leaving them. you know of course that they are. they beg you to come back.... vera and nicholas too. they simply won't know what to do without you. vera says that you have been angry with her. she doesn't know why, but she says that she will do her very best if you come back, so that you won't be angry any more.... nina, dear, you know that it is they whom you really love. you never can be happy here. you know that you cannot.... come back to them! come back! i don't know what it was that alexei petrovitch said to you, but whatever it was you should not listen to it. he is a bad man and only means harm to your family. he does indeed...." i paused. she had never moved whilst i was speaking. now she only said, shaking her head, "it's no good, ivan andreievitch.... it's no good." "but why? why?" i asked. "give me your reasons, nina." she answered proudly, "i don't see why i should give you any reasons, ivan andreievitch. i am free. i can do as i wish." "there's something behind this that i don't know," i said. "i ought to know.... it isn't fair not to tell me. what did alexei petrovitch say to you?" but she only shook her head. "he had nothing to do with this. it is my affair, ivan andreievitch. i couldn't live with vera and nicholas any longer." grogoff then interfered. "i think this is about enough...." he said. "i have given you your opportunity. nina has been quite clear in what she has said. she does not wish to return. there is your answer." he cleared his voice and went on in rather a higher tone: "i think you forget, ivan andreievitch, another aspect of this affair. it is not only a question of our private family disputes. nina has come here to assist me in my national work. as a member of the soviet i may, without exaggeration, claim to have an opportunity in my hands that has been offered in the past to few human beings. you are an englishman, and so hidebound with prejudices and conventions. you may not be aware that there has opened this week the greatest war the world has ever seen--the war of the proletariats against the bourgeoisies and capitalists of the world." i tried to interrupt him, but he went on, his voice ever rising and rising: "what is your wretched german war? what but a struggle between the capitalists of the different countries to secure greater robberies and extortions, to set their feet more firmly than ever on the broad necks of the wretched people! yes, you english, with your natural hypocrisy, pretend that you are fighting for the freedom of the world. what about ireland? what about india? what about south africa?... no, you are all alike. germany, england, italy, france, and our own wretched government that has, at last, been destroyed by the brave will of the people. we declare a people's war!... we cry aloud to the people to throw down their arms! and the people will hear us!" he paused for breath. his arms were raised, his eyes on fire, his cheeks crimson. "yes," i said, "that is all very well. but suppose the german people are the only ones who refuse to listen to you. suppose that all the other nations, save germany, have thrown down their arms--a nice chance then for german militarism!" "but the german people will listen!" he screamed, almost frothing at the mouth. "they are ready at any moment to follow our example. william and your george and the rest of them--they are doomed, i tell you!" "nevertheless," i went on, "if you desert us now by making peace and germany wins this war you will have played only a traitor's part, and all the world will judge you." "traitor! traitor!" the word seemed to madden him. "traitor to whom, pray? traitor to our czar and your english king? yes, and thank god for it! did the russian people make the war? they were led like lambs to the slaughter. like lambs, i tell you. but now they will have their revenge. on all the bourgeoisie of the world. the bourgeoisie of the world!..." he suddenly broke off, flinging himself down on the dirty sofa. "pheugh. talking makes one hot!... have a drink, ivan andreievitch.... nina, fetch a drink." through all this my eyes had never left her for a moment. i had hoped that this empty tub-thumping to which we had been listening would have affected her. but she had not moved nor stirred. "nina!" i said softly. "nina. come with me!" but she only shook her head. grogoff, quite silent now, lolled on the sofa, watching us. i went up to her and put my hand on her sleeve. "dear nina," i said, "come back to us." i saw her lip tremble. there was unshed tears in her eyes. but again she shook her head. "what have they done," i asked, "to make you take this step?" "something has happened...." she said slowly. "i can't tell you." "just come and talk to vera." "no, it's hopeless... i can't see her again. but, durdles... tell her it's not her fault." at the sound of my pet name i took courage again. "but tell me, nina.... do you love this man?" she turned round and looked at grogoff as though she were seeing him for the first time. "love?... oh no, not love! but he will be kind to me, i think. and i must be myself, be a woman, not a child any longer." then, suddenly clearing her voice, speaking very firmly, looking me full in the face, she said: "tell vera... that i saw... what happened that thursday afternoon--the thursday of the revolution week. tell her that--when you're alone with her. tell her that--then she'll understand." she turned and almost ran out of the room. "well, you see," said grogoff smiling lazily from the sofa. "that settles it." "it doesn't settle it," i answered. "we shall never rest until we have got her back." but, i had to go. there was nothing more just then to be done. v on my return i found vera alone waiting for me with restless impatience. "well?" she said eagerly. then when she saw that i was alone her face clouded. "i trusted you--" she began. "it's no good," i said at once. "not for the moment. she's made up her mind. it's not because she loved him nor, i think, for anything very much that her uncle said. she's got some idea in her head. perhaps you can explain it." "i?" said vera, looking at me. "yes. she gave me a message for you." "what was it?" but even as she asked the question she seemed to fear the answer, because she turned away from me. "she told me to tell you that she saw what happened on the afternoon of the thursday in revolution week. she said that then you would understand." vera looked at me with the strangest expression of defiance, fear, triumph. "what did she see?" "i don't know. that's what she told me." vera did a strange thing. she laughed. "they can all know. i don't care. i want them to know. nina can tell them all." "tell them what?" "oh, you'll hear with the rest. uncle alexei has done this. he told nina because he hates me. he won't rest until he ruins us all. but i don't care. he can't take from me what i've got. he can't take from me what i've got.... but we must get her back, ivan andreievitch. she _must_ come back--" nicholas came in and then semyonov and then bohun. bohun, drawing me aside, whispered to me: "can i come and see you? i must ask your advice--" "to-morrow evening," i told him, and left. next day i was ill again. i had i suppose done too much the day before. i was in bed alone all day. my old woman had suddenly returned without a word of explanation or excuse. she had not, i am sure, even got so far as the moscow province. i doubt whether she had even left petrograd. i asked her no questions. i could tell of course that she had been drinking. she was a funny old creature, wrinkled and yellow and hideous, very little different in any way from a native in the wilds of central africa. the savage in her liked gay colours and trinkets, and she would stick flowers in her hair and wear a tinkling necklace of bright red and blue beads. she had a mangy dog, hairless in places and rheumy at the eyes, who was all her passion, and this creature she would adore, taking it to sleep with her, talking to it by the hour together, pulling its tail and twisting its neck so that it growled with rage--and then, when it growled, she, too, would make strange noises as though sympathising with it. she returned to me from no sort of sense of duty, but simply because, i think, she did not know where else to go. she scowled on me and informed me that now that there had been the revolution everything was different; nevertheless the sight of my sick yellow face moved her as sickness and misfortune always move every russian, however old and debased he may be. "you shouldn't have gone out walking," she said crossly. "that man's been here again?" referring to the rat, whom she hated. "if it hadn't been for him," i said, "i would have died." but she made the flat as cheerful as she could, lighting the stove, putting some yellow flowers into a glass, dusting the benois water-colour, putting my favourite books beside my bed. when henry bohun came in he was surprised at the brightness of everything. "why, how cosy you are!" he cried. "ah, ha," i said, "i told you it wasn't so bad here." he picked up my books, looked at galleon's _roads_ and then _pride and prejudice_. "it's the simplest things that last," he said. "galleon's jolly good, but he's not simple enough. _tess_ is the thing, you know, and _tono-bungay,_ and _the nigger of the narcissus_... i usen't to think so. i've grown older, haven't i?" he had. "what do you think of _discipline_ now?" i asked. "oh, lord!" he blushed, "i was a young cuckoo." "and what about knowing all about russia after a week?" "no--and that reminds me!" he drew his chair closer to my bed. "that's what i've come to talk about. do you mind if i gas a lot?" "gas as much as you like," i said. "well, i can't explain things unless i do.... you're sure you're not too seedy to listen?" "not a bit. it does me good," i told him. "you see in a way you're really responsible. you remember, long ago, telling me to look after markovitch when i talked all that rot about caring for vera?" "yes--i remember very well indeed." "in a way it all started from that. you put me on to seeing markovitch in quite a different light. i'd always thought of him as an awfully dull dog with very little to say for himself, and a bit loose in the top-story too. i thought it a terrible shame a ripping woman like vera having married him, and i used to feel sick with him about it. then sometimes he'd look like the devil himself, as wicked as sin, poring over his inventions, and you'd fancy that to stick a knife in his back might be perhaps the best thing for everybody. "well, you explained him to me and i saw him different--not that i've ever got very much out of him. i don't think that he either likes me or trusts me, and anyway he thinks me too young and foolish to be of any importance--which i daresay i am. he told me, by the way, the other day, that the only englishman he thought anything of was yourself--" "very nice of him," i murmured. "yes, but not very flattering to me when i've spent months trying to be fascinating to him. anyhow, although i may be said to have failed in one way, i've got rather keen on the pursuit. if i can't make him like me i can at least study him and learn something. that's a leaf out of your book, durward. you're always studying people, aren't you?" "oh, i don't know," i said. "yes, of course you are. well, i'll tell you frankly i've got fond of the old bird. i don't believe you could live at close quarters with any russian, however nasty, and not get a kind of affection for him. they're so damned childish." "oh yes, you could," i said. "try semyonov." "i'm coming to him in a minute," said bohun. "well, markovitch was most awfully unhappy. that's one thing one saw about him at once--unhappy of course because vera didn't love him and he adored her. but there was more in it than that. he let himself go one night to me--the only time he's ever talked to me really. he was drunk a bit, and he wanted to borrow money off me. but there was more in it than that. he talked to me about russia. that seemed to have been his great idea when the war began that it was going to lead to the most marvellous patriotism all through russia. it seemed to begin like that, and do you know, durward, as he talked i saw that patriotism _was_ at the bottom of everything, that you could talk about internationalism until you were blue in the face, and that it only began to mean anything when you'd learnt first what nationality was--that you couldn't really love all mankind until you'd first learnt to love one or two people close to you. and that you couldn't love the world as a vast democratic state until you'd learnt to love your own little bit of ground, your own fields, your own river, your own church tower. markovitch had it all as plain as plain. 'make your own house secure and beautiful. then it is ready to take its place in the general scheme. we russians always begin at the wrong end,' he said. 'we jump all the intermediate stages. i'm as bad as the rest.' i know you'll say i'm so easily impressed, durward, but he was wonderful that night--and so _right_. so that as he talked i just longed to rush back and see that my village--topright in wiltshire--was safe and sound with the highgate at the end of the village street, and the village stores with the lollipop windows, and the green with the sheep on it, and the ruddy stream with the small trout and the high down beyond.... oh well, you know what i mean--" "i know," said i. "i saw that the point of markovitch was that he must have some ideal to live up to. if he couldn't have vera he'd have russia, and if he couldn't have russia he'd have his inventions. when we first came along a month or two ago he'd lost russia, he was losing vera, and he wasn't very sure about his inventions. a bad time for the old boy, and you were quite right to tell me to look after him. then came the revolution, and he thought that everything was saved. vera and russia and everything. wasn't he wonderful that week? like a child who has suddenly found paradise.... could any englishman ever be cheated like that by anything? why a fellow would be locked up for a loony if he looked as happy as markovitch looked that week. it wouldn't be decent.... well, then...." he paused dramatically. "what's happened to him since, durward?" "how do you mean? what's happened to him since?" i asked. "i mean just what i say. something happened to him at the end of that week. i can put my finger almost exactly on the day--the thursday of that week. what was it? that's one of the things i've come to ask you about?" "i don't know. i was ill," i said. "no, but has nobody told you anything?" "i haven't heard a word," i said. his face fell. "i felt sure you'd help me?" he said. "tell me the rest and perhaps i can put things together," i suggested. "the rest is really semyonov. the queerest things have been happening. of course, the thing is to get rid of all one's english ideas, isn't it? and that's so damned difficult. it's no use saying an english fellow wouldn't do this or that. of course he wouldn't.... oh, they _are_ queer!" he sighed, poor boy, with the difficulty of the whole affair. "giving them up in despair, bohun, is as bad as thinking you understand them completely. just take what comes." "well, 'what came' was this. on that thursday evening markovitch was as though he'd been struck in the face. you never saw such a change. of course we all noticed it. white and sickly, saying nothing to anybody. next morning, quite early, semyonov came over and proposed lodging with us. "it absolutely took my breath away, but no one else seemed very astonished. what on earth did he want to leave his comfortable flat and come to us for? we were packed tight enough as it was. i never liked the feller, but upon my word i simply hated him as he sat there, so quiet, stroking his beard and smiling at us in his sarcastic way. "to my amazement markovitch seemed quite keen about it. not only agreed, but offered his own room as a bedroom. 'what about your inventions?' some one asked him. "'i've given them up,' he said, looking at us all just like a caged animal--'for ever.' "i would have offered to retire myself if i hadn't been so interested, but this was all so curious that i was determined to see it out to the end. and you'd told me to look after markovitch. if ever he'd wanted looking after it was now! i could see that vera hated the idea of semyonov coming, but after markovitch had spoken she never said a word. so then it was all settled." "what did nina do?" i asked. "nina? she never said anything either. at the end she went up to semyonov and took his hand and said, 'i'm so glad you're coming, uncle alexei,' and looked at vera. oh! they're all as queer as they can be, i tell you!" "what happened next?" i asked eagerly. "everything's happened and nothing's happened," he replied. "nina's run away. of course you know that. what she did it for i can't imagine. fancy going to a fellow like grogoff! lawrence has been coming every day and just sitting there, not saying anything. semyonov's amiable to everybody--especially amiable to markovitch. but he's laughing at him all the time i think. anyway he makes him mad sometimes, so that i think markovitch is going to strike him. but of course he never does.... now here's a funny thing. this is really what i want to ask you most about." he drew his chair closer to my bed and dropped his voice as though he were going to whisper a secret to me. "the other night i was awake--about two in the morning it was--and wanted a book--so i went into the dining-room. i'd only got bedroom slippers on and i was stopped at the door by a sound. it was semyonov sitting over by the further window, in his shirt and trousers, his beard in his hands, and sobbing as though his heart would break. i'd never heard a man cry like that. i hate hearing a man cry anyway. i've heard fellers at the front when they're off their heads or something... but semyonov was worse than that. it was a strong man crying, with all his wits about him.... then i heard some words. he kept repeating again and again. 'oh, my dear, my dear, my dear!... wait for me!... wait for me! wait for me!...' over and over again--awful! i crept back to my room frightened out of my life. i've never known anything so awful. and semyonov of all people! "it was like that man in _wuthering heights_. what's his name? heathcliffe! i always thought that was a bit of an exaggeration when he dashed his head against a tree and all that. but, by jove, you never know!... now, durward, you've got to tell me. you've known semyonov for years. you can explain. what's it all about, and what's he trying to do to markovitch?" "i can scarcely think what to tell you," i said at last. "i don't really know much about semyonov, and my guesses will probably strike you as insane." "no, they won't," said bohun. "i've learnt a bit lately." "semyonov," i said, "is a deep-dyed sensualist. all his life he's thought about nothing but gratifying his appetites. that's simple enough--there are plenty of that type everywhere. but unfortunately for him he's a very clever man, and like every russian both a cynic and an idealist--a cynic in facts _because_ he's an idealist. he got everything so easily all through his life that his cynicism grew and grew. he had wealth and women and position. he was as strong as a horse. every 'one gave way to him and he despised everybody. he went to the front, and one day came across a woman different from any other whom he had ever known." "how different?" asked bohun, because i paused. "different in that she was simpler and naïver and honester and better and more beautiful--" "better than vera?" bohun asked. "different," i said. "she was younger, less strong-willed, less clever, less passionate perhaps. but alone--alone, in all the world. every one must love her--no one could help it...." i broke off again. bohun waited. i went on. "semyonov saw her and snatched her from the englishman to whom she was engaged. i don't think she ever really loved the englishman, but she loved semyonov." "well?" said bohun. "she was killed. a stray shot, when she was giving tea to the men in the trenches.... it meant a lot... to all of us. the englishman was killed too, so he was all right. i think semyonov would have liked that same end; but he didn't get it, so he's remained desolate. really desolate, in a way that only your thorough sensualist can be. a beautiful fruit just within his grasp, something at last that can tempt his jaded appetite. he's just going to taste it, when whisk! it's gone, and gone, perhaps, into some one else's hands. how does he know? how does he know anything? there may be another life--who can really prove there isn't? and when you've seen something in the very thick and glow of existence, something more alive than life itself, and, click! it's gone--well, it _must_ have gone somewhere, mustn't it? not the body only, but that soul, that spirit, that individual personal expression of beauty and purity and loveliness? oh, it must be somewhere yet!... it _must_ be!... at any rate _he_ didn't know. and he didn't know either that she might not have proved his idealism right after all. ah! to your cynic there's nothing more maddening! do you think your cynic loves his cynicism? not a bit of it! not he! but he won't be taken in by sham any more. that he swears.... "so it was with semyonov. this girl might have proved the one real exception; she might have lasted, she might have grown even more beautiful and more wonderful, and so proved his idealism true after all. he doesn't know, and i don't know. but there it is. he's haunted by the possibility of it all his days. he's a man now ruled by an obsession. he thinks of one thing and one thing only, day and night. his sensuality has fallen away from him because women are dull--sterile to him beside that perfect picture of the woman lost. lost! he may recover her! he doesn't know. the thought of death obsesses him. what is there in it? is she behind there or no? is she behind there, maddening thought, with her englishman? "he must know. he _must_ know. he calls to her--she won't come to him. what is he to do? suicide? no, to a proud man like semyonov that's a miserable confession of weakness. how they'd laugh at him, these other despicable human beings, if he did that! he'd prove himself as weak as they. no, that's not for him. what then? "this is a fantastic world, bohun, and nothing is impossible for it. suppose he were to select some one, some weak and irritable and sentimental and disappointed man, some one whose every foible and weakness he knew, suppose he were to place himself near him and so irritate and confuse and madden him that at last one day, in a fury of rage and despair, that man were to do for him what he is too proud to do for himself! think of the excitement, the interest, the food for his cynicism, the food for his conceit such a game would be to semyonov. is this going to do it? or this? or this? now i've got him far enough? another five minutes!... think of the hairbreadth escapes, the check and counter check, the sense, above all, that to a man like semyonov is almost everything, that he is master of human emotions, that he can direct wretched, weak human beings whither he will. "and the other--the weak, disappointed, excitable man--can't you see that semyonov has him close to his hand, that he has only to stretch a finger--" "markovitch!" cried bohun. "now you know," i said, "why you've got to stay on in that flat." vi i have said already, i think, that the instinctive motive of vera's life was her independent pride. cling to that, and however the world might rock and toss around her she could not be wrecked. imagine, then, what she must have suffered during the weeks that followed her surrender to lawrence. not that for a moment she intended to go back on her surrender, which was, indeed, the proudest moment of her whole life. she never looked back for one second after that embrace, she never doubted herself or him or the supreme importance of love itself; but the rest of her--her tenderness, her fidelity, her loyalty, her self-respect--this was all tortured now by the things that she seemed compelled to do. it must have appeared to her as though fate, having watched that complete abandonment, intended to deprive her of everything upon which she had depended. she was, i think, a woman of very simple instincts. the things that had been in her life--her love for nina, her maternal tenderness for nicholas, her sense of duty--remained with her as strongly after that tremendous thursday afternoon as they had been before it. she did not see why they need be changed. she did not love nina any the less because she loved lawrence; indeed, she had never loved nina so intensely as on the night when she had realised her love for lawrence to the full, that night when they had sheltered the policeman. and she had never pretended to love nicholas. she had always told him that she did not love him. she had been absolutely honest with him always, and he had often said to her, "if ever real love comes into your life, vera, you will leave me," and she had always answered him, "no, nicholas, why should i? i will never change. why should i?" she honestly thought that her love for lawrence need not alter things. she would tell nicholas, of course, and then she would act as he wished. if she were not to see lawrence she would not see him--that would make no difference to her love for him. what she did not realise--and that was strange after living with him for so long--was that he was always hoping that her tender kindliness towards him would, one day, change into something more passionate. i think that, subconsciously, she did realise it, and that was why she was, during those weeks before the revolution, so often uneasy and unhappy. but i am sure that definitely she never admitted it. the great fact was that, as soon as possible, she must tell nicholas all about it. and the days went by, and she did not. she did not, partly because she had now some one else as well as herself to consider. i believe that in those weeks between that thursday and easter day she never had one moment alone with lawrence. he came, as bohun had told me, to see them; he sat there and looked at her, and listened and waited. she herself, i expect, prevented their being alone. she was waiting for something to happen. then nina's flight overwhelmed everything. that must have been the most awful thing. she never liked grogoff, never trusted him, and had a very clear idea of his character. but more awful to her than his weakness was her knowledge that nina did not love him. what could have driven her to do such a thing? she knew of her affection for lawrence, but she had, perhaps, never taken that seriously. how could nina really love lawrence when he, so obviously, cared nothing at all for her? she reasoned then, as every one always does, on the lines of her own character. she herself could never have cared seriously for any one had there been no return. her pride would not have allowed her.... but nina had been the charge of her life. before nicholas, before her own life, before everything. nina was her duty, her sacred cause--and now she was betraying her trust! something must be done--but what? but what? she knew nina well enough to realise that a false step would only plunge her farther than ever into the business. it must have seemed to her indeed that because of her own initial disloyalty the whole world was falling away from her. then there came semyonov; i did not at this time at all sufficiently realise that her hatred of her uncle--for it _was_ hatred, more, much more than mere dislike--had been with her all her life. many months afterwards she told me that she could never remember a time when she had not hated him. he had teased her when she was a very little girl, laughing at her naïve honesty, throwing doubts on her independence, cynically ridiculing her loyalty. there had been one horrible winter month (then ten or eleven years of age) when she had been sent to stay with him in moscow. he had a fine house near the arbat, and he was living (although she did not of course know anything about that at the time) with one of his gaudiest mistresses. her mother and father being dead she had no protection. she was defenceless. i don't think that he in any way perverted her innocence. i except that he was especially careful to shield her from his own manner of life (he had always his own queer tradition of honour which he effected indeed to despise), but she felt more than she perceived. the house was garish, over-scented and over-lighted. there were many gilt chairs and large pictures of naked women and numbers of coloured cushions. she was desperately lonely. she hated the woman of the house, who tried, i have no doubt, to be kind to her, and after the first week she was left to herself. one night, long after she had gone to bed there was a row downstairs, one of the scenes common enough between semyonov and his women. terrified, she went to the head of the stairs and heard the smash of falling glass and her uncle's voice raised in a scream of rage and vituperation. a great naked woman in a gold frame swung and leered at her in the lighted passage. she fled back to her dark room and lay, for the rest of that night, trembling and quivering with her head beneath the bed-clothes. from that moment she feared her uncle as much as she hated him. long afterwards came his influence over nicholas. no one had so much influence over nicholas as he. nicholas himself admitted it. he was alternately charmed and frightened, beguiled and disgusted, attracted and repulsed. before the war semyonov had, for a time, seen a good deal of them, and nicholas steadily degenerated. then semyonov was bored with it all and went off after other game more worthy of his doughty spear. then came the war, and vera devoutedly hoped that her dear uncle would meet his death at the hands of some patriotic austrian. he did indeed for a time disappear from their lives, and it seemed that he might never come back again. then on that fateful christmas day he did return, and vera's worst fears were realised. she hated him all the more because of her impotence. she could do nothing against him at all. she was never very subtle in her dealings with people, and her own natural honesty made her often stupid about men's motives. but the thing for which she feared her uncle most was his, as it seemed to her, supernatural penetration into the thoughts of others. she of course greatly exaggerated his gifts in that direction simply because they were in no way her gifts, and he, equally of course, discovered very early in their acquaintance that this was the way to impress her. he played tricks with her exactly as a conjurer produces a rabbit out of a hat.... when he announced his intention of coming to live in the flat she was literally paralyzed with fright. had it been any one else she would have fought, but in her uncle's drawing gradually nearer and nearer to the centre of all their lives, coming as it seemed to her so silently and mysteriously, without obvious motive, and yet with so stealthy a plan, against this man she could do nothing.... nevertheless she determined to fight for nicholas to the last--to fight for nicholas, to bring back nina, these were now the two great aims of her life; and whilst they were being realised her love for lawrence must be passive, passive as a deep passionate flame beats with unwavering force in the heart of the lamp.... they had made me promise long before that i would spend easter eve with them and go with them to our church on the quay. i wondered now whether all the troubles of the last weeks would not negative that invitation, and i had privately determined that if i did not hear from them again i would slip off with lawrence somewhere. but on good friday markovitch, meeting me in the morskaia, reminded me that i was coming. it is very difficult to give any clear picture of the atmosphere of the town between revolution week and this easter eve, and yet all the seeds of the later crop of horrors were sewn during that period. its spiritual mentality corresponded almost exactly with the physical thaw that accompanied it--mist, then vapour dripping of rain, the fading away of one clear world into another that was indistinct, ghostly, ominous. i find written in my diary of easter day--exactly five weeks after the outbreak of the revolution--these words: "from long talks with k. and others i see quite clearly that russians have gone mad for the time being. it's heartbreaking to see them holding meetings everywhere, arguing at every street corner as to how they intend to arrange a democratic peace for europe, when meanwhile the germans are gathering every moment force upon the frontiers." pretty quick, isn't it, to change from utopia to threatenings of the worst sort of communism? but the great point for us in all this--the great point for our private personal histories as well as the public one--was that it was during these weeks that the real gulf between russia and the western world showed itself! yes, for more than three years we had been pretending that a week's sentiment and a hurriedly proclaimed idealism could bridge a separation which centuries of magic and blood and bones had gone to build. for three years we tricked ourselves (i am not sure that the russians were ever really deceived) ... but we liked the ballet, we liked tolstoi and dostoieffsky (we translated their inborn mysticism into the weakest kind of sentimentality), we liked the theory of inexhaustible numbers, we liked the picture of their pounding, steam-roller like, to berlin... we tricked ourselves, and in the space of a night our trick was exposed. plain enough the reasons for these mistakes that we in england have made over that same revolution, mistakes made by none more emphatically than by our own social democrats. those who hailed the revolution as the fulfilment of all their dearest hopes, those who cursed it as the beginning of the damnation of the world--all equally in the wrong. the revolution had no thought for _them_. russian extremists might shout as they pleased about their leading the fight for the democracies of the world--they never even began to understand the other democracies. whatever russia may do, through repercussion, for the rest of the world, she remains finally alone--isolated in her government, in her ideals, in her ambitions, in her abnegations. for a moment the world-politics of her foreign rulers seemed to draw her into the western whirlpool. for a moment only she remained there. she has slipped back again behind her veil of mist and shadow. we may trade with her, plunge into her politics, steal from her art, emphasise her religion--she remains alone, apart, mysterious.... i think it was with a kind of gulping surprise, as after a sudden plunge into icy cold water, that we english became conscious of this. it came to us first in the form that to us the war was everything--to the russian, by the side of an idea the war was nothing at all. how was i, for instance, to recognise the men who took a leading part in the events of this extraordinary year as the same men who fought with bare hands, with fanatical bravery through all the galician campaign of two years before? had i not realised sufficiently at that time that russia moves always according to the idea that governs her--and that when that idea changes the world, _his_ world changes with it.... well, to return to markovitch.... vii i was on the point of setting out for the english prospect on saturday evening when there was a knock on my door, and to my surprise nicholas markovitch came in. he was in evening dress--rather quaint it seemed to me, with his pointed collar so high, his tail-coat so much too small, and his large-brimmed bowler hat. he explained to me confusedly that he wished to walk with me alone to the church... that he had things to tell me... that we should meet the others there. i saw at once two things, that he was very miserable, that he was a little drunk. his misery showed itself in his strange, pathetic, gleaming eyes, that looked so often as though they held unshed tears (this gave him an unfortunate ridiculous aspect), in his hollow pale cheeks and the droop of his mouth, not petulant nor peevish, simply unhappy in the way that animals or very young children express unhappiness. his drunkenness showed itself in quite another way. he was unsteady a little on his feet, and his hands trembled, his forehead was flushed, and he spoke thickly, sometimes running his words together. at the same time he was not very drunk, and was quite in control of his thoughts and intentions. we went out together. it could not have been called a fine night--it was too cold, and there was a hint of rain in the air--and yet there is beauty, i believe, in every russian easter eve. the day comes so wonderfully at the end of the long heavy winter. the white nights with their incredible, almost terrifying beauty are at hand, the ice is broken, the new world of sun and flowers is ready, at an instant's magic word, to be born. nevertheless this year there was an incredible pathos in the wind. the soul of petrograd was indeed stirring, but mournfully, ominously. there were not, for one thing, the rows of little fairy lamps that on this night always make the streets so gay. they hang in chains and clusters of light from street to street, blazing in the square, reflected star-like in the canals, misty and golden-veiled in distance. to-night only the churches had their lights; for the rest, the streets were black chasms of windy desolation, the canals burdened with the breaking ice which moved restlessly against the dead barges. very strong in the air was the smell of the sea; the heavy clouds that moved in a strange kind of ordered procession overhead seemed to carry that scent with them, and in the dim pale shadows of the evening glow one seemed to see at the end of every street mysterious clusters of masts, and to hear the clank of chains and the creak of restless boards. there were few people about and a great silence everywhere. the air was damp and thick, and smelt of rotten soil, as though dank grass was everywhere pushing its way up through the cobbles and paving-stones. as we walked markovitch talked incessantly. it was only a very little the talk of a drunken man, scarcely disconnected at all, but every now and again running into sudden little wildnesses and extravagances. i cannot remember nearly all that he said. he came suddenly, as i expected him to do, to the subject of semyonov. "you know of course that alexei petrovitch is living with us now?" "yes. i know that." "you can understand, ivan andreievitch, that when he came first and proposed it to me i was startled. i had other things--very serious things to think of just then. we weren't--we aren't--very happy at home just now... you know that... i didn't think he'd be very gay with us. i told him that. he said he didn't expect to be gay anywhere at this time, but that he was lonely in his flat all by himself, and he thought for a week or two he'd like company. he didn't expect it would be for very long. no.... he said he was expecting 'something to happen.' something to himself, he said, that would alter his affairs. so, as it was only for a little time, well, it didn't seem to matter. besides, he's a powerful man. he's difficult to resist--very difficult to resist...." "why have you given up your inventions, nicolai leontievitch?" i said to him, suddenly turning round upon him. "my inventions?" he repeated, seeming very startled at that. "yes, your inventions." "no, no.... understand, i have no more use for them. there are other things now to think about--more important things." "but you were getting on with them so well?" "no--not really. i was deceiving myself as i have often deceived myself before. alexei showed me that. he told me that they were no good--" "but i thought that he encouraged you?" "yes--at first--only at first. afterwards he saw into them more clearly; he changed his mind. i think he was only intending to be kind. a strange man... a strange man...." "a very strange man. don't you let him influence you, nicholas markovitch." "influence me? do you think he does that?" he suddenly came close to me, catching my arm. "i don't know. i haven't seen you often together." "perhaps he does... _mojet bweet_... you may be right. i don't know--i don't know what i feel about him at all. sometimes he seems to me very kind; sometimes i'm frightened of him, sometimes"--here he dropped his voice--"he makes me very angry, so angry that i lose control of myself--a despicable thing... a despicable thing... just as i used to feel about the old man to whom i was secretary. i nearly murdered him once. in the middle of the night i thought suddenly of his stomach, all round and white and shining. it was an irresistible temptation to plunge a knife into it. i was awake for hours thinking of it. every man has such hours.... at the same time alexei can be very kind." "how do you mean--kind?" i asked. "for instance he has some very good wine--fifty bottles at least--he has given it all to us. then he insists on paying us for his food. he is a generous-spirited man. money is nothing to us--" "don't you drink his wine," i said. nicholas was instantly offended. "what do you mean, ivan andreievitch? not drink his wine? am i an infant? can i not look after myself?--_blagadaryoo vas_.... i am more than ten years old." he took his hand away from my arm. "no, i didn't mean that at all," i assured him. "of course not--only you told me not long ago that you had given up wine altogether. that's why i said what i did." "so i have! so i have!" he eagerly assured me. "but easter's a time for rejoicing... rejoicing!"--his voice rose suddenly shrill and scornful--"rejoicing with the world in the state that it is. truly, ivan andreievitch, i don't wonder at alexei's cynicism. i don't indeed. the world is a sad spectacle for an observant man." he suddenly put his hand through my arm, so close to me now that i could feel his beating heart. "but you believe, don't you, ivan andreievitch, that russia now has found herself?" his voice became desperately urgent and beseeching. "you must believe that. you don't agree with those fools who don't believe that she will make the best of all this? fools? scoundrels! scoundrels! that's what they are. i must believe in russia now or i shall die. and so with all of us. if she does not rise now as one great country and lead the world, she will never do so. our hearts must break. but she will... she will! no one who is watching events can doubt it. only cynics like alexei doubt--he doubts everything. and he cannot leave anything alone. he must smear everything with his dirty finger. but he must leave russia alone... i tell him...." he broke off. "if russia fails now," he spoke very quietly, "my life is over. i have nothing left. i will die." "come, nicolai leontievitch," i said, "you mustn't let yourself go like that. life isn't over because one is disappointed in one's country. and even though one is disappointed one does not love the less. what's friendship worth if every disappointment chills one's affection? one loves one's country because she is one's country, not because she's disappointing...." and so i went on with a number of amiable platitudes, struggling to comfort him somewhere, and knowing that i was not even beginning to touch the trouble of his soul. he drew very close to me, his fingers gripping my sleeve--"i'll tell you, ivan andreievitch--but you mustn't tell anybody else. i'm afraid. yes, i am. afraid of myself, afraid of this town, afraid of alexei, although that must seem strange to you. things are very bad with me, ivan andreievitch. very bad, indeed. oh! i have been disappointed! yes, i have. not that i expected anything else. but now it has come at last, the blow that i have always feared has fallen--a very heavy blow. my own fault, perhaps, i don't know. but i'm afraid of myself. i don't know what i may do. i have such strange dreams--why has alexei come to stay with us?" "i don't know," i said. then, thank god, we reached the church. it was only as we went up the steps that i realised that he had never once mentioned vera. viii and yet with all our worries thick upon us it was quite impossible to resist the sweetness and charm and mystery of that service. i think that perhaps it is true, as many have said, that people did not crowd to the churches on that easter as they had earlier ones, but our church was a small one, and it seemed to us to be crammed. we stumbled up the dark steps, and found ourselves at the far end of the very narrow nave. at the other end there was a pool of soft golden light in which dark figures were bathed mysteriously. at the very moment of our entering, the procession was passing down the nave on its way round the outside of the church to look for the body of our lord. down the nave they came, the people standing on either side to let them pass, and then, many of them, falling in behind. every one carried a lighted candle. first there were the singers, then men carrying the coloured banners, then the priest in stiff gorgeous raiment, then officials and dignitaries, finally the crowd. the singing, the forest of lighted candles, the sudden opening of the black door and the blowing in of the cold night wind, the passing of the voices out into the air, the soft, dying away of the singing and then the hushed expectation of the waiting for the return--all this had in it something so elemental, so simple, and so true to the very heart of the mystery of life that all trouble and sorrow fell away and one was at peace. how strange was that expectation! we knew so well what the word must be; we could tell exactly the moment of the knock of the door, the deep sound of the priest's voice, the embracings and dropping of wax over every one's clothes that would follow it--and yet every year it was the same! there _was_ truth in it, there was some deep response to the human dependence, some whispered promise of a future good. we waited there, our hearts beating, crowded against the dark walls. it was a very democratic assembly, bourgeoisie, workmen, soldiers, officers, women in evening dress and peasant women with shawls over their heads. no one spoke or whispered. suddenly there was a knock. the door was opened. the priest stood there, in his crimson and gold. "christ is risen!" he cried, his voice vibrating as though he had indeed but just now, out there in the dark and wind, made the great discovery. "he is risen indeed!" came the reply from us all. markovitch embraced me. "let us go," he whispered, "i can't bear it somehow to-night." we went out. everywhere the bells were ringing--the wonderful deep boom of st. isaac's, and then all the other bells, jangling, singing, crying, chattering, answering from all over petrograd. from the other side of the neva came the report of the guns and the fainter, more distant echo of the guns near the sea. i could hear behind it all the incessant "chuck-chuck, chuck-chuck," of the ice colliding on the river. it was very cold, and we hurried back to anglisky prospect. markovitch was quite silent all the way. when we arrived we found vera and uncle ivan and semyonov waiting for us (bohun was with friends). on the table was the _paskha_, a sweet paste made of eggs and cream, curds and sugar, a huge ham, a large cake or rather, sweet bread called _kulich_, and a big bowl full of easter eggs, as many-coloured as the rainbow. this would be the fare during the whole week, as there was to be no cooking until the following saturday--and very tired of the ham and the eggs one became before that day. there was also wine--some of semyonov's gift, i supposed--and a tiny bottle of vodka. we were not a very cheerful company. uncle ivan, who was really distinguished by his complete inability to perceive what was going on under his nose, was happy, and ate a great deal of the ham and certainly more of the _paskha_ than was good for him. i do not know who was responsible for the final incident--semyonov perhaps--but i have often wondered whether some word or other of mine precipitated it. we had finished our meal and were sitting quietly together, each occupied with his own thoughts. i had noticed that markovitch had been drinking a great deal. i was just thinking it was time for me to go when i heard semyonov say: "well, what do you think of your revolution now, nicholas?" "what do you mean--my revolution?" he asked. (the strange thing on looking back is that the whole of this scene seems to me to have passed in a whisper, as though we were all terrified of somebody.) "well--do you remember how you talked to me?... about the saving of the world and all the rest of it that this was going to be? doesn't seem to be quite turning out that way, does it, from all one hears? a good deal of quarrelling, isn't there? and what about the army--breaking up a bit, isn't it?" "don't, uncle alexei," i heard vera whisper. "what i said i still believe," nicholas answered very quietly. "leave russia alone, alexei--and leave me alone, too." "i'm not touching you, nicholas," semyonov answered, laughing softly. "yes you are--you know that you are. i'm not angry--not yet. but it's unwise of you--unwise...." "unwise--how?" "never mind. 'below the silent pools there lie hidden many devils.' leave me alone. you are our guest." "indeed, nicholas," said semyonov, still laughing, "i mean you no harm. ask our friend durward here whether i ever mean any one any harm. he will, i'm sure, give me the best of characters." "no--no harm perhaps--but still you tease me.... i'm a fool to mind.... but then i am a fool--every one knows it." all the time he was looking with his pathetic eyes and his pale face at vera. vera said again, very low, almost in a whisper: "uncle alexei... please." "but really, nicholas," semyonov went on, "you under-rate yourself. you do indeed. nobody thinks you a fool. i think you a very lucky man. with your talents--" "talents!" said nicholas softly, looking at vera. "i have no talents." "--and vera's love for you," went on semyonov-- "ah! that is over!" nicholas said, so low that i scarcely heard it. i do not know what then exactly happened. i think that vera put out her hand to cover nicholas'. at any rate i saw him draw his away, very gently. it lay on the table, and the only sound beside the voices was the tiny rattle of his nails as his hand trembled against the woodwork. vera said something that i did not catch. "no..." nicholas said. "no... we must be true with one another, vera. i have been drinking too much wine. my head is aching, and perhaps my words are not very clear. but it gives me courage to say what i have in my mind. i haven't thought out yet what we must do. perhaps you can help me. but i must tell you that i saw everything that happened here on that thursday afternoon in the week of the revolution--" vera made a little movement of distress "yes, you didn't know--but i was in my room--where alexei sleeps now, you know. i couldn't help seeing. i'm very sorry." "no, nicholas, i'm very glad," vera answered quietly. "i would have told you in any case. i should have told you before. i love him and he loves me, just as you saw. i would like ivan andreievitch and uncle ivan and every one to know. there is nothing to conceal. i have never loved any one before, and i'm not ashamed of loving some one now.... it doesn't alter our life, nicholas. i care for you just as i did care, and i will do just as you tell me. i will never see him again if that's what you wish, but i shall always love him." "ah, vera--you are cruel." nicholas gave a little cry like a hurt animal, then he went away from us, standing for a moment looking at us. "we'll have to consider what we must do. i don't know. i can't think to-night.... and you, alexei, you leave me alone...." he went stumbling away towards his bedroom. vera said nothing to any of us. she got up slowly, looked about her for a moment as though she were bewildered by the light and then went after nicholas. i turned to semyonov. "you'd better go back to your own place," i said. "not yet, thank you," he answered, smiling. ix on the afternoon of easter monday i was reminded by bohun of an engagement that i had made some weeks before to go that evening to a party at the house of a rich merchant, rozanov by name. i have, i think, mentioned him earlier in this book. i cannot conceive why i had ever made the promise, and in the afternoon, meeting bohun at watkins' bookshop in the morskaia, i told him that i couldn't go. "oh, come along!" he said. "it's your duty." "why my duty?" "they're all talking as hard as they can about saving the world by turning the other cheek, and so on; and a few practical facts about germany from you will do a world of good." "oh, your propaganda!" i said. "no, it isn't my propaganda," he answered. "it's a matter of life and death to get these people to go on with the war, and every little helps." "well, i'll come," i said, shaking my head at the book-seller, who was anxious that i should buy the latest works of mrs. elinor glyn and miss ethel dell. i had in fact reflected that a short excursion into other worlds would be good for me. during these weeks i had been living in the very heart of the markovitches, and it would be healthy to escape for a moment. but i was not to escape. i met bohun at the top of the english prospect, and we decided to walk. rozanov lived in the street behind the kazan cathedral. i did not know very much about him except that he was a very wealthy merchant, who had made his money by selling cheap sweets to the peasant. he lived, i knew, an immoral and self-indulgent life, and his hobby was the quite indiscriminate collection of modern russian paintings, his walls being plastered with innumerable works by benois, somoff, dobeijinsky, yakofflyeff, and lançeray. he had also two serovs, a fine vrubel, and several ryepins. he had also a fine private collection of indecent drawings. "i really don't know what on earth we're going to this man for," i said discontentedly. "i was weak this afternoon." "no, you weren't," said bohun. "and i'll tell you frankly that i'm jolly glad not to be having a meal at home to-night. do you know, i don't believe i can stick that flat much longer!" "why, are things worse?" i asked. "it's getting so jolly creepy," bohun said. "everything goes on normally enough outwardly, but i suppose there's been some tremendous row. of course i don't knew any-thing about that. after what you told me the other night though, i seem to see everything twice its natural size." "what do you mean?" i asked him. "you know when something queer's going on inside a house you seem to notice the furniture of the rooms much more than you ordinarily do. i remember once a fellow's piano making me quite sick whenever i looked at it. i didn't know why; i don't know why now, but the funny thing is that another man who knew him once said exactly the same thing to me about it. he felt it too. of course we're none of us quite normal just now. the whole town seems to be turning upside down. i'm always imagining there are animals in the canals; and don't you notice what lots of queer fellows there are in the nevski now, and chinese and japs--all sorts of wild men. and last night i had a dream that all the lumps of ice in the nevski turned into griffins and went marching through the red square eating every one up on their way...." bohun laughed. "that's because _i'd_ eaten something of course--too much _paskha_ probably. "but, seriously, i came in this evening at five o'clock, and the first thing i noticed was that little red lacquer musical box of semyonov's. you know it. the one with a sports-man in a top hat and a horse and a dog on the lid. he brought it with some other little things when he moved in. it's a jolly thing to look at, but it's got two most irritating tunes. one's like 'the blue bells of scotland.' you said yourself the other day it would drive you mad if you heard it often. well, there it was, jangling away in its self-sufficient wheezy voice. semyonov was sitting in the armchair reading the newspaper, markovitch was standing behind the chair with the strangest look on his face. suddenly, just as i came in he bent down and i heard him say: 'won't you stop the beastly thing?' 'certainly,' said semyonov, and he went across in his heavy plodding kind of way and stopped it. i went off to my room and then, upon my word, five minutes after i heard it begin again, thin and reedy through the walls. but when i came back into the dining-room there was no one there. you can't think how that tune irritated me, and i tried to stop it. i went up to it, but i couldn't find the hinge or the key. so on it went, over and over again. then there's another thing. have you ever noticed how some chairs will creak in a room, just as though some one were sitting down or getting up? it always, in ordinary times, makes you jump, but when you're strung up about something--! there's a chair in the markovitches' dining-room just like that. it creaks more like a human being than anything you ever heard, and to-night i could have sworn semyonov got up out of it. it was just like his heavy slow movement. however, there wasn't any one there. do you think all this silly?" he asked. "no, indeed i don't," i answered. "then there's a picture. you know that awful painting of a mid-victorian ancestor of vera's--a horrible old man with bushy eyebrows and a high, rather dirty-looking stock?" "yes, i know it," i said. "it's one of those pictures with eyes that follow you all round the room. at least it has now. i usen't to notice them. now they stare at you as though they'd eat you, and i know that markovitch feels them because he keeps looking up at the beastly thing. then there's--but no, i'm not going to talk any more about it. it isn't any good. one gets thinking of anything these days. one's nerves are all on edge. and that flat's too full of people any way." "yes, it is," i agreed. we arrived at rozanov's house, and went up in a very elegant heavily-gilt lift. once in the flat we were enveloped in a cloud of men and women, tobacco smoke, and so many pictures that it was like tumbling into an art-dealer's. where there weren't pictures there was gilt, and where there wasn't gilt there was naked statuary, and where there wasn't naked statuary there was rozanov, very red and stout and smiling, gay in a tightly fitting black-tail coat, white waistcoat and black trousers. who all the people were i haven't the least idea. there was a great many. a number of jews and jewesses, amiable, prosperous, and kindly, an artist or two, a novelist, a lady pianist, two or three actors. i noticed these. then there was an old maid, a mlle. finisterre, famous in petrograd society for her bitterness and acrimony, and in appearance an exact copy of balzac's sophie gamond. i noticed several of those charming, quiet, wise women of whom russia is so prodigal, a man or two whom i had met at different times, especially one officer, one of the finest, bravest, and truest men i have ever known; some of the inevitable giggling girls--and then suddenly, standing quite alone, nina! her loneliness was the first thing that struck me. she stood back against the wall underneath the shining frames, looking about her with a nervous, timid smile. her hair was piled up on top of her head in the old way that she used to do when she was trying to imitate vera, and i don't know why but that seemed to me a good omen, as though she were already on her way back to us. she was wearing a very simple white frock. in spite of her smile she looked unhappy, and i could see that during this last week experience had not been kind to her, because there was an air of shyness and uncertainty which had never been there before. i was just going over to speak to her when two of the giggling girls surrounded her and carried her off. i carried the little picture of her in my mind all through the noisy, strident meal that followed. i couldn't see her from where i sat, nor did i once catch the tones of her voice, although i listened. only a month ago there would have been no party at which nina was present where her voice would not have risen above all others. no one watching us would have believed any stories about food shortage in petrograd. i daresay at this very moment in berlin they are having just such meals. until the last echo of the last trump has died away in the fastnesses of the advancing mountains the rich will be getting from somewhere the things that they desire! i have no memory of what we had to eat that night, but i know that it was all very magnificent and noisy, kind-hearted and generous and vulgar. a great deal of wine was drunk, and by the end of the meal every one was talking as loudly as possible. i had for companion the beautiful mlle. finisterre. she had lived all her life in petrograd, and she had a contempt for the citizens of that fine town worthy of semyonov himself. opposite us sat a stout, good-natured jewess, who was very happily enjoying her food. she was certainly the most harmless being in creation, and was probably guilty of a thousand generosities and kindnesses in her private life. nevertheless, mlle. finisterre had for her a dark and sinister hatred, and the remarks that she made about her, in her bitter and piercing voice, must have reached their victim. she also abused her host very roundly, beginning to tell me in the fullest detail the history of an especially unpleasant scandal in which he had notoriously figured. i stopped her at last. "it seems to me," i said, "that it would be better not to say these things about him while you're eating his bread and salt." she laughed shrilly, and tapped me on the arm with a bony finger. "oh, you english!... always so moral and strict about the proprieties... and always so hypercritical too. oh, you amuse me! i'm french, you see--not russian at all; these poor people see through nothing--but we french!" after dinner there was a strange scene. we all moved into the long, over-decorated drawing-room. we sat about, admired the pictures (a beautiful one by somoff i especially remember--an autumn scene with eighteenth-century figures and colours so soft and deep that the effect was inexpressibly delicate and mysterious), talked and then fell into one of those russian silences that haunt every russian party. i call those silences "russian," because i know nothing like them in any other part of the world. it is as though the souls of the whole company suddenly vanished through the windows, leaving only the bodies and clothes. every one sits, eyes half closed, mouths shut, hands motionless, host and hostess, desperately abandoning every attempt at rescue, gaze about them in despair. the mood may easily last well into the morning, when the guests, still silent, will depart, assuring everybody that they have enjoyed themselves immensely, and really believing that they have; or it may happen that some remark will suddenly be made, and instantly back through the windows the souls will come, eagerly catching up their bodies again, and a babel will arise, deafening, baffling, stupefying. or it may happen that a russian will speak with sudden authority, almost like a prophet, and will continue for half an hour and more, pouring out his soul, and no one will dream of thinking it an improper exhibition. in fine, anything can happen at a russian party. what happened on this occasion was this. the silence had lasted for some minutes, and i was wondering for how much longer i could endure it (i had one eye on nina somewhere in the background, and the other on bohun restlessly kicking his patent-leather shoes one against the other), when suddenly a quiet, ordinary little woman seated near me said: "the thing for russia to do now is to abandon all resistance and so shame the world." she was a mild, pleasant-looking woman, with the eyes of a very gentle cow, and spoke exactly as though she were still pursuing her own private thoughts. it was enough; the windows flew open, the souls came flooding in, and such a torrent of sound poured over the carpet that the naked statuary itself seemed to shiver at the threatened deluge. every one talked; every one, even, shouted. just as, during the last weeks, the streets had echoed to the words "liberty," "democracy," "socialism," "brotherhood," "anti-annexation," "peace of the world," so now the art gallery echoed. the very pictures shook in their frames. one old man in a white beard continued to cry, over and over again, "firearms are not our weapons... bullets are not our weapons. it's the peace of god, the peace of god that we need." one lady (a handsome jewess) jumped up from her chair, and standing before us all recited a kind of chant, of which i only caught sentences once, and again: "russia must redeem the world from its sin... this slaughter must be slayed... russia the saviour of the world... this slaughter must be slayed." i had for some time been watching bohun. he had travelled a long journey since that original departure from england in december; but i was not sure whether he had travelled far enough to forget his english terror of making a fool of himself. apparently he had.... he said, his voice shaking a little, blushing as he spoke: "what about germany?" the lady in the middle of the floor turned upon him furiously: "germany! germany will learn her lesson from us. when we lay down our arms her people, too, will lay down theirs." "supposing she doesn't?" the interest of the room was now centred on him, and every one else was silent. "that is not our fault. we shall have made our example." a little hum of applause followed this reply, and that irritated bohun. he raised his voice: "yes, and what about your allies, england and france, are you going to betray them?" several voices took him up now. a man continued: "it is not betrayal. we are not betraying the proletariat of england and france. they are our friends. but the alliance with the french and english capitalistic governments was made not by us but by our own capitalistic government, which is now destroyed." "very well, then," said bohun. "but when the war began did you not--all of you, not only your government, but you people now sitting in this room--did you not all beg and pray england to come in? during those days before england's intervention, did you not threaten to call us cowards and traitors if we did not come in? _pomnite_?" there was a storm of answers to this. i could not distinguish much of what it was. i was fixed by mlle. finisterre's eagle eye, gleaming at the thought of the storm that was rising. "that's not our affair.... that's not our affair," i heard voices crying. "we did support you. for years we supported you. we lost millions of men in your service.... now this terrible slaughter must cease, and russia show the way to peace." bohun's moment then came upon him. he sprang to his feet, his face crimson, his body quivering; so desperate was his voice, so urgent his distress that the whole room was held. "what has happened to you all? don't you see, don't you see what you are doing? what has come to you, you who were the most modest people in europe and are now suddenly the most conceited? what do you hope to do by this surrender? "do you know, in the first place, what you will do? you will deliver the peoples of three-quarters of the globe into hopeless slavery; you will lose, perhaps for ever, the opportunity of democracy; you will establish the grossest kind of militarism for all time. why do you think germany is going to listen to you? what sign has she ever shown that she would? when have her people ever turned away or shown horror at any of the beastly things her rulers have been doing in this war?... what about your own revolution? do you believe in it? do you treasure it? do you want it to last? do you suppose for a moment that, if you bow to germany, she won't instantly trample out your revolution and give you hack your monarchy? how can she afford to have a revolutionary republic close to her own gates? what is she doing at this moment? piling up armies with which to invade you, and conquer you, and lead you into slavery. what have you done so far by your revolutionary orders? what have you done by relaxing discipline in the army? what good have you done to any one or anything? is any one the happier? isn't there disorder everywhere--aren't all your works stopping and your industries failing? what about the eighty million peasants who have been liberated in the course of a night? who's going to lead them if you are not? this thing has happened by its own force, and you are sitting down under it, doing nothing. why did it succeed? simply because there was nothing to oppose it. authority depended on the army, not on the czar, and the army was the people. so it is with the other armies of the world. do you think that the other armies couldn't do just as you did if they wished. they could, in half an hour. they hate the war as much as you do, but they have also patriotism. they see that their country must be made strong first before other countries will listen to its ideas. but where is your patriotism? has the word russia been mentioned once by you since the revolution? never once.... 'democracy,' 'brotherhood'--but how are democracy and brotherhood to be secured unless other countries respect you.... oh, i tell you it's absurd!... it's more than absurd, it's wicked, it's rotten...." poor boy, he was very near tears. he sat down suddenly, staring blankly in front of him, his hands clenched. rozanov answered him, rozanov flushed, his fat body swollen with food and drink, a little unsteady on his legs, and the light of the true mystic in his pig-like eyes. he came forward into the middle of the circle. "that's perhaps true what you say," he cried; "it's very english, very honest, and, if you will forgive me, young man, very simple. you say that we russians are conceited. no, we are not conceited, but we see farther than the rest of the world. is that our curse? perhaps it is, but equally, perhaps, we may save the world by it. now look at me! am i a fine man? no, i am not. every one knows i am not. no man could look at my face and say that i am a fine man. i have done disgraceful things all my life. all present know some of the things i have done, and there are some worse things which nobody knows save myself. well, then.... am i going to stop doing such things? am i now, at fifty-five, about to become instantly a saint? indeed not. i shall continue to do the things that i have already done, and i shall drop into a beastly old age. i know it. "so, young man, i am a fair witness. you may trust me to speak the truth as i see it. i believe in christ. i believe in the christ-life, the christ-soul. if i could, i would stop my beastliness and become christlike. i have tried on several occasions, and failed, because i have no character. but does that mean that i do not believe in it when i see it? not at all. i believe in it more than ever. and so with russia--you don't see far enough, young man, neither you nor any of your countrymen. it is one of your greatest failings that you do not care for ideas. how is this war going to end? by the victory of germany? perhaps.... perhaps even it may be that russia by her weakness will help to that victory. but is that the end? no.... if russia has an idea and because of her faith in that idea, she will sacrifice everything, will be buffeted on both cheeks, will be led into slavery, will deliver up her land and her people, will be mocked at by all the world... perhaps that is her destiny.... she will endure all that in order that her idea may persist. and her idea will persist. are not the germans and austrians human like ourselves? slowly, perhaps very slowly, they will say to themselves: 'there is russia who believes in the peace of the world, in the brotherhood of man, and she will sacrifice everything for it, she will go out, as christ did, and be tortured and be crucified--and then on the third day she will rise again.' is not that the history of every triumphant idea?... you say that meanwhile germany will triumph. perhaps for a time she may, but our idea will not die. "the further germany goes, the deeper will that idea penetrate into her heart. at the end she will die of it, and a new germany will be born into a new world.... i tell you i am an evil man, but i believe in god and in the righteousness of god." what do i remember after those words of rozanov? it was like a voice speaking to me across a great gulf of waters--but that voice was honest. i do not know what happened after his speech. i think there was a lot of talk. i cannot remember. only just before i was going i was near nina for a moment. she looked up at me just as she used to do. "durdles--is vera all right?" "she's miserable, nina, because you're not there. come back to us." but she shook her head. "no, no, i can't. give her my--" then she stopped. "no, tell her nothing." "can i tell her you're happy?" i asked. "oh, i'm all right," she answered roughly, turning away from me. x but the adventures of that easter monday night were not yet over. i had walked away with bohun; he was very silent, depressed, poor boy, and shy with the reaction of his outburst. "i made the most awful fool of myself," he said. "no, you didn't," i answered. "the trouble of it is," he said slowly, "that neither you nor i see the humorous side of it all strongly enough. we take it too seriously. it's got a funny side all right." "maybe you're right," i said. "but you must remember that the markovitch situation isn't exactly funny just now--and we're both in the middle of it. oh! if only i could find nina back home and semyonov away, i believe the strain would lift. but i'm frightened that something's going to happen. i've grown very fond of these people, you know, bohun--vera and nina and nicholas. isn't it odd how one gets to love russians--more than one's own people? the more stupid things they do the more you love them--whereas with one's own people it's quite the other way. oh, i do _want_ vera and nina and nicholas to be happy!" "isn't the town queer to-night?" said bohun, suddenly stopping. (we were just at the entrance to the mariensky square.) "yes," i said. "i think these days between the thaw and the white nights are in some ways the strangest of all. there seems to be so much going on that one can't quite see." "yes--over there--at the other end of the square--there's a kind of mist--a sort of water-mist. it comes from the canal." "and do you see a figure like an old bent man with a red lantern? do you see what i mean--that red light?" "and those shadows on the further wall like riders passing with silver-tipped spears? isn't it...? there they go--ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen...." "how still the square is? do you see those three windows all alight? isn't there a dance going on? don't you hear the music?" "no, it's the wind." "no, surely.... that's a flute--and then violins. listen! those are fiddles for certain!" "how still, how still it is!" we stood and listened whilst the white mist gathered and grew over the cobbles. certainly there was a strain of music, very faint and dim, threading through the air. "well, i must go on," said bohun. "you go up to the left, don't you? good-night." i watched bohun's figure cross the square. the light was wonderful, like fold on fold of gauze, but opaque, so that buildings showed with sharp outline behind it. the moon was full and quite red. i turned to go home and ran straight into lawrence. "good heavens!" i cried. "are you a ghost too?" he didn't seem to feel any surprise at meeting me. he was plainly in a state of tremendous excitement. he spoke breathlessly. "you're exactly the man. you must come back with me. my diggings now are only a yard away from here." "it's very late," i began, "and--" "things are desperate," he said. "i don't know--" he broke off. "oh! come and help me, durward, for god's sake!" i went with him, and we did not exchange another word until we were in his rooms. he began hurriedly taking off his clothes. "there! sit on the bed. different from wilderling's, isn't it? poor devil.... i'm going to have a bath if you don't mind--i've got to clear my head." he dragged out a tin bath from under his bed, then a big can of water from a corner. stripped, he looked so thick and so strong, with his short neck and his bull-dog build, that i couldn't help saying, "you don't look a day older than the last time you played rugger for cambridge." "i am, though." he sluiced the cold water over his head, grunting. "not near so fit--gettin' fat too.... rugger days are over. wish all my other days were over too." he got out of the bath, wiped himself, put on pyjamas, brushed his teeth, then his hair, took out a pipe, and then sat beside me on the bed. "look here, durward," he said. "i'm desperate, old man." (he said "desprite.") "we're all in a hell of a mess." "i know," i said. he puffed furiously at his pipe. "you know, if i'm not careful i shall go a bit queer in the head. get so angry, you know," he added simply. "angry with whom?" i asked. "with myself mostly for bein' such a bloody fool. but not only myself--with civilisation, durward, old cock!--and also with that swine semyonov." "ah, i thought you'd come to him," i said. "now the points are these," he went on, counting on his thick stubbly fingers. "first, i love vera--and when i say love i mean love. never been in love before, you know--honest injun, never.... never had affairs with tobacconists' daughters at cambridge--never had an affair with a woman in my life--no, never. used to wonder what was the matter with me, why i wasn't like other chaps. now i know. i was waitin' for vera. quite simple. i shall never love any one again--never. i'm not a kid, you know, like young bohun--i love vera once and for all, and that's that..." "yes," i said. "and the next point?" "the next point is that vera loves me. no need to go into that--but she does." "yes, she does," i said. "third point, she's married, and although she don't love her man she's sorry for him. fourth point, he loves her. fifth point, there's a damned swine hangin' round called alexei petrovitch semyonov.... well, then, there you have it." he considered, scratching his head. i waited. then he went on: "now it would be simpler if she didn't want to be kind to nicholas, if nicholas didn't love her, if--a thousand things were different. but they must be as they are, i suppose. i've just been with her. she's nearly out of her mind with worry." he paused, puffing furiously at his pipe. then he went on: "she's worrying about me, about nina, and about nicholas. and especially about nicholas. there's something wrong with him. he knows about my kissing her in the flat. well, that's all right. i meant him to know. everything's just got to be above-board. but semyonov knows too, and that devil's been raggin' him about it, and nicholas is just like a bloomin' kid. that's got to stop. i'll wring that feller's neck. but even that wouldn't help matters much. vera says nicholas is not to be hurt whatever happens. 'never mind us,' she says, 'we're strong and can stand it.' but he can't. he's weak. and she says he's just goin' off his dot. and it's got to be stopped--it's just got to be stopped. there's only one way to stop it." he stayed: suddenly he put his heavy hand on my knee. "what do you mean?" i asked. "i've got to clear out. that's what i mean. right away out. back to england." i didn't speak. "that's it," he went on, but now as though he were talking to himself. "that's what you've got to do, old son.... she says so, and she's right. can't alter our love, you know. nothing changes that. we've got to hold on... ought to have cleared out before...." suddenly he turned. he almost flung himself upon me. he gripped my arms so that i would have cried out if the agony in his eyes hadn't held me. "here," he muttered, "let me alone for a moment. i must hold on. i'm pretty well beat. i'm just about done." for what seemed hours we sat there. i believe it was, in reality, only a few minutes. he sat facing me, his eyes staring at me but not seeing me, his body close against me, and i could see the sweat glistening on his chest through the open pyjamas. he was rigid as though he had been struck into stone. he suddenly relaxed. "that's right," he said; "thanks, old man. i'm better now. it's a bit late, i expect, but stay on a while." he got into bed. i sat beside him, gripped his hand, and ten minutes later he was asleep. xi the next day, tuesday, was stormy with wind and rain. it was strange to see from my window the whirlpool of ice-encumbered waters. the rain fell in slanting, hissing sheets upon the ice, and the ice, in lumps and sheets and blocks, tossed and heaved and spun. at times it was as though all the ice was driven by some strong movement in one direction, then it was like the whole pavement of the world slipping down the side of the firmament into space. suddenly it would be checked and, with a kind of quiver, station itself and hang chattering and clutching until the sweep would begin in the opposite direction! i could see only dimly through the mist, but it was not difficult to imagine that, in very truth, the days of the flood had returned. nothing could be seen but the tossing, heaving welter of waters with the ice, grim and grey through the shadows, like "ships and monsters, sea-serpents and mermaids," to quote galleon's _spanish nights_. of course the water came in through my own roof, and it was on that very afternoon that i decided, once and for all, to leave this abode of mine. romantic it might be; i felt it was time for a little comfortable realism. my old woman brought me the usual cutlets, macaroni, and tea for lunch; then i wrote to a friend in england; and finally, about four o'clock, after one more look at the hissing waters, drew my curtains, lit my candles, and sat down near my stove to finish that favourite of mine, already mentioned in these pages, de la mare's _the return_. i read on with absorbed attention. i did not hear the dripping on the roof, nor the patter-patter of the drops from the ceiling, nor the beating of the storm against the glass. my candles blew in the draught, and shadows crossed and recrossed the page. do you remember the book's closing words?-- "once, like lawford in the darkness at widderstone, he glanced up sharply across the lamplight at his phantasmagorical shadowy companion, heard the steady surge of multitudinous rain-drops, like the roar of time's winged chariot hurrying near, then he too, with spectacles awry, bobbed on in his chair, a weary old sentinel on the outskirts of his friend's denuded battlefield." "shadowy companion," "multitudinous rain-drops," "a weary old sentinel," "his friend's denuded battlefield"... the words echoed like little muffled bells in my brain, and it was, i suppose, to their chiming that i fell into dreamless sleep. from this i was suddenly roused by the sharp noise of knocking, and starting up, my book clattering to the floor, i saw facing me, in the doorway, semyonov. twice before he had come to me just like this--out of the heart of a dreamless sleep. once in the orchard near buchatch, on a hot summer afternoon; once in this same room on a moonlit night. some strange consciousness, rising, it seemed, deep out of my sleep, told me that this would be the last time that i would so receive him. "may i come in?" he said. "if you must, you must," i answered. "i am not physically strong enough to prevent you." he laughed. he was dripping wet. he took off his hat and overcoat, sat down near the stove, bending forward, holding his cloak in his hands and watching the steam rise from it. i moved away and stood watching. i was not going to give him any possible illusion as to my welcoming him. he turned round and looked at me. "truly, ivan andreievitch," he said, "you are a fine host. this is a miserable greeting." "there can be no greetings between us ever again," i answered him. "you are a blackguard. i hope that this is our last meeting." "but it is," he answered, looking at me with friendliness; "that is precisely why i've come. i've come to say good-bye." "good-bye?" i repeated with astonishment. this chimed in so strangely with my premonition. "i never was more delighted to hear it. i hope you're going a long distance from us all." "that's as may be," he answered. "i can't tell you definitely." "when are you going?" i asked. "that i can't tell you either. but i have a premonition that it will be soon." "oh, a premonition," i said, disappointed. "is nothing settled?" "no, not definitely. it depends on others." "have you told vera and nicholas?" "no--in fact, only last night vera begged me to go away, and i told her that i would love to do anything to oblige her, but this time i was afraid that i couldn't help her. i would be compelled, alas, to stay on indefinitely." "look here, semyonov," i said, "stop that eternal fooling. tell me honestly--are you going or not?" "going away from where?" he asked, laughing. "from the markovitches, from all of us, from petrograd?" "yes--i've told you already," he answered. "i've come to say good-bye." "then what did you mean by telling vera--" "never you mind, ivan andreievitch. don't worry your poor old head with things that are too complicated for you--a habit of yours, i'm afraid. just believe me when i say that i've come to say good-bye. i have an intuition that we shall never talk together again. i may be wrong. but my intuitions are generally correct." i noticed then that his face was haggard, his eyes dark, the light in them exhausted as though he had not slept.... i had never before seen him show positive physical distress. let his soul be what it might, his body seemed always triumphant. "whether your intuition is right or no," i said, "this _is_ the last time. i never intend to speak to you again if i can help it. the day that i hear that you have really left us, never to return, will be one of the happiest days of my life." semyonov gave me a strange look, humorous, ironical, and, upon my word, almost affectionate: "that's very sad what you say, ivan andreievitch--if you mean it. and i suppose you mean it, because you english always do mean what you say.... but it's sad because, truly, i have friendly feelings towards you, and you're almost the only man in the world of whom i could say that." "you speak as though your friendship were an honour," i said hotly. "it's a degradation." he smiled. "now that's melodrama, straight out of your worst english plays. _and_ how bad they can be!... but you hadn't always this vehement hatred. what's changed your mind?" "i don't know that i _have_ changed my mind," i answered. "i think i've always disliked you. but there at the front and in the forest you were brave and extraordinarily competent. you treated trenchard abominably, of course--but he rather asked for it in some ways. here you've been nothing but the meanest skunk and sneak. you've set out deliberately to poison the lives of some of the best-hearted and most helpless people on this earth.... you deserve hanging, if any murderer ever did!" he looked at me so mildly and with such genuine interest that i was compelled to feel my indignation a whit melodramatic. "if you are going," i said more calmly, "for heaven's sake go! it _can't_ be any pleasure to you, clever and talented as you are, to bait such harmless people as vera and nicholas. you've done harm enough. leave them, and i forgive you everything." "ah, of course your forgiveness is of the first importance to me," he said, with ironic gravity. "but it's true enough. you're going to be bothered with me--i _do_ seem a worry to you, don't i?--for only a few days more. and how's it going to end, do you think? who's going to finish me off? nicholas or vera? or perhaps our english byron, lawrence? or even yourself? have you your revolver with you? i shall offer no resistance, i promise you." suddenly he changed. he came closer to me. his weary, exhausted eyes gazed straight into mine: "ivan andreievitch, never mind about the rest--never mind whether you do or don't hate me, that matters to nobody. what i tell you is the truth. i have come to you, as i have always come to you, like the moth to the flame. why am i always pursuing you? is it for the charm and fascination of your society? your wit? your beauty? i won't flatter you--no, no, it's because you alone, of all these fools here, knew her. you knew her as no one else alive knew her. she liked you--god knows why! at least i do know why--it was because of her youth and innocence and simplicity, because she didn't know a wise man from a fool, and trusted all alike.... but you knew her, you knew her. you remember her and can talk of her. ah, how i've hungered, hungered, to talk to you about her! sometimes i've come all this way and then turned back at the door. how i've prayed that it might have been some other who knew her, some real man, not a sentimental, gloomy old woman like yourself, ivan andreievitch. and yet you have your points. you have in you the things that she saw--you are honest, you are brave.... you are like a good english clergyman. but she!... i should have had some one with wit, with humour, with a sense of life about her. all the things, all the little things--the way she walked, her clothes, her smile--when she was cross! ah, she was divine when she was cross!... ivan andreievitch, be kind to me! think for a moment less of your morals, less of your principles--and talk to me of her! talk to me of her!" he had drawn quite close to me; he looked like a madman--i have no doubt that, at that moment, he was one. "i can't!... i won't!" i answered, drawing away. "she is the most sacred memory i have in my life. i hate to think of her with you. and that because you smirch everything you touch. i have no feeling of jealousy...." "you? jealousy!" he said, looking at me scornfully. "why should you be jealous?" "i loved her too," i said. he looked at me. in spite of myself the colour flooded my face. he looked at me from head to foot--my plainness, my miserable physique, my lameness, my feeble frame--everything was comprehended in the scorn of that glance. "no," i said, "you need not suppose that she ever realised. she did not. i would have died rather than have spoken of it. but i will not talk about her. i will not." he drew away from me. his face was grave; the mockery had left it. "oh, you english, how strange you are!... in trusting, yes.... but the things you miss! i understand now many things. i give up my desire. you shan't smirch your precious memories.... and you, too, must understand that there has been all this time a link that has bound us.... well, that link has snapped. i must go. meanwhile, after i am gone, remember that there is more in life, ivan andreievitch, than you will ever understand. who am i?... rather ask, what am i? i am a desire, a purpose, a pursuit--what you like. if another suffer for that i cannot help it, and if human nature is so weak, so stupid, it is right that it should suffer. but perhaps i am not myself at all, ivan andreievitch. perhaps this is a ghost that you see.... what if the town has changed in the night and strange souls have slipped into our old bodies? "isn't there a stir about the town? is it i that pursue nicholas, or is it my ghost that pursues myself? is it nicholas that i pursue? is not nicholas dead, and is it not my hope of release that i follow?... don't be so sure of your ground, ivan andreievitch. you know the proverb: 'there's a secret city in every man's heart. it is at that city's altars that the true prayers are offered.' there has been more than one revolution in the last two months." he came up to me: "do not think too badly of me, ivan andreievitch, afterwards. i'm a haunted man, you know." he bent forward and kissed me on the lips. a moment later he was gone. xii that tuesday night poor young bohun will remember to his grave--and beyond it, i expect. he came in from his work about six in the evening and found markovitch and semyonov sitting in the dining-room. everything was ordinary enough. semyonov was in the armchair reading a newspaper; markovitch was walking very quietly up and down the farther end of the room. he wore faded blue carpet slippers; he had taken to them lately. everything was the same as it had always been. the storm that had raged all day had now died down, and a very pale evening sun struck little patches of colour on the big table with the fading table-cloth, on the old brown carpet, on the picture of the old gentleman with bushy eyebrows, on semyonov's musical-box, on the old knick-knacks and the untidy shelf of books. (bohun looked especially to see whether the musical-box were still there. it was there on a little side-table.) bohun, tired with his long day's efforts to shove the glories of the british empire down the reluctant throats of the indifferent russians, dropped into the other armchair with a tattered copy of turgenieff's _house of gentle-folks_, and soon sank into a state of half-slumber. he roused himself from this to hear semyonov reading extracts from the newspaper. he caught, at first, only portions of sentences. i am writing this, of course, from bohun's account of it, and i cannot therefore quote the actual words, but they were incidents of disorder at the front. "there!" semyonov would say, pausing. "now, nicholas... what do you say to that? a nice state of things. the colonel was murdered, of course, although our friend the _retch_ doesn't put it quite so bluntly. the _novaya jezn_ of course highly approves. here's another...." this went on for some ten minutes, and the only sound beside semyonov's voice was markovitch's padding steps. "ah! here's another bit!... now what about that, my fine upholder of the russian revolution? see what they've been doing near riga! it says...." "can't you leave it alone, alexei? keep your paper to yourself!" these words came in so strange a note, a tone so different from markovitch's ordinary voice, that they were, to bohun, like a warning blow on the shoulder. "there's gratitude--when i'm trying to interest you! how childish, too, not to face the real situation! do you think you're going to improve things by pretending that anarchy doesn't exist? so soon, too, after your beautiful revolution! how long is it? let me see... march, april... yes, just about six weeks.... well, well!" "leave me alone, alexei!... leave me alone!" bohun had with that such a sense of a superhuman effort at control behind the words that the pain of it was almost intolerable. he wanted, there and then, to have left the room. it would have been better for him had he done so. but some force held him in his chair, and, as the scene developed, be felt as though his sudden departure would have laid too emphatic a stress on the discomfort of it. he hoped that in a moment vera or uncle ivan would come and the scene would end. semyonov, meanwhile, continued: "what were those words you used to me not so long ago? something about free russia, i think--russia moving like one man to save the world--russia with an unbroken front.... too optimistic, weren't you?" the padding feet stopped. in a whisper that seemed to bohun to fill the room with echoing sound markovitch said: "you have tempted me for weeks now, alexei.... i don't know why you hate me so, nor why you pursue me. go back to your own place. if i am an unfortunate man, and by my own fault, that should be nothing to you who are more fortunate." "torment you! i?... my dear nicholas, never! but you are so childish in your ideas--and are you unfortunate? i didn't know it. is it about your inventions that you are speaking? well, they were never very happy, were they?" "you praised them to me!" "did i?... my foolish kindness of heart, i'm afraid. to tell the truth, i was thankful when you saw things as they were..." "you took them away from me." "i took them away? what nonsense! it was your own wish--vera's wish too." "yes, you persuaded both vera and nina that they were no good. they believed in them before you came." "you flatter me, nicholas. i haven't such power over vera's opinions, i'm afraid. if i tell her anything she believes at once the opposite. you must have seen that yourself." "you took her belief away from me. you took her love away from me." semyonov laughed. that laugh seemed to rouse markovitch to frenzy. he screamed out. "you have taken everything from me!... you will not leave me alone! you must be careful. you are in danger, i tell you." semyonov sprang up from his chair, and the two men, advancing towards one another, came into bohun's vision. markovitch was like a madman, his hands raised, his eyes staring from his head, his body trembling. semyonov was quiet, motionless, smiling, standing very close to the other. "well, what are you going to do?" he asked. markovitch stood for a moment, his hands raised, then his whole body seemed to collapse. he moved away, muttering something which bohun could not hear. with shuffling feet, his head lowered, he went out of the room. semyonov returned to his seat. to bohun, an innocent youth with very simple and amiable ideas about life, the whole thing seemed "beastly beyond words." "i saw a man torture a dog once," he told me. "he didn't do much to it really. tied it up to a tree and dug into it with a pen-knife. i went home and was sick.... well, i felt sick this time, too." nevertheless his own "sickness" was not the principal affair. the point was the sense of danger that seemed now to tinge with its own faint stain every article in the room. bohun's hatred of semyonov was so strong that he felt as though he would never be able to speak to him again; but it was not really of semyonov that he was thinking. his thoughts were all centred round markovitch. you must remember that for a long time now he had considered himself markovitch's protector. this sense of his protection had developed in him an affection for the man that he would not otherwise have felt. he did not, of course, know of any of markovitch's deepest troubles. he could only guess at his relations with vera, and he did not understand the passionate importance that he attached to his russian idea. but he knew enough to be aware of his childishness, his simplicity, his _naïveté_, and his essential goodness. "he's an awfully decent sort, really," he used to say in a kind of apologetic defence. the very fact of semyonov's strength made his brutality seem now the more revolting. "like hitting a fellow half your size".... he saw that things in that flat were approaching a climax, and he knew enough now of russian impetuosity to realise that climaxes in that country are, very often, no ordinary affairs. it was just as though there were an evil smell in the flat, he explained to me. "it seemed to hang over everything. things looked the same and yet they weren't the same at all." his main impression that "something would very soon happen if he didn't look out," drove everything else from his mind--but he didn't quite see what to do. speak to vera? to nicholas? to semyonov?... he didn't feel qualified to do any of these things. he went to bed that night early, about ten o'clock. he couldn't sleep. his door was not quite closed and he could hear first vera, then uncle ivan, lastly markovitch go to bed. he lay awake then, with that exaggerated sense of hearing that one has in the middle of the night, when one is compelled, as it were, against one's will, to listen for sounds. he heard the dripping of the tap in the bathroom, the creaking of some door in the wind (the storm had risen again) and all the thousand and one little uncertainties, like the agitated beating of innumerable hearts that penetrate the folds and curtains of the night. as he lay there he thought of what he would do did markovitch really go off his head. he had a revolver, he knew. he had seen it in his hand. and then what was semyonov after? my explanation had seemed, at first, so fantastic and impossible that bohun had dismissed it, but now, after the conversation that he had just overheard, it did not seem impossible at all--especially in the middle of the night. his mind travelled back to his own first arrival in petrograd, that first sleep at the "france" with the dripping water and the crawling rats, the plunge into the kazan cathedral, and everything that followed. he did not see, of course, his own progress since that day, or the many things that russia had already done for him, but he did feel that such situations as the one he was now sharing were, to-day, much more in the natural order of things than they would have been four months before.... he dozed off and then was awakened, sharply, abruptly, by the sound of markovitch's padded feet. there could be no mistaking them; very softly they went past bohun's door, down the passage towards the dining-room. he sat up in bed, and all the other sounds of the night seemed suddenly to be accentuated--the dripping of the tap, the blowing of the wind, and even the heavy breathing of old sacha, who always slept in a sort of cupboard near the kitchen, with her legs hanging out into the passage. suddenly no sound! the house was still, and, with that, the sense of danger and peril was redoubled, as though the house were holding its breath as it watched.... bohun could endure it no longer; he got up, put on his dressing-gown and bedroom slippers, and went out. when he got as far as the dining-room door he saw that markovitch was standing in the middle of the room with a lighted candle in his hand. the glimmer of the candle flung a circle, outside which all was dusk. within the glimmer there was markovitch, his hair rough and strangely like a wig, his face pale yellow, and wearing an old quilted bed-jacket of a purple green colour. he was in a night-dress, and his naked legs were like sticks of tallow. he stood there, the candle shaking in his hand, as though he were uncertain as to what he would do next. he was saying something to himself, bohun thought. at any rate his lips were moving. then he put his hand into the pocket of his bed-coat and took out a revolver. bohun saw it gleam in the candle-light. he held it up close to his eyes as though he were short-sighted and seemed to sniff at it. then, clumsily, bohun said, he opened it, to see whether it were loaded, i suppose, and closed it again. after that, very softly indeed, he shuffled off towards the door of semyonov's room, the room that had once been the sanctuary of his inventions. all this time young bohun was paralysed. he said that all his life now, in spite of his having done quite decently in france, he would doubt his capacity in a crisis because, during the whole of this affair, he never stirred. but that was because it was all exactly like a dream. "i was in the dream, you know, as well as the other fellows. you know those dreams when you're doing your very damnedest to wake up--when you struggle and sweat and know you'll die if something doesn't happen--well, it was like that, except that i didn't struggle and swear, but just stood there, like a painted picture, watching...." markovitch had nearly reached semyonov's door (you remember that there was a little square window of glass in the upper part of it) when he did a funny thing. he stopped dead as though some one had rapped him on the shoulder. he stopped and looked round, then, very slowly, as though he were compelled, gazed with his nervous blinking eyes up at the portrait of the old gentleman with the bushy eyebrows. bohun looked up too and saw (it was probably a trick of the faltering candle-light) that the old man was not looking at him at all, but steadfastly, and, of course, ironically at markovitch. the two regarded one another for a while, then markovitch, still moving with the greatest caution, slipped the revolver back into his pocket, got a chair, climbed on to it and lifted the picture down from its nail. he looked at it for a moment, staring into the cracked and roughened paint, then hung it deliberately back on its nail again, but with its face to the wall. as he did this his bare, skinny legs were trembling so on the chair that, at every moment, he threatened to topple over. he climbed down at last, put the chair back in its place, and then once more turned towards semyonov's door. when he reached it he stopped and again took out the revolver, opened it, looked into it, and closed it. then he put his hand on the door-knob. it was then that bohun had, as one has in dreams, a sudden impulse to scream: "look out! look out! look out!" although, heaven knows, he had no desire to protect semyonov from anything. but it was just then that the oddest conviction came over him, namely, an assurance that semyonov was standing on the other side of the door, looking through the little window and waiting. he could not have told, any more than one can ever tell in dreams, how he was so certain of this. he could only see the little window as the dimmest and darkest square of shadow behind markovitch's candle, but he was sure that this was so. he could even see semyonov standing there, in his shirt, with his thick legs, his head a little raised, listening... for what seemed an endless time markovitch did not move. he also seemed to be listening. was it possible that he heard semyonov's breathing?... but, of course, i have never had any actual knowledge that semyonov was there. that was simply bohun's idea.... then markovitch began very slowly, bending a little, as though it were stiff and difficult, to turn the handle. i don't know what then bohun would have done. he must, i think, have moved, shouted, screamed, done something or other. there was another interruption. he heard a quick, soft step behind him. he moved into the shadow. it was vera, in her night-dress, her hair down her back. she came forward into the room and whispered very quietly: "nicholas!" he turned at once. he did not seem to be startled or surprised; he had dropped the revolver at once back into his pocket. he came up to her, she bent down and kissed him, then put her arm round him and led him away. when they had gone bohun also went back to bed. the house was very still and peaceful. suddenly he remembered the picture. it would never do, he thought, if in the morning it were found by sacha or uncle ivan with its face to the wall. after hesitating he lit his own candle, got out of bed again, and went down the passage. "the funny thing was," he said, "that i really expected to find it just as it always was, face outwards.... as though the whole thing really had been a dream. but it wasn't. it had its face to the wall all right. i got a chair, turned it round, and went back to bed again." xiii that night, whether as a result of my interview with semyonov i do not know, my old enemy leapt upon me once again. i had, during the next three days, one of the worst bouts of pain that it has ever been my fortune to experience. for twenty-four hours i thought it more than any man could bear, and i hid my head and prayed for death; during the next twenty-four i slowly rose, with a dim far-away sense of deliverance; on the third day i could hear, in the veiled distance, the growls of my defeated foe.... through it all, behind the wall of pain, my thoughts knocked and thudded, urging me to do something. it was not until the friday or the saturday that i could think consecutively. my first thought was driven in on me by the old curmudgeon of a doctor, as his deliberate opinion that it was simply insanity to stay on in those damp rooms when i suffered from my complaint, that i was only asking for what i got, and that he, on his part, had no sympathy for me. i told him that i entirely agreed with him, that i had determined several weeks ago to leave these rooms, and that i thought that i had found some others in a different, more populated part of the town. he grunted his approval, and, forbidding me to go out for at least a week, left me. at least a week!... no, i must be out long before that. now that the pain had left me, weak though i was, i was wildly impatient to return to the markovitches. through all these last days' torments i had been conscious of semyonov, seen his hair and his mouth and his beard and his square solidity and his tired, exhausted eyes, and strangely, at the end of it all, felt the touch of his lips on mine. oddly, i did not hate semyonov; i saw quite clearly that i had never hated him--something too impersonal about him, some sense, too, of an outside power driving him. no, i did not hate him, but god! how i feared him--feared him not for my own sake, but for the sake of those who had--was this too arrogant?--been given as it seemed to me,--into my charge. i remembered that monday was the th of april, and that, on that evening, there was to be a big allied meeting at the bourse, at which our ambassador, sir george buchanan, the belgian consul, and others, were to speak. i had promised to take vera to this. tuesday the st of may was to see a great demonstration by all the workmen's and soldiers' committees. it was to correspond with the labour demonstrations arranged to take place on that day all over europe, and the russian date had been altered to the new style in order to provide for this. many people considered that the day would be the cause of much rioting, of definite hostility to the provisional government, of anti-foreign demonstrations, and so on; others, idealistic russians, believed that all the soldiers, the world over, would on that day throw down their arms and proclaim a universal peace.... i for my part believed that it would mark the ending of the first phase of the revolution and the beginning of the second, and that for russia at any rate it would mean the changing from a war of nations into a war of class--in other words, that it would mean the rising up of the russian peasant as a definite positive factor in the world's affairs. but all that political business was only remotely, at that moment, my concern. what i wanted to know was what was happening to nicholas, to vera, to lawrence, and the others. even whilst i was restlessly wondering what i could do to put myself into touch with them, my old woman entered with a letter which she said had been brought by hand. the letter was from markovitch. i give this odd document here exactly as i received it. i do not attempt to emphasise or explain or comment in any way. i would only add that no russian is so mad as he seems to any englishman, and no englishman so foolish as he seems to any russian. i must have received this letter, i think, late on sunday afternoon, because i was, i remember, up and dressed, and walking about my room. it was written on flimsy grey paper in pencil, which made it difficult to read. there were sentences unfinished, words misspelt, and the whole of it in the worst of russian handwritings. certain passages, i am, even now, quite unable to interpret: it ran as follows: dear ivan andreievitch--vera tells me that you are ill again. she has been round to enquire, i think. i did not come because i knew that if i did i should only talk about my own troubles, the same as you've always listened to, and what kind of food is that for a sick man? all the same, that is just what i am doing now, but reading a letter is not like talking to a man; you can always stop and tear the paper when perhaps it would not be polite to ask a man to go. but i hope, nevertheless, that you won't do that with this--not because of any desire i may have to interest you in myself, but because of something of much more importance than either of us, something i want you to believe--something you _must_ believe.... don't think me mad. i am quite sane sitting here in my room writing.... every one is asleep. every one but not everything. i've been queer, now and again, lately... off and on. do you know how it comes? when the inside of the world goes further and further within dragging you after it, until at last you are in the bowels of darkness choking. i've known such moods all my life. haven't you known them? lately, of course, i've been drinking again. i tell you, but i wouldn't own it to most people. but they all know, i suppose.... alexei made me start again, but it's foolish to put everything on to him. if i weren't a weak man he wouldn't be able to do anything with me, would he? do you believe in god, and don't you think that he intended the weak to have some compensation somewhere, because it isn't their fault that they're weak, is it! they can struggle and struggle, but it's like being in a net. well, one must just make a hole in the net large enough to get out of, that's all. and now, ever since two days ago, when i resolved to make that hole, i've been quite calm. i'm as calm as anything now writing to you. two days ago vera told me that he was going back to england.... oh, she was so good to me that day, ivan andreievitch. we sat together all alone in the flat, and she had her hand in mine, just as we used to do in the old days when i pretended to myself that she loved me. now i know that she did not, but the warmer and more marvellous was her kindness to me, her goodness, and nobility. do you not think, ivan andreievitch, that if you go deep enough in every human heart, there is this kernel of goodness, this fidelity to some ideal. do you know we have a proverb: "in each man's heart there is a secret town at whose altars the true prayers are offered!" even perhaps with alexei it is so, only there you must go very deep, and there is no time. but i must tell you about vera. she told me so kindly that he was going to england, and that now her whole life would be led in nina and myself. i held her hand very close in mine and asked her, was it really true that she loved him. and she said, yes she did, but that that she could not help. she said that she had spoken with him, and that they had decided that it would be best for him to go away. then she begged my forgiveness for many things, because she had been harsh or cross,--i don't know what things.... oh, ivan andreievitch, _she_ to beg forgiveness of _me!_ but i held her hand closer and closer, because i knew that it was the last time that i would be able so truly to hold it. how could she not see that now everything was over--everything--quite everything! am i one to hold her, to chain her down, to keep her when she has already escaped? is that the way to prove my fidelity to her? of course i did not speak to her of this, but for the first time in all our years together, i felt older than her and wiser. but of course alexei saw it. how he heard i do not know, but that same day he came to me and he seemed to be very kind. i don't know what he said, but he explained that vera would always be unhappy now, always, longing and waiting and hoping.... "keep him here in russia!" he whispered to me. "she will get tired of him then--they will tire of one another; but if you send him away...." oh! he is a devil, ivan andreievitch, and why has he persecuted me so? what have i ever done to him? nothing... but for weeks now he has pursued me and destroyed my inventions, and flung russia in my face and made nina, dear nina, laugh at me, and now, when the other things are finished, he shows me that vera will be unhappy so long as i am alive. what have i ever done, ivan andreievitch? i am so unimportant, why has he taken such a trouble? to-day i gave him his last chance... or last night... it is four in the morning now, and the bells are already ringing for the early mass. i said to him: "will you go away? leave us all for ever? will you promise never to return?" he said in that dreadful quiet sure way of his: "no, i will never go away until you make me." vera hates him. i cannot leave her alone with him, can i? i (here there are three lines of illegible writing)... so i will think again and again of that last time when we sat together and all the good things that she said. what greatness of soul, what goodness, what splendour! and perhaps after all i am a fortunate man to be allowed to be faithful to so fine a grandeur! many men have poor ambitions, and god bestows his gifts with strange blindness, i often think. but i am tired, and you too will be tired. perhaps you have not got so far. i must thank you for your friendship to me. i am very grateful for it. and you, if afterwards you ever think of me, think that i always wished to... no, why should you think of me at all? but think of russia! that is why i write this. you love russia, and i believe that you will continue to love russia whatever she will do. never forget that it is because she cares so passionately for the good of the world that she makes so many mistakes. she sees farther than other countries, and she cares more. but she is also more ignorant. she has never been allowed to learn anything or to try to do anything for herself. you are all too impatient, too strongly aware of your own conditions, too ignorant of hers! of course there are wicked men here and many idle men, but every country has such. you must not judge her by that nor by all the talk you hear. we talk like blind men on a dark road.... do you believe that there are no patriots here? ah! how bitterly i have been disappointed during these last weeks! it has broken my heart... but do not let your heart be broken. you can wait. you are young. believe in russian patriotism, believe in russian future, believe in russian soul.... try to be patient and understand that she is blindfolded, ignorant, stumbling... but the glory will come; i can see it shining far away!... it is not for me, but for you--and for vera... for vera... vera.... here the letter ended; only scrawled very roughly across the paper the letters n.m.... xiv as soon as i had finished reading the letter i went to the telephone and rang up the markovitches' flat. bohun spoke to me. i asked him whether nicholas was there, he said, "yes, fast asleep in the arm-chair," was semyonov there? "no, he was dining out that night." i asked him to remind vera that i was expecting to take her to the meeting next day, and rang off. there was nothing more to be done just then. two minutes later there was a knock on my door and vera came in. "why!" i cried. "i've just been ringing up to tell you that, of course, i was coming on monday." "that is partly what i wanted to know," she said, smiling. "and also i thought that you'd fancied we'd all deserted you." "no," i answered. "i don't expect you round here every time i'm ill. that would be absurd. you'll be glad to know at any rate that i've decided to give up these ridiculous rooms. i deserve all the illness i get so long as i'm here." "yes, that's good," she answered. "how you could have stayed so long--" she dropped into a chair, closed her eyes and lay back. "oh, ivan andreievitch, but i'm tired!" she looked, lying there, white-faced, her eyelids like grey shadows, utterly exhausted. i waited in silence. after a time she opened her eyes and said, suddenly: "we all come and talk to you, don't we? i, nina, nicholas, sherry (she meant lawrence), even uncle alexei. i wonder why we do, because we never take your advice, you know.... perhaps it's because you seem right outside everything." i coloured a little at that. "did i hurt you?... i'm sorry. no, i don't know that i am. i don't mind now whether i hurt any one. you know that he's going back to england?" i nodded my head. "he told you himself?" "yes," i said. she lay back in her chair and was silent for a long time. "you think i'm a noble woman, don't you. oh yes, you do! i can see you just thirsting for my nobility. it's what uncle alexei always says about you, that you've learnt from dostoieffsky how to be noble, and it's become a habit with you." "if you're going to believe--" i began angrily. "oh, i hate him! i listen to nothing that he says. all the same, durdles, this passion for nobility on your part is very irritating. i can see you now making up the most magnificent picture of my nobility. i'm sure if you were ever to write a book about us all, you'd write of me something like this: 'vera michailovna had won her victory. she had achieved her destiny.... having surrendered her lover she was as fine as a greek statue!' something like that.... oh, i can see you at it!" "you don't understand--" i began. "oh, but i do!" she answered. "i've watched your attitude to me from the first. you wanted to make poor nina noble, and then nicholas, and then, because they wouldn't either of them do, you had to fall back upon me: memories of that marvellous woman at the front, marie some one or other, have stirred up your romantic soul until it's all whipped cream and jam--mulberry jam, you know, so as to have the proper dark colour." "why all this attack on me?" i asked. "what have i done?" "you've done nothing," she cried. "we all love you, durdles, because you're such a baby, because you dream such dreams, see nothing as it is.... and perhaps after all you're right--your vision is as good as another. but this time you've made me restless. you're never to see me as a noble woman again, ivan andreievitch. see me as i am, just for five minutes! i haven't a drop of noble feeling in my soul!" "you've just given him up," i said. "you've sent him back to england, although you adore him, because your duty's with your husband. you're breaking your heart--" "yes, i am breaking my heart," she said quietly. "i'm a dead woman without him. and it's my weakness, my cowardice, that is sending him away. what would a french woman or an english woman have done? given up the world for their lover. given up a thousand nicholases, sacrificed a hundred ninas--that's real life. that's real, i tell you. what feeling is there in my soul that counts for a moment beside my feeling for sherry? i say and i feel and i know that i would die for him, die with him, happily, gladly. those are no empty words. "i who have never been in love before, i am devoured by it now until there is nothing left of me--nothing.... and yet i remain. it is our weakness, our national idleness. i haven't the strength to leave nicholas. i am soft, sentimental, about his unhappiness. pah! how i despise myself.... i am capable of living on here for years with husband and lover, going from one to another, weeping for both of them. already i am pleading with sherry that he should remain here. we will see what will happen. we will see what will happen! ah, my contempt for myself! without bones, without energy, without character. "but this is life, ivan andreievitch! i stay here, i send him away because i cannot bear to see nicholas suffer. and i do not care for nicholas. do you understand that? i never loved him, and now i have a contempt for him--in spite of myself. uncle alexei has done that. oh yes! he has made a fool of nicholas for months, and although i have hated him for doing that, i have seen, also, what a fool nicholas is! but he is a hero, too. make _him_ as noble as you like, ivan andreievitch. you cannot colour it too high. he is the real thing and i am the sham.... but oh! i do not want to live with him any more, i am tired of him, his experiments, his lamentations, his weakness, his lack of humour--tired of him, sick of him. and yet i cannot leave him, because i am soft, soft without bones, like my country, ivan andreievitch.... my lover is strong. nothing can change his will. he will go, will leave me, until he knows that i am free. then he will never leave me again. "perhaps i will get tired of his strength one day--it may be--just as now i am tired of nicholas's weakness. everything has its end. "but no! he has humour, and he sees life as it is. i shall be able always to tell him the truth. with nicholas it is always lies...." she suddenly sprang up and stood before me. "now, do you think me noble?" she cried. "yes," i answered. "ah! you are incorrigible! you have drunk dostoieffsky until you can see nothing but god and the moujik! but i am alive, ivan andreievitch, not a heroine in a book! alive, alive, alive! not one of your lisas or annas or natashas. i'm alive enough to shoot uncle alexei and poison nicholas--but i'm soft too, soft so that i cannot bear to see a rabbit killed... and yet i love sherry so that i am blind for him and deaf for him and dead for him--when he is not there. my love--the only one of my life--the first and the last--" she flung out her arms: "life! now! before it is too late! i want it, i want him, i want happiness!" she stood thus for a moment, staring out to the sea. then her arms dropped, she laughed, fastening her cloak-- "there's your nobility, ivan andreievitch--theatrical, all of it. i know what i am, and i know what i shall do. nicholas will live to eighty; i also. i shall hate him, but i shall he in an agony when he cuts his finger. i shall never see sherry again. later, he will marry a fresh english girl like an apple.... i, because i am weak, soft putty--i have made it so." she turned away from me, staring desperately at the wall. when she looked back to me her face was grey. she smiled. "what a baby you are!... but take care of yourself. don't come on monday if it's bad weather. good-bye." she went. after a bad, sleepless night, and a morning during which i dozed in a nightmareish kind of way, i got up early in the afternoon, had some tea, and about six o'clock started out. it was a lovely evening; the spring light was in the air, the tufted trees beside the canal were pink against the pale sky, and thin layers of ice, like fragments of jade, broke the soft blue of the water. how pleasant to feel the cobbles firm beneath one's feet, to know that the snow was gone for many months, and that light now would flood the streets and squares! nevertheless, my foreboding was not raised, and the veils of colour hung from house to house and from street to street could not change the realities of the scene. i climbed the stairs to the flat and found vera waiting for me. she was with uncle ivan, who, i found to my disappointment, was coming with us. we started off. "we can walk across to the bourse," she said. "it's such a lovely evening, and we're a little early." we talked of nothing but the most ordinary things; uncle ivan's company prevented anything else. to say that i cursed him is to put it very mildly. he had been, i believe, oblivious of all the scenes that had occurred during the last weeks. if the last judgement occurred under his very nose, and he had had a cosy meal in front of him, he would have noticed nothing. the revolution had had no effect on him at all; it did not seem strange to him that semyonov should come to live with them; he had indeed fancied that nicholas had not "been very well" lately, but then nicholas had always been an odd and cantankerous fellow, and he, as he told me, never paid too much attention to his moods. his one anxiety was lest sacha should be hindered from her usual shopping on the morrow, it being may day, when there would be processions and other tiresome things. he hoped that there was enough food in the house. "there will be cold cutlets and cheese," vera said. he told me that he really did not know why he was going to this meeting. he took no interest in politics, and he hated speeches, but he would like to see our ambassador. he had heard that he was always excellently dressed.... vera said very little. her troubles that evening must have been accumulating upon her with terrible force--i did not know, at that time, about her night-scene with nicholas. she was very quiet, and just as we entered the building she whispered to me: "once over to-morrow--" i did not catch the rest. people pressed behind us, and for a moment we were separated; we were not alone again. i have wondered since what she meant by that, whether she had a foreboding or some more definite warning, or whether she simply referred to the danger of riots and general lawlessness. i shall never know now. i had expected a crowded meeting, but i was not prepared for the multitude that i found. we entered by a side-door, and then passed up a narrow passage, which led us to the reserved seats at the side of the platform. i had secured these some days before. in the dark passage one could realise nothing; important gentlemen in frock-coats, officers, and one or two soldiers, were hurrying to and fro, with an air of having a great deal to do, and not knowing at all how to do it. beyond the darkness there was a steady hum, like the distant whirr of a great machine. there was a very faint smell in the air of boots and human flesh. a stout gentleman with a rosette in his buttonhole showed us to our seats. vera sat between uncle ivan and myself. when i looked about me i was amazed. the huge hall was packed so tightly with human beings that one could see nothing but wave on wave of faces, or, rather, the same face, repeated again and again and again, the face of a baby, of a child, of a credulous, cynical dreamer, a face the kindest, the naïvest, the cruellest, the most friendly, the most human, the most savage, the most eastern, and the most western in the world. that vast presentation of that reiterated visage seemed suddenly to explain everything to me. i felt at once the stupidity of any appeal, and the instant necessity for every kind of appeal. i felt the negation, the sudden slipping into insignificant unimportance of the whole of the western world--and, at the same time, the dismissal of the east. "no longer my masters" a voice seemed to cry from the very heart of that multitude. "no longer will we halt at your command, no longer will your words be wisdom to us, no longer shall we smile with pleasure at your stories, and cringe with fear at your displeasure; you may hate our defection, you may lament our disloyalty, you may bribe us and smile upon us, you may preach to us and bewail our sins. we are no longer yours--we are our own--salute a new world, for it is nothing less that you see before you!..." and yet never were there forces more unconscious of their destiny--utterly unselfconscious as animals, babies, the flowers of the field. still there to be driven, perhaps to be persuaded, to be whipped, to be cajoled, to be blinded, to be tricked and deceived, drugged and deafened--but not for long! the end of that old world had come--the new world was at hand--"life begins to-morrow!" the dignitaries came upon the platform, and, beyond them all, in distinction, nobility, wisdom was our own ambassador. this is no place for a record of the discretion and tact and forbearance that he had shown during those last two years. to him had fallen perhaps the most difficult work of all in the war. it might seem that on broad grounds the allies had failed with russia, but the end was not yet, and in years to come, when england reaps unexpected fruit from her russian alliance, let her remember to whom she owed it. no one could see him there that night without realising that there stood before russia, as england's representative, not only a great courtier and statesman, but a great gentleman, who had bonds of courage and endurance that linked him to the meanest soldier there. i have emphasised this because he gave the note to the whole meeting. again and again one's eyes came back to him and always that high brow, that unflinching carriage of the head, the nobility and breeding of every movement gave one reassurance and courage. one's own troubles seemed small beside that example, and the tangled morality of that vexed time seemed to be tested by a simpler and higher standard. it was altogether a strange affair. at first it lacked interest, some member of the italian embassy spoke, i think, and then some one from serbia. the audience was apathetic. all those bodies, so tightly wedged together that arms and legs were held in an iron vice, stayed motionless, and once and again there would be a short burst of applause or a sibilant whisper, but it would be something mechanical and uninspired. i could see one soldier, in the front row behind the barrier, a stout fellow with a face of supreme good humour, down whose forehead the sweat began to trickle; he was patient for a while, then he tried to raise his hand. he could not move without sending a ripple down the whole front line. heads were turned indignantly in his direction. he submitted; then the sweat trickled into his eyes. he made a superhuman effort and half raised his arm; the crowd pushed again and his arm fell. his face wore an expression of ludicrous despair.... the hall got hotter and hotter. soldiers seemed to be still pressing in at the back. the italian gentleman screamed and waved his arms, but the faces turned up to his were blank and amiably expressionless. "it is indeed terribly hot," said uncle ivan. then came a sailor from the black sea fleet who had made himself famous during these weeks by his impassioned oratory. he was a thin dark-eyed fellow, and he obviously knew his business. he threw himself at once into the thick of it all, paying no attention to the stout frock-coated gentlemen who sat on the platform, dealing out no compliments, whether to the audience or the speakers, wasting no time at all. he told them all that they had debts to pay, that their honour was at stake, and that europe was watching them. i don't know that that face that stared at him cared very greatly for europe, but it is certain that a breath of emotion passed across it, that there was a stir, a movement, a response.... he sat down, there was a roar of applause; he regarded them contemptuously. at that moment i caught sight of boris grogoff. i had been on the watch for him. i had thought it very likely that he would be there. well, there he was, at the back of the crowd, listening with a contemptuous sneer on his face, and a long golden curl poking out from under his cap. and then something else occurred--something really strange. i was conscious, as one sometimes is in a crowd, that i was being stared at by some one deliberately. i looked about me, and then, led by the attraction of the other's gaze, i saw quite close to me, on the edge of the crowd nearest to the platform, the rat. he was dressed rather jauntily in a dark suit with his cup set on one side, and his hair shining and curled. his face glittered with soap, and he was smiling in his usual friendly way. he gazed at me quite steadily. my lips moved very slightly in recognition. he smiled and, i fancy, winked. then, as though he had actually spoken to me, i seemed to hear him say: "well, good-bye.... i'm never coming to you again. good-bye, good-bye." it was as definite a farewell as you can have from a man, more definite than you will have from most, as though, further, he said: "i'm gone for good and all. i have other company and more profitable plunder. on the back of our glorious revolution i rise from crime to crime.... good-bye." i was, in sober truth, never to speak to him again. i cannot but regret that on the last occasion when i should have a real opportunity of looking him full in the face, he was to offer me a countenance of friendly good-humour and amiable rascality. i shall have, until i die, a feeling of tenderness.... i was recalled from my observation of grogoff and the rat by the sensation that the waters of emotion were rising higher around me. i raised my eyes and saw that the belgian consul was addressing the meeting. he was a stout little man, with eye-glasses and a face of no importance, but it was quite obvious at once that he was most terribly in earnest. because he did not know the russian language he was under the unhappy necessity of having a translator, a thin and amiable russian, who suffered from short sight and a nervous stammer. he could not therefore have spoken under heavier disadvantages, and my heart ached for him. it need not have done so. he started in a low voice, and they shouted to him to speak up. at the end of his first paragraph the amiable russian began his translation, sticking his nose into the paper, losing the place and stuttering over his sentences. there was a restless movement in the hall, and the poor belgian consul seemed lost. he was made, however, of no mean stuff. before the russian had finished his translation the little man had begun again. this time he had stepped forward, waving his glasses and his head and his hand, bending forward and backward, his voice rising and rising. at the end of his next paragraph he paused and, because the russian was slow and stammering once again, went forward on ids own account. soon he forgot himself, his audience, his translator, everything except his own dear belgium. his voice rose and rose; he pleaded with a marvellous rhythm of eloquence her history, her fate, her shameful devastation. he appealed on behalf of her murdered children, her ravished women, her slaughtered men. he appealed on behalf of her arts, her cathedrals, and libraries ruined, her towns plundered. he told a story, very quietly, of an old grandfather and grandmother murdered and their daughter ravished before the eyes of her tiny children. here he himself began to shed tears. he tried to brush them back. he paused and wiped his eyes.... finally, breaking down altogether, he turned away and hid his face.... i do not suppose that there were more than a dozen persons in that hall who understood anything of the language in which he spoke. certainly it was the merest gibberish to that whole army of listening men. nevertheless, with every word that he uttered the emotion grew tenser. cries--little sharp cries like the bark of a puppy--broke out here and there. "_verrno! verrno! verrno_! (true! true! true!)" movements, like the swift finger of the wind on the sea, hovered, wavered, and vanished.... he turned back to them, his voice broken with sobs, and he could only cry the one word "belgia... belgia... belgia"... to that they responded. they began to shout, to cry aloud. the screams of "_verrno... verrno_" rose until it seemed that the roof would rise with them. the air was filled with shouts, "bravo for the allies." "_soyousniki! soyousniki_!" men raised their caps and waved them, smiled upon one another as though they had suddenly heard wonderful news, shouted and shouted and shouted... and in the midst of it all the little rotund belgian consul stood bowing and wiping his eyes. how pleased we all were! i whispered to vera: "you see! they do care! their hearts are touched. we can do anything with them now!" even uncle ivan was moved, and murmured to himself "poor belgium! poor belgium!" how delighted, too, were the gentlemen on the platform. smiling, they whispered to one another, and i saw several shake hands. a great moment. the little consul bowed finally and sat down. never shall i forget the applause that followed. like one man the thousands shouted, tears raining down their cheeks, shaking hands, even embracing! a vast movement, as though the wind had caught them and driven them forward, rose, lifted them, so that they swayed like bending corn towards the platform, for an instant we were all caught up together. there was one great cry: "belgium!" the sound rose, fell, sunk into a muttering whisper, died to give way to the breathless attention that awaited the next speaker. i whispered to vera: "i shall never forget that. i'm going to leave on that. it's good enough for me." "yes," she said, "we'll go." "what a pity," whispered uncle ivan, "that they didn't understand what they were shouting about." we slipped out behind the platform; turned down the dark long passage, hearing the new speaker's voice like a bell ringing beyond thick walls, and found our way into the open. the evening was wonderfully fresh and clear. the neva lay before us like a blue scarf, and the air faded into colourless beauty above the dark purple of the towers and domes. vera caught my arm: "look!" she whispered. "there's boris!" i knew that she had on several occasions tried to force her way into his flat, that she had written every day to nina (letters as it afterwards appeared, that boris kept from her). i was afraid that she would do something violent. "wait!" i whispered, "perhaps nina is here somewhere." grogoff was standing with another man on a small improvised platform just outside the gates of the bourse. as the soldiers came out (many of them were leaving now on the full tide of their recent emotions) grogoff and his friend caught them, held them, and proceeded to instruct their minds. i caught some of grogoff's sentences: "_tovaristchi_!" i heard him cry, "comrades! listen to me. don't allow your feelings to carry you away! you have serious responsibilities now, and the thing for you to do is not to permit sentiment to make you foolish. who brought you into this war? your leaders? no, your old masters. they bled you and robbed you and slaughtered you to fill their own pockets. who is ruling the world now? the people to whom the world truly belongs? no, the capitalists, the money-grubbers, the old thieves like nicholas who is now under lock and key... capitalists... england, france... thieves, robbers.... "belgium? what is belgium to you? did you swear to protect her people? does england, who pretends such loving care for belgium, does she look after ireland? what about her persecution of south africa? belgium? have you heard what she did in the congo?..." as the men came, talking, smiling, wiping their eyes, they were caught by grogoff's voice. they stood there and listened. soon they began to nod their heads. i heard them muttering that good old word "_verrno! verrno_!" again. the crowd grew. the men began to shout their approval. "aye! it's true," i heard a solder near me mutter. "the english are thieves"; and another "belgium?... after all i could not understand a word of what that little fat man said." i heard no more, but i did not wonder now at the floods that were rising and rising, soon to engulf the whole of this great country. the end of this stage of our story was approaching for all of us. we three had stood back, a little in the shadow, gazing about to see whether we could hail a cab. as we waited i took my last look at grogoff, his stout figure against the purple sky, the masts of the ships, the pale tumbling river, the black line of the farther shore. he stood, his arms waving, his mouth open, the personification of the disease from which russia was suffering. a cab arrived. i turned, said as it were, my farewell to grogoff and everything for which he stood, and went. we drove home almost in silence. vera, staring in front of her, her face proud and reserved, building up a wall of her own thoughts. "come in for a moment, won't you?" she asked me, rather reluctantly i thought. but i accepted, climbed the stairs and followed uncle ivan's stubby and self-satisfied progress into the flat. i heard vera cry. i hurried after her and found, standing close together, in the middle of the room henry bohun and nina! with a little sob of joy and shame too, nina was locked in vera's arms. xv this is obviously the place for the story, based, of course, on the very modest and slender account given me by the hero of it, of young bohun's knightly adventure. in its inception the whole affair is still mysterious to me. looking back from this distance of time i see that he was engaged on one knightly adventure after another--first vera, then markovitch, lastly nina. the first i caught at the very beginning, the second i may be said to have inspired, but to the third i was completely blind. i was blind, i suppose, because, in the first place, nina had, from the beginning, laughed at bohun, and in the second, she had been entirely occupied with lawrence. bohun's knight-errantry came upon her with, i am sure, as great a shock of surprise as it did upon me. and yet, when you come to think of it, it was the most natural thing. they were the only two of our party who had any claim to real youth, and they were still so young that they could believe in one ideal after another as quick as you can catch goldfish in a bowl of water. bohun would, of course, have indignantly denied that he was out to help anybody, but that, nevertheless, was the direction in which his character led him; and once russia had stripped from him that thin coat of self-satisfaction, he had nothing to do but mount his white charger and enter the tournament. i've no idea when he first thought of nina. he did not, of course, like her at the beginning, and i doubt whether she caused him any real concern, too, until her flight to grogoff. that shocked him terribly. he confessed as much to me. she had always been so happy and easy about life. nothing was serious to her. i remember once telling her she ought to take the war more deeply. i was a bit of a prig about it, i suppose. at any rate she thought me one.... and then to go off to a fellow like grogoff! he thought of it the more seriously when he saw the agony vera was in. she did not ask him to help her, and so he did nothing; but he watched her efforts, the letters that she wrote, the eagerness with which she ravished the post, her fruitless visits to grogoff's flat, her dejected misery over her failure. he began himself to form plans, not, i am convinced, from any especial affection for nina, but simply because he had the soul of a knight, although, thank god, he didn't know it. i expect, too, that he was pretty dissatisfied with his knight-errantries. his impassioned devotion to vera had led to nothing at all, his enthusiasm for russia had led to a most unsatisfactory revolution, and his fatherly protection of markovitch had inspired apparently nothing more fruitful than distrust. i would like to emphasise that it was in no way from any desire to interfere in other people's affairs that young bohun undertook these quests. he had none of my own meddlesome quality. he had, i think, very little curiosity and no psychological self-satisfaction, but he had a kind heart, an adventurous spirit, and a hatred for the wrong and injustice which seemed just now to be creeping about the world; but all this, again thank god, was entirely subconscious. he knew nothing whatever about himself. the thought of nina worried him more and more. after he went to bed at night, he would hear her laugh and see her mocking smile and listen to her shrill imitations of his own absurdities. she had been the one happy person amongst them all, and now--! well, he had seen enough of boris grogoff to know what sort of fellow he was. he came at last to the conclusion that, after a week or two she would be "sick to death of it," and longing to get away, but then "her pride would keep her at it. she'd got a devil of a lot of pride." he waited, then, for a while, and hoped, i suppose, that some of vera's appeals would succeed. they did not; and then it struck him that vera was the very last person to whom nina would yield--just because she wanted to yield to her most, which was pretty subtle of him and very near the truth. no one else seemed to be making any very active efforts, and at last he decided that he must do something himself. he discovered grogoff's address, went to the gagarinskaya and looked up at the flat, hung about a bit in the hope of seeing nina. then he did see her at rozanov's party, and this, although he said nothing to me about it at the time, had a tremendous effect on him. he thought she looked "awful." all the joy had gone from her; she was years older, miserable, and defiant. he didn't speak to her, but from that night he made up his mind. rozanov's party may be said to have been really the turning-point of his life. it was the night that he came out of his shell, grew up, faced the world--and it was the night that he discovered that he cared about nina. the vision of her poor little tired face, her "rather dirty white dress," her "grown-up" hair, her timidity and her loneliness, never left him for a moment. all the time that i thought he was occupied only with the problem of markovitch and semyonov, he was much more deeply occupied with nina. so unnaturally secretive can young men be! at last he decided on a plan. he chose the monday, the day of the bourse meeting, because he fancied that grogoff would be present at that and he might therefore catch nina alone, and because he and his fellow-propagandists would be expected also at the meeting and he would therefore be free of his office earlier on that afternoon. he had no idea at all how he would get into the flat, but he thought that fortune would be certain to favour him. he always thought that. well, fortune did. he left the office and arrived in the gagarinskaya about half-past five in the evening. he walked about a little, and then saw a bearded tall fellow drive up in an isvostchick. he recognised this man as lenin, the soul of the anti-government party, and a man who was afterwards to figure very prominently in russia's politics. this fellow argued very hotly with the isvostchick about his fare, then vanished through the double doors. bohun followed him. outside grogoff's flat lenin waited and rang the bell. bohun waited on the floor below; then, when he heard the door open, he noiselessly slipped up the stairs, and, as lenin entered, followed behind him whilst the old servant's back was turned helping lenin with his coat. he found, as he had hoped, a crowd of cloaks and a shuba hanging beside the door in the dark corner of the wall. he crept behind these. he heard lenin say to the servant that, after all, he would not take off his coat, as he was leaving again immediately. then directly afterwards grogoff came into the hall. that was the moment of crisis. did grogoff go to the rack for his coat and all was over; a very unpleasant scene must follow--a ludicrous expulsion, a fling or two at the amiable habits of thieving and deceit on the part of the british nation, and any hope of seeing nina ruined perhaps for ever. worst of all, the ignominy of it! no young man likes to be discovered hidden behind a coat-rack, however honest his original intentions! his heart beat to suffocation as he peeped between the coats.... grogoff was already wearing his own overcoat. it was, thank god, too warm an evening for a shuba. the men shook hands, and grogoff saying something rather deferentially about the meeting, lenin, in short, brusque tones, put him immediately in his place. then they went out together, the door closed behind them, and the flat was as silent as an aquarium. he waited for a while, and then, hearing nothing, crept into the hall. perhaps nina was out. if the old servant saw him she would think him a burglar and would certainly scream. he pushed back the door in front of him, stepped forward, and almost stepped upon nina! she gave a little cry, not seeing whom it was. she was looking very untidy, her hair loose down her back, and a rough apron over her dress. she looked ill, and there were heavy black lines under her eyes as though she had not slept for weeks. then she saw who it was and, in spite of herself, smiled. "genry!" she exclaimed. "yes," he said in a whisper, closing the door very softly behind him. "look here, don't scream or do anything foolish. i don't want that old woman to catch me." he has no very clear memory of the conversation that followed. she stood with her back to the wall, storing at him, and every now and again taking up a corner of her pinafore and biting it. he remembered that action of hers especially as being absurdly childish. but the overwhelming impression that he had of her was of her terror--terror of everything and of everybody, of everybody apparently except himself. (she told him afterwards that he was the only person in the world who could have rescued her just then because she simply couldn't be frightened of some one at whom she'd laughed so often.) she was terrified, of course, of grogoff--she couldn't mention his name without trembling--but she was terrified also of the old servant, of the flat, of the room, of the clock, of every sound or hint of a sound that there was in the world. she to be so frightened! she of whom he would have said that she was equal to any one or anything! what she must have been through during those weeks to have brought her to this!... but she told him very little. he urged her at once that she must come away with him, there and then, just as she was. she simply shook her head at that. "no... no... no..." she kept repeating. "you don't understand." "i do understand," he answered, always whispering, and with one ear on the door lest the old woman should hear and come in. "we've got very little time," he said. "grogoff will never let you go if he's here. i know why you don't come back--you think we'll all look down on you for having gone. but that's nonsense. we are all simply miserable without you." but she simply continued to repeat "no... no..." then, as he urged her still further, she begged him to go away. she said that he simply didn't know what grogoff would do if he returned and found him, and although he'd gone to a meeting he might return at any moment. then, as though to urge upon him grogoff's ferocity, in little hoarse whispers she let him see some of the things that during these weeks she'd endured. he'd beaten her, thrown things at her, kept her awake hour after hour at night making her sing to him... and, of course, worst things, things far, far worse that she would never tell to anybody, not even to vera! poor nina, she had indeed been punished for her innocent impetuosities. she was broken in body and soul; she had faced reality at last and been beaten by it. she suddenly turned away from him, buried her head in her arm, as a tiny child does, and cried.... it was then that he discovered he loved her. he went to her, put his arm round her, kissed her, stroked her hair, whispering little consoling things to her. she suddenly collapsed, burying her head in his breast and watering his waistcoat with her tears.... after that he seemed to be able to do anything with her that he pleased. he whispered to her to go and get her hat, then her coat, then to hurry up and come along.... as he gave these last commands he heard the door open, turned and saw masha, grogoff's old witch of a servant, facing him. the scene that followed must have had its ludicrous side. the old woman didn't scream or make any kind of noise, she simply asked him what he was doing there; he answered that he was going out for a walk with the mistress of the house. she said that he should do nothing of the kind. he told her to stand away from the door. she refused to move. he then rushed at her, caught her round the waist, and a most impossible struggle ensued up and down the middle of the room. he called to nina to run, and had the satisfaction of seeing her dart through the door like a frightened hare. the old woman bit and scratched and kicked, making sounds all the time like a kettle just on the boil. suddenly, when he thought that nina had had time to get well away, he gave the old woman a very unceremonious push which sent her back against grogoff's chief cabinet, and he had the comfort to hear the whole of this crash to the ground as he closed the door behind him. out in the street he found nina, and soon afterwards an isvostchick. she crouched up close against him, staring in front of her, saying nothing, shivering and shivering.... as he felt her hot hand shake inside his, he vowed that he would never leave her again. i don't believe that he ever will. so he took her home, and his knight errantry was justified at last. xvi these events had for a moment distracted my mind, but as soon as i was alone i felt the ever-increasing burden of my duty towards markovitch. the sensation was absolutely dream-like in its insistence on the one hand that i should take some kind of action, and its preventing me, on the other, from taking any action at all. i felt the strange inertia of the spectator in the nightmare, who sees the house tumbling about his head and cannot move. besides, what action could i take? i couldn't stand over markovitch, forbid him to stir from the flat, or imprison semyonov in his room, or warn the police... besides, there were now no police. moreover, vera and bohun and the others were surely capable of watching markovitch. nevertheless something in my heart insisted that it was i who was to figure in this.... through the dusk of the streets, in the pale ghostly shadows that prelude the coming of the white nights, i seemed to see three pursuing figures, semyonov, markovitch, and myself. i was pursuing, and yet held. i went back to my flat, but all that night i could not sleep. already the first music of the may day processions could be heard, distant trumpets and drums, before i sank into uneasy, bewildered slumber. i dreamt then dreams so fantastic and irresolute that i cannot now disentangle them. i remember that i was standing beside the banks of the neva. the river was rising, flinging on its course in the great tempestuous way that it always has during the first days of its release from the ice. the sky grew darker--the water rose. i sought refuge in the top gallery of a church with light green domes, and from here i watched the flood, first as it covered the quays, tumbling in cascades of glittering water over the high parapet, trickling in little lines and pools, then rising into sheeted levels, then billowing in waves against the walls of the house, flooding the doors and the windows, until so far as the eye could reach there were only high towers remaining above its grasp. i do not know what happened to my security, and saw at length the waters stretch from sky to sky, one dark, tossing ocean. the sun rose, a dead yellow; slowly the waters sank again, islands appeared, stretches of mud and waste. heaving their huge bodies out of the ocean, vast monsters crawled through the mud, scaled and horned, lying like logs beneath the dead sun. the waters sank--forests rose. the sun sank and there was black night, then a faint dawn, and in the early light of a lovely morning a man appeared standing on the beach, shading his eyes, gazing out to sea. i fancied that in that strong bearded figure i recognised my peasant, who had seemed to haunt my steps so often. gravely he looked round him, then turned back into the forest.... was my dream thus? frankly i do not know--too neat an allegory to be true, perhaps--and yet there was something of this in it. i know that i saw boris, and the rat, and vera, and semyonov, and markovitch, appearing, vanishing, reappearing, and that i was strongly conscious that the submerged and ruined world did not _touch_ them, and was only a background to their own individual activities.... i know that markovitch seemed to come to me again and cry, "be patient... be patient.... have faith... be faithful!" i know that i woke struggling to keep him with me, crying out that he was not to leave me, that that way was danger.... i woke to find my room flooded with sunshine, and my old woman looking at me with disapproval. "wake up, barin," she was saying, "it's three o'clock." "three o'clock?" i muttered, trying to pull myself together. "three in the afternoon... i have some tea for you." when i realised the time i had the sensation of the wildest panic. i jumped from my bed, pushing the old woman out of the room. i had betrayed my trust! i had betrayed my trust! i felt assured 'that some awful catastrophe had occurred, something that i might have prevented. when i was dressed, disregarding my housekeeper's cries, i rushed out into the street. at my end of the ekaterinsgofsky canal i was stopped by great throngs of men and women returning homewards from the procession. they were marching, most of them, in ordered lines across the street, arm in arm, singing the "marseillaise." very different from the procession a few weeks before. that had been dumb, cowed, bewildered. this was the movement of a people conscious of their freedom, sure of themselves, disdaining the world. everywhere bands were playing, banners were glittering, and from the very heart of the soil, as it seemed, the "marseillaise" was rising. although the sun only shone at brief intervals, there was a sense of spring warmth in the air. for some time i could not cross the street, then i broke through and almost ran down the deserted stretch of the canal. i arrived almost breathless at the door in the english prospect. there i found sacha watching the people and listening to the distant bands. "sacha!" i cried, "is alexei petrovitch at home?" "no, barin," she answered, looking at me in some surprise. "he went out about a quarter of an hour ago." "and nicholas markovitch?" "he went out just now." "did he tell you where he was going?" "no, barin, but i heard alexei petrovitch tell him, an hour back, that he was going to katerinhof." i did not listen to more. i turned and went. katerinhof was a park, ten minutes distant from my island; it was so called because there was there the wooden palace of katherine the great. she had once made it her place of summer residence, but it was now given over to the people and was, during the spring and summer, used by them as a kind of fair and pleasure-garden. the place had always been to me romantic and melancholy, with the old faded wooden palace, the deserted ponds, and the desolate trees. i had never been there in the summer. i don't know with what idea i hurried there. i can only say that i had no choice but to go, and that i went as though i were still continuing my dream of the morning. great numbers of people were hurrying there also. the road was thronged, and many of them sang as they went. looking back now it has entirely a dream-like colour. i stepped from the road under the trees, and was at once in a world of incredible fantasy. so far as the eye could see there were peasants; the air was filled with an indescribable din. as i stepped deeper into the shelter of the leafless trees the colour seemed, like fluttering banners, to mingle and spread and sway before my eyes. near to me were the tub-thumpers now so common to us all in petrograd--men of the grogoff kind stamping and shouting on their platforms, surrounded by open-mouthed soldiers and peasants. here, too, were the quacks such as you might see at any fair in europe--quack dentists, quack medicine-men, men with ointments for healing sores, men with pills, and little bottles of bright liquid, and tricks for ruptures and broken legs and arms. a little way beyond them were the pedlars. here were the wildest men in the world. tartars and letts and indians, asiatics with long yellow faces, and strange fellows from northern russia. they had everything to sell, bright beads and looking-glasses and little lacquered trays, coloured boxes, red and green and yellow, lace and silk and cloths of every colour, purple and crimson and gold. from all these men there rose a deafening gabble. i pressed farther, although the crowd now around me was immense, and so i reached the heart of the fair. here were enormous merry-go-rounds, and i had never seen such glittering things. they were from china, japan, where you will. they were hung in shining, gleaming colours, covered with tinsel and silver, and, as they went tossing round, emitting from their hearts a wild barbaric wail that may have been, in some far eastern city, the great song of all the lovers of the world for all i know, the colours flashed and wheeled and dazzled, and the light glittered from stem to stem of the brown silent trees. here was the very soul of the east. near me a chinaman, squatting on his haunches, was showing before a gaping crowd the exploits of his trained mice, who walked up and down little crimson ladders, poked their trembling noses through holes of purple silk, and ran shivering down precipices of golden embroidery. near to him two japanese were catching swords in their mouths, and beyond them again a great number of chinese were tumbling and wrestling, and near to them again some japanese children did little tricks, catching coloured balls in wooden cups and turning somersaults. around all these a vast mass of peasants pushed and struggled. like children they watched and smiled and laughed, and always, like the flood of the dream, their numbers seemed to increase and increase.... the noise was deafening, but always above the merry-go-rounds and the cheap-jacks and the shrill screams of the japanese and the cries of the pedlars i heard the chant of the "marseillaise" carried on high through the brown leafless park. i was bewildered and dazzled by the noise and the light. i turned desperately, pushing with my hands as one does in a dream. then i saw markovitch and semyonov. i had no doubt at all that the moment had at last arrived. it was as though i had seen it all somewhere before. semyonov was standing a little apart leaning against a tree, watching with his sarcastic smile the movements of the crowd. markovitch was a little way off. i could see his eyes fixed absolutely on semyonov. he did not move nor notice the people who jostled him. semyonov made a movement with his hand as though he had suddenly come to some decision. he walked slowly away in the direction of the palace. markovitch, keeping a considerable distance from him, followed. for a moment i was held by the crowd around me, and when at last i got free semyonov had disappeared, and i could just see markovitch turning the corner of the palace. i ran across the grass, trying to call out, but i could not hear my own voice. i turned the corner, and instantly i was in a strange place of peace. the old building with its wooden lattices and pillars stood melancholy guard over the dead pond on whose surface some fragments of ice still lay. there was no sun, only a heavy, oppressive air. all the noise was muffled as though a heavy door had swung to. they were standing quite close to me. semyonov had turned and faced us both. i saw him smile, and his lips moved. a moment later i saw markovitch fling his hand forward, and in the air the light on the revolver twinkled. i heard no sound, but i saw semyonov raise his arm, as though in self-defence. his face, lifted strangely to the bare branches, was triumphant, and i heard quite clearly the words, like a cry of joy and welcome: "at last!... at last!" he tumbled forward on his face. i saw markovitch turn the revolver on himself, and then heard a report, sharp and deafening, as though we had been in a small room. i saw markovitch put his hand to his side, and his mouth, open as though in astonishment, was suddenly filled with blood. i ran to him, caught him in my arms; he turned on me a face full of puzzled wonder, i caught the word "vera," and he crumpled up against my heart. even as i held him, i heard coming closer and closer the rough triumphant notes of the "marseillaise." the end available by internet archive (https://archive.org) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/ / -h.zip) images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/russiaspartinwor shum transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). russia's part in the world war by colonel c. m. shumsky-solomonov published by the russian information bureau in the u. s. woolworth building new york city copyright by russian information bureau new york introduction the author of this pamphlet, colonel c. m. shumsky-solomonov, is an officer of the russian army, a distinguished soldier and an authority on military problems. col. shumsky-solomonov was one of the defenders of port arthur during the russo-japanese war, and as a military expert of the petrograd daily, "birjeviya viedomosti", he was well known not only in russia but also throughout europe. the purpose of this pamphlet is to present russia's part in the recent war. russia at present lies in seas of blood and tears because of her enormous sacrifices in the struggle against prussian militarism. the nightmare of bolshevism was able to overtake russia because she was exhausted by three years of active participation in the war, during which her casualties reached , , , and her economic life became overstrained and partially destroyed. russia's present pitiful condition is the result of her self-sacrificing services to humanity. according to the data quoted by col. shumsky-solomonov, of the , , russian casualties in the recent war, not less than , , were in dead. "russia's losses," says col. shumsky-solomonov, "are more than twice those of france, four-five times those of england, and more than thirty-five times those of america. russia's losses are more than twice the total strength of the british army, and three-four times all the forces mustered by the united states. the number of russia's casualties is larger than the total population of any of the following european countries: sweden, norway, denmark, portugal, belgium, holland or the balkan states." if russia had not sacrificed , , of her best youth, now sleeping on the battle-fields of europe, a prussian bayonet would now be ruling the world. as col. shumsky-solomonov points out, the great role played by russia in the recent struggle "became apparent at the very beginning of the war, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating the initial and most dangerous plan of the germans, by her early offensive in aid of the allies. russia, having diverted against herself the entire austrian army and part of the german, at the time of the battle on the marne, through her offensive in east prussia and galicia, deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea of moltke's plan to fling 'all forces into france.'" "at the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in france, to break through to calais, at ypres," says col. shumsky-solomonov, "russia, by the blows she delivered in galicia, at warsaw and in east prussia, contributed to the early termination of this second offensive in france, so dangerous to england, and compelled the germans for more than a year to abstain from their main operations on the main decisive front of the war--in france. "in russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the struggle against germany, austria and turkey, although forced to abandon poland, still gave the allies the opportunity to prepare throughout a whole year for the coming german offensive at verdun. in russia, thanks to the brusilov offensive, saved italy at that critical moment when the austrians, through their successful offensive from tyrol, in the rear of the italians, threatened to cut off a considerable portion of the italian army, at the same time menacing venice. together with this, russia by this offensive greatly facilitated the operations of the allies on the somme, and was instrumental in the final clearing of the verdun forts. "in the same year russia took upon herself the blows of mackensen's and falkenhayn's armies, which had invaded roumania, stopped the further advance of the germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable stretch of the roumanian front." in the beginning of the war, in august, , there were, in addition to the austrian army, only german divisions engaged on the russian front. during the first russian advance into eastern prussia, the german general staff was obliged, on the eve of the battle of the marne, to transfer additional divisions to the eastern front. the number of german divisions engaged on the russian front grew continuously, and in october, , there were divisions, in november-- divisions, in december-- divisions, and in january, ,-- german divisions on the russian front. the role played by russia and the services the russian armies rendered in the struggle against prussian imperialism can be seen further from the fact that during the spring of there were german and austrian divisions engaged on the russian front alone, while on all the other allied fronts together there were german and austrian divisions.[ ] to this it must be added that russia entered the war unprepared for a modern struggle. as col. shumsky-solomonov points out, "the russian army consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth of its number." general brusilov once said: "our soldiers had no shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements before an attack; so it was necessary for them to break down the wires with their own bodies and thus to form a bridge for the next attacking column." in the fall of the russian armies collapsed after months of intensive german and bolshevist propaganda, but this cannot minimize the great heroism of the russian soldiers during the first three years of the war, heroism without which the alliance of the democratic nations would never have been able to defeat the prussian militarism. a. j. sack _director of the russian information bureau in the u. s._ may , . russia's part in the world war was it possible for germany to win the war? in discussing russia's role in the past world war, it is customary to cite the losses sustained by the russian army, losses numbering many millions. there is no doubt that russia's sacrifices were great, and it is just as true that her losses were greater than those sustained by any of the other allies. nevertheless, these sacrifices are by far not the only standard of measurement of russia's participation in this gigantic struggle. russia's role must be gauged, first of all, by the efforts made by the russian army to blast the german war plans during the first years of the war, when neither america, nor italy, nor roumania were among the belligerents, and the british army was still in the process of formation. russia's role must in addition be gauged by the efforts put forth by the russian army to save the situation at other critical moments of the war. and of such, we know, there were not a few until the allies succeeded in gaining their victory over the stubborn and powerful enemy. lastly, and this is the main thing, the role played by the russian army must be considered also in this respect that the strenuous campaign waged by russia, with her millions of inhabitants, for three years against germany, austro-hungary and turkey, sapped the resources of the enemy and thereby made possible the delivery of the final blow. this weakening of the powers of the enemy by russia was already bound at various stages of the war to facilitate correspondingly the various operations of the allies. therefore at the end of the war three years of effort on the part of russia, which had devoured the enemy's forces, were destined to enable the allies finally to crush the enemy. the final catastrophe of the central powers was the direct consequence of the offensive of the allies in , but russia made possible this collapse to a considerable degree, having effected, in common with the others, the weakening of germany, and having consumed during the three years of strenuous fighting countless reserves, forces and resources of the central powers. could germany have won the war? a careful analysis of this question brings home the conviction that germany was very close to victory, and that it required unusual straining of efforts on the part of france and russia to prevent germany from "winning out." the plan of the old field marshal, moltke, was far from worthless. it is a fact that it took from six weeks to two months to mobilize the armed forces of russia, during which period russia was unprepared for action. the population of germany was million and that of austria-hungary million, a total of million persons. during these two months of forced inaction those millions of teutons were faced only by million frenchmen, for russia was not yet ready. a threefold superiority in numbers, in addition to an equal degree of military skill, technical equipment and culture, was bound to crush lone france. it is true that for the complete realization of this scheme it was necessary that the austrian army, as well, involve france. this should have been anticipated, as military science does not admit of the division of forces. just to the contrary, it demands "the concentration of all forces in the decisive hour and at the deciding point,"--in france, upon this particular occasion. it may be said that russia could have occupied galicia and east prussia had the austrian army left for france. well, the fact is that both these provinces were occupied by russia anyhow. but if in the first battle of the marne, when the germans felt the shortage of the two or three corps dispatched back into prussia, they would have had these troops at their disposal in addition to half a million austrians, joffre's condition would have been rendered critical. the loss of the marne would have been equivalent to the loss of the war by france, and, consequently, to the loss of the entire war. the outcome was different. the concentrated attack upon france failed because of the fact that of the german divisions and the austrian divisions only about or divisions were on the scene of action in france. the russian army, unprepared for action for another days, nevertheless rushed into east prussia in an impulse of self-sacrifice and received in addition the full strength of the blow from the austro-hungarian army. this generous move on the part of russia destroyed the moltke plan and his basic idea "the concentration of _all forces_ against france", as a part of the german force had been diverted from that front. the plan collapsed, and the only actual chance which the germans had of winning a victory was lost with it. later, when russia was prepared, when the english army began to grow, and italy, roumania and america had abandoned their neutrality, germany's chances for a final victory vanished. it is the recognition of these facts that should prompt every impartial historian of the war to admit that the self-sacrifice of the unprepared russian army during the first days of the war played an enormous role in the only period when germany had victory almost within her grasp. it is to be regretted that the extraordinary conditions which developed in russia towards the end of the war are obscuring the true historic role of russia in the sanguine world struggle. it is simple enough to understand that during the two or three years, while the british army was still in the process of formation, and italy, roumania and america were neutral, the entire burden of fighting the central powers devolved upon the armies of france and russia. it is just as simple to understand that during that period, when the enemy was most powerful and undemoralized, when he was operating with his best troops, that the most difficult and responsible part of the problem had to be performed. it is just as easy--from an examination of the maps of the first three years of the war, maps which speak only of two principal fronts, the french and the russian, and no other--to grasp the significance of the gigantic role played in this war by great russia and the millions of sacrifices she consecrated to the common cause of the allies. sadly enough, this only correct criterion of russia's historic role in the war is becoming more and more obscured from the public opinion of the world. in the recently published memoirs of general ludendorf, the defeated german military leader, in an endeavor to clear himself, attempts to slander the russian army and discredit all the great sacrifices and heroic efforts contributed by russia to the allied cause. taking advantage of the scant familiarity of the general public with military matters, ludendorf uses false data, cites wrong figures and consciously distorts the historic perspective of the war. it is difficult to understand how a serious-minded military leader can stoop to employ, in a supposedly serious work, methods fit for the yellow press, such as accusing russian generals of treason, etc., etc. these memoirs, as a whole, were met at the time of their publication by sharp and adverse criticism in the foreign, and even the german, press. ludendorf's memoirs are especially misleading in the part describing the first russian advance in east prussia, the advance that played such a decisive role in the defeat which the germans suffered on the marne. it should never be forgotten that this event proved fatal and brought about the final defeat of the germans in this sonov.[ ] russia's sacrifice ludendorf commences his recital of events on the russian front with the statement that in , in east prussia, with a force of only two german corps, he destroyed , russians--six army corps--under the command of general samsonov, and that general rennenkampf, who was only within two or three days' march from samsonov, had designedly failed to aid samsonov. this statement by general ludendorf is absolutely false from beginning to end. it can be very easily proven that ludendorf attacked samsonov not with two army corps, but with more than , german troops. with this army he attacked not , russians, but only two russian army corps, i. e., , men--the st and the th russian army corps. thus, ludendorf had a force three times larger than his adversary. it may be easily seen from this that while ludendorf gives samsonov twice as many men as he had in reality, he, at the same time, credits rennenkampf with three times the number he actually had. his own force ludendorf puts, on paper, at one-third of what he had in fact. rennenkampf knew nothing about the events on the samsonov front until august , whereas the latter was surrounded on august . (see gurko's book, "war and revolution.") the cause of the russian defeat in that battle was not the "genius" of ludendorf, but lay rather in the fact that the russian army, _in its eagerness to relieve paris, advanced too quickly, with not fully mobilized and insufficient forces, and in two separate armies_, coupled with the difficulty of reconnoitering and obtaining information about the enemy in a country where the entire population was in a state of armed belligerency. the death of samsonov and of a part of his staff and the disruption of liaison were other causes.[ ] in her haste to aid her allies, russia risked much, and she lost a battle on account of the precariousness of the operation, insufficiency of forces and an unfortunate accident. but she succeeded in diverting several german corps from france, and the russian blood shed at tannenberg thus helped win the first battle of the marne. it may thus be seen from the descriptions of the first battles in east prussia that ludendorf, for the sake of german martial glory and probably also for the glorification of his own role, makes use of a very primitive and naive expedient. he multiplies the number of russian troops several times, and also diminishes his own forces several times. this creates the impression that ludendorf with "inconsiderable" forces smashed the "many times larger" forces of the russians. as a matter of fact, however, as we have seen, ludendorf had in these engagements, ½, , and sometimes even times as many men as the russians. how excessive this superiority of numbers was may be inferred from the fact that the germans themselves went to france with but ½ times as many men and that they considered this sufficient for a decisive victory over the french army. however, no matter how much ludendorf may distort the facts in his memoirs, he cannot refrain, albeit only by - words, from mentioning the strategical catastrophe which overtook germany through the invasion of east prussia by the russian troops. ludendorf himself admits that "_the transfer of the two army corps from the french front to eastern prussia had fatal consequences for germany. the german advance on france was turned into a retreat._" this admission from ludendorf characterizes the importance of all the events of the first few weeks of the war and it contains an involuntary appreciation of the historic role and self-sacrificing efforts of russia. the enemy, albeit indirectly, admits that russian blood was not shed in vain on the fields of east prussia; it was precisely for this reason that germany was unable to win the war at the only moment at which she could ever have won, taking advantage of russia's unpreparedness and the temporary isolation of france. in conclusion, we must also point out that from a formal standpoint russia was not bound to fling herself into a risky operation in east prussia. the russian army, like any other army, was bound to take the field actively only after the completion of her mobilization, and this early assistance was still less her duty as she herself was at the time invaded by austrian forces. but russia regarded her alliance with france from a higher standpoint than mere formal obligations. the justice of history--not the "history" of ludendorf--will in its own time record how far russia stood from egotistic politics and egotistic strategy during those tragic days of august and september, , when the german masses, smashing every obstacle in their path, moved through northern france on paris. the german defeat at warsaw the battle of ypres, the determined operations of the germans for the capture of calais, is the other critical moment in the history of the world war, when russia once more brought heavy sacrifices to the common cause of the allies. ludendorf, in describing these difficult days for the germans, again makes use, we regret to say, of the same unsavory expedient he used in describing the first engagements in east prussia. thus, for instance, he asserts that when he was defeated in october, , at warsaw, the russians had , , men,[ ] while he had only one german army--the th--and one austrian army--the st. as a matter of fact, the russians were opposed, on the entire front, by five austrian armies and two german armies--the th and the th--by more than divisions approximating about , , men. the russians, having left only a small force to oppose four austrian armies, fell with their three armies upon two enemy armies, one german and one austrian, near warsaw. with a numerical superiority of one and a quarter to one the russians defeated the germans, and threw them back across the whole of poland to posen. the germans saved themselves on that occasion only by destroying the railroads back of them and by burning the bridges. the significance of the operations at warsaw and in galicia in october, and beyond warsaw in november, , is to be seen from ludendorf's own story. referring to a conversation he had with general falkenhayn, who at that time was the main leader of all german army operations, he writes in his memoirs: "at the end of october, , general von falkenhayn summoned me to berlin.... _gen. von falkenhayn spoke hopefully of the attack near ypres_, and wanted to defer further decisions." but already in the beginning of november, i. e., a few days after this conversation, the operations of the russian armies in galicia, the posen territory, and on the east prussian front, greatly diminished the hopefulness of falkenhayn and _compelled him to slacken the pressure against the allies at ypres and to transfer large forces from france to the russian front--to the detriment of the offensive against ypres_. ludendorf himself figures these reinforcements which arrived from france in the middle of november, and, consequently, must have left there in the beginning of november, at , men. there were corps with infantry divisions, which ludendorf figures at , men. besides, ludendorf mentions right here the arrival of richthofen's cavalry corps, hollen's cavalry corps, the nd and th cavalry divisions. still earlier ludendorf mentions that the newly formed th reserve corps and the th reserve corps were dispatched to east prussia. and finally, in still another place, we can find in ludendorf's account a number of other new divisions which had been sent to the russian front instead of to ypres. in this manner it is easy to see, from the data furnished by ludendorf himself, that, "hopeful" at the end of october for the success of the attack on ypres, falkenhayn found it necessary to dispatch from france , additional soldiers to the russian front, aside from the reserves taken from the interior of germany, which forces would also have been welcome to the germans during the fateful days at ypres. while the frontal attacks on ypres, attended by considerable casualties, demanded the presence of large german reserves, these reserves were the very ones which were swallowed up entirely by the russian operations in the east, at warsaw, galicia and east prussia. [illustration: while the russian troops were persecuting the defeated austrians in galicia, general hindenburg began an advance towards warsaw. the russian general staff transferred from galicia three armies for the defense of warsaw, and these armies defeated the two austro-german armies and persecuted them through poland up to the border of germany (october, ).] if the firmness of the allies held back the germans at ypres and prevented them from breaking through to calais, the russian army also played an important part in this strategic situation--compelling the germans to abandon the operation at ypres much earlier than the germans and falkenhayn had figured. but not in this alone was the role of russia apparent in the trying days of october and november, . not only did russia force the germans to transfer , soldiers to the east, and to abandon early the operations in france, but she also compelled the germans, by her operations in , _to abandon for more than a year all large offensives in the west_. this is attested not only by the facts (as is well known, from the end of up to february, , the germans did not start any offensive in france), but by ludendorf himself, notwithstanding all his endeavors to discredit the russian army. speaking of the weakness of the german front in the west in the month of november, ludendorf says that it was perfectly natural "that in this situation our eyes should again turn to the east."... further on he adds that he had asked himself whether it were not better "once and for all to restrict operations on the western front to a defensive and to carry out the contemplated operations against russia with all our available forces.... this point of view seemed to me to be the right one, and i asked our high command for reinforcements from the west...." thus, such facts as the abandonment by the germans of all operations in the west for more than a year, as well as ludendorf's own words, prove with absolute clearness and conclusiveness that the germans, partly through the firmness of the allies, but mainly on account of the hard blows from the russian army, found themselves compelled for a long time to refrain from an offensive in france. there is no doubt but that the germans never abandoned entirely the attempt to crush france, for we have seen how such a serious attempt was made by them subsequently at verdun. but if they were compelled at the end of to defer this attempt at crushing france for more than a year, it is obvious that the decisive part in this decision of the germans was played by russia, in the increasing offensive of her armies all along the front from the baltic to the carpathians. [illustration: this diagram shows that the germans had calculated, at first, to stop the russian army with the aid of the austrian troops and only of their own divisions-- infantry and one cavalry divisions. soon, in september, , they were compelled to forward more divisions to the east,--during the marne period. later, when the austrians were defeated, the number of german relief columns increased and numbered, at the end of , divisions, instead of the former divisions,--three times as many. early in the number of german divisions grew to . during and the number of the german troops on the russian front was also increasing incessantly, at the expense of german strength on the french front.] _thus, if the taking of the field by unprepared russia in the beginning of the war contributed to the defeat of the most dangerous and main plan of the germans, in august and september, the new sacrifices brought by russia in october and november on the plains of galicia, poland and east prussia compelled the germans to desist for more than a year from all attempts to win the war in france. august and september, , were the months in which the german forces were brought to a standstill, and october and november saw them already much impaired._ at both important, critical moments russia played her decisive part. _at this same period, towards the close of , the germans were compelled by the operations of the russian army to increase the number of their troops on the russian front up to divisions. if the germans were unable in the beginning of the war to win out in france where they had all their forces, allotting to the russian front only divisions and the austrian army, so much the less could they have won at the end of , when the russians had compelled them to have divisions in the field, that is, to treble their forces on the russian front, to the detriment of their french front._ new opportunities for the allies the third great period of the world-conflict-- --is the year of russia's single-handed fight against germany, austria and turkey. this year was hardest for russia not only because all attention and all efforts of the three enemy powers were directed against russia alone, but also because in russia was less than ever before prepared for the struggle--being without arms, shells and munitions. no matter how much ludendorf may distort the truth in his memoirs, the whole world knows that in that year the russian positions were covered not by barbed wire entanglements, but by the naked breasts of the russian soldiers, and german charges were repulsed not by artillery barrages but by the bayonet, by cold steel--reminding us of the times when the mexicans, armed only with spears, fought against the rifles and cannon of the spaniards under fernando cortez. russia's loss of poland in is altogether a result of this situation, unprecedented in any of the wars fought by european nations. it was hard to gain victory when the shortage of arms was so great that some corps counted but , bayonets instead of , , and at the same time it was impossible to complement these corps with their quota of men because these men had no rifles. russia had called millions to the colors, but had rifles only for one-tenth of her men. it is only too obvious that nothing could be accomplished with millions of men of whom only one in ten was armed. but in , when russia acquired rifles and artillery, brusilov launched his memorable offensive which netted more than , prisoners. another great offensive was in preparation for , but the revolution interfered with its realization. however that may be, the germans had planned to have done with russia by confronting it with austrian armies and with four or five additional german corps. but already in the germans were compelled to keep corps in the east to the detriment and dislocation of their plans and forces in france. (see diagrams no. , .) even during the days of the revolution the germans were obliged to maintain ½ divisions on the eastern front, in addition to austrian and turkish, altogether infantry and cavalry divisions, while on the anglo-french front the enemy had at that time only divisions. if we take into consideration all the russian theatres of war, including those in asia, the enemy kept on the russian fronts infantry divisions and cavalry divisions,--altogether divisions (in may, ) while on the anglo-french front the enemy had in may, , only divisions. [illustration: the number of german and austrian divisions on the russian and other allied fronts during spring of infantry cavalry total on the russian front in europe in asia ---- on other allied fronts french-belgian italian saloniki mesopotamian ---- this diagram shows that in --the beginning of the russian revolution--there were german, austrian, turkish and bulgarian divisions on the russian front, of whom were on the russian front in europe. on the anglo-french front there were at this time only german divisions. the enemy forces were thus divided as follows: on the russian front, per cent.; on the anglo-french front, per cent.; on the italian front, per cent.; on the salonika front, ½ per cent., and on the mesopotamian front--about ½ per cent. thus, early in the russian army had opposing it about one-half of all the forces of the central powers. it is clearer that if these teutonic forces would be able to concentrate on the french front, it would mean an immediate breakdown of the allies and the triumph of the prussian militarism throughout the civilized world.] notwithstanding the lack of arms and munitions the russian army rendered the allies, in the critical days of , assistance that was not less important and serious than that of the days of the marne and ypres. russia, by diverting upon herself, towards the close of , all the efforts of the central powers, thereby offered france and england the opportunity for a whole year to prepare for the prosecution of the war. throughout , when germany, austria and turkey were diverted by russia, france was enabled quickly to accumulate new reserves, munitions, shells, to recover from the serious wounds of , and to prepare for that inevitable blow from germany which subsequently took the form of a determined offensive at verdun in . at the same time england, owing to the fact that russia had in taken upon herself the whole burden of the struggle, was enabled in the course of one year to carry out kitchener's stupendous plan of expanding the small, thousand-strong english army of volunteers into the four million-strong army of the english nation in arms. on the other hand germany, having called to the colors new reserves, was compelled by russia to expend these reserves on the russian front, and not on the main front, in france, where the fate of the whole war was to be decided for germany. all these opportunities, all this stupendous preparation in the creation and development of new armed forces by the allies, took place undisturbed and in favorable circumstances, solely because was the year of russia's single-handed fight against three enemy powers, the year of the greatest self-sacrifice of the russian army for the common cause. who knows what might have been the result of the german offensive in france had those german reserves which perished in russia broken through somewhere in the north of france simultaneously with the storming of verdun, in february. who knows how far the german military catastrophe might have been averted had all the fresh reserves of the germans, which were being incessantly swallowed up by the russian front, found themselves in the west! to these questions ludendorf himself happens to give the answers in his memoirs. speaking of the offensive of the germans at verdun and of the offensive of the austrians in italy, he says: "both offensives suffered from the fact that inadequate reserves prevented the first successes from being followed up." where did these reserves, which were lacking for the capture of verdun, where did they go to after germany had in created a great many new formations? _in they were swallowed up by the russian front during the german offensive in poland, and the verdun operation was frustrated because, as ludendorf declares, there were no reserves with which to develop the first success of the germans._ for this reason the unbiased investigator will admit that russia in contributed to a tremendous extent towards the calm and systematic preparation of the allies for the decisive german blow, struck at verdun, but planned to go beyond paris. if the firm stand of the french at verdun, if the talent of castelnau, who stopped the withdrawal of the french to the other bank of the meuse, directly repulsed the attack of the germans, the true ally, russia, certainly aided by diverting upon herself all the german reserves in and giving the allies a whole year of respite in which to create new armed forces. _the russian front incessantly drew to itself all new german formations and reserves, and thereby automatically forced the german army in the west to carry on unproductive operations which never reached their objective._ not one single german operation in france could obtain full development, and inevitably spent itself just because of lack of reserves which were always opportunely swallowed by the russian front. turning to the operations of we see that the germans, notwithstanding all their efforts and partial successes, never gained any decisive results on the russian front. the russian army, having neither munitions nor arms, was naturally unable to win at this time, and was compelled to retreat from poland. but the russian army was not crushed, which, however, had been the main objective of ludendorf's offensive. in his memoirs ludendorf plainly states: "the german general staff now resolved to try to obtain a decision against russia." this, translated from military parlance into plain english, simply means that it was the object to settle, to "finish" with russia, in other words, to crush her army, for otherwise there would have been no sense in starting operations against russia, and in wasting against her the reserves so much needed on the main front, against france. neither does ludendorf conceal this object further on in his memoirs, _but he admits that it was not accomplished_. for this failure he blames general falkenhayn, the chief of the general staff, who, it was supposed, prevented ludendorf from crushing the russian army. we shall not enter into the personal disputes between ludendorf and falkenhayn, whom ludendorf throughout criticises sharply. we shall only note that ludendorf attempted four times during the summer of to surround or break through the several retreats of the russian army, but the latter in every instance retreated in perfect order, carrying their arms with them. in which one of these four instances, then, did falkenhayn interfere? how preposterous this shifting of the blame to falkenhayn is, may be seen even from ludendorf's own statement: "throughout the whole war we never succeeded, either on the eastern or western front, in exploiting a big break-through to the full!" in this way he himself admits that the germans did not even once succeed, at the proper time, in utilizing a big success to the full, i. e., falkenhayn's role was immaterial. it is but natural that the resistance of the russians in prevented the germans from exploiting that success which they regarded as a big one, but which, as a matter of fact, consisted only in the systematic retreat of the russian army which was without arms and munitions. however, the most inopportune statement made by ludendorf is contained in the following remark of his concerning the operations against the russians in : "we had brought the final overthrow of russia a step nearer." the offensive of brusilov in the following year, which netted him more than , prisoners and made ludendorf, as he himself says, frequently worry about the fate of the entire austro-german front in russia, demonstrates how the offensive of ludendorf in hastened "the final overthrow of russia." on the contrary, this offensive which cost ludendorf a great many of his reserves, and afforded a year of quiet preparation to the allies, did, as we saw, hasten "the final overthrow of germany." _at this period of the campaign of there were on the russian front german divisions and up to austrian, altogether divisions, and on the french front about divisions. the germans could not defeat the allies in the beginning of the war, although they had then in france almost all their forces. it is natural that in , when they had in france only per cent. of their total forces, the germans, through the efforts of russia, were finally deprived of any chance of winning in france. it was only through russia's military operations that the germans were driven to such an unfavorable, hopeless grouping of their forces._ again opportunities for the allies in the following year, , russia once more came forward with her assistance at a critical moment, when the austrians had broken the resistance of the italian armies on the asiago-arsiero front, threatening a further development of their offensive in the rear of the italian army, in the direction of venice. at the same time ludendorf in his memoirs points out how great were the objects which the austrians were aiming at on the italian front, and he says plainly: "in italy it was a question of an operation on a grand scale." however, the russian army in had no intention of launching an offensive on the austrian front, and prepared for an offensive in an altogether different place, on the german front. our general staff had prepared for the main offensive in the direction of vilna, and accordingly it was here that troops and munitions were being concentrated. (see gurko's "war and revolution.") everything was ready when the italians, crushed by the austrians, appealed to russia for aid. an offensive on the austrian front held no particular interest for russia, which naturally had in view the crushing of the main enemy--the germans. still, russia, just as on previous occasions, did not hesitate a minute to help her allies. notwithstanding that nothing had been prepared for such an offensive, general brusilov launched it along a front two hundred miles long, with the troops he just happened to have on the spot. everybody remembers this celebrated offensive of brusilov, which netted hundreds of thousands of prisoners, a great number of other trophies, and which compelled the austrians to immediately abandon their offensive in italy and to begin the transfer of troops to the russian front. "austria gradually broke off the italian offensive and sent troops to the eastern front," writes ludendorf. "the italian army now started a counter-offensive in the tyrol," he remarks further on. describing the period of brusilov's offensive, ludendorf does not conceal the fact that they passed through some very bad and critical moments. "our g. h. q. made heavy demands on both groups (group south of riga and prince leopold group) _and also withdrew divisions from the west_," writes ludendorf. "even all the fresh divisions that were thrown in were hardly sufficient to hold the front," says he in describing the situation of the austro-germans after the russian break through at the dniester. "this was one of the greatest crises on the eastern front," says he further on, in speaking of the new break by brusilov at lutzk. the effects of brusilov's offensive proved to be so far-reaching as to affect not only the situation on the italian front but also that on the french main front. the allies, in view of the difficult situation of the germans on the russian front, launched an offensive at the somme, and towards fall they had finally cleared the forts of verdun of the germans. so did russia once more fulfill her obligation towards her allies, as soon as her army had received some quantity of munitions. this quantity was not yet sufficient in , and it was only in that the russian troops were at last more or less provided. the lack of munitions during the period of brusilov's offensive was pointed out by the russian staff, and ludendorf himself emphasizes it. he writes that the situation was relieved thanks to the fact that "the russians were also contending against extraordinary difficulty of supply." from this it may be seen that the russian army, having obtained only the first consignments of inconsiderable and insufficient munitions, did not hesitate, in , to offer her allies generous assistance on the largest scale. * * * * * still earlier, during the verdun period, the russian army, not yet recuperated from the hard blows of , did by no means stand by as an idle onlooker of the heroic efforts of the french at verdun. when at the end of february, , french headquarters appealed to the russian army for assistance, preparations were begun for an offensive. "the russian army had not lost its spirit after the heavy fighting of ," says ludendorf. on the th of march operations were begun by the russian troops in the territory to the northwest of dvinsk, continuing until the th of march. this partial offensive, solely in aid of the french, was attended by success of a local nature. ludendorf criticises this operation and says that "it was choked in swamps and blood." of course, the terrible weather conditions, the rains and the impassable roads, interfered with a broad development of this offensive, but still it had a sufficiently serious effect. "from the th to the st of march," acknowledges ludendorf, "the situation of the th (german) army was critical." salvation of roumania at the close of the russian army again had to offer most effective assistance at the critical moment of mackensen's and falkenhayn's invasion of roumania. general alexeiev pointed out to the roumanian high command the excessive length of the roumanian frontier line which rendered operations in the border district difficult for the small roumanian army. general alexeiev, as well as the allied military experts, advised the roumanians to shorten their front line, by means of a retreat, to a shorter line in the east which could be held by the comparatively small roumanian army. but the roumanians, calculating upon a weakening of the austrians, preferred to choose a new plan and invaded vast transylvania. [illustration: this map shows the four places in which the russian army, led by gen. brussiloff, broke through the austro-german front in the summer of .] this too daring move, which at first met but feeble resistance, was, however, soon checked by the enemy. when thereupon the enemy himself took the offensive and invaded roumania and began to threaten bucharest, the roumanian representative at russian headquarters, general coanda, appealed to russia for aid. the russian army had not yet succeeded in recuperating from the effects of its great summer offensive of . russia's reserves and supplies had been to a considerable extent spent during the period of brusilov's offensive. nevertheless russia, again as always, did not hesitate for one minute to come to the assistance of the allies. the russians even proposed to take upon themselves the defense of the roumanian capital--bucharest--but this offer was turned down by the roumanians with some show of embarrassment; they pointed out that the railroads leading to bucharest were blocked with evacuated freights from the capital and could not therefore carry the russian troops. probably certain political considerations played not a small part in this. however that might be, russia did not refuse her aid in the form desired by the roumanians. from the long russian front which, in turn, stood in need of reserves, troops were taken off and sent to roumania. two armies, under letchitzki and sakharov, and the great mass of cavalry under mannerheim, were assigned by the russians to assist the retreating roumanians. this effective help by russia achieved its purpose, stopping the offensive of the enemy, and towards the russian armies also took upon themselves the none too easy task of defending the greater part of the roumanian front. for the following year, , russia prepared for a decisive offensive on the german front, in common with the allies. that was the first year that the russian army had at last obtained sufficient armaments and supplies. the germans realized that most serious danger threatened them, and the germano-bolshevist provocation was now chosen as the means of disarming russia. and yet, even during those terrible days of the collapse of the russian army and the revolution, russia was indispensable to the allies. during those revolutionary days of russia compelled the enemy to maintain on the russian front = divisions= of german, austrian, turkish and bulgarian troops, to the enemy's detriment on the french main front. on this front the enemy was enabled to maintain only = divisions=. russia, although sapped by the germano-bolshevist conspiracy, was still formidable, and the enemy did not risk the moving of any of his troops from the russian front. russia was growing faint, but that honest russia which had saved her allies in east prussia, galicia, on the fields of poland, lithuania, roumania, in the caucasus and armenia, did not lay down her arms to the very last moment, remaining true to her obligations. russia's losses-- , , from this brief outline one can readily see what great and numerous objects russia accomplished in the world war, and how important was her role in that final collapse of the central powers at which the allies had been aiming in the four-year long struggle. in full accord with these efforts are the extraordinary sacrifices brought by russia, sacrifices in men, sacrifices in material resources and money, and finally, that great upheaval through which the russian people are now passing, as a result of their over-exertion in the years of the world war. among these sacrifices, russia's losses in men run into such great numbers that the immense, extraordinary part played by russia becomes at once obvious to anyone. of the many different figures quoted by various investigators the most reliable are undoubtedly those furnished by the official statistics of the russian army staff. among these figures made public in the press the most important are those given by the staff of the commander-in-chief of the russian army, pertaining to the year , concerning the total number of mobilized soldiers and the number of those still in the service. according to this information, the russian war ministry called to the colors from the outbreak of the war up to the winter of more than million men; but the commissary department of the army had towards the close of less than million on its rolls. the difference of ½ million between these two figures constituted the absolute losses of the army during campaigns ( , , ). this gave the staff the basis for calculating the yearly average total losses at ½ million men. adding, accordingly, ½ million losses for , we obtain million total losses during the whole war. but these are only the men who were a total loss to the army, i. e., the losses in killed and prisoners, without the wounded, except a moderate number of crippled who were no longer fit for service at the front nor for service out of the ranks, and who therefore had to be discharged from the army entirely. the total number of russian war-prisoners towards the end of the war, according to figures compiled by the russian commission on war prisoners, amounted to about ½ million. deducting this number from million, we obtain ½ million in killed and the small number of crippled who were discharged entirely. this number, ½ million, obtained from official statistics, is the basis of our calculations. the percentage of disabled was comparatively small. german statistics during the war figured it to be per cent. hence the figure of ½ million must comprize only a little less than million in killed alone. the number of wounded is usually approximately ½ times the number of killed.[ ] multiplying the number of wounded not by ½, but only by , we obtain about million wounded. thus we have a total of million killed and prisoners, and million wounded, or a grand total of not less than million losses for russia, in killed, wounded and prisoners. these figures are rather minimized, for we have above underestimated the number of wounded. these figures, based upon official statistics, agree with those arrived at by the "copenhagen society for studying the consequences of the war." this society estimates the losses at ½ million, exclusive of prisoners. as we have shown above, there were ½ million prisoners. thus there can be no doubt but that the number of russian casualties was _not less than , , _, of which there were _ , , in killed_. these losses are almost equal to the combined losses of our allies.[ ] russia's losses are more than twice those of france, - times those of england, and more than times those of america. these losses are more than twice the total strength of the british army, and - times all the forces mustered by the united states. this number of casualties alone is larger than the total population of any of the following european countries: sweden, norway, denmark, portugal, belgium, holland, or the balkan states! thus do simple figures tell us clearly and plainly that russia sacrificed in the common cause of the allies the greatest number of victims and that she ranks first in the sad roster of allied casualties. [illustration: the death toll in the allied armies , , russia , , france , england , italy , belgium , rumania , serbia & montenegro , united states of america] conclusion from this brief outline may be seen how tremendous and important a role was played by russia in the world conflict. summing up the general facts cited above, we arrive at the following definite conclusions: .) russia's role in the world war was bound to be very serious and important for this reason alone, that the participation of a nation numbering million souls could not fail to be significant in itself, and was therefore bound to exercise a tremendous influence upon the outcome of the world war. .) accordingly, russia's role became apparent even at the very beginning of the war, in the important aid she rendered in frustrating the initial and most dangerous plan of the germans, by her early offensive in aid of the allies. russia, having diverted against herself the entire austrian army and part of the german, at the time of the battle on the marne, through her offensive in east prussia and galicia, deprived the enemy of the opportunity to realize the fundamental idea of moltke's plan to fling "all forces into france." the enemy, having contrary to his plan moved on france with only a part of his forces, inevitably suffered defeat. this cooperation on the part of russia was of tremendous significance, for the germans based their plan on the idea that they would at first have to deal only with france alone, on one front only, whereas russia compelled them at once to start the war on two fronts, both with russia and france. this made the initial german war plan useless because strategy says plainly: "errors in the strategic deploying of forces in the beginning of a war have a decisive influence and cannot be rectified until the war is over." from this rule of strategy it is plain that russia's operations in the beginning of the war at the outset condemned germany to lose the war. .) at the following attempt of the enemy to find a decision in france, to break through to calais, at ypres, russia, by the blows she delivered in galicia, at warsaw and in east prussia, contributed to the early termination of this second offensive in france, so dangerous to england, and compelled the germans for more than a year to abstain from their main operations on the main decisive front of the war--in france. .) in russia, having shouldered alone the whole burden of the struggle against germany, austria and turkey, although forced to abandon poland, still gave the allies the opportunity to prepare throughout a whole year for the coming german offensive at verdun. at the same time, having compelled the germans during to spend all their fresh formations and reserves on the russian front, russia thereby deprived the germans of the reserves they needed for verdun and their other operations in france. .) in russia, thanks to the brusilov offensive, saved italy at that critical moment when the austrians, through their successful offensive from tyrol in the rear of the italians, threatened to cut off a considerable portion of the italian army, at the same time menacing venice. together with this, russia by this offensive greatly facilitated the operations of the allies on the somme, and was instrumental in the final clearing of the verdun forts. .) in russia took upon herself the blows of mackensen's and falkenhayn's armies which had invaded roumania, stopped the further advance of the germans, and undertook the defense of a considerable stretch of the roumanian front. .) through a period of three years of struggle against germany, austria and turkey, russia, having diverted the forces of the enemy, afforded the allies a long period of quiet for the preparation and strengthening of the allied armies and for the systematic creation of a new million british army. .) throughout this period of three years of struggle _russia compelled the enemy to spend on the russian front such a stupendous amount of force, reserves and munitions_ as to hasten the inevitable fall of the enemy, and _this immensely facilitated the delivery of the final, decisive blows by the allies_. .) russia, incessantly drawing upon herself the forces of the enemy, did not give him the opportunity for one minute from the very beginning of the war to gather sufficient force for a decisive blow on the main, decisive front--in france. the role of russia, therefore, was clearly apparent in the fact that she deprived germany throughout the war of the possibility to win and rendered futile every effort of the enemy in this respect. .) corresponding with the most important role that russia played in the war are her enormous sacrifices in men, material and treasure. her losses in men, amounting to , , , exceed several times the casualties of any of the allies; are almost equal to the losses of all the allies combined; exceed several times the total number of men mobilized by any one of the allies.... .) russia's role in the recent war was so important and extraordinary that _without russia the very idea of a struggle with german militarism would have been impossible_. germany would have been able to crush any combination of the european powers if russia had not participated in such combination. were it not for russia, germany would now dominate not only europe, but probably the rest of the world as well. .) russia's great role in the world war is so much the greater since she fought under extraordinary circumstances, lacking so indispensable an asset as a great network of railways, with a backward technique, industry, etc. in the hard first years of the war the russian armies, as we have seen, in extraordinary circumstances and frequently without arms and munitions, did everything possible, and, together with failures, had also their successes. ludendorf was able to achieve success on the russian front only when the germans outnumbered their adversaries by at least three to two. at tannenberg the germans had twice as many and, at certain stages, even three times as many men as the russians. against rennenkampf ludendorf had three men to every two of his enemy, and probably even as many as two to one, as rennenkampf had suffered severe losses during the preceding days. it is equally true that the russians were able to defeat the germans whenever they had even a small superiority of force. near warsaw the russians had less than five men to every four germans and they succeeded in defeating the latter and throwing them clear across all poland. it may seem strange that the germans should have managed to have numerical superiority over the russians all the time. regrettable as it may be, it is nevertheless true, for the strength of an army is determined not by the number of its men, but by the number of bayonets (infantry), sabres (cavalry) and guns (artillery). the russian army consisted of millions, but bayonets and guns it had only for one-tenth of its number. in some russian divisions numbered, instead of , bayonets, only a mere thousand, owing to disastrous losses. the only employment of infantry during those days was as a screen for the artillery, while the latter was quite useless for fighting purposes because it had no ammunition whatever. under such conditions many of our corps often did not exceed the strength of a single regiment and some armies numbered no more effectives than a single division. we had plenty of men, but no arms and ammunition. therefore, the germans frequently surpassed us not in men, but in bayonets and guns. the tragedy of the russian situation lay in the cruel fact that russia, while only one-tenth of her armies were armed, was facing germany and austria, who were armed from head to foot. not ludendorf and not his ordinary military skill were the causes of russia's failures in the first year of the war, but that simple and terrible truth which brusilov once expressed in the following words: "_the russians had no shells with which to blast their way across barbed-wire entanglements before an attack; so it became necessary for them to break down the wires with the bodies of russian soldiers, and to form a bridge across these dead bodies for the next attacking column._" [illustration: the black line represents the russian front in . the front stretched from the baltic sea to the black sea. the roumanian front was held also primarily by russian troops.] we have concluded our sketch of russia's participation in the world war with . but also has its story: in that year russia was denied a voice at the conference on that peace in the name of which russia had offered up so many sacrifices and made such efforts. we have seen how important and essential a part russia played in the overthrow of german militarism. russia's tremendous role confirms once more the elementary truth that in the future also russia will inevitably be a colossal factor of political and military equilibrium in europe. whatever does happen to russia, however they may dismember her living body, the immense russian nation, with million souls of pure russian blood alone, will always remain that heavy military weight which inevitably lowers that particular scale upon which it descends. it is true, germany is now crushed and enfeebled. but we know that victorious countries are now suffering not less, and some of them even more, from the consequences of the most stupendous world conflict. years will pass, and possibly but a few years, and again the world will recuperate. we have no reason to expect that the active german people will lag behind the rest in this work of reestablishing normal conditions of life and labor. the treaty of versailles has not solved a good many problems, and among them also those that were the cause of the world war. notwithstanding all partitioning, germany still retains up to million souls, but france only a little more than million. the population of germany has always been growing, while that of france, if it has not decreased, has not increased. _after all, germany has and will have a numerical superiority over france of one and a half times._ france, well aware of that, tries to maintain an alliance with england, and reckons upon the aid of america. but the statesmen of the west realize how insufficient all this is, for they still remember well that first critical month of the war when france was all alone and saved herself only through extraordinary efforts. until the united states arrives on the scene! why, that inevitably means months and months of waiting. until the british army is mobilized and transported! why, we know how difficult and tedious are the conditions of embarkation and landing of troops, artillery, transport columns, munitions, etc. we know that the , soldiers of the british army alone required, in august, , more than three weeks for disembarkation. and where? in three ports where everything was equipped for disembarkation purposes, where ideal conditions prevailed such as were hard to find in any other ports. thus france, in the event of a new conflict with her old foe, will again find herself for quite some time left all alone to face the numerically superior enemy. where will russia be then? no poland, no combination of any group of small states will be able to take the place of russia, for that would be a mere - millions; it will be not russia, but only one-seventh, a sixth, or fifth part of that which russia gave during the past war. these weak nations will only become additional trophies to the enemy, just as roumania, serbia and belgium became his easy prey in the past war. where will russia be then? not the present-day russia bleeding to death in its struggle against bolshevism, but the future, once more powerful, russia?... bolshevism, an abnormal phenomenon, is bound to come to an end--somewhat earlier, or somewhat later. no matter how much may be cut off from russia, she will always remain an immense, great, rich, and therefore powerful, country. too much will depend upon what this coming russia may have to say, for any sensible statesman to refuse to reckon with that eventuality. this question the statesmen of the west must ask of themselves clearly and plainly--not those statesmen who think no further than the following day and of the success of their fight against their political opponents--but those wise leaders of the nations who really have at heart the interests of their own countries, as well as of the entire civilized world. "ostrich politics" may least of all be applied in dealing with that tremendous military and political factor which covers one-sixth of the land surface of the globe and is called russia. footnotes: [ ] see diagrams on pp. and . [ ] see appendixes no. i and ii, in which an analysis of this part of ludendorf's memoirs is given. [ ] see appendixes "ludendorf--samsonov" and "ludendorf--rennenkampf" at the end of the pamphlet. [ ] how preposterous is this figure of , , men, supposed to have been transferred by the russians from galicia to warsaw, to oppose ludendorf, may be seen from the fact that only railway lines run from galicia to warsaw. it is not difficult to demonstrate that it is impossible to carry , , men on railway lines within weeks (the offensive of the germans against warsaw began in the first days of october, and the retreat began two weeks later, i. e., when the russian troops were transferred from galicia to warsaw). one army corps requires - trains. the best road in russia can at most carry trains in hours in one direction. hence, to entrain a corps would require days. consequently the most that could be entrained within days would be corps to each railway line. thus, all roads combined might have been able to carry up to corps, but actually, of course, they carried less than that. but even if we allow the computation of corps to stand, we have but - thousand men, and not , , as mr. ludendorf unhesitatingly allots. [ ] according to figures submitted in by the army committee of the german reichstag, the german army lost during the first months of the war thousand killed, , , wounded, and thousand prisoners. this shows that the number of wounded is ½ times the number of killed. [ ] according to the statistics of the "copenhagen society," the french army lost , , in killed, the british-- , , the italian-- , , and each of the remaining allies-- , and less. appendix no. i ludendorf--samsonov .) a careful perusal of ludendorf's memoirs brings out the fact that during the first russian invasion of eastern prussia there participated on the german side: the st, th, th and st reserve corps, the rd reserve division, the th landwehr brigade, goltz's division, the garrisons of the vistula fortresses,--thorn, kulm and graudenitz, and a brigade of cavalry. the german forces consisted, therefore, not of two corps numbering , men but of more than , , not counting the masses of landsturm, which fact ludendorf carefully conceals. .) the russians, on the other hand, advanced into east prussia not fully mobilized, as this battle took place twenty-seven days after the war was declared, and the russian mobilization was only completed three--four weeks later. samsonov had no six army corps under his command, but only corps: the st, the th, the th and the th, and, figuring even at , men per army corps, this force could not have exceeded , men. .) it can be seen, therefore, that in this battle over , germans were opposing , russians at most. however, as a matter of positive fact, the attack of the , germans was directed against two russian corps only, the st and the th, i. e., at only approximately , men. .) a force of germans, three times as strong, overpowered two russian corps. during that attack samsonov and a part of his staff were killed. that, and the disruption of liaison, was the reason reinforcements were not sent up from the other corps and the germans succeeded in invading the russian rear (see map no. ). .) the remainder of samsonov's army, about , men, became surrounded by , germans, and, left without leadership, in the midst of an extremely critical and dangerous operation, on unfamiliar territory, it was shattered. _only under such an unfortunate combination of circumstances could a threefold strong german force win the battle in a tactical sense. but, from the strategic point of view, the germans lost in this stage of their campaign, as this battle diverted a number of german corps from france and served a purpose of the greatest importance._ [illustration: the russian troops are indicated on this map by white squares; the germans--by black. it can be seen from this map that the army of gen. samsonov took up positions from usdau to biskofsburg. the germans attacked his flanks, i. e., usdau, his left flank, and biskofsburg, his right. the st and th russian corps were located there, as indicated by the map. it may be observed from the map that the st corps was attacked by two german corps, one division and the vistula garrisons, i. e., about , germans attacked , russians. the th corps at biskofsburg was put in a similar situation. under pressure from a threefold stronger german force, the st and th corps retreated. thereupon the germans fell under neiderborg and passenheim upon the rear of samsonov's remaining troops, the th and th corps. these corps were consequently surrounded by this threefold stronger force and were defeated after a heroic fight of three days.] .) it must be added that the entire population of east prussia was armed, and scouting was very difficult. the russians knew nothing about the enemy, while the latter was fully informed by the inhabitants concerning the russians and knew every step these were making. that is why the german attack came as a surprise. .) the assertion that rennenkampf had , men and intentionally did not come to samsonov's aid is a downright misstatement. this can be seen from the fact that the battle, which was begun on august , was lost in hours, on the morning of august , and rennenkampf, who with small forces was within three days' marching distance from samsonov-- miles--could not have arrived in time, particularly when we consider that he had to overcome on his way fortifications and barbed-wire defenses manned by landsturm and by cavalry. .) ludendorf's assertion that rennenkampf's force consisted of divisions, almost , men, is an obvious falsehood. a single army is never made up of more than six army corps, for facility and expediency in commanding, and this is a basic rule in military organizations. ludendorf knows this very well, but it appears that he consciously misstated the truth in this case as well. .) in reality rennenkampf's army consisted of eight divisions or four army corps,--the nd, the rd, the th and the th, and of six cavalry divisions. altogether his force consisted of about , men. the bulk of his infantry could not have reached the front at that time, as it was necessary to organize the rear and to coordinate the railway movement in prussia, as the russian rail gauge is much wider than that adopted by the german railway system. rennenkampf's front, therefore, was occupied largely by cavalry, supported only in section by weak detachments of infantry. .) rennenkampf could not have aided samsonov even if he had known his situation, because he was already at a distance of miles from his own railway lines, and ludendorf himself admits that it is not possible to operate safely further than miles from one's railroads. rennenkampf's army, therefore, without provisions and ammunition, had to wait until its rear was made secure and was unable to move further. appendix no. ii. ludendorf--rennenkampf his second battle--with rennenkampf--ludendorf describes with a similar distortion of facts. on this occasion he goes so far as to assert that rennenkampf had not , men but , , and he states at the same time that rennenkampf was a traitor because he retreated too soon. as we have already seen, rennenkampf had only about , men, and he was reinforced by one more corps, the nd,--about , additional men; therefore his army could not have exceeded , men. ludendorf places his own army at , men, much less, of course, than his actual strength, but even at that rate he attacked , russians with , german troops, outnumbering his adversary one and a half times. that accounts for the ease with which ludendorf was able to throw , men into the frontal attack and still was able to send up , men to get into rennenkampf's rear (see map no. ). rennenkampf's troops were kept engaged for seven days in repulsing ludendorf's attacks upon their front, and he had no troops left with which to parry the attack on his rear. when the germans invaded the russian rear and were threatening to cut off the russian main line of retreat, the vershbolovo-kovno railroad, rennenkampf was compelled to retreat so as not to be cut off. in fact, had rennenkampf not retreated at that time, he would have committed the same act of treason that marshal bazaine was guilty of in , when he, under similar circumstances, did not consent to escape from the steadily closing-up iron ring of germans and was finally captured with his entire army. rennenkampf gave orders to retreat only when the germans were firing at the city of gumbinnen and at his rear railway lines. this was not too soon by any means, but may have been rather a little late. [illustration: rennenkampf's troops are indicated between welau and ingenburg (white square). opposite them is the german army (black square). rennenkampf had corps,--less than , men. he was attacked frontally also by corps which engaged all his effectives. meanwhile two german corps (the th and the st) that remained free began invading his rear (these corps are indicated in black). when these two corps approached gumbinnen, they found themselves in a position to cut rennenkampf off from his only road, the insterburg-kovno railway. rennenkampf had no men to oppose these troops with, as all his units were fighting at the front line of welau-ingenburg. rennenkampf was therefore compelled to retreat in order not to be cut off.] the nd corps did not even succeed in getting near rennenkampf, and was halted by the germans fifty miles away from the field of battle. rennenkampf had, therefore, not , men to germany's , , but only , ,--about one-half. the cause of the defeat of rennenkampf was that that military operation had been calculated for the combined armies of samsonov and rennenkampf, and was a risky undertaking at that. when rennenkampf was left alone, this operation was as a matter of course doomed to defeat, and it required the tenacity of rennenkampf to have offered the obstinate resistance that he did in this battle. * * * * * * transcriber's note: obvious punctuation errors were corrected. inconsistent hyphenation wss made consistent. ludendorff consistently spelled ludendorf but has not been corrected. p. : apparent missing line in: "brought about the final defeat of the germans in this [newline] sonov." pp. - : several misspellings of rennenkampf corrected. p. : he was atacked frontally -> he was attacked frontally. bright islands by frank riley _the future enters into us, in order to transform itself in us, long before it happens._--rainer maria rilke [transcriber's note: this etext was produced from worlds of if science fiction, june . extensive research did not uncover any evidence that the u.s. copyright on this publication was renewed.] when the two geno-doctors were gone, miryam took the red capsule from under the base of the bedlamp and slipped it between her dry lips. reason told her to swallow the capsule quickly, but instead she held it under her tongue, clinging, against her will, to the last few moments of life. she knew she was being weak, that she was still seeking hope where there was no hope, and she prayed to the ancient god of the ghetto that the gelatin coating would dissolve quickly. pain interrupted the prayer, spreading like slow fire from deep within her young body, where the unwanted child of genetics center stirred so restlessly, so impatient to be born. the white walls of her center room blurred in and out of focus. shadows merged together in brief, uncertain patterns. lights flickered where there were no lights, and the darkness was so intense it had a glare of its own. at the worst of the pain cycle, miryam bit down on her under lip until the flesh showed as white as her teeth. she fought off temptation to crunch the capsule and put an end to all pain, all fear. no, she would not go that way. she would go in a moment of blinding clarity, knowing why, savoring the last bitter sweet second of her triumph. with a subconscious gesture of femininity, miryam brushed the dark, damp hair from her forehead, and wiped the perspiration from her lips. "pretty little thing," one of the geno-service agents had called her, when she was arrested last fall in the warsaw suburb where she had taught nursery school since escaping from the ghetto. "doesn't look a bit like one of her kind," another agent had said, putting his hand under her chin and turning her face to the glare of his flashlight. "no wonder she fooled the psycho and chemico squads.... lucky for us!" "what's the matter, little one?" the first agent had spoken again. "didn't you know we were coming? i thought all of you people were supposed to be telepaths.... or doesn't it work when you're asleep?" he flipped the covers off her trembling body and whistled. "hands off!" the geno-sergeant had warned sharply. "she's for center!" now the capsule under her tongue was moist and soft. time fled on swift, fluttering wings. soon the horror would be done. but the stubborn spark still glowed, and miryam allowed her mind to drift down the long, shining corridor to the room where the younger of the two geno-doctors was changing into a white coat. the older man, who wore the gold trefoil of geno-sar on his collar, tilted back in his chair. "she should be just about due," he said cheerfully. "yes, sir," replied the young doctor, sounding the proper note of deference for a man who communed daily with the political elite. "what do you think of her?" "well, sir, frankly--i was surprised--" the young doctor twisted muscular arms to button the back of his jacket. he had but recently come from the genetics sanitarium on the black sea, and his face was tanned deep brown. "from reading the weekly reports of your staff, i didn't know she was that--that young--" miryam trembled with a hope she dared not recognize, but it was crushed out of her by the geno-sar's booming voice. "not only one of the youngest--but one of the very best specimens we've had to work with at center! you read her psi rating?" "yes, sir. seventy-two point four, wasn't it?" "seventy-two point six! absolutely phenomenal! closest thing to a pure telepath our agents have ever turned up for us! this could be a big night for center, my boy.... a big night!" the young doctor shook his head to clear away the lingering image of a tragic, lovely face against a tear-stained pillow. miryam was startled to find this image in his mind, and her pulse leaped again. in a carefully professional tone, the young doctor asked: "what was her rating after insemination? did the emotional shock...?" "not at all! oh, naturally, she was uncooperative in the tests, but pentathol and our cross-references gave us a true picture!" "and the spermatozoa?" "best we could get! refrigerated about thirty years ago from a specimen that tested forty-seven point eight." the geno-sar paused, and because a comment was obviously in order, the young doctor said: "this certainly could be a big night for center!" the geno-sar snapped his cigarette lighter with an expansive flourish. "all the sciences have been taking a crack at psi--ever since the last politbureau directive gave it number one priority. you should have heard the talk at sar-bureau meeting this afternoon! the math-sar actually laughed at genetics ... told us to stick to our white mice!" the young doctor made a polite cluck of disapproval. "those stupid mathematicians could learn something of heredity from their own ancients," the geno-sar continued, growing heated. "think of liebnitz, gifted at --galois, a genius before he was !" the geno-sar recovered his temper, and winked. "of course, i didn't say that at the meeting--the bureau chief is very partial to math--but i did remind them, most pointedly, of the known data on inherited sensory differences between individuals. and you should have seen the squirming! especially when i got into the taste studies and the phenyl-thio-carbamide tests! then, when i told of genetics research on sense of time--sense of direction--sensitivity to pain, sound and smells--well, the chief was hanging on my every word! the psycho-sar became desperate to the point of rashness, and he jibed at me about our ancient master, profim lysenko." the geno-sar's head inclined slightly as he pronounced the name. "but the chief himself gave the correct answer! he quoted from a bureau directive which stated clearly that sensory characteristics, like any others, could well have been acquired in the first place, and then passed on through heredity! oh, i tell you, it was a heart-warming afternoon!" the younger man had been paying him only half attention. "it's strange we should find some cases of psi among her people," he mused. "when i was at the university i always meant to study something about the--" he hesitated and searched for the approved term, "--the specimen races, but i never had time...." for an instant the geno-sar's steel-blue eyes narrowed, and miryam was shocked to find him appraising the young man for possible heresy. she had always regarded the scientific mind as something remote, cold, but never as something that could commit a heresy. however, the geno-sar decided to table the subject. "of course you didn't!" he boomed. "you couldn't have made such a splendid record without total specialization! each to his own, that's how science has prospered under the benevolence of our party!" he glanced up at the clock. "well, aren't we just about ready for this delivery?" * * * * * miryam drew back her mind. what a fool she was to go on seeking! the child resumed its inexorable turning within her swollen body, and she knew she could never give to the world a life conceived so terribly, so coldly, without love or passion or tenderness. even in these final moments, with the gelatin melting under her tongue, miryam shuddered with the remembered anguish of struggling up from the depths of anaesthesia to find herself bearing the seed of a child, from a faceless man who had died long ago. often, during the carefully guarded months of pregnancy, she had wondered about that man, who he had been, how his talent had compared with hers. miryam knew little about genetics, or any other science. the scientific mind had always frightened her, and she had feared to explore it. but she knew there was no truth to the folklore that psi was a characteristic of her people. she knew of only a few cases outside her own family, although within her family it seemed to have been a characteristic that had recurred frequently for many generations. her father had cautioned her about selecting a husband, and pleaded with her not to flee the ghetto. for the past three days, since the nurse had momentarily left the cabinet at the end of the corridor unlocked and unguarded, miryam had known that she need not be concerned about the success or failure of this terrible experiment. from the nurse's mind she had plucked the essential facts about the potency of the red capsule. this knowledge, for all its loneliness, had been something to cherish, to press to her full breasts, as she would never hold that child of horror. tears filled her eyes, squeezed in droplets between the closed lids. tears because she was so alone. tears of unbearable sadness and pity, for her people, for her youth and her young body, for the warmth that would be eternally cold, for the unnatural child that squirmed and turned, and would never cry. in a last forlorn gesture, in a final seeking before the darkness closed, miryam let her mind stray out of the white room, out of the marble magnificence of center. she let her thoughts escape on the soft breeze of the early summer evening. how beautiful it was, even here in the city, amid the science buildings that formed bright islands of light around the minarets and vaulted domes of government square. even these awesome buildings were lovely in the purple dusk. their windows were like scattered emeralds of light. how could there be so much beauty without compassion? so much knowledge without understanding? so much human genius without humanity? and what a battering of thoughts in the mild air around the centers of science! what a discordance! what a tumult of theories, each of them nurtured within its own walls by the zealous sars. there were the departments of chemistry and physics. there was the glass-walled tower of astronomy! there was the institute of psychology, with all its many bureaus. and the new electronics building, alabaster even in the dusk. they were all there, extending in stately splendor along the main avenues, and along the park, where the gossamer mist was rising. how intolerant were the thoughts they radiated! how sure! electronics said: "quite obviously the answer to psi is in the electrical currents of the brain. our newest electro-encephalograph has demonstrated...." chemistry said: "solution to psi inevitably will be found in the chemical balance of the cells...." parapsychology said: "we must continue to ignore those who insist upon attributing physical properties to a non-physical characteristic...." and underneath this learned babble, miryam heard the moth-like whispering of her own people, starving in the ghetto, or hidden throughout the city, disguised, furtive, tense. her mind came close to government square, and she cringed, as she had cringed all her young life. the somatics were unbearable. hatred and fear, blind prejudice, jealousy, cunning, ceaseless intrigue and plotting, setting sar against sar, using the genius of each science, dividing and ruling. no, there was nothing left. no hope, no promise. this was the end of time. this was the night of the world. withdrawing again, retreating into itself, miryam's mind brushed the fragment of a thought. it was a half-formed thought, more a groping, more a question, than an idea. it was delicate, fragile, a wraith and a wisp. but it came to her as clear as the note from a silver bell. startled, she hesitated in her withdrawal, and perceived the young geno-doctor in the corridor near her room. he had paused by the casement window, and was staring out at the twinkling islands of light around government square. and as his gaze wandered moodily from tech, to psycho, to chemico, to all the incandescent, isolated centers of genius, the idle speculation had formed. "wouldn't it be an unusual view if all those bright islands were connected by strings of light...?" once formed, the speculation had fanned the ember of a thought: "wonder if psi will build those strings of lights?" then the young doctor turned almost guiltily from the window to meet the geno-sar coming down the corridor. and he said with crisp efficiency, "i'll check out -a for delivery." "good boy! i'll go on up and check the staff...." the geno-sar rubbed his hands together, and walked off, repeating nervously, "two psi characteristics must be the answer--two psi--" "maybe they are," the young doctor murmured softly. "maybe they are...." * * * * * delivery, miryam thought. the life within her throbbed and prodded. there was an ebbing of pain for a moment, and in that moment she saw with the blinding clarity she had sought that this child of hers might bring new hope to the world. that psi ability might be the answer to many things for the race of mankind. what did it matter that it was conceived without love and emotion. what did it matter that she was being used as an experiment ... if this child within her could fulfill the promise. miryam spat the soft capsule between her quivering lips. she watched it roll and bounce across the polished tile floor, toward the door. pain returned, and its fire was warm. there were no shadows on the wall. pain returned, and it had purpose and promise. wonderingly, she beheld the concept that science, too, lived with fear, each science in its own ghetto. and if the young doctor was right, if psi.... as the doctor stepped into the room, he bent over and picked up the red capsule. his thumb and forefinger felt the warmth, the moisture, and he looked long and thoughtfully into miryam's dark, glowing eyes. his fingers shook as he wrapped the capsule in a piece of tissue and dropped it into the pocket of his white jacket. he picked up the chart from the foot of the bed. "miryam--" his voice was not under complete control, and he began again, with an effort at lightness. "miryam--that's a strange name. what does it mean?" "it is an ancient spelling," she whispered, her eyes deep and dark, filled with pain and wonder. "you may find it easier to call me--mary." the bullitt mission to russia testimony before the committee on foreign relations united states senate of william c. bullitt. mcmxix contents the committee meets mr. bullitt's official status ordered to russia council of ten discusses russia the troops at archangel situation in russia france blocks prinkipos conference what america wanted the british terms text of projected peace proposal by the allied and associated governments mr. bullitt's report on russia economic situation social conditions political situation peace proposals conclusions appendix to report transport food management social conditions statements of leaders of opposition parties army lenin's prestige concessions breakfast with lloyd george bullitt report suppressed proposed declaration of associated governments' policy and offer of armistice nansen plan to feed russia auchincloss-miller proposal bullitt memorandum for auchincloss reply of president and three premiers to nansen holchak's advance causes rejection of peace proposal lloyd george deceives parliament mr. bullitt resigns report of lincoln steffens reports of capt. w.w. pettit social work in petrograd the committee adjourns united states senate, committee on foreign relations, washington, d.c., friday, september , . the committee met, pursuant to the call of the chairman, at o'clock a.m., in room , senate office building, senator henry cabot lodge presiding. present: senators lodge (chairman), brandegee, fall, knox, harding, and new. the chairman. mr. bullitt is to make a statement to the committee this morning. i think i ought to say that mr. bullitt was summoned on the d of august, i believe, and he was in the woods at that time, out of reach of telegraph or telephone or mail, and only received the summons a few days ago. he came at once to washington. that is the reason of the delay in his hearing. the chairman. mr. bullitt, will you take the stand and give your full name, please, to the stenographer? mr. bullitt, william c. bullitt. the chairman. you are a native and a resident of philadelphia, are you not? mr. bullitt. i am, sir. the chairman. prior to the war, what were you engaged in? mr. bullitt. before the war i was employed by the philadelphia public ledger. i had been a correspondent for them in various places, and i had been a member of the editorial staff in philadelphia for a time. the chairman. you went abroad for them as a correspondent? mr. bullitt. i did, sir. the chairman. before we went into the war? mr. bullitt. before we went into the war i toured germany, austria, hungary, belgium, poland, and other places, studying conditions there, for the purposes of the public ledger. the chairman. after we entered the war, what did you do? you came back? mr. bullitt. yes, sir; i came back. i was in the united states at that time. the chairman. at that time? mr. bullitt. and i was asked to enter the department of state, to work in the division of western european affairs under mr. grew, in which my special province was to follow the political situation of germany and austria-hungary, to prepare the confidential reports of the department on germany, austria, and hungary--the weekly reports--and also such memoranda on conditions as the president and the secretary and others might call for. the chairman. and then you went to paris as a member of the staff, after the armistice? mr. bullitt. yes; i was an employee of the department at the time of the armistice, and i was ordered to paris as a member of the staff of the commission. senator knox. when did you first go to paris, mr. bullitt? mr. bullitt. i sailed on the _george washington_. i went over with the original trip of the president. senator knox. and you were there continuously how long? mr. bullitt. i remained in paris until--i can give you the exact date--i was ordered to go on a special mission to berne about the first week of february. i can give you the exact date, if it is of any moment. senator knox. no; it is not. mr. bullitt. i remained a week in berne, then returned and remained in paris until i was ordered to go to russia. i left for russia on the d of february. i was in paris during the entire period until the d of february. senator knox. you said you went over on the original trip of the president. just to get these dates right, when did you reach paris? mr. bullitt. i left new york on december and, as i remember, we reached paris on december . senator knox. and you were there, then, until you went to berne in february? mr. bullitt. in february, senator knox. what was your personal relation to the peace conference and its work? mr. bullitt's official status mr. bullitt. when i first arrived i was asked to take charge of a confidential bulletin which was to be gotten out for the benefit of the commissioners each morning. it was to be read by them. that lasted a very short time, and as is usual with most things of the kind, we discovered that the commissioners did not care to spend the time reading it, and therefore it was decided to abolish this bulletin, and that instead i should receive all the intelligence reports of military intelligence, of the state department, intelligence received through all the special dispatches of the ambassadors, etc., in fact, all the information that came in, and a section was created called the current intelligence section. i was called the chief of the division of current intelligence summaries. senator knox. then, as i understand, your function was to acquaint yourself with everything that was going on in connection with the conference, and disseminate the news to the different branches of the peace conference and the different bureaus? mr. bullitt. i was to report only to the commissioners. senator knox. well, but the essential thing is, was it your duty to get information? mr. bullitt. yes; it was my duty to be in constant touch with everyone who was in the american delegation, and present information to the commissioners each morning. i had minutes with each commissioner each morning. senator knox. so that you were practically a clearing house of information for the members of the american mission? mr. bullitt. that is what i was supposed to be. * * * * * ordered to russia senator knox. what was your mission to russia, and when did you go? mr. bullitt. i was ordered to go to russia on the th of february. i received the following order from secretary lansing [reading]: american commission to negotiate peace, february, . mr. william c. bullitt, american commission to negotiate peace. sir: you are hereby directed to proceed to russia for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the american commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, and all american diplomatic and consular officials are hereby directed to extend to you the proper courtesies and facilities to enable you to fulfill the duties of your mission. i am, sir, your obedient servant, robert lansing, secretary of state of the united states of america. [seal.] senator knox. what is the date of that? mr. bullitt. february , . i also received at the same time from mr. joseph c. grew, the secretary of the american commission, the following [reading]: american commission to negotiate peace, february, . to whom it may concern: i hereby certify that mr. william c. bullitt has been authorized by the american commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace to proceed to russia, for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the commission, and i bespeak for him the proper courtesies and facilities in enabling him to fulfill the duties of his mission. j.c. grew, secretary of the american commission to negotiate peace. [seal.] senator knox. you say you started in february. what time in february? mr. bullitt. i left on the d day of february. senator knox. did you know at that time, or have you ascertained since, whether a secret mission had or not been dispatched from paris, that is, by the president himself; a man by the name of buckler, who went to russia a few days before you did? mr. bullitt. mr. w.h. buckler, mr. henry white's half brother. he was an attaché of the american embassy in london. he was ordered from there to go, about the st of january, to stockholm, to confer with litvinov, who had been the ambassador of the soviet government to london--the british had allowed him to stay there without actually recognizing his official status, and had dealt with him. mr. buckler there conferred with litvinov, who made various propositions and representations to him which mr. buckler at once telegraphed back to paris, and which were considered so important by the president that the president read them in extenso to the council of ten on the morning of january . i regret that i have no actual copy of those proposals by litvinov, or of buckler's telegrams. at that time there was a discussion taking place in regard to russia which had extended over a couple of weeks, a discussion of the utmost interest, in the council of ten. i happen to have the minutes of the council for january , when this russian question was taken up, which i shall be glad to read, if the senators should be interested, and also the minutes of the council of ten on january , at which meeting the prinkipos proposal was decided upon. the buckler meeting with litvinov was what eventually swung the meeting in favor of prinkipos, the suggestion for which had been made by mr. lloyd george. no; that is slightly incorrect. mr. lloyd george had suggested that representatives of the various russian governments and factions should be brought to paris. council of ten discusses russia notes on conversations held in the office of m. pichon at the quai d'orsay, on january , --preliminary discussion regarding the situation in russia. mr. lloyd george commenced his statement setting forth the information in the possession of the british government regarding the russian situation, by referring to the matter which had been exposed recently in l'humanite. he stated that he wished to point out that there had been a serious misconception on the part of the french government as to the character of the proposal of the british government. the british proposal did not contemplate in any sense whatever, a recognition of the bolsheviki government, nor a suggestion that bolshevik delegates be invited to attend the conference. the british proposal was to invite all of the different governments now at war within what used to be the russian empire, to a truce of god, to stop reprisals and outrages and to send men here to give, so to speak, an account of themselves. the great powers would then try to find a way to bring some order out of chaos. these men were not to be delegates to the peace conference, and he agreed with the french government entirely that they should not be made members of the conference. mr. lloyd george then proceeded to set forth briefly the reasons which had led the british government to make this proposal. they were as follows: firstly, the real facts are not known; secondly, it is impossible to get the facts, the only way is to adjudicate the question; and thirdly, conditions in russia are very bad; there is general mis-government and starvation. it is not known who is obtaining the upper hand, but the hope that the bolshevik government would collapse had not been realized. in fact, there is one report that the bolsheviki are stronger than ever, that their internal position is strong, and that their hold on the people is stronger. take, for instance, the case of the ukraine. some adventurer raises a few men and overthrows the government. the government is incapable of overthrowing him. it is also reported that the peasants are becoming bolsheviki. it is hardly the business of the great powers to intervene either in lending financial support to one side or the other, or in sending munitions to either side. mr. lloyd george stated that there seemed to be three possible policies: . military intervention. it is true there the bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as german militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, is there anyone who proposes it? it would mean holding a certain number of vast provinces in russia. the germans with one million men on their eastern front only held the fringe of this territory. if he now proposed to send a thousand british troops to russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. the same applies to u.s. troops in siberia; also to canadians and french as well. the mere idea of crushing bolshevism by a military force is pure madness. even admitting that it is done, who is to occupy russia? no one can conceive or understand to bring about order by force. . a cordon. the second suggestion is to besiege bolshevik russia. mr. lloyd george wondered if those present realized what this would mean. from the information furnished him bolshevik russia has no corn, but within this territory there are , , men, women, and children. there is now starvation in petrograd and moscow. this is not a health cordon, it is a death cordon. moreover, as a matter of fact, the people who would die are just the people that the allies desire to protect. it would not result in the starvation of the bolsheviki; it would simply mean the death of our friends. the cordon policy is a policy which, as humane people, those present could not consider. mr. lloyd george asked who was there to overthrow the bolsheviki? he had been told there were three men, denekin, kolchak and knox. in considering the chances of these people to overthrow the bolsheviki, he pointed out that he had received information that the czecho-slovaks now refused to fight; that the russian army was not to be trusted, and that while it was true that a bolshevik army had recently gone over to kolchak it was never certain that just the reverse of this would not take place. if the allies counted on any of these men, he believed they were building on quick-sand. he had heard a lot of talk about denekin, but when he looked on the map he found that denekin was occupying a little backyard near the black sea. then he had been told that denekin had recognized kolchak, but when he looked on the map, there was a great solid block of territory between denekin and kolchak. moreover, from information received it would appear that kolchak had been collecting members of the old régime around him, and would seem to be at heart a monarchist. it appeared that the czecho-slovaks were finding this out. the sympathies of the czecho-slovaks are very democratic, and they are not at all prepared to fight for the restoration of the old conditions in russia. mr. lloyd george stated that he was informed that at the present time two-thirds of bolshevik russia was starving. institutions of bolsheviki are institutions of old czarist régime. this is not what one would call creating a new world. . the third alternative was contained in the british proposal, which was to summon these people to paris to appear before those present, somewhat in the way that the roman empire summoned chiefs of outlying tributary states to render an account of their actions. mr. lloyd george pointed out the fact that the argument might be used that there were already here certain representatives of these governments; but take, for instance, the case of sazonov, who claims to represent the government of omsk. as a matter of fact, sazonov can not speak from personal observation. he is nothing but a partisan, like all the rest. he has never been in contact, and is not now in direct contact with the government at omsk. it would be manifestly absurd for those who are responsible for bringing about the peace conference, to come to any agreement and leave paris when one-half of europe and one-half of asia is still in flames. those present must settle this question or make fools of themselves. mr. lloyd george referred to the objection that had been raised to permitting bolshevik delegates to come to paris. it had been claimed that they would convert france and england to bolshevism. if england becomes bolshevist, it will not be because a single bolshevist representative is permitted to enter england. on the other hand, if a military enterprise were started against the bolsheviki, that would make england bolshevist, and there would be a soviet in london. for his part, mr. lloyd george was not afraid of bolshevism if the facts are known in england and the united states. the same applied to germany. he was convinced that an educated democracy can be always trusted to turn down bolshevism. under all circumstances, mr. lloyd george saw no better way out than to follow the third alternative. let the great powers impose their conditions and summon these people to paris to give an account of themselves to the great powers, not to the peace conference. mr. pichon suggested that it might be well to ask m. noulens, the french ambassador to russia, who had just returned to france, to appear before the meeting to-morrow morning, and give those present his views on the russian situation. president wilson stated that he did not see how it was possible to controvert the statement of mr. lloyd george. he thought that there was a force behind this discussion which was no doubt in his mind, but which it might be desirable to bring out a little more definitely. he did not believe that there would be sympathy anywhere with the brutal aspect of bolshevism, if it were not for the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economic world. while it might be true that this evil was in process of discussion and slow reform, it must be admitted, that the general body of men have grown impatient at the failure to bring about the necessary reform. he stated that there were many men who represented large vested interests in the united states who saw the necessity for these reforms and desired something which should be worked out at the peace conference, namely, the establishment of some machinery to provide for the opportunity of the individuals greater than the world has ever known. capital and labor in the united states are not friends. still they are not enemies in the sense that they are thinking of resorting to physical force to settle their differences. but they are distrustful, each of the other. society can not go on that plane. on the one hand, there is a minority possessing capital and brains; on the other, a majority consisting of the great bodies of workers who are essential to the minority, but do not trust the minority, and feel that the minority will never render them their rights. a way must be found to put trust and cooperation between these two. president wilson pointed out that the whole world was disturbed by this question before the bolskeviki came into power. seeds need soil, and the bolsheviki seeds found the soil already prepared for them. president wilson stated that he would not be surprised to find that the reason why british and united states troops would not be ready to enter russia to fight the bolsheviki was explained by the fact that the troops were not at all sure that if they put down bolshevism they would not bring about a re-establishment of the ancient order. for example, in making a speech recently, to a well-dressed audience in new york city who were not to be expected to show such feeling, mr. wilson had referred casually to russia, stating that the united states would do its utmost to aid her suppressed people. the audience exhibited the greatest enthusiasm, and this had remained in the president's mind as an index to where the sympathies of the new world are. president wilson believed that those present would be playing against the principle of the free spirit of the world if they did not give russia a chance to find herself along the lines of utter freedom. he concurred with mr. lloyd george's view and supported his recommendations that the third line of procedure be adopted. president wilson stated that he had also, like mr. lloyd george, received a memorandum from his experts which agreed substantially with the information which mr. lloyd george had received. there was one point which he thought particularly worthy of notice, and that was the report that the strength of the bolshevik leaders lay in the argument that if they were not supported by the people of russia, there would be foreign intervention, and the bolsheviki were the only thing that stood between the russians and foreign military control. it might well be that if the bolsheviki were assured that they were safe from foreign aggression, they might lose support of their own movement. president wilson further stated that he understood that the danger of destruction of all hope in the baltic provinces was immediate, and that it should be made very clear if the british proposal were adopted, that the bolsheviki would have to withdraw entirely from lithuania and poland. if they would agree to this to refrain from reprisals and outrages, he, for his part, would be prepared to receive representatives from as many groups and centers of action, as chose to come, and endeavor to assist them to reach a solution of their problem. he thought that the british proposal contained the only suggestions that lead anywhere. it might lead nowhere. but this could at least be found out. m. pichon referred again to the suggestion that ambassador noulens be called before the meeting. mr. balfour suggested that it might be well to call the dutch consul, lately in petrograd, if it was the desire of those present to hear the anti-bolshevik side. baron sonnino suggested that m. scavenius, minister of denmark, recently in russia, would be able to give interesting data on the russian situation. those present seemed to think that it might be desirable to hear what these gentlemen might have to say. senator knox. do you know anything about a letter that buckler wrote to the president in relation to his mission? have you ever seen a copy of his report in the form of a letter? mr. bullitt. i have read a copy of his report, but i have not the copy. the only reference i have to it that i find, in the short time i have had to go over my papers since i came down from the woods, is in a memorandum to col. house in reference to the withdrawal of the american troops from archangel [reading]: buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with litvinov, who said that unquestionably the bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the archangel front at any time; and, furthermore, would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those russians in and about archangel who have been cooperating with the allies. he, furthermore, suggested that such russians as did not care to trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops. senator knox. do you know anything about whether litvinov communicated directly with the president in reference to this buckler mission? mr. bullitt. litvinov had written a letter to the president, which has since been widely published, on december . senator knox. that is the letter i had in mind. i had seen some references to that. do you have a copy of that letter? mr. bullitt. i do not know whether i have any copies of this letter--that is, authentic. i think i have a newspaper copy some place, but i have no actual copy of the letter. senator knox. can you tell us anything more about the discussion in reference to the withdrawal of troops from russia that took place at that time--anything more than is indicated by your letter, there? mr. bullitt. there were very serious discussions, all the time. telegrams were being received frequently from the various commanders at archangel, the american and the british notably, in regard to conditions, which they described as likely to be disastrous, and discussions of real gravity were taking place all the time. the subject was very much in the air. i have, i will say, very few references to that particular condition. i have here this memorandum which takes up some of these subjects. i do not know if the committee would care to hear it. the chairman. yes. senator knox. this is a memorandum that you sent to col. house? mr. bullitt. yes; col. house. senator knox. please read it. mr. bullitt [reading]: january , . memorandum for col. house. subject: withdrawal of american troops from archangel. dear col. house: the , american, british, and french troops at archangel are no longer serving any useful purpose. only , russians have rallied around this force. it is the attacked, not the attacker, and serves merely to create cynicism in regard to all our proposals and to stimulate recruiting for the red army. furthermore, the , americans, , british, , french, and , russian troops in this region are in considerable danger of destruction by the bolsheviki. gen. ironside has just appealed for reinforcements and the british war office has directed the commanding general at murmansk to be prepared to dispatch a battalion of infantry to archangel. instead of transferring troops from murmansk to archangel, it seems to me that we should at once transfer to murmansk and bring home the troops which are now at archangel. aside from the needless suffering which these men are enduring, aside from the demands of the public in the united states and england for the return of these men, it seems to me that the withdrawal of these troops would be of great value as a proof that we have made the prinkipos proposal in full good faith. i have asked gen. churchill to obtain the most expert opinion available on the practicability of moving the , american, british, and french troops and such russians as may wish to accompany them from archangel to murmansk. the appended memorandum and map which he has prepared show that unless the ice in the white sea suddenly becomes thicker it is at present possible with the aid of six ice breakers which are now at archangel to move these troops by water to kem on the murmansk railroad, whence they may be carried by train to murmansk. buckler discussed the matter of the withdrawal of these troops with litvinov, who said that unquestionably the bolsheviki would agree to an armistice on the archangel front at any time and, furthermore, would pledge themselves not to injure in any way those russians in and about archangel who have been cooperating with the allies. he furthermore suggested that such russians as did not care to trust their lives to such a promise should be taken out with the troops. the provisional government at archangel has just notified us that it will not accept the proposal for a conference at prinkipos. it seems dignified and honorable at this moment to inform the archangel government that since it can not agree to the allied proposal, presented after the most serious consideration, we shall decline to support it further with arms, but will make provision for the safety of all russians who are unwilling to remain at archangel. i have discussed this archangel business at some length with philip kerr, lloyd george's secretary, who says that l.g. intends to bring the british troops out on the st of may, which he believes to be the first practicable moment. the first practicable moment, however, seems to be now. the situation at archangel is most serious for the soldiers who are stationed there, but it is also serious for the governments which sent them out and seem to have abandoned them. unless they are saved by prompt action, we shall have another gallipoli. very respectfully yours, william c. bullitt. i discussed these matters with each one of the commissioners each morning. it was my duty to keep them au courant with anything that struck me as important, which in the stress of the business of the peace conference they were likely to overlook. senator knox. this was a memorandum made in the line of your duty? mr. bullitt. this was a memorandum made as the result of the conversations that i had had with all of the commissioners that morning. this particular memorandum, in fact, was ordered by col. house, and in connection with it he asked me to have made a map showing the feasibility of getting the troops out of russia, by the military experts of the conference, which map i have here. if you would be interested in it in any way, i will append the memorandum made for gen. churchill with regard to withdrawing the troops. senator knox. i was going to ask you whether or not you had any information as to the terms which the allies were willing to accept from russia. council of ten formulates a russian policy mr. bullitt. i had, of course, seen the discussions of the conference with regard to the entire russian matter. the conference had decided, after long consideration, that it was impossible to subdue or wipe out the soviet government by force. the discussion of that is of a certain interest, i believe, in connection with this general matter. there are, in regard to the question you have just asked, minutes of the council of ten, on january , . lloyd george had introduced the proposition that representatives of the soviet government should be brought to paris along with the representatives of the other russian governments [reading]: [mcd. secret. i.c. . secretaries' notes of a conversation held in m. pichon's room at the quai d'orsay on tuesday, january , , at hours.] present united states of america: president wilson, mr. r. lansing, mr. a.h. frazier, col. u.s. grant, mr. l. harrison. british empire: the right hon. d. lloyd george, the right hon. a.j. balfour, lieut. col. sir m.p.a. hankey, k.c.b., maj. a.m. caccia, m.v.o., mr. e. phipps. france: m. clemenceau, m. pichon, m. dutasta, m. berthelot, capt. a. potier. italy: signor orlando, h.e. baron sonnino, count aldrovandi, maj. a. jones. japan: baron makino, h.e.m. matsui, m. saburi. interpreter, prof. p.j. mantoux. situation in russia m. clemenceau said they had met together to decide what could be done in russia under present circumstances. president wilson said that in order to have something definite to discuss, he wished to take advantage of a suggestion made by mr. lloyd george and to propose a modification of the british proposal. he wished to suggest that the various organized groups in russia should be asked to send representatives, not to paris, but to some other place, such as salonika, convenient of approach, there to meet such representatives as might be appointed by the allies, in order to see if they could draw up a program upon which agreement could be reached. mr. lloyd george pointed out that the advantage of this would be that they could be brought straight there from russia through the black sea without passing through other countries. m. sonnino said that some of the representatives of the various governments were already here in paris, for example, m. sazonov. why should these not be heard? president wilson expressed the view that the various parties should not be heard separately. it would be very desirable to get all these representatives in one place, and still better, all in one room, in order to obtain a close comparison of views. mr. balfour said that a further objection to mr. sonnino's plan was that if m. sazonov was heard in paris, it would be difficult to refuse to hear the others in paris also, and m. clemenceau objected strongly to having some of these representatives in paris. m. sonnino explained that all the russian parties had some representatives here, except the soviets, whom they did not wish to hear. mr. lloyd george remarked that the bolshevists were the very people some of them wished to hear. m. sonnino continuing said that they had heard m. litovnov's statements that morning. that was the statement that litvinov had made to buckler which the president had read to the council of ten that morning. [continuing reading.] the allies were now fighting against the bolshevists who were their enemies, and therefore they were not obliged to hear them with the others. mr. balfour remarked that the essence of president wilson's proposal was that the parties must all be heard at one and the same time. mr. lloyd george expressed the view that the acceptance of m. sonnino's proposals would amount to their hearing a string of people, all of whom held the same opinion, and all of whom would strike the same note. but they would not hear the people who at the present moment were actually controlling european russia. in deference to m. clemenceau's views, they had put forward this new proposal. he thought it would be quite safe to bring the bolshevist representatives to salonika, or perhaps to lemnos. it was absolutely necessary to endeavor to make peace. the report read by president wilson that morning went to show that the bolshevists were not convinced of the error of their ways, but they apparently realised the folly of their present methods. therefore they were endeavouring to come to terms. president wilson asked to be permitted to urge one aspect of the case. as m. sonnino had implied, they were all repelled by bolshevism, and for that reason they had placed armed men in opposition to them. one of the things that was clear in the russian situation was that by opposing bolshevism with arms, they were in reality serving the cause of bolshevism. the allies were making it possible for the bolsheviks to argue that imperialistic and capitalistic governments were endeavouring to exploit the country and to give the land back to the landlords, and so bring about a re-action. if it could be shown that this was not true, and that the allies were prepared to deal with the rulers of russia, much of the moral force of this argument would disappear. the allegation that the allies were against the people and wanted to control their affairs provided the argument which enabled them to raise armies. if, on the other hand, the allies could swallow their pride and the natural repulsion which they felt for the bolshevists and see the representatives of all organized groups in one place, he thought it would bring about a marked reaction against bolshevism. m. clemenceau said that, in principle, he did not favour conversation with the bolshevists; not because they were criminals, but because we would be raising them to our level by saying that they were worthy of entering into conversation with us. the bolshevist danger was very great at the present moment. bolshevism was spreading. it had invaded the baltic provinces and poland, and that very morning they received very bad news regarding its spread to budapesth and vienna. italy, also, was in danger. the danger was probably greater there than in france. if bolshevism, after spreading in germany, were to traverse austria and hungary and so reach italy, europe would be faced with a very great danger. therefore, something must be done against bolshevism. when listening to the document presented by president wilson that morning, he had been struck by the cleverness with which the bolshevists were attempting to lay a trap for the allies. when the bolshevists first came into power, a breach was made with the capitalist government on questions of principle, but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. he need not say how valueless their promises were, but if they were listened to, the bolshevists would go back to their people and say: "we offered them great principles of justice and the allies would have nothing to do with us. now we offer money, and they are ready to make peace." he admitted his remarks did not offer a solution. the great misfortune was that the allies were in need of a speedy solution. after four years of war, and the losses and sufferings they had incurred, their populations could stand no more. russia also was in need of immediate peace. but its necessary evolution must take time. the signing of the world peace could not await russia's final avatar. had time been available, he would suggest waiting, for eventually sound men representing common-sense would come to the top. but when would that be? he could make no forecast. therefore they must press for an early solution. to sum up, had he been acting by himself, he would temporize and erect barriers to prevent bolshevism from spreading. but he was not alone, and in the presence of his colleagues he felt compelled to make some concession, as it was essential that there should not be even the appearance of disagreement amongst them. the concession came easier after having heard president wilson's suggestions. he thought that they should make a very clear and convincing appeal to all reasonable peoples, emphatically stating that they did not wish in any way to interfere in the internal affairs of russia, and especially that they had no intention of restoring czardom. the object of the allies being to hasten the creation of a strong government, they proposed to call together representatives of all parties to a conference. he would beg president wilson to draft a paper, fully explaining the position of the allies to the whole world, including the russians and the germans. mr. lloyd george agreed and gave notice that he wished to withdraw his own motion in favour of president wilson's. mr. balfour said that he understood that all these people were to be asked on an equality. on these terms he thought the bolshevists would refuse, and by their refusal, they would put themselves in a very bad position. m. sonnino said that he did not agree that the bolshevists would not come. he thought they would be the first to come, because they would be eager to put themselves on an equality with the others. he would remind his colleagues that, before the peace of brest-litovsk was signed, the bolshevists promised all sorts of things, such as to refrain from propaganda, but since that peace had been concluded they had broken all their promises, their one idea being to spread revolution in all other countries. his idea was to collect together all the anti-bolshevik parties and help them to make a strong government, provided they pledged themselves not to serve the forces of re-action and especially not to touch the land question, thereby depriving the bolshevists of their strongest argument. should they take these pledges, he would be prepared to help them. mr. lloyd george enquired how this help would be given. m. sonnino replied that help would be given with soldiers to a reasonable degree or by supplying arms, food, and money. for instance, poland asked for weapons and munitions; the ukraine asked for weapons. all the allies wanted was to establish a strong government. the reason that no strong government at present existed was that no party could risk taking the offensive against bolshevism without the assistance of the allies. he would enquire how the parties of order could possibly succeed without the help of the allies. president wilson had said that they should put aside all pride in the matter. he would point out that, for italy and probably for france also, as m. clemenceau had stated, it was in reality a question of self-defence. he thought that even a partial recognition of the bolshevists would strengthen their position, and, speaking for himself, he thought that bolshevism was already a serious danger in his country. mr. lloyd george said he wished to put one or two practical questions to m. sonnino. the british empire now had some , to , men in russia. m. de scavenius had estimated that some , additional men would be required, in order to keep the anti-bolshevist governments from dissolution. and general franchet d'esperey also insisted on the necessity of allied assistance. now canada had decided to withdraw her troops, because the canadian soldiers would not agree to stay and fight against the russians. similar trouble had also occurred amongst the other allied troops. and he felt certain that, if the british tried to send any more troops there, there would be mutiny. m. sonnino suggested that volunteers might be called for. mr. lloyd george, continuing, said that it would be impossible to raise , men in that way. he asked, however, what contributions america, italy and france would make towards the raising of this army. president wilson and m. clemenceau each said none. m. orlando agreed that italy could make no further contributions. mr. lloyd george said that the bolshevists had an army of , men who would, before long, be good soldiers, and to fight them at least , russian soldiers would be required. who would feed, equip and pay them? would italy, or america, or france, do so? if they were unable to do that, what would be the good of fighting bolshevism? it could not be crushed by speeches. he sincerely trusted that they would accept president wilson's proposal as it now stood. m. orlando agreed that the question was a very difficult one for the reasons that had been fully given. he agreed that bolshevism constituted a grave danger to all europe. to prevent a contagious epidemic from spreading, the sanitarians set up a _cordon sanitaire_. if similar measures could be taken against bolshevism, in order to prevent its spreading, it might be overcome, since to isolate it meant vanquishing it. italy was now passing through a period of depression, due to war weariness. but bolshevists could never triumph there, unless they found a favourable medium, such as might be produced either by a profound patriotic disappointment in their expectations as to the rewards of the war, or by an economic crisis. either might lead to revolution, which was equivalent to bolshevism. therefore, he would insist that all possible measures should be taken to set up this cordon. next, he suggested the consideration of repressive measures. he thought two methods were possible; either the use of physical force or the use of moral force. he thought mr. lloyd george's objection to the use of physical force unanswerable. the occupation of russia meant the employment of large numbers of troops for an indefinite period of time. this meant an apparent prolongation of the war. there remained the use of moral force. he agreed with m. clemenceau that no country could continue in anarchy and that an end must eventually come; but they could not wait; they could not proceed to make peace and ignore russia. therefore, mr. lloyd george's proposal, with the modifications introduced after careful consideration by president wilson and m. clemenceau, gave a possible solution. it did not involve entering into negotiations with the bolsheviks; the proposal was merely an attempt to bring together all the parties in russia with a view to finding a way out of the present difficulty. he was prepared, therefore, to support it. president wilson asked for the views of his japanese colleagues. baron makino said that after carefully considering the various points of view put forward, he had no objections to make regarding the conclusions reached. he thought that was the best solution under the circumstances. he wished, however, to enquire what attitude would be taken by the representatives of the allied powers if the bolshevists accepted the invitation to the meeting and there insisted upon their principles. he thought they should under no circumstances countenance bolshevist ideas. the conditions in siberia east of the baikal had greatly improved. the objects which had necessitated the despatch of troops to that region had been attained. bolshevism was no longer aggressive, though it might still persist in a latent form. in conclusion, he wished to support the proposal before the meeting. president wilson expressed the view that the emissaries of the allied powers should not be authorised to adopt any definite attitude towards bolshevism. they should merely report back to their governments the conditions found. mr. lloyd george asked that that question be further considered. he thought the emissaries of the allied powers should be able to establish an agreement if they were able to find a solution. for instance, if they succeeded in reaching an agreement on the subject of the organization of a constituent assembly, they should be authorised to accept such a compromise without the delay of a reference to the governments. president wilson suggested that the emissaries might be furnished with a body of instructions. mr. balfour expressed the view that abstention from hostile action against their neighbours should be made a condition of their sending representatives to this meeting. president wilson agreed. m. clemenceau suggested that the manifesto to the russian parties should be based solely on humanitarian grounds. they should say to the russians: "you are threatened by famine. we are prompted by humanitarian feelings; we are making peace; we do not want people to die. we are prepared to see what can be done to remove the menace of starvation." he thought the russians would at once prick up their ears, and be prepared to hear what the allies had to say. they would add that food cannot be sent unless peace and order were re-established. it should, in fact, be made quite clear that the representatives of all parties would merely be brought together for purely humane reasons. mr. lloyd george said that in this connection he wished to invite attention to a doubt expressed by certain of the delegates of the british dominions, namely, whether there would be enough food and credit to go round should an attempt be made to feed all allied countries, and enemy countries, and russia also. the export of so much food would inevitably have the effect of raising food prices in allied countries and so create discontent and bolshevism. as regards grain, russia had always been an exporting country, and there was evidence to show that plenty of food at present existed in the ukraine. president wilson said that his information was that enough food existed in russia, but, either on account of its being hoarded or on account of difficulties of transportation, it could not be made available. (it was agreed that president wilson should draft a proclamation, for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organized parties in russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as salonika or lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and associated great powers the means of restoring order and peace in russia. participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.) . _peace conference_.--m. clemenceau considered it to be most urgent that the delegates should be set to work. he understood that president wilson would be ready to put on the table at the next full conference, proposals relating to the creation of a league of nations. he was anxious to add a second question, which could be studied immediately, namely, reparation for damages. he thought the meeting should consider how the work should be organized in order to give effect to this suggestion. mr. lloyd george said that he agreed that these questions should be studied forthwith. he would suggest that, in the first place, the league of nations should be considered, and, that after the framing of the principles, an international committee of experts be set to work out its constitution in detail. the same remark applied also to the question of indemnities and reparation. he thought that a committee should also be appointed as soon as possible to consider international labour legislation. president wilson observed that he had himself drawn up a constitution of a league of nations. he could not claim that it was wholly his own creation. its generation was as follows:--he had received the phillimore report, which had been amended by colonel house and re-written by himself. he had again revised it after having received general smuts' and lord robert cecil's reports. it was therefore a compound of these various suggestions. during the week he had seen m. bourgeois, with whom he found himself to be in substantial accord on principles. a few days ago he had discussed his draft with lord robert cecil and general smuts, and they found themselves very near together. mr. balfour suggested that president wilson's draft should be submitted to the committee as a basis for discussion. president wilson further suggested that the question should be referred as far as possible to the men who had been studying it. mr. lloyd george expressed his complete agreement. he thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on the fundamental principles and then refer the matter to the committee. when that committee met they could take president wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion. (it was agreed that the question of appointing an international committee, consisting of two members from each of the five great powers, to whom would be referred president wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.) . _poland_.--m. pichon called attention to the necessity for replying to the demand addressed by m. paderewski to colonel house, which had been read by president wilson that morning, and asked that marshal foch should be present. (it was agreed that this question should be discussed at the next meeting.) . _disarmament_.--mr. balfour called attention to the urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he would shortly propose that a committee should be appointed to consider this question. villa majestic, paris january st, . this is the minute of january , and the prinkipos memorandum was written on january . the instructions to the president were as follows: it was agreed that president wilson should draft a proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organized parties in russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as salonika or lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and associated great powers the means of restoring order and peace in russia. participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities. the president then wrote the prinkipos proposition. senator knox. did you make a written report of your mission? mr. bullitt. i did, sir. senator knox. have you it here? mr. bullitt. yes, sir. i might read the report without the appendices. senator knox. the chairman wants you to read it. the chairman. i do not know whether it is very long. the report he made would be of some interest. you were the only official representative sent? mr. bullitt. yes, sir; except capt. pettit, my assistant. the circumstances of my sending will perhaps require further elucidation. i not only was acquainted with the minutes of the discussions of the council of ten, but in addition i had discussed the subject with each of the commissioners each morning and i had talked with many british representatives. after the prinkipos proposal was made, the replies began to come in from various factions, that they would refuse to accept it for various reasons. the soviet government replied in a slightly evasive form. they said, "we are ready to accept the terms of the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." they did not say, "we are ready to stop fighting on such and such a date." it was not made specific. senator knox. that was one of the conditions of the proposal? france blocks prinkipos conference mr. bullitt. it was. that is why i say they replied in an evasive manner. the french--and particularly the french foreign office, even more than mr. clemenceau--and you can observe it from that minute were opposed to the idea, and we found that the french foreign office had communicated to the ukrainian government and various other antisoviet governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would support them and continue to support them, and not allow the allies, if they could prevent it, or the allied governments, to make peace with the russian soviet government. at all events, the time set for the prinkipos proposal was february . at that time nobody had acted in a definite, uncompromising matter. it therefore fell to the ground. there was a further discussion as to what should be done. the peace conference was still of the opinion that it was impossible to hope to conquer the soviet government by force of arms, because in the latter part of that report, which i did not read to the committee, there was expressed very forcibly the opinion of mr. lloyd george, that the populations at home would not stand it. therefore they desired to follow up further the line of making peace. about that time i was working particularly closely on the russian affairs. i had had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in it, and on the very day that col. house and mr. lansing first asked me to undertake this mission to russia, i was dining at mr. lloyd george's apartment to discuss russian affairs with his secretaries, so that i had a fair idea of the point of view of everyone in paris. i further, before i went, received urgent instructions from secretary lansing if possible to obtain the release of consul treadwell, who had been our consul in petrograd and had been transferred to tashkent, and had been detained by the local soviet government and had been kept there several months. he was one of our government officers they had seized. mr. lansing ordered me to do everything i could to obtain his release. i further, before i went, asked col. house certain specific questions in regard to what, exactly, the point of view of our government was on this subject, what we were ready to do, and i think it perhaps might be important to detail a brief resume of this conversation. the idea was this: lloyd george had gone over to london on february , as i remember, to try to adjust some labor troubles. he, however, still insisted that the prinkipos proposal must be renewed or some other peace proposal must be made, and i arranged a meeting between him and col. house, which was to take place, i believe, on february , at which time they were to prepare a renewal of the prinkipos proposal, and they were both prepared to insist that it be passed against any opposition of the french. i arranged this meeting through mr. philip kerr, mr. lloyd george's confidential assistant. however, on the th day of the month, mr. clemenceau was shot, and the next day mr. lloyd george telephoned over from london to say that as long as clemenceau was wounded and was ill, he was boss of the roost, and that anything he desired to veto would be immediately wiped out and therefore it was no use for him and col. house, as long as clemenceau was ill, to attempt to renew the prinkipos proposal, as clemenceau would simply have to hold up a finger and the whole thing would drop to the ground. therefore, it was decided that i should go at once to russia to attempt to obtain from the soviet government an exact statement of the terms on which they were ready to stop fighting. i was ordered if possible to obtain that statement and have it back in paris before the president returned to paris from the united states. the plan was to make a proposal to the soviet government which would certainly be accepted. the chairman. these orders came from the president? mr. bullitt. these orders came to me from col. house. i also discussed the matter with mr. lansing, and mr. lansing and col. house gave me the instructions which i had. senator knox. you said a moment ago that you went to col. house to get a statement of the american position. what america wanted mr. bullitt. yes; i asked col. house these questions [reading]: . if the bolsheviki are ready to stop the forward movement of their troops on all fronts and to declare an armistice on all fronts, would we be willing to do likewise? . is the american government prepared to insist that the french, british, italian, and japanese governments shall accept such an armistice proposal? . if fighting is stopped on all fronts, is the government of the united states prepared to insist on the reestablishment of economic relations with russia, subject only to the equitable distribution among all classes of the population of supplies and food and essential commodities which may be sent to russia? in other words, a sort of hoover belgian distribution plan so that the bolsheviki could not use the food we sent in there for propaganda purposes and to starve their enemies and to feed their friends. the fourth question i asked him was as follows: . is the united states government, under these conditions, prepared to press the allies for a joint statement that all allied troops will be withdrawn from the soil of russia as soon as practicable, on condition that the bolsheviki give explicit assurances that there will be no retaliation against persons who have cooperated with the allied forces? col. house replied that we were prepared to. further, i asked col. house whether it was necessary to get a flat and explicit assurance from the soviet government that they would make full payment of all their debts before we would make peace with them, and col. house replied that it was not; that no such statement was necessary, however, that such a statement would be extremely desirable to have, inasmuch as much of the french opposition to making peace with the soviet government was on account of the money owed by russia to france. i further had an intimation of the british disposition toward russia. as i said before, i had discussed the matter with mr. philip kerr, and sir maurice hankey and col. house asked me to inform mr. kerr of my mission before i went. it was to be an entire secret from all except the british. the british and american delegations worked in very close touch throughout the conference, and there were practically no secrets that the american delegation had that were not also the property of the british delegation. the british terms i was asked to inform mr. kerr of this trip. i told him all about it, and asked him if he could get mr. balfour and mr. lloyd george to give me a general indication of their point of view on peace with russia; what they would be prepared to do in the matter. mr. kerr and i then talked and prepared what we thought might be the basis of peace with russia. i then received from mr. kerr, before i left, the following letter, which is a personal letter, which i regret greatly to bring forward, but which i feel is necessary in the interest of an understanding of this matter. [reading:] [private and confidential.] british delegation, paris, february , . my dear bullitt: i inclose a note of the sort of conditions upon which i personally think it would be possible for the allied governments to resume once more normal relations with soviet russia. you will understand, of course, that these have no official significance and merely represent suggestions of my own opinion. yours, sincerely, p.h. kerr. that was from mr. kerr, lloyd george's confidential secretary. mr. kerr had, however, told me that he had discussed the entire matter with mr. lloyd george and mr. balfour, and therefore i thought he had a fair idea of what conditions the british were ready to accept. the note inclosed reads as follows: . hostilities to cease on all fronts. . all de facto governments to remain in full control of the territories which they at present occupy. . railways and ports necessary to transportation between soviet russia and the sea to be subject to the same regulations as international railways and ports in the rest of europe. . allied subjects to be given free right of entry and full security to enable them to enter soviet russia and go about their business there provided they do not interfere in politics. . amnesty to all political prisoners on both sides: full liberty to all russians who have fought with the allies. . trade relations to be restored between soviet russia and the outside world under conditions which, while respecting the sovereignty of soviet russia insure that allied supplies are made available on equal terms to all classes of the russian people. . all other questions connected with russia's debt to the allies, etc., to be considered independently after peace has been established. . all allied troops to be withdrawn from russia as soon as russian armies above quota to be defined have been demobilized and their surplus arms surrendered or destroyed. you will see the american and british positions were very close together. senator knox. with these statements from col. house as to the american position and from mr. kerr as to the british position, and with the instructions which you had received, you proceeded to russia, and, as you said a moment ago, you made a written report? mr. bullitt. i did, sir. do you want it read, or shall i state the substance and then put it in the record? i think i can state it more briefly if i read the first eight pages of it and then put the rest of it in the record. the chairman. very well; do that. mr. bullitt. this report i made to the president and to the american commissioners, by order of the president transmitted to me on my return by mr. lansing. i should like to say, before i read this report, that of course i was in russia an extremely short time, and this is merely the best observation that i could make supplemented by the observation of capt. pettit of the military intelligence, who was sent in as my assistant, and with other impressions that i got from mr. lincoln steffens and other observers who were there. senator knox. how long were you in russia? mr. bullitt. for only one week. i was instructed to go in and bring back as quickly as possible a definite statement of exactly the terms the soviet government was ready to accept. the idea in the minds of the british and the american delegation were that if the allies made another proposal it should be a proposal which we would know in advance would be accepted, so that there would be no chance of another prinkipos proposal miscarrying. i might perhaps read first, or show to you, the official text. this is the official text of their proposition which they handed me in moscow on the th of march. here is a curious thing--the soviet foreign office envelope. terms which russia offered to accept as i said, i was sent to obtain an exact statement of the terms that the soviet government was ready to accept, and i received on the th the following statement from tchitcherin and litvinov. senator knox. who were they? mr. bullitt. tchitcherin was peoples' commisar for foreign affairs of the soviet republic and litvinov was the former soviet ambassador to london, the man with whom buckler had had his conversation, and who was now practically assistant secretary for foreign affairs. i also had a conference with lenin. the soviet government undertook to accept this proposal provided it was made by the allied and associated governments not later than april , . the proposal reads as follows [reading]: text of projected peace proposal by the allied and associated governments. the allied and associated governments to propose that hostilities shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former russian empire and finland on ----[ ] and that no new hostilities shall begin after this date, pending a conference to be held at ----[ ] on ----[ ] [footnote : the date of the armistice to be set at least a week after the date when the allied and associated governments make this proposal.] [footnote : the soviet government greatly prefers that the conference should be held in a neutral country and also that either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to moscow should be put at its disposal.] [footnote : the conference to begin not later than a week after the armistice takes effect and the soviet government greatly prefers that the period between the date of the armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be only three days, if possible.] the duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material to the territory of the former russian empire. the conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference. . all existing de facto governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland to remain in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of territories; until the peoples inhabiting the territories controlled by these de facto governments shall themselves determine to change their governments. the russian soviet government, the other soviet governments and all other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire, the allied and associated governments, and the other governments which are operating against the soviet governments, including finland, poland, galicia, roumania, armenia, azerbaidjan, and afghanistan, to agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing de facto governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and the other governments signatory to this agreement. [footnote : the allied and associated governments to undertake to see to it that the de facto governments of germany do not attempt to upset by force the de facto governments of russia. the de facto governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force the de facto governments of germany.] . the economic blockade to be raised and trade relations between soviet russia and the allied and associated countries to be reestablished under conditions which will ensure that supplies from the allied and associated countries are made available on equal terms to all classes of the russian people. . the soviet governments of russia to have the right of unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports which belonged to the former russian empire and to finland and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation of passengers and goods between their territories and the sea; detailed arrangements for the carrying out of this provision to be agreed upon at the conference. . the citizens of the soviet republics of russia to have the right of free entry into the allied and associated countries as well as into all countries which have been formed on the territory of the former russian empire and finland; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of those countries. [footnote : it is considered essential by the soviet government that the allied and associated governments should see to it that poland and all neutral countries extend the same rights as the allied and associated countries.] nationals of the allied and associated countries and of the other countries above named to have the right of free entry into the soviet republics of russia; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of the soviet republics. the allied and associated governments and other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into the various russian soviet republics. the soviet governments of russia to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all the allied and associated countries and into the nonsoviet countries which have been formed on the territory of the former russian empire and finland. . the soviet governments, the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland, to give a general amnesty to all political opponents, offenders, and prisoners. the allied and associated governments to give a general amnesty to all russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to soviet russia. all russians who have fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the soviet governments, and those opposed to the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland to be included in this amnesty. all prisoners of war of non-russian powers detained in russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in russia to be given full facilities for repatriation. the russian prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, likewise all russian nationals, including the russian soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation. . immediately after the signing of this agreement all troops of the allied and associated governments and other non-russian governments to be withdrawn from russia and military assistance to cease to be given to antisoviet governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire. the soviet governments and the antisoviet governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland to begin to reduce their armies simultaneously, and at the same rate, to a peace footing immediately after the signing of this agreement. the conference to determine the most effective and just method of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous demobilization and also the withdrawal of the troops and the cessation of military assistance to the antisoviet governments. . the allied and associated governments, taking cognizance of the statement of the soviet government of russia, in its note of february , in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the soviet governments and the other governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former russian empire, to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. detailed arrangements for the payment of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the present financial position of russia. the russian gold seized by the czecho-slovaks in kazan or taken from germany by the allies to be regarded as partial payment of the portion of the debt due from the soviet republics of russia. the soviet government of russia undertakes to accept the foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than april , . in regard to the second sentence in paragraph , in regard to "giving help to soviet russia" i may say that i was told that that was not a sine qua non but it was necessary in order to get the proposal through the russian executive committee, which it had to pass before it was handed to me. i was also handed an additional sheet, which i refused to take as a part of the formal document, containing the following: the soviet government is most anxious to have a semiofficial guaranty from the american and british governments that they will do their utmost to see to it that france lives up to the conditions of the armistice. the soviet government had a deep suspicion of the french government. in reference to this matter, and in explanation of that proposal, i sent a number of telegrams from helsingfors. i feel that in a way it is important, for an explanation of the matter, that those telegrams should be made public, but, on the other hand, they were sent in a confidential code of the department of state, and i do not feel at liberty to read them unless ordered to specifically by the committee. i should not wish to take the responsibility for breaking a code which is in current use by the department. senator knox. i should think your scruples were well founded. i should not read those telegrams. mr. bullitt. i can simply inform you briefly of the nature of them. senator knox. you might give us the nature of them. to whom were they sent? mr. bullitt. on reaching petrograd i sent capt. pettit out to helsingfors after i had had a discussion with tchitcherin and with litvinov with a telegram, in which i said i had reached petrograd and had perfected arrangements to cross the boundary at will, and to communicate with the mission via the consul at helsingfors; that the journey had been easy, and that the reports of frightful conditions in petrograd had been ridiculously exaggerated. i described the discussions i had had with tchitcherin and with litvinov, and said they had assured me that after going to moscow and after discussion with lenin, i should be able to carry out a specific statement of the position of the soviet government on all points. on reaching helsingfors i sent a telegram to the mission at paris "most secret, for the president, secretary lansing, and col. house only," in which i said that in handing me the statement which i have just read, tchitcherin and litvinov had explained that the executive council of the soviet government had formally considered and adopted it, and that the soviet government considered itself absolutely bound to accept the proposals made therein, provided they were made on or before april , and under no conditions would they change their minds. i also explained that i had found lenin, tchitcherin, and litvinov full of the sense of russia's need for peace, and that i felt the details of their statement might be modified without making it unacceptable to them, and that in particular the clause under article was not of vital importance. that, on the other hand, i felt that in the main this statement represented the minimum terms that the soviet government would accept. i explained that it was understood with regard to article that the allied and associated countries should have a right to send inspectors into soviet russia and see to it that the disposition of supplies, if the blockade was lifted, was entirely equitable, and i explained also that it was fully understood that the phrase under article on "official representatives" did not include diplomatic representatives, that the soviet government simply desired to have some agents who might more or less look out for their people here. i explained further that in regard to footnote no. , the soviet government hoped and preferred that the conference should be held in norway; that its preferences thereafter were, first, some point in between russia and finland; second, a large ocean liner anchored off moon island or the aland islands; and, fourth, prinkipos. i also explained that tchitcherin and all the other members of the government with whom i had talked had said in the most positive and unequivocal manner that the soviet government was determined to pay its foreign debts, and i was convinced that there would be no dispute on that point. senator knox. do you know how these telegrams were received in paris, whether favorably or unfavorably? mr. bullitt. i can only say, in regard to that, there are three other very brief ones. one was on a subject which i might give you the gist of before i go on with it. senator knox. go ahead, in your own way. mr. bullitt. col. house sent me a message of congratulation on receipt of them, and by one of the curious quirks of the conference, a member of the secretariat refused to send the message because of the way in which it was signed, and col. house was only able to give me a copy of it when i reached paris. i have a copy of it here. senator harding. would not this story be more interesting if we knew which member of the conference objected? mr. bullitt. i believe the objection was on the technical point that col. house had signed "ammission" instead of his name, but i really do not know which member of the conference it was that made the objection. i then sent another telegram, which is rather long, too long to attempt to paraphrase, and i will ask that i may not put it in, because the entire substance of it is contained in briefer form in my formal report. this telegram itself is in code. senator brandegee. are there any translations of those of your telegrams that are in code? mr. bullitt. no; i have given you the substance of them as i have gone along. as i said to you before, secretary lansing had instructed me if possible to obtain the release of mr. treadwell, our consul at tashkent, somewhere between , and , miles from moscow. in moscow i had spoken to lenin and tchitcherin and litvinov in regard to it, and finally they said they recognized that it was foolish to hold him; that they had never really given much thought to the matter; that he had been held by the local government at tashkent, which was more than , miles away; that raids were being made on the railroad constantly, and they might have some difficulty in communicating. however, they promised me that they would send a telegram at once ordering his release, and that they would send him out either by persia or by finland whichever way he preferred. i told them i was sure he would prefer to go by way of finland. here is a copy of their telegram ordering his release, which will not be of much use to you, i fear, as it is in russian. they carried out this promise to the letter, releasing treadwell at once, and treadwell in due course of time and in good health appeared on the frontier of finland on the th of april. all that time was consumed in travel from tashkent, which is a long way under present conditions. senator new. i saw mr. treadwell here some time ago. mr. bullitt. i then sent a telegram in regard to mr. pettit, the officer of military intelligence, who was with me as my assistant, saying i intended to send him back to petrograd at once to keep in touch with the situation so that we should have information constantly. i will say in this connection that it was not an extraordinary thing for the various governments to have representatives in russia. the british government had a man in there at the same time that i was there. he was traveling as a red cross representative, but in reality he was there for the foreign office, a maj. a.r. parker, i believe. i am not certain of his name, but we can verify it. i also sent a telegram from helsingfors, "strictly personal to col. house," requesting him to show my fifth and sixth telegrams to mr. philip kerr, mr. lloyd george's secretary, so that mr. lloyd george might be at once informed in regard to the situation, inasmuch as he had known i was going, and inasmuch as the british had been so courteous as to offer to send me across on a cruiser. when i got to london and found that the torpedo boat on which i had expected to go was escorting the president, mr. lloyd george's office in london called up the admiralty and asked them to give me a boat in which to go across. incidentally i was informed by col. house, on my arrival in paris, that copies of my telegrams had been sent at once to mr. lloyd george and mr. balfour. senator knox. mr. bullitt, i do not think we need to go into quite so much detail. you have told us now with what instructions you went, what the british attitude was, what the american attitude was, and what the soviet government proposed. now, let us have your report. mr. bullitt. all right, sir. this was my report-- senator brandegee. what is the date of that, please? mr. bullitt. this copy does not bear the date on it. on the other hand i can tell you within a day or two. the date unfortunately was left off of this particular copy. it was made on or about the th or th day of march, in the week before april . senator brandegee. ? mr. bullitt. . i unquestionably could obtain from secretary lansing or the president or some one else the actual original of the report. senator brandegee. i do not care about the precise date, but i want to get it approximately. mr. bullitt. it was about the st day of april. senator knox. to whom was the report made? mr. bullitt. the report was addressed to the president and the american commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace. i was ordered to make it. i had sent all these telegrams from helsingfors, and i felt personally that no report was necessary, but the president desired a written report, and i made the report as follows: mr. bullitt's report on russia economic situation russia to-day is in a condition of acute economic distress. the blockade by land and sea is the cause of this distress and lack of the essentials of transportation is its gravest symptom. only one-fourth of the locomotives which ran on russian lines before the war are now available for use. furthermore, soviet russia is cut off entirely from all supplies of coal and gasoline. in consequence, transportation by all steam and electric vehicles is greatly hampered; and transportation by automobile and by the fleet of gasoline-using volga steamers and canal boats is impossible. (appendix, p. .) as a result of these hindrances to transportation it is possible to bring from the grain centers to moscow only carloads of food a day, instead of the carloads which are essential, and to petrograd only carloads, instead of the essential . in consequence, every man, woman, and child in moscow and petrograd is suffering from slow starvation. (appendix, p. .) mortality is particularly high among new-born children whose mothers can not suckle them, among newly-delivered mothers, and among the aged. the entire population, in addition, is exceptionally susceptible to disease; and a slight illness is apt to result fatally because of the total lack of medicines. typhoid, typhus, and smallpox are epidemic in both petrograd and moscow. industry, except the production of munitions of war, is largely at a standstill. nearly all means of transport which are not employed in carrying food are used to supply the army, and there is scarcely any surplus transport to carry materials essential to normal industry. furthermore, the army has absorbed the best executive brains and physical vigor of the nation. in addition, soviet russia is cut off from most of its sources of iron and of cotton. only the flax, hemp, wood, and lumber industries have an adequate supply of raw material. on the other hand, such essentials of economic life as are available are being utilized to the utmost by the soviet government. such trains as there are, run on time. the distribution of food is well controlled. many industrial experts of the old régime are again managing their plants and sabotage by such managers has ceased. loafing by the workmen during work hours has been overcome. (appendix, p. .) social conditions the destructive phase of the revolution is over and all the energy of the government is turned to constructive work. the terror has ceased. all power of judgment has been taken away from the extraordinary commission for suppression of the counter-revolution, which now merely accuses suspected counter-revolutionaries, who are tried by the regular, established, legal tribunals. executions are extremely rare. good order has been established. the streets are safe. shooting has ceased. there are few robberies. prostitution has disappeared from sight. family life has been unchanged by the revolution, the canard in regard to "nationalization of women" notwithstanding. (appendix, p. .) the theaters, opera, and ballet are performing as in peace. thousands of new schools have been opened in all parts of russia and the soviet government seems to have done more for the education of the russian people in a year and a half than czardom did in years. (appendix, p. .) political situation the soviet form of government is firmly established. perhaps the most striking fact in russia today is the general support which is given the government by the people in spite of their starvation. indeed, the people lay the blame for their distress wholly on the blockade and on the governments which maintain it. the soviet form of government seems to have become to the russian people the symbol of their revolution. unquestionably it is a form of government which lends itself to gross abuse and tyranny but it meets the demand of the moment in russia and it has acquired so great a hold on the imagination of the common people that the women are ready to starve and the young men to die for it. the position of the communist party (formerly bolsheviki) is also very strong. blockade and intervention have caused the chief opposition parties, the right social revolutionaries and the menshiviki, to give temporary support to the communists. these opposition parties have both made formal statements against the blockade, intervention, and the support of antisoviet governments by the allied and associated governments. their leaders, volsky and martov, are most vigorous in their demands for the immediate raising of the blockade and peace. (appendix, p. .) indeed, the only ponderable opposition to the communists to-day comes from more radical parties--the left social revolutionaries and the anarchists. these parties, in published statements, call the communists, and particularly lenin and tchitcherin, "the paid bourgeois gendarmes of the entente." they attack the communists because the communists have encouraged scientists, engineers, and industrial experts of the bourgeois class to take important posts under the soviet government at high pay. they rage against the employment of bourgeois officers in the army and against the efforts of the communists to obtain peace. they demand the immediate massacre of all the bourgeoisie and an immediate declaration of war on all nonrevolutionary governments. they argue that the entente governments should be forced to intervene more deeply in russia, asserting that such action would surely provoke the proletariat of all european countries to immediate revolution. within the communist party itself there is a distinct division of opinion in regard to foreign policy, but this disagreement has not developed personal hostility or open breach in the ranks of the party. trotski, the generals, and many theorists believe the red army should go forward everywhere until more vigorous intervention by the entente is provoked, which they, too, count upon to bring revolution in france and england. their attitude is not a little colored by pride in the spirited young army. (appendix, p. .) lenin, tchitcherin, and the bulk of the communist party, on the other hand, insist that the essential problem at present is to save the proletariat of russia, in particular, and the proletariat of europe, in general, from starvation, and assert that it will benefit the revolution but little to conquer all europe if the government of the united states replies by starving all europe. they advocate, therefore, the conciliation of the united states even at the cost of compromising with many of the principles they hold most dear. and lenin's prestige in russia at present is so overwhelming that the trotski group is forced reluctantly to follow him. (appendix, p. .) lenin, indeed, as a practical matter, stands well to the right in the existing political life of russia. he recognizes the undesirability, from the socialist viewpoint, of the compromises he feels compelled to make; but he is ready to make the compromises. among the more notable concessions he has already made are: the abandonment of his plan to nationalize the land and the adoption of the policy of dividing it among the peasants, the establishment of savings banks paying per cent interest, the decision to pay all foreign debts, and the decision to give concessions if that shall prove to be necessary to obtain credit abroad. (appendix, p. .) in a word, lenin feels compelled to retreat from his theoretical position all along the line. he is ready to meet the western governments half way. peace proposals lenin seized upon the opportunity presented by my trip of investigation to make a definite statement of the position of the soviet government. he was opposed by trotski and the generals, but without much difficulty got the support of the majority of the executive council, and the statement of the position of the soviet government which was handed to me was finally adopted unanimously. my discussion of this proposal with the leaders of the soviet government was so detailed that i feel sure of my ground in saying that it does not represent the minimum terms of the soviet government, and that i can point out in detail wherein it may be modified without making it unacceptable to the soviet government. for example, the clause under article --"and to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to soviet russia"--is certainly not of vital importance. and the clause under article , in regard to admission of citizens of the soviet republics of russia into the allied and associated countries, may certainly be changed in such a way as to reserve all necessary rights to control such immigration to the allied and associated countries, and to confine it to persons who come on legitimate and necessary business, and to exclude definitely all possibility of an influx of propagandists. conclusions the following conclusions are respectfully submitted: . no government save a socialist government can be set up in russia to-day except by foreign bayonets, and any governments so set up will fall the moment such support is withdrawn. the lenin wing of the communist party is to-day as moderate as any socialist government which can control russia. . no real peace can be established in europe or the world until peace is made with the revolution. this proposal of the soviet government presents an opportunity to make peace with the revolution on a just and reasonable basis--perhaps a unique opportunity. . if the blockade is lifted and supplies begin to be delivered regularly to soviet russia, a more powerful hold over the russian people will be established than that given by the blockade itself--the hold given by fear that this delivery of supplies may be stopped. furthermore, the parties which oppose the communists in principle but are supporting them at present will be able to begin to fight against them. . it is, therefore, respectfully recommended that a proposal following the general lines of the suggestion of the soviet government should be made at the earliest possible moment, such changes being made, particularly in article and article , as will make the proposal acceptable to conservative opinion in the allied and associated countries. very respectfully submitted. william c. bullitt. * * * * * appendix to report transport _locomotives_.--before the war russia had , locomotives. destruction by war and ordinary wear and tear have reduced the number of locomotives in good order to , . russia is entirely cut off from supplies of spare parts and materials for repair, facilities for the manufacture of which do not exist in russia. and the soviet government is able only with the greatest difficulty to keep in running order the few locomotives at its disposal. _coal_.--soviet russia is entirely cut off from supplies of coal. kolchak holds the perm mining district, although soviet troops are now on the edge of it. denikin still holds the larger part of the donetz coal district and has destroyed the mines in the portion of the district which he has evacuated. as a result of this, locomotives, electrical power plants, etc., must be fed with wood, which is enormously expensive and laborious and comparatively ineffectual. _gasoline_.--there is a total lack of gasoline, due to the british occupation of baku. the few automobiles in the cities which are kept running for vital government business are fed with substitute mixtures, which causes them to break down with great frequency and to miss continually. almost the entire fleet on the great inland waterway system of russia was propelled by gasoline. as a result the volga and the canals, which are so vital a part of russia's system of transportation, are useless. food everyone is hungry in moscow and petrograd, including the people's commissaries themselves. the daily ration of lenin and the other commissaries is the same as that of a soldier in the army or of a workman at hard labor. in the hotel which is reserved for government officials the menu is the following: breakfast--a quarter to half a pound of black bread, which must last all day, and tea without sugar. dinner--a good soup, a small piece of fish, for which occasionally a diminutive piece of meat is substituted, a vegetable, either a potato or a bit of cabbage, more tea without sugar. supper--what remains of the morning ration of bread and more tea without sugar. occasionally sugar, butter, and chickens slip through from the ukraine and are sold secretly at atrocious prices--butter, for example, at roubles a pound. whenever the government is able to get its hands on any such "luxuries" it turns them over to the schools, where an attempt is made to give every child a good dinner every day. the food situation has been slightly improved by the rejoining of ukraine to great russia, for food is relatively plentiful in the south; but no great improvement in the situation is possible because of the lack of transport. management such supplies as are available in soviet russia are being utilized with considerable skill. for example, in spite of the necessity of firing with wood, the moscow-petrograd express keeps up to its schedule, and on both occasions when i made the trip it took but hours, compared to the hours of prewar days. the food control works well, so that there is no abundance alongside of famine. powerful and weak alike endure about the same degree of starvation. the soviet government has made great efforts to persuade industrial managers and technical experts of the old régime to enter its service. many very prominent men have done so. and the soviet government pays them as high as $ , a year for their services, although lenin gets but $ , a year. this very anomalous situation arises from the principle that any believing communist must adhere to the scale of wages established by the government, but if the government considers it necessary to have the assistance of any anticommunist, it is permitted to pay him as much as he demands. all meetings of workmen during work hours have been prohibited, with the result that the loafing which was so fatal during the kerensky régime has been overcome and discipline has been restored in the factories as in the army. social conditions _terror_.--the red terror is over. during the period of its power the extraordinary commission for the suppression of the counter revolution, which was the instrument of the terror, executed about , persons in petrograd, in moscow, and , in the remainder of the country-- , in all russia. these figures agree with those which were brought back from russia by maj. wardwell, and inasmuch as i have checked them from soviet, anti-soviet, and neutral sources i believe them to be approximately correct. it is worthy of note in this connection that in the white terror in southern finland alone, according to official figures, gen. mannerheim executed without trial , working men and women. _order_.--one feels as safe in the streets of petrograd and moscow as in the streets of paris or new york. on the other hand, the streets of these cities are dismal, because of the closing of retail shops whose functions are now concentrated in a few large nationalized "department stores." petrograd, furthermore, has been deserted by half its population; but moscow teems with twice the number of inhabitants it contained before the war. the only noticeable difference in the theaters, opera, and ballet is that they are now run under the direction of the department of education, which prefers classics and sees to it that working men and women and children are given an opportunity to attend the performances and that they are instructed beforehand in the significance and beauties of the productions. _morals_.--prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic reasons for their career having ceased to exist. family life has been absolutely unchanged by the revolution. i have never heard more genuinely mirthful laughter than when i told lenin, tchitcherin, and litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been "nationalized." this lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not even take the trouble to deny it. respect for womanhood was never greater than in russia to-day. indeed, the day i reached petrograd was a holiday in honor of wives and mothers. _education_.--the achievements of the department of education under lunacharsky have been very great. not only have all the russian classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of russia. furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by means of moving pictures and lectures. in the art galleries one meets classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of the pictures. the children's schools have been entirely reorganized, and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at school every day. furthermore, very remarkable schools have been opened for defective and over-nervous children. on the theory that genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry, and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring the nervous systems of the children. _morale_.--the belief of the convinced communists in their cause is almost religious. never in any religious service have i seen higher emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the petrograd soviet in celebration of the foundation of the third socialist internationale. the remark of one young man to me when i questioned him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. he replied very simply: "i am ready to give another year of starvation to our revolution." statements of leaders of opposition parties the following statement was made to me by volsky, leader of the right social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party: "intervention of any kind will prolong the régime of the bolsheviki by compelling us, like all honorable russians, to drop opposition and rally round the soviet government in defense of the revolution. with regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against soviet russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the sending of troops. if the allies come to an agreement with the soviet government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the bolsheviki. "if by any chance kolchak and denikin were to win, they would have to kill in tens of thousands where the bolsheviki have had to kill in hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of russia into anarchy. has not the ukraine been enough to teach the allies that occupation by non-bolshevik troops merely turns into bolsheviki those of the population who were not bolsheviki before? it is clear to us that the bolshiviki are really fighting against bourgeois dictatorship, we are, therefore, prepared to help them in every possible way. "grandmother ekaterina constantinovna breshkovskaya has no sort of authority, either from the assembly of members of the all russian constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. her utterances in america, if she is preaching intervention, represent her personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect." volsky signed this latter statement: "v. volsky, late president of the assembly of members of the all russian constituent assembly." martov, leader of the menshiviki, stated: "the menshiviki are against every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least desirable qualities of the revolution. further, the needs of the army overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic reconstruction. agreement with the soviet government would lessen the tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the soviet government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense, while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the bolshevik régime. "the forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared temporarily to sink their differences with the bolsheviki in order to defend the revolution as a whole." martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he desires. army the soviet army now numbers between , , and , , troops of the line. nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of and . the morale of regiments varies greatly. the convinced communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading enthusiasm. other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists, are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly untrustworthy. great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but are under control of convinced communist supervisors. nearly all the lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. the soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished them under the czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously like americans. they are popular with the people. i witnessed a review of , troops in petrograd. the men marched well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns and light artillery was excellent. on the other hand they have no big guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of the more refined instruments of destruction. the testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the red army. trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country. lenin's prestige the hold which lenin has gained on the imagination of the russian people makes his position almost that of a dictator. there is already a lenin legend. he is regarded as almost a prophet. his picture, usually accompanied by that of karl marx, hangs everywhere. in russia one never hears lenin and trotski spoken of in the same breath as is usual in the western world. lenin is regarded as in a class by himself. trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals. when i called on lenin at the kremlin i had to wait a few minutes until a delegation of peasants left his room. they had heard in their village that comrade lenin was hungry. and they had come hundreds of miles carrying poods of bread as the gift of the village to lenin. just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report had come that comrade lenin was working in an unheated room. they came bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. lenin is the only leader who receives such gifts. and he turns them into the common fund. face to face lenin is a very striking man--straightforward and direct, but also genial and with a large humor and serenity. concessions the soviet government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because of necessity. the members of the government realize that the lifting of the blockade will be illusory unless the soviet government is able to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the united states and england, so that goods may be bought in those countries. for russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. these exports will be utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which russia needs. russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. the members of the soviet government realize fully that as a preliminary step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. but even though these debts are paid the members of the soviet government believe that they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere promise to pay. they believe, therefore, that they will have to grant concessions in russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate credit. they desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country. senator knox. to whom did you hand that report? mr. bullitt. i handed copies of this personally to secretary lansing, col. house, gen. bliss and mr. henry white, and i handed a second copy, for the president, to mr. lansing. secretary lansing wrote on it, "urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and i took it up to the president's house. senator knox. at the same time that you handed in this report, did you hand them the proposal of the soviet government? mr. bullitt. the proposal of the soviet government is appended to this report. senator knox. it is a part of the report? mr. bullitt. it is a part of the report which i have already read. there comes first an appendix explaining the statements which i have just read, and giving the evidence i have for them. senator knox. was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion and upon your report? mr. bullitt. it was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out manner. immediately on my return i was first asked to appear before the american commission. first, the night i got back i had a couple of hours with col. house, in which i went over the whole matter. col. house was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if possible, on the basis of this proposal. the next morning i was called before the other commissioners, and i talked with mr. lansing, gen. bliss, and mr. henry white all the morning and most of the afternoon. we had a long discussion, at the end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis. breakfast with lloyd george the next morning i had breakfast with mr. lloyd george at his apartment. gen. smuts and sir maurice hankey and mr. philip kerr were also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, i brought mr. lloyd george the official text of the proposal, the same official one, in that same envelop, which i have just shown to you. he had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from helsingfors. as he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said, "that is the same one i have already read," and he handed it to gen. smuts, who was across the table, and said, "general, this is of the utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away." gen. smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. mr. lloyd george, however, said that he did not know what he could do with british public opinion. he had a copy of the daily mail in his hand, and he said, "as long as the british press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible about russia?" the daily mail was roaring and screaming about the whole russian situation. then mr. lloyd george said, "of course all the reports we get from people we send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." he then said, "i wonder if we could get lansdowne to go?" then he immediately corrected himself and said, "no; it would probably kill him." then he said, "i wish i could send bob cecil, but we have got to keep him for the league of nations." and he said to smuts, "it would be splendid if you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was going down to hungary. afterwards he said he thought the most desirable man to send was the marquis of salisbury, lord robert cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go down with british public opinion. mr. lloyd george then urged me to make public my report. he said it was absolutely necessary to have publicity given to the actual conditions in russia, which he recognized were as presented. i saw mr. balfour that afternoon with sir eric drummond, who at that time was acting as his secretary. he is now secretary of the league of nations. we discussed the entire matter. sir william wiseman told me afterward that mr. balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition. well, to cut the story short, first the president referred the matter to col. house. he left his decision on the matter with col. house, as was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. mr. lloyd george also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal to col. house; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as far as we would and would follow the lead of the president and col. house. col. house thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this proposal, which i did. col. house in the meantime had seen mr. orlando, and mr. orlando had expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis, at least so col. house informed me at the time. the french, i believe, had not yet been approached formally on the matter. senator knox. by the way, right here, you say mr. lloyd george advised you to make your report public. did you make it public? mr. bullitt. no, sir. mr. lloyd george desired me to make it public for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion. senator knox. but you did not do it? bullitt report suppressed mr. bullitt. i attempted to. i prepared a statement for the press based on my report, giving the facts, which i submitted to the commission to be given out. no member of the commission was ready to take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was referred to the president. the president received it and decided that he did not want it given out. he thought he would rather keep it secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never been made public until this moment. col. house asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement based on this proposal of the soviet government. it was to be an ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the soviet government if we made it, and he thought that the president and mr. lloyd george would put it through. senator brandegee. did you attend that meeting of the commission when that report was considered by the american commission? mr. bullitt. i first handed each member of the commission my report. i had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day. they sat in the morning and in the afternoon. senator brandegee. i wondered whether you were present when the president thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make it public. mr. bullitt. no, sir; i was not. then upon order of col. house, to whom the matter had been referred, i prepared this declaration of policy. i prepared it in conjunction with mr. whitney shepherdson, who was col. house's assistant secretary, and also versed in international law. i do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal which was prepared. col. house took this and held it under advisement and discussed it, i believe, with the president and other persons. the chairman. it had better be printed. the document referred to is as follows: a proposed declaration of policy to be issued in the name of the associated governments and an offer of an armistice the representatives of the states assembled in conference at paris recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in russia to lay down their arms and to send delegates to prince's island. these delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the russian people and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations may be established between her people and the other peoples of the world." the truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not take place. the people of russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of government under which they shall live. their task is one of unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the existence of misapprehensions among the russian people or throughout the world. therefore, the representatives of the associated powers, now sitting in the conference of paris, have determined to state publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to prince's island concerning the policies which govern their relations with the russian people. they wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems of russia. they believe that the peace of the world will largely depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the russian people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from without. on the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any russian government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek to impose its will upon other peoples by force. the full authority and military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of any such attempt. the task of creating a stable government demands all the great strength of russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which attend and delay the reconstruction. the associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of europe. their efforts, begun in belgium and in northern france during the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from finland to the dalmatian coast. ports long idle are busy again. trainloads of food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an impartial hand. industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by war. these measures of relief will be continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce. it is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to assuage the distress of millions of men and women in russia and to provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible and desirable. relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country. these requisites can not be assured while russia is still at war. the allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement between themselves and all governments now exercising political authority within the territory of the former russian empire, including finland, together with poland, galicia, roumania, armenia, azerbaidjan, and afghanistan, that hostilities against one another shall cease on all fronts within these territories on april ---- at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long as the armistice shall continue. the duration of the armistice shall be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. the allied and associated governments propose that such of these governments as are willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, to ---- where they shall meet on april ---- with representatives of the allied and associated governments in conference to discuss peace, upon the basis of the following principles: ( ) all signatory governments shall remain, as against each other, in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change their government. ( ) the right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons comply with the laws of the country to which they seek admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics of that country. ( ) the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several signatories to each other. ( ) a general amnesty shall be granted by the various signatories to all political or military opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of their association or affiliation with another signatory, provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of the land. ( ) nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the country of another shall be given all possible facilities for repatriation. ( ) the allied and associated governments shall immediately withdraw their armed forces and further military support from the territory of the former russian empire, including finland, and the various governments within that territory shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be agreed upon by the conference. ( ) any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be established, subject to a program of equitable distribution of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be agreed upon by the conference. ( ) provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among the several signatories. ( ) the conference shall be competent to discuss and determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of establishing peace within the territory of the former russian empire, including finland, and the reestablishment of international relations among the signatories. note.--if it is desirable to include a specific reference to russia's financial obligations, the following clause ( bis) would be acceptable to the soviet government at least: "the governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former russian empire to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. detailed arrangements for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard being had to the present financial situation of russia." senator brandegee. was this brought to the attention of the president? mr. bullitt. the first night after i got in col. house went to the telephone and called up the president right away and told him that i was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where there were wars. the president said he would see me the next evening down at col. house's office, as i remember it. the next evening, however, the president had a headache and he did not come. the following afternoon col. house said to me that he had seen the president and the president had said he had a one-track mind and was occupied with germany at present, and he could not think about russia, and that he had left the russian matter all to him, col. house. therefore i continued to deal with col. house directly on it inasmuch as he was the delegate of the president, and lloyd george, in the matter. i used to see col. house every day, indeed two or three times a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before april , which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to expire. nansen plan to feed russia meanwhile mr. hoover and mr. auchincloss had the idea of approaching peace with russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached mr. fridjof nansen, the arctic explorer, and got him to write and send the following letter to the president. you doubtless have seen his letter to the president. paris, april , . my dear mr. president: the present food situation in russia, where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now uppermost in all men's minds. as it appears that no solution of this food and disease question has so far been reached in any direction, i would like to make a suggestion from a neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic misery on purely humanitarian grounds. it would appear to me possible to organize a purely humanitarian commission for the provisioning of russia, the foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to some considerable extent by russia itself, the justice of distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the membership of the commission to be comprised of norwegian, swedish, and possibly dutch, danish, and swiss nationalities. it does not appear that the existing authorities in russia would refuse the intervention of such a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to the humanitarian purpose of saving life. if thus organized upon the lines of the belgian relief commission, it would raise no question of political recognition or negotiations between the allies with the existing authorities in russia. i recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and i would be glad to know under what conditions you would approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and medical supplies from the united states government. i am addressing a similar note to messrs. orlando, clemenceau, and lloyd george. believe me, my dear mr. president, yours, most respectfully, fridjof nansen. his excellency the president, ii place des etats-unis, paris. senator knox, i think that was published in nearly all the papers. mr. bullitt. yes. in it he proposed that a commission should be formed at once for the feeding of russia, because of the frightful conditions of starvation and so on. col. house decided that it would be an easier way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to sit down and make peace. therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to the nansen letter, which i have here. paris, france, april , . suggested reply to dr. nansen by the president of the united states and the premiers of france, great britain, and italy: dear mr. nansen: it is the earnest desire of the allied and associated governments, and of the peoples for whom they speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, women, and children who are suffering in russia. the associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of europe. their efforts, begun in belgium and in northern france during the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from finland to the dalmatian coast. ports long idle are busy again. trainloads of food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an impartial hand. industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by war. these measures of relief will be continued until nations are once more able to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce. the associated peoples desire and deem it their duty similarly to assist in relieving the people of russia from the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. in view of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken by the associated governments they welcome the suggestion that the neutral states should take the initiative in the matter of russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to state in accordance with your request, the conditions under which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for the provisioning of russia. the allied and associated governments and all governments now exercising political authority within the territory of the former russian empire, including finland, together with poland, galicia, roumania, armenia, azerbaidjan, and afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one another shall cease on all fronts within these territories on april at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long as the armistice shall continue. the duration of the armistice shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent. the allied and associated governments propose that such of these governments as are willing to accept the terms of this armistice, shall send not more than three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, to christiania, where they shall meet on april with representatives of the allied and associated governments in conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of russia, upon the basis of the following principles: . all signatory governments shall remain, as against each other, in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, subject to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change their government. . the right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons comply with the laws of the country to which they seek admittance, and provided also-that they do not interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics of that country. . the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several signatories to one another. . a general amnesty shall be granted by the various signatories to all political or military opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so treated because of their association or affiliation with another signatory, provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of the land. . nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the country of another shall be given all possible facilities for repatriation. . the allied and associated governments will immediately withdraw their armed forces and further military support from the territory of the former russian empire, including finland and the various governments within that territory shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be agreed upon by the conference. . any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be established, subject to a program of equitable distribution of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be agreed upon by the conference in consultation with representatives of those neutral states which are prepared to assume the responsibility for the provisioning of russia. . provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among the several signatories. . the governments which have been set up on the territory of the former russian empire and finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former russian empire to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. detailed arrangements for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard being had to the present financial situation of russia. . the conference shall be competent to discuss and determine any other matter which bears upon the provisioning of russia, the problem of establishing peace within the territory of the former russian empire, including finland, and the reestablishment of international relations among the signatories. mr. bullitt. i also prepared at the orders of col. house------ senator knox. what attitude did you take toward the nansen proposal? mr. bullitt. at first i opposed it. i was in favor of the original plan. senator knox. you were in favor of the original plan? mr. bullitt. i was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the matter. however, i found that there was no use in kicking against the pricks, that i was unable to persuade the commission that my point of view was the correct one. therefore at the request of col. house i wrote out a reply to dr. nansen, in which i embodied a peace proposal so that it would have meant a peace conference via nansen, which was what was desired. senator brandegee. was that letter delivered to nansen? mr. bullitt. no. i gave this reply of mine to col. house. col. house read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to the president and to lloyd george as his solution of the way to deal with this russian matter, he wished it considered by his international law experts, mr. auchincloss and mr. miller, and it was thereupon turned over that afternoon to mr. auchincloss and mr. miller. does the senator desire this document? senator knox. i do not regard it as material. it was not accepted? mr. bullitt. it was not accepted. what happened in regard to this was that mr. auchincloss and mr. miller, to correct its legal language, produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was largely an offer to feed russia provided russia put all her railroads in the hands of the allied and associated governments. i have that as well. senator brandegee. do you object to having that put in the record, senator knox? senator knox. no. senator brandegee. i would like to have that put in. (the document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:) (auchincloss-miller proposal) draft of proposed letter to be signed by president wilson and the prime ministers of great britain, france, and italy in reply to mr. nansen's letter: dear sir: the situation of misery and suffering in russia which is described in your letter of april is one which appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. regardless of political differences or shades of thought, the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, and above all of women and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable is one which is shocking to humanity. the governments and the peoples whom we represent, without thought of political, military or financial advantage, would be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the existing situation in russia. it seems to us that such a commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the beneficent results which you have in view and could not either in its conception or its operation be considered as having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose of saving life." it is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties owing to the existing situation in russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. but if the existing de facto governments of russia are all willing as the governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of russia, no political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto. there will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of distribution in russia itself. the problem of supply we can ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. the problem of transport of supplies to russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments. the difficulties of transport in russia can in large degree only be overcome in russia itself. so far as possible, we would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of relief that control of transportation in russia, so far as was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from any governmental or private control whatsoever. the real human element in the situation, even supposing all these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the naked. subject to the supervision of such a commission, this is a problem which should be solely under the control of the people of russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible to put it under their control. it is not a question of class or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in need, and these human beings in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the belgian relief commission, the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. under no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not political, and still more important, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. that such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all hostilities on the russian fronts. indeed, relief to russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider. under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we should be prepared to give it our full support. senator knox. what i am anxious to get at is to find out what became of your report. senator fall. i should like to know whether col. house approved mr. auchincloss's and mr. miller's report, or the report of the witness. mr. bullitt. i should like to have this clear, and if i can read just this one page i shall be greatly obliged. on this proposition i wrote the following memorandum to mr. auchincloss [reading]: april , . memorandum for mr. auchincloss: dear gordon: i have studied carefully the draft of the reply to dr. nansen which you have prepared. in spirit and substance your letter differs so radically from the reply which i consider essential that i find it difficult to make any constructive criticism. and i shall refrain from criticizing your rhetoric. there are two proposals in your letter, however, which are obviously unfair and will not, i am certain, be accepted by the soviet government. . the life of russia depends upon its railroads; and your demand for control of transportation by the commission can hardly be accepted by the soviet government which knows that plots for the destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in the american consulate in moscow. you are asking the soviet government to put its head in the lion's mouth. it will not accept. you must moderate your phrases. . when you speak of the "cessation of hostilities by russian troops," you fail to speak of hostilities by troops of the allied and associated governments, a number of whom, you may recall, have invaded russia. furthermore, your phrase does not cover finns, esthonians, letts, poles, etc. in addition, you say absolutely nothing about the withdrawal of the troops of the allied and associated governments from russian territory. and, most important, you fail to say that troops and military supplies will cease to be sent into the territory of the former russian empire. you thereby go a long way toward proving trotsky's thesis: that any armistice will simply be used by the allies as a period in which to supply tanks, aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the various antisoviet governments. as it stands, your armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and i am sure that it will not be accepted by the soviet government. very respectfully, yours, william c. bullitt. senator new. otherwise you had no fault to find with it? mr. bullitt. yes. the morning after col. house had told me he wished to submit this proposition to his international law experts, i came as usual to his office about . , and mr. auchincloss was on his way to the president with his proposal, the auchincloss-miller proposal, as col. house's proposal. but i got that stopped. i went in to col. house, and col. house told mr. auchincloss not to take it up to the president, and asked me if i could doctor up the reply of mr. auchincloss and mr. miller to the nansen letter so that it might possibly be acceptable to the soviet government. i thereupon rewrote the auchincloss-miller letter, but i was forced to stick very closely to the text. i was told that i could cut things out if i wished to, but to stick very closely to the text, which i did. i drew this redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. my redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four to nansen. i have both these documents here, my reply--and the four took that reply--and with the changes---- the chairman. what four--the successors of the ten? mr. bullitt. the successors of the , sir, took the reply------ the chairman. who were the four at that moment? mr. bullitt. m. orlando, mr. lloyd george, m. clemenceau, and the president. this extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these proposals of the soviet government. this is my attempt to doctor up the auchincloss-miller proposition. in spite of every effort i could make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that this reply to the nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that proposal of the soviet government. [reading:] dear sir: the misery and suffering in russia described in your letter of april appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. it is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which make life endurable. the governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in russia. it seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life." there are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. but if the existing local governments of russia are as willing as the governments and the peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of russia, no political obstacle will remain. there will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and also the problem of distribution in russia itself. the problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. the problem of transport of supplies to russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments. the problem of transport in russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of your commission. subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of russia themselves. the people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the belgian relief commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. in no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. that such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within the territory of the former russian empire is obvious. and the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within these territories. indeed, relief to russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider. under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support. reply of president wilson, premiers clemenceau, lloyd george, and orlando, to dr. nansen, april , dear sir: the misery and suffering in russia described in your letter of april appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. it is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable. the governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in russia. it seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life." there are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. but if the existing local governments of russia are as willing as the governments and people whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of russia, no political obstacle will remain. there will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the problem of distribution in russia itself. the problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. the problem of finance would seem to us to fall upon the russian authorities. the problem of transport of supplies to russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments whose interests should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far less. the problems of transport in russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of your commission. subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of russia themselves. the people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the belgian relief commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. in no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political; under no other condition could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. that such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of russia is obvious. and the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within russian territory. indeed, relief to russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would be impossible to consider. under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support. v.e. orlando. d. lloyd george. woodrow wilson. g. clemenceau. senator knox. i want the reply of auchincloss to nansen to go into the record. the chairman. let all that correspondence be printed in the record. senator knox. dr. nansen's proposition, and then the reply, (the letters referred to are inserted above.) mr. bullitt. the nansen letter was written in mr. hoover's office. nansen made the proposition. i wrote the original of a reply to dr. nansen, which i believe would have led to peace. col. house indicated his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the international legal standpoint, which was then done by mr. auchincloss and mr. miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my proposal. i then objected to that as it was on its way to the president. it was not sent to the president, and i was ordered to try to doctor it up. i attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change of two or three words which made it even worse and even more indefinite, so that the soviet government could not possibly conceive it as a genuine peace proposition. it left the whole thing in the air. senator knox. we would like to have you see that these documents to which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the sequence in which you have named them. mr. bullitt. yes, i shall be at the service of the committee in that regard. senator harding. lest i missed something while i was out of the room i am exceedingly curious to know why the soviet proposal was not given favorable consideration. senator knox. mr. bullitt has stated that. kolchak's advance causes rejection of peace proposal mr. bullitt. the principal reason was entirely different. the fact was that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, kolchak made a -mile advance. there was a revolt of peasants in a district of russia which entirely cut off supplies from the bolshevik army operating against kolchak. kolchak made a -mile advance, and immediately the entire press of paris was roaring and screaming on the subject, announcing that kolchak would be in moscow within two weeks; and therefore everyone in paris, including, i regret to say members of the american commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in russia, because they thought kolchak would arrive in moscow and wipe out the soviet government. senator knox. and the proposal which you brought back from russia, that is the soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this last document to which you have just referred. mr. bullitt. yes; it was. may i say this, that april was the final date when their proposition was open. i had attempted every day and almost every night to obtain a reply to it. i finally requested the commission to send the following telegram to tchitcherin. i proposed to send this telegram to the american consul at helsingfors [reading]: april , . american consul, helsingfors: please send kock or other reliable person immediately to petrograd to schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with following message for tchitcherin: "action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within week.--bullitt." ammission. the commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute of their meeting [reading]: american mission to negotiate peace, [no. .] april , . to: the commissioners, for action. subject: telegram to tchitcherin. _statement_.--action by the council of four on the reply to mr. nansen was prevented yesterday by french objection to a minor clause in the president's letter. it is hoped that agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow, but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached for several days. to-day, april , the pledge of the soviet government to accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of march expires. no indication has been given the soviet government that its statement was ever placed before the conference of paris or that any change of policy in regard to russia is contemplated. in view of the importance which the soviet government placed upon its statement, i fear that this silence and the passing of april will be interpreted as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the soviet government and that the soviet government will at once issue belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on all fronts, including bessarabia and archangel. it is certain that if the soviet troops should enter bessarabia or should overcome the allied forces at archangel, the difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to be adopted within the next few days would be greatly increased. i feel that if the appended telegram should be sent at once to tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and no provocative political statements would be issued. i therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram should be sent at once. respectfully submitted. william c. bullitt. april , . at the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum was read in which mr. bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the american consul at helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a message through reliable sources to tchitcherin respecting mr. lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in russia. after some discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to read as follows: "please send kock or other reliable person immediately to petrograd to schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with following message for tchitcherin, sent on my personal responsibility: 'individuals of neutral states are considering organization for feeding russia. will perhaps decide something definite within a week.'--bullitt." christian a. herter, assistant to mr. white. i believe that telegram was dispatched. i do not know. senator knox. mr. bullitt, i want to ask you a question. you have told us that you went to russia with instructions from the secretary of state, mr. lansing, with a definition of the american policy by mr. house, with the approval of lloyd george, who approved of your mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. now, tell us whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the soviet government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference and acted on? mr. bullitt. it was never formally laid before the peace conference, which i believe met only six times during the course of the entire proceedings of what is called the peace conference. lloyd george deceives parliament senator knox. did not mr. lloyd george in a speech to parliament assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned from russia? have you a copy of his speech? mr. bullitt. about a week after i had handed to mr. lloyd george the official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other persons, he made a speech before the british parliament, and gave the british people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any such proposition. it was a most egregious case of misleading the public, perhaps the boldest that i have ever known in my life. on the occasion of that statement of mr. lloyd george, i wrote the president. i clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the president, and i asked the president to inform me whether the statement of mr. lloyd george was true or untrue. he was unable to answer, inasmuch as he would have had to reply on paper that mr. lloyd george had made an untrue statement. so flagrant was this that various members of the british mission called on me at the crillon, a day or so later, and apologized for the prime minister's action in the case. senator knox. have you a copy of lloyd george's remarks in the parliament? mr. bullitt. i have a copy. senator knox. suppose you read it? mr. bullitt. it is as follows: mr. clynes. before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or representations alleged to have been made to his government by persons acting on behalf of such government as there is in central russia? mr. lloyd george. we have had no approaches at all except what have appeared in the papers. mr. clynes. i ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged. mr. lloyd george. we have had no approaches at all. constantly there are men coming and going to russia of all nationalities, and they always come back with their tales of russia. but we have made no approach of any sort. i have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not considered them. i think i know what my right honorable friend refers to. there was some suggestion that a young american had come back from russia with a communication. it is not for me to judge the value of this communication, but if the president of the united states had attached any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he certainly did not. it was explained to me by the members of the british delegation who called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although when lloyd george got back to london he intended to make a statement very favorable to peace with russia, he found that lord northcliffe, acting through mr. wickham steed, the editor of the times, and mr. winston churchill, british secretary for war, had rigged the conservative majority of the house of commons against him, and that they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak what was his own opinion at the moment on russian policies. mr. bullitt resigns senator knox. mr. bullitt, you resigned your relations with the state department and the public service, did you not? mr. bullitt. i did, sir. senator knox. when? mr. bullitt. i resigned on may . senator knox. for what reason? mr. bullitt. well, i can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any other way by reading my letter of resignation to the president, which is brief. senator knox. very well, we would like to hear it. the chairman. before that letter is read, you did not see the president and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your report? mr. bullitt. none whatever, except as it was reported to me by col. house. col. house, as i said before, reported to me that he thought in the first place that the president favored the peace proposal; in the second place, that the president could not turn his mind to it, because he was too occupied with germany, and finally--well, really, i have no idea what was in the president's mind. senator knox. there never was another effort to secure an audience with the president for you after those first two that you say col. house made? mr. bullitt. no; not at all. meetings with the president were always arranged through col. house. in my letter of resignation to the president, which was dated may , , i said: may , . my dear mr. president: i have submitted to-day to the secretary of state my resignation as an assistant in the department of state, attaché to the american commission to negotiate peace. i was one of the millions who trusted confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." but our government has consented now to deliver the suffering peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and dismemberments--a new century of war. and i can convince myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world order" is possible as a servant of this government. russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has not even been understood. unjust decisions of the conference in regard to shantung, the tyrol, thrace, hungary, east prussia, danzig, the saar valley, and the abandonment of the principle of the freedom of the seas make new international conflicts certain. it is my conviction that the present league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars, and that the united states will be involved in them by the obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in the special understanding with france. therefore the duty of the government of the united states to its own people and to mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty, to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the league of nations, to refuse to entangle the united states further by the understanding with france. that you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements, and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is well known. nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of the world, which was yours; you would have been able to resist the pressure and might have established the "new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak. i am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, like myself, in every nation who had faith in you. very sincerely, yours, william c. bullitt. to the honorable woodrow wilson, president of the united states. senator knox. did you ever get a reply to that letter? mr. bullitt. i did not, sir. the only intimation i had in regard to it was that mr. close, secretary of the president, with whom i was lunching, said to me that the president had read my letter and had said that he would not reply. in connection with that i wrote col. house a letter at the same time as follows: may , . my dear col. house: since you kindly lent me the text of the proposed treaty of peace, i have tried to convince myself that some good might come of it and that i ought to remain in the service of the department of state to labor for its establishment. it is with sincere regret that i have come to the conviction that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the signature and ratification of it, and of the special understanding with france. i have therefore submitted my resignation to the secretary of state and have written the appended note to the president. i hope you will bring it to his attention; not because he will care what i may think, but because i have expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young and old men in the commission--thoughts which the president will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown. i feel sure that you will agree that i am right in acting on my conviction and i hope that this action will in no way affect the relationship between us which has always been so delightful and stimulating to me. with my sincerest personal regards, i am, very respectfully, yours, william c. bullitt. to the honorable edward m. house, hotel crillon, paris. senator knox. did you get a reply to that? mr. bullitt. col. house sent for me, and after that we had a conversation. that was the only reply that i had. i had a conversation with col. house on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out. senator knox. was anything said during this conversation which you feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important? mr. bullitt. i made a record of the conversation. inasmuch as the conversations which i had with various members of the commission on the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important issues, i kept a record of those conversations, that is, those i had at the time when i resigned. they are the only conversations of which i made records, and i made them simply because we did deal more or less with the entire question of the peace treaty. on the other hand, they are personal conversations, and i hesitate to repeat them, unless the committee considers it particularly important. senator knox. i would not press you on the personal conversations which you had with col. house after you resigned. i leave the matter to your own judgment. i wondered whether there might have been something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but i withdraw that suggestion. i should like to ask you this one question: i suppose your letter of resignation to mr. lansing was merely formal? mr. bullitt. my letter of resignation to mr. lansing was a formal letter. senator knox. you certainly got a reply to that. mr. bullitt. i did, sir. i wrote a formal letter and i got a formal reply, and the secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because of the form in which i had put my resignation, and particularly because i had appended to my note my letter to the president. we then discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty. the chairman. are you through? senator knox. yes. the chairman. mr. bullitt, you put into the record or read here, i think, some extracts from the minutes of the council of ten? mr. bullitt. yes, sir. the chairman. were you present at any of these meetings? mr. bullitt. i was not, sir. the chairman. the council of ten was the first body that was dealing with the treaty generally, the important body? it was not a special commission? mr. bullitt. no, sir. it was the main body of the conference. the chairman. yes; it was the main body, and was the one that subsequently became the council of five, and then the council of four, and i think at one time a council of three? mr. bullitt. yes, sir. the chairman. well, now, there were records of these meetings, were there not? mr. bullitt. yes, sir. the chairman. do you know what disposition was made of those records? mr. bullitt. mr. chairman, there were a number of copies for each delegation, and i presume that there must be a number of copies in this country at the present time; perhaps not. the chairman. you say each delegate had a copy? mr. bullitt. each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the secretary of the american commission had a copy, i believe, and the assistant secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries, mr. leland harrison; and mr. grew had a copy. the chairman. did mr. lansing have copies while he served on the council of ten? mr. bullitt. yes, sir; well, i am quite sure that he did. i am sure that i have seen copies on the desk of the secretary. the chairman. well, they were furnished regularly to every member of the conference? mr. bullitt. yes. the chairman. we have found some difficulty in getting them; that is the reason i asked. senator knox. i am informed--perhaps mr. bullitt can tell us--that there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in this country. do you know anything about that--perhaps auchincloss & miller? mr. bullitt. i could not be certain in regard to the matter, but i should certainly be under the impression that mr. auchincloss and mr. miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. perhaps mr. auchincloss has left his with col. house. he would have col. house's copies. perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. but mr. auchincloss and mr. miller perhaps have those minutes in their files. the chairman. undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those records in existence. mr. bullitt. certainly, sir. the chairman. that must be the case. mr. bullitt. certainly, sir. also records of the meetings of the american commission. senator brandegee. do you know whether or not they are in the state department--any of these minutes or records in our state department? mr. bullitt. i should presume that in the normal course of events they would be certainly among mr. lansing's papers, which were very carefully kept. he had an excellent secretariat. the chairman. did any member of our delegation, any member of the council of , express to you any opinions about the general character of this treaty? mr. bullitt. well, mr. lansing, col. house, gen. bliss, and mr. white had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject. the chairman. were they enthusiastically in favor of it? mr. bullitt. i regret to say, not. as i say, the only documents of the sort that i have are the memoranda of the discussions that i had after i resigned, when we thrashed over the whole ground. the chairman. those memoranda of consultations that you had after you resigned you prefer not to publish? i am not asking you to do so. mr. bullitt. i think it would be out of the way. the chairman. i quite understand your position. i only wanted to know--i thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of arrangements, i would call them, that were made for the consideration of this treaty. mr. bullitt. it is no secret that mr. lansing, gen. bliss, and mr. henry white objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the treaty. the chairman. it is known that they objected to shantung. that, i think, is public information. i do not know that it is public information that they objected to anything else. mr. bullitt. i do not think that secretary lansing is at all enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. i have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if i may, i will just read, without going into the rest of that conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved. this was a conversation with the secretary of state at . on may . the secretary sent for me. it was a long conversation, and mr. lansing in the course of it said: mr. lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making arbitration compulsory. he also said that he was absolutely opposed to the united states taking a mandate in either armenia or constantinople; that he thought that constantinople should be placed under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by an international committee. this is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the whole discussion, and therefore i feel at liberty to read it, as it is not a personal matter. the chairman. this is a note of the conversation made at the time? mr. bullitt. this is a note which i immediately dictated after the conversation. [reading:] mr. lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with shantung and the league of nations. he said: "i consider that the league of nations at present is entirely useless. the great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. england and france in particular have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the league, and the great powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples." we then talked about the possibility of ratification by the senate. mr. lansing said: "i believe that if the senate could only understand what this treaty means, and if the american people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but i wonder if they will ever understand what it lets them in for." he expressed the opinion that mr. knox would probably really understand the treaty-- [laughter.] may i reread it? he expressed the opinion that mr. knox would probably really understand the treaty, and that mr. lodge would; but that mr. lodge's position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective. [laughter.] the chairman. i do not mind. mr. bullitt (reading): he thought, however, that mr. knox might instruct america in the real meaning of it. [laughter.] the chairman. he has made some very valuable efforts in the direction. mr. bullitt. i beg to be excused from reading any more of these conversations. senator brandegee. we get the drift. [laughter.] i want to ask one or two questions. the chairman. go ahead. senator brandegee. did you read any of these minutes of the meetings of the american commission? mr. bullitt. of the american commission itself? senator brandegee. yes. mr. bullitt. no, sir. i have on one or two occasions glanced at them but i never have read them carefully. senator brandegee. they were accessible to you at the time, were they? mr. bullitt. they were, sir. senator brandegee. you stated, if i recall your testimony correctly, that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the president objected to that? mr. bullitt. the president--if i may explain again--approved in principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the peoples of the various countries. senator brandegee. do you know what his objection was to the legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on the assembly? mr. bullitt. the president believed, i think--in fact, it was so stated to me by col. house, who discussed the matter with me--that it would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league. senator brandegee. do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy if congress should appoint the delegates than if the president should? mr. bullitt. it would necessitate a larger central body if representation was to be given to the important political parties of the various countries. it would have necessitated a body of, say, representatives from the united states-- from the republican party and from the; democratic party, in the assembly of the league, which would become a large body. senator brandegee. the idea was that the political parties of the country should be represented? mr. bullitt. yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the league and the true opinion of the countries. senator brandegee. when you went across to paris on the _george washington_ with the president do you know whether he had with him at that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he showed to you of discussed with you? mr. bullitt. the president outlined to several of us one evening, or rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league of nations. i did not see any formal draft that he had, but the president made a statement before the council of , in one of these minutes from which i have been reading, stating that he had first--and in fact i think i know it from other sources--that he had first received the phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by col. house and that he had rewritten col. house's report, and after he had discussed his rewriting with robert cecil and gen. smuts, he had rewritten it again. senator brandegee. you stated substantially that the only part of the league draft which was laid before the peace conference which the president had his way about, was article . did you make some such statement as that? mr. bullitt. yes, sir. senator brandegee. the president stated to us that that was practically what he had submitted to the niagara conference here when the abc powers from south america were discussing the mexican question. he had then considered it as an article for american use on this continent. do you know what the attitude of gen smuts was as to article as proposed by the president? mr. bullitt. i do not, sir. again, full minutes of the discussions and conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the league of nations were kept. senator brandegee. did you read the various other plans that were proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations? mr. bullitt. i have read some of them, sir. senator brandegee. did the others have anything similar to what is now article in the treaty pending in the senate? mr. bullitt. i really can not say. i am sorry, but i have forgotten. i should not care to testify on that. senator brandegee. do you know from what you heard while you were there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious to have article in the covenant for the league? mr. bullitt. the french were not only anxious for it, but i believe were anxious greatly to strengthen it. they desired immediately a league army to be established, and i believe also to be stationed in alsace-lorraine and along the rhine, in addition to article . i can not say for certain about the others. the chairman. mr. bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a representative of the egyptian people. do you know anything about that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? i mean the clauses that appear in regard to the british protectorate. mr. bullitt. you mean our agreement to recognize the british protectorate in egypt? the chairman. it was recognized by this treaty in those clauses. mr. bullitt. yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty formally came out, did we not? i recall the morning it was done. it was handled by sir william wiseman, who was the confidential representative that lloyd george and balfour had constantly with col. house and the president. he was a sort of extra confidential foreign office. it was all done, if i recall his statement correctly, in the course of one morning. the president was informed that the egyptian nationalists were using his points as meaning that the president thought that egypt should have the right to control her own destinies, and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to foment revolution; that since the president had provoked this trouble by the points, they thought that he should allay it by the statement that we would recognize the british protectorate, and as i remember sir william wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had got our recognition of the british protectorate before luncheon. the chairman. the president made some public statement? mr. bullitt. i am not certain in regard to the further developments of it. i recall that incident, that it was arranged through sir william wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes. senator knox. that was a good deal of time to devote to a little country like egypt. mr. bullitt. i do not know. you should know, sir, you have been secretary of state. senator knox. we never chewed them up that fast. senator new. mr. bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference to the irish question, with which you are familiar? mr. bullitt. at the conference? i do not believe the irish question was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. there was considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the walsh mission easily without antagonizing the irish vote in this country. [laughter.] i think that is the only consideration that ireland received. senator new. there was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there not? mr. bullitt. i think so. the chairman. is there anything further that anybody desires to ask mr. bullitt? we are very much obliged to you indeed, mr. bullitt. mr. bullitt. mr. chairman, if i may just say--i do not know whether it is a matter of first interest to the senators or not--but on this trip with me to russia there was capt. pettit, and at the same time the journalist, lincoln steffens, and i have documents which they prepared and which might be of interest to the committee. the chairman. if you will hand those to the stenographer, we will print them with your testimony. senator knox. what are your plans, mr. bullitt? what are you going to do in this country now? mr. bullitt. i expect to return to maine and fish for trout, where i was when i was summoned by the committee. senator brandegee. did mr. steffens go to russia with you? mr. bullitt. he did. the chairman. he held no official position? mr. bullitt. no. senator brandegee. who advised him to go? mr. bullitt. i did. senator brandegee. is he in the country now? mr. bullitt. i do not believe so. i believe he is still in europe. report of lincoln steffens (by order of the committee the report of lincoln steffens referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:) report of lincoln steffens april , . politically, russia has reached a state of equilibrium; internally; for the present at least. i think the revolution there is ended; that it has run its course. there will be changes. there may be advances; there will surely be reactions, but these will be regular, i think; political and economic, but parliamentary, a new center of gravity seems to have been found. certainly, the destructive phase of the revolution in russia is over. constructive work has begun. we saw this everywhere. and we saw order, and though we inquired for them, we heard of no disorders. prohibition is universal and absolute. robberies have been reduced in petrograd below normal of large cities. warned against danger before we went in, we felt safe. prostitution has disappeared with its clientele, who have been driven out by the "no-work-no-food law," enforced by the general want and the labor-card system. loafing on the job by workers and sabotage by upper-class directors, managers, experts and clerks have been overcome. russia has settled down to work. the soviet form of government, which sprang up so spontaneously all over russia, is established. this is not a paper thing; not an invention. never planned, it has not yet been written into the forms of law. it is not even uniform. it is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, and in its final development it is not democratic. the present russian government is the most autocratic government i have ever seen. lenin, head of the soviet government, is farther removed from the people than the tsar was, or than any actual ruler in europe is. the people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. these little informal soviets elect a local soviet; which elects delegates to the city or country (community) soviet; which elects delegates to the government (state) soviet. the government soviets together elect delegates to the all-russian soviet, which elects commissionaires (who correspond to our cabinet, or to a european minority). and these commissionaires finally elect lenin. he is thus five or six removes from the people. to form an idea of his stability, independence, and power, think of the process that would have to be gone through with by the people to remove him and elect a successor. a majority of all the soviets in all russia would have to be changed in personnel or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and represent the altered will of the people. no student of government likes the soviet as it has developed. lenin himself doesn't. he calls it a dictatorship, and he opposed it at first. when i was in russia in the days of milyoukov and kerensky, lenin and the bolsheviks were demanding the general election of the constituent assembly. but the soviets existed then; they had the power, and i saw foreign ambassadors blunder, and the world saw milyoukov and kerensky fall, partly because they would not, or could not, comprehend the nature of the soviet; as lenin did finally, when, against his theory, he joined in and expressed the popular repudiation of the constituent assembly and went over to work with the soviet, the actual power in russia. the constituent assembly, elected by the people, represented the upper class and the old system. the soviet was the lower class. the soviet, at bottom, is a natural gathering of the working people, of peasants, in their working and accustomed groupings, instead of, as with us, by artificial geographical sections. labor unions and soldiers' messes made up the soviets in the cities; poorer peasants and soldiers at the village inn were the first soviets in the country; and in the beginning, two years ago, these lower class delegates used to explain to me that the "rich peasants" and the "rich people" had their own meetings and meeting places. the popular intention then was not to exclude the upper classes from the government, but only from the soviets, which were not yet the same. but the soviets, once in existence, absorbed in their own class tasks and their own problems, which the upper class had either not understood or solved, ignored--no; they simply forgot the council of empire and the duma. and so they discovered (or, to be more exact, their leaders discovered) that they had actually all the power. all that lenin and the other socialist leaders had to do to carry through their class-struggle theory was to recognize this fact of power and teach the soviets to continue to ignore the assemblies and the institutions of the upper classes, which, with their "governments," ministries, and local assemblies, fell, powerless from neglect. the soviet government sprouted and grew out of the habits, the psychology, and the condition of the russian people. it fitted them. they understand it. they find they can work it and they like it. every effort to put something else in its place (including lenin's) has failed. it will have to be modified, i think, but not in essentials, and it can not be utterly set aside. the tsar himself, if he should come back, would have to keep the russian soviet, and somehow rule over and through it. the communist party (dubbed "bolshevik") is in power now in the soviet government. i think it will stay there a long time. what i have shown of the machinery of change is one guaranty of communist dominance. there are others. all opposition to the communist government has practically ceased inside of russia. there are three organized opposition parties: mencheviks, social revolutionary right, and social revolutionary left. the anarchists are not organized. the social revolutionary left is a small group of very anarchistic leaders, who have hardly any following. the mencheviks and the social revolutionaries right are said to be strong, but there is no way of measuring their strength, for a very significant reason. these parties have stopped fighting. they are critical, but they are not revolutionary. they also think the revolution is over. they proposed, and they still propose eventually, to challenge and oust the communist party by parliamentary and political methods, not by force. but when intervention came upon distracted russia, and the people realized they were fighting many enemies on many fronts, the two strong opposing parties expressed their own and the public will to stand by the party in power until the menace of foreign invasion was beaten off. these parties announced this in formal statements, uttered by their regular conventions; you have confirmation of it in the memoranda written for you by martov and volsky, and you will remember how one of them put it to us personally: "there is a fight to be made against the bolsheviks, but so long as you foreigners are making it, we russians won't. when you quit and leave us alone, we will take up our burden again, and we shall deal with the bolsheviks. and we will finish them. but we will do it with our people, by political methods, in the soviets, and not by force, not by war or by revolution, and not with any outside foreign help." this is the nationalistic spirit, which we call patriotism, and understand perfectly; it is much stronger in the new than it was in the old, the tsar's, russia. but there is another force back of this remarkable statement of a remarkable state of mind. all russia has turned to the labor of reconstruction; sees the idea in the plans proposed for the future; and is interested--imaginatively. destruction was fun for a while and a satisfaction to a suppressed, betrayed, to an almost destroyed people. violence was not in their character, however. the russian people, sober, are said to be a gentle people. one of their poets speaks of them as "that gentle beast, the russian people," and i noticed and described in my reports of the first revolution how patient, peaceable, and "safe" the mobs of petrograd were. the violence came later, with bolshevism, after the many attempts at counterrevolution, and with vodka. the bolshevik leaders regret and are ashamed of their red terror. they do not excuse it. it was others, you remember, who traced the worst of the russian atrocities and the terror itself to the adoption by the counter-revolutionists of the method of assassination (of lenin and others), and most of all to the discovery by the mobs of wine cellars and vodka stills. that the russian drunk and the russian sober are two utterly different animals, is well known to the jews, to the reactionaries, and to the russians themselves. and that is why this people lately have not only obeyed; they have themselves ruthlessly enforced the revolutionary prohibition decrees in every part of russia that we would inquire about and hear from. the destructive spirit, sated, exhausted, or suppressed, has done its work. the leaders say so--the leaders of all parties. there is a close relationship between the russian people and the new russian leaders, in power and out. new men in politics are commonly fresh, progressive, representative; it's the later statesmen that damp the enthusiasm and sober the idealism of legislators. in russia all legislators, all, are young or new. it is as if we should elect in the united states a brand-new set of men to all offices, from the lowest county to the highest federal position, and as if the election should occur in a great crisis, when all men are full of hope and faith. the new leaders of the local soviets of russia were, and they still are, of the people, really. that is one reason why their autocratic dictatorship is acceptable. they have felt, they shared the passion of the mob to destroy, but they had something in mind to destroy. the soviet leaders used the revolution to destroy the system of organized russian life. while the mobs broke windows, smashed wine cellars, and pillaged buildings to express their rage, their leaders directed their efforts to the annihilation of the system itself. they pulled down the tsar and his officers; they abolished the courts, which had been used to oppress them; they closed shops, stopped business generally, and especially all competitive and speculative business; and they took over all the great industries, monopolies, concessions, and natural resources. this was their purpose. this is their religion. this is what the lower-class culture has been slowly teaching the people of the world for years: that it is not some particular evil, but the whole system of running business and railroads, shops, banks, and exchanges, for speculation and profit that must be changed. this is what causes poverty and riches, they teach, misery, corruption, vice, and war. the people, the workers, or their state, must own and run these things "for service." not political democracy, as with us; economic democracy is the idea; democracy in the shop, factory, business. bolshevism is a literal interpretation, the actual application of this theory, policy, or program. and so, in the destructive period of the russian revolution, the bolshevik leaders led the people to destroy the old system, root and branch, fruit and blossom, too. and apparently this was done. the blocks we saw in petrograd and moscow of retail shops nailed up were but one sign of it. when we looked back of these dismal fronts and inquired more deeply into the work of the revolution we were convinced that the russians have literally and completely done their job. and it was this that shocked us. it is this that has startled the world; not the atrocities of the revolution, but the revolution itself. the organization of life as we know it in america, in the rest of europe, in the rest of the world, is wrecked and abolished in russia. the revolution didn't do it. the tsar's government had rotted it. the war broke down the worn-out machinery of it; the revolution has merely scrapped it finally. the effect is hunger, cold, misery, anguish, disease--death to millions. but worse than these--i mean this--was the confusion of mind among the well and the strong. we do not realize, any of us--even those of us who have imagination--how fixed our minds and habits are by the ways of living that we know. so with the russians. they understood how to work and live under their old system; it was not a pretty one; it was dark, crooked, and dangerous, but they had groped around in it all their lives from childhood up. they could find their way in it. and now they can remember how it was, and they sigh for the old ways. the rich emigres knew whom to see to bribe for a verdict, a safe-conduct, or a concession; and the poor, in their hunger, think now how it would be to go down to the market and haggle, and bargain, from one booth to another, making their daily purchases, reckoning up their defeats and victories over the traders. and they did get food then. and now--it is all gone. they have destroyed all this, and having destroyed it they were lost, strangers in their own land. this tragedy of transition was anticipated by the leaders of the revolution, and the present needs were prepared for in the plans laid for reconstruction. lenin has imagination. he is an idealist, but he is a scholar, too, and a very grim realist. lenin was a statistician by profession. he had long been trying to foresee the future of society under socialism, and he had marked down definitely the resources, the machinery, and the institutions existing under the old order, which could be used in the new. there was the old russian communal land system, passing, but standing in spots with its peasants accustomed to it. that was to be revived; it is his solution of the problem of the great estates. they are not to be broken up, but worked by the peasants in common. then there was the great russian cooperative (trading) society, with its , , families before the war; now with , , members. he kept that. there was a conflict; it was in bourgeoise hands but it was an essential part of the projected system of distribution, so lenin compromised and communist russia has it. he had the railroads, telegraph, telephone already; the workers seized the factories, the local soviets the mines; the all-russian soviet, the banks. the new government set up shops--one in each neighborhood--to dole out not for money, but on work tickets, whatever food, fuel, and clothing this complete government monopoly had to distribute. no bargaining, no display, no advertising, and no speculation. everything one has earned by labor the right to buy at the cooperative and soviet shops is at a fixed, low price, at the established (too small.) profit--to the government or to the members of the cooperative. money is to be abolished gradually. it does not count much now. private capital has been confiscated, most of the rich have left russia, but there are still many people there who have hidden away money or valuables, and live on them without working. they can buy food and even luxuries, but only illegally from peasants and speculators at the risk of punishment and very high prices. they can buy, also, at the government stores, at the low prices, but they can get only their share there, and only on their class or work tickets. the class arrangement, though transitory and temporary--the aim is to have but one class--is the key to the idea of the whole new system. there are three classes. the first can buy, for example, - / pounds of bread a day; the second, three-quarters of a pound; the third, only one-quarter of a pound; no matter how much money they may have. the first class includes soldiers, workers in war, and other essential industries, actors, teachers, writers, experts, and government workers of all sorts. the second class is of all other sorts of workers. the third is of people who do not work--the leisure class. their allowance is, under present circumstances, not enough to live on, but they are allowed to buy surreptitiously from speculators on the theory that the principal of their capital will soon be exhausted, and, since interest, rent, and profits--all forms of unearned money--are abolished, they will soon be forced to go to work. the shock of this, and the confusion due to the strange details of it, were, and they still are, painful to many minds, and not only to the rich. for a long time there was widespread discontent with this new system. the peasants rebelled, and the workers were suspicious. they blamed the new system for the food shortage, the fuel shortage, the lack of raw materials for the factories. but this also was anticipated by that very remarkable mind and will--lenin. he used the state monopoly and control of the press, and the old army of revolutionary propagandists to shift the blame for the sufferings of russia from the revolutionary government to the war, the blockade, and the lack of transportation. also, he and his executive organization were careful to see that, when the government did get hold of a supply of anything, its arrival was heralded, and the next day it appeared at the community shops, where everybody (that worked) got his share at the low government price. the two american prisoners we saw had noticed this, you remember. "we don't get much to eat," they said, "but neither do our guards or the other russians. we all get the same. and when they get more, we get our share." the fairness of the new system, as it works so far, has won over to it the working class and the poorer peasants. the well-to-do still complain, and very bitterly sometimes. their hoardings are broken into by the government and by the poverty committees, and they are severely punished for speculative trading. but even these classes are moved somewhat by the treatment of children. they are in a class by themselves: class a,--i. they get all the few delicacies--milk, eggs, fruit, game, that come to the government monopoly--at school, where they all are fed, regardless of class. "even the rich children," they told us, "they have as much as the poor children." and the children, like the workers, now see the operas, too, the plays, the ballets, the art galleries--all with instructors. the bolsheviks--all the russian parties--regard the communists' attitude toward children as the symbol of their new civilization. "it is to be for the good of humanity, not business," one of them, an american, said, "and the kids represent the future. our generation is to have only the labor, the joy, and the misery of the struggle. we will get none of the material benefits of the new system, and we will probably never all understand and like it. but the children--it is for them and their children that we are fighting, so we are giving them the best of it from the start, and teaching them to take it all naturally. they are getting the idea. they are to be our new propagandists." the idea is that everybody is to work for the common good, and so, as the children and the american prisoners note, when they all produce more, they all get more. they are starving now, but they are sharing their poverty. and they really are sharing it. lenin eats, like everybody else--only one meal a day--soup, fish, bread, and tea. he has to save out of that a bit for breakfast and another bit for supper. the people, the peasants, send him more, but he puts it in the common mess. so the heads of this government do not have to imagine the privations of the people; they feel them. and so the people and the government realize that, if ever russia becomes prosperous, all will share in the wealth, exactly as they share in the poverty now. in a word, rich russia expects to become a rich russian people. this, then, is the idea which has begun to catch the imagination of the russian people. this it is that is making men and women work with a new interest, and a new incentive, not to earn high wages and short hours, but to produce an abundance for all. this is what is making a people, sick of war, send their ablest and strongest men into the new, high-spirited, hard-drilled army to defend, not their borders, but their new working system of common living. and this is what is making lenin and his sobered communist government ask for peace. they think they have carried a revolution through for once to the logical conclusion. all other revolutions have stopped when they had revolved through the political phase to political democracy. this one has turned once more clear through the economic phase to economic democracy, to self-government in the factory, shop, and on the land, and has laid a foundation for universal profit sharing, for the universal division of food, clothes, and all goods, equally among all. and they think their civilization is working on this foundation. they want time to go on and build it higher and better. they want to spread it all over the world, but only as it works, as they told us when we reminded them that the world dreaded their propaganda: "we are through with the old propaganda of argument. all we ask now is to be allowed to prove by the examples of things well done here in russia, that the new system is good. we are so sure we shall make good, that we are willing to stop saying so, to stop reasoning, stop the haranguing, and all that old stuff. and especially are we sick of the propaganda by the sword. we want to stop fighting. we know that each country must evolve its own revolution out of its own conditions and in its own imagination. to force it by war is not scientific, not democratic, not socialistic. and we are fighting now only in self-defense. we will stop fighting, if you will let us stop. we will call back our troops, if you will withdraw yours. we will demobilize. we need the picked organizers and the skilled workers now in the army for our shops, factories, and farms. we would love to recall them to all this needed work, and use their troop trains to distribute our goods and our harvests, if only you will call off your soldiers and your moral, financial, and material support from our enemies, and the enemies of our ideals. let every country in dispute on our borders self-determine its own form of government and its own allegiance. "but you must not treat us as a conquered nation. we are not conquered. we are prepared to join in a revolutionary, civil war all over all of europe and the world, if this good thing has to be done in this bad way of force. but we would prefer to have our time and our energy to work to make sure that our young, good thing is good. we have proved that we can share misery, and sickness, and poverty; it has helped us to have these things to share, and we think we shall be able to share the wealth of russia as we gradually develop it. but we are not sure of that; the world is not sure. let us russians pay the price of the experiment; do the hard, hard work of it; make the sacrifice--then your people can follow us, slowly, as they decide for themselves that what we have is worth having." that is the message you bring back, mr. bullitt. it is your duty to deliver it. it is mine to enforce it by my conception of the situation as it stands in russia and europe to-day. it seems to me that we are on the verge of war, a new war, a terrible war--the long-predicted class war--all over europe. the peace commission, busy with the settlement of the old war, may not see the new one, or may not measure aright the imminent danger of it. germany is going over, hungary has gone, austria is coming into the economic revolutionary stage. the propaganda for it is old and strong in all countries: italy, france, spain, belgium, norway, sweden--you know. all men know this propaganda. but that is in the rear. look at the front. russia is the center of it. germany, austria, hungary are the wings of the potential war front of--bolshevism. and russia, the center, has made a proposition to you for peace, for a separate peace; made it officially; made it after thought; made it proudly, not in fear, but in pitiful sympathy with its suffering people and for the sake of a vision of the future in which it verily believes. they are practical men--those that made it. you met them. we talked with them. we measured their power. they are all idealists, but they are idealists sobered by the responsibility of power. sentiment has passed out of them into work--hard work. they said they could give one year more of starvation to the revolution, but they said it practically, and they prefer to compromise and make peace. i believe that, if we take their offer, there will be such an outcry of rage and disappointment from the left socialists of germany, italy, france, and the world, that lenin and trotsky will be astonished. the red revolution--the class war--will be broken, and evolution will have its chance once more in the rest of europe. and you and i know that the men we met in moscow see this thus, and that they believe the peace conference will not, can not, see it, but will go on to make war and so bring on the european revolution. but your duty, our duty, is to point out this opportunity, and to vouch for the strength and the will and the character of lenin and the commissaires of russia to make and keep the compact they have outlined to you. well, this is the briefest way in which i can express my full faith: kautsky has gone to moscow. he has gone late; he has gone after we were there. he will find, as we found, a careful, thoughtful, deliberate group of men in power; in too much power; unremovable and controlling a state of monopoly, which is political, social, economic, financial; which controls or directs all the activities, all the fears, all the hopes, all the aspirations of a great people. kautsky will speak to revolutionary russia for revolutionary germany, and for a revolutionary europe. there will be an appeal in that; there will be a strong appeal in that to the revolutionary russian commissaires. but, if i am any judge of character, lenin and his commissaires will stand by their offer to us until paris has answered, or until the time set for the answer--april --shall have passed. then, and not until then, will kautsky receive an answer to his appeal for--whatever it is the germans are asking. it is not enough that you have delivered your message and made it a part of the record of the peace conference. i think it is your duty to ask the fixed attention of your chiefs upon it for a moment, and to get from them the courtesy of a clear, direct reply to russia before april . reports of capt. w.w. pettit (the reports of capt. pettit are here printed in full, as follows:) reports of capt, w.w. pettit i left petrograd on march . during the past three weeks i have crossed the finnish border six times and have been approximately two weeks in petrograd. i have met tchitcherin, litvinov, and most of the important personages in the communist government of petrograd (including bill shatov, chief of police). briefly, my opinion of the russian situation is as follows: in petrograd i presume the present communist government has a majority of the working-men behind it, but probably less than half of the total population are members of the communist party. however, my conclusions are based on conversations with not only communists, but also many opponents of the communist government, members of the aristocracy, business men, and foreigners, and i am persuaded that a large majority of the population of petrograd if given a choice between the present government and the two alternatives, revolution or foreign intervention, would without hesitation take the present government. foreign intervention would unite the population in opposition and would tend to greatly emphasize the present nationalist spirit. revolution would result in chaos. (there is nowhere a group of russians in whom the people i have talked with have confidence. kolchak, denikin, yudenvitch, trepov, the despicable hordes of russian emigrees who haunt the grand hotel, stockholm; the socithans house, helsingfors; the offices of the peace commission in paris, and squabble among themselves as to how the russian situation shall be solved; all equally fail to find many supporters in petrograd.) those with whom i have talked recognize that revolution, did it succeed in developing a strong government, would result in a white terror comparable with that of finland. in finland our consul has a record of , executions in some districts, out of something like districts, by the white guard. in petrograd i have been repeatedly assured that the total red executions in petrograd and moscow and other cities was at a maximum , . it may seem somewhat inconsistent for the russian bourgeoisie to oppose allied intervention and at the same time fail to give whole-hearted support to the present government. they justify this attitude on the grounds that when the two great problems of food and peace are solved the whole population can turn itself to assisting the present régime in developing a stable efficient government. they point to the numerous changes which have already been introduced by the present communist government, to the acknowledgment that mistakes have been made to the ease of securing introduction of constructive ideas under the present régime. all these facts have persuaded many of the thinking people with whom i have talked to look to the present government in possibly a somewhat modified form as the salvation of russia. at present the situation is bad. russia is straining every nerve to raise an army to oppose the encircling white guards. that the army is efficient is demonstrated by the present location of soviet forces who have contended with the russian white guard supported by enormous sums of money, munitions, and even soldiers from the allies. naturally, transportation is inefficient; it was horrible in the last year of the czar's regime. absolute separation from the rest of the world, combined with the chaotic conditions which russia has passed through since the revolution, plus the sabotage, which until recently was quite general among the intelligent classes, including engineers, has resulted in a decrease in rolling stock. the transportation of the enormous army which has been raised limits the number of cars which can be used for food. the cutting off of siberia, finland, the baltic provinces, and until recently the ukraine, made it necessary to establish new lines of food transportation. consequently there has been great suffering in petrograd. of the population of a million, , are reported by the board of health to be ill, , seriously ill in hospitals or at home, and another , with swollen limbs still able to go to the food kitchens. however, the reports of people dying in the streets are not true. whatever food exists is fairly well distributed and there are food kitchens where anyone can get a fairly good dinner for . rubles. for money one can still obtain many of the luxuries of life. the children, some , of whom have been provided with homes, are splendidly taken care of, and except for the absence of milk have little to complain of. in the public schools free lunches are given the children, and one sees in the faces of the younger generation little of the suffering which some of the older people have undergone and are undergoing. food conditions have improved recently, due to the suspension of passenger traffic and the retaking of the ukraine, where food is plentiful. from to carloads of food have arrived in petrograd each day since february . perhaps it is futile to add that my solution of the russian problem is some sort of recognition of the present government, with the establishment of economic relations and the sending of every possible assistance to the people. i have been treated in a wonderful manner by the communist representatives, though they know that i am no socialist and though i have admitted to the leaders that my civilian clothing is a disguise. they have the warmest affection for america, believe in president wilson, and are certain that we are coming to their assistance, and, together with our engineers, our food, our school-teachers, and our supplies, they are going to develop in russia a government which will emphasize the rights of the common people as no other government has. i am so convinced of the necessity for us taking a step immediately to end the suffering of this wonderful people that i should be willing to stake all i have in converting ninety out of every hundred american business men whom i could take to petrograd for two weeks. it is needless for me to tell you that most of the stories that have come from russia regarding atrocities, horrors, immorality, are manufactured in viborg, helsingfors, or stockholm. the horrible massacres planned for last november were first learned of in petrograd from the helsingfors papers. that anybody could even for a moment believe in the nationalization of women seems impossible to anyone in petrograd. to-day petrograd is an orderly city--probably the only city of the world of its size without police. bill shatov, chief of police, and i were at the opera the other night to hear chaliapine sing in boris gudonov. he excused himself early because he said there had been a robbery the previous night, in which a man had lost , rubles, that this was the first robbery in several weeks, and that he had an idea who had done it, and was going to get the men that night. i feel personally that petrograd is safer than paris. at night there are automobiles, sleighs, and people on the streets at o'clock to a much greater extent than was true in paris when i left five weeks ago. most wonderful of all, the great crowd of prostitutes has disappeared. i have seen not a disreputable woman since i went to petrograd, and foreigners who have been there for the last three months report the same. the policy of the present government has resulted in eliminating throughout russia, i am told, this horrible outgrowth of modern civilization. begging has decreased. i have asked to be taken to the poorest parts of the city to see how the people in the slums live, and both the communists and bourgeoisie have held up their hands and said, "but you fail to understand there are no such places." there is poverty, but it is scattered and exists among those of the former poor or of the former rich who have been unable to adapt themselves to the conditions which require everyone to do something. terrorism has ended. for months there have been no executions, i am told, and certainly people go to the theater and church and out on the streets as much as they would in any city of the world. (certain memoranda referred to in the hearing relating to the work of capt. pettit in russia are here printed in full as follows:) memorandum from: w.w. pettit to: ammission, paris. (attention of mr. bullitt.) . _mr. pettit's recent movements_.--on march i left helsingfors for petrograd and remained there until march when i left for helsingfors, at which place i received a cable ordering me to report immediately to paris. on the th i left again for petrograd to secure some baggage i had left. on the st i left petrograd for helsingfors. on april st i left helsingfors for stockholm and in stockholm i find a telegram asking me to wait until i receive further orders. . _optimism of present government_.--on the night of the th and the afternoon of the st i had several hours with schklovsky, tchitcherin's personal representative in petrograd. he was disappointed to think i was to return to paris, but felt certain that inasmuch as the orders recalling me had been sent before mr. bullitt's arrival, there was every possibility of my being returned to petrograd. he was most optimistic about the future and felt that the allies must soon take some definite stand regarding russia, and that the result of the paris negotiations would almost surely be favorable to the soviet government. he said that the present war conditions and the limited transportation facilities, with the shortage of food resulting therefrom, had handicapped his government enormously, and that everyone hopes that soon the action of the allied powers will permit the establishment of normal relations in russia. . _radios in re bullitt_.--he has received at least three radio communications from the american press in which mr. bullitt's activities have been mentioned and this has tended to encourage him. the last cablegram stated that mr. bullitt was preparing a statement regarding conditions in russia which the press anticipated would go far toward dispelling ignorance and misinformation regarding conditions in moscow and petrograd. . _hungarian situation_.--the hungarian situation has also gone far toward encouraging the present government. hungary has proposed a mutual offensive and defensive alliance with russia. the fact that the soviet government has been instituted in hungary without bloodshed up to the present, and with little opposition on the part of the people, has also encouraged schklovsky. he stated that the action of the allies in sending troops against hungary was to be regretted because of the bloodshed which would probably result. however, he thought in the long run that the allies would find it a suicidal policy to try to suppress the hungarian revolution by force. . _the ukraine situation_.--the soviet troops have taken almost the entire ukraine and this with the food supplies which it will provide have strengthened the soviet government. a friend who has recently returned from peltava, ekaterinoslav, kiev, and other southern cities, states that food is abundant and cheap. the soviet government believes that the french and greek troops are withdrawing from odessa and going to sebastopol. they anticipate taking odessa within the next few days. . _esthonian situation_.--at least twice within the last two weeks esthonia has sent word to the soviet government that it desired peace. the following four points have been emphasized by the esthonians: (i) that peace must come immediately; ( ) that the offer must come from the soviet government; ( ) that a fair offer will be accepted by the esthonians immediately without consultation with france or england, who are supporting them; ( ) that free access to esthonian harbors and free use of esthonian railroads will be assured the soviet government. . _the lithuanian situation_.--it is fairly well understood that the lithuanian government that is fighting the bolsheviks is not going to allow itself to be made a tool by the french and british governments to invade russian territory. the lithuanian government is desirous of securing possession of lithuanian territory, but beyond that it is understood it will not go. . _the finnish situation_.--the soviet government is in close touch with the finnish situation and has little fear of an invasion of russia from that direction. the finnish army is without question a third red; probably a half red; possibly two-thirds red. there is even reported to be a tendency on a part of certain of the white guards to oppose intervention in russia. one of the finnish regiments in esthonia has returned to finland, and it is supposed that it will assist the proposed revolution of the finns in east karelia against the soviet government. the soviet government has sent a committee to helsingfors to arrange economic relations with finland, and it is said that this committee carries threats of reprisals on the part of the soviet government against the finns in petrograd unless the treaty is negotiated. it is said in petrograd that some of the finns have already left petrograd in anticipation that the finnish government will not be permitted to make any arrangement with the soviet government because of the attitude of certain of the allied representatives in helsingfors. . _improvement in food conditions_.--the suspension of passenger traffic from march to april has resulted in the government bringing to petrograd to cars of food each day, and one sees large quantities of food being transported about the city. at easter time it is hoped to be able to give pounds of white bread to the population of petrograd. there also seems to be a larger supply of food for private purchase in the city. mr. shiskin has recently been able to buy geese, a sucking pig, splendid legs of veal, and roasts of beef at from to rubles a pound, which, considering the value of the ruble, is much less than it sounds. shiskin has also been able recently to get eggs, milk, honey, and butter, together with potatoes, carrots, and cabbage. my bill for food for days with mr. shiskin was about , rubles. . _order in petrograd_.--about three weeks ago there were several strikes in factories in petrograd and lenin came to talk to the strikers. apparently the matter was settled satisfactorily and the workers were given the same bread rations that the soldiers receive. at the putilov works some men struck and part of them were dismissed. both shatov and the director of factories said that there were no executions, though the population the next morning reported workers shot and that afternoon the rumor had increased the number to . there is practically no robbery in the city. shatov left the opera the other night early because he told me the previous night a man had lost , rubles and it was such an exceptional thing to have a robbery that he was going out personally to investigate the matter, having some idea as to who was responsible. . _currency plans_.--zorin tells me that the soviet government has or had printed a new issue of currency which it is proposed to exchange for the old currency within the next three months. the details of the plan have not been completed but he thinks that an exchange of ruble for ruble will be made up to , ; an additional , will be placed on deposit in the government bank. that beyond , only a small percentage will be allowed to any one, and that a limit of possibly , will be placed beyond which no rubles will be exchanged. then the plan is, after a certain period to declare the old ruble valueless. zorin feels that as a result of this plan the new ruble will have some value and that the present situation in the country in which the farmer has so much paper that he refuses to sell any longer for money, will be relieved. this exchange would be followed later on by the issue of still other currency the entire purpose being the more equal distribution of wealth and the gradual approach to elimination of currency. . _concessions_.--it is asserted that the northern railway concession has been signed and amundsen tells me that all negotiations were accomplished without the payment of a single cent of tea money, probably the first instance of the absence of graft in such negotiations in the history of russia. he says that trepov, through his agent borisov, at moscow, was the greatest opponent of the norwegian interests. trepov was formerly minister of ways and communications and is reported to have been refused a similar concession under the czar's government. amundsen claims that trepov has made every effort to secure this concession from the soviet government. i am attaching a statement regarding a concession which is supposed to have been granted to the lumber interests. there are rumors that other concessions have been granted. . _y.m.c.a._--recently the y.m.c.a. secretary arrived in petrograd, claiming to have come without authorization from his superiors. he has been staying at the embassy but recently went to moscow at the invitation of tchitcherin. schklovsky tells me that the american has plans for the establishment of the y.m.c.a. in russia which he wanted to put before the moscow government. schklovsky doubted that it would be feasible to organize in russia at present a branch of the international association unless some rather fundamental modifications were made in their policy. . _treadwell_.--i have twice asked schklovsky to secure information regarding treadwell, and he assures me that he has taken the matter up with moscow, but that apparently they have had no news from tashkent as yet. he promised to let me know as soon as anything was heard. . _attitude toward united states_.--the degree of confidence which the russians and the soviet officials show toward our government is to me a matter of surprise, considering our activities during the past months. there seems to be no question in the minds of the officials in petrograd whom i have met that we are going to give them an opportunity to develop a more stable form of government, and they apparently look upon president wilson as one who is going to decide the question on its merits without being influenced by the enormous pressure of the russian emigrés and the french government. doubtless part of this attitude is due to the favorable impression created by mr. bullitt, but much of it must be the result of information which they have secured from the press. at the present moment the united states has the opportunity of demonstrating to the russian people its friendship and cementing the bonds which already exist. russia believes in us, and a little assistance to russia in its present crisis will result in putting the united states in a position in russia which can never be overthrown by germany or any other power. . _social work_.--i have recently sent a cable from helsingfors regarding health and sanitary conditions in petrograd, a copy of which i am attaching. i have spent the past two weeks visiting schools and the children's home in petrograd. there are , children for whom homes have been provided in the past nine months, and preparations are being made to house , more. homes of emigrés are being taken over and groups of children placed in them under the care of able instructors; where the children are old enough they go to school during the daytime. a beautiful home life has been developed. the children are well fed and well clothed, and there is a minimum of sickness among them. at the present time, when so much disease exists in petrograd, and when there is so much starvation, the healthy appearance of these thousands of children, together with the well-fed condition of children who are not in institutions, but are receiving free meals in schools, is a demonstration of the social spirit behind much of the activities of the present government. i shall send later a more detailed statement of some of the interesting things i have learned about this phase of the activities of the new regime. . _conclusion_.--in this rather hastily dictated memorandum which mr. francis is going to take tonight to paris i have tried to point out some of the things that have interested me in petrograd. naturally i have emphasized the brighter side, for the vast amount of absolutely false news manufactured in helsingfors and stockholm and sent out through the world seems to me to necessitate the emphasizing of some of the more hopeful features of the present government. naturally the character of the russian people has not changed to any great extent in months, and there is doubtless corruption, and there is certainly inefficiency and ignorance and a hopeless failure to grasp the new principles motivating the government on the part of many of the people. a people subjected to the treatment which russians have had during the last years can not in one generation be expected to change very greatly, but personally i feel the present government has made a vast improvement on the government of the czar as i knew it in - . without doubt the majority of the people in petrograd are opposed to allied intervention or revolution and wish the present government to be given a fair chance to work out the salvation of russia. one of the most hopeful symptoms of the present government is its willingness to acknowledge mistakes when they are demonstrated and to adopt new ideas which are worth while. personally i am heart and soul for some action on the part of the united states government which will show our sincere intention to permit the russian people to solve their own problems with what assistance they may require from us. stockholm, april . social work in petrograd the wife of zinoviev, madame lelina, is in charge of the social institutions in the city of petrograd. this does not include the public schools, which are under another organization. madame lelina is a short-haired woman, probably jewish, of about . she has an enormous amount of energy, and is commonly supposed to be doing at least two things at the same time. the morning i met her she was carrying on two interviews and trying to arrange to have me shown some of the social work she is directing. there seemed to be little system about her efforts. her office was rather disorderly, and her method of work seemed very wasteful of time and effort, and very much like the usual russian way of doing things. bill shatov, formerly organizer of the i.w.w., who is commissar of police for petrograd and also commissar for one of the northern armies, introduced me to madame lelina, and accompanied me the first day on our visits. we were guided by a young woman by the name of bachrath, who is a university graduate and lawyer, and since the legal profession has fallen into disrepute, has turned her efforts toward social work. under her guidance i spent three days visiting institutions. i saw a boarding school for girls, a boarding home for younger children, an institution for the feeble-minded, three of the new homes organized by the soviet government, and two small hospitals for children. the institutions which madame lelina is directing are in two groups: first, those which she has taken over from the old czar regime, and second, those which have been founded in the last months. the new government has been so handicapped by the difficulties of securing food and other supplies, by the sabotage of many of the intelligent classes, and by the necessity of directing every energy toward carrying on hostilities against the bourgeoisie and the allies, that there has been little opportunity to remodel the institutions inherited from the previous régime, therefore neither the strength nor the weakness of these institutions is to any great extent due to the present régime. two of the institutions i visited were of this type, one happened to be very good and the other very bad, and in neither case did i feel that lelina's organization was responsible. an aristocratic organization under the czar maintained a boarding school for girls. this has been taken over by the soviet government with little change, and the children in this institution are enjoying all the opportunities which a directress trained in france and germany, with an exceptionally skillful corps of assistants, can give them. i inquired regarding the changes which the soviet government had made in the organization of this school. some of the girls who were there have been kept, but vacant places have been filled by madame lelina's committee, and the institution has been required to take boys into the day school, a plan which is carried out in most of the soviet social and educational work. much more freedom has been introduced in the management of the institution, and the girls at table talk and walk about, much as though they were in their own homes. the soviet government requires that certain girls be permitted membership in the teachers' committee, and the two communists accompanying me pointed to this as a great accomplishment. privately, the teachers informed me they regarded it as of little significance, and apparently they were entirely out of sympathy with the innovations that the new government has made. now all the girls are required to work in the kitchen, dining room, or m cleaning their own dormitories, and certain girls are assigned to the kitchen to over-see the use of supplies by the cooks. however, the whole institution, from the uniforms of the girls to the required form in which even hand towels have to be hung, indicates the iron will of the directress. in one class we visited the girls sat at desks and listened to a traditional pedagogue pour out quantities of information on pushkin's boris gudonov. occasionally the girls were called upon to react, which they did with sentences apparently only partially memorized. the spirit of the institution is behind that of our better institutions in america, and the spirit of the classroom is quite mediaeval. the greatest objection which the teachers seem to have to soviet activities is the question of sacred pictures and religious observances. the chapel of the school has been closed, but in each room from the corner still hangs the ikon and at the heads of many of the girls' beds there are still small pictures of the virgin, much to the disgust of the representatives of the soviet government, who in many cases are jewish, and in practically all cases have renounced any religious connection. recently the soviet party has announced the fact that they as a party are not hostile to any religion, but intend to remain neutral on the subject. the attitude of the commissars apparently is that required religious observances should not be permitted in public institutions, and doubtless some of the inspectors have gone further than was necessary in prohibiting any symbol of the religion which probably most of the children still nominally adhere to. the second institution i visited, which had been taken over from the old government, was an orphan asylum with some children mostly under . it was frightfully crowded, in many places rather dirty, with frequently bad odors from unclean toilets. in one little room some small boys were sleeping and eating, and i found one child of who was not able to walk and was eating in the bed in which he slept. ventilation was bad, linen not very clean, a general feeling of repression present, slovenly employees, and, in general, an atmosphere of inefficiency and failure to develop a home spirit which one still finds in some of the worst institutions in america. the instructor who showed me this home realized its horrors, and said that the government intended to move the children into more adequate quarters as soon as conditions permitted. in summer the children are all taken to the country. in this institution all the older children go out to public schools and there have been no cases of smallpox or typhus in spite of the epidemics the city has had this winter. forty children were in the hospital with minor complaints. about per cent of the children are usually ill. the school for feeble-minded occupies a large apartment house and the children are divided into groups of under the direction of two teachers, each group developing home life in one of the large apartments. there is emphasis on handwork. printing presses, a bookbinding establishment, and woodworking tools are provided. music and art appreciation are given much time, and some of the work done is very beautiful. this school is largely the result of the efforts of the soviet government. careful records are kept of the children and simple test material has been devised to develop in the more backward children elementary reactions regarding size, shape, form, and color. the greatest difficulty is the impossibility of securing trained workers either for the shops or for the special pedagogical problems of the school. however, an energetic corps of young men and young women are employed, and they are conscious of the size of their problem and are already thinking of the difficulties of sending their students back into industrial life. in many of the activities of the soviet government, as well as in these institutions taken over from the old regime, i was dismayed at the inefficiency and ignorance of many of the subordinates. after talking to the leaders and getting some understanding of their ideals, an american expects to see these carried over into practice. one is liable to forget that the russian people have not greatly changed, and that the same easy-going, inefficient attitude of decades of the previous regime still exists. no one knows this obstacle better than the members of the present regime. they realize that the character of the russian people is their greatest obstacle, and change in the russian conception of government service is a slow process. far from being discouraged, they point to their accomplishments with pride. during the last nine months madame lelina has taken , children into government homes and preparations are made to take , more during the next three months. the three new institutions which i visited are attractive suburban homes of wealthy emigrés. the government has taken these over and is putting groups of children in charge of specially selected and trained men and women. the older children go out to school. for the younger children kindergarten activities are provided and much time is spent out of doors. an atmosphere of home life has been developed which is surprising considering the short time the institutions have been organized and the difficulties they have had to contend with. this plan, which i am told is permanent, is a most encouraging feature of madame lelina's work. requests to have children placed in the government institutions are turned over to a special corps of investigators. in each house there is what is known as a poor committee which must also approve the requests and the local soviet is required to pass upon the commitment of the child to an institution. the large number of children taken over by the city is due to the number of orphans and half orphans caused by the war and to the impossibility of many poor families providing their children with food during the recent famine. in cases where several children of a family are taken they are placed in the same home. frequent opportunities for relatives to visit the homes are provided. the amount of sickness has been surprisingly low considering the great amount of disease in petrograd during the last few months. in one group of children there have been no deaths within the past nine months, and among all the children there have been very few cases of contagious diseases. the difficulties which madame lelina faces are numerous. first, russia has never had an adequate number of trained workers and many of those who were trained have refused to cooperate with the present regime, and, secondly, though the soviet government has adopted the policy of turning over to the children's homes and the schools an adequate supply of food, regardless of the suffering of the adult population, still it has been impossible to get certain items of diet, as, for instance, milk. it is true, however, that among these children one sees few signs of undernourishment or famine, and in general throughout the city the children seem much better nourished than the adult population. i had planned to visit other institutions but was unable to do so. i was told of a large palace which has been taken over as a home for mothers. here all women who so desire are sent after childbirth with their children for a period of two months. the health department, which asserts that there are in addition to the , bedridden people in the city, another , who are ill because of undernourishment though able to go to the food kitchens, has been very successful in securing from the local soviets special food supplies to be provided sick persons on doctors' orders. at each food kitchen the board of health has a representative whose business it is to give such special diet as may be possible to undernourished individuals. (thereupon, at . o'clock p.m., the committee adjourned subject to the call of the chairman.) produced from scanned images of public domain material from the google print project.) our revolution essays on working-class and international revolution, - by leon trotzky collected and translated, with biography and explanatory notes by moissaye j. olgin author of "the soul of the russian revolution" [illustration] new york henry holt and company copyright, , by henry holt and company published march, preface the world has not known us russian revolutionists. the world has sympathized with us; the world abroad has given aid and comfort to our refugees; the world, at times, even admired us; yet the world has not known us. friends of freedom in europe and america were keenly anxious to see the victory of our cause; they watched our successes and our defeats with breathless interest; yet they were concerned with material results. our views, our party affiliations, our factional divisions, our theoretical gropings, our ideological constructions, to us the leading lights in our revolutionary struggles, were foreign to the world. all this was supposed to be an internal russian affair. the revolution has now ceased to be an internal russian affair. it has become of world-wide import. it has started to influence governments and peoples. what was not long ago a theoretical dispute between two "underground" revolutionary circles, has grown into a concrete historical power determining the fate of nations. what was the individual conception of individual revolutionary leaders is now ruling millions. the world is now vitally interested in understanding russia, in learning the history of our revolution which is the history of the great russian nation for the last fifty years. this involves, however, knowing not only events, but also the development of thoughts, of aims, of ideas that underlie and direct events; gaining an insight into the immense volume of intellectual work which recent decades have accumulated in revolutionary russia. we have selected leon trotzky's contribution to revolutionary thought, not because he is now in the limelight of history, but because his conceptions represent a very definite, a clear-cut and intrinsically consistent trend of revolutionary thought, quite apart from that of other leaders. we do not agree with many of trotzky's ideas and policies, yet we cannot overlook the fact that these ideas have become predominant in the present phase of the russian revolution and that they are bound to give their stamp to russian democracy in the years to come, whether the present government remains in power or not. the reader will see that trotzky's views as applied in bolsheviki ruled russia are not of recent origin. they were formed in the course of the first russian revolution of , in which trotzky was one of the leaders. they were developed and strengthened in the following years of reaction, when many a progressive group went to seek compromises with the absolutist forces. they became particularly firm through the world war and the circumstances that led to the establishment of a republican order in russia. perhaps many a grievous misunderstanding and misinterpretation would have been avoided had thinking america known that those conceptions of trotzky were not created on the spur of the moment, but were the result of a life-long work in the service of the revolution. trotzky's writings, besides their theoretical and political value, represent a vigor of style and a clarity of expression unique in russian revolutionary literature. m.j. olgin. new york, february th, . contents page biographical notes the proletariat and the revolution the events in petersburg prospects of a labor dictatorship the soviet and the revolution preface to _my round trip_ the lessons of the great year on the eve of a revolution two faces the growing conflict war or peace? trotzky on the platform in petrograd leon trotzky biographical notes trotzky is a man of about forty. he is tall, strong, angular; his appearance as well as his speech give the impression of boldness and vigor. his voice is a high tenor ringing with metal. and even in his quiet moments he resembles a compressed spring. he is always aggressive. he is full of passion,--that white-hot, vibrating mental passion that characterizes the intellectual jew. on the platform, as well as in private life, he bears an air of peculiar importance, an indefinable something that says very distinctly: "here is a man who knows his value and feels himself chosen for superior aims." yet trotzky is not imposing. he is almost modest. he is detached. in the depths of his eyes there is a lingering sadness. it was only natural that he, a gifted college youth with a strong avidity for theoretical thinking, should have exchanged, some twenty years ago, the somber class-rooms of the university of odessa for the fresh breezes of revolutionary activity. that was the way of most gifted russian youths. that especially was the way of educated young jews whose people were being crushed under the steam-roller of the russian bureaucracy. in the last years of the nineteenth century there was hardly enough opportunity to display unusual energy in revolutionary work. small circles of picked workingmen, assembling weekly under great secrecy somewhere in a backyard cabin in a suburb, to take a course in sociology or history or economics; now and then a "mass" meeting of a few score laborers gathered in the woods; revolutionary appeals and pamphlets printed on a secret press and circulated both among the educated classes and among the people; on rare occasions, an open manifestation of revolutionary intellectuals, such as a meeting of students within the walls of the university--this was practically all that could be done in those early days of russian revolution. into this work of preparation, trotzky threw himself with all his energy. here he came into the closest contact with the masses of labor. here he acquainted himself with the psychology and aspirations of working and suffering russia. this was the rich soil of practical experience that ever since has fed his revolutionary ardor. his first period of work was short. in we find him already in solitary confinement in the prisons of odessa, devouring book after book to satisfy his mental hunger. no true revolutionist was ever made downhearted by prison, least of all trotzky, who knew it was a brief interval of enforced idleness between periods of activity. after two and a half years of prison "vacation" (as the confinement was called in revolutionary jargon) trotzky was exiled to eastern siberia, to ust-kut, on the lena river, where he arrived early in , only to seize the first opportunity to escape. again he resumed his work, dividing his time between the revolutionary committees in russia and the revolutionary colonies abroad. and were years of growth for the labor movement and of social-democratic influence over the working masses. trotzky, an uncompromising marxist, an outspoken adherent of the theory that only the revolutionary workingmen would be able to establish democracy in russia, devoted much of his energy to the task of uniting the various social-democratic circles and groups in the various cities of russia into one strong social-democratic party, with a clear program and well-defined tactics. this required a series of activities both among the local committees and in the social-democratic literature which was conveniently published abroad. it was in connection with this work that trotzky's first pamphlet was published and widely read. it was entitled: _the second convention of the russian social-democratic labor party_ (geneva, ), and dealt with the controversies between the two factions of russian social-democracy which later became known as the bolsheviki and the mensheviki. trotzky's contribution was an attempt at reconciliation between the two warring camps which professed the same marxian theory and pursued the same revolutionary aim. the attempt failed, as did many others, yet trotzky never gave up hope of uniting the alienated brothers. on the eve of the revolution of , trotzky was already a revolutionary journalist of high repute. we admired the vigor of his style, the lucidity of his thought and the straightness of his expression. articles bearing the pseudonym "n. trotzky" were an intellectual treat, and invariably aroused heated discussions. it may not be out of place to say a few words about this pseudonym. many an amazing comment has been made in the american press on the jew bronstein "camouflaging" under a russian name, trotzky. it seems to be little known in this country that to assume a pen name is a practice widely followed in russia, not only among revolutionary writers. thus "gorki" is a pseudonym; "shchedrin" (saltykov) is a pseudonym. "fyodor sologub" is a pseudonym. as to revolutionary writers, the very character of their work has compelled them to hide their names to escape the secret police. ulyanov, therefore, became "lenin," and bronstein became "trotzky." as to his "camouflaging" as a russian, this assertion is based on sheer ignorance. trotzky is not a genuine russian name--no more so than ostrovski or levine. true, there was a russian playwright ostrovski, and tolstoi gave his main figure in _anna karenin_ the name of levine. yet ostrovski and levine are well known in russia as jewish names, and so is trotzky. i have never heard of a gentile bearing the name trotzky. trotzky has never concealed his jewish nationality. he was too proud to dissimulate. pride is, perhaps, one of the dominant traits of his powerful personality. revolutionary russia did not question the race or nationality of a writer or leader. one admired trotzky's power over emotion, the depth of his convictions, the vehemence of his attacks on the opponents of the revolution. as early as , one line of his revolutionary conceptions became quite conspicuous: _his opposition to the liberal movement in russia_. in a series of essays in the social-democratic _iskra_ (_spark_), in a collection of his essays published in geneva under the title _before january ninth_, he unremittingly branded the liberals for lack of revolutionary spirit, for cowardice in face of a hateful autocracy, for failure to frame and to defend a thoroughly democratic program, for readiness to compromise with the rulers on minor concessions and thus to betray the cause of the revolution. no one else was as eloquent, as incisive in pointing out the timidity and meekness of the zemstvo opposition (zemstvo were the local representative bodies for the care of local affairs, and the liberal land owners constituted the leading party in those bodies) as the young revolutionary agitator, trotzky. trotzky's fury against the wavering policy of the well-to-do liberals was only a manifestation of another trait of his character: _his desire for clarity in political affairs_. trotzky could not conceive of half-way measures, of "diplomatic" silence over vital topics, of cunning moves and concealed designs in political struggles. the attitude of a milukov, criticizing the government and yet willing to acquiesce in a monarchy of a prussian brand, criticizing the revolutionists and yet secretly pleased with the horror they inflicted upon romanoff and his satellites, was simply incompatible with trotzky's very nature and aroused his impassioned contempt. to him, black was always black, and white was white, and political conceptions ought to be so clear as to find adequate expression in a few simple phrases. trotzky's own political line was the revolution--a violent uprising of the masses, headed by organized labor, forcibly to overthrow bureaucracy and establish democratic freedom. with what an outburst of blazing joy he greeted the upheaval of january , --the first great mass-movement in russia with clear political aims: "the revolution has come!" he shouted in an ecstatic essay completed on january th. "the revolution has come. one move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships and fatigue. the revolution has come and destroyed the plans of so many politicians who had dared to make their little political calculations with no regard for the master, the revolutionary people. the revolution has come and destroyed scores of superstitions, and has manifested the power of the program which is founded on the revolutionary logic of the development of the masses.... the revolution has come and the period of our infancy has passed." the revolution filled the entire year of with the battle cries of ever-increasing revolutionary masses. the political strike became a powerful weapon. the village revolts spread like wild-fire. the government became frightened. it was under the sign of this great conflagration that trotzky framed his theory of _immediate transition from absolutism to a socialist order_. his line of argument was very simple. the working class, he wrote, was the only real revolutionary power. the bourgeoisie was weak and incapable of adroit resistance. the intellectual groups were of no account. the peasantry was politically primitive, yet it had an overwhelming desire for land. "once the revolution is victorious, political power necessarily passes into the hands of the class that has played a leading rôle in the struggle, and that is the working class." to secure permanent power, the working class would have to win over the millions of peasants. this would be possible by recognizing all the agrarian changes completed by the peasants in time of the revolution and by a radical agrarian legislation. "once in power, the proletariat will appear before the peasantry as its liberator." on the other hand, having secured its class rule over russia, why should the proletariat help to establish parliamentary rule, which is the rule of the bourgeois classes over the people? "to imagine that social-democracy participates in the provisional government, playing a leading rôle in the period of revolutionary democratic reconstruction, insisting on the most radical reforms and all the time enjoying the aid and support of the organized proletariat,--only to step aside when the democratic program is put into operation, to leave the completed building at the disposal of the bourgeois parties and thus to open an era of parliamentary politics where social-democracy forms only a party of opposition,--to imagine this would mean to compromise the very idea of a labor government." moreover, "once the representatives of the proletariat enter the government, not as powerless hostages, but as a leading force, the divide between the minimum-program and the maximum-program automatically disappears, collectivism becomes the order of the day," since "political supremacy of the proletariat is incompatible with its economic slavery." it was precisely the same program which trotzky is at present attempting to put into operation. this program has been his guiding star for the last twelve years. in the fall of it looked as if trotzky's hope was near its realization. the october strike brought autocracy to its knees. a constitution was promised. a soviet (council of workmen's deputies) was formed in petersburg to conduct the revolution. trotzky became one of the strongest leaders of the council. it was in those months that we became fully aware of two qualities of trotzky's which helped him to master men: his power as a speaker, and his ability to write short, stirring articles comprehensible to the masses. in the latter ability nobody equals him among russian socialists. the leaders of russian social-democracy were wont to address themselves to the intellectual readers. socialist writers of the early period of the revolution were seldom confronted with the necessity of writing for plain people. trotzky was the best among the few who, in the stormy months of the revolution, were able to appeal to the masses in brief, strong, yet dignified articles full of thought, vision, and emotion. the soviet was struggling in a desperate situation. autocracy had promised freedom, yet military rule was becoming ever more atrocious. the sluices of popular revolutionary movement were open, yet revolutionary energy was being gradually exhausted. the soviet acted as a true revolutionary government, ignoring the government of the romanoffs, giving orders to the workingmen of the country, keeping a watchful eye on political events; yet the government of the old régime was regaining its self-confidence and preparing for a final blow. the air was full of bad omens. it required an unusual degree of revolutionary faith and vigor to conduct the affairs of the soviet. trotzky was the man of the hour. first a member of the executive committee, then the chairman of the soviet, he was practically in the very vortex of the revolution. he addressed meetings, he ordered strikes, he provided the vanguard of the workingmen with firearms; he held conferences with representatives of labor unions throughout the country, and--the irony of history--he repeatedly appeared before the ministers of the old régime as a representative of labor democracy to demand from them the release of a prisoner or the abolition of some measures obnoxious to labor. it was in this school of the soviet that trotzky learned to see events in a national aspect, and it was the very existence of the soviet which confirmed his belief in the possibility of a revolutionary proletarian dictatorship. looking backward at the activities of the soviet, he thus characterized that prototype of the present revolutionary government in russia. "the soviet," he wrote, "was the organized authority of the masses themselves over their separate members. this was a true, unadulterated democracy, without a two-chamber system, without a professional bureaucracy, with the right of the voters to recall their representative at will and to substitute another." in short, it was the same type of democracy trotzky and lenin are trying to make permanent in present-day russia. the black storm soon broke loose. trotzky was arrested with the other members of the "revolutionary government," after the soviet had existed for about a month and a half. trotzky went to prison, not in despair, but as a leader of an invincible army which though it had suffered temporary defeat, was bound to win. trotzky had to wait twelve years for the moment of triumph, yet the moment came. in prison trotzky was very active, reading, writing, trying to sum up his experience of the revolutionary year. after twelve months of solitary confinement he was tried and sentenced to life exile in siberia: the government of the enemies of the people was wreaking vengeance on the first true representatives of the people. on january , , trotzky started his trip for obdorsk, in northern siberia on the arctic ocean. he was under unusual rigid surveillance even for russian prisons. each movement of his and of his comrades was carefully guarded. no communication with the outer world was permitted. the very journey was surrounded by great secrecy. yet such was the fame of the soviet, that crowds gathered at every station to greet the prisoners' train, and even the soldiers showed extraordinary respect for the imprisoned "workingmen's deputies" as they called them. "we are surrounded by friends on every side," trotzky wrote in his note book. in tiumen the prisoners had to leave the railway train for sleighs drawn by horses. the journey became very tedious and slow. the monotony was broken only by little villages, where revolutionary exiles were detained. here and there the exiles would gather to welcome the leaders of the revolution. red flags gave touches of color to the blinding white of the siberian snow. "long live the revolution!" was printed with huge letters on the surface of the northern snow, along the road. this was beautiful, but it gave little consolation. the country became ever more desolate. "every day we move down one step into the kingdom of cold and wilderness," trotzky remarked in his notes. it was a gloomy prospect, to spend years and years in this god forsaken country. trotzky was not the man to submit. in defiance of difficulties, he managed to escape before he reached the town of his destination. as there was only one road along which travelers could move, and as there was danger that authorities, notified by wire of his escape, could stop him at any moment, he left the road and on a sleigh drawn by reindeer he crossed an unbroken wilderness of versts, over miles. this required great courage and physical endurance. the picturesque journey is described by trotzky in a beautiful little book, _my round trip_. it was in this ostiak sleigh, in the midst of a bleak desert, that he celebrated the th of february, the day of the opening of the second duma. it was a mockery at russia: here, the representatives of the people, assembled in the quasi-parliament of russia; there, a representative of the revolution that created the duma, hiding like a criminal in a bleak wilderness. did he dream in those long hours of his journey, that some day the wave of the revolution would bring him to the very top? early in spring he arrived abroad. he established his home in vienna where he lived till the outbreak of the great war. his time and energy were devoted to the internal affairs of the social-democratic party and to editing a popular revolutionary magazine which was being smuggled into russia. he earned a meager living by contributing to russian "legal" magazines and dailies. i met him first in , in stuttgart. he seemed to be deeply steeped in the revolutionary factional squabbles. again i met him in copenhagen in . he was the target of bitter criticism for his press-comment on one of the social-democratic factions. he seemed to be dead to anything but the problem of reconciling the bolsheviki with the mensheviki and the other minor divisions. yet that air of importance which distinguished him even from the famous old leaders had, in , become more apparent. by this time he was already a well-known and respected figure in the ranks of international socialism. in the fall of he went into the balkans as a war correspondent. there he learned to know the balkan situation from authentic sources. his revelations of the atrocities committed on both sides attracted wide attention. when he came back to vienna in he was a stronger internationalist and a stronger anti-militarist than ever. his house in vienna was a poor man's house, poorer than that of an ordinary american workingman earning eighteen dollars a week. trotzky has been poor all his life. his three rooms in a vienna working-class suburb contained less furniture than was necessary for comfort. his clothes were too cheap to make him appear "decent" in the eyes of a middle-class viennese. when i visited his house i found mrs. trotzky engaged in housework, while the two light-haired lovely boys were lending not inconsiderable assistance. the only thing that cheered the house were loads of books in every corner, and, perhaps, great though hidden hopes. on august , , the trotzkys, as enemy aliens, had to leave vienna for zurich, switzerland. trotzky's attitude towards the war was a very definite one from the very beginning. he accused german social-democracy for having voted the war credits and thus endorsed the war. he accused the socialist parties of all the belligerent countries for having concluded a truce with their governments which in his opinion was equivalent to supporting militarism. he bitterly deplored the collapse of internationalism as a great calamity for the emancipation of the world. yet, even in those times of distress, he did not remain inactive. he wrote a pamphlet to the german workingmen entitled _the war and internationalism_ (recently translated into english and published in this country under the title _the bolsheviki and world peace_) which was illegally transported into germany and austria by aid of swiss socialists. for this attempt to enlighten the workingmen, one of the german courts tried him in a state of contumacy and sentenced him to imprisonment. he also contributed to a russian socialist daily of internationalist aspirations which was being published by russian exiles in paris. later he moved to paris to be in closer contact with that paper. due to his radical views on the war, however, he was compelled to leave france. he went to spain, but the spanish government, though not at war, did not allow him to stay in that country. he was himself convinced that the hand of the russian foreign ministry was in all his hardships. so it happened that in the winter - , he came to the united states. when i met him here, he looked haggard; he had grown older, and there was fatigue in his expression. his conversation hinged around the collapse of international socialism. he thought it shameful and humiliating that the socialist majorities of the belligerent countries had turned "social-patriots." "if not for the minorities of the socialist parties, the true socialists, it would not be worth while living," he said once with deep sadness. still, he strongly believed in the internationalizing spirit of the war itself, and expected humanity to become more democratic and more sound after cessation of hostilities. his belief in an impending russian revolution was unshaken. similarly unshaken was his mistrust of the russian non-socialist parties. on january , , less than two months before the overthrow of the romanoffs, he wrote in a local russian paper: "whoever thinks critically over the experience of , whoever draws a line from that year to the present day, must conceive how utterly lifeless and ridiculous are the hopes of our social-patriots for a revolutionary coöperation between the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie in russia." his demand for _clarity_ in political affairs had become more pronounced during the war and through the distressing experiences of the war. "there are times," he wrote on february , , "when diplomatic evasiveness, casting glances with one eye to the right, with the other to the left, is considered wisdom. such times are now vanishing before our eyes, and their heroes are losing credit. war, as revolution, puts problems in their clearest form. for war or against war? for national defense or for revolutionary struggle? the fierce times we are living now demand in equal measure both fearlessness of thought and bravery of character." when the russian revolution broke out, it was no surprise for trotzky. he had anticipated it. he had scented it over the thousands of miles that separated him from his country. he did not allow his joy to overmaster him. the march revolution in his opinion was only a beginning. it was only an introduction to a long drawn fight which would end in the establishment of socialism. history seemed to him to have fulfilled what he had predicted in and . the working class was the leading power in the revolution. the soviets became even more powerful than the provisional government. trotzky preached that it was the task of the soviets to become _the_ government of russia. it was his task to go to russia and fight for a labor government, for internationalism, for world peace, for a world revolution. "if the first russian revolution of ," he wrote on march th, "brought about revolutions in asia,--in persia, turkey, china,--the second russian revolution will be the beginning of a momentous social-revolutionary struggle in europe. only this struggle will bring real peace to the blood-drenched world." with these hopes he went to russia,--to forge a socialist russia in the fire of the revolution. whatever may be our opinion of the merits of his policies, the man has remained true to himself. his line has been straight. the proletariat and the revolution the essay _the proletariat and the revolution_ was published at the close of , nearly one year after the beginning of the war with japan. this was a crucial year for the autocratic rulers of russia. it started with patriotic demonstrations, it ended with a series of humiliating defeats on the battlefields and with an unprecedented revival of political activities on the part of the well-to-do classes. the zemstvos (local elective bodies for the care of local affairs) headed by liberal landowners, conducted a vigorous political campaign in favor of a constitutional order. other liberal groups, organizations of professionals (referred to in trotzky's essay as "democrats" and "democratic elements") joined in the movement. the zemstvo leaders called an open convention in petersburg (november th), which demanded civic freedom and a constitution. the "democratic elements" organized public gatherings of a political character under the disguise of private banquets. the liberal press became bolder in its attack on the administration. the government tolerated the movement. prince svyatopolk-mirski, who had succeeded von plehve, the reactionary dictator assassinated in july, , by a revolutionist, had promised "cordial relations" between government and society. in the political jargon, this period of tolerance, lasting from august to the end of the year, was known as the era of "spring." it was a thrilling time, full of political hopes and expectation. yet, strange enough, the working class was silent. the working class had shown great dissatisfaction in and especially in summer, , when scores of thousands in the southwest and in the south went on a political strike. during the whole of , however, there were almost no mass-manifestations on the part of the workingmen. this gave an occasion to many a liberal to scoff at the representatives of the revolutionary parties who built all their tactics on the expectation of a national revolution. to answer those skeptics and to encourage the active members of the social-democratic party, trotzky wrote his essay. its main value, which lends it historic significance, is the clear diagnosis of the political situation. though living abroad, trotzky keenly felt the pulse of the masses, the "pent up revolutionary energy" which was seeking for an outlet. his description of the course of a national revolution, the rôle he attributes to the workingmen, the non-proletarian population of the cities, the educated groups, and the army; his estimation of the influence of the war on the minds of the raw masses; finally, the slogans he puts before the revolution,--all this corresponds exactly to what happened during the stormy year of . reading _the proletariat and the revolution_, the student of russian political life has a feeling as if the essay had been written _after_ the revolution, so closely it follows the course of events. yet, it appeared before january th, , i.e., before the first great onslaught of the petersburg proletariat. trotzky's belief in the revolutionary initiative of the working class could not be expressed in a more lucid manner. the proletariat must not only conduct a revolutionary propaganda. the proletariat itself must move towards a revolution. to move towards a revolution does not necessarily mean to fix a date for an insurrection and to prepare for that day. you never can fix a day and an hour for a revolution. the people have never made a revolution by command. what _can_ be done is, in view of the fatally impending catastrophe, to choose the most appropriate positions, to arm and inspire the masses with a revolutionary slogan, to lead simultaneously all the reserves into the field of battle, to make them practice in the art of fighting, to keep them ready under arms,--and to send an alarm all over the lines when the time has arrived. would that mean a series of exercises only, and not a decisive combat with the enemy forces? would that be mere manoeuvers, and not a street revolution? yes, that would be mere manoeuvers. there is a difference, however, between revolutionary and military manoeuvers. our preparations can turn, at any time and independent of our will, into a real battle which would decide the long drawn revolutionary war. not only can it be so, it _must_ be. this is vouched for by the acuteness of the present political situation which holds in its depths a tremendous amount of revolutionary explosives. at what time mere manoeuvers would turn into a real battle, depends upon the volume and the revolutionary compactness of the masses, upon the atmosphere of popular sympathy which surrounds them and upon the attitude of the troops which the government moves against the people. those three elements of success must determine our work of preparation. revolutionary proletarian masses _are_ in existence. we ought to be able to call them into the streets, at a given time, all over the country; we ought to be able to unite them by a general slogan. all classes and groups of the people are permeated with hatred towards absolutism, and that means with sympathy for the struggle for freedom. we ought to be able to concentrate this sympathy on the proletariat as a revolutionary power which alone can be the vanguard of the people in their fight to save the future of russia. as to the mood of the army, it hardly kindles the heart of the government with great hopes. there has been many an alarming symptom for the last few years; the army is morose, the army grumbles, there are ferments of dissatisfaction in the army. we ought to do all at our command to make the army detach itself from absolutism at the time of a decisive onslaught of the masses. let us first survey the last two conditions, which determine the course and the outcome of the campaign. we have just gone through the period of "political renovation" opened under the blare of trumpets and closed under the hiss of knouts,--the era of svyatopolk-mirski--the result of which is hatred towards absolutism aroused among all the thinking elements of society to an unusual pitch. the coming days will reap the fruit of stirred popular hopes and unfulfilled government's pledges. political interest has lately taken more definite shape; dissatisfaction has grown deeper and is founded on a more outspoken theoretical basis. popular thinking, yesterday utterly primitive, now greedily takes to the work of political analysis. all manifestations of evil and arbitrary power are being speedily traced back to the principal cause. revolutionary slogans no more frighten the people; on the contrary, they arouse a thousandfold echo, they pass into proverbs. the popular consciousness absorbs each word of negation, condemnation or curse addressed towards absolutism, as a sponge absorbs fluid substance. no step of the administration remains unpunished. each of its blunders is carefully taken account of. its advances are met with ridicule, its threats breed hatred. the vast apparatus of the liberal press circulates daily thousands of facts, stirring, exciting, inflaming popular emotion. the pent up feelings are seeking an outlet. thought strives to turn into action. the vociferous liberal press, however, while feeding popular unrest, tends to divert its current into a small channel; it spreads superstitious reverence for "public opinion," helpless, unorganized "public opinion," which does not discharge itself into action; it brands the revolutionary method of national emancipation; it upholds the illusion of legality; it centers all the attention and all the hopes of the embittered groups around the zemstvo campaign, thus systematically preparing a great debacle for the popular movement. acute dissatisfaction, finding no outlet, discouraged by the inevitable failure of the legal zemstvo campaign which has no traditions of revolutionary struggle in the past and no clear prospects in the future, must necessarily manifest itself in an outbreak of desperate terrorism, leaving radical intellectuals in the rôle of helpless, passive, though sympathetic onlookers, leaving liberals to choke in a fit of platonic enthusiasm while lending doubtful assistance. this ought not to take place. we ought to take hold of the current of popular excitement; we ought to turn the attention of numerous dissatisfied social groups to one colossal undertaking headed by the proletariat,--to the _national revolution_. the vanguard of the revolution ought to wake from indolence all other elements of the people; to appear here and there and everywhere; to put the questions of political struggle in the boldest possible fashion; to call, to castigate, to unmask hypocritical democracy; to make democrats and zemstvo liberals clash against each other; to wake again and again, to call, to castigate, to demand a clear answer to the question, _what are you going to do?_ to allow no retreat; to compel the legal liberals to admit their own weakness; to alienate from them the democratic elements and help the latter along the way of the revolution. to do this work means to draw the threads of sympathy of all the democratic opposition towards the revolutionary campaign of the proletariat. we ought to do all in our power to draw the attention and gain the sympathy of the poor non-proletarian city population. during the last mass actions of the proletariat, as in the general strikes of in the south, nothing was done in this respect, and this was the weakest point of the preparatory work. according to press correspondents, the queerest rumors often circulated among the population as to the intentions of the strikers. the city inhabitants expected attacks on their houses, the store keepers were afraid of being looted, the jews were in a dread of pogroms. this ought to be avoided. _a political strike, as a single combat of the city proletariat with the police and the army, the remaining population being hostile or even indifferent, is doomed to failure._ the indifference of the population would tell primarily on the morale of the proletariat itself, and then on the attitude of the soldiers. under such conditions, the stand of the administration must necessarily be more determined. the generals would remind the officers, and the officers would pass to the soldiers the words of dragomirov: "rifles are given for sharp shooting, and nobody is permitted to squander cartridges for nothing." _a political strike of the proletariat ought to turn into a political demonstration of the population_, this is the first prerequisite of success. the second important prerequisite is the mood of the army. a dissatisfaction among the soldiers, a vague sympathy for the "revoluters," is an established fact. only part of this sympathy may rightly be attributed to our direct propaganda among the soldiers. the major part is done by the practical clashes between army units and protesting masses. only hopeless idiots or avowed scoundrels dare to shoot at a living target. an overwhelming majority of the soldiers are loathe to serve as executioners; this is unanimously admitted by all correspondents describing the battles of the army with unarmed people. the average soldier aims above the heads of the crowd. it would be unnatural if the reverse were the case. when the bessarabian regiment received orders to quell the kiev general strike, the commander declared he could not vouch for the attitude of his soldiers. the order, then, was sent to the cherson regiment, but there was not one half-company in the entire regiment which would live up to the expectations of their superiors. kiev was no exception. the conditions of the army must now be more favorable for the revolution than they were in . we have gone through a year of war. it is hardly possible to measure the influence of the past year on the minds of the army. the influence, however, must be enormous. war draws not only the attention of the people, it arouses also the professional interest of the army. our ships are slow, our guns have a short range, our soldiers are uneducated, our sergeants have neither compass nor map, our soldiers are bare-footed, hungry, and freezing, our red cross is stealing, our commissariat is stealing,--rumors and facts of this kind leak down to the army and are being eagerly absorbed. each rumor, as strong acid, dissolves the rust of mental drill. years of peaceful propaganda could hardly equal in their results one day of warfare. the mere mechanism of discipline remains, the faith, however, the conviction that it is right to carry out orders, the belief that the present conditions can be continued, are rapidly dwindling. the less faith the army has in absolutism, the more faith it has in its foes. we ought to make use of this situation. we ought to explain to the soldiers the meaning of the workingmen's action which is being prepared by the party. we ought to make profuse use of the slogan which is bound to unite the army with the revolutionary people, _away with the war!_ we ought to create a situation where the officers would not be able to trust their soldiers at the crucial moment. this would reflect on the attitude of the officers themselves. the rest will be done by the street. it will dissolve the remnants of the barrack-hypnosis in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people. the main factor, however, remain the revolutionary masses. true it is that during the war the most advanced elements of the masses, the thinking proletariat, have not stepped openly to the front with that degree of determination which was required by the critical historic moment. yet it would manifest a lack of political backbone and a deplorable superficiality, should one draw from this fact any kind of pessimistic conclusions. the war has fallen upon our public life with all its colossal weight. the dreadful monster, breathing blood and fire, loomed up on the political horizon, shutting out everything, sinking its steel clutches into the body of the people, inflicting wound upon wound, causing mortal pain, which for a moment makes it even impossible to ask for the causes of the pain. the war, as every great disaster, accompanied by crisis, unemployment, mobilization, hunger and death, stunned the people, caused despair, but not protest. this is, however, only a beginning. raw masses of the people, silent social strata, which yesterday had no connection with the revolutionary elements, were knocked by sheer mechanical power of facts to face the central event of present-day russia, the war. they were horrified, they could not catch their breaths. the revolutionary elements, who prior to the war had ignored the passive masses, were affected by the atmosphere of despair and concentrated horror. this atmosphere enveloped them, it pressed with a leaden weight on their minds. the voice of determined protest could hardly be raised in the midst of elemental suffering. the revolutionary proletariat which had not yet recovered from the wounds received in july, , was powerless to oppose the "call of the primitive." the year of war, however, passed not without results. masses, yesterday primitive, to-day are confronted with the most tremendous events. they must seek to understand them. the very duration of the war has produced a desire for reasoning, for questioning as to the meaning of it all. thus the war, while hampering for a period of time the revolutionary initiative of thousands, has awakened to life the political thought of millions. the year of war passed not without results, not a single day passed without results. in the lower strata of the people, in the very depths of the masses, a work was going on, a movement of molecules, imperceptible, yet irresistible, incessant, a work of accumulating indignation, bitterness, revolutionary energy. the atmosphere our streets are breathing now is no longer an atmosphere of blank despair, it is an atmosphere of concentrated indignation which seeks for means and ways for revolutionary action. each expedient action of the vanguard of our working masses would now carry away with it not only all our revolutionary reserves, but also thousands and hundreds of thousands of revolutionary recruits. this mobilization, unlike the mobilization of the government, would be carried out in the presence of general sympathy and active assistance of an overwhelming majority of the population. in the presence of strong sympathies of the masses, in the presence of active assistance on the part of the democratic elements of the people; facing a government commonly hated, unsuccessful both in big and in small undertakings, a government defeated on the seas, defeated in the fields of battle, despised, discouraged, with no faith in the coming day, a government vainly struggling, currying favor, provoking and retreating, lying and suffering exposure, insolent and frightened; facing an army whose morale has been shattered by the entire course of the war, whose valor, energy, enthusiasm and heroism have met an insurmountable wall in the form of administrative anarchy, an army which has lost faith in the unshakable security of a régime it is called to serve, a dissatisfied, grumbling army which more than once has torn itself free from the clutches of discipline during the last year and which is eagerly listening to the roar of revolutionary voices,--such will be the conditions under which the revolutionary proletariat will walk out into the streets. it seems to us that no better conditions could have been created by history for a final attack. history has done everything it was allowed by elemental wisdom. the thinking revolutionary forces of the country have to do the rest. a tremendous amount of revolutionary energy has been accumulated. it should not vanish with no avail, it should not be dissipated in scattered engagements and clashes, with no coherence and no definite plan. all efforts ought to be made to concentrate the bitterness, the anger, the protest, the rage, the hatred of the masses, to give those emotions a common language, a common goal, to unite, to solidify all the particles of the masses, to make them feel and understand that they are not isolated, that simultaneously, with the same slogan on the banner, with the same goal in mind, innumerable particles are rising everywhere. if this understanding is achieved, half of the revolution is done. we have got to summon all revolutionary forces to simultaneous action. how can we do it? first of all we ought to remember that the main scene of revolutionary events is bound to be the city. nobody is likely to deny this. it is evident, further, that street demonstrations can turn into a popular revolution only when they are a manifestation of _masses_, i.e., when they embrace, in the first place, the workers of factories and plants. to make the workers quit their machines and stands; to make them walk out of the factory premises into the street; to lead them to the neighboring plant; to proclaim there a cessation of work; to make new masses walk out into the street; to go thus from factory to factory, from plant to plant, incessantly growing in numbers, sweeping police barriers, absorbing new masses that happened to come across, crowding the streets, taking possession of buildings suitable for popular meetings, fortifying those buildings, holding continuous revolutionary meetings with audiences coming and going, bringing order into the movements of the masses, arousing their spirit, explaining to them the aim and the meaning of what is going on; to turn, finally, the entire city into one revolutionary camp, this is, broadly speaking, the plan of action. the starting point ought to be the factories and plants. that means that street manifestations of a serious character, fraught with decisive events, ought to begin with _political strikes of the masses_. it is easier to fix a date for a strike, than for a demonstration of the people, just as it is easier to move masses ready for action than to organize new masses. a political strike, however, not a _local, but a general political strike all over russia_,--ought to have a general political slogan. this slogan is: _to stop the war and to call a national constituent assembly_. this demand ought to become nation-wide, and herein lies the task for our propaganda preceding the all-russian general strike. we ought to use all possible occasions to make the idea of a national constituent assembly popular among the people. without losing one moment, we ought to put into operation all the technical means and all the powers of propaganda at our disposal. proclamations and speeches, educational circles and mass-meetings ought to carry broadcast, to propound and to explain the demand of a constituent assembly. there ought to be not one man in a city who should not know that his demand is: a national constituent assembly. the peasants ought to be called to assemble on the day of the political strike and to pass resolutions demanding the calling of a constituent assembly. the suburban peasants ought to be called into the cities to participate in the street movements of the masses gathered under the banner of a constituent assembly. all societies and organizations, professional and learned bodies, organs of self-government and organs of the opposition press ought to be notified in advance by the workingmen that they are preparing for an all-russian political strike, fixed for a certain date, to bring about the calling of a constituent assembly. the workingmen ought to demand from all societies and corporations that, on the day appointed for the mass-manifestation, they should join in the demand of a national constituent assembly. the workingmen ought to demand from the opposition press that it should popularize their slogan and that on the eve of the demonstration it should print an appeal to the population to join the proletarian manifestation under the banner of a national constituent assembly. we ought to carry on the most intensive propaganda in the army in order that on the day of the strike each soldier, sent to curb the "rebels," should know that he is facing the people who are demanding a national constituent assembly. explanatory notes "_the hiss of the knout_" which ended the era of "cordial relations" was a statement issued by the government on december , , declaring that "all disturbances of peace and order and all gatherings of an anti-governmental character must and will be stopped by all legal means in command of the authorities." the zemstvo and municipal bodies were advised to keep from political utterings. as to the socialist parties, and to labor movement in general, they were prosecuted under svyatopolk-mirski as severely as under von plehve. "_the vast apparatus of the liberal press_" was the only way to reach millions. the revolutionary "underground" press, which assumed towards unusual proportions, could, after all, reach only a limited number of readers. in times of political unrest, the public became used to read between the lines of the legal press all it needed to feed its hatred of oppression. by "_legal_" _press_, "_legal_" _liberals_ are meant the open public press and those liberals who were trying to comply with the legal requirements of absolutism even in their work of condemning the absolutist order. the term "legal" is opposed by the term "revolutionary" which is applied to political actions in defiance of law. _dragomirov_ was for many years commander of the kiev military region and known by his epigrammatic style. the events in petersburg this is an essay of triumph. written on january , , eleven days after the "bloody sunday," it gave vent to the enthusiastic feelings of every true revolutionist aroused by unmistakable signs of an approaching storm. the march of tens of thousands of workingmen to the winter palace to submit to the "little father" a petition asking for "bread and freedom," was on the surface a peaceful and loyal undertaking. yet it breathed indignation and revolt. the slaughter of peaceful marchers (of whom over , were killed or wounded) and the following wave of hatred and revolutionary determination among the masses, marked the beginning of broad revolutionary uprisings. for trotzky, the awakening of the masses to political activity was not only a good revolutionary omen, but also a defeat of liberal ideology and liberal tactics. those tactics had been planned under the assumption that the russian people were not ripe for a revolution. trotzky, a thorough revolutionist, _saw_ in the liberal movement a manifestation of political superstitions. to him, the _only_ way to overthrow absolutism was the way of a violent revolution. yet, when the liberals proudly asserted that the revolutionary masses of russia were only a creation of the overheated phantasy of the revolutionists, while the movement of the well-to-do intelligent elements was a flagrant fact, the social-democrats had no material proofs to the contrary, except sporadic outbursts of unrest among the workingmen and, of course, the conviction of those revolutionists who were in touch with the masses. it is, therefore, easy to understand the triumph of a trotzky or any other socialist after january th. in trotzky's opinion, the th of january had put liberalism into the archives. "we are done with it for the entire period of the revolution," he exclaims. the most remarkable part of this essay, as far as political vision is concerned, is trotzky's prediction that the left wing of the "osvoboshdenie" liberals (later organized as the constitutional democratic party) would attempt to become leaders of the revolutionary masses and to "tame" them. the liberals did not fail to make the attempt in and , but with no success whatever. neither did social-democracy, however, completely succeed in leading the masses all through the revolution, in the manner outlined by trotzky in this essay. true, the social-democrats were the party that gained the greatest influence over the workingmen in the stormy year of ; their slogans were universally accepted by the masses; their members were everywhere among the first ranks of revolutionary forces; yet events developed too rapidly and spontaneously to make the leadership of a political organization possible. how invincibly eloquent are facts! how utterly powerless are words! the masses have made themselves heard! they have kindled revolutionary flames on caucasian hill-tops; they have clashed, breast against breast, with the guards' regiments and the cossacks on that unforgettable day of january ninth; they have filled the streets and squares of industrial cities with the noise and clatter of their fights.... the revolutionary masses are no more a theory, they are a fact. for the social-democratic party there is nothing new in this fact. we had predicted it long ago. we had seen its coming at a time when the noisy liberal banquets seemed to form a striking contrast with the political silence of the people. _the revolutionary masses are a fact_, was our assertion. the clever liberals shrugged their shoulders in contempt. those gentlemen think themselves sober realists solely because they are unable to grasp the consequences of great causes, because they make it their business to be humble servants of each ephemeral political fact. they think themselves sober statesmen in spite of the fact that history mocks at their wisdom, tearing to pieces their school books, making to naught their designs, and magnificently laughing at their pompous predictions. "_there are no revolutionary people in russia as yet._" "_the russian workingman is backward in culture, in self-respect, and (we refer primarily to the workingmen of petersburg and moscow) he is not yet prepared for organized social and political struggle._" thus mr. struve wrote in his _osvoboshdenie_. he wrote it on january th, . two days later the proletariat of petersburg arose. "_there are no revolutionary people in russia as yet._" these words ought to have been engraved on the forehead of mr. struve were it not that mr. struve's forehead already resembles a tombstone under which so many plans, slogans, and ideas have been buried,--socialist, liberal, "patriotic," revolutionary, monarchic, democratic and other ideas, all of them calculated not to run too far ahead and all of them hopelessly dragging behind. "_there are no revolutionary people in russia as yet_," so it was declared through the mouth of _osvoboshdenie_ by russian liberalism which in the course of three months had succeeded in convincing itself that liberalism was the main figure on the political stage and that its program and tactics would determine the future of russia. before this declaration had reached its readers, the wires carried into the remotest corners of the world the great message of the beginning of a national revolution in russia. yes, the revolution has begun. we had hoped for it, we had had no doubt about it. for long years, however, it had been to us a mere deduction from our "doctrine," which all nonentities of all political denominations had mocked at. they never believed in the revolutionary rôle of the proletariat, yet they believed in the power of zemstvo petitions, in witte, in "blocs" combining naughts with naughts, in svyatopolk-mirski, in a stick of dynamite.... there was no political superstition they did not believe in. only the belief in the proletariat to them was a superstition. history, however, does not question political oracles, and the revolutionary people do not need a passport from political eunuchs. the revolution has come. one move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, up which in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardships and fatigue. the revolution has come and destroyed the plans of so many politicians who had dared to make their little political calculations with no regard for the master, the revolutionary people. the revolution has come and destroyed scores of superstitions, and has manifested the power of the program which is founded on the revolutionary logic of the development of the masses. the revolution has come, and the period of our political infancy has passed. down to the archives went our traditional liberalism whose only resource was the belief in a lucky change of administrative figures. its period of bloom was the stupid reign of svyatopolk-mirski. its ripest fruit was the ukase of december th. but now, january ninth has come and effaced the "spring," and has put military dictatorship in its place, and has promoted to the rank of governor-general of petersburg the same trepov, who just before had been pulled down from the post of moscow chief of police by the same liberal opposition. that liberalism which did not care to know about the revolution, which hatched plots behind the scenes, which ignored the masses, which counted only on its diplomatic genius, has been swept away. _we are done with it for the entire period of the revolution._ the liberals of the left wing will now follow the people. they will soon attempt to take the people into their own hands. the people are a power. one must _master_ them. but they are, too, a _revolutionary_ power. one, therefore, must _tame_ them. this is, evidently, the future tactics of the _osvoboshdenie_ group. our fight for a revolution, our preparatory work for the revolution must also be our merciless fight against liberalism for influence over the masses, for a leading rôle in the revolution. in this fight we shall be supported by a great power, the very logic of the revolution! the revolution has come. the _forms_ taken by the uprising of january th could not have been foreseen. a revolutionary priest, in perplexing manner placed by history at the head of the working masses for several days, lent the events the stamp of his personality, his conceptions, his rank. this form may mislead many an observer as to the real substance of the events. the actual meaning of the events, however, is just that which social-democracy foresaw. the central figure is the proletariat. the workingmen start a strike, they unite, they formulate political demands, they walk out into the streets, they win the enthusiastic sympathy of the entire population, they engage in battles with the army.... the hero, gapon, has not created the revolutionary energy of the petersburg workingmen, he only unloosed it. he found thousands of thinking workingmen and tens of thousands of others in a state of political agitation. he formed a plan which united all those masses--for the period of one day. the masses went to speak to the tzar. they were faced by ulans, cossacks, guards. gapon's plan had not prepared the workingmen for that. what was the result? they seized arms wherever they could, they built barricades.... they fought, though, apparently, they went to beg for mercy. this shows that they went _not to beg, but to demand_. the proletariat of petersburg manifested a degree of political alertness and revolutionary energy far exceeding the limits of the plan laid out by a casual leader. gapon's plan contained many elements of revolutionary romanticism. on january th, the plan collapsed. yet the revolutionary proletariat of petersburg is no romanticism, it is a living reality. so is the proletariat of other cities. an enormous wave is rolling over russia. it has not yet quieted down. one shock, and the proletarian crater will begin to erupt torrents of revolutionary lava. the proletariat has arisen. it has chosen an incidental pretext and a casual leader--a self-sacrificing priest. that seemed enough to start with. it was not enough to _win_. _victory_ demands not a romantic method based on an illusory plan, but revolutionary tactics. _a simultaneous action of the proletariat of all russia must be prepared._ this is the first condition. no local demonstration has a serious political significance any longer. after the petersburg uprising, only an all-russian uprising should take place. scattered outbursts would only consume the precious revolutionary energy with no results. wherever spontaneous outbursts occur, as a late echo of the petersburg uprising, _they must be made use of to revolutionize and to solidify the masses, to popularize among them the idea of an all-russian uprising_ as a task of the approaching months, perhaps only weeks. this is not the place to discuss the technique of a popular uprising. the questions of revolutionary technique can be solved only in a practical way, under the live pressure of struggle and under constant communication with the active members of the party. there is no doubt, however, that the technical problems of organizing a popular uprising assume at present tremendous importance. those problems demand the collective attention of the party. [trotzky then proceeds to discuss the question of armament, arsenals, clashes with army units, barricades, etc. then he continues:] as stated before, these questions ought to be solved by local organizations. of course, this is only a minor task as compared with the political leadership of the masses. yet, this task is most essential for the political leadership itself. the organization of the revolution becomes at present the axis of the political leadership of revolting masses. what are the requirements for this leadership? a few very simple things: freedom from routine in matters of organization; freedom from miserable traditions of underground conspiracy; a broad view; courageous initiative; ability to gauge situations; courageous initiative once more. the events of january th have given us a revolutionary beginning. we must never fall below this. we must make this our starting point in moving the revolution forward. we must imbue our work of propaganda and organization with the political ideas and revolutionary aspirations of the uprising of the petersburg workers. the russian revolution has approached its climax--a national uprising. the organization of this uprising, which would determine the fate of the entire revolution, becomes the day's task for our party. no one can accomplish it, but we. priest gapon could appear only once. he cherished extraordinary illusions, that is why he could do what he has done. yet he could remain at the head of the masses for a brief period only. the memory of george gapon will always be dear to the revolutionary proletariat. yet his memory will be that of a hero who opened the sluices of the revolutionary torrent. should a new figure step to the front now, equal to gapon in energy, revolutionary enthusiasm and power of political illusions, his arrival would be too late. what was great in george gapon may now look ridiculous. there is no room for a second george gapon, as the thing now needed is not an illusion, but clear revolutionary thinking, a decisive plan of action, a flexible revolutionary organization which would be able to give the masses a slogan, to lead them into the field of battle, to launch an attack all along the line and bring the revolution to a victorious conclusion. such an organization can be the work of social-democracy only. no other party is able to create it. no other party can give the masses a revolutionary slogan, as no one outside our party has freed himself from all considerations not pertaining to the interests of the revolution. no other party, but social-democracy, is able to organize the action of the masses, as no one but our party is closely connected with the masses. our party has committed many errors, blunders, almost crimes. it wavered, evaded, hesitated, it showed inertia and lack of pluck. at times it hampered the revolutionary movement. _however, there is no revolutionary party but the social-democratic party!_ our organizations are imperfect. our connections with the masses are insufficient. our technique is primitive. _yet, there is no party connected with the masses but the social-democratic party!_ at the head of the revolution is the proletariat. at the head of the proletariat is social-democracy! let us exert all our power, comrades! let us put all our energy and all our passion into this. let us not forget for a moment the great responsibility vested in our party: a responsibility before the russian revolution and in the sight of international socialism. the proletariat of the entire world looks to us with expectation. broad vistas are being opened for humanity by a victorious russian revolution. comrades, let us do our duty! let us close our ranks, comrades! let us unite, and unite the masses! let us prepare, and prepare the masses for the day of decisive actions! let us overlook nothing. let us leave no power unused for the cause. brave, honest, harmoniously united, we shall march forward, linked by unbreakable bonds, brothers in the revolution! explanatory notes _osvoboshdenie_ (_emancipation_) was the name of a liberal magazine published in stuttgart, germany, and smuggled into russia to be distributed among the zemstvo-liberals and other progressive elements grouped about the zemstvo-organization. the _osvoboshdenie_ advocated a constitutional monarchy; it was, however, opposed to revolutionary methods. _peter struve_, first a socialist, then a liberal, was the editor of the _osvoboshdenie_. struve is an economist and one of the leading liberal journalists in russia. _zemstvo-petitions_, accepted in form of resolutions at the meetings of the liberal zemstvo bodies and forwarded to the central government, were one of the means the liberals used in their struggle for a constitution. the petitions, worded in a very moderate language, demanded the abolition of "lawlessness" on the part of the administration and the introduction of a "legal order," i.e., a constitution. _sergius witte_, minister of finance in the closing years of the th century and up to the revolution of , was known as a bureaucrat of a liberal brand. _the ukase of december th, _, was an answer of the government to the persistent political demands of the "spring" time. the ukase promised a number of insignificant bureaucratic reforms, not even mentioning a popular representation and threatening increased punishments for "disturbances of peace and order." _trepov_ was one of the most hated bureaucrats, a devoted pupil of von plehve's in the work of drowning revolutionary movements in blood. _george gapon_ was the priest who organized the march of january th. trotzky's admiration for the heroism of gapon was originally shared by many revolutionists. later it became known that gapon played a dubious rôle as a friend of labor, and an agent of the government. _the_ "_political illusions_" of george gapon, referred to in this essay, was his assumption that the tzar was a loving father to his people. gapon hoped to reach the emperor of all the russias and to make him "receive the workingmen's petition from hand to hand." prospects of a labor dictatorship this is, perhaps, the most remarkable piece of political writing the revolution has produced. written early in , after the great upheavals of the fall of , at a time when the russian revolution was obviously going down hill, and autocracy, after a moment of relaxation, was increasing its deadly grip over the country, the essays under the name _sum total and prospectives_ (which we have here changed into a more comprehensible name, _prospects of labor dictatorship_) aroused more amazement than admiration. they seemed so entirely out of place. they ignored the liberal parties as quite negligible quantities. they ignored the creation of the duma to which the constitutional democrats attached so much importance as a place where democracy would fight the battles of the people and win. they ignored the very fact that the vanguard of the revolution, the industrial proletariat, was beaten, disorganized, downhearted, tired out. the essays met with opposition on the part of leading social-democratic thinkers of both the bolsheviki and mensheviki factions. the essays seemed to be more an expression of trotzky's revolutionary ardor, of his unshakable faith in the future of the russian revolution, than a reflection of political realities. it was known that he wrote them within prison walls. should not the very fact of his imprisonment have convinced him that in drawing a picture of labor dictatorship he was only dreaming? history has shown that it was not a dream. whatever our attitude towards the course of events in the revolution may be, we must admit that, in the main, this course has taken the direction predicted in trotzky's essays. there is a labor dictatorship now in russia. it is a _labor_ dictatorship, not a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants." the liberal and radical parties have lost influence. the labor government has put collective ownership and collective management of industries on the order of the day. the labor government has not hesitated in declaring russia to be ready for a socialist revolution. it was compelled to do so under the pressure of revolutionary proletarian masses. the russian army has been dissolved in the armed people. the russian revolution has called the workingmen of the world to make a social revolution. all this had been outlined by trotzky twelve years ago. when one reads this series of essays, one has the feeling that they were written not in the course of the first russian upheaval (the essays appeared in as part of a book by trotzky, entitled _our revolution_, petersburg, n. glagoleff, publisher) but as if they were discussing problems of the present situation. this, more than anything else, shows the _continuity_ of the revolution. the great overthrow of was completed by the same political and social forces that had met and learned to know each other in the storms of and . the ideology of the various groups and parties had hardly changed. even the leaders of the major parties were, in the main, the same persons. of course, the international situation was different. but even the possibility of a european war and its consequences had been foreseen by trotzky in his essays. twelve years ago those essays seemed to picture an imaginary world. to-day they seem to tell the history of the russian revolution. we may agree or disagree with trotzky, the leader, nobody can deny the power and clarity of his political vision. * * * * * in the _first_ chapter, entitled "peculiarities of our historic development," the author gives a broad outline of the growth of absolutism in russia. development of social forms in russia, he says, was slow and primitive. our social life was constructed on an archaic and meager economic foundation. yet, russia did not lead an isolated life. russia was under constant pressure of higher politico-economical organisms,--the neighboring western states. the russian state, in its struggle for existence, outgrew its economic basis. historic development in russia, therefore, was taking place under a terrific straining of national economic forces. the state absorbed the major part of the national economic surplus and also part of the product necessary for the maintenance of the people. the state thus undermined its own foundation. on the other hand, to secure the means indispensable for its growth, the state forced economic development by bureaucratic measures. ever since the end of the seventeenth century, the state was most anxious to develop industries in russia. "new trades, machines, factories, production on a large scale, capital, appear from a certain angle to be an artificial graft on the original economic trunk of the people. similarly, russian science may appear from the same angle to be an artificial graft on the natural trunk of national ignorance." this, however, is a wrong conception. the russian state could not have created something out of nothing. state action only accelerated the processes of natural evolution of economic life. state measures that were in contradiction to those processes were doomed to failure. still, the rôle of the state in economic life was enormous. when social development reached the stage where the bourgeoisie classes began to experience a desire for political institutions of a western type, russian autocracy was fully equipped with all the material power of a modern european state. it had at its command a centralized bureaucratic machinery, incapable of regulating modern relations, yet strong enough to do the work of oppression. it was in a position to overcome distance by means of the telegraph and railroads,--a thing unknown to the pre-revolutionary autocracies in europe. it had a colossal army, incompetent in wars with foreign enemies, yet strong enough to maintain the authority of the state in internal affairs. based on its military and fiscal apparatus, absorbing the major part of the country's resources, the government increased its annual budget to an enormous amount of two billions of rubles, it made the stock-exchange of europe its treasury and the russian tax-payer a slave to european high finance. gradually, the russian state became an end in itself. it evolved into a power independent of society. it left unsatisfied the most elementary wants of the people. it was unable even to defend the safety of the country against foreign foes. yet, it seemed strong, powerful, invincible. it inspired awe. it became evident that the russian state would never grant reforms of its own free will. as years passed, the conflict between absolutism and the requirements of economic and cultural progress became ever more acute. there was only one way to solve the problem: "to accumulate enough steam inside the iron kettle of absolutism to burst the kettle." this was the way outlined by the marxists long ago. marxism was the only doctrine that had correctly predicted the course of development in russia. * * * * * in the _second_ chapter, "city and capital," trotzky attempts a theoretical explanation to the weakness of the middle-class in russia. russia of the eighteenth, and even of the major part of the nineteenth, century, he writes, was marked by an absence of cities as industrial centers. our big cities were administrative rather than industrial centers. our primitive industries were scattered in the villages, auxiliary occupations of the peasant farmers. even the population of our so called "cities," in former generations maintained itself largely by agriculture. russian cities never contained a prosperous, efficient and self-assured class of artisans--that real foundation of the european middle class which in the course of revolutions against absolutism identified itself with the "people." when modern capitalism, aided by absolutism, appeared on the scene of russia and turned large villages into modern industrial centers almost over night, it had no middle-class to build on. in russian cities, therefore, the influence of the bourgeoisie is far less than in western europe. russian cities practically contain great numbers of workingmen and small groups of capitalists. moreover, the specific political weight of the russian proletariat is larger than that of the capital employed in russia, because the latter is to a great extent _imported_ capital. thus, while a large proportion of the capital operating in russia exerts its political influence in the parliaments of belgium or france, the working class employed by the same capital exert their entire influence in the political life of russia. as a result of these peculiar historic developments, the russian proletariat, recruited from the pauperized peasant and ruined rural artisans, has accumulated in the new cities in very great numbers, "and nothing stood between the workingmen and absolutism but a small class of capitalists, separated from the 'people' (i.e., the middle-class in the european sense of the word), half foreign in its derivation, devoid of historic traditions, animated solely by a hunger for profits." chapter iii - - history does not repeat itself. you are free to compare the russian revolution with the great french revolution, yet this would not make the former resemble the latter. the nineteenth century passed not in vain. already the year of is widely different from . as compared with the great revolution, the revolutions in prussia or austria appear amazingly small. from one viewpoint, the revolutions of came too early; from another, too late. that gigantic exertion of power which is necessary for the bourgeois society to get completely square with the masters of the past, can be achieved either through powerful _unity_ of an entire nation arousing against feudal despotism, or through a powerful development of _class struggle_ within a nation striving for freedom. in the first case--of which a classic example are the years - ,--the national energy, compressed by the terrific resistance of the old régime, was spent entirely in the struggle against reaction. in the second case--which has never appeared in history as yet, and which is treated here as hypothetical--the actual energy necessary for a victory over the black forces of history is being developed within the bourgeois nation through "civil war" between classes. fierce internal friction characterizes the latter case. it absorbs enormous quantities of energy, prevents the bourgeoisie from playing a leading rôle, pushes its antagonist, the proletariat, to the front, gives the workingman decades' experience in a month, makes them the central figures in political struggles, and puts very tight reins into their hands. strong, determined, knowing no doubts, the proletariat gives events a powerful twist. thus, it is either--or. either a nation gathered into one compact whole, as a lion ready to leap; or a nation completely divided in the process of internal struggles, a nation that has released her best part for a task which the whole was unable to complete. such are the two polar types, whose purest forms, however, can be found only in logical contraposition. here, as in many other cases, the middle road is the worst. this was the case in . in the french revolution we see an active, enlightened bourgeoisie, not yet aware of the contradictions of its situation; entrusted by history with the task of leadership in the struggle for a new order; fighting not only against the archaic institutions of france, but also against the forces of reaction throughout europe. the bourgeoisie consciously, in the person of its various factions, assumes the leadership of the nation, it lures the masses into struggle, it coins slogans, it dictates revolutionary tactics. democracy unites the nation in one political ideology. the people--small artisans, petty merchants, peasants, and workingmen--elect bourgeois as their representatives; the mandates of the communities are framed in the language of the bourgeoisie which becomes aware of its messianic rôle. antagonisms do not fail to reveal themselves in the course of the revolution, yet the powerful momentum of the revolution removes one by one the most unresponsive elements of the bourgeoisie. each stratum is torn off, but not before it has given over all its energy to the following one. the nation as a whole continues to fight with ever increasing persistence and determination. when the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie tears itself away from the main body of the nation to form an alliance with louis xvi, the democratic demands of the nation turn _against_ this part of the bourgeoisie, leading to universal suffrage and a republican government as logically consequent forms of democracy. the great french revolution is a true national revolution. it is more than that. it is a classic manifestation, on a national scale, of the world-wide struggle of the bourgeois order for supremacy, for power, for unmitigated triumph. in , the bourgeoisie was no more capable of a similar rôle. it did not want, it did not dare take the responsibility for a revolutionary liquidation of a political order that stood in its way. the reason is clear. the task of the bourgeoisie--of which it was fully aware--was not to secure its _own_ political supremacy, but to secure for itself _a share_ in the political power of the old régime. the bourgeoisie of , niggardly wise with the experience of the french bourgeoisie, was vitiated by its treachery, frightened by its failures. it did not lead the masses to storm the citadels of the absolutist order. on the contrary, with its back against the absolutist order, it resisted the onslaught of the masses that were pushing it forward. the french bourgeoisie made its revolution great. its consciousness was the consciousness of the people, and no idea found its expression in institutions without having gone through its consciousness as an end, as a task of political construction. it often resorted to theatrical poses to conceal from itself the limitations of its bourgeois world,--yet it marched forward. the german bourgeoisie, on the contrary, was not doing the revolutionary work; it was "doing away" with the revolution from the very start. its consciousness revolted against the objective conditions of its supremacy. the revolution could be completed not by the bourgeoisie, but against it. democratic institutions seemed to the mind of the german bourgeois not an aim for his struggle, but a menace to his security. another class was required in , a class capable of conducting the revolution beside the bourgeoisie and in spite of it, a class not only ready and able to push the bourgeoisie forward, but also to step over its political corpse, should events so demand. none of the other classes, however, was ready for the job. _the petty middle class_ were hostile not only to the past, but also to the future. they were still entangled in the meshes of medieval relations, and they were unable to withstand the oncoming "free" industry; they were still giving the cities their stamp, and they were already giving way to the influences of big capital. steeped in prejudices, stunned by the clatter of events, exploiting and being exploited, greedy and helpless in their greed, they could not become leaders in matters of world-wide importance. still less were the _peasants_ capable of political initiative. scattered over the country, far from the nervous centers of politics and culture, limited in their views, the peasants could have no great part in the struggles for a new order. the _democratic intellectuals_ possessed no social weight; they either dragged along behind their elder sister, the liberal bourgeoisie, as its political tail, or they separated themselves from the bourgeoisie in critical moments only to show their weakness. _the industrial workingmen_ were too weak, unorganized, devoid of experience and knowledge. the capitalist development had gone far enough to make the abolition of old feudal relations imperative, yet it had not gone far enough to make the working class, the product of new economic relations, a decisive political factor. antagonism between bourgeoisie and proletariat, even within the national boundaries of germany, was sharp enough to prevent the bourgeoisie from stepping to the front to assume national hegemony in the revolution, yet it was not sharp enough to allow the proletariat to become a national leader. true, the internal frictions of the revolution had prepared the workingmen for political independence, yet they weakened the energy and the unity of the revolution and they caused a great waste of power. the result was that, after the first successes, the revolution began to plod about in painful uncertainty, and under the first blows of the reaction it started backwards. austria gave the clearest and most tragic example of unfinished and unsettled relations in a revolutionary period. it was this situation that gave lassalle occasion to assert that henceforward revolutions could find their support only in the class struggle of the proletariat. in a letter to marx, dated october , he writes: "the experiences of austria, hungary and germany in and have led me to the firm conclusion that no struggle in europe can be successful unless it is proclaimed from the very beginning as purely socialistic. no struggle can succeed in which social problems appear as nebulous elements kept in the background, while on the surface the fight is being conducted under the slogan of national revival of bourgeois republicanism." we shall not attempt to criticize this bold conclusion. one thing is evident, namely that already at the middle of the nineteenth century the national task of political emancipation could not be completed by a unanimous concerted onslaught of the entire nation. only the independent tactics of the proletariat deriving its strength from no other source but its class position, could have secured a victory of the revolution. the russian working class of differs entirely from the vienna working class of . the best proof of it is the all-russian practice of the councils of workmen's deputies (soviets). those are no organizations of conspirators prepared beforehand to step forward in times of unrest and to seize command over the working class. they are organs consciously created by the masses themselves to coördinate their revolutionary struggle. the soviets, elected by and responsible to the masses, are thoroughly democratic institutions following the most determined class policy in the spirit of revolutionary socialism. the differences in the social composition of the russian revolution are clearly shown in the question of arming the people. _militia_ (national guard) was the first slogan and the first achievement of the revolutions of and in paris, in all the italian states and in vienna and berlin. in , the demand for a national guard (i.e., the armament of the propertied classes and the "intellectuals") was put forth by the entire bourgeois opposition, including the most moderate factions. in russia, the demand for a national guard finds no favor with the bourgeois parties. this is not because the liberals do not understand the importance of arming the people: absolutism has given them in this respect more than one object lesson. the reason why liberals do not like the idea of a national guard is because they fully realize the impossibility of creating in russia an armed revolutionary force outside of the proletariat and against the proletariat. they are ready to give up this demand, as they give up many others, just as the french bourgeoisie headed by thiers preferred to give up paris and france to bismarck rather than to arm the working class. the problem of an armed revolution in russia becomes essentially a problem of the proletariat. national militia, this classic demand of the bourgeoisie of , appears in russia from the very beginning as a demand for arming the people, primarily the working class. herein the fate of the russian revolution manifests itself most clearly. chapter iv the revolution and the proletariat a revolution is an open contest of social forces in their struggle for political power. the state is not an end in itself. it is only a working machine in the hands of the social force in power. as every machine, the state has its motor, transmission, and its operator. its motive power is the class interest; its motor are propaganda, the press, influences of school and church, political parties, open air meetings, petitions, insurrections; its transmission is made up of legislative bodies actuated by the interest of a caste, a dynasty, a guild or a class appearing under the guise of divine or national will (absolutism or parliamentarism); its operator is the administration, with its police, judiciary, jails, and the army. the state is not an end in itself. it is, however, the greatest means for organizing, disorganizing and reorganizing social relations. according to who is directing the machinery of the state, it can be an instrument of profoundest transformations, or a means of organized stagnation. each political party worthy of its name strives to get hold of political power and thus to make the state serve the interests of the class represented by the party. social-democracy, as the party of the proletariat, naturally strives at political supremacy of the working class. the proletariat grows and gains strength with the growth of capitalism. from this viewpoint, the development of capitalism is the development of the proletariat for dictatorship. the day and the hour, however, when political power should pass into the hands of the working class, is determined not directly by the degree of capitalistic development of economic forces, but by the relations of class struggle, by the international situation, by a number of subjective elements, such as tradition, initiative, readiness to fight.... it is, therefore, not excluded that in a backward country with a lesser degree of capitalistic development, the proletariat should sooner reach political supremacy than in a highly developed capitalist state. thus, in middle-class paris, the proletariat consciously took into its hands the administration of public affairs in . true it is, that the reign of the proletariat lasted only for two months, it is remarkable, however, that in far more advanced capitalist centers of england and the united states, the proletariat never was in power even for the duration of one day. to imagine that there is an automatic dependence between a dictatorship of the proletariat and the technical and productive resources of a country, is to understand economic determinism in a very primitive way. such a conception would have nothing to do with marxism. it is our opinion that the russian revolution creates conditions whereby political power can (and, in case of a victorious revolution, _must_) pass into the hands of the proletariat before the politicians of the liberal bourgeoisie would have occasion to give their political genius full swing. summing up the results of the revolution and counter-revolution in and , marx wrote in his correspondences to the new york _tribune_: "the working class in germany is, in its social and political development, as far behind that of england and france as the german bourgeoisie is behind the bourgeoisie of those countries. like master, like man. the evolution of the conditions of existence for a numerous, strong, concentrated, and intelligent proletariat goes hand in hand with the development of the conditions of existence for a numerous, wealthy, concentrated and powerful middle class. the working class movement itself never is independent, never is of an exclusively proletarian character until all the different factions of the middle class, and particularly its most progressive faction, the large manufacturers, have conquered political power, and remodeled the state according to their wants. it is then that the inevitable conflict between employer and the employed becomes imminent, and cannot be adjourned any longer."[ ] this quotation must be familiar to the reader, as it has lately been very much abused by scholastic marxists. it has been used as an iron-clad argument against the idea of a labor government in russia. if the russian capitalistic bourgeoisie is not strong enough to take governmental power into its hands, how is it possible to think of an industrial democracy, i.e., a political supremacy of the proletariat, was the question. [ ] karl marx, _germany in _. (english edition, pp. - .) let us give this objection closer consideration. marxism is primarily a method of analysis,--not the analysis of texts, but the analysis of social relations. applied to russia, is it true that the weakness of capitalistic liberalism means the weakness of the working class? is it true, not in the abstract, but in relation to russia, that an independent proletarian movement is impossible before the bourgeoisie assume political power? it is enough to formulate these questions in order to understand what hopeless logical formalism there is hidden behind the attempt to turn marx's historically relative remark into a super-historic maxim. our industrial development, though marked in times of prosperity by leaps and bounds of an "american" character, is in reality miserably small in comparison with the industry of the united states. five million persons, forming . per cent. of the population engaged in economic pursuits, are employed in the industries of russia; six millions and . per cent. are the corresponding figures for the united states. to have a clear idea as to the real dimensions of industry in both countries, we must remember that the population of russia is twice as large as the population of the united states, and that the output of american industries in amounted to billions of rubles whereas the output of russian industries for the same year hardly reached . billions. there is no doubt that the number of the proletariat, the degree of its concentration, its cultural level, and its political importance depend upon the degree of industrial development in each country. this dependence, however, is not a direct one. between the productive forces of a country on one side and the political strength of its social classes on the other, there is at any given moment a current and cross current of various socio-political factors of a national and international character which modify and sometimes completely reverse the political expression of economic relations. the industry of the united states is far more advanced than the industry of russia, while the political rôle of the russian workingmen, their influence on the political life of their country, the possibilities of their influence on world politics in the near future, are incomparably greater than those of the american proletariat. in his recent work on the american workingman, kautsky arrives at the conclusion that there is no immediate and direct dependence between the political strength of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat of a country on one hand and its industrial development on the other. "here are two countries," he writes, "diametrically opposed to each other: in one of them, one of the elements of modern industry is developed out of proportion, i.e., out of keeping with the stage of capitalistic development; in the other, another; in america it is the class of capitalists; in russia, the class of labor. in america there is more ground than elsewhere to speak of the dictatorship of capital, while nowhere has labor gained as much influence as in russia, and this influence is bound to grow, as russia has only recently entered the period of modern class struggle." kautsky then proceeds to state that germany can, to a certain degree, study her future from the present conditions in russia, then he continues: "it is strange to think that it is the russian proletariat which shows us our future as far as, not the organization of capital, but the protest of the working class is concerned. russia is the most backward of all the great states of the capitalist world. this may seem to be in contradiction with the economic interpretation of history which considers economic strength the basis of political development. this is, however, not true. it contradicts only that kind of economic interpretation of history which is being painted by our opponents and critics who see in it not a _method of analysis_, but a _ready pattern_."[ ] these lines ought to be recommended to those of our native marxians who substitute for an independent analysis of social relations a deduction from texts selected for all emergencies of life. no one can compromise marxism as shamefully as these bureaucrats of marxism do. [ ] k. kautsky, _the american and the russian workingman_. in kautsky's estimation, russia is characterized, economically, by a comparatively low level of capitalistic development; politically, by a weakness of the capitalistic bourgeoisie and by a great strength of the working class. this results in the fact, that "the struggle for the interests of russia as a whole has become the task of _the only powerful class in russia_, industrial labor. this is the reason why labor has gained such a tremendous political importance. this is the reason why the struggle of russia against the polyp of absolutism which is strangling the country, turned out to be a single combat of absolutism against industrial labor, a combat where the peasantry can lend considerable assistance without, however, being able to play a leading rôle.[ ] [ ] d. mendeleyer, _russian realities_, , p. . are we not warranted in our conclusion that the "man" will sooner gain political supremacy in russia than his "master"? * * * * * there are two sorts of political optimism. one overestimates the advantages and the strength of the revolution and strives towards ends unattainable under given conditions. the other consciously limits the task of the revolution, drawing a line which the very logic of the situation will compel him to overstep. you can draw limits to all the problems of the revolution by asserting that this is a bourgeois revolution in its objective aims and inevitable results, and you can close your eyes to the fact that the main figure in this revolution is the working class which is being moved towards political supremacy by the very course of events. you can reassure yourself by saying that in the course of a bourgeois revolution the political supremacy of the working class can be only a passing episode, and you can forget that, once in power, the working class will offer desperate resistance, refusing to yield unless compelled to do so by armed force. you can reassure yourself by saying that social conditions in russia are not yet ripe for a socialist order, and you can overlook the fact that, once master of the situation, the working class would be compelled by the very logic of its situation to organize national economy under the management of the state. the term _bourgeois revolution_, a general sociological definition, gives no solution to the numerous political and tactical problems, contradictions and difficulties which are being created by the mechanism of a _given_ bourgeois revolution. within the limits of a bourgeois revolution at the end of the eighteenth century, whose objective was the political supremacy of capital, the dictatorship of the _sans-culottes_ turned out to be a fact. this dictatorship was not a passing episode, it gave its stamp to a whole century that followed the revolution, though it was soon crushed by the limitations of the revolution. within the limits of a revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, which is also a bourgeois revolution in its immediate objective aims, there looms up a prospect of an inevitable, or at least possible, supremacy of the working class in the near future. that this supremacy should not turn out to be a passing episode, as many a realistic philistine may hope, is a task which the working class will have at heart. it is, then, legitimate to ask: is it inevitable that the dictatorship of the proletariat should clash against the limitations of a bourgeois revolution and collapse, or is it not possible that under given _international conditions_ it may open a way for an ultimate victory by crushing those very limitations? hence a tactical problem: should we consciously strive toward a labor government as the development of the revolution will bring us nearer to that stage, or should we look upon political power as upon a calamity which the bourgeois revolution is ready to inflict upon the workingmen, and which it is best to avoid? chapter v the proletariat in power and the peasantry in case of a victorious revolution, political power passes into the hands of the class that has played in it a dominant rôle, in other words, it passes into the hands of the working class. of course, revolutionary representatives of non-proletarian social groups may not be excluded from the government; sound politics demands that the proletariat should call into the government influential leaders of the lower middle class, the intelligentzia and the peasants. the problem is, _who will give substance to the politics of the government, who will form in it a homogeneous majority?_ it is one thing when the government contains a labor majority, which representatives of other democratic groups of the people are allowed to join; it is another, when the government has an outspoken bourgeois-democratic character where labor representatives are allowed to participate in the capacity of more or less honorable hostages. the policies of the liberal capitalist bourgeoisie, notwithstanding all their vacillations, retreats and treacheries, are of a definite character. the policies of the proletariat are of a still more definite, outspoken character. the policies of the intelligentzia, however, a result of intermediate social position and political flexibility of this group; the politics of the peasants, a result of the social heterogeneity, intermediate position, and primitiveness of this class; the politics of the lower middle class, a result of muddle-headedness, intermediate position and complete want of political traditions,--can never be clear, determined, and firm. it must necessarily be subject to unexpected turns, to uncertainties and surprises. to imagine a revolutionary democratic government without representatives of labor is to see the absurdity of such a situation. a refusal of labor to participate in a revolutionary government would make the very existence of that government impossible, and would be tantamount to a betrayal of the cause of the revolution. a participation of labor in a revolutionary government, however, is admissible, both from the viewpoint of objective probability and subjective desirability, _only in the rôle of a leading dominant power_. of course, you can call such a government "dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry," "dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry, and the intelligentzia," or "a revolutionary government of the workingmen and the lower middle class." this question will still remain: who has the hegemony in the government and through it in the country? _when we speak of a labor government we mean that the hegemony belongs to the working class._ the proletariat will be able to hold this position under one condition: if it broadens the basis of the revolution. many elements of the working masses, especially among the rural population, will be drawn into the revolution and receive their political organization only after the first victories of the revolution, when the revolutionary vanguard, the city proletariat, shall have seized governmental power. under such conditions, the work of propaganda and organization will be conducted through state agencies. legislative work itself will become a powerful means of revolutionizing the masses. the burden thrust upon the shoulders of the working class by the peculiarities of our social and historical development, the burden of completing a bourgeois revolution by means of labor struggle, will thus confront the proletariat with difficulties of enormous magnitude; on the other hand, however, it will offer the working class, at least in the first period, unusual opportunities. this will be seen in the relations between the proletariat and the peasants. in the revolutions of - , and , governmental power passed from absolutism into the hands of the moderate bourgeois elements which emancipated the peasants before revolutionary democracy succeeded or even attempted to get into power. the emancipated peasantry then lost interest in the political ventures of the "city-gentlemen," i.e., in the further course of the revolution; it formed the dead ballast of "order," the foundation of all social "stability," betraying the revolution, supporting a cesarian or ultra-absolutist reaction. the russian revolution is opposed to a bourgeois constitutional order which would be able to solve the most primitive problems of democracy. the russian revolution will be against it for a long period to come. reformers of a bureaucratic brand, such as witte and stolypin, can do nothing for the peasants, as their "enlightened" efforts are continually nullified by their own struggle for existence. the fate of the most elementary interests of the peasantry--the entire peasantry as a class--is, therefore, closely connected with the fate of the revolution, i.e., with the fate of the proletariat. _once in power, the proletariat will appear before the peasantry as its liberator._ proletarian rule will mean not only democratic equality, free self-government, shifting the burden of taxation on the propertied classes, dissolution of the army among the revolutionary people, abolition of compulsory payments for the church, but also recognition of all revolutionary changes made by the peasants in agrarian relations (seizures of land). these changes will be taken by the proletariat as a starting point for further legislative measures in agriculture. under such conditions, the russian peasantry will be interested in upholding the proletarian rule ("labor democracy"), at least in the first, most difficult period, not less so than were the french peasants interested in upholding the military rule of napoleon bonaparte who by force guaranteed to the new owners the integrity of their land shares. but is it not possible that the peasants will remove the workingmen from their positions and take their place? no, this can never happen. this would be in contradiction to all historical experiences. history has convincingly shown that the peasantry is incapable of an independent political rôle. the history of capitalism is the history of subordination of the village by the city. industrial development had made the continuation of feudal relations in agriculture impossible. yet the peasantry had not produced a class which could live up to the revolutionary task of destroying feudalism. it was the city which made rural population dependent on capital, and which produced revolutionary forces to assume political hegemony over the village, there to complete revolutionary changes in civic and political relations. in the course of further development, the village becomes completely enslaved by capital, and the villagers by capitalistic political parties, which revive feudalism in parliamentary politics, making the peasantry their political domain, the ground for their preëlection huntings. modern peasantry is driven by the fiscal and militaristic system of the state into the clutches of usurers' capital, while state-clergy, state-schools and barrack depravity drive it into the clutches of usurers' politics. the russian bourgeoisie yielded all revolutionary positions to the russian proletariat. it will have to yield also the revolutionary hegemony over the peasants. once the proletariat becomes master of the situation, conditions will impel the peasants to uphold the policies of a labor democracy. they may do it with no more political understanding than they uphold a bourgeois régime. the difference is that while each bourgeois party in possession of the peasants' vote uses its power to rob the peasants, to betray their confidence and to leave their expectations unfulfilled, in the worst case to give way to another capitalist party, the working class, backed by the peasantry, will put all forces into operation to raise the cultural level of the village and to broaden the political understanding of the peasants. our attitude towards the idea of a "dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" is now quite clear. it is not a question whether we think it "admissible" or not, whether we "wish" or we "do not wish" this form of political coöperation. in our opinion, it simply cannot be realized, at least in its direct meaning. such a coöperation presupposes that either the peasantry has identified itself with one of the existing bourgeois parties, or it has formed a powerful party of its own. neither is possible, as we have tried to point out. chapter vi proletarian rule the proletariat can get into power only at a moment of national upheaval, of sweeping national enthusiasm. the proletariat assumes power as a revolutionary representative of the people, as a recognized leader in the fight against absolutism and barbaric feudalism. having assumed power, however, the proletariat will open a new era, an era of positive legislation, of revolutionary politics, and this is the point where its political supremacy as an avowed spokesman of the nation may become endangered. the first measures of the proletariat--the cleansing of the augean stables of the old régime and the driving away of their inhabitants--will find active support of the entire nation whatever the liberal castraters may tell us of the power of some prejudices among the masses. the work of political cleansing will be accompanied by democratic reorganization of all social and political relations. the labor government, impelled by immediate needs and requirements, will have to look into all kinds of relations and activities among the people. it will have to throw out of the army and the administration all those who had stained their hands with the blood of the people; it will have to disband all the regiments that had polluted themselves with crimes against the people. this work will have to be done immediately, long before the establishment of an elective responsible administration and before the organization of a popular militia. this, however, will be only a beginning. labor democracy will soon be confronted by the problems of a normal workday, the agrarian relations and unemployment. the legislative solution of those problems will show the _class character_ of the labor government. it will tend to weaken the revolutionary bond between the proletariat and the nation; it will give the economic differentiation among the peasants a political expression. antagonism between the component parts of the nation will grow step by step as the policies of the labor government become more outspoken, lose their general democratic character and become _class policies_. the lack of individualistic bourgeois traditions and anti-proletarian prejudices among the peasants and the intelligentzia will help the proletariat assume power. it must not be forgotten, however, that this lack of prejudices is based not on political understanding, but on political barbarism, on social shapelessness, primitiveness, and lack of character. these are all qualities which can hardly guarantee support for an active, consistent proletarian rule. the abolition of the remnants of feudalism in agrarian relations will be supported by all the peasants who are now oppressed by the landlords. a progressive income tax will be supported by an overwhelming majority of the peasants. yet, legislative measures in defense of the rural proletariat (farm hands) will find no active support among the majority, and will meet with active opposition on the part of a minority of the peasants. the proletariat will be compelled to introduce class struggle into the village and thus to destroy that slight community of interests which undoubtedly unites the peasants as a whole. in its next steps, the proletariat will have to seek for support by helping the poor villagers against the rich, the rural proletariat against the agrarian bourgeoisie. this will alienate the majority of the peasants from labor democracy. relations between village and city will become strained. the peasantry as a whole will become politically indifferent. the peasant minority will actively oppose proletarian rule. this will influence part of the intellectuals and the lower middle class of the cities. two features of proletarian politics are bound particularly to meet with the opposition of labor's allies: _collectivism_ and _internationalism_. the strong adherence of the peasants to private ownership, the primitiveness of their political conceptions, the limitations of the village horizon, its distance from world-wide political connections and interdependences, are terrific obstacles in the way of revolutionary proletarian rule. to imagine that social-democracy participates in the provisional government, playing a leading rôle in the period of revolutionary democratic reconstruction, insisting on the most radical reforms and all the time enjoying the aid and support of the organized proletariat,--only to step aside when the democratic program is put into operation, to leave the completed building at the disposal of the bourgeois parties and thus to open an era of parliamentary politics where social-democracy forms only a party of opposition,--to imagine this would mean to compromise the very idea of a labor government. it is impossible to imagine anything of the kind, not because it is "against principles"--such abstract reasoning is devoid of any substance--but because it is _not real_, it is the worst kind of utopianism, it is the revolutionary utopianism of philistines. our distinction between a minimum and maximum program has a great and profound meaning only under bourgeois rule. the very fact of bourgeois rule eliminates from our minimum program all demands incompatible with private ownership of the means of production. those demands form the substance of a socialist revolution, and they presuppose a dictatorship of the proletariat. the moment, however, a revolutionary government is dominated by a socialist majority, the distinction between minimum and maximum programs loses its meaning both as a question of principle and as a practical policy. _under no condition will a proletarian government be able to keep within the limits of this distinction._ let us take the case of an eight hour workday. it is a well established fact that an eight hour workday does not contradict the capitalist order; it is, therefore, well within the limits of the social-democratic minimum program. imagine, however, its realization in a revolutionary period, when all social passions are at the boiling point. an eight hour workday law would necessarily meet with stubborn and organized opposition on the part of the capitalists--let us say in the form of a lock-out and closing down of factories and plants. hundreds of thousands of workingmen would be thrown into the streets. what ought the revolutionary government to do? a bourgeois government, however radical, would never allow matters to go as far as that. it would be powerless against the closing of factories and plants. it would be compelled to make concessions. the eight hour workday would not be put into operation; the revolts of the workingmen would be put down by force of arms.... under the political domination of the proletariat, the introduction of an eight hour workday must have totally different consequences. the closing down of factories and plants cannot be the reason for increasing labor hours by a government which represents not capital, but labor, and which refuses to act as an "impartial" mediator, the way bourgeois democracy does. a labor government would have only one way out--to expropriate the closed factories and plants and to organize their work on a public basis. or let us take another example. a proletarian government must necessarily take decisive steps to solve the problem of unemployment. representatives of labor in a revolutionary government can by no means meet the demands of the unemployed by saying that this is a bourgeois revolution. once, however, the state ventures to eliminate unemployment--no matter how--a tremendous gain in the economic power of the proletariat is accomplished. the capitalists whose pressure on the working class was based on the existence of a reserve army of labor, will soon realize that they are powerless _economically_. it will be the task of the government to doom them also to _political_ oblivion. measures against unemployment mean also measures to secure means of subsistence for strikers. the government will have to undertake them, if it is anxious not to undermine the very foundation of its existence. nothing will remain for the capitalists but to declare a lock-out, to close down factories and plants. since capitalists can wait longer than labor in case of interrupted production, nothing will remain for a labor government but to meet a general lock-out by expropriating the factories and plants and by introducing in the biggest of them state or communal production. in agriculture, similar problems will present themselves through the very fact of land-expropriation. we cannot imagine a proletarian government expropriating large private estates with agricultural production on a large scale, cutting them into pieces and selling them to small owners. for it the only open way is to organize in such estates coöperative production under communal or state management. this, however, _is the way of socialism_. social-democracy can never assume power under a double obligation: to put the _entire_ minimum program into operation for the sake of the proletariat, and to keep strictly _within the limits_ of this program, for the sake of the bourgeoisie. such a double obligation could never be fulfilled. participating in the government, not as powerless hostages, but as a leading force, the representatives of labor _eo ipso_ break the line between the minimum and maximum program. _collectivism becomes the order of the day._ at which point the proletariat will be stopped on its march in this direction, depends upon the constellation of forces, not upon the original purpose of the proletarian party. it is, therefore, absurd to speak of a _specific_ character of proletarian dictatorship (or a dictatorship of the proletariat _and_ the peasantry) within a bourgeois revolution, viz., a _purely democratic_ dictatorship. the working class can never secure the democratic character of its dictatorship without overstepping the limits of its democratic program. illusions to the contrary may become a handicap. they would compromise social-democracy from the start. once the proletariat assumes power, it will fight for it to the end. one of the means to secure and solidify its power will be propaganda and organization, particularly in the village; another means will be a _policy of collectivism_. collectivism is not only dictated by the very position of the social-democratic party as the party in power, but it becomes imperative as a means to secure this position through the active support of the working class. * * * * * when our socialist press first formulated the idea of a _permanent revolution_ which should lead from the liquidation of absolutism and civic bondage to a socialist order through a series of ever growing social conflicts, uprisings of ever new masses, unremitting attacks of the proletariat on the political and economic privileges of the governing classes, our "progressive" press started a unanimous indignant uproar. oh, they had suffered enough, those gentlemen of the "progressive" press; this nuisance, however, was too much. revolution, they said, is not a thing that can be made "legal!" extraordinary measures are allowable only on extraordinary occasions. the aim of the revolutionary movement, they asserted, was not to make the revolution go on forever, but to bring it as soon as possible into the channels of _law_, etc., etc. the more radical representatives of the same democratic bourgeoisie do not attempt to oppose the revolution from the standpoint of completed constitutional "achievements": tame as they are, they understand how hopeless it is to fight the proletariat revolution with the weapon of parliamentary cretinism _in advance_ of the establishment of parliamentarism itself. they, therefore, choose another way. they forsake the standpoint of law, but take the standpoint of what they deem to be facts,--the standpoint of historic "possibilities," the standpoint of political "realism,"--even ... even the standpoint of "marxism." it was antonio, the pious venetian bourgeois, who made the striking observation: mark you this, bassanio, the devil can cite scriptures for his purpose. those gentlemen not only consider the idea of labor government in russia fantastic, but they repudiate the very probability of a social revolution in europe in the near historic epoch. the necessary "prerequisites" are not yet in existence, is their assertion. is it so? it is, of course, not our purpose to set a time for a social revolution. what we attempt here is to put the social revolution into a proper historic perspective. chapter vii prerequisites to socialism marxism turned socialism into a science. this does not prevent some "marxians" from turning marxism into a utopia. [trotzky then proceeds to find logical flaws in the arguments of n. roshkov, a russian marxist, who had made the assertion that russia was not yet ripe for socialism, as her level of industrial technique and the class-consciousness of her working masses were not yet high enough to make socialist production and distribution possible. then he goes back to what he calls "prerequisites to socialism," which in his opinion are: ( ) development of industrial technique; ( ) concentration of production; ( ) social consciousness of the masses. in order that socialism become possible, he says, it is not necessary that each of these prerequisites be developed to its logically conceivable limit.] all those processes (development of technique, concentration of production, growth of mass-consciousness) go on simultaneously, and not only do they help and stimulate each other, but they also _hamper and limit_ each other's development. each of the processes of a higher order presupposes the development of another process of a lower order, yet the full development of any of them is incompatible with the full development of the others. the logical limit of technical development is undoubtedly a perfect automatic mechanism which takes in raw materials from natural resources and lays them down at the feet of men as ready objects of consumption. were not capitalism limited by relations between classes and by the consequences of those relations, the class struggle, one would be warranted in his assumption that industrial technique, having approached the ideal of one great automatic mechanism within the limits of capitalistic economy, _eo ipso_ dismisses capitalism. the concentration of production which is an outgrowth of economic competition has an inherent tendency to throw the entire population into the working class. taking this tendency apart from all the others, one would be warranted in his assumption that capitalism would ultimately turn the majority of the people into a reserve army of paupers, lodged in prisons. this process, however, is being checked by revolutionary changes which are inevitable under a certain relationship between social forces. it will be checked long before it has reached its logical limit. and the same thing is true in relation to social mass-consciousness. this consciousness undoubtedly grows with the experiences of every day struggle and through the conscious efforts of socialist parties. isolating this process from all others, we can imagine it reaching a stage where the overwhelming majority of the people are encompassed by professional and political organizations, united in a feeling of solidarity and in identity of purpose. were this process allowed to grow quantitatively without changing in quality, socialism might be established peacefully, through a unanimous compact of the citizens of the twenty-first or twenty-second century. the historic prerequisites to socialism, however, do not develop in isolation from each other; _they limit each other_; reaching a certain stage, which is determined by many circumstances, but which is very far from their mathematical limits, they undergo a qualitative change, and in their complex combination they produce what we call a social revolution. let us take the last mentioned process, the growth of social mass-consciousness. this growth takes place not in academies, but in the very life of modern capitalistic society, on the basis of incessant class struggle. the growth of proletarian class consciousness makes class struggles undergo a transformation; it deepens them; it puts a foundation of principle under them, thus provoking a corresponding reaction on the part of the governing classes. the struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie has its own logic; it must become more and more acute and bring things to a climax long before the time when concentration of production has become predominant in economic life. it is evident, further, that the growth of the political consciousness of the proletariat is closely related with its numerical strength; proletarian dictatorship presupposes great numbers of workingmen, strong enough to overcome the resistance of the bourgeois counter-revolution. this, however, does not imply that the overwhelming majority of the people must consist of proletarians, or that the overwhelming majority of proletarians must consist of convinced socialists. of course, the fighting revolutionary army of the proletariat must by all means be stronger than the fighting counter-revolutionary army of capital; yet between those two camps there may be a great number of doubtful or indifferent elements who are not actively helping the revolution, but are rather inclined to desire its ultimate victory. the proletarian policy must take all this into account. this is possible only where there is a hegemony of industry over agriculture, and a hegemony of the city over the village. let us review the prerequisites to socialism in the order of their diminishing generality and increasing complexity. . socialism is not only a problem of equal distribution, but also a problem of well organized production. socialistic, i.e., coöperative production on a large scale is possible only where economic progress has gone so far as to make a large undertaking more productive than a small one. the greater the advantages of a large undertaking over a small one, i.e., the higher the industrial technique, the greater must be the economic advantages of socialized production, the higher, consequently, must be the cultural level of the people to enable them to enjoy equal distribution based on well organized production. this first prerequisite of socialism has been in existence for many years. ever since division of labor has been established in manufactories; ever since manufactories have been superseded by factories employing a system of machines,--large undertakings become more and more profitable, and consequently their socialization would make the people more prosperous. there would have been no gain in making all the artisans' shops common property of the artisans; whereas the seizure of a manufactory by its workers, or the seizure of a factory by its hired employees, or the seizure of all means of modern production by the people must necessarily improve their economic conditions,--the more so, the further the process of economic concentration has advanced. at present, social division of labor on one hand, machine production on the other have reached a stage where the only coöperative organization that can make adequate use of the advantages of collectivist economy, is the state. it is hardly conceivable that socialist production would content itself with the area of the state. economic and political motives would necessarily impel it to overstep the boundaries of individual states. the world has been in possession of technical equipment for collective production--in one or another form--for the last hundred or two hundred years. _technically_, socialism is profitable not only on a national, but also to a large extent on an international scale. why then have all attempts at organizing socialist communities failed? why has concentration of production manifested its advantages all through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries not in socialistic, but in capitalistic forms? the reason is that there was no social force ready and able to introduce socialism. . here we pass from the prerequisite of industrial technique to the _socio-economic_ prerequisite, which is less general, but more complex. were our society not an antagonistic society composed of classes, but a homogeneous partnership of men consciously selecting the best economic system, a mere calculation as to the advantages of socialism would suffice to make people start socialistic reconstruction. our society, however, harbors in itself opposing interests. what is good for one class, is bad for another. class selfishness clashes against class selfishness; class selfishness impairs the interests of the whole. to make socialism possible, a social power has to arise in the midst of the antagonistic classes of capitalist society, a power objectively placed in a position to be interested in the establishment of socialism, at the same time strong enough to overcome all opposing interests and hostile resistance. it is one of the principal merits of scientific socialism to have discovered such a social power in the person of the proletariat, and to have shown that this class, growing with the growth of capitalism, can find its salvation only in socialism; that it is being moved towards socialism by its very position, and that the doctrine of socialism in the presence of a capitalist society must necessarily become the ideology of the proletariat. how far, then, must the social differentiation have gone to warrant the assertion that the second prerequisite is an accomplished fact? in other words, what must be the numerical strength of the proletariat? must it be one-half, two-thirds, or nine-tenths of the people? it is utterly futile to try and formulate this second prerequisite of socialism arithmetically. an attempt to express the strength of the proletariat in mere numbers, besides being schematic, would imply a series of difficulties. whom should we consider a proletarian? is the half-paupered peasant a proletarian? should we count with the proletariat those hosts of the city reserve who, on one hand, fall into the ranks of the parasitic proletariat of beggars and thieves, and, on the other hand, fill the streets in the capacity of peddlers, i.e., of parasites on the economic body as a whole? it is not easy to answer these questions. the importance of the proletariat is based not only on its numbers, but primarily on its rôle in industry. the political supremacy of the bourgeoisie is founded on economic power. before it manages to take over the authority of the state, it concentrates in its hands the national means of production; hence its specific weight. the proletariat will possess no means of production of its own before the social revolution. its social power depends upon the circumstance that the means of production in possession of the bourgeoisie can be put into motion only by the hands of the proletariat. from the bourgeois viewpoint, the proletariat is also one of the means of production, forming, in combination with the others, a unified mechanism. yet the proletariat is the only non-automatic part of this mechanism, and can never be made automatic, notwithstanding all efforts. this puts the proletariat into a position to be able to stop the functioning of the national economic body, partially or wholly--through the medium of partial or general strikes. hence it is evident that, the numerical strength of the proletariat being equal, its importance is proportional to the mass of the means of production it puts into motion: the proletarian of a big industrial concern represents--other conditions being equal--a greater social unit than an artisan's employee; a city workingman represents a greater unit than a proletarian of the village. in other words, the political rôle of the proletariat is greater in proportion as large industries predominate over small industries, industry predominates over agriculture, and the city over the village. at a period in the history of germany or england when the proletariats of those countries formed the same percentage to the total population as the proletariat in present day russia, they did not possess the same social weight as the russian proletariat of to-day. they could not possess it, because their objective importance in economic life was comparatively smaller. the social weight of the cities represents the same phenomenon. at a time when the city population of germany formed only per cent. of the total nation, as is the case in present-day russia, the german cities were far from equaling our cities in economic and political importance. the concentration of big industries and commercial enterprises in the cities, and the establishment of closer relations between city and country through a system of railways, has given the modern cities an importance far exceeding the mere volume of their population. moreover, the growth of their importance runs ahead of the growth of their population, and the growth of the latter runs ahead of the natural increase of the entire population of the country. in , the number of artisans, masters and their employees, in italy was per cent. of the population, the same as the percentage of the proletariat, including artisans, in russia of to-day. their importance, however, was far less than that of the russian industrial proletariat. the question is not, how strong the proletariat is numerically, but what is its position in the general economy of a country. [the author then quotes figures showing the numbers of wage-earners and industrial proletarians in germany, belgium and england: in germany, in , . millions proletarians; in belgium . millions, or per cent. of all the persons who make a living independently; in england . millions.] in the leading european countries, city population numerically predominates over the rural population. infinitely greater is its predominance through the aggregate of means of production represented by it, and through the qualities of its human material. the city attracts the most energetic, able and intelligent elements of the country. thus we arrive at the conclusion that economic evolution--the growth of industry, the growth of large enterprises, the growth of cities, the growth of the proletariat, especially the growth of the industrial proletariat--have already prepared the arena not only for the _struggle_ of the proletariat for political power, but also for the _conquest_ of that power. . here we approach the third prerequisite to socialism, the _dictatorship of the proletariat_. politics is the plane where objective prerequisites intersect with subjective. on the basis of certain technical and socio-economic conditions, a class puts before itself a definite task--to seize power. in pursuing this task, it unites its forces, it gauges the forces of the enemy, it weighs the circumstances. yet, not even here is the proletariat absolutely free: besides subjective moments, such as understanding, readiness, initiative which have a logic of their own, there are a number of objective moments interfering with the policies of the proletariat, such are the policies of the governing classes, state institutions (the army, the class-school, the state-church), international relations, etc. let us first turn our attention to the subjective moment; let us ask, _is the proletariat ready for a socialist change?_ it is not enough that development of technique should make socialist economy profitable from the viewpoint of the productivity of national labor; it is not enough that social differentiation, based on technical progress, should create the proletariat, as a class objectively interested in socialism. it is of prime importance that this class should _understand_ its objective interests. it is necessary that this class should _see_ in socialism the only way of its emancipation. it is necessary that it should unite into an army powerful enough to seize governmental power in open combat. it would be a folly to deny the necessity for the preparation of the proletariat. only the old blanquists could stake their hopes in the salutary initiative of an organization of conspirators formed independently of the masses. only their antipodes, the anarchists, could build their system on a spontaneous elemental outburst of the masses whose results nobody can foresee. when social-democracy speaks of seizing power, it thinks of _a deliberate action of a revolutionary class_. there are socialists-ideologists (ideologists in the wrong sense of the word, those who turn all things upside down) who speak of preparing the proletariat for socialism as a problem of moral regeneration. the proletariat, they say, and even "humanity" in general, must first free itself from its old selfish nature; altruistic motives must first become predominant in social life. as we are still very far from this ideal, they contend, and as human nature changes very slowly, socialism appears to be a problem of remote centuries. this view seems to be very realistic, evolutionistic, etc. it is in reality a conglomeration of hackneyed moralistic considerations. those "ideologists" imagine that a socialist psychology can be acquired before the establishment of socialism; that in a world ruled by capitalism the masses can be imbued with a socialist psychology. socialist psychology as here conceived should not be identified with socialist aspirations. the former presupposes the absence of selfish motives in economic relations, while the latter are an outcome of the class psychology of the proletariat. class psychology, and socialist psychology in a society not split into classes, may have many common features, yet they differ widely. coöperation in the struggle of the proletariat against exploitation has developed in the soul of the workingmen beautiful sprouts of idealism, brotherly solidarity, a spirit of self-sacrifice. yet those sprouts cannot grow and blossom freely within capitalist society: individual struggle for existence, the yawning abyss of poverty, differentiations among the workingmen themselves, the corrupting influence of the bourgeois parties,--all this interferes with the growth of idealism among the masses. however, it is a fact that, while remaining selfish as any of the lower middle class, while not exceeding the average representative of the bourgeois classes by the "human" value of his personality, the average workingman learns in the school of life's experience that _his most primitive desires and most natural wants can be satisfied only on the debris of the capitalist order_. if socialism should attempt to create a new human nature within the limits of the old world, it would be only a new edition of the old moralistic utopias. the task of socialism is not to create a socialist psychology as a prerequisite to socialism, but to create socialist conditions of human life as a prerequisite to a socialist psychology. chapter viii a labor government in russia and socialism the objective prerequisites of a social revolution, as we have shown above, have been already created by the economic progress of advanced capitalist countries. but how about russia? is it possible to think that the seizure of power by the russian proletariat would be the beginning of a socialist reconstruction of our national economy? a year ago we thus answered this question in an article which was mercilessly bombarded by the organs of both our factions. we wrote: "the workingmen of paris, says marx, had not expected miracles from the commune. we cannot expect miracles from a proletarian dictatorship now. governmental power is not almighty. it is folly to think that once the proletariat has seized power, it would abolish capitalism and introduce socialism by a number of decrees. the economic system is not a product of state activity. what the proletariat will be able to do is to shorten economic evolution towards collectivism through a series of energetic state measures. "the starting point will be the reforms enumerated in our so-called minimum program. the very situation of the proletariat, however, will compel it to move along the way of collectivist practice. "it will be comparatively easy to introduce the eight hour workday and progressive taxation, though even here the center of gravity is not the issuance of a 'decree,' but the organization of its practical application. it will be difficult, however,--and here we pass to collectivism--to organize production under state management in such factories and plants as would be closed down by their owners in protest against the new law. "it will be comparatively simple to issue a law abolishing the right of inheritance, and to put it into operation. inheritances in the form of money capital will not embarrass the proletariat and not interfere with its economy. to be, however, the inheritor of capital invested in land and industry, would mean for a labor government to organize economic life on a public basis. "the same phenomenon, on a vastly larger scale, is represented by the question of expropriation (of land), with or without compensation. expropriation with compensation has political advantages, but it is financially difficult; expropriation without compensation has financial advantages, but it is difficult politically. greater than all the other difficulties, however, will be those of an economic nature, the difficulties of organization. "to repeat: a labor government does not mean a government of miracles. "public management will begin in those branches where the difficulties are smallest. publicly managed enterprises will originally represent kind of oases linked with private enterprises by the laws of exchange of commodities. the wider the field of publicly managed economy will grow, the more flagrant its advantages will become, the firmer will become the position of the new political régime, and the more determined will be the further economic measures of the proletariat. its measures it will base not only on the national productive forces, but also on international technique, in the same way as it bases its revolutionary policies not only on the experience of national class relations but also on the entire historic experience of the international proletariat." _political supremacy of the proletariat is incompatible with its economic slavery._ whatever may be the banner under which the proletariat will find itself in possession of power, it will be compelled to enter the road of socialism. it is the greatest utopia to think that the proletariat, brought to the top by the mechanics of a bourgeois revolution, would be able, even if it wanted, to limit its mission by creating a republican democratic environment for the social supremacy of the bourgeoisie. political dominance of the proletariat, even if it were temporary, would extremely weaken the resistance of capital which is always in need of state aid, and would give momentous opportunities to the economic struggle of the proletariat. a proletarian régime will immediately take up the agrarian question with which the fate of vast millions of the russian people is connected. in solving this, as many another question, the proletariat will have in mind the main tendency of its economic policy: to get hold of a widest possible field for the organization of a socialist economy. the forms and the tempo of this policy in the agrarian question will be determined both by the material resources that the proletariat will be able to get hold of, and by the necessity to coördinate its actions so as not to drive possible allies into the ranks of the counter-revolution. it is evident that the _agrarian_ question, i.e., the question of rural economy and its social relations, is not covered by the _land_ question which is the question of the forms of land ownership. it is perfectly clear, however, that the solution of the land question, even if it does not determine the future of the agrarian evolution, would undoubtedly determine the future agrarian policy of the proletariat. in other words, the use the proletariat will make of the land must be in accord with its general attitude towards the course and requirements of the agrarian evolution. the land question will, therefore, be one of the first to interest the labor government. one of the solutions, made popular by the socialist-revolutionists, is the _socialization of the land_. freed from its european make-up, it means simply "equal distribution" of land. this program demands an expropriation of all the land, whether it is in possession of landlords, of peasants on the basis of private property, or it is owned by village communities. it is evident that such expropriation, being one of the first measures of the new government and being started at a time when capitalist exchange is still in full swing, would lead the peasants to believe that they are "victims of the reform." one must not forget that the peasants have for decades made redemption payments in order to turn their land into private property; many prosperous peasants have made great sacrifices to secure a large portion of land as their private possession. should all this land become state property, the most bitter resistance would be offered by the members of the communities and by private owners. starting out with a reform of this kind, the government would make itself most unpopular among the peasants. and why should one confiscate the land of the communities and the land of small private owners? according to the socialist-revolutionary program, the only use to be made of the land by the state is to turn it over to all the peasants and agricultural laborers on the basis of equal distribution. this would mean that the confiscated land of the communities and small owners would anyway return to individuals for private cultivation. consequently, there would be _no economic gain_ in such a confiscation and redistribution. _politically_, it would be a great blunder on the part of the labor government as it would make the masses of peasants hostile to the proletarian leadership of the revolution. closely connected with this program is the question of hired agricultural labor. equal distribution presupposes the prohibition of using hired labor on farms. this, however, can be only a _consequence_ of economic reforms, it cannot be decreed by a law. it is not enough to forbid an agricultural capitalist to hire laborers; one must first secure agricultural laborers a fair existence; furthermore, this existence must be profitable from the viewpoint of social economy. to declare equal distribution of land and to forbid hired labor, would mean to compel agricultural proletarians to settle on small lots, and to put the state under obligation to provide them with implements for their socially unprofitable production. it is clear that the intervention of the proletariat in the organization of agriculture ought to express itself not in settling individual laborers on individual lots, but in organizing _state or communal management of large estates_. later, when socialized production will have established itself firmly, a further step will be made towards socialization by forbidding hired labor. this will eliminate small capitalistic enterprises in agriculture; it will, however, leave unmolested those private owners who work their land wholly or to a great extent by the labor of their families. to expropriate such owners can by no means be a desire of the socialistic proletariat. the proletariat can never indorse a program of "equal distribution" which on one hand demands a useless, purely formal expropriation of small owners, and on the other hand it demands a very real parceling of large estates into small lots. this would be a wasteful undertaking, a pursuance of a reactionary and utopian plan, and a political harm for the revolutionary party. * * * * * how far, however, can the socialist policy of the working class advance in the economic environment of russia? one thing we can say with perfect assurance: it will meet political obstacles long before it will be checked by the technical backwardness of the country. _without direct political aid from the european proletariat the working class of russia will not be able to retain its power and to turn its temporary supremacy into a permanent socialist dictatorship._ we cannot doubt this for a moment. on the other hand, there is no doubt that a _socialist revolution in the west would allow us to turn the temporary supremacy of the working class directly into a socialist dictatorship_. chapter ix europe and the revolution in june, , we wrote: "more than half a century passed since . half a century of unprecedented victories of capitalism all over the world. half a century of "organic" mutual adaptation of the forces of the bourgeois and the forces of feudal reaction. half a century in which the bourgeoisie has manifested its mad appetite for power and its readiness to fight for it madly! "as a self-taught mechanic, in his search for perpetual motion, meets ever new obstacles and piles mechanism over mechanism to overcome them, so the bourgeoisie has changed and reconstructed the apparatus of its supremacy avoiding 'supra-legal' conflicts with hostile powers. and as the self-taught mechanic finally clashes against the ultimate insurmountable obstacle,--the law of conservation of energy,--so the bourgeoisie had to clash against the ultimate implacable barrier,--class antagonism, fraught with inevitable conflict. "capitalism, forcing its economic system and social relations on each and every country, has turned the entire world into one economic and political organism. as the effect of the modern credit system, with the invisible bonds it draws between thousands of enterprises, with the amazing mobility it lends to capital, has been to eliminate local and partial crises, but to give unusual momentum to general economic convulsions, so the entire economic and political work of capitalism, with its world commerce, with its system of monstrous foreign debts, with its political groupings of states, which have drawn all reactionary forces into one world-wide co-partnership, has prevented local political crises, but it has prepared a basis for a social crisis of unheard of magnitude. driving unhealthy processes inside, evading difficulties, staving off the deep problems of national and international politics, glossing over all contradictions, the bourgeoisie has postponed the climax, yet it has prepared a radical world-wide liquidation of its power. it has clung to all reactionary forces no matter what their origin. it has made the sultan not the last of its friends. it has not tied itself on the chinese ruler only because he had no power: it was more profitable to rob his possessions than to keep him in the office of a world gendarme and to pay him from the treasury of the bourgeoisie. thus the bourgeoisie made the stability of its political system wholly dependent upon the stability of the pre-capitalistic pillars of reaction. "this gives events an international character and opens a magnificent perspective; political emancipation, headed by the working class of russia, will elevate its leader to a height unparalleled in history, it will give russian proletariat colossal power and make it the initiator of world-wide liquidation of capitalism, to which the objective prerequisites have been created by history." it is futile to guess how the russian revolution will find its way to old capitalistic europe. this way may be a total surprise. to illustrate our thought rather than to predict events, we shall mention poland as the possible connecting link between the revolutionary east and the revolutionary west. [the author pictures the consequences of a revolution in poland. a revolution in poland would necessarily follow the victory of the revolution in russia. this, however, would throw revolutionary sparks into the polish provinces of germany and austria. a revolution in posen and galicia would move the hohenzollerns and hapsburgs to invade poland. this would be a sign for the proletariat of germany to get into a sharp conflict with their governments. a revolution becomes inevitable.] a revolutionary poland, however, is not the only possible starting point for a european revolution. the system of armed peace which became predominant in europe after the franco-prussian war, was based on a system of european equilibrium. this equilibrium took for granted not only the integrity of turkey, the dismemberment of poland, the preservation of austria, that ethnographic harlequin's robe, but also the existence of russian despotism in the rôle of a gendarme of the european reaction, armed to his teeth. the russo-japanese war has given a mortal blow to this artificial system in which absolutism was the dominant figure. for an indefinite period russia is out of the race as a first-class power. the equilibrium has been destroyed. on the other hand, the successes of japan have incensed the conquest instincts of the capitalistic bourgeoisie, especially the stock exchange, which plays a colossal rôle in modern politics. _the possibilities of a war on european territory have grown enormously._ conflicts are ripening here and there; so far they have been settled in a diplomatic way, but nothing can guarantee the near future. _a european war, however, means a european revolution._ even without the pressure of such events as war or bankruptcy, a revolution may take place in the near future in one of the european countries as a result of acute class struggles. we shall not make computations as to which country would be first to take the path of revolution; it is obvious, however, that class antagonisms have for the last years reached a high degree of intensity in all the european countries. the influence of the russian revolution on the proletariat of europe is immense. not only does it destroy the petersburg absolutism, that main power of european reaction; it also imbues the minds and the souls of the european proletariat with revolutionary daring. it is the purpose of every socialist party to revolutionize the minds of the working class in the same way as development of capitalism has revolutionized social relations. the work of propaganda and organization among the proletariat, however, has its own intrinsic inertia. the socialist parties of europe--in the first place the most powerful of them, the german socialist party--have developed a conservatism of their own, which grows in proportion as socialism embraces ever larger masses and organization and discipline increase. social-democracy, personifying the political experience of the proletariat, can, therefore, at a certain juncture, become an immediate obstacle on the way of an open proletarian conflict with the bourgeois reaction. in other words, the propaganda-conservatism of a proletarian party can, at a certain moment, impede the direct struggle of the proletariat for power. the colossal influence of the russian revolution manifests itself in killing party routine, in destroying socialist conservatism, in making a clean contest of proletarian forces against capitalist reaction a question of the day. the struggle for universal suffrage in austria, saxony and prussia has become more determined under the direct influence of the october strike in russia. an eastern revolution imbues the western proletariat with revolutionary idealism and stimulates its desire to speak "russian" to its foes. the russian proletariat in power, even if this were only the result of a passing combination of forces in the russian bourgeois revolution, would meet organized opposition on the part of the world's reaction, and readiness for organized support on the part of the world's proletariat. left to its own resources, the russian working class must necessarily be crushed the moment it loses the aid of the peasants. nothing remains for it but to link the fate of its political supremacy and the fate of the russian revolution with the fate of a socialist revolution in europe. all that momentous authority and political power which is given to the proletariat by a combination of forces in the russian bourgeois revolution, it will thrust on the scale of class struggle in the entire capitalistic world. equipped with governmental power, having a counter-revolution behind his back, having the european reaction in front of him, the russian workingman will issue to all his brothers the world over his old battle-cry which will now become the call for the last attack: _proletarians of all the world, unite!_ explanatory notes the first _council of workmen's deputies_ was formed in petersburg, on october th, , in the course of the great general october strike that compelled nicholas romanoff to promise a constitution. it represented individual factories, labor unions, and included also delegates from the socialist parties. it looked upon itself as the center of the revolution and a nucleus of a revolutionary labor government. similar councils sprung up in many other industrial centers. it was arrested on december d, having existed for fifty days. its members were tried and sent to siberia. _intelligentzia_ is a term applied in russia to an indefinite, heterogeneous group of "intellectuals," who are not actively and directly involved in the industrial machinery of capitalism, and at the same time are not members of the working class. it is customary to count among the _intelligentzia_ students, teachers, writers, lawyers, physicians, college professors, etc. however, the term _intelligentzia_ implies also a certain degree of idealism and radical aspirations. _witte_ was the first prime-minister under the quasi-constitution granted on october th, . _stolypin_ was appointed prime minister after the dissolution of the first duma in july, . under the _minimum program_ the social-democrats understand all that range of reforms which can be obtained under the existing capitalist system of "private ownership of the means of production," such as an eight hour workday, social insurance, universal suffrage, a republican order. the _maximum program_ demands the abolition of private property and public management of industries, i.e., socialism. "_some prejudices among the masses_" referred to in this essay is the alleged love of the primitive masses for their tzar. this was an argument usually put forth by the liberals against republican aspirations. _lower-middle-class_ is the only term half-way covering the russian "mieshchanstvo" used by trotzky. "mieshchanstvo" has a socio-economic meaning, and a flavor of moral disapproval. socially and economically it means those numerous inhabitants of modern cities who are engaged in independent economic pursuits, as artisans (masters), shopkeepers, small manufacturers, petty merchants, etc., who have not capital enough to rank with the bourgeoisie. morally "mieshchanstvo" presupposes a limited horizon, lack of definite revolutionary or political ideas, and lack of political courage. the _village community_ is a remnant of old times in russia. up to the members of the village were not allowed to divide the land of the community among the individual peasants on the basis of private property. the land legally belonged to the entire community which allotted it to its members. since the compulsory character of communal land-ownership was abandoned, yet in very great areas of russia it still remained the prevailing system of land-ownership. besides having a share in the community-land, the individual peasant could acquire a piece of land out of his private means (the seller being usually the landlord) and thus become a _small private owner_. the soviet and the revolution (fifty days) about two years after the arrest of the soviet of , a number of former leaders of that organization, among them chrustalyov nossar, the first chairman, and trotzky, the second chairman, met abroad after having escaped from siberian exile. they decided to sum up their soviet experiences in a book which they called _the history of the council of workingmen's deputies_. the book appeared in in petersburg, and was immediately suppressed. one of the essays of this book is here reprinted. in his estimation of the rôle of the soviet trotzky undoubtedly exaggerates. only by a flight of imagination can one see in the activities of the soviet regarding the postal, telegraph and railroad strikers the beginnings of a soviet control over post-office, telegraph and railroads. it is also a serious question whether the soviet was really a leading body, or whether it was led by the current of revolutionary events which it was unable to control. what makes this essay interesting and significant is trotzky's assertion that "the first new wave of the revolution will lead to the creation of soviets all over the country." this has actually happened. his predictions of the formation of an all-russian soviet, and of the program the soviets would follow, have also been realized in the course of the present revolution. the history of the soviet is a history of fifty days. the soviet was constituted on october th; its session was interrupted by a military detachment of the government on december rd. between those two dates the soviet lived and struggled. what was the substance of this institution? what enabled it in this short period to take an honorable place in the history of the russian proletariat, in the history of the russian revolution? the soviet organized the masses, conducted political strikes, led political demonstrations, tried to arm the workingmen. but other revolutionary organizations did the same things. the substance of the soviet was its effort to become _an organ of public authority_. the proletariat on one hand, the reactionary press on the other, have called the soviet "a labor government"; this only reflects the fact that the soviet was in reality _an embryo of a revolutionary government_. in so far as the soviet was in actual possession of authoritative power, it made use of it; in so far as the power was in the hands of the military and bureaucratic monarchy, the soviet fought to obtain it. prior to the soviet, there had been revolutionary organizations among the industrial workingmen, mostly of a social-democratic nature. but those were organizations _among_ the proletariat; their immediate aim was to _influence the masses_. the soviet is an organization _of_ the proletariat; its aim is to fight for _revolutionary power_. at the same time, the soviet was _an organized expression of the will of the proletariat as a class_. in its fight for power the soviet applied such methods as were naturally determined by the character of the proletariat as a class: its part in production; its numerical strength; its social homogeneity. in its fight for power the soviet has combined the direction of all the social activities of the working class, including decisions as to conflicts between individual representatives of capital and labor. this combination was by no means an artificial tactical attempt: it was a natural consequence of the situation of a class which, consciously developing and broadening its fight for its immediate interests, had been compelled by the logic of events to assume a leading position in the revolutionary struggle for power. the main weapon of the soviet was a political strike of the masses. the power of the strike lies in disorganizing the power of the government. the greater the "anarchy" created by a strike, the nearer its victory. this is true only where "anarchy" is not being created by anarchic actions. the class that puts into motion, day in and day out, the industrial apparatus and the governmental apparatus; the class that is able, by a sudden stoppage of work, to paralyze both industry and government, must be organized enough not to fall the first victim of the very "anarchy" it has created. the more effective the disorganization of government caused by a strike, the more the strike organization is compelled to assume governmental functions. the council of workmen's delegates introduces a free press. it organizes street patrols to secure the safety of the citizens. it takes over, to a greater or less extent, the post office, the telegraph, and the railroads. it makes an effort to introduce the eight hour workday. paralyzing the autocratic government by a strike, it brings its own democratic order into the life of the working city population. after january th the revolution had shown its power over the minds of the working masses. on june th, through the revolt of the potyomkin tavritchesky it had shown that it was able to become a material force. in the october strike it had shown that it could disorganize the enemy, paralyze his will and utterly humiliate him. by organizing councils of workmen's deputies all over the country, _it showed that it was able to create authoritative power_. revolutionary authority can be based only on active revolutionary force. whatever our view on the further development of the russian revolution, it is a fact that so far no social class besides the proletariat has manifested readiness to uphold a revolutionary authoritative power. the first act of the revolution was an encounter in the streets of the _proletariat_ with the monarchy; the first serious victory of the revolution was achieved through the _class-weapon of the proletariat_, the political strike; the first nucleus of a revolutionary government was _a proletarian representation_. the soviet is the first democratic power in modern russian history. the soviet is the organized power of the masses themselves over their component parts. this is a true, unadulterated democracy, without a two-chamber system, without a professional bureaucracy, with the right of the voters to recall their deputy any moment and to substitute another for him. through its members, through deputies elected by the workingmen, the soviet directs all the social activities of the proletariat as a whole and of its various parts; it outlines the steps to be taken by the proletariat, it gives them a slogan and a banner. this art of directing the activities of the masses on the basis of organized self-government, is here applied for the first time on russian soil. absolutism ruled the masses, but it did not direct them. it put mechanical barriers against the living creative forces of the masses, and within those barriers it kept the restless elements of the nation in an iron bond of oppression. the only mass absolutism ever directed was the army. but that was not directing, it was merely commanding. in recent years, even the directing of this atomized and hypnotized military mass has been slipping out of the hands of absolutism. liberalism never had power enough to command the masses, or initiative enough to direct them. its attitude towards mass-movements, even if they helped liberalism directly, was the same as towards awe-inspiring natural phenomena--earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. the proletariat appeared on the battlefield of the revolution as a self-reliant aggregate, totally independent from bourgeois liberalism. the soviet was a _class-organization_, this was the source of its fighting power. it was crushed in the first period of its existence not by lack of confidence on the part of the masses in the cities, but by the limitations of a purely urban revolution, by the relatively passive attitude of the village, by the backwardness of the peasant element of the army. the soviet's position among the city population was as strong as could be. the soviet was not an official representative of the entire half million of the working population in the capital; its organization embraced about two hundred thousand, chiefly industrial workers; and though its direct and indirect political influence was of a much wider range, there were thousands and thousands of proletarians (in the building trade, among domestic servants, day laborers, drivers) who were hardly, if at all, influenced by the soviet. there is no doubt, however, that the soviet represented the interests of _all_ these proletarian masses. there were but few adherents of the black hundred in the factories, and their number dwindled hour by hour. the proletarian masses of petersburg were solidly behind the soviet. among the numerous intellectuals of petersburg the soviet had more friends than enemies. thousands of students recognized the political leadership of the soviet and ardently supported it in its decisions. professional petersburg was entirely on the side of the soviet. the support by the soviet of the postal and telegraph strike won it the sympathy of the lower governmental officials. all the oppressed, all the unfortunate, all honest elements of the city, all those who were striving towards a better life, were instinctively or consciously on the side of the soviet. the soviet was actually or potentially a representative of an overwhelming majority of the population. its enemies in the capital would not have been dangerous had they not been protected by absolutism, which based its power on the most backward elements of an army recruited from peasants. the weakness of the soviet was not its own weakness, it was the weakness of a purely urban revolution. the fifty day period was the period of the greatest power of the revolution. _the soviet was its organ in the fight for public authority._ the class character of the soviet was determined by the class differentiation of the city population and by the political antagonism between the proletariat and the capitalistic bourgeoisie. this antagonism manifested itself even in the historically limited field of a struggle against absolutism. after the october strike, the capitalistic bourgeoisie consciously blocked the progress of the revolution, the petty middle class turned out to be a nonentity, incapable of playing an independent rôle. the real leader of the urban revolution was the proletariat. its class-organization was the organ of the revolution in its struggle for power. the struggle for power, for public authority--this is the central aim of the revolution. the fifty days of the soviet's life and its bloody finale have shown that urban russia is too narrow a basis for such a struggle, and that even within the limits of the urban revolution, a local organization cannot be the central leading body. for a national task the proletariat required an organization on a national scale. the petersburg soviet was a local organization, yet the need of a central organization was so great that it had to assume leadership on a national scale. it did what it could, still it remained primarily the _petersburg_ council of workmen's deputies. the urgency of an all-russian labor congress which undoubtedly would have had authority to form a central leading organ, was emphasized even at the time of the first soviet. the december collapse made its realization impossible. the idea remained, an inheritance of the fifty days. the idea of a soviet has become ingrained in the consciousness of the workingmen as the first prerequisite to revolutionary action of the masses. experience has shown that a soviet is not possible or desirable under all circumstances. the objective meaning of the soviet organization is to create conditions for disorganizing the government, for "anarchy," in other words for a revolutionary conflict. the present lull in the revolutionary movement, the mad triumph of reaction, make the existence of an open, elective, authoritative organization of the masses impossible. there is no doubt, however, that _the first new wave of the revolution will lead to the creation of soviets all over the country_. an all-russian soviet, organized by an all-russian labor congress, will assume leadership of the local elective organizations of the proletariat. names, of course, are of no importance; so are details of organization; the main thing is: a centralized democratic leadership in the struggle of the proletariat for a popular government. history does not repeat itself, and the new soviet will not have again to go through the experience of the fifty days. these, however, will furnish it a complete program of action. this program is perfectly clear. to establish revolutionary coöperation with the army, the peasantry, and the plebeian lower strata of the urban bourgeoisie. to abolish absolutism. to destroy the material organization of absolutism by reconstructing and partly dismissing the army. to break up the entire bureaucratic apparatus. to introduce an eight hour workday. to arm the population, starting with the proletariat. to turn the soviets into organs of revolutionary self-government in the cities. to create councils of peasants' delegates (peasants' committees) as local organs of the agrarian revolution. to organize elections to the constituent assembly and to conduct a preëlection campaign for a definite program on the part of the representatives of the people. it is easier to formulate such a program than to carry it through. if, however, the revolution will ever win, the proletariat cannot choose another. the proletariat will unfold revolutionary accomplishment such as the world has never seen. the history of fifty days will be only a poor page in the great book of the proletariat's struggle and ultimate triumph. preface to _my round trip_ trotzky was never personal. the emotional side of life seldom appears in his writings. his is the realm of social activities, social and political struggles. his writings breathe logic, not sentiment, facts, not poetry. the following preface to his _round trip_ is, perhaps, the only exception. it speaks of the man trotzky and his beliefs. note his confession of faith: "history is a tremendous mechanism serving our ideals." ... at the stockholm convention of the social-democratic party, some curious statistical data was circulated, showing the conditions under which the party of the proletariat was working: the convention as a whole, in the person of its members, had spent in prison one hundred and thirty-eight years and three and a half months. the convention had been in exile one hundred and forty-eight years and six and a half months. escaped from prison: once, eighteen members of the convention; twice, four members. escaped from exile: once, twenty-three; twice, five; three times, one member. the length of time the convention as a whole had been active in social-democratic work, was years. it follows that the time spent in prison and exile is about one-third of the time a social-democrat is active. but these figures are too optimistic. "the convention has been active in social-democratic work for years"--this means merely that the activities of those persons had been spread over so many years. their actual period of work must have been much shorter. possibly all these persons had worked, actually and directly, only one-sixth or one-tenth of the above time. such are conditions of underground activity. on the other hand, the time spent in prison and exile is real time: the convention had spent over fifty thousand days and nights behind iron bars, and more than that in barbarous corners of the country. perhaps i may give, in addition to these figures, some facts about myself. the author of these lines was arrested for the first time in january, , after working for ten months in the workmen's circles of nikolayev. he spent two and a half years in prison, and escaped from siberia after living there two years of his four years' exile. he was arrested the second time on december rd, , as a member of the petersburg council of workmen's deputies. the council had existed for fifty days. the arrested members of the soviet each spent days in prison, then they were sent to obdorsk "forever." ... each russian social-democrat who has worked in his party for ten years could give similar statistics about himself. the political helter-skelter which exists in russia since october th and which the gotha almanach has characterized with unconscious humor as "_a constitutional monarchy under an absolute tzar_," has changed nothing in our situation. this political order cannot reconcile itself with us, not even temporarily, as it is organically incapable of admitting any free activity of the masses. the simpletons and hypocrites who urge us to "keep within legal limits" remind one of marie antoinette who recommended the starving peasants to eat cake! one would think we suffer from an organic aversion for cake, a kind of incurable disease! one would think our lungs infected with an irresistible desire to breathe the atmosphere of the solitary dungeons in the fortress of peter and paul! one would think we have no other use for those endless hours pulled out of our lives by the jailers. we love our underground just as little as a drowning person loves the bottom of the sea. yet, we have as little choice, as, let us say directly, the absolutist order. being fully aware of this we can afford to be optimists even at a time when the underground tightens its grip around our necks with unrelenting grimness. it will not choke us, we know it! we shall survive! when the bones of all the great deeds which are being performed now by the princes of the earth, their servants and the servants of their servants will have turned to dust, when nobody will know the graves of many present parties with all their exploits--the cause we are serving will rule the world, and our party, now choking underground, will dissolve itself into humanity, for the first time its own master. history is a tremendous mechanism serving our ideals. its work is slow, barbarously slow, implacably cruel, yet the work goes on. we believe in it. only at moments, when this voracious monster drinks the living blood of our hearts to serve it as food, we wish to shout with all our might: _what thou dost, do quickly!_ paris, april / , . the lessons of the great year this essay was published in a new york russian newspaper on january th, , less than two months before the second russian revolution. trotzky then lived in new york. the essay shows how his contempt, even hatred, for the liberal parties in russia had grown since - . (january th, --january th, ) revolutionary anniversaries are not only days for reminiscence, they are days for summing up revolutionary experiences, especially for us russians. our history has not been rich. our so-called "national originality" consisted in being poor, ignorant, uncouth. it was the revolution of that first opened before us the great highway of political progress. on january th the workingman of petersburg knocked at the gate of the winter palace. on january th the entire russian people knocked at the gate of history. the crowned janitor did not respond to the knock. nine months later, however, on october th, he was compelled to open the heavy gate of absolutism. notwithstanding all the efforts of bureaucracy, a little slit stayed open--forever. the revolution was defeated. the same old forces and almost the same figures now rule russia that ruled her twelve years ago. yet the revolution has changed russia beyond recognition. the kingdom of stagnation, servitude, vodka and humbleness has become a kingdom of fermentation, criticism, fight. where once there was a shapeless dough--the impersonal, formless people, "holy russia,"--now social classes consciously oppose each other, political parties have sprung into existence, each with its program and methods of struggle. january th opens _a new russian history_. it is a line marked by the blood of the people. there is no way back from this line to asiatic russia, to the cursed practices of former generations. there is no way back. there will never be. not the liberal bourgeoisie, not the democratic groups of the lower bourgeoisie, not the radical intellectuals, not the millions of russian peasants, but the _russian proletariat_ has by its struggle started the new era in russian history. this is basic. on the foundation of this fact we, social-democrats, have built our conceptions and our tactics. on january th it was the priest gapon who happened to be at the head of the petersburg workers,--a fantastic figure, a combination of adventurer, hysterical enthusiast and impostor. his priest's robe was the last link that then connected the workingmen with the past, with "holy russia." nine months later, in the course of the october strike, the greatest political strike history has ever seen, there was at the head of the petersburg workingmen their own elective self-governing organization--the council of workmen's deputies. it contained many a workingman who had been on gapon's staff,--nine months of revolution had made those men grow, as they made grow the entire working class which the soviet represented. in the first period of the revolution, the activities of the proletariat were met with sympathy, even with support from liberal society. the milukovs hoped the proletariat would punch absolutism and make it more inclined to compromise with the bourgeoisie. yet absolutism, for centuries the only ruler of the people, was in no haste to share its power with the liberal parties. in october, , the bourgeoisie learned that it could not obtain power before the back-bone of tzarism was broken. this blessed thing could, evidently, be accomplished only by a victorious revolution. but the revolution put the working class in the foreground, it united it and solidified it not only in its struggle against tzarism, but also in its struggle against capital. the result was that each new revolutionary step of the proletariat in october, november and december, the time of the soviet, moved the liberals more and more in the direction of the monarchy. the hopes for revolutionary coöperation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat turned out a hopeless utopia. those who had not seen it then and had not understood it later, those who still dream of a "national" uprising against tzarism, do not understand the revolution. for them class struggle is a sealed book. at the end of the question became acute. the monarchy had learned by experience that the bourgeoisie would not support the proletariat in a decisive battle. the monarchy then decided to move against the proletariat with all its forces. the bloody days of december followed. the council of workmen's deputies was arrested by the ismailovski regiment which remained loyal to tzarism. the answer of the proletariat was momentous: the strike in petersburg, the insurrection in moscow, the storm of revolutionary movements in all industrial centers, the insurrection on the caucasus and in the lettish provinces. the revolutionary movement was crushed. many a poor "socialist" readily concluded from our december defeats that a revolution in russia was impossible without the support of the bourgeoisie. if this be true, it would only mean that a revolution in russia is impossible. our _upper industrial bourgeoisie_, the only class possessing actual power, is separated from the proletariat by an insurmountable barrier of class hatred, and it needs the monarchy as a pillar of order. the gutchkovs, krestovnikovs and ryabushinskys cannot fail to see in the proletariat their mortal foe. our _middle and lower industrial and commercial bourgeoisie_ occupies a very insignificant place in the economic life of the country, and is all entangled in the net of capital. the milukovs, the leaders of the lower middle class, are successful only in so far as they represent the interests of the upper bourgeoisie. this is why the cadet leader called the revolutionary banner a "red rag"; this is why he declared, after the beginning of the war, that if a revolution were necessary to secure victory over germany, he would prefer no victory at all. our _peasantry_ occupies a tremendous place in russian life. in it was shaken to its deepest foundations. the peasants were driving out their masters, setting estates on fire, seizing the land from the landlords. yes, the curse of the peasantry is that it is scattered, disjointed, backward. moreover, the interests of the various peasant groups do not coincide. the peasants arose and fought adroitly against their local slave-holders, yet they stopped in reverence before the all-russian slave-holder. the sons of the peasants in the army did not understand that the workingmen were shedding their blood not only for their own sake, but also for the sake of the peasants. the army was an obedient tool in the hands of tzarism. it crushed the labor revolution in december, . whoever thinks about the experiences of , whoever draws a line from that year to the present time, must see how utterly lifeless and pitiful are the hopes of our social-patriots for revolutionary coöperation between the proletariat and the liberal bourgeoisie. during the last twelve years big capital has made great conquests in russia. the middle and lower bourgeoisie has become still more dependent upon the banks and trusts. the working class, which had grown in numbers since , is now separated from the bourgeoisie by a deeper abyss than before. if a "national" revolution was a failure twelve years ago, there is still less hope for it at present. it is true in the last years that the cultural and political level of the peasantry has become higher. however, there is less hope now for a revolutionary uprising of the peasantry as a whole than there was twelve years ago. the only ally of the urban proletariat may be the proletarian and half-proletarian strata of the village. but, a skeptic may ask, is there then any hope for a victorious revolution in russia under these circumstances? one thing is clear--if a revolution comes, it will not be a result of coöperation between capital and labor. the experiences of show that this is a miserable utopia. to acquaint himself with those experiences, to study them is the duty of every thinking workingman who is anxious to avoid tragic mistakes. it is in this sense that we have said that revolutionary anniversaries are not only days for reminiscences, but also days for summing up revolutionary experiences. _gutchkov_, _ryabushinsky_ and _krestovnikov_ are representatives of big capital in russia. gutchkov is the leader of the moderately liberal party of octobrists. he was war minister in the first cabinet after the overthrow of the romanoffs. on the eve of a revolution this essay was written on march th, , when the first news of unrest in petrograd had reached new york. the streets of petrograd again speak the language of . as in the time of the russo-japanese war, the masses demand bread, peace, and freedom. as in , street cars are not running and newspapers do not appear. the workingmen let the steam out of the boilers, they quit their benches and walk out into the streets. the government mobilizes its cossacks. and as was in , only those two powers are facing each other in the streets--the revolutionary workingmen and the army of the tzar. the movement was provoked by lack of bread. this, of course, is not an accidental cause. in all the belligerent countries the lack of bread is the most immediate, the most acute reason for dissatisfaction and indignation among the masses. all the insanity of the war is revealed to them from this angle: it is impossible to produce necessities of life because one has to produce instruments of death. however, the attempts of the anglo-russian semi-official news agencies to explain the movement by a temporary shortage in food, or to snow storms that have delayed transportation, are one of the most ludicrous applications of the policy of the ostrich. the workingmen would not stop the factories, the street cars, the print shops and walk into the streets to meet tzarism face to face on account of snow storms which temporarily hamper the arrival of foodstuffs. people have a short memory. many of our own ranks have forgotten that the war found russia in a state of potent revolutionary ferment. after the heavy stupor of - , the proletariat gradually healed its wounds in the following years of industrial prosperity; the slaughter of strikers on the lena river in april, , awakened the revolutionary energy of the proletarian masses. a series of strikes followed. in the year preceding the world war, the wave of economic and political strikes resembled that of . when poincaré, the president of the french republic, came to petersburg in the summer of (evidently to talk over with the tzar how to free the small and weak nations) the russian proletariat was in a stage of extraordinary revolutionary tension, and the president of the french republic could see with his own eyes in the capital of his friend, the tzar, how the first barricades of the second russian revolution were being constructed. the war checked the rising revolutionary tide. we have witnessed a repetition of what happened ten years before, in the russo-japanese war. after the stormy strikes of , there had followed a year of almost unbroken political silence-- --the first year of the war. it took the workingmen of petersburg twelve months to orientate themselves in the war and to walk out into the streets with their demands and protests. january th, , was, so to speak, the official beginning of our first revolution. the present war is vaster than was the russo-japanese war. millions of soldiers have been mobilized by the government for the "defense of the fatherland." the ranks of the proletariat have thus been disorganized. on the other hand, the more advanced elements of the proletariat had to face and weigh in their minds a number of questions of unheard of magnitude. what is the cause of the war? shall the proletariat agree with the conception of "the defense of the fatherland"? what ought to be the tactics of the working-class in war time? in the meantime, the tzarism and its allies, the upper groups of the nobility and the bourgeoisie, had during the war completely exposed their true nature,--the nature of criminal plunderers, blinded by limitless greed and paralyzed by want of talent. the appetites for conquest of the governing clique grew in proportion as the people began to realize its complete inability to cope with the most elementary problems of warfare, of industry and supplies in war time. simultaneously, the misery of the people grew, deepened, became more and more acute,--a natural result of the war multiplied by the criminal anarchy of the rasputin tzarism. in the depths of the great masses, among people who may have never been reached by a word of propaganda, a profound bitterness accumulated under the stress of events. meantime the foremost ranks of the proletariat were finishing digesting the new events. the socialist proletariat of russia came to after the shock of the nationalist fall of the most influential part of the international, and decided that new times call us not to let up, but to increase our revolutionary struggle. the present events in petrograd and moscow are a result of this internal preparatory work. a disorganized, compromised, disjointed government on top. an utterly demoralized army. dissatisfaction, uncertainty and fear among the propertied classes. at the bottom, among the masses, a deep bitterness. a proletariat numerically stronger than ever, hardened in the fire of events. all this warrants the statement that we are witnessing the beginning of the second russian revolution. let us hope that many of us will be its participants. two faces (internal forces of the russian revolution) let us examine more closely what is going on. nicholas has been dethroned, and according to some information, is under arrest. the most conspicuous black hundred leaders have been arrested. some of the most hated have been killed. a new ministry has been formed consisting of octobrists, liberals and the radical kerensky. a general amnesty has been proclaimed. all these are facts, big facts. these are the facts that strike the outer world most. changes in the higher government give the bourgeoisie of europe and america an occasion to say that the revolution has won and is now completed. the tzar and his black hundred fought for their power, for this alone. the war, the imperialistic plans of the russian bourgeoisie, the interests of the allies, were of minor importance to the tzar and his clique. they were ready at any moment to conclude peace with the hohenzollerns and hapsburgs, to free their most loyal regiment for war against their own people. the progressive bloc of the duma mistrusted the tzar and his ministers. this bloc consisted of various parties of the russian bourgeoisie. the bloc had two aims: one, to conduct the war to a victorious end; another, to secure internal reforms: more order, control, accounting. a victory is necessary for the russian bourgeoisie to conquer markets, to increase their territories, to get rich. reforms are necessary primarily to enable the russian bourgeoisie to win the war. the progressive imperialistic bloc wanted _peaceful_ reforms. the liberals intended to exert a duma pressure on the monarchy and to keep it in check with the aid of the governments of great britain and france. they did not want a revolution. they knew that a revolution, bringing the working masses to the front, would be a menace to their domination, and primarily a menace to their imperialistic plans. the laboring masses, in the cities and in the villages, and even in the army itself, want peace. the liberals know it. this is why they have been enemies of the revolution all these years. a few months ago milukov declared in the duma: "if a revolution were necessary for victory, i would prefer no victory at all." yet the liberals are now in power--through the revolution. the bourgeois newspaper men see nothing but this fact. milukov, already in his capacity as a minister of foreign affairs, has declared that the revolution has been conducted in the name of a victory over the enemy, and that the new government has taken upon itself to continue the war to a victorious end. the new york stock exchange interpreted the revolution in this specific sense. there are clever people both on the stock exchange and among the bourgeois newspaper men. yet they are all amazingly stupid when they come to deal with mass-movements. they think that milukov manages the revolution, in the same sense as they manage their banks or news offices. they see only the liberal governmental reflection of the unfolding events, they notice only the foam on the surface of the historical torrent. the long pent-up dissatisfaction of the masses has burst forth so late, in the thirty-second month of the war, not because the masses were held by police barriers--those barriers had been badly shattered during the war--but because all liberal institutions and organs, together with their social-patriotic shadows, were exerting an enormous influence over the least enlightened elements of the workingmen, urging them to keep order and discipline in the name of "patriotism." hungry women were already walking out into the streets, and the workingmen were getting ready to uphold them by a general strike, while the liberal bourgeoisie, according to news reports, still issued proclamations and delivered speeches to check the movement,--resembling that famous heroine of dickens who tried to stem the tide of the ocean with a broom. the movement, however, took its course, from below, from the workingmen's quarters. after hours and days of uncertainty, of shooting, of skirmishes, the army joined in the revolution, from below, from the best of the soldier masses. the old government was powerless, paralyzed, annihilated. the tzar fled from the capital "to the front." the black hundred bureaucrats crept, like cockroaches, each into his corner. then, and only then, came the duma's turn to act. the tzar had attempted in the last minute to dissolve it. and the duma would have obeyed, "following the example of former years," had it been free to adjourn. the capitals, however, were already dominated by the revolutionary people, the same people that had walked out into the streets despite the wishes of the liberal bourgeoisie. the army was with the people. had not the bourgeoisie attempted to organize its own government, a revolutionary government would have emerged from the revolutionary working masses. the duma of june rd would never have dared to seize the power from the hands of tzarism. but it did not want to miss the chance offered by interregnum: the monarchy had disappeared, while a revolutionary government was not yet formed. contrary to all their part, contrary to their own policies and against their will, the liberals found themselves in possession of power. milukov now declares russia will continue the war "to the end." it is not easy for him so to speak: he knows that his words are apt to arouse the indignation of the masses against the new government. yet he had to speak to them--for the sake of the london, paris and american stock exchanges. it is quite possible that he cabled his declaration for foreign consumption only, and that he concealed it from his own country. milukov knows very well that _under given conditions he cannot continue the war, crush germany, dismember austria, occupy constantinople and poland_. the masses have revolted, demanding bread and peace. the appearance of a few liberals at the head of the government has not fed the hungry, has not healed the wounds of the people. to satisfy the most urgent, the most acute needs of the people, _peace_ must be restored. the liberal imperialistic bloc does not dare to speak of peace. they do not do it, first, on account of the allies. they do not do it, further, because the liberal bourgeoisie is to a great extent responsible before the people for the present war. the milukovs and gutchkovs, not less than the romanoff camarilla, have thrown the country into this monstrous imperialistic adventure. to stop the war, to return to the ante-bellum misery would mean that they have to account to the people for this undertaking. the milukovs and gutchkovs are afraid of the liquidation of the war not less than they were afraid of the revolution. this is their aspect in their new capacity, as the government of russia. they are compelled to continue the war, and they can have no hope of victory; they are afraid of the people, and people do not trust them. this is how karl marx characterized a similar situation: "from the very beginning ready to betray the people and to compromise with the crowned representatives of the old régime, because the bourgeoisie itself belongs to the old world; ... keeping a place at the steering wheel of the revolution not because the people were back of them, but because the people pushed them forward; ... having no faith in themselves, no faith in the people; grumbling against those above, trembling before those below; selfish towards both fronts and aware of their selfishness; revolutionary in the face of conservatives, and conservative in the face of revolutionists, with no confidence in their own slogans and with phrases instead of ideas; frightened by the world's storm and exploiting the world's storm,--vulgar through lack of originality, and original only in vulgarity; making profitable business out of their own desires, with no initiative, with no vocation for world-wide historic work ... a cursed senile creature condemned to direct and abuse in his own senile interests the first youthful movements of a powerful people,--a creature with no eyes, with no ears, with no teeth, with nothing whatever,--this is how the prussian bourgeoisie stood at the steering wheel of the prussian state after the march revolution." these words of the great master give a perfect picture of the russian liberal bourgeoisie, as it stands at the steering wheel of the government after _our_ march revolution. "with no faith in themselves, with no faith in the people, with no eyes, with no teeth." ... this is their political face. luckily for russia and europe, there is another face to the russian revolution, a genuine face: the cables have brought the news that the provisional government is opposed by a workmen's committee which has already raised a voice of protest against the liberal attempt to rob the revolution and to deliver the people to the monarchy. should the russian revolution stop to-day as the representatives of liberalism advocate, to-morrow the reaction of the tzar, the nobility and the bureaucracy would gather power and drive milukov and gutchkov from their insecure ministerial trenches, as did the prussian reaction years ago with the representatives of prussian liberalism. but the russian revolution will not stop. time will come, and the revolution will make a clean sweep of the bourgeois liberals blocking its way, as it is now making a clean sweep of the tzarism reaction. (published in new york on march , .) _june third_, , was the day on which, after the dissolution of the first and second dumas, the tzar's government, in defiance of the constitution, promulgated a new electoral law which eliminated from the russian quasi-parliament large groups of democratic voters, thus securing a "tame" majority obedient to the command of the government. to say "the duma of june third" is equivalent to saying: "a duma dominated by representatives of rich land-owners and big business," generally working hand in hand with autocracy, though pretending to be representatives of the people. in the duma of june third, the octobrists and all parties to the right of them were with the government, the constitutional democrats (cadets) and all parties to the left of them were in the opposition. the _progressive bloc_ was formed in the duma in . it included a number of liberal and conservative factions, together with the cadets, and was opposed to the government. its program was a cabinet responsible to the duma. the growing conflict an open conflict between the forces of the revolution, headed by the city proletariat and the anti-revolutionary liberal bourgeoisie temporarily at the head of the government, is more and more impending. it cannot be avoided. of course, the liberal bourgeoisie and the quasi-socialists of the vulgar type will find a collection of very touching slogans as to "national unity" against class divisions; yet no one has ever succeeded in removing social contrasts by conjuring with words or in checking the natural progress of revolutionary struggle. the internal history of unfolding events is known to us only in fragments, through casual remarks in the official telegrams. but even now it is apparent that on two points the revolutionary proletariat is bound to oppose the liberal bourgeoisie with ever-growing determination. the first conflict has already arisen around the question of the form of government. the russian bourgeoisie needs a monarchy. in all the countries pursuing an imperialistic policy, we observe an unusual increase of personal power. the policy of world usurpations, secret treaties and open treachery requires independence from parliamentary control and a guarantee against changes in policies caused by the change of cabinets. moreover, for the propertied classes the monarchy is the most secure ally in its struggle against the revolutionary onslaught of the proletariat. in russia both these causes are more effective than elsewhere. the russian bourgeoisie finds it impossible to deny the people universal suffrage, well aware that this would arouse opposition against the provisional government among the masses, and give prevalence to the left, the more determined wing of the proletariat in the revolution. even that monarch of the reserve, michael alexandrovitch, understands that he cannot reach the throne without having promised "universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage." it is the more essential for the bourgeoisie to create right now a monarchic counterbalance against the deepest social-revolutionary demands of the working masses. _formally_, in words, the bourgeoisie has agreed to leave the question of a form of government to the discretion of the constituent assembly. practically, however, the octobrist-cadet provisional government will turn all the preparatory work for the constituent assembly into a campaign in favor of a monarchy against a republic. the character of the constituent assembly will largely depend upon the character of those who convoke it. it is evident, therefore, that right now the revolutionary proletariat will have _to set up its own organs, the councils of workingmen's soldiers' and peasants' deputies, against the executive organs of the provisional government_. in this struggle the proletariat ought to unite about itself the rising masses of the people, with one aim in view--_to seize governmental power_. only a revolutionary labor government will have the desire and ability to give the country a thorough democratic cleansing during the work preparatory to the constituent assembly, to reconstruct the army from top to bottom, to turn it into _a revolutionary militia_ and to show the poorer peasants in practice that their only salvation is in a support of a revolutionary labor régime. a constituent assembly convoked after such preparatory work will truly reflect the revolutionary, creative forces of the country and become a powerful factor in the further development of the revolution. the second question that is bound to bring the internationally inclined socialist proletariat in opposition to the imperialistic liberal bourgeoisie, is _the question of war and peace_. (published in new york, march , .) war or peace? the question of chief interest, now, to the governments and the peoples of the world is, what will be the influence of the russian revolution on the war? will it bring peace nearer? or will the revolutionary enthusiasm of the people swing towards a more vigorous prosecution of the war? this is a great question. on its solution depends not only the outcome of the war, but the fate of the revolution itself. in , milukov, the present militant minister of foreign affairs, called the russo-japanese war an adventure and demanded its immediate cessation. this was also the spirit of the liberal and radical press. the strongest industrial organizations favored immediate peace in spite of unequaled disasters. why was it so? because they expected internal reforms. the establishment of a constitutional system, a parliamentary control over the budget and the state finances, a better school system and, especially, an increase in the land possessions of the peasants, would, they hoped, increase the prosperity of the population and create a _vast internal market_ for russian industry. it is true that even then, twelve years ago, the russian bourgeoisie was ready to usurp land belonging to others. it hoped, however, that abolition of feudal relations in the village would create a more powerful market than the annexation of manchuria or corea. the democratization of the country and liberation of the peasants, however, turned out to be a slow process. neither the tzar, nor the nobility, nor the bureaucracy were willing to yield any of their prerogatives. liberal exhortations were not enough to make them give up the machinery of the state and their land possessions. a revolutionary onslaught of the masses was required. this the bourgeoisie did not want. the agrarian revolts of the peasants, the ever growing struggle of the proletariat and the spread of insurrections in the army caused the liberal bourgeoisie to fall back into the camp of the tzarist bureaucracy and reactionary nobility. their alliance was sealed by the _coup d'état_ of june rd, . out of this _coup d'état_ emerged the third and the fourth dumas. the peasants received no land. the administrative system changed only in name, not in substance. the development of an internal market consisting of prosperous farmers, after the american fashion, did not take place. the capitalist classes, reconciled with the régime of june rd, turned their attention to the usurpation of foreign markets. a new era of russian imperialism ensues, an imperialism accompanied by a disorderly financial and military system and by insatiable appetites. gutchkov, the present war minister, was formerly a member of the committee on national defense, helping to make the army and the navy complete. milukov, the present minister of foreign affairs, worked out a program of world conquests which he advocated on his trips to europe. russian imperialism and his octobrist and cadet representatives bear a great part of the responsibility for the present war. by the grace of the revolution which they had not wanted and which they had fought, gutchkov and milukov are now in power. for the continuation of the war, for victory? of course! they are the same persons who had dragged the country into the war for the sake of the interests of capital. all their opposition to tzarism had its source in their unsatisfied imperialistic appetites. so long as the clique of nicholas ii. was in power, the interests of the dynasty and of the reactionary nobility were prevailing in russian foreign affairs. this is why berlin and vienna had hoped to conclude a separate peace with russia. now, purely imperialistic interests have superseded the tzarism interests; pure imperialism is written on the banner of the provisional government. "the government of the tzar is gone," the milukovs and gutchkovs say to the people, "now you must shed your blood for the common interests of the entire nation." those interests the imperialists understand as the reincorporation of poland, the conquest of galicia, constantinople, armenia, persia. this transition from an imperialism of the dynasty and the nobility to an imperialism of a purely bourgeois character, can never reconcile the russian proletariat to the war. an international struggle against the world slaughter and imperialism are now our task more than ever. the last despatches which tell of an anti-militaristic propaganda in the streets of petrograd show that our comrades are bravely doing their duty. _the imperialistic boasts of milukov to crush germany, austria and turkey are the most effective and most timely aid for the hohenzollerns and hapsburgs...._ milukov will now serve as a scare-crow in their hands. the liberal imperialistic government of russia has not yet started reform in its own army, yet it is already helping the hohenzollerns to raise the patriotic spirit and to mend the shattered "national unity" of the german people. should the german proletariat be given a right to think that all the russian people and the main force of the russian revolution, the proletariat, are behind the bourgeois government of russia, it would be a terrific blow to the men of our trend of mind, the revolutionary socialists of germany. to turn the russian proletariat into patriotic cannon food in the service of the russian liberal bourgeoisie would mean _to throw the german working masses into the camp of the chauvinists and for a long time to halt the progress of a revolution in germany_. the prime duty of the revolutionary proletariat in russia is to show that there is _no power_ behind the evil imperialistic will of the liberal bourgeoisie. the russian revolution has to show the entire world its real face. _the further progress of the revolutionary struggle in russia and the creation of a revolutionary labor government supported by the people will be a mortal blow to the hohenzollerns because it will give a powerful stimulus to the revolutionary movement of the german proletariat and of the labor masses of all the other countries._ if the first russian revolution of brought about revolutions in asia--in persia, turkey, china--the second russian revolution will be the beginning of a powerful social-revolutionary struggle in europe. only this struggle will bring real peace to the blood-drenched world. no, the russian proletariat will not allow itself to be harnessed to the chariot of milukov imperialism. the banner of russian social-democracy is now, more than ever before, glowing with bright slogans of inflexible internationalism: away with imperialistic robbers! long live a revolutionary labor government! long live peace and the brotherhood of nations! (published in new york, march , .) trotzky on the platform in petrograd (from a russian paper) trotzky, always trotzky. since i had seen him the last time, he has been advanced in rank: he has become the chairman of the petrograd soviet. he has succeeded tchcheidze, the wise, sober leader who has lost the confidence of the revolutionary masses. he holds the place of lenin, the recognized leader of the left wing of social-democracy, whose absence from the capital is due to external, accidental causes. it seems to me that trotzky has become more nervous, more gloomy, and more restrained. something like a freezing chill emanates from his deep and restless eyes; a cool, determined, ironical smile plays around his mobile jewish lips, and there is a chill in his well-balanced, clear-cut words which he throws into his audience with a peculiar calmness. he seems almost lonesome on the platform. only a small group of followers applaud. the others protest against his words or cast angry, restless glances at him. he is in a hostile gathering. he is a stranger. is he not also a stranger to those who applaud him and in whose name he speaks from this platform? calm and composed he looks at his adversaries, and you feel it is a peculiar joy for him to see the rage, the fear, the excitement his words provoke. he is a mephisto who throws words like bombs to create a war of brothers at the bedside of their sick mother. he knows in advance which words will have the greatest effect, which would provoke the most bitter resentment. and the more extreme, the more painful his words are, the firmer and stronger is his voice, the slower his speech, the more challenging his tone. he speaks a sentence, then he stops to wait till the storm is over, then he repeats his assertion, with sharper intonation and with more disdain in his tone. only his eyes become more nervous, and a peculiar disquieting fire is blazing in them. this time he does not speak; he reads a written declaration. he reads it with pauses, sometimes accentuating the words, sometimes passing over them quickly, but all the time he is aware of the effect and waits for a response. his voice is the voice of a prophet, a preacher: "petrograd is in danger! the revolution is in danger! the people are in danger!" ... he is a stranger on the platform, and yet--electric currents flow from him to his surroundings, creating sincere though primitive enthusiasm on one side, on the other anger and spite. he opens vast perspectives before the naïve faithful masses: "long live an immediate, honest, democratic peace!" "all power to the workmen's councils! all the land to the people!" index absolutism, rôle of, in outgrowing economic basis, ; in promoting industry and science, , ; as an end in itself, - . agrarian question, - . armament for the revolution, - . army, , , . bourgeoisie, imperialistic plans of, - ; afraid of peace, - ; reactionary, - ; responsible for the war, - . capitalism, preparing its own collapse, - ; and feudal reaction, - . cities, as scene of revolutionary battles, ; social structure of, - . class consciousness, of proletariat, as prerequisite to socialism, - . constituent assembly, as a revolutionary slogan, - . demonstrations, in the streets, - ; to become of nation-wide magnitude, . french revolution, - . gapon, , ; - . intelligentzia, . january ninth, ; - ; - . june third, . labor dictatorship, - ; crushing absolutism, abandoning its remnants, - ; introducing class politics, ; introducing class struggle in the village, - ; introducing collectivism and internationalism, ; abandoning distinction between minimum and maximum program, ; and eight hour workday, - ; and unemployment, - ; and agriculture, ; and collectivism, - ; and class consciousness, - ; incompatible with economic slavery, ; and agrarian question, - . liberalism, denying the existence of revolutionary masses, - ; defeated by events of january th, ; trying to "tame" revolutionary people, ; not reliable as partner in revolution, - ; - . manoeuvers, revolutionary, - . masses, drawn into the revolution, - ; as a political reality, - ; stirred by world-war, - . middle-class (_see_ bourgeoisie), weakness of, in russia, , . militia, - . "osvoboshdenie," , , . peasantry, as of no significance in revolution, - . poland, as possible revolutionary link between russia and europe, - . prerequisites to socialism, in relation to each other, - . proletariat, as a vanguard of the revolution, - ; rôle of, in events of january th, - ; stronger than bourgeoisie in russia, ; growing with capitalism, ; may sooner reach political supremacy in a backward country, - ; - ; as liberator of peasants, - ; as a class objectively opposed to capitalism, - ; to revolutionize european proletariat, - . revolution, in europe, as aid to socialism in russia, - ; may be result of shattered european equilibrium, - ; as result of russian revolution, - . revolution, in general, ; of bourgeois character, - . revolution, of _ _, - . revolution, of _ _, its causes, - ; social forces in, - ; to stir up revolution in germany, . social-democracy, foresaw revolution, - ; natural leader of the revolution, - . soviet, distinguishing russian revolution from that of _ _, ; short history of, ; general survey of the rôle of, - ; as class-organization, - ; as organ of political authority, - ; an imminent form of russian revolution, ; program of (outlined by trotzky for the future), - ; to fight against provisional government, . "spring," - ; ; . strike, political, as beginning of revolution, - ; , . struve, . technique, industrial, as prerequisite to socialism, ; - . "underground," and the revolutionist, - . war, russo-japanese, ; of the world, as influencing masses, - . witte, , . zemstvo, movement of, in _ _, - ; ; . transcriber's notes: obvious typesetting errors have been corrected. questionable or vintage spelling has been left as printed in the original publication. variations in spelling have been left as printed, unless otherwise noted in the following. in the original publication, each chapter listed in the contents section was preceded by a "title page" containing only the chapter title as listed in the contents, followed by a blank page. the chapter title was repeated on the first page in each chapter. the chapter title pages have not been reproduced in this transcription. page : the following phrase, beginning a quotation, has no closing quotation mark in the original publication: "the struggle for the interests of russia as a whole...." page : transcribed "on" as "of" to match the quoted phrase on p. : "private ownership of the means of production". originally printed as: "'private ownership on the means of production'". page : transcribed "caucasas" as "caucasus". as originally printed: "the insurrection on the caucasas and in the lettish provinces." page : supplied "to" in the following phrase, shown in brackets: "yet he had to speak [to] them...." +---------------------------------------------------------+ | | | transcriber's note: | | a number of obvious typographical errors have been | | corrected in this text. for a complete list, please | | see the bottom of this document. | | corrections listed in the existing errata at the | | end of this book have been applied to the text. | | | +---------------------------------------------------------+ the practice and theory of bolshevism bertrand russell london: george allen & unwin ltd. ruskin house, museum street, w.c. _first published november _ _reprinted february _ (_all rights reserved_) preface the russian revolution is one of the great heroic events of the world's history. it is natural to compare it to the french revolution, but it is in fact something of even more importance. it does more to change daily life and the structure of society: it also does more to change men's beliefs. the difference is exemplified by the difference between marx and rousseau: the latter sentimental and soft, appealing to emotion, obliterating sharp outlines; the former systematic like hegel, full of hard intellectual content, appealing to historic necessity and the technical development of industry, suggesting a view of human beings as puppets in the grip of omnipotent material forces. bolshevism combines the characteristics of the french revolution with those of the rise of islam; and the result is something radically new, which can only be understood by a patient and passionate effort of imagination. before entering upon any detail, i wish to state, as clearly and unambiguously as i can, my own attitude towards this new thing. by far the most important aspect of the russian revolution is as an attempt to realize communism. i believe that communism is necessary to the world, and i believe that the heroism of russia has fired men's hopes in a way which was essential to the realization of communism in the future. regarded as a splendid attempt, without which ultimate success would have been very improbable, bolshevism deserves the gratitude and admiration of all the progressive part of mankind. but the method by which moscow aims at establishing communism is a pioneer method, rough and dangerous, too heroic to count the cost of the opposition it arouses. i do not believe that by this method a stable or desirable form of communism can be established. three issues seem to me possible from the present situation. the first is the ultimate defeat of bolshevism by the forces of capitalism. the second is the victory of the bolshevists accompanied by a complete loss of their ideals and a régime of napoleonic imperialism. the third is a prolonged world-war, in which civilization will go under, and all its manifestations (including communism) will be forgotten. it is because i do not believe that the methods of the third international can lead to the desired goal that i have thought it worth while to point out what seem to me undesirable features in the present state of russia. i think there are lessons to be learnt which must be learnt if the world is ever to achieve what is desired by those in the west who have sympathy with the original aims of the bolsheviks. i do not think these lessons can be learnt except by facing frankly and fully whatever elements of failure there are in russia. i think these elements of failure are less attributable to faults of detail than to an impatient philosophy, which aims at creating a new world without sufficient preparation in the opinions and feelings of ordinary men and women. but although i do not believe that communism can be realized immediately by the spread of bolshevism, i do believe that, if bolshevism falls, it will have contributed a legend and a heroic attempt without which ultimate success might never have come. a fundamental economic reconstruction, bringing with it very far-reaching changes in ways of thinking and feeling, in philosophy and art and private relations, seems absolutely necessary if industrialism is to become the servant of man instead of his master. in all this, i am at one with the bolsheviks; politically, i criticize them only when their methods seem to involve a departure from their own ideals. there is, however, another aspect of bolshevism from which i differ more fundamentally. bolshevism is not merely a political doctrine; it is also a religion, with elaborate dogmas and inspired scriptures. when lenin wishes to prove some proposition, he does so, if possible, by quoting texts from marx and engels. a full-fledged communist is not merely a man who believes that land and capital should be held in common, and their produce distributed as nearly equally as possible. he is a man who entertains a number of elaborate and dogmatic beliefs--such as philosophic materialism, for example--which may be true, but are not, to a scientific temper, capable of being known to be true with any certainty. this habit, of militant certainty about objectively doubtful matters, is one from which, since the renaissance, the world has been gradually emerging, into that temper of constructive and fruitful scepticism which constitutes the scientific outlook. i believe the scientific outlook to be immeasurably important to the human race. if a more just economic system were only attainable by closing men's minds against free inquiry, and plunging them back into the intellectual prison of the middle ages, i should consider the price too high. it cannot be denied that, over any short period of time, dogmatic belief is a help in fighting. if all communists become religious fanatics, while supporters of capitalism retain a sceptical temper, it may be assumed that the communists will win, while in the contrary case the capitalists would win. it seems evident, from the attitude of the capitalist world to soviet russia, of the entente to the central empires, and of england to ireland and india, that there is no depth of cruelty, perfidy or brutality from which the present holders of power will shrink when they feel themselves threatened. if, in order to oust them, nothing short of religious fanaticism will serve, it is they who are the prime sources of the resultant evil. and it is permissible to hope that, when they have been dispossessed, fanaticism will fade, as other fanaticisms have faded in the past. the present holders of power are evil men, and the present manner of life is doomed. to make the transition with a minimum of bloodshed, with a maximum of preservation of whatever has value in our existing civilization, is a difficult problem. it is this problem which has chiefly occupied my mind in writing the following pages. i wish i could think that its solution would be facilitated by some slight degree of moderation and humane feeling on the part of those who enjoy unjust privileges in the world as it is. the present work is the outcome of a visit to russia, supplemented by much reading and discussion both before and after. i have thought it best to record what i saw separately from theoretical considerations, and i have endeavoured to state my impressions without any bias for or against the bolsheviks. i received at their hands the greatest kindness and courtesy, and i owe them a debt of gratitude for the perfect freedom which they allowed me in my investigations. i am conscious that i was too short a time in russia to be able to form really reliable judgments; however, i share this drawback with most other westerners who have written on russia since the october revolution. i feel that bolshevism is a matter of such importance that it is necessary, for almost every political question, to define one's attitude in regard to it; and i have hopes that i may help others to define their attitude, even if only by way of opposition to what i have written. i have received invaluable assistance from my secretary, miss d.w. black, who was in russia shortly after i had left. the chapter on art and education is written by her throughout. neither is responsible for the other's opinions. bertrand russell _september, ._ contents page preface part i the present condition of russia i. what is hoped from bolshevism ii. general characteristics iii. lenin, trotsky and gorky iv. art and education v. communism and the soviet constitution vi. the failure of russian industry vii. daily life in moscow viii. town and country ix. international policy part ii bolshevik theory i. the materialistic theory of history ii. deciding forces in politics iii. bolshevik criticism of democracy iv. revolution and dictatorship v. mechanism and the individual vi. why russian communism has failed vii. conditions for the success of communism part i the present condition of russia i what is hoped from bolshevism to understand bolshevism it is not sufficient to know facts; it is necessary also to enter with sympathy or imagination into a new spirit. the chief thing that the bolsheviks have done is to create a hope, or at any rate to make strong and widespread a hope which was formerly confined to a few. this aspect of the movement is as easy to grasp at a distance as it is in russia--perhaps even easier, because in russia present circumstances tend to obscure the view of the distant future. but the actual situation in russia can only be understood superficially if we forget the hope which is the motive power of the whole. one might as well describe the thebaid without mentioning that the hermits expected eternal bliss as the reward of their sacrifices here on earth. i cannot share the hopes of the bolsheviks any more than those of the egyptian anchorites; i regard both as tragic delusions, destined to bring upon the world centuries of darkness and futile violence. the principles of the sermon on the mount are admirable, but their effect upon average human nature was very different from what was intended. those who followed christ did not learn to love their enemies or to turn the other cheek. they learned instead to use the inquisition and the stake, to subject the human intellect to the yoke of an ignorant and intolerant priesthood, to degrade art and extinguish science for a thousand years. these were the inevitable results, not of the teaching, but of fanatical belief in the teaching. the hopes which inspire communism are, in the main, as admirable as those instilled by the sermon on the mount, but they are held as fanatically, and are likely to do as much harm. cruelty lurks in our instincts, and fanaticism is a camouflage for cruelty. fanatics are seldom genuinely humane, and those who sincerely dread cruelty will be slow to adopt a fanatical creed. i do not know whether bolshevism can be prevented from acquiring universal power. but even if it cannot, i am persuaded that those who stand out against it, not from love of ancient injustice, but in the name of the free spirit of man, will be the bearers of the seeds of progress, from which, when the world's gestation is accomplished, new life will be born. the war has left throughout europe a mood of disillusionment and despair which calls aloud for a new religion, as the only force capable of giving men the energy to live vigorously. bolshevism has supplied the new religion. it promises glorious things: an end of the injustice of rich and poor, an end of economic slavery, an end of war. it promises an end of the disunion of classes which poisons political life and threatens our industrial system with destruction. it promises an end to commercialism, that subtle falsehood that leads men to appraise everything by its money value, and to determine money value often merely by the caprices of idle plutocrats. it promises a world where all men and women shall be kept sane by work, and where all work shall be of value to the community, not only to a few wealthy vampires. it is to sweep away listlessness and pessimism and weariness and all the complicated miseries of those whose circumstances allow idleness and whose energies are not sufficient to force activity. in place of palaces and hovels, futile vice and useless misery, there is to be wholesome work, enough but not too much, all of it useful, performed by men and women who have no time for pessimism and no occasion for despair. the existing capitalist system is doomed. its injustice is so glaring that only ignorance and tradition could lead wage-earners to tolerate it. as ignorance diminishes, tradition becomes weakened, and the war destroyed the hold upon men's minds of everything merely traditional. it may be that, through the influence of america, the capitalist system will linger for another fifty years; but it will grow continually weaker, and can never recover the position of easy dominance which it held in the nineteenth century. to attempt to bolster it up is a useless diversion of energies which might be expended upon building something new. whether the new thing will be bolshevism or something else, i do not know; whether it will be better or worse than capitalism, i do not know. but that a radically new order of society will emerge, i feel no doubt. and i also feel no doubt that the new order will be either some form of socialism or a reversion to barbarism and petty war such as occurred during the barbarian invasion. if bolshevism remains the only vigorous and effective competitor of capitalism, i believe that no form of socialism will be realized, but only chaos and destruction. this belief, for which i shall give reasons later, is one of the grounds upon which i oppose bolshevism. but to oppose it from the point of view of a supporter of capitalism would be, to my mind, utterly futile and against the movement of history in the present age. the effect of bolshevism as a revolutionary hope is greater outside russia than within the soviet republic. grim realities have done much to kill hope among those who are subject to the dictatorship of moscow. yet even within russia, the communist party, in whose hands all political power is concentrated, still lives by hope, though the pressure of events has made the hope severe and stern and somewhat remote. it is this hope that leads to concentration upon the rising generation. russian communists often avow that there is little hope for those who are already adult, and that happiness can only come to the children who have grown up under the new régime and been moulded from the first to the group-mentality that communism requires. it is only after the lapse of a generation that they hope to create a russia that shall realize their vision. in the western world, the hope inspired by bolshevism is more immediate, less shot through with tragedy. western socialists who have visited russia have seen fit to suppress the harsher features of the present régime, and have disseminated a belief among their followers that the millennium would be quickly realized there if there were no war and no blockade. even those socialists who are not bolsheviks for their own country have mostly done very little to help men in appraising the merits or demerits of bolshevik methods. by this lack of courage they have exposed western socialism to the danger of becoming bolshevik through ignorance of the price that has to be paid and of the uncertainty as to whether the desired goal will be reached in the end. i believe that the west is capable of adopting less painful and more certain methods of reaching socialism than those that have seemed necessary in russia. and i believe that while some forms of socialism are immeasurably better than capitalism, others are even worse. among those that are worse i reckon the form which is being achieved in russia, not only in itself, but as a more insuperable barrier to further progress. in judging of bolshevism from what is to be seen in russia at present, it is necessary to disentangle various factors which contribute to a single result. to begin with, russia is one of the nations that were defeated in the war; this has produced a set of circumstances resembling those found in germany and austria. the food problem, for example, appears to be essentially similar in all three countries. in order to arrive at what is specifically bolshevik, we must first eliminate what is merely characteristic of a country which has suffered military disaster. next we come to factors which are russian, which russian communists share with other russians, but not with other communists. there is, for example, a great deal of disorder and chaos and waste, which shocks westerners (especially germans) even when they are in close political sympathy with the bolsheviks. my own belief is that, although, with the exception of a few very able men, the russian government is less efficient in organization than the germans or the americans would be in similar circumstances, yet it represents what is most efficient in russia, and does more to prevent chaos than any possible alternative government would do. again, the intolerance and lack of liberty which has been inherited from the tsarist régime is probably to be regarded as russian rather than communist. if a communist party were to acquire power in england, it would probably be met by a less irresponsible opposition, and would be able to show itself far more tolerant than any government can hope to be in russia if it is to escape assassination. this, however, is a matter of degree. a great part of the despotism which characterizes the bolsheviks belongs to the essence of their social philosophy, and would have to be reproduced, even if in a milder form, wherever that philosophy became dominant. it is customary among the apologists of bolshevism in the west to excuse its harshness on the ground that it has been produced by the necessity of fighting the entente and its mercenaries. undoubtedly it is true that this necessity has produced many of the worst elements in the present state of affairs. undoubtedly, also, the entente has incurred a heavy load of guilt by its peevish and futile opposition. but the expectation of such opposition was always part of bolshevik theory. a general hostility to the first communist state was both foreseen and provoked by the doctrine of the class war. those who adopt the bolshevik standpoint must reckon with the embittered hostility of capitalist states; it is not worth while to adopt bolshevik methods unless they can lead to good in spite of this hostility. to say that capitalists are wicked and we have no responsibility for their acts is unscientific; it is, in particular, contrary to the marxian doctrine of economic determinism. the evils produced in russia by the enmity of the entente are therefore to be reckoned as essential in the bolshevik method of transition to communism, not as specially russian. i am not sure that we cannot even go a step further. the exhaustion and misery caused by unsuccessful war were necessary to the success of the bolsheviks; a prosperous population will not embark by such methods upon a fundamental economic reconstruction. one can imagine england becoming bolshevik after an unsuccessful war involving the loss of india--no improbable contingency in the next few years. but at present the average wage-earner in england will not risk what he has for the doubtful gain of a revolution. a condition of widespread misery may, therefore, be taken as indispensable to the inauguration of communism, unless, indeed, it were possible to establish communism more or less peacefully, by methods which would not, even temporarily, destroy the economic life of the country. if the hopes which inspired communism at the start, and which still inspire its western advocates, are ever to be realized, the problem of minimizing violence in the transition must be faced. unfortunately, violence is in itself delightful to most really vigorous revolutionaries, and they feel no interest in the problem of avoiding it as far as possible. hatred of enemies is easier and more intense than love of friends. but from men who are more anxious to injure opponents than to benefit the world at large no great good is to be expected. ii general characteristics i entered soviet russia on may th and recrossed the frontier on june th. the russian authorities only admitted me on the express condition that i should travel with the british labour delegation, a condition with which i was naturally very willing to comply, and which that delegation kindly allowed me to fulfil. we were conveyed from the frontier to petrograd, as well as on subsequent journeys, in a special _train de luxe_; covered with mottoes about the social revolution and the proletariat of all countries; we were received everywhere by regiments of soldiers, with the internationale being played on the regimental band while civilians stood bare-headed and soldiers at the salute; congratulatory orations were made by local leaders and answered by prominent communists who accompanied us; the entrances to the carriages were guarded by magnificent bashkir cavalry-men in resplendent uniforms; in short, everything was done to make us feel like the prince of wales. innumerable functions were arranged for us: banquets, public meetings, military reviews, etc. the assumption was that we had come to testify to the solidarity of british labour with russian communism, and on that assumption the utmost possible use was made of us for bolshevik propaganda. we, on the other hand, desired to ascertain what we could of russian conditions and russian methods of government, which was impossible in the atmosphere of a royal progress. hence arose an amicable contest, degenerating at times into a game of hide and seek: while they assured us how splendid the banquet or parade was going to be, we tried to explain how much we should prefer a quiet walk in the streets. i, not being a member of the delegation, felt less obligation than my companions did to attend at propaganda meetings where one knew the speeches by heart beforehand. in this way, i was able, by the help of neutral interpreters, mostly english or american, to have many conversations with casual people whom i met in the streets or on village greens, and to find out how the whole system appears to the ordinary non-political man and woman. the first five days we spent in petrograd, the next eleven in moscow. during this time we were living in daily contact with important men in the government, so that we learned the official point of view without difficulty. i saw also what i could of the intellectuals in both places. we were all allowed complete freedom to see politicians of opposition parties, and we naturally made full use of this freedom. we saw mensheviks, social revolutionaries of different groups, and anarchists; we saw them without the presence of any bolsheviks, and they spoke freely after they had overcome their initial fears. i had an hour's talk with lenin, virtually _tête-à-tête_; i met trotsky, though only in company; i spent a night in the country with kamenev; and i saw a great deal of other men who, though less known outside russia, are of considerable importance in the government. at the end of our time in moscow we all felt a desire to see something of the country, and to get in touch with the peasants, since they form about per cent, of the population. the government showed the greatest kindness in meeting our wishes, and it was decided that we should travel down the volga from nijni novgorod to saratov, stopping at many places, large and small, and talking freely with the inhabitants. i found this part of the time extraordinarily instructive. i learned to know more than i should have thought possible of the life and outlook of peasants, village schoolmasters, small jew traders, and all kinds of people. unfortunately, my friend, clifford allen, fell ill, and my time was much taken up with him. this had, however, one good result, namely, that i was able to go on with the boat to astrakhan, as he was too ill to be moved off it. this not only gave me further knowledge of the country, but made me acquainted with sverdlov, acting minister of transport, who was travelling on the boat to organize the movement of oil from baku up the volga, and who was one of the ablest as well as kindest people whom i met in russia. one of the first things that i discovered after passing the red flag which marks the frontier of soviet russia, amid a desolate region of marsh, pine wood, and barbed wire entanglements, was the profound difference between the theories of actual bolsheviks and the version of those theories current among advanced socialists in this country. friends of russia here think of the dictatorship of the proletariat as merely a new form of representative government, in which only working men and women have votes, and the constituencies are partly occupational, not geographical. they think that "proletariat" means "proletariat," but "dictatorship" does not quite mean "dictatorship." this is the opposite of the truth. when a russian communist speaks of dictatorship, he means the word literally, but when he speaks of the proletariat, he means the word in a pickwickian sense. he means the "class-conscious" part of the proletariat, _i.e._, the communist party.[ ] he includes people by no means proletarian (such as lenin and tchicherin) who have the right opinions, and he excludes such wage-earners as have not the right opinions, whom he classifies as lackeys of the _bourgeoisie_. the communist who sincerely believes the party creed is convinced that private property is the root of all evil; he is so certain of this that he shrinks from no measures, however harsh, which seem necessary for constructing and preserving the communist state. he spares himself as little as he spares others. he works sixteen hours a day, and foregoes his saturday half-holiday. he volunteers for any difficult or dangerous work which needs to be done, such as clearing away piles of infected corpses left by kolchak or denikin. in spite of his position of power and his control of supplies, he lives an austere life. he is not pursuing personal ends, but aiming at the creation of a new social order. the same motives, however, which make him austere make him also ruthless. marx has taught that communism is fatally predestined to come about; this fits in with the oriental traits in the russian character, and produces a state of mind not unlike that of the early successors of mahomet. opposition is crushed without mercy, and without shrinking from the methods of the tsarist police, many of whom are still employed at their old work. since all evils are due to private property, the evils of the bolshevik régime while it has to fight private property will automatically cease as soon as it has succeeded. these views are the familiar consequences of fanatical belief. to an english mind they reinforce the conviction upon which english life has been based ever since , that kindliness and tolerance are worth all the creeds in the world--a view which, it is true, we do not apply to other nations or to subject races. in a very novel society it is natural to seek for historical parallels. the baser side of the present russian government is most nearly paralleled by the directoire in france, but on its better side it is closely analogous to the rule of cromwell. the sincere communists (and all the older members of the party have proved their sincerity by years of persecution) are not unlike the puritan soldiers in their stern politico-moral purpose. cromwell's dealings with parliament are not unlike lenin's with the constituent assembly. both, starting from a combination of democracy and religious faith, were driven to sacrifice democracy to religion enforced by military dictatorship. both tried to compel their countries to live at a higher level of morality and effort than the population found tolerable. life in modern russia, as in puritan england, is in many ways contrary to instinct. and if the bolsheviks ultimately fall, it will be for the reason for which the puritans fell: because there comes a point at which men feel that amusement and ease are worth more than all other goods put together. far closer than any actual historical parallel is the parallel of plato's republic. the communist party corresponds to the guardians; the soldiers have about the same status in both; there is in russia an attempt to deal with family life more or less as plato suggested. i suppose it may be assumed that every teacher of plato throughout the world abhors bolshevism, and that every bolshevik regards plato as an antiquated _bourgeois_. nevertheless, the parallel is extraordinarily exact between plato's republic and the régime which the better bolsheviks are endeavouring to create. bolshevism is internally aristocratic and externally militant. the communists in many ways resemble the british public-school type: they have all the good and bad traits of an aristocracy which is young and vital. they are courageous, energetic, capable of command, always ready to serve the state; on the other hand, they are dictatorial, lacking in ordinary consideration for the plebs. they are practically the sole possessors of power, and they enjoy innumerable advantages in consequence. most of them, though far from luxurious, have better food than other people. only people of some political importance can obtain motor-cars or telephones. permits for railway journeys, for making purchases at the soviet stores (where prices are about one-fiftieth of what they are in the market), for going to the theatre, and so on, are, of course, easier to obtain for the friends of those in power than for ordinary mortals. in a thousand ways, the communists have a life which is happier than that of the rest of the community. above all, they are less exposed to the unwelcome attentions of the police and the extraordinary commission. the communist theory of international affairs is exceedingly simple. the revolution foretold by marx, which is to abolish capitalism throughout the world, happened to begin in russia, though marxian theory would seem to demand that it should begin in america. in countries where the revolution has not yet broken out, the sole duty of a communist is to hasten its advent. agreements with capitalist states can only be make-shifts, and can never amount on either side to a sincere peace. no real good can come to any country without a bloody revolution: english labour men may fancy that a peaceful evolution is possible, but they will find their mistake. lenin told me that he hopes to see a labour government in england, and would wish his supporters to work for it, but solely in order that the futility of parliamentarism may be conclusively demonstrated to the british working man. nothing will do any real good except the arming of the proletariat and the disarming of the _bourgeoisie_. those who preach anything else are social traitors or deluded fools. for my part, after weighing this theory carefully, and after admitting the whole of its indictment of _bourgeois_ capitalism, i find myself definitely and strongly opposed to it. the third international is an organization which exists to promote the class-war and to hasten the advent of revolution everywhere. my objection is not that capitalism is less bad than the bolsheviks believe, but that socialism is less good, not in its best form, but in the only form which is likely to be brought about by war. the evils of war, especially of civil war, are certain and very great; the gains to be achieved by victory are problematical. in the course of a desperate struggle, the heritage of civilization is likely to be lost, while hatred, suspicion, and cruelty become normal in the relations of human beings. in order to succeed in war, a concentration of power is necessary, and from concentration of power the very same evils flow as from the capitalist concentration of wealth. for these reasons chiefly, i cannot support any movement which aims at world revolution. the damage to civilization done by revolution in one country may be repaired by the influence of another in which there has been no revolution; but in a universal cataclysm civilization might go under for a thousand years. but while i cannot advocate world revolution, i cannot escape from the conclusion that the governments of the leading capitalist countries are doing everything to bring it about. abuse of our power against germany, russia, and india (to say nothing of any other countries) may well bring about our downfall, and produce those very evils which the enemies of bolshevism most dread. the true communist is thoroughly international. lenin, for example, so far as i could judge, is not more concerned with the interests of russia than with those of other countries; russia is, at the moment, the protagonist of the social revolution, and, as such, valuable to the world, but lenin would sacrifice russia rather than the revolution, if the alternative should ever arise. this is the orthodox attitude, and is no doubt genuine in many of the leaders. but nationalism is natural and instinctive; through pride in the revolution, it grows again even in the breasts of communists. through the polish war, the bolsheviks have acquired the support of national feeling, and their position in the country has been immensely strengthened. the only time i saw trotsky was at the opera in moscow. the british labour delegation were occupying what had been the tsar's box. after speaking with us in the ante-chamber, he stepped to the front of the box and stood with folded arms while the house cheered itself hoarse. then he spoke a few sentences, short and sharp, with military precision, winding up by calling for "three cheers for our brave fellows at the front," to which the audience responded as a london audience would have responded in the autumn of . trotsky and the red army undoubtedly now have behind them a great body of nationalist sentiment. the reconquest of asiatic russia has even revived what is essentially an imperialist way of feeling, though this would be indignantly repudiated by many of those in whom i seemed to detect it. experience of power is inevitably altering communist theories, and men who control a vast governmental machine can hardly have quite the same outlook on life as they had when they were hunted fugitives. if the bolsheviks remain in power, it is much to be feared that their communism will fade, and that they will increasingly resemble any other asiatic government--for example, our own government in india. footnotes: [ ] see the article "on the rôle of the communist party in the proletarian revolution," in _theses presented to the second congress of the communist international, petrograd-moscow, july, _--a valuable work which i possess only in french. iii lenin, trotsky and gorky soon after my arrival in moscow i had an hour's conversation with lenin in english, which he speaks fairly well. an interpreter was present, but his services were scarcely required. lenin's room is very bare; it contains a big desk, some maps on the walls, two book-cases, and one comfortable chair for visitors in addition to two or three hard chairs. it is obvious that he has no love of luxury or even comfort. he is very friendly, and apparently simple, entirely without a trace of _hauteur_. if one met him without knowing who he was, one would not guess that he is possessed of great power or even that he is in any way eminent. i have never met a personage so destitute of self-importance. he looks at his visitors very closely, and screws up one eye, which seems to increase alarmingly the penetrating power of the other. he laughs a great deal; at first his laugh seems merely friendly and jolly, but gradually i came to feel it rather grim. he is dictatorial, calm, incapable of fear, extraordinarily devoid of self-seeking, an embodied theory. the materialist conception of history, one feels, is his life-blood. he resembles a professor in his desire to have the theory understood and in his fury with those who misunderstand or disagree, as also in his love of expounding, i got the impression that he despises a great many people and is an intellectual aristocrat. the first question i asked him was as to how far he recognized the peculiarity of english economic and political conditions? i was anxious to know whether advocacy of violent revolution is an indispensable condition of joining the third international, although i did not put this question directly because others were asking it officially. his answer was unsatisfactory to me. he admitted that there is little chance of revolution in england now, and that the working man is not yet disgusted with parliamentary government. but he hopes that this result may be brought about by a labour ministry. he thinks that, if mr. henderson, for instance, were to become prime minister, nothing of importance would be done; organized labour would then, so he hopes and believes, turn to revolution. on this ground, he wishes his supporters in this country to do everything in their power to secure a labour majority in parliament; he does not advocate abstention from parliamentary contests, but participation with a view to making parliament obviously contemptible. the reasons which make attempts at violent revolution seem to most of us both improbable and undesirable in this country carry no weight with him, and seem to him mere _bourgeois_ prejudices. when i suggested that whatever is possible in england can be achieved without bloodshed, he waved aside the suggestion as fantastic. i got little impression of knowledge or psychological imagination as regards great britain. indeed the whole tendency of marxianism is against psychological imagination, since it attributes everything in politics to purely material causes. i asked him next whether he thought it possible to establish communism firmly and fully in a country containing such a large majority of peasants. he admitted that it was difficult, and laughed over the exchange the peasant is compelled to make, of food for paper; the worthlessness of russian paper struck him as comic. but he said--what is no doubt true--that things will right themselves when there are goods to offer to the peasant. for this he looks partly to electrification in industry, which, he says, is a technical necessity in russia, but will take ten years to complete.[ ] he spoke with enthusiasm, as they all do, of the great scheme for generating electrical power by means of peat. of course he looks to the raising of the blockade as the only radical cure; but he was not very hopeful of this being achieved thoroughly or permanently except through revolutions in other countries. peace between bolshevik russia and capitalist countries, he said, must always be insecure; the entente might be led by weariness and mutual dissensions to conclude peace, but he felt convinced that the peace would be of brief duration. i found in him, as in almost all leading communists, much less eagerness than existed in our delegation for peace and the raising of the blockade. he believes that nothing of real value can be achieved except through world revolution and the abolition of capitalism; i felt that he regarded the resumption of trade with capitalist countries as a mere palliative of doubtful value. he described the division between rich and poor peasants, and the government propaganda among the latter against the former, leading to acts of violence which he seemed to find amusing. he spoke as though the dictatorship over the peasant would have to continue a long time, because of the peasant's desire for free trade. he said he knew from statistics (what i can well believe) that the peasants have had more to eat these last two years than they ever had before, "and yet they are against us," he added a little wistfully. i asked him what to reply to critics who say that in the country he has merely created peasant proprietorship, not communism; he replied that that is not quite the truth, but he did not say what the truth is.[ ] the last question i asked him was whether resumption of trade with capitalist countries, if it took place, would not create centres of capitalist influence, and make the preservation of communism more difficult? it had seemed to me that the more ardent communists might well dread commercial intercourse with the outer world, as leading to an infiltration of heresy, and making the rigidity of the present system almost impossible. i wished to know whether he had such a feeling. he admitted that trade would create difficulties, but said they would be less than those of the war. he said that two years ago neither he nor his colleagues thought they could survive against the hostility of the world. he attributes their survival to the jealousies and divergent interests of the different capitalist nations; also to the power of bolshevik propaganda. he said the germans had laughed when the bolsheviks proposed to combat guns with leaflets, but that the event had proved the leaflets quite as powerful. i do not think he recognizes that the labour and socialist parties have had any part in the matter. he does not seem to know that the attitude of british labour has done a great deal to make a first-class war against russia impossible, since it has confined the government to what could be done in a hole-and-corner way, and denied without a too blatant mendacity. he thoroughly enjoys the attacks of lord northcliffe, to whom he wishes to send a medal for bolshevik propaganda. accusations of spoliation, he remarked, may shock the _bourgeois_, but have an opposite effect upon the proletarian. i think if i had met him without knowing who he was, i should not have guessed that he was a great man; he struck me as too opinionated and narrowly orthodox. his strength comes, i imagine, from his honesty, courage, and unwavering faith--religious faith in the marxian gospel, which takes the place of the christian martyr's hopes of paradise, except that it is less egotistical. he has as little love of liberty as the christians who suffered under diocletian, and retaliated when they acquired power. perhaps love of liberty is incompatible with whole-hearted belief in a panacea for all human ills. if so, i cannot but rejoice in the sceptical temper of the western world. i went to russia a communist; but contact with those who have no doubts has intensified a thousandfold my own doubts, not as to communism in itself, but as to the wisdom of holding a creed so firmly that for its sake men are willing to inflict widespread misery. trotsky, whom the communists do not by any means regard as lenin's equal, made more impression upon me from the point of view of intelligence and personality, though not of character. i saw too little of him, however, to have more than a very superficial impression. he has bright eyes, military bearing, lightning intelligence and magnetic personality. he is very good-looking, with admirable wavy hair; one feels he would be irresistible to women. i felt in him a vein of gay good humour, so long as he was not crossed in any way. i thought, perhaps wrongly, that his vanity was even greater than his love of power--the sort of vanity that one associates with an artist or actor. the comparison with napoleon was forced upon one. but i had no means of estimating the strength of his communist conviction, which may be very sincere and profound. an extraordinary contrast to both these men was gorky, with whom i had a brief interview in petrograd. he was in bed, apparently very ill and obviously heart-broken. he begged me, in anything i might say about russia, always to emphasize what russia has suffered. he supports the government--as i should do, if i were a russian--not because he thinks it faultless, but because the possible alternatives are worse. one felt in him a love of the russian people which makes their present martyrdom almost unbearable, and prevents the fanatical faith by which the pure marxians are upheld. i felt him the most lovable, and to me the most sympathetic, of all the russians i saw. i wished for more knowledge of his outlook, but he spoke with difficulty and was constantly interrupted by terrible fits of coughing, so that i could not stay. all the intellectuals whom i met--a class who have suffered terribly--expressed their gratitude to him for what he has done on their behalf. the materialistic conception of history is all very well, but some care for the higher things of civilization is a relief. the bolsheviks are sometimes said to have done great things for art, but i could not discover that they had done more than preserve something of what existed before. when i questioned one of them on the subject, he grew impatient, and said: "we haven't time for a new art, any more than for a new religion." unavoidably, although the government favours art as much as it can, the atmosphere is one in which art cannot flourish, because art is anarchic and resistant to organization. gorky has done all that one man could to preserve the intellectual and artistic life of russia. i feared that he was dying, and that, perhaps, it was dying too. but he recovered, and i hope it will recover also. footnotes: [ ] electrification is desired not merely for reorganizing industry, but in order to industrialize agriculture. in _theses presented to the second congress of the communist international_ (an instructive little book, which i shall quote as _theses_), it is said in an article on the agrarian question that socialism will not be secure till industry is reorganized on a new basis with "general application of electric energy in all branches of agriculture and rural economy," which "alone can give to the towns the possibility of offering to backward rural districts a technical and social aid capable of determining an extraordinary increase of productivity of agricultural and rural labour, and of engaging the small cultivators, in their own interest, to pass progressively to a collectivist mechanical cultivation" (p. of french edition). [ ] in _theses_ (p. ) it is said: "it would be an irreparable error ... not to admit the gratuitous grant of part of the expropriated lands to poor and even well-to-do peasants." iv art and education it has often been said that, whatever the inadequacy of bolshevik organization in other fields, in art and in education at least they have made great progress. to take first of all art: it is true that they began by recognizing, as perhaps no other revolutionary government would, the importance and spontaneity of the artistic impulse, and therefore while they controlled or destroyed the counter-revolutionary in all other social activities, they allowed the artist, whatever his political creed, complete freedom to continue his work. moreover, as regards clothing and rations they treated him especially well. this, and the care devoted to the upkeep of churches, public monuments, and museums, are well-known facts, to which there has already been ample testimony. the preservation of the old artistic community practically intact was the more remarkable in view of the pronounced sympathy of most of them with the old régime. the theory, however, was that art and politics belonged to two separate realms; but great honour would of course be the portion of those artists who would be inspired by the revolution. three years' experience, however, have proved the falsity of this doctrine and led to a divorce between art and popular feeling which a sensitive observer cannot fail to remark. it is glaringly apparent in the hitherto most vital of all russian arts, the theatre. the artists have continued to perform the old classics in tragedy or comedy, and the old-style operette. the theatre programmes have remained the same for the last two years, and, but for the higher standard of artistic performance, might belong to the theatres of paris or london. as one sits in the theatre, one is so acutely conscious of the discrepancy between the daily life of the audience and that depicted in the play that the latter seems utterly dead and meaningless. to some of the more fiery communists it appears that a mistake has been made. they complain that _bourgeois_ art is being preserved long after its time, they accuse the artists of showing contempt for their public, of being as untouched by the revolutionary mood as an elderly _bourgeoise_ bewailing the loss of her personal comfort; they would like to see only the revolutionary mood embodied in art, and to achieve this would make a clean sweep, enforcing the writing and performance of nothing but revolutionary plays and the painting of revolutionary pictures. nor can it be argued that they are wrong as to the facts: it is plain that the preservation of the old artistic tradition has served very little purpose; but on the other hand it is equally plain that an artist cannot be drilled like a military recruit. there is, fortunately, no sign that these tactics will be directly adopted, but in an indirect fashion they are already being applied. an artist is not to blame if his temperament leads him to draw cartoons of leading bolsheviks, or satirize the various comical aspects--and they are many--of the soviet régime. to force such a man, however, to turn his talent only against denikin, yudenitch and kolchak, or the leaders of the entente, is momentarily good for communism, but it is discouraging to the artist, and may prove in the long run bad for art, and possibly for communism also. it is plain from the religious nature of communism in russia, that such controlling of the impulse to artistic creation is inevitable, and that propaganda art alone can flourish in such an atmosphere. for example, no poetry or literature that is not orthodox will reach the printing press. it is so easy to make the excuse of lack of paper and the urgent need for manifestoes. thus there may well come to be a repetition of the attitude of the mediæval church to the sagas and legends of the people, except that, in this case, it is the folk tales which will be preserved, and the more sensitive and civilized products banned. the only poet who seems to be much spoken of at present in russia is one who writes rough popular songs. there are revolutionary odes, but one may hazard a guess that they resemble our patriotic war poetry. i said that this state of affairs may in the long run be bad for art, but the contrary may equally well prove to be the truth. it is of course discouraging and paralysing to the old-style artist, and it is death to the old individual art which depended on subtlety and oddity of temperament, and arose very largely from the complicated psychology of the idle. there it stands, this old art, the purest monument to the nullity of the art-for-art's-sake doctrine, like a rich exotic plant of exquisite beauty, still apparently in its glory, till one perceives that the roots are cut, and that leaf by leaf it is gradually fading away. but, unlike the puritans in this respect, the bolsheviks have not sought to dig up the roots, and there are signs that the paralysis is merely temporary. moreover, individual art is not the only form, and in particular the plastic arts have shown that they can live by mass action, and flourish under an intolerant faith. communist artists of the future may erect public buildings surpassing in beauty the mediæval churches, they may paint frescoes, organize pageants, make homeric songs about their heroes. communist art will begin, and is beginning now, in the propaganda pictures, and stories such as those designed for peasants and children. there is, for instance, a kind of rake's progress or "how she became a communist," in which the entente leaders make a sorry and grotesque appearance. lenin and trotsky already figure in woodcuts as moses and aaron, deliverers of their people, while the mother and child who illustrate the statistics of the maternity exhibition have the grace and beauty of mediæval madonnas. russia is only now emerging from the middle ages, and the church tradition in painting is passing with incredible smoothness into the service of communist doctrine. these pictures have, too, an oriental flavour: there are brown madonnas in the russian churches, and such an one illustrates the statistics of infant mortality in india, while the russian mother, broad-footed, in gay petticoat and kerchief, sits in a starry meadow suckling her baby from a very ample white breast. i think that this movement towards the church tradition may be unconscious and instinctive, and would perhaps be deplored by many communists, for whom grandiose bad rodin statuary and the crudity of cubism better express what they mean by revolution. but this revolution is russian and not french, and its art, if all goes well, should inevitably bear the popular russian stamp. it is would-be primitive and popular art that is vulgar. such at least is the reflection engendered by an inspection of russian peasant work as compared with the spirit of _children's tales_. the russian peasant's artistic impulse is no legend. besides the carving and embroidery which speak eloquently to peasant skill, one observes many instances in daily life. he will climb down, when his slowly-moving train stops by the wayside, to gather branches and flowers with which he will decorate the railway carriage both inside and out, he will work willingly at any task which has beauty for its object, and was all too prone under the old régime to waste his time and his employer's material in fashioning small metal or wooden objects with his hands. if the _bourgeois_ tradition then will not serve, there is a popular tradition which is still live and passionate and which may perhaps persist. unhappily it has a formidable enemy in the organization and development of industry, which is far more dangerous to art than communist doctrine. indeed, industry in its early stages seems everywhere doomed to be the enemy of beauty and instinctive life. one might hope that this would not prove to be so in russia, the first socialist state, as yet unindustrial, able to draw on the industrial experience of the whole world, were it not that one discovers with a certain misgiving in the bolshevik leaders the rasping arid temperament of those to whom the industrial machine is an end in itself, and, in addition, reflects that these industrially minded men have as yet no practical experience, nor do there exist men of goodwill to help them. it does not seem reasonable to hope that russia can pass through the period of industrialization without a good deal of mismanagement, involving waste resulting in too long hours, child labour and other evils with which the west is all too familiar. what the bolsheviks would not therefore willingly do to art, the juggernaut which they are bent on setting in motion may accomplish for them. the next generation in russia will have to consist of practical hard-working men, the old-style artists will die off and successors will not readily arise. a state which is struggling with economic difficulties is bound to be slow to admit an artistic vocation, since this involves exemption from practical work. moreover the majority of minds always turn instinctively to the real need of the moment. a man therefore who is adapted by talent and temperament to becoming an opera singer, will under the pressure of communist enthusiasm and government encouragement turn his attention to economics. (i am here quoting an actual instance.) the whole russian people at this stage in their development strike one as being forced by the logic of their situation to make a similar choice. it may be all to the good that there should be fewer professional artists, since some of the finest work has been done by men and groups of men to whom artistic expression was only a pastime. they were not hampered by the solemnity and reverence for art which too often destroy the spontaneity of the professional. indeed a revival of this attitude to art is one of the good results which may be hoped for from a communist revolution in a more advanced industrial community. there the problem of education will be to stimulate the creative impulses towards art and science so that men may know how to employ their leisure hours. work in the factory can never be made to provide an adequate outlet. the only hope, if men are to remain human beings under industrialism, is to reduce hours to the minimum. but this is only possible when production and organization are highly efficient, which will not be the case for a long time in russia. hence not only does it appear that the number of artists will grow less, but that the number of people undamaged in their artistic impulses and on that account able to create or appreciate as amateurs is likely to be deplorably small. it is in this damaging effect of industry on human instinct that the immediate danger to art in russia lies. the effect of industry on the crafts is quite obvious. a craftsman who is accustomed to work with his hands, following the tradition developed by his ancestors, is useless when brought face to face with a machine. and the man who can handle the machine will only be concerned with quantity and utility in the first instance. only gradually do the claims of beauty come to be recognized. compare the modern motor car with the first of its species, or even, since the same law seems to operate in nature, the prehistoric animal with its modern descendant. the same relation exists between them as between man and the ape, or the horse and the hipparion. the movement of life seems to be towards ever greater delicacy and complexity, and man carries it forward in the articles that he makes and the society that he develops. industry is a new tool, difficult to handle, but it will produce just as beautiful objects as did the mediæval builder and craftsman, though not until it has been in being for a long time and belongs to tradition. one may expect, therefore, that while the crafts in russia will lose in artistic value, the drama, sculpture and painting and all those arts which have nothing to do with the machine and depend entirely upon mental and spiritual inspiration will receive an impetus from the communist faith. whether the flowering period will be long or short depends partly on the political situation, but chiefly on the rapidity of industrial development. it may be that the machine will ultimately conquer the communist faith and grind out the human impulses, and russia become during this transition period as inartistic and soulless as was america until quite recent years. one would like to hope that mechanical progress will be swift and social idealism sufficiently strong to retain control. but the practical difficulties are almost insuperable. such signs of the progress of art as it is possible to notice at this early stage would seem to bear out the above argument. for instance, an attempt is being made to foster the continuation of peasant embroidery, carving, &c., in the towns. it is done by people who have evidently lost the tradition already. they are taught to copy the models which are placed in the peasant museum, but there is no comparison between the live little wooden lady who smiles beneath the glass case, and the soulless staring-eyed creature who is offered for sale, nor between the quite ordinary carved fowl one may buy and the amusing life-like figure one may merely gaze at. but when one comes to art directly inspired by communism it is a different story. apart from the propaganda pictures already referred to, there are propaganda plays performed by the red army in its spare moments, and there are the mass pageant plays performed on state occasions. i had the good fortune to witness one of each kind. the play was called _zarevo_ (the dawn), and was performed on a saturday night on a small stage in a small hall in an entirely amateur fashion. it represented russian life just before the revolution. it was intense and tragic and passionately acted. dramatic talent is not rare in russia. almost the only comic relief was provided by the tsarist police, who made one appearance towards the end, got up like comic military characters in a musical comedy--just as, in mediæval miracle plays, the comic character was satan. the play's intention was to show a typical russian working-class family. there were the old father, constantly drunk on vodka, alternately maudlin and scolding; the old mother; two sons, the one a communist and the other an anarchist; the wife of the communist, who did dressmaking; her sister, a prostitute; and a young girl of _bourgeois_ family, also a communist, involved in a plot with the communist son, who was of course the hero of the play. the first act revealed the stern and heroic communist maintaining his views despite the reproaches of father and mother and the nagging of his wife. it showed also the anarchist brother (as might be expected from the bolshevik hostility to anarchism) as an unruly, lazy, ne'er-do-well, with a passionate love for sonia, the young _bourgeoise_, which was likely to become dangerous if not returned. she, on the other hand, obviously preferred the communist. it was clear that he returned her love, but it was not quite clear that he would wish the relation to be anything more than platonic comradeship in the service of their common ideal. an unsuccessful strike, bringing want and danger from the police, together with increasing jealousy on the part of the anarchist, led up to the tragic dénouement. i was not quite definite as to how this was brought about. all violent action was performed off the stage, and this made the plot at times difficult to follow. but it seemed that the anarchist in a jealous rage forged a letter from his brother to bring sonia to a rendezvous, and there murdered her, at the same time betraying his brother to the police. when the latter came to effect his arrest, and accuse him also, as the most likely person, of the murder, the anarchist was seized with remorse and confessed. both were therefore led away together. once the plot is sketched, the play calls for no comment. it had not great merit, though it is unwise to hazard a judgment on a play whose dialogue was not fully interpreted, but it was certainly real, and the link between audience and performers was established as it never seemed to be in the professional theatre. after the performance, the floor was cleared for dancing, and the audience were in a mood of thorough enjoyment. the pageant of the "world commune," which was performed at the opening of the third international congress in petrograd, was a still more important and significant phenomenon. i do not suppose that anything of the kind has been staged since the days of the mediæval mystery plays. it was, in fact, a mystery play designed by the high priests of the communist faith to instruct the people. it was played on the steps of an immense white building that was once the stock exchange, a building with a classical colonnade on three sides of it, with a vast flight of steps in front, that did not extend the whole width of the building but left at each side a platform that was level with the floor of the colonnade. in front of this building a wide road ran from a bridge over one arm of the river to a bridge over the other, so that the stretches of water and sky on either side seemed to the eye of imagination like the painted wings of a gigantic stage. two battered red columns of fantastic design, that were once light towers to guide ships, stood on either side midway between the extremities of the building and the water, but on the opposite side of the road. these two towers were beflagged and illuminated and carried the limelight, and between and behind them was gathered a densely packed audience of forty or fifty thousand people. the play began at sundown, while the sky was still red away to the right and the palaces on the far bank to the left still aglow with the setting sun, and it continued under the magic of the darkening sky. at first the beauty and grandeur of the setting drew the attention away from the performers, but gradually one became aware that on the platform before the columns kings and queens and courtiers in sumptuous conventional robes, and attended by soldiers, were conversing in dumb show with one another. a few climbed the steps of a small wooden platform that was set up in the middle, and one indicated by a lifted hand that here should be built a monument to the power of capitalism over the earth. all gave signs of delight. sentimental music was heard, and the gay company fell to waltzing away the hours. meanwhile, from below on the road level, there streamed out of the darkness on either side of the building and up the half-lit steps, their fetters ringing in harmony with the music, the enslaved and toiling masses coming in response to command to build the monument for their masters. it is impossible to describe the exquisite beauty of the slow movement of those dark figures aslant the broad flight of steps; individual expressions were of course indistinguishable, and yet the movement and attitude of the groups conveyed pathos and patient endurance as well as any individual speech or gesture in the ordinary theatre. some groups carried hammer and anvil, and others staggered under enormous blocks of stone. love for the ballet has perhaps made the russians understand the art of moving groups of actors in unison. as i watched these processions climbing the steps in apparently careless and spontaneous fashion, and yet producing so graceful a result, i remembered the mad leap of the archers down the stage in _prince igor_, which is also apparently careless and spontaneous and full of wild and irregular beauty, yet never varies a hair-breadth from one performance to the next. for a time the workers toiled in the shadow in their earthly world, and dancing continued in the lighted paradise of the rulers above, until presently, in sign that the monument was complete, a large yellow disc was hoisted amid acclamation above the highest platform between the columns. but at the same moment a banner was uplifted amongst the people, and a small figure was seen gesticulating. angry fists were shaken and the banner and speaker disappeared, only to reappear almost immediately in another part of the dense crowd. again hostility, until finally among the french workers away up on the right, the first communist manifesto found favour. rallying around their banner the _communards_ ran shouting down the steps, gathering supporters as they came. above, all is confusion, kings and queens scuttling in unroyal fashion with flying velvet robes to safe citadels right and left, while the army prepares to defend the main citadel of capitalism with its golden disc of power. the _communards_ scale the steps to the fortress which they finally capture, haul down the disc and set their banner in its place. the merry music of the _carmagnole_ is heard, and the victors are seen expressing their delight by dancing first on one foot and then on the other, like marionettes. below, the masses dance with them in a frenzy of joy. but a pompous procession of prussian legions is seen approaching, and, amid shrieks and wails of despair, the people are driven back, and their leaders set in a row and shot. thereafter came one of the most moving scenes in the drama. several dark-clad women appeared carrying a black pall supported on sticks, which they set in front of the bodies of the leaders so that it stood out, an irregular pointed black shape against the white columns behind. but for this melancholy monument the stage was now empty. thick clouds of black smoke arose from braziers on either side and obscured the steps and the platform. through the smoke came the distant sound of chopin's _marche funèbre_, and as the air became clearer white figures could be dimly seen moving around the black pall in a solemn dance of mourning. behind them the columns shone ghostly and unreal against the glimmering mauve rays of an uncertain and watery dawn. the second part of the pageant opened in july . once again the rulers were feasting and the workers at toil, but the scene was enlivened by the presence of the leaders of the second international, a group of decrepit professorial old men, who waddled in in solemn procession carrying tomes full of international learning. they sat in a row between the rulers and the people, deep in study, spectacles on nose. the call to war was the signal for a dramatic appeal from the workers to these leaders, who refused to accept the red flag, but weakly received patriotic flags from their respective governments. jaurès, elevated to be the symbol of protest, towered above the people, crying in a loud voice, but fell back immediately as the assassin's shot rang out. then the people divided into their national groups and the war began. it was at this point that "god save the king" was played as the english soldiers marched out, in a comic manner which made one think of it as "_gawd_ save the king." other national anthems were burlesqued in a similar fashion, but none quite so successfully. a ridiculous effigy of the tsar with a knout in his hand now occupied the symbolic position and dominated the scene. the incidents of the war which affected russia were then played. spectacular cavalry charges on the road, marching soldiers, batteries of artillery, a pathetic procession of cripples and nurses, and other scenes too numerous to describe, made up that part of the pageant devoted to the war. then came the russian revolution in all its stages. cars dashed by full of armed men, red flags appeared everywhere, the people stormed the citadel and hauled down the effigy of the tsar. the kerensky government assumed control and drove them forth to war again, but soon they returned to the charge, destroyed the provisional government, and hoisted all the emblems of the russian soviet republic. the entente leaders, however, were seen preparing their troops for battle, and the pageant went on to show the formation of the red army under its emblem the red star. white figures with golden trumpets appeared foretelling victory for the proletariat. the last scene, the world commune, is described in the words of the abstract, taken from a russian newspaper, as follows:-- cannon shots announce the breaking of the blockade against soviet russia, and the victory of the world proletariat. the red army returns from the front, and passes in triumphant review before the leaders of the revolution. at their feet lie the crowns of kings and the gold of the bankers. ships draped with flags are seen carrying workers from the west. the workers of the whole world, with the emblems of labour, gather for the celebration of the world commune. in the heavens luminous inscriptions in different languages appear, greeting the congress: "long live the third international! workers of the world, unite! triumph to the sounds of the hymn of the world commune, the 'international'." even so glowing an account, however, hardly does it justice. it had the pomp and majesty of the day of judgment itself. rockets climbed the skies and peppered them with a thousand stars, fireworks blazed on all sides, garlanded and beflagged ships moved up and down the river, chariots bearing the emblems of prosperity, grapes and corn, travelled slowly along the road. the eastern peoples came carrying gifts and emblems. the actors, massed upon the steps, waved triumphant hands, trumpets sounded, and the song of the international from ten thousand throats rose like a mighty wave engulfing the whole. though the end of this drama may have erred on the side of the grandiose, this may perhaps be forgiven the organizers in view of the occasion for which they prepared it. nothing, however, could detract from the beauty and dramatic power of the opening and of many of the scenes. moreover, the effects obtained by movement in the mass were almost intoxicating. the first entrance of the masses gave a sense of dumb and patient force that was moving in the extreme, and the frenzied delight of the dancing crowd at the victory of the french _communards_ stirred one to ecstasy. the pageant lasted for five hours or more, and was as exhausting emotionally as the passion play is said to be. i had the vision of a great period of communist art, more especially of such open-air spectacles, which should have the grandeur and scope and eternal meaning of the plays of ancient greece, the mediæval mysteries, or the shakespearean theatre. in building, writing, acting, even in painting, work would be done, as it once was, by groups, not by one hand or mind, and evolution would proceed slowly until once again the individual emerged from the mass. in considering education under the bolshevik régime, the same two factors which i have already dealt with in discussing art, namely industrial development and the communist doctrine, must be taken into account. industrial development is in reality one of the tenets of communism, but as it is one which in russia is likely to endanger the doctrine as a whole i have thought it better to consider it as a separate item. as in the matter of art, so in education, those who have given unqualified praise seem to have taken the short and superficial view. it is hardly necessary to launch into descriptions of the crèches, country homes or palaces for children, where montessori methods prevail, where the pupils cultivate their little gardens, model in plasticine, draw and sing and act, and dance their eurythmic dances barefoot on floors once sacred to the tread of the nobility. i saw a reception and distributing house in petrograd with which no fault could be found from the point of view of scientific organization. the children were bright-eyed and merry, and the rooms airy and clean. i saw, too, a performance by school children in moscow which included some quite wonderful eurythmic dancing, in particular an interpretation of grieg's _tanz in der halle des bergkönigs_ by the dalcroze method, but with a colour and warmth which were russian, and in odd contrast to the mathematical precision associated with most dalcroze performances. but in spite of the obvious merit of such institutions as exist, misgivings would arise. to begin with, it must be remembered that it is necessary first to admit that children should be delivered up almost entirely to the state. nominally, the mother still comes to see her child in these schools, but in actual fact, the drafting of children to the country must intervene, and the whole temper of the authorities seemed to be directed towards breaking the link between mother and child. to some this will seem an advantage, and it is a point which admits of lengthy discussion, but as it belongs rather to the question of women and the family under communism, i can do no more than mention it here. then, again, it must be remembered that the tactics of the bolsheviks towards such schools as existed under the old régime in provincial towns and villages, have not been the same as their tactics towards the theatres. the greater number of these schools are closed, in part, it would seem, from lack of personnel, and in part from fear of counter-revolutionary propaganda. the result is that, though those schools which they have created are good and organized on modern lines, on the whole there would seem to be less diffusion of child education than before. in this, as in most other departments, the bolsheviks show themselves loath to attempt anything which cannot be done on a large scale and impregnated with communist doctrine. it goes without saying that communist doctrine is taught in schools, as christianity has been taught hitherto, moreover the communist teachers show bitter hostility to other teachers who do not accept the doctrine. at the children's entertainment alluded to above, the dances and poems performed had nearly all some close relation to communism, and a teacher addressed the children for something like an hour and a half on the duties of communists and the errors of anarchism. this teaching of communism, however necessary it may appear for the building of the communist state of the future, does seem to me to be an evil in that it is done emotionally and fanatically, with an appeal to hate and militant ardour rather than to constructive reason. it binds the free intellect and destroys initiative. an industrial state needs not only obedient and patient workers and artists, it needs also men and women with initiative in scientific research. it is idle to provide channels for scientific research later if it is to be choked at the source. that source is an enquiring and free intellect unhampered by iron dogma. beneficial to artistic and emotional development therefore, the teaching of communism as a faith may well be most pernicious to the scientific and intellectual side of education, and will lead direct to the pragmatist view of knowledge and scientific research which the church and the capitalist already find it so convenient to adopt. but to come to the chief and most practical question, the relation of education to industry. sooner or later education in russia must become subordinate to the needs of industrial development. that the bolsheviks already realize this is proved by the articles of lunacharsky which recently appeared in _le phare_ (geneva). it was the spectre of industry that haunted me throughout the consideration of education as in the consideration of art, and what i have said above of its dangers to the latter seems to me also to apply here. montessori schools belong, in my view, to that stage in industrial development when education is directed as much towards leisure occupations as towards preparation for professional life. possibly the fine flower of useless scientific enquiry belongs to this stage also. nobody in russia is likely to have much leisure for a good many years to come, if the bolshevik programme of industrial development is efficiently carried out. and there seemed to me to be something pathetic and almost cruel in this varied and agreeable education of the child, when one reflected on the long hours of grinding toil to which he was soon to be subject in workshop or factory. for i repeat that i do not believe industrial work in the early days of industry can be made tolerable to the worker. once again i experienced the dread of seeing the ideals of the russian revolutionaries go down before the logic of necessity. they are beginning to pride themselves on being hard, practical men, and it seems quite reasonable to fear that they should come to regard this full and humane development of the child as a mere luxury and ultimately neglect it. worse still, the few of these schools which already exist may perhaps become exclusive to the communists and their children, or that company of samurai which is to leaven and govern the mass of the people. if so, they will soon come to resemble our public schools, in that they will prepare, in an artificial play atmosphere, men who will pass straight to the position of leaders, while the portion of the proletariat who serve under them will be reading and writing, just so much technical training as is necessary, and communist doctrine. this is a nightmare hypothesis, but the difficulties of the practical problem seem to warrant its entertainment. the number of people in russia who can even read and write is extremely small, the need to get them employed industrially as rapidly as possible is very great, hence the system of education which develops out of this situation cannot be very ambitious or enlightened. further it will have to continue over a sufficiently long period of time to allow of the risk of its becoming stable and traditional. in adult education already the pupil comes for a short period, learns communism, reading and writing--there is hardly time to give him much more--and returns to leaven the army or his native village. in achieving this the bolsheviks are already doing a very important and valuable work, but they cannot hope for a long while to become the model of public instruction which they have hitherto been represented to be. and the conditions of their becoming so ultimately are adherence to their ideals through a very long period of stress, and a lessening of fanaticism in their communist teaching, conditions which, unhappily, seem to be mutually incompatible. the whole of the argument set out in this chapter may be summed up in the statement of one fact which the mere idealist is prone to overlook, namely that russia is a country at a stage in economic development not much more advanced than america in the pioneer days. the old civilization was aristocratic and exotic; it could not survive in the modern world. it is true that it produced great men, but its foundations were rotten. the new civilization may, for the moment, be less productive of individual works of genius, but it has a new solidity and gives promise of a new unity. it may be that i have taken too hopeful a view and that the future evolution of russia will have as little connection with the life and tradition of its present population as modern america with the life of the red indian tribes. the fact that there exists in russia a population at a far higher stage of culture, which will be industrially educated, not exterminated, militates against this hypothesis, but the need for education may make progress slower than it was in the united states. one would not have looked for the millennium of communism, nor even for valuable art and educational experiment in the america of early railroading and farming days. nor must one look for such things from russia yet. it may be that during the next hundred years there, economic evolution will obscure communist ideals, until finally, in a country that has reached the stage of present-day america, the battle will be fought out again to a victorious and stable issue. unless, indeed, the marxian scripture prove to be not infallible, and faith and heroic devotion show themselves capable of triumphing over economic necessity. v communism and the soviet constitution before i went to russia i imagined that i was going to see an interesting experiment in a new form of representative government. i did see an interesting experiment, but not in representative government. every one who is interested in bolshevism knows the series of elections, from the village meeting to the all-russian soviet, by which the people's commissaries are supposed to derive their power. we were told that, by the recall, the occupational constituencies, and so on, a new and far more perfect machinery had been devised for ascertaining and registering the popular will. one of the things we hoped to study was the question whether the soviet system is really superior to parliamentarism in this respect. we were not able to make any such study, because the soviet system is moribund.[ ] no conceivable system of free election would give majorities to the communists, either in town or country. various methods are therefore adopted for giving the victory to government candidates. in the first place, the voting is by show of hands, so that all who vote against the government are marked men. in the second place, no candidate who is not a communist can have any printing done, the printing works being all in the hands of the state. in the third place, he cannot address any meetings, because the halls all belong to the state. the whole of the press is, of course, official; no independent daily is permitted. in spite of all these obstacles, the mensheviks have succeeded in winning about seats out of , on the moscow soviet, by being known in certain large factories where the electoral campaign could be conducted by word of mouth. they won, in fact, every seat that they contested. but although the moscow soviet is nominally sovereign in moscow, it is really only a body of electors who choose the executive committee of forty, out of which, in turn, is chosen the presidium, consisting of nine men who have all the power. the moscow soviet, as a whole, meets rarely; the executive committee is supposed to meet once a week, but did not meet while we were in moscow. the presidium, on the contrary, meets daily. of course, it is easy for the government to exercise pressure over the election of the executive committee, and again over the election of the presidium. it must be remembered that effective protest is impossible, owing to the absolutely complete suppression of free speech and free press. the result is that the presidium of the moscow soviet consists only of orthodox communists. kamenev, the president of the moscow soviet, informed us that the recall is very frequently employed; he said that in moscow there are, on an average, thirty recalls a month. i asked him what were the principal reasons for the recall, and he mentioned four: drinking, going to the front (and being, therefore, incapable of performing the duties), change of politics on the part of the electors, and failure to make a report to the electors once a fortnight, which all members of the soviet are expected to do. it is evident that the recall affords opportunities for governmental pressure, but i had no chance of finding out whether it is used for this purpose. in country districts the method employed is somewhat different. it is impossible to secure that the village soviet shall consist of communists, because, as a rule, at any rate in the villages i saw, there are no communists. but when i asked in the villages how they were represented on the volost (the next larger area) or the gubernia, i was met always with the reply that they were not represented at all. i could not verify this, and it is probably an overstatement, but all concurred in the assertion that if they elected a non-communist representative he could not obtain a pass on the railway and, therefore, could not attend the volost or gubernia soviet. i saw a meeting of the gubernia soviet of saratov. the representation is so arranged that the town workers have an enormous preponderance over the surrounding peasants; but even allowing for this, the proportion of peasants seemed astonishingly small for the centre of a very important agricultural area. the all-russian soviet, which is constitutionally the supreme body, to which the people's commissaries are responsible, meets seldom, and has become increasingly formal. its sole function at present, so far as i could discover, is to ratify, without discussion, previous decisions of the communist party on matters (especially concerning foreign policy) upon which the constitution requires its decision. all real power is in the hands of the communist party, who number about , in a population of about millions. i never came across a communist by chance: the people whom i met in the streets or in the villages, when i could get into conversation with them, almost invariably said they were of no party. the only other answer i ever had was from some of the peasants, who openly stated that they were tsarists. it must be said that the peasants' reasons for disliking the bolsheviks are very inadequate. it is said--and all i saw confirmed the assertion--that the peasants are better off than they ever were before. i saw no one--man, woman, or child--who looked underfed in the villages. the big landowners are dispossessed, and the peasants have profited. but the towns and the army still need nourishing, and the government has nothing to give the peasants in return for food except paper, which the peasants resent having to take. it is a singular fact that tsarist roubles are worth ten times as much as soviet roubles, and are much commoner in the country. although they are illegal, pocket-books full of them are openly displayed in the market places. i do not think it should be inferred that the peasants expect a tsarist restoration: they are merely actuated by custom and dislike of novelty. they have never heard of the blockade; consequently they cannot understand why the government is unable to give them the clothes and agricultural implements that they need. having got their land, and being ignorant of affairs outside their own neighbourhood, they wish their own village to be independent, and would resent the demands of any government whatever. within the communist party there are, of course, as always in a bureaucracy, different factions, though hitherto the external pressure has prevented disunion. it seemed to me that the personnel of the bureaucracy could be divided into three classes. there are first the old revolutionists, tested by years of persecution. these men have most of the highest posts. prison and exile have made them tough and fanatical and rather out of touch with their own country. they are honest men, with a profound belief that communism will regenerate the world. they think themselves utterly free from sentiment, but, in fact, they are sentimental about communism and about the régime that they are creating; they cannot face the fact that what they are creating is not complete communism, and that communism is anathema to the peasant, who wants his own land and nothing else. they are pitiless in punishing corruption or drunkenness when they find either among officials; but they have built up a system in which the temptations to petty corruption are tremendous, and their own materialistic theory should persuade them that under such a system corruption must be rampant. the second class in the bureaucracy, among whom are to be found most of the men occupying political posts just below the top, consists of _arrivistes_, who are enthusiastic bolsheviks because of the material success of bolshevism. with them must be reckoned the army of policemen, spies, and secret agents, largely inherited from the tsarist times, who make their profit out of the fact that no one can live except by breaking the law. this aspect of bolshevism is exemplified by the extraordinary commission, a body practically independent of the government, possessing its own regiments, who are better fed than the red army. this body has the power of imprisoning any man or woman without trial on such charges as speculation or counter-revolutionary activity. it has shot thousands without proper trial, and though now it has nominally lost the power of inflicting the death penalty, it is by no means certain that it has altogether lost it in fact. it has spies everywhere, and ordinary mortals live in terror of it. the third class in the bureaucracy consists of men who are not ardent communists, who have rallied to the government since it has proved itself stable, and who work for it either out of patriotism or because they enjoy the opportunity of developing their ideas freely without the obstacle of traditional institutions. among this class are to be found men of the type of the successful business man, men with the same sort of ability as is found in the american self-made trust magnate, but working for success and power, not for money. there is no doubt that the bolsheviks are successfully solving the problem of enlisting this kind of ability in the public service, without permitting it to amass wealth as it does in capitalist communities. this is perhaps their greatest success so far, outside the domain of war. it makes it possible to suppose that, if russia is allowed to have peace, an amazing industrial development may take place, making russia a rival of the united states. the bolsheviks are industrialists in all their aims; they love everything in modern industry except the excessive rewards of the capitalists. and the harsh discipline to which they are subjecting the workers is calculated, if anything can, to give them the habits of industry and honesty which have hitherto been lacking, and the lack of which alone prevents russia from being one of the foremost industrial countries. footnotes: [ ] in _theses_ (p. of french edition) it is said: "the ancient classic subdivision of the labour movement into three forms (parties, trade unions, and co-operatives) has served its time. the proletarian revolution has raised up in russia the essential form of proletarian dictatorship, the _soviets_. but the work in the soviets, as in the industrial trade unions which have become revolutionary, must be invariably and systematically directed by the party of the proletariat, i.e. the communist party. as the organized advanced guard of the working class, the communist party answers equally to the economic, political and spiritual needs of the entire working class. it must be the soul of the trade unions, the soviets, and all other proletarian organizations. "the appearance of the soviets, the principal historical form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in no way diminishes the directing rôle of the party in the proletarian revolution. when the german communists of the 'left' ... declare that 'the party itself must also adapt itself more and more to the soviet idea and proletarianize itself,' we see there only an insinuating expression of the idea that the communist party must dissolve itself into the soviets, so that the soviets can replace it. "this idea is profoundly erroneous and reactionary. "the history of the russian revolution shows us, at a certain moment, the soviets going against the proletarian party and helping the agents of the bourgeoisie.... "in order that the soviets may fulfil their historic mission, the existence of a communist party, strong enough not to 'adapt' itself to the soviets but to exercise on them a decisive influence, to force them _not to adapt themselves_ to the bourgeoisie and official social democracy, ... is on the contrary necessary." vi the failure of russian industry at first sight it is surprising that russian industry should have collapsed as badly as it has done, and still more surprising that the efforts of the communists have not been more successful in reviving it. as i believe that the continued efficiency of industry is the main condition for success in the transition to a communist state, i shall endeavour to analyse the causes of the collapse, with a view to the discovery of ways by which it can be avoided elsewhere. of the fact of the collapse there can be no doubt. the ninth congress of the communist party (march-april, ) speaks of "the incredible catastrophes of public economy," and in connection with transport, which is one of the vital elements of the problem, it acknowledges "the terrible collapse of the transport and the railway system," and urges the introduction of "measures which cannot be delayed and which are to obviate the complete paralysis of the railway system and, together with this, the ruin of the soviet republic." almost all those who have visited russia would confirm this view of the gravity of the situation. in the factories, in great works like those of putilov and sornovo, very little except war work is being done; machinery stands idle and plant is becoming unusable. one sees hardly any new manufactured articles in russia, beyond a certain very inadequate quantity of clothes and boots--always excepting what is needed for the army. and the difficulty of obtaining food is conclusive evidence of the absence of goods such as are needed by the peasants. how has this state of affairs arisen? and why does it continue? a great deal of disorganization occurred before the first revolution and under kerensky. russian industry was partly dependent on poland; the war was conducted by methods of reckless extravagance, especially as regards rolling-stock; under kerensky there was a tendency to universal holiday, under the impression that freedom had removed the necessity for work. but when all this is admitted to the full, it remains true that the state of industry under the bolsheviks is much worse than even under kerensky. the first and most obvious reason for this is that russia was quite unusually dependent upon foreign assistance. not only did the machinery in the factories and the locomotives on the railways come from abroad, but the organizing and technical brains in industry were mainly foreign. when the entente became hostile to russia, the foreigners in russian industry either left the country or assisted counter-revolution. even those who were in fact loyal naturally became suspect, and could not well be employed in responsible posts, any more than germans could in england during the war. the native russians who had technical or business skill were little better; they almost all practised sabotage in the first period of the bolshevik régime. one hears amusing stories of common sailors frantically struggling with complicated accounts, because no competent accountant would work for the bolsheviks. but those days passed. when the government was seen to be stable, a great many of those who had formerly sabotaged it became willing to accept posts under it, and are now in fact so employed, often at quite exceptional salaries. their importance is thoroughly realized. one resolution at the above-mentioned congress says (i quote verbally the unedited document which was given to us in moscow): being of opinion that without a scientific organization of industry, even the widest application of compulsory labour service, as the great labour heroism of the working class, will not only fail to secure the establishment of a powerful socialist production, but will also fail to assist the country to free itself from the clutches of poverty--the congress considers it imperative to register all able specialists of the various departments of public economy and widely to utilize them for the purpose of industrial organization. the congress considers the elucidation for the wide masses of the workers of the tremendous character of the economic problems of the country to be one of the chief problems of industrial and general political agitation and propaganda; and of equal importance to this, technical education, and administrative and scientific technical experience. the congress makes it obligatory on all the members of the party mercilessly to fight that particular obnoxious form, the ignorant conceit which deems the working class capable of solving all problems without the assistance _in the most responsible cases_ of specialists of the bourgeois school, the management. demagogic elements who speculate on this kind of prejudice in the more backward section of our working classes, can have no place in the ranks of the party of scientific socialism. but russia alone is unable to supply the amount of skill required, and is very deficient in technical instructors, as well as in skilled workmen. one was told, over and over again, that the first step in improvement would be the obtaining of spare parts for locomotives. it seems strange that these could not be manufactured in russia. to some extent they can be, and we were shown locomotives which had been repaired on communist saturdays. but in the main the machinery for making spare parts is lacking and the skill required for its manufacture does not exist. thus dependence on the outside world persists, and the blockade continues to do its deadly work of spreading hunger, demoralization and despair. the food question is intimately bound up with the question of industry. there is a vicious circle, for not only does the absence of manufactured goods cause a food shortage in the towns, but the food shortage, in turn, diminishes the strength of the workers and makes them less able to produce goods. i cannot but think that there has been some mismanagement as regards the food question. for example, in petrograd many workers have allotments and often work in them for eight hours after an eight hours' day in their regular employment. but the food produced in the allotments is taken for general consumption, not left to each individual producer. this is in accordance with communist theory, but of course greatly diminishes the incentive to work, and increases the red tape and administrative machinery. lack of fuel has been another very grave source of trouble. before the war coal came mostly from poland and the donetz basin. poland is lost to russia, and the donetz basin was in the hands of denikin, who so destroyed the mines before retreating that they are still not in working order. the result is a practically complete absence of coal. oil, which is equally important in russia, was also lacking until the recent recovery of baku. all that i saw on the volga made me believe that real efficiency has been shown in reorganizing the transport of oil, and doubtless this will do something to revive industry. but the oil used to be worked very largely by englishmen, and english machinery is much needed for refining it. in the meantime, russia has had to depend upon wood, which involves immense labour. most of the houses are not warmed in winter, so that people live in a temperature below freezing-point. another consequence of lack of fuel was the bursting of water-pipes, so that people in petrograd, for the most part, have to go down to the neva to fetch their water--a considerable addition to the labour of an already overworked day. i find it difficult to believe that, if greater efficiency had existed in the government, the food and fuel difficulties could not have been considerably alleviated. in spite of the needs of the army, there are still many horses in russia; i saw troops of thousands of horses on the volga, which apparently belonged to kalmuk tribes. by the help of carts and sledges, it ought to be possible, without more labour than is warranted by the importance of the problem, to bring food and timber into moscow and petrograd. it must be remembered that both cities are surrounded by forests, and moscow at least is surrounded by good agricultural land. the government has devoted all its best energies hitherto to the two tasks of war and propaganda, while industry and the food problem have been left to a lesser degree of energy and intelligence. it is no doubt probable that, if peace is secured, the economic problems will receive more attention than hitherto. but the russian character seems less adapted to steady work of an unexciting nature than to heroic efforts on great occasions; it has immense passive endurance, but not much active tenacity. whether, with the menace of foreign invasion removed, enough day-by-day detailed energy would exist for the reorganization of industry, is a doubtful question, as to which only time can decide. this leads to the conclusion--which i think is adopted by most of the leading men in russia--that it will be very difficult indeed to save the revolution without outside economic assistance. outside assistance from capitalist countries is dangerous to the principles of communism, as well as precarious from the likelihood of fresh causes of quarrel. but the need of help is urgent, and if the policy of promoting revolution elsewhere were to succeed, it would probably render the nations concerned temporarily incapable of supplying russian needs. it is, therefore, necessary for russia to accept the risks and uncertainties involved in attempting to make peace with the entente and to trade with america. by continuing war, russia can do infinite damage to us, especially in asia, but cannot hope, for many years, to achieve any degree of internal prosperity. the situation, therefore, is one in which, even from the narrowest point of view, peace is to the interest of both parties. it is difficult for an outsider with only superficial knowledge to judge of the efforts which have been made to reorganize industry without outside help. these efforts have chiefly taken the form of industrial conscription. workers in towns seek to escape to the country, in order to have enough to eat; but this is illegal and severely punished. the same communist report from which i have already quoted speaks on this subject as follows: _labour desertion._--owing to the fact that a considerable part of the workers either in search of better food conditions or often for the purposes of speculation, voluntarily leave their places of employment or change from place to place, which inevitably harms production and deteriorates the general position of the working class, the congress considers one of the most urgent problems of soviet government and of the trade union organization to be established as the firm, systematic and insistent struggle with labour desertion, the way to fight this is to publish a list of desertion fines, the creation of a labour detachment of deserters under fine, and, finally, internment in concentration camps. it is hoped to extend the system to the peasantry: the defeat of the white armies and the problems of peaceful construction in connection with the incredible catastrophes of public economy demand an extraordinary effort of all the powers of the proletariat and the drafting into the process of public labour of the wide masses of the peasantry. on the vital subject of transport, in a passage of which i have already quoted a fragment, the communist party declares: for the most immediate future transport remains the centre of the attention and the efforts of the soviet government. the improvement of transport is the indispensable basis upon which even the most moderate success in all other spheres of production and first of all in the provision question can be gained. the chief difficulty with regard to the improvement of transport is the weakness of the transport trade union, which is due in the first case to the heterogeneity of the personnel of the railways, amongst whom there are still a number of those who belong to the period of disorganization, and, secondly, to the fact that the most class-conscious and best elements of the railway proletariat were at the various fronts of the civil war. considering wide trade union assistance to the railway workers to be one of the principal tasks of the party, and as the only condition under which transport can be raised to its height, the congress at the same time recognizes the inflexible necessity of employing exclusive and extraordinary measures (martial law, and so forth). such necessity is the result of the terrible collapse of the transport and the railroad system and is to introduce measures which cannot be delayed and which are to obviate the complete paralysis of the railway system and, together with this, the ruin of the soviet republic. the general attitude to the militarization of labour is stated in the resolution with which this section of the proceedings begins: the ninth congress approves of the decision of the central committee of the russian communist party on the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, compulsory labour service, militarization of production and the application of military detachments to economic needs. in connection with the above, the congress decrees that the party organization should in every way assist the trade unions and the labour sections in registering all skilled workers with a view of employing them in the various branches of production with the same consistency and strictness as was done, and is being carried out at the present time, in relation to the commanding staff for army needs. every skilled worker is to return to his particular trade exceptions, i.e. the retention of the skilled worker in any other branch of soviet service, is allowed only with the sanction of the corresponding central and local authorities. it is, of course, evident that in these measures the bolsheviks have been compelled to travel a long way from the ideals which originally inspired the revolution. but the situation is so desperate that they could not be blamed if their measures were successful. in a shipwreck all hands must turn to, and it would be ridiculous to prate of individual liberty. the most distressing feature of the situation is that these stern laws seem to have produced so little effect. perhaps in the course of years russia might become self-supporting without help from the outside world, but the suffering meantime would be terrible. the early hopes of the revolution would fade more and more. every failure of industry, every tyrannous regulation brought about by the desperate situation, is used by the entente as a justification of its policy. if a man is deprived of food and drink, he will grow weak, lose his reason, and finally die. this is not usually considered a good reason for inflicting death by starvation. but where nations are concerned, the weakness and struggles are regarded as morally culpable, and are held to justify further punishment. so at least it has been in the case of russia. nothing produced a doubt in our governing minds as to the rightness of our policy except the strength of the red army and the fear of revolution in asia. is it surprising that professions of humanitarian feeling on the part of english people are somewhat coldly received in soviet russia? vii daily life in moscow daily life in moscow, so far as i could discover, has neither the horrors depicted by the northcliffe press nor the delights imagined by the more ardent of our younger socialists. on the one hand, there is no disorder, very little crime, not much insecurity for those who keep clear of politics. everybody works hard; the educated people have, by this time, mostly found their way into government offices or teaching or some other administrative profession in which their education is useful. the theatres, the opera and the ballet continue as before, and are quite admirable; some of the seats are paid for, others are given free to members of trade unions. there is, of course, no drunkenness, or at any rate so little that none of us ever saw a sign of it. there is very little prostitution, infinitely less than in any other capital. women are safer from molestation than anywhere else in the world. the whole impression is one of virtuous, well-ordered activity. on the other hand, life is very hard for all except men in good posts. it is hard, first of all, owing to the food shortage. this is familiar to all who have interested themselves in russia, and it is unnecessary to dwell upon it. what is less realized is that most people work much longer hours than in this country. the eight-hour day was introduced with a flourish of trumpets; then, owing to the pressure of the war, it was extended to ten hours in certain trades. but no provision exists against extra work at other jobs, and very many people do extra work, because the official rates do not afford a living wage. this is not the fault of the government, at any rate as regards the major part; it is due chiefly to war and blockade. when the day's work is over, a great deal of time has to be spent in fetching food and water and other necessaries of life. the sight of the workers going to and fro, shabbily clad, with the inevitable bundle in one hand and tin can in the other, through streets almost entirely empty of traffic, produces the effect of life in some vast village, rather than in an important capital city. holidays, such as are common throughout all but the very poorest class in this country, are very difficult in russia. a train journey requires a permit, which is only granted on good reasons being shown; with the present shortage of transport, this regulation is quite unavoidable. railway queues are a common feature in moscow; it often takes several days to get a permit. then, when it has been obtained, it may take several more days to get a seat in a train. the ordinary trains are inconceivably crowded, far more so, though that seems impossible, than london trains at the busiest hour. on the shorter journeys, passengers are even known to ride on the roof and buffers, or cling like flies to the sides of the waggons. people in moscow travel to the country whenever they can afford the time and get a permit, because in the country there is enough to eat. they go to stay with relations--most people in moscow, in all classes, but especially among manual workers, have relations in the country. one cannot, of course, go to an hotel as one would in other countries. hotels have been taken over by the state, and the rooms in them (when they are still used) are allocated by the police to people whose business is recognized as important by the authorities. casual travel is therefore impossible even on a holiday. journeys have vexations in addition to the slowness and overcrowding of the trains. police search the travellers for evidences of "speculation," especially for food. the police play, altogether, a much greater part in daily life than they do in other countries--much greater than they did, for example, in prussia twenty-five years ago, when there was a vigorous campaign against socialism. everybody breaks the law almost daily, and no one knows which among his acquaintances is a spy of the extraordinary commission. even in the prisons, among prisoners, there are spies, who are allowed certain privileges but not their liberty. newspapers are not taken in, except by very few people, but they are stuck up in public places, where passers-by occasionally glance at them.[ ] there is very little to read; owing to paper shortage, books are rare, and money to buy them is still rarer. one does not see people reading, as one does here in the underground for example. there is practically no social life, partly because of the food shortage, partly because, when anybody is arrested, the police are apt to arrest everybody whom they find in his company, or who comes to visit him. and once arrested, a man or woman, however innocent, may remain for months in prison without trial. while we were in moscow, forty social revolutionaries and anarchists were hunger-striking to enforce their demand to be tried and to be allowed visits. i was told that on the eighth day of the strike the government consented to try them, and that few could be proved guilty of any crime; but i had no means of verifying this. industrial conscription is, of course, rigidly enforced. every man and woman has to work, and slacking is severely punished, by prison or a penal settlement. strikes are illegal, though they sometimes occur. by proclaiming itself the friend of the proletarian, the government has been enabled to establish an iron discipline, beyond the wildest dreams of the most autocratic american magnate. and by the same professions the government has led socialists from other countries to abstain from reporting unpleasant features in what they have seen. the tolstoyans, of whom i saw the leaders, are obliged by their creed to resist every form of conscription, though some have found ways of compromising. the law concerning conscientious objectors to military service is practically the same as ours, and its working depends upon the temper of the tribunal before which a man comes. some conscientious objectors have been shot; on the other hand, some have obtained absolute exemption. life in moscow, as compared to life in london, is drab, monotonous, and depressed. i am not, of course, comparing life there with that of the rich here, but with that of the average working-class family. when it is realized that the highest wages are about fifteen shillings a month, this is not surprising. i do not think that life could, under any system, be very cheerful in a country so exhausted by war as russia, so i am not saying this as a criticism of the bolsheviks. but i do think there might be less police interference, less vexatious regulation, and more freedom for spontaneous impulses towards harmless enjoyments. religion is still very strong. i went into many churches, where i saw obviously famished priests in gorgeous vestments, and a congregation enormously devout. generally more than half the congregation were men, and among the men many were soldiers. this applies to the towns as well as to the country. in moscow i constantly saw people in the streets crossing themselves. there is a theory that the moscow working man feels himself free from capitalist domination, and therefore bears hardships gladly. this is no doubt true of the minority who are active communists, but i do not think it has any truth for the others. the average working man, to judge by a rather hasty impression, feels himself the slave of the government, and has no sense whatever of having been liberated from a tyranny. i recognize to the full the reasons for the bad state of affairs, in the past history of russia and the recent policy of the entente. but i have thought it better to record impressions frankly, trusting the readers to remember that the bolsheviks have only a very limited share of responsibility for the evils from which russia is suffering. footnotes: [ ] the ninth communist congress (march-april, ) says on this subject: "in view of the fact that the first condition of the success of the soviet republic in all departments, including the economic, is chiefly systematic printed agitation, the congress draws the attention of the soviet government to the deplorable state in which our paper and printing industries find themselves. the ever decreasing number of newspapers fail to reach not only the peasants but even the workers, in addition to which our poor technical means render the papers hardly readable. the congress strongly appeals to the supreme council of public economy, to the corresponding trade unions and other interested institutions, to apply all efforts to raise the quantity, to introduce general system and order in the printing business, and so secure for the worker and peasant in russia a supply of socialist printed matter." viii town and country the problem of inducing the peasants to feed the towns is one which russia shares with central europe, and from what one hears russia has been less unsuccessful than some other countries in dealing with this problem. for the soviet government, the problem is mainly concentrated in moscow and petrograd; the other towns are not very large, and are mostly in the centre of rich agricultural districts. it is true that in the north even the rural population normally depends upon food from more southerly districts; but the northern population is small. it is commonly said that the problem of feeding moscow and petrograd is a transport problem, but i think this is only partially true. there is, of course, a grave deficiency of rolling-stock, especially of locomotives in good repair. but moscow is surrounded by very good land. in the course of a day's motoring in the neighbourhood, i saw enough cows to supply milk to the whole child population of moscow, although what i had come to see was children's sanatoria, not farms. all kinds of food can be bought in the market at high prices. i travelled over a considerable extent of russian railways, and saw a fair number of goods trains. for all these reasons, i feel convinced that the share of the transport problem in the food difficulties has been exaggerated. of course transport plays a larger part in the shortage in petrograd than in moscow, because food comes mainly from south of moscow. in petrograd, most of the people one sees in the streets show obvious signs of under-feeding. in moscow, the visible signs are much less frequent, but there is no doubt that under-feeding, though not actual starvation, is nearly universal. the government supplies rations to every one who works in the towns at a very low fixed price. the official theory is that the government has a monopoly of the food and that the rations are sufficient to sustain life. the fact is that the rations are not sufficient, and that they are only a portion of the food supply of moscow. moreover, people complain, i do not know how truly, that the rations are delivered irregularly; some say, about every other day. under these circumstances, almost everybody, rich or poor, buys food in the market, where it costs about fifty times the fixed government price. a pound of butter costs about a month's wages. in order to be able to afford extra food, people adopt various expedients. some do additional work, at extra rates, after their official day's work is over. for, though there is supposed to be by law an eight-hours day, extended to ten in certain vital industries, the wage paid for it is not a living wage, and there is nothing to prevent a man from undertaking other work in his spare time. but the usual resource is what is called "speculation," i.e., buying and selling. some person formerly rich sells clothes or furniture or jewellery in return for food; the buyer sells again at an enhanced price, and so on through perhaps twenty hands, until a final purchaser is found in some well-to-do peasant or _nouveau riche_ speculator. again, most people have relations in the country, whom they visit from time to time, bringing back with them great bags of flour. it is illegal for private persons to bring food into moscow, and the trains are searched; but, by corruption or cunning, experienced people can elude the search. the food market is illegal, and is raided occasionally; but as a rule it is winked at. thus the attempt to suppress private commerce has resulted in an amount of unprofessional buying and selling which far exceeds what happens in capitalist countries. it takes up a great deal of time that might be more profitably employed; and, being illegal, it places practically the whole population of moscow at the mercy of the police. moreover, it depends largely upon the stores of goods belonging to those who were formerly rich, and when these are expended the whole system must collapse, unless industry has meanwhile been re-established on a sound basis. it is clear that the state of affairs is unsatisfactory, but, from the government's point of view, it is not easy to see what ought to be done. the urban and industrial population is mainly concerned in carrying on the work of government and supplying munitions to the army. these are very necessary tasks, the cost of which ought to be defrayed out of taxation. a moderate tax in kind on the peasants would easily feed moscow and petrograd. but the peasants take no interest in war or government. russia is so vast that invasion of one part does not touch another part; and the peasants are too ignorant to have any national consciousness, such as one takes for granted in england or france or germany. the peasants will not willingly part with a portion of their produce merely for purposes of national defence, but only for the goods they need--clothes, agricultural implements, &c.--which the government, owing to the war and the blockade, is not in a position to supply. when the food shortage was at its worst, the government antagonized the peasants by forced requisitions, carried out with great harshness by the red army. this method has been modified, but the peasants still part unwillingly with their food, as is natural in view of the uselessness of paper and the enormously higher prices offered by private buyers. the food problem is the main cause of popular opposition to the bolsheviks, yet i cannot see how any popular policy could have been adopted. the bolsheviks are disliked by the peasants because they take so much food; they are disliked in the towns because they take so little. what the peasants want is what is called free trade, i.e., de-control of agricultural produce. if this policy were adopted, the towns would be faced by utter starvation, not merely by hunger and hardship. it is an entire misconception to suppose that the peasants cherish any hostility to the entente. the _daily news_ of july th, in an otherwise excellent leading article, speaks of "the growing hatred of the russian peasant, who is neither a communist nor a bolshevik, for the allies generally and this country in particular." the typical russian peasant has never heard of the allies or of this country; he does not know that there is a blockade; all he knows is that he used to have six cows but the government reduced him to one for the sake of poorer peasants, and that it takes his corn (except what is needed for his own family) at a very low price. the reasons for these actions do not interest him, since his horizon is bounded by his own village. to a remarkable extent, each village is an independent unit. so long as the government obtains the food and soldiers that it requires, it does not interfere, and leaves untouched the old village communism, which is extraordinarily unlike bolshevism and entirely dependent upon a very primitive stage of culture. the government represents the interests of the urban and industrial population, and is, as it were, encamped amid a peasant nation, with whom its relations are rather diplomatic and military than governmental in the ordinary sense. the economic situation, as in central europe, is favourable to the country and unfavourable to the towns. if russia were governed democratically, according to the will of the majority, the inhabitants of moscow and petrograd would die of starvation. as it is, moscow and petrograd just manage to live, by having the whole civil and military power of the state devoted to their needs. russia affords the curious spectacle of a vast and powerful empire, prosperous at the periphery, but faced with dire want at the centre. those who have least prosperity have most power; and it is only through their excess of power that they are enabled to live at all. the situation is due at bottom to two facts: that almost the whole industrial energies of the population have had to be devoted to war, and that the peasants do not appreciate the importance of the war or the fact of the blockade. it is futile to blame the bolsheviks for an unpleasant and difficult situation which it has been impossible for them to avoid. their problem is only soluble in one of two ways: by the cessation of the war and the blockade, which would enable them to supply the peasants with the goods they need in exchange for food; or by the gradual development of an independent russian industry. this latter method would be slow, and would involve terrible hardships, but some of the ablest men in the government believe it to be possible if peace cannot be achieved. if we force this method upon russia by the refusal of peace and trade, we shall forfeit the only inducement we can hold out for friendly relations; we shall render the soviet state unassailable and completely free to pursue the policy of promoting revolution everywhere. but the industrial problem is a large subject, which has been already discussed in chapter vi. ix international policy in the course of these chapters, i have had occasion to mention disagreeable features of the bolshevik régime. but it must always be remembered that these are chiefly due to the fact that the industrial life of russia has been paralysed except as ministering to the wants of the army, and that the government has had to wage a bitter and doubtful civil and external war, involving the constant menace of domestic enemies. harshness, espionage, and a curtailment of liberty result unavoidably from these difficulties. i have no doubt whatever that the sole cure for the evils from which russia is suffering is peace and trade. peace and trade would put an end to the hostility of the peasants, and would at once enable the government to depend upon popularity rather than force. the character of the government would alter rapidly under such conditions. industrial conscription, which is now rigidly enforced, would become unnecessary. those who desire a more liberal spirit would be able to make their voices heard without the feeling that they were assisting reaction and the national enemies. the food difficulties would cease, and with them the need for an autocratic system in the towns. it must not be assumed, as is common with opponents of bolshevism, that any other government could easily be established in russia. i think every one who has been in russia recently is convinced that the existing government is stable. it may undergo internal developments, and might easily, but for lenin, become a bonapartist military autocracy. but this would be a change from within--not perhaps a very great change--and would probably do little to alter the economic system. from what i saw of the russian character and of the opposition parties, i became persuaded that russia is not ready for any form of democracy, and needs a strong government. the bolsheviks represent themselves as the allies of western advanced socialism, and from this point of view they are open to grave criticism. for their international programme there is, to my mind, nothing to be said. but as a national government, stripped of their camouflage, regarded as the successors of peter the great, they are performing a necessary though unamiable task. they are introducing, as far as they can, american efficiency among a lazy and undisciplined population. they are preparing to develop the natural resources of their country by the methods of state socialism, for which, in russia, there is much to be said. in the army they are abolishing illiteracy, and if they had peace they would do great things for education everywhere. but if we continue to refuse peace and trade, i do not think the bolsheviks will go under. russia will endure great hardships, in the years to come as before. but the russians are inured to misery as no western nation is; they can live and work under conditions which we should find intolerable. the government will be driven more and more, from mere self-preservation, into a policy of imperialism. the entente has been doing everything to expose germany to a russian invasion of arms and leaflets, by allowing poland to engage in war and compelling germany to disarm. all asia lies open to bolshevik ambitions. almost the whole of the former russian empire in asia is quite firmly in their grasp. trains are running at a reasonable speed to turkestan, and i saw cotton from there being loaded on to volga steamers. in persia and turkey, revolts are taking place, with bolshevik support. it is only a question of a few years before india will be in touch with the red army. if we continue to antagonize the bolsheviks, i do not see what force exists that can prevent them from acquiring the whole of asia within ten years. the russian government is not yet definitely imperialistic in spirit, and would still prefer peace to conquest. the country is weary of war and denuded of goods. but if the western powers insist upon war, another spirit, which is already beginning to show itself, will become dominant. conquest will be the only alternative to submission. asiatic conquest will not be difficult. but for us, from the imperialist standpoint, it will mean utter ruin. and for the continent it will mean revolutions, civil wars, economic cataclysms. the policy of crushing bolshevism by force was always foolish and criminal; it has now become impossible and fraught with disaster. our own government, it would seem, have begun to realize the dangers, but apparently they do not realize them sufficiently to enforce their view against opposition. in the theses presented to the second congress of the third international (july ), there is a very interesting article by lenin called "first sketch of the theses on national and colonial questions" (_theses_, pp. - ). the following passages seemed to me particularly illuminating:-- the present world-situation in politics places on the order of the day the dictatorship of the proletariat; and all the events of world politics are inevitably concentrated round one centre of gravity: the struggle of the international bourgeoisie against the soviet republic, which inevitably groups round it, on the one hand the sovietist movements of the advanced working men of all countries, on the other hand all the national movements of emancipation of colonies and oppressed nations which have been convinced by a bitter experience that there is no salvation for them except in the victory of the soviet government over world-imperialism. we cannot therefore any longer confine ourselves to recognizing and proclaiming the union of the workers of all countries. it is henceforth necessary to pursue the realization of the strictest union of all the national and colonial movements of emancipation with soviet russia, by giving to this union forms corresponding to the degree of evolution of the proletarian movement among the proletariat of each country, or of the democratic-bourgeois movement of emancipation among the workers and peasants of backward countries or backward nationalities. the federal principle appears to us as a transitory form towards the complete unity of the workers of all countries. this is the formula for co-operation with sinn fein or with egyptian and indian nationalism. it is further defined later. in regard to backward countries, lenin says, we must have in view:-- the necessity of the co-operation of all communists in the democratic-bourgeois movement of emancipation in those countries. again: "the communist international must conclude temporary alliances with the bourgeois democracy of backward countries, but must never fuse with it." the class-conscious proletariat must "show itself particularly circumspect towards the survivals of national sentiment in countries long oppressed," and must "consent to certain useful concessions." the asiatic policy of the russian government was adopted as a move against the british empire, and as a method of inducing the british government to make peace. it plays a larger part in the schemes of the leading bolsheviks than is realized by the labour party in this country. its method is not, for the present, to preach communism, since the persians and hindoos are considered scarcely ripe for the doctrines of marx. it is nationalist movements that are supported by money and agitators from moscow. the method of quasi-independent states under bolshevik protection is well understood. it is obvious that this policy affords opportunities for imperialism, under the cover of propaganda, and there is no doubt that some among the bolsheviks are fascinated by its imperialist aspect. the importance officially attached to the eastern policy is illustrated by the fact that it was the subject of the concluding portion of lenin's speech to the recent congress of the third international (july ). bolshevism, like everything russian, is partly asiatic in character. one may distinguish two distinct trends, developing into two distinct policies. on the one side are the practical men, who wish to develop russia industrially, to secure the gains of the revolution nationally, to trade with the west, and gradually settle down into a more or less ordinary state. these men have on their side the fact of the economic exhaustion of russia, the danger of ultimate revolt against bolshevism if life continues to be as painful as it is at present, and the natural sentiment of humanity that wishes to relieve the sufferings of the people; also the fact that, if revolutions elsewhere produce a similar collapse of industry, they will make it impossible for russia to receive the outside help which is urgently needed. in the early days, when the government was weak, they had unchallenged control of policy, but success has made their position less secure. on the other side there is a blend of two quite different aims: first, the desire to promote revolution in the western nations, which is in line with communist theory, and is also thought to be the only way of obtaining a really secure peace; secondly, the desire for asiatic dominion, which is probably accompanied in the minds of some with dreams of sapphires and rubies and golden thrones and all the glories of their forefather solomon. this desire produces an unwillingness to abandon the eastern policy, although it is realized that, until it is abandoned, peace with capitalist england is impossible. i do not know whether there are some to whom the thought occurs that if england were to embark on revolution we should become willing to abandon india to the russians. but i am certain that the converse thought occurs, namely that, if india could be taken from us, the blow to imperialist feeling might lead us to revolution. in either case, the two policies, of revolution in the west and conquest (disguised as liberation of oppressed peoples) in the east, work in together, and dovetail into a strongly coherent whole. bolshevism as a social phenomenon is to be reckoned as a religion, not as an ordinary political movement. the important and effective mental attitudes to the world may be broadly divided into the religious and the scientific. the scientific attitude is tentative and piecemeal, believing what it finds evidence for, and no more. since galileo, the scientific attitude has proved itself increasingly capable of ascertaining important facts and laws, which are acknowledged by all competent people regardless of temperament or self-interest or political pressure. almost all the progress in the world from the earliest times is attributable to science and the scientific temper; almost all the major ills are attributable to religion. by a religion i mean a set of beliefs held as dogmas, dominating the conduct of life, going beyond or contrary to evidence, and inculcated by methods which are emotional or authoritarian, not intellectual. by this definition, bolshevism is a religion: that its dogmas go beyond or contrary to evidence, i shall try to prove in what follows. those who accept bolshevism become impervious to scientific evidence, and commit intellectual suicide. even if all the doctrines of bolshevism were true, this would still be the case, since no unbiased examination of them is tolerated. one who believes, as i do, that the free intellect is the chief engine of human progress, cannot but be fundamentally opposed to bolshevism, as much as to the church of rome. among religions, bolshevism is to be reckoned with mohammedanism rather than with christianity and buddhism. christianity and buddhism are primarily personal religions, with mystical doctrines and a love of contemplation. mohammedanism and bolshevism are practical, social, unspiritual, concerned to win the empire of this world. their founders would not have resisted the third of the temptations in the wilderness. what mohammedanism did for the arabs, bolshevism may do for the russians. as ali went down before the politicians who only rallied to the prophet after his success, so the genuine communists may go down before those who are now rallying to the ranks of the bolsheviks. if so, asiatic empire with all its pomps and splendours may well be the next stage of development, and communism may seem, in historical retrospect, as small a part of bolshevism as abstinence from alcohol is of mohammedanism. it is true that, as a world force, whether for revolution or for empire, bolshevism must sooner or later be brought by success into a desperate conflict with america; and america is more solid and strong, as yet, than anything that mohammed's followers had to face. but the doctrines of communism are almost certain, in the long run, to make progress among american wage-earners, and the opposition of america is therefore not likely to be eternal. bolshevism may go under in russia, but even if it does it will spring up again elsewhere, since it is ideally suited to an industrial population in distress. what is evil in it is mainly due to the fact that it has its origin in distress; the problem is to disentangle the good from the evil, and induce the adoption of the good in countries not goaded into ferocity by despair. russia is a backward country, not yet ready for the methods of equal co-operation which the west is seeking to substitute for arbitrary power in politics and industry. in russia, the methods of the bolsheviks are probably more or less unavoidable; at any rate, i am not prepared to criticize them in their broad lines. but they are not the methods appropriate to more advanced countries, and our socialists will be unnecessarily retrograde if they allow the prestige of the bolsheviks to lead them into slavish imitation. it will be a far less excusable error in our reactionaries if, by their unteachableness, they compel the adoption of violent methods. we have a heritage of civilization and mutual tolerance which is important to ourselves and to the world. life in russia has always been fierce and cruel, to a far greater degree than with us, and out of the war has come a danger that this fierceness and cruelty may become universal. i have hopes that in england this may be avoided through the moderation of both sides. but it is essential to a happy issue that melodrama should no longer determine our views of the bolsheviks: they are neither angels to be worshipped nor devils to be exterminated, but merely bold and able men attempting with great skill an almost impossible task. part ii bolshevik theory i the materialistic theory of history the materialistic conception of history, as it is called, is due to marx, and underlies the whole communist philosophy. i do not mean, of course, that a man could not be a communist without accepting it, but that in fact it is accepted by the communist party, and that it profoundly influences their views as to politics and tactics. the name does not convey at all accurately what is meant by the theory. it means that all the mass-phenomena of history are determined by economic motives. this view has no essential connection with materialism in the philosophic sense. materialism in the philosophic sense may be defined as the theory that all apparently mental occurrences either are really physical, or at any rate have purely physical causes. materialism in this sense also was preached by marx, and is accepted by all orthodox marxians. the arguments for and against it are long and complicated, and need not concern us, since, in fact, its truth or falsehood has little or no bearing on politics. in particular, philosophic materialism does not prove that economic causes are fundamental in politics. the view of buckle, for example, according to which climate is one of the decisive factors, is equally compatible with materialism. so is the freudian view, which traces everything to sex. there are innumerable ways of viewing history which are materialistic in the philosophic sense without being economic or falling within the marxian formula. thus the "materialistic conception of history" may be false even if materialism in the philosophic sense should be true. on the other hand, economic causes might be at the bottom of all political events even if philosophic materialism were false. economic causes operate through men's desire for possessions, and would be supreme if this desire were supreme, even if desire could not, from a philosophic point of view, be explained in materialistic terms. there is, therefore, no logical connection either way between philosophic materialism and what is called the "materialistic conception of history." it is of some moment to realize such facts as this, because otherwise political theories are both supported and opposed for quite irrelevant reasons, and arguments of theoretical philosophy are employed to determine questions which depend upon concrete facts of human nature. this mixture damages both philosophy and politics, and is therefore important to avoid. for another reason, also, the attempt to base a political theory upon a philosophical doctrine is undesirable. the philosophical doctrine of materialism, if true at all, is true everywhere and always; we cannot expect exceptions to it, say, in buddhism or in the hussite movement. and so it comes about that people whose politics are supposed to be a consequence of their metaphysics grow absolute and sweeping, unable to admit that a general theory of history is likely, at best, to be only true on the whole and in the main. the dogmatic character of marxian communism finds support in the supposed philosophic basis of the doctrine; it has the fixed certainty of catholic theology, not the changing fluidity and sceptical practicality of modern science. treated as a practical approximation, not as an exact metaphysical law, the materialistic conception of history has a very large measure of truth. take, as an instance of its truth, the influence of industrialism upon ideas. it is industrialism, rather than the arguments of darwinians and biblical critics, that has led to the decay of religious belief in the urban working class. at the same time, industrialism has revived religious belief among the rich. in the eighteenth century french aristocrats mostly became free-thinkers; now their descendants are mostly catholics, because it has become necessary for all the forces of reaction to unite against the revolutionary proletariat. take, again, the emancipation of women. plato, mary wolstonecraft, and john stuart mill produced admirable arguments, but influenced only a few impotent idealists. the war came, leading to the employment of women in industry on a large scale, and instantly the arguments in favour of votes for women were seen to be irresistible. more than that, traditional sexual morality collapsed, because its whole basis was the economic dependence of women upon their fathers and husbands. changes in such a matter as sexual morality bring with them profound alterations in the thoughts and feelings of ordinary men and women; they modify law, literature, art, and all kinds of institutions that seem remote from economics. such facts as these justify marxians in speaking, as they do, of "bourgeois ideology," meaning that kind of morality which has been imposed upon the world by the possessors of capital. contentment with one's lot may be taken as typical of the virtues preached by the rich to the poor. they honestly believe it is a virtue--at any rate they did formerly. the more religious among the poor also believed it, partly from the influence of authority, partly from an impulse to submission, what macdougall calls "negative self-feeling," which is commoner than some people think. similarly men preached the virtue of female chastity, and women usually accepted their teaching; both really believed the doctrine, but its persistence was only possible through the economic power of men. this led erring women to punishment here on earth, which made further punishment hereafter seem probable. when the economic penalty ceased, the conviction of sinfulness gradually decayed. in such changes we see the collapse of "bourgeois ideology." but in spite of the fundamental importance of economic facts in determining the politics and beliefs of an age or nation, i do not think that non-economic factors can be neglected without risks of errors which may be fatal in practice. the most obvious non-economic factor, and the one the neglect of which has led socialists most astray, is nationalism. of course a nation, once formed, has economic interests which largely determine its politics; but it is not, as a rule, economic motives that decide what group of human beings shall form a nation. trieste, before the war, considered itself italian, although its whole prosperity as a port depended upon its belonging to austria. no economic motive can account for the opposition between ulster and the rest of ireland. in eastern europe, the balkanization produced by self-determination has been obviously disastrous from an economic point of view, and was demanded for reasons which were in essence sentimental. throughout the war wage-earners, with only a few exceptions, allowed themselves to be governed by nationalist feeling, and ignored the traditional communist exhortation: "workers of the world, unite." according to marxian orthodoxy, they were misled by cunning capitalists, who made their profit out of the slaughter. but to any one capable of observing psychological facts, it is obvious that this is largely a myth. immense numbers of capitalists were ruined by the war; those who were young were just as liable to be killed as the proletarians were. no doubt commercial rivalry between england and germany had a great deal to do with causing the war; but rivalry is a different thing from profit-seeking. probably by combination english and german capitalists could have made more than they did out of rivalry, but the rivalry was instinctive, and its economic form was accidental. the capitalists were in the grip of nationalist instinct as much as their proletarian "dupes." in both classes some have gained by the war; but the universal will to war was not produced by the hope of gain. it was produced by a different set of instincts, and one which marxian psychology fails to recognize adequately. the marxian assumes that a man's "herd," from the point of view of herd-instinct, is his class, and that he will combine with those whose economic class-interest is the same as his. this is only very partially true in fact. religion has been the most decisive factor in determining a man's herd throughout long periods of the world's history. even now a catholic working man will vote for a catholic capitalist rather than for an unbelieving socialist. in america the divisions in local elections are mainly on religious lines. this is no doubt convenient for the capitalists, and tends to make them religious men; but the capitalists alone could not produce the result. the result is produced by the fact that many working men prefer the advancement of their creed to the improvement of their livelihood. however deplorable such a state of mind may be, it is not necessarily due to capitalist lies. all politics are governed by human desires. the materialist theory of history, in the last analysis, requires the assumption that every politically conscious person is governed by one single desire--the desire to increase his own share of commodities; and, further, that his method of achieving this desire will usually be to seek to increase the share of his class, not only his own individual share. but this assumption is very far from the truth. men desire power, they desire satisfactions for their pride and their self-respect. they desire victory over rivals so profoundly that they will invent a rivalry for the unconscious purpose of making a victory possible. all these motives cut across the pure economic motive in ways that are practically important. there is need of a treatment of political motives by the methods of psycho-analysis. in politics, as in private life, men invent myths to rationalize their conduct. if a man thinks that the only reasonable motive in politics is economic self-advancement, he will persuade himself that the things he wishes to do will make him rich. when he wants to fight the germans, he tells himself that their competition is ruining his trade. if, on the other hand, he is an "idealist," who holds that his politics should aim at the advancement of the human race, he will tell himself that the crimes of the germans demand their humiliation. the marxian sees through this latter camouflage, but not through the former. to desire one's own economic advancement is comparatively reasonable; to marx, who inherited eighteenth-century rationalist psychology from the british orthodox economists, self-enrichment seemed the natural aim of a man's political actions. but modern psychology has dived much deeper into the ocean of insanity upon which the little barque of human reason insecurely floats. the intellectual optimism of a bygone age is no longer possible to the modern student of human nature. yet it lingers in marxism, making marxians rigid and procrustean in their treatment of the life of instinct. of this rigidity the materialistic conception of history is a prominent instance. in the next chapter i shall attempt to outline a political psychology which seems to me more nearly true than that of marx. ii deciding forces in politics the larger events in the political life of the world are determined by the interaction of material conditions and human passions. the operation of the passions on the material conditions is modified by intelligence. the passions themselves may be modified by alien intelligence guided by alien passions. so far, such modification has been wholly unscientific, but it may in time become as precise as engineering. the classification of the passions which is most convenient in political theory is somewhat different from that which would be adopted in psychology. we may begin with desires for the necessaries of life: food, drink, sex, and (in cold climates) clothing and housing. when these are threatened, there is no limit to the activity and violence that men will display. planted upon these primitive desires are a number of secondary desires. love of property, of which the fundamental political importance is obvious, may be derived historically and psychologically from the hoarding instinct. love of the good opinion of others (which we may call vanity) is a desire which man shares with many animals; it is perhaps derivable from courtship, but has great survival value, among gregarious animals, in regard to others besides possible mates. rivalry and love of power are perhaps developments of jealousy; they are akin, but not identical. these four passions--acquisitiveness, vanity, rivalry, and love of power--are, after the basic instincts, the prime movers of almost all that happens in politics. their operation is intensified and regularized by herd instinct. but herd instinct, by its very nature, cannot be a prime mover, since it merely causes the herd to act in unison, without determining what the united action is to be. among men, as among other gregarious animals, the united action, in any given circumstances, is determined partly by the common passions of the herd, partly by imitation of leaders. the art of politics consists in causing the latter to prevail over the former. of the four passions we have enumerated, only one, namely acquisitiveness, is concerned at all directly with men's relations to their material conditions. the other three--vanity, rivalry, and love of power--are concerned with social relations. i think this is the source of what is erroneous in the marxian interpretation of history, which tacitly assumes that acquisitiveness is the source of all political actions. it is clear that many men willingly forego wealth for the sake of power and glory, and that nations habitually sacrifice riches to rivalry with other nations. the desire for some form of superiority is common to almost all energetic men. no social system which attempts to thwart it can be stable, since the lazy majority will never be a match for the energetic minority. what is called "virtue" is an offshoot of vanity: it is the habit of acting in a manner which others praise. the operation of material conditions may be illustrated by the statement (myers's _dawn of history_) that four of the greatest movements of conquest have been due to drought in arabia, causing the nomads of that country to migrate into regions already inhabited. the last of these four movements was the rise of islam. in these four cases, the primal need of food and drink was enough to set events in motion; but as this need could only be satisfied by conquest, the four secondary passions must have very soon come into play. in the conquests of modern industrialism, the secondary passions have been almost wholly dominant, since those who directed them had no need to fear hunger or thirst. it is the potency of vanity and love of power that gives hope for the industrial future of soviet russia, since it enables the communist state to enlist in its service men whose abilities might give them vast wealth in a capitalistic society. intelligence modifies profoundly the operation of material conditions. when america was first discovered, men only desired gold and silver; consequently the portions first settled were not those that are now most profitable. the bessemer process created the german iron and steel industry; inventions requiring oil have created a demand for that commodity which is one of the chief influences in international politics. the intelligence which has this profound effect on politics is not political, but scientific and technical: it is the kind of intelligence which discovers how to make nature minister to human passions. tungsten had no value until it was found to be useful in the manufacture of shells and electric light, but now people will, if necessary, kill each other in order to acquire tungsten. scientific intelligence is the cause of this change. the progress or retrogression of the world depends, broadly speaking, upon the balance between acquisitiveness and rivalry. the former makes for progress, the latter for retrogression. when intelligence provides improved methods of production, these may be employed to increase the general share of goods, or to set apart more of the labour power of the community for the business of killing its rivals. until , acquisitiveness had prevailed, on the whole, since the fall of napoleon; the past six years have seen a prevalence of the instinct of rivalry. scientific intelligence makes it possible to indulge this instinct more fully than is possible for primitive peoples, since it sets free more men from the labour of producing necessaries. it is possible that scientific intelligence may, in time, reach the point when it will enable rivalry to exterminate the human race. this is the most hopeful method of bringing about an end of war. for those who do not like this method, there is another: the study of scientific psychology and physiology. the physiological causes of emotions have begun to be known, through the studies of such men as cannon (_bodily changes in pain, hunger, fear and rage_). in time, it may become possible, by physiological means, to alter the whole emotional nature of a population. it will then depend upon the passions of the rulers how this power is used. success will come to the state which discovers how to promote pugnacity to the extent required for external war, but not to the extent which would lead to domestic dissensions. there is no method by which it can be insured that rulers shall desire the good of mankind, and therefore there is no reason to suppose that the power to modify men's emotional nature would cause progress. if men desired to diminish rivalry, there is an obvious method. habits of power intensify the passion of rivalry; therefore a state in which power is concentrated will, other things being equal, be more bellicose than one in which power is diffused. for those who dislike wars, this is an additional argument against all forms of dictatorship. but dislike of war is far less common than we used to suppose; and those who like war can use the same argument to support dictatorship. iii bolshevik criticism of democracy the bolshevik argument against parliamentary democracy as a method of achieving socialism is a powerful one. my answer to it lies rather in pointing out what i believe to be fallacies in the bolshevik method, from which i conclude that no swift method exists of establishing any desirable form of socialism. but let us first see what the bolshevik argument is. in the first place, it assumes that those to whom it is addressed are absolutely certain that communism is desirable, so certain that they are willing, if necessary, to force it upon an unwilling population at the point of the bayonet. it then proceeds to argue that, while capitalism retains its hold over propaganda and its means of corruption, parliamentary methods are very unlikely to give a majority for communism in the house of commons, or to lead to effective action by such a majority even if it existed. communists point out how the people are deceived, and how their chosen leaders have again and again betrayed them. from this they argue that the destruction of capitalism must be sudden and catastrophic; that it must be the work of a minority; and that it cannot be effected constitutionally or without violence. it is therefore, in their view, the duty of the communist party in a capitalist country to prepare for armed conflict, and to take all possible measure for disarming the bourgeoisie and arming that part of the proletariat which is willing to support the communists. there is an air of realism and disillusionment about this position, which makes it attractive to those idealists who wish to think themselves cynics. but i think there are various points in which it fails to be as realistic as it pretends. in the first place, it makes much of the treachery of labour leaders in constitutional movements, but does not consider the possibility of the treachery of communist leaders in a revolution. to this the marxian would reply that in constitutional movements men are bought, directly or indirectly, by the money of the capitalists, but that revolutionary communism would leave the capitalists no money with which to attempt corruption. this has been achieved in russia, and could be achieved elsewhere. but selling oneself to the capitalists is not the only possible form of treachery. it is also possible, having acquired power, to use it for one's own ends instead of for the people. this is what i believe to be likely to happen in russia: the establishment of a bureaucratic aristocracy, concentrating authority in its own hands, and creating a régime just as oppressive and cruel as that of capitalism. marxians never sufficiently recognize that love of power is quite as strong a motive, and quite as great a source of injustice, as love of money; yet this must be obvious to any unbiased student of politics. it is also obvious that the method of violent revolution leading to a minority dictatorship is one peculiarly calculated to create habits of despotism which would survive the crisis by which they were generated. communist politicians are likely to become just like the politicians of other parties: a few will be honest, but the great majority will merely cultivate the art of telling a plausible tale with a view to tricking the people into entrusting them with power. the only possible way by which politicians as a class can be improved is the political and psychological education of the people, so that they may learn to detect a humbug. in england men have reached the point of suspecting a good speaker, but if a man speaks badly they think he must be honest. unfortunately, virtue is not so widely diffused as this theory would imply. in the second place, it is assumed by the communist argument that, although capitalist propaganda can prevent the majority from becoming communists, yet capitalist laws and police forces cannot prevent the communists, while still a minority, from acquiring a supremacy of military power. it is thought that secret propaganda can undermine the army and navy, although it is admittedly impossible to get the majority to vote at elections for the programme of the bolsheviks. this view is based upon russian experience, where the army and navy had suffered defeat and had been brutally ill used by incompetent tsarist authorities. the argument has no application to more efficient and successful states. among the germans, even in defeat, it was the civilian population that began the revolution. there is a further assumption in the bolshevik argument which seems to me quite unwarrantable. it is assumed that the capitalist governments will have learned nothing from the experience of russia. before the russian revolution, governments had not studied bolshevik theory. and defeat in war created a revolutionary mood throughout central and eastern europe. but now the holders of power are on their guard. there seems no reason whatever to suppose that they will supinely permit a preponderance of armed force to pass into the hands of those who wish to overthrow them, while, according to the bolshevik theory, they are still sufficiently popular to be supported by a majority at the polls. is it not as clear as noonday that in a democratic country it is more difficult for the proletariat to destroy the government by arms than to defeat it in a general election? seeing the immense advantages of a government in dealing with rebels, it seems clear that rebellion could have little hope of success unless a very large majority supported it. of course, if the army and navy were specially revolutionary, they might effect an unpopular revolution; but this situation, though something like it occurred in russia, is hardly to be expected in the western nations. this whole bolshevik theory of revolution by a minority is one which might just conceivably have succeeded as a secret plot, but becomes impossible as soon as it is openly avowed and advocated. but perhaps it will be said that i am caricaturing the bolshevik doctrine of revolution. it is urged by advocates of this doctrine, quite truly, that all political events are brought about by minorities, since the majority are indifferent to politics. but there is a difference between a minority in which the indifferent acquiesce, and a minority so hated as to startle the indifferent into belated action. to make the bolshevik doctrine reasonable, it is necessary to suppose that they believe the majority can be induced to acquiesce, at least temporarily, in the revolution made by the class-conscious minority. this, again, is based upon russian experience: desire for peace and land led to a widespread support of the bolsheviks in november on the part of people who have subsequently shown no love for communism. i think we come here to an essential part of bolshevik philosophy. in the moment of revolution, communists are to have some popular cry by which they win more support than mere communism could win. having thus acquired the state machine, they are to use it for their own ends. but this, again, is a method which can only be practised successfully so long as it is not avowed. it is to some extent habitual in politics. the unionists in won a majority on the boer war, and used it to endow brewers and church schools. the liberals in won a majority on chinese labour, and used it to cement the secret alliance with france and to make an alliance with tsarist russia. president wilson, in , won his majority on neutrality, and used it to come into the war. this method is part of the stock-in-trade of democracy. but its success depends upon repudiating it until the moment comes to practise it. those who, like the bolsheviks, have the honesty to proclaim in advance their intention of using power for other ends than those for which it was given them, are not likely to have a chance of carrying out their designs. what seems to me to emerge from these considerations is this: that in a democratic and politically educated country, armed revolution in favour of communism would have no chance of succeeding unless it were supported by a larger majority than would be required for the election of a communist government by constitutional methods. it is possible that, if such a government came into existence, and proceeded to carry out its programme, it would be met by armed resistance on the part of capital, including a large proportion of the officers in the army and navy. but in subduing this resistance it would have the support of that great body of opinion which believes in legality and upholds the constitution. moreover, having, by hypothesis, converted a majority of the nation, a communist government could be sure of loyal help from immense numbers of workers, and would not be forced, as the bolsheviks are in russia, to suspect treachery everywhere. under these circumstances, i believe that the resistance of the capitalists could be quelled without much difficulty, and would receive little support from moderate people. whereas, in a minority revolt of communists against a capitalist government, all moderate opinion would be on the side of capitalism. the contention that capitalist propaganda is what prevents the adoption of communism by wage-earners is only very partially true. capitalist propaganda has never been able to prevent the irish from voting against the english, though it has been applied to this object with great vigour. it has proved itself powerless, over and over again, in opposing nationalist movements which had almost no moneyed support. it has been unable to cope with religious feeling. and those industrial populations which would most obviously benefit by socialism have, in the main, adopted it, in spite of the opposition of employers. the plain truth is that socialism does not arouse the same passionate interest in the average citizen as is roused by nationality and used to be roused by religion. it is not unlikely that things may change in this respect: we may be approaching a period of economic civil wars comparable to that of the religious civil wars that followed the reformation. in such a period, nationalism is submerged by party: british and german socialists, or british and german capitalists, will feel more kinship with each other than with compatriots of the opposite political camp. but when that day comes, there will be no difficulty, in highly industrial countries, in securing socialist majorities; if socialism is not then carried without bloodshed, it will be due to the unconstitutional action of the rich, not to the need of revolutionary violence on the part of the advocates of the proletariat. whether such a state of opinion grows up or not depends mainly upon the stubbornness or conciliatoriness of the possessing classes, and, conversely, upon the moderation or violence of those who desire fundamental economic change. the majority which bolsheviks regard as unattainable is chiefly prevented by the ruthlessness of their own tactics. apart from all arguments of detail, there are two broad objections to violent revolution in a democratic community. the first is that, when once the principle of respecting majorities as expressed at the ballot-box is abandoned, there is no reason to suppose that victory will be secured by the particular minority to which one happens to belong. there are many minorities besides communists: religious minorities, teetotal minorities, militarist minorities, capitalist minorities. any one of these could adopt the method of obtaining power advocated by the bolsheviks, and any one would be just as likely to succeed as they are. what restrains these minorities, more or less, at present, is respect for the law and the constitution. bolsheviks tacitly assume that every other party will preserve this respect while they themselves, unhindered, prepare the revolution. but if their philosophy of violence becomes popular, there is not the slightest reason to suppose that they will be its beneficiaries. they believe that communism is for the good of the majority; they ought to believe that they can persuade the majority on this question, and to have the patience to set about the task of winning by propaganda. the second argument of principle against the method of minority violence is that abandonment of law, when it becomes widespread, lets loose the wild beast, and gives a free rein to the primitive lusts and egoisms which civilization in some degree curbs. every student of mediæval thought must have been struck by the extraordinarily high value placed upon law in that period. the reason was that, in countries infested by robber barons, law was the first requisite of progress. we, in the modern world, take it for granted that most people will be law-abiding, and we hardly realize what centuries of effort have gone to making such an assumption possible. we forget how many of the good things that we unquestionably expect would disappear out of life if murder, rape, and robbery with violence became common. and we forget even more how very easily this might happen. the universal class-war foreshadowed by the third international, following upon the loosening of restraints produced by the late war, and combined with a deliberate inculcation of disrespect for law and constitutional government, might, and i believe would, produce a state of affairs in which it would be habitual to murder men for a crust of bread, and in which women would only be safe while armed men protected them. the civilized nations have accepted democratic government as a method of settling internal disputes without violence. democratic government may have all the faults attributed to it, but it has the one great merit that people are, on the whole, willing to accept it as a substitute for civil war in political disputes. whoever sets to work to weaken this acceptance, whether in ulster or in moscow, is taking a fearful responsibility. civilization is not so stable that it cannot be broken up; and a condition of lawless violence is not one out of which any good thing is likely to emerge. for this reason, if for no other, revolutionary violence in a democracy is infinitely dangerous. iv revolution and dictatorship the bolsheviks have a very definite programme for achieving communism--a programme which has been set forth by lenin repeatedly, and quite recently in the reply of the third international to the questionnaire submitted by the independent labour party. capitalists, we are assured, will stick at nothing in defence of their privileges. it is the nature of man, in so far as he is politically conscious, to fight for the interests of his class so long as classes exist. when the conflict is not pushed to extremes, methods of conciliation and political deception may be preferable to actual physical warfare; but as soon as the proletariat make a really vital attack upon the capitalists, they will be met by guns and bayonets. this being certain and inevitable, it is as well to be prepared for it, and to conduct propaganda accordingly. those who pretend that pacific methods can lead to the realization of communism are false friends to the wage-earners; intentionally or unintentionally, they are covert allies of the bourgeoisie. there must, then, according to bolshevik theory, be armed conflict sooner or later, if the injustices of the present economic system are ever to be remedied. not only do they assume armed conflict: they have a fairly definite conception of the way in which it is to be conducted. this conception has been carried out in russia, and is to be carried out, before very long, in every civilized country. the communists, who represent the class-conscious wage-earners, wait for some propitious moment when events have caused a mood of revolutionary discontent with the existing government. they then put themselves at the head of the discontent, carry through a successful revolution, and in so doing acquire the arms, the railways, the state treasure, and all the other resources upon which the power of modern governments is built. they then confine political power to communists, however small a minority they may be of the whole nation. they set to work to increase their number by propaganda and the control of education. and meanwhile, they introduce communism into every department of economic life as quickly as possible. ultimately, after a longer or shorter period, according to circumstances, the nation will be converted to communism, the relics of capitalist institutions will have been obliterated, and it will be possible to restore freedom. but the political conflicts to which we are accustomed will not reappear. all the burning political questions of our time, according to the communists, are questions of class conflict, and will disappear when the division of classes disappears. accordingly the state will no longer be required, since the state is essentially an engine of power designed to give the victory to one side in the class conflict. ordinary states are designed to give the victory to the capitalists; the proletarian state (soviet russia) is designed to give the victory to the wage-earners. as soon as the community contains only wage-earners, the state will cease to have any functions. and so, through a period of dictatorship, we shall finally arrive at a condition very similar to that aimed at by anarchist communism. three questions arise in regard to this method of reaching utopia. first, would the ultimate state foreshadowed by the bolsheviks be desirable in itself? secondly, would the conflict involved in achieving it by the bolshevik method be so bitter and prolonged that its evils would outweigh the ultimate good? thirdly, is this method likely to lead, in the end, to the state which the bolsheviks desire, or will it fail at some point and arrive at a quite different result? if we are to be bolsheviks, we must answer all these questions in a sense favourable to their programme. as regards the first question, i have no hesitation in answering it in a manner favourable to communism. it is clear that the present inequalities of wealth are unjust. in part, they may be defended as affording an incentive to useful industry, but i do not think this defence will carry us very far. however, i have argued this question before in my book on _roads to freedom_, and i will not spend time upon it now. on this matter, i concede the bolshevik case. it is the other two questions that i wish to discuss. our second question was: is the ultimate good aimed at by the bolsheviks sufficiently great to be worth the price that, according to their own theory, will have to be paid for achieving it? if anything human were absolutely certain, we might answer this question affirmatively with some confidence. the benefits of communism, if it were once achieved, might be expected to be lasting; we might legitimately hope that further change would be towards something still better, not towards a revival of ancient evils. but if we admit, as we must do, that the outcome of the communist revolution is in some degree uncertain, it becomes necessary to count the cost; for a great part of the cost is all but certain. since the revolution of october, , the soviet government has been at war with almost all the world, and has had at the same time to face civil war at home. this is not to be regarded as accidental, or as a misfortune which could not be foreseen. according to marxian theory, what has happened was bound to happen. indeed, russia has been wonderfully fortunate in not having to face an even more desperate situation. first and foremost, the world was exhausted by the war, and in no mood for military adventures. next, the tsarist régime was the worst in europe, and therefore rallied less support than would be secured by any other capitalist government. again, russia is vast and agricultural, making it capable of resisting both invasion and blockade better than great britain or france or germany. the only other country that could have resisted with equal success is the united states, which is at present very far removed from a proletarian revolution, and likely long to remain the chief bulwark of the capitalist system. it is evident that great britain, attempting a similar revolution, would be forced by starvation to yield within a few months, provided america led a policy of blockade. the same is true, though in a less degree, of continental countries. therefore, unless and until an international communist revolution becomes possible, we must expect that any other nation following russia's example will have to pay an even higher price than russia has had to pay. now the price that russia is having to pay is very great. the almost universal poverty might be thought to be a small evil in comparison with the ultimate gain, but it brings with it other evils of which the magnitude would be acknowledged even by those who have never known poverty and therefore make light of it. hunger brings an absorption in the question of food, which, to most people, makes life almost purely animal. the general shortage makes people fierce, and reacts upon the political atmosphere. the necessity of inculcating communism produces a hot-house condition, where every breath of fresh air must be excluded: people are to be taught to think in a certain way, and all free intelligence becomes taboo. the country comes to resemble an immensely magnified jesuit college. every kind of liberty is banned as being "_bourgeois_"; but it remains a fact that intelligence languishes where thought is not free. all this, however, according to the leaders of the third international, is only a small beginning of the struggle, which must become world-wide before it achieves victory. in their reply to the independent labour party they say: it is probable that upon the throwing off of the chains of the capitalist governments, the revolutionary proletariat of europe will meet the resistance of anglo-saxon capital in the persons of british and american capitalists who will attempt to blockade it. it is then possible that the revolutionary proletariat of europe will rise in union with the peoples of the east and commence a revolutionary struggle, the scene of which will be the entire world, to deal a final blow to british and american capitalism (_the times_, july , ). the war here prophesied, if it ever takes place, will be one compared to which the late war will come to seem a mere affair of outposts. those who realize the destructiveness of the late war, the devastation and impoverishment, the lowering of the level of civilization throughout vast areas, the general increase of hatred and savagery, the letting loose of bestial instincts which had been curbed during peace--those who realize all this will hesitate to incur inconceivably greater horrors, even if they believe firmly that communism in itself is much to be desired. an economic system cannot be considered apart from the population which is to carry it out; and the population resulting from such a world-war as moscow calmly contemplates would be savage, bloodthirsty and ruthless to an extent that must make any system a mere engine of oppression and cruelty. this brings us to our third question: is the system which communists regard as their goal likely to result from the adoption of their methods? this is really the most vital question of the three. advocacy of communism by those who believe in bolshevik methods rests upon the assumption that there is no slavery except economic slavery, and that when all goods are held in common there must be perfect liberty. i fear this is a delusion. there must be administration, there must be officials who control distribution. these men, in a communist state, are the repositories of power. so long as they control the army, they are able, as in russia at this moment, to wield despotic power even if they are a small minority. the fact that there is communism--to a certain extent--does not mean that there is liberty. if the communism were more complete, it would not necessarily mean more freedom; there would still be certain officials in control of the food supply, and these officials could govern as they pleased so long as they retained the support of the soldiers. this is not mere theory: it is the patent lesson of the present condition of russia. the bolshevik theory is that a small minority are to seize power, and are to hold it until communism is accepted practically universally, which, they admit, may take a long time. but power is sweet, and few men surrender it voluntarily. it is especially sweet to those who have the habit of it, and the habit becomes most ingrained in those who have governed by bayonets, without popular support. is it not almost inevitable that men placed as the bolsheviks are placed in russia, and as they maintain that the communists must place themselves wherever the social revolution succeeds, will be loath to relinquish their monopoly of power, and will find reasons for remaining until some new revolution ousts them? would it not be fatally easy for them, without altering economic structure, to decree large salaries for high government officials, and so reintroduce the old inequalities of wealth? what motive would they have for not doing so? what motive is possible except idealism, love of mankind, non-economic motives of the sort that bolsheviks decry? the system created by violence and the forcible rule of a minority must necessarily allow of tyranny and exploitation; and if human nature is what marxians assert it to be, why should the rulers neglect such opportunities of selfish advantage? it is sheer nonsense to pretend that the rulers of a great empire such as soviet russia, when they have become accustomed to power, retain the proletarian psychology, and feel that their class-interest is the same as that of the ordinary working man. this is not the case in fact in russia now, however the truth may be concealed by fine phrases. the government has a class-consciousness and a class-interest quite distinct from those of the genuine proletarian, who is not to be confounded with the paper proletarian of the marxian schema. in a capitalist state, the government and the capitalists on the whole hang together, and form one class; in soviet russia, the government has absorbed the capitalist mentality together with the governmental, and the fusion has given increased strength to the upper class. but i see no reason whatever to expect equality or freedom to result from such a system, except reasons derived from a false psychology and a mistaken analysis of the sources of political power. i am compelled to reject bolshevism for two reasons: first, because the price mankind must pay to achieve communism by bolshevik methods is too terrible; and secondly because, even after paying the price, i do not believe the result would be what the bolsheviks profess to desire. but if their methods are rejected, how are we ever to arrive at a better economic system? this is not an easy question, and i shall treat it in a separate chapter. v mechanism and the individual is it possible to effect a fundamental reform of the existing economic system by any other method than that of bolshevism? the difficulty of answering this question is what chiefly attracts idealists to the dictatorship of the proletariat. if, as i have argued, the method of violent revolution and communist rule is not likely to have the results which idealists desire, we are reduced to despair unless we can see hope in other methods. the bolshevik arguments against all other methods are powerful. i confess that, when the spectacle of present-day russia forced me to disbelieve in bolshevik methods, i was at first unable to see any way of curing the essential evils of capitalism. my first impulse was to abandon political thinking as a bad job, and to conclude that the strong and ruthless must always exploit the weaker and kindlier sections of the population. but this is not an attitude that can be long maintained by any vigorous and temperamentally hopeful person. of course, if it were the truth, one would have to acquiesce. some people believe that by living on sour milk one can achieve immortality. such optimists are answered by a mere refutation; it is not necessary to go on and point out some other way of escaping death. similarly an argument that bolshevism will not lead to the millennium would remain valid even if it could be shown that the millennium cannot be reached by any other road. but the truth in social questions is not quite like truth in physiology or physics, since it depends upon men's beliefs. optimism tends to verify itself by making people impatient of avoidable evils; while despair, on the other hand, makes the world as bad as it believes it to be. it is therefore imperative for those who do not believe in bolshevism to put some other hope in its place. i think there are two things that must be admitted: first, that many of the worst evils of capitalism might survive under communism; secondly, that the cure for these evils cannot be sudden, since it requires changes in the average mentality. what are the chief evils of the present system? i do not think that mere inequality of wealth, in itself, is a very grave evil. if everybody had enough, the fact that some have more than enough would be unimportant. with a very moderate improvement in methods of production, it would be easy to ensure that everybody should have enough, even under capitalism, if wars and preparations for wars were abolished. the problem of poverty is by no means insoluble within the existing system, except when account is taken of psychological factors and the uneven distribution of power. the graver evils of the capitalist system all arise from its uneven distribution of power. the possessors of capital wield an influence quite out of proportion to their numbers or their services to the community. they control almost the whole of education and the press; they decide what the average man shall know or not know; the cinema has given them a new method of propaganda, by which they enlist the support of those who are too frivolous even for illustrated papers. very little of the intelligence of the world is really free: most of it is, directly or indirectly, in the pay of business enterprises or wealthy philanthropists. to satisfy capitalist interests, men are compelled to work much harder and more monotonously than they ought to work, and their education is scamped. wherever, as in barbarous or semi-civilized countries, labour is too weak or too disorganized to protect itself, appalling cruelties are practised for private profit. economic and political organizations become more and more vast, leaving less and less room for individual development and initiative. it is this sacrifice of the individual to the machine that is the fundamental evil of the modern world. to cure this evil is not easy, because efficiency is promoted, at any given moment, though not in the long run, by sacrificing the individual to the smooth working of a vast organization, whether military or industrial. in war and in commercial competition, it is necessary to control individual impulses, to treat men as so many "bayonets" or "sabres" or "hands," not as a society of separate people with separate tastes and capacities. some sacrifice of individual impulses is, of course, essential to the existence of an ordered community, and this degree of sacrifice is, as a rule, not regretable even from the individual's point of view. but what is demanded in a highly militarized or industrialized nation goes far beyond this very moderate degree. a society which is to allow much freedom to the individual must be strong enough to be not anxious about home defence, moderate enough to refrain from difficult external conquests, and rich enough to value leisure and a civilized existence more than an increase of consumable commodities. but where the material conditions for such a state of affairs exist, the psychological conditions are not likely to exist unless power is very widely diffused throughout the community. where power is concentrated in a few, it will happen, unless those few are very exceptional people, that they will value tangible achievements in the way of increase in trade or empire more than the slow and less obvious improvements that would result from better education combined with more leisure. the joys of victory are especially great to the holders of power, while the evils of a mechanical organization fall almost exclusively upon the less influential. for these reasons, i do not believe that any community in which power is much concentrated will long refrain from conflicts of the kind involving a sacrifice of what is most valuable in the individual. in russia at this moment, the sacrifice of the individual is largely inevitable, because of the severity of the economic and military struggle. but i did not feel, in the bolsheviks, any consciousness of the magnitude of this misfortune, or any realization of the importance of the individual as against the state. nor do i believe that men who do realize this are likely to succeed, or to come to the top, in times when everything has to be done against personal liberty. the bolshevik theory requires that every country, sooner or later, should go through what russia is going through now. and in every country in such a condition we may expect to find the government falling into the hands of ruthless men, who have not by nature any love for freedom, and who will see little importance in hastening the transition from dictatorship to freedom. it is far more likely that such men will be tempted to embark upon new enterprises, requiring further concentration of forces, and postponing indefinitely the liberation of the populations which they use as their material. for these reasons, equalization of wealth without equalization of power seems to me a rather small and unstable achievement. but equalization of power is not a thing that can be achieved in a day. it requires a considerable level of moral, intellectual, and technical education. it requires a long period without extreme crises, in order that habits of tolerance and good nature may become common. it requires vigour on the part of those who are acquiring power, without a too desperate resistance on the part of those whose share is diminishing. this is only possible if those who are acquiring power are not very fierce, and do not terrify their opponents by threats of ruin and death. it cannot be done quickly, because quick methods require that very mechanism and subordination of the individual which we should struggle to prevent. but even equalization of power is not the whole of what is needed politically. the right grouping of men for different purposes is also essential. self-government in industry, for example, is an indispensable condition of a good society. those acts of an individual or a group which have no very great importance for outsiders ought to be freely decided by that individual or group. this is recognized as regards religion, but ought to be recognized over a much wider field. bolshevik theory seems to me to err by concentrating its attention upon one evil, namely inequality of wealth, which it believes to be at the bottom of all others. i do not believe any one evil can be thus isolated, but if i had to select one as the greatest of political evils, i should select inequality of power. and i should deny that this is likely to be cured by the class-war and the dictatorship of the communist party. only peace and a long period of gradual improvement can bring it about. good relations between individuals, freedom from hatred and violence and oppression, general diffusion of education, leisure rationally employed, the progress of art and science--these seem to me among the most important ends that a political theory ought to have in view. i do not believe that they can be furthered, except very rarely, by revolution and war; and i am convinced that at the present moment they can only be promoted by a diminution in the spirit of ruthlessness generated by the war. for these reasons, while admitting the necessity and even utility of bolshevism in russia, i do not wish to see it spread, or to encourage the adoption of its philosophy by advanced parties in the western nations. vi why russian communism has failed the civilized world seems almost certain, sooner or later, to follow the example of russia in attempting a communist organization of society. i believe that the attempt is essential to the progress and happiness of mankind during the next few centuries, but i believe also that the transition has appalling dangers. i believe that, if the bolshevik theory as to the method of transition is adopted by communists in western nations, the result will be a prolonged chaos, leading neither to communism nor to any other civilized system, but to a relapse into the barbarism of the dark ages. in the interests of communism, no less than in the interests of civilization, i think it imperative that the russian failure should be admitted and analysed. for this reason, if for no other, i cannot enter into the conspiracy of concealment which many western socialists who have visited russia consider necessary. i shall try first to recapitulate the facts which make me regard the russian experiment as a failure, and then to seek out the causes of failure. the most elementary failure in russia is in regard to food. in a country which formerly produced a vast exportable surplus of cereals and other agricultural produce, and in which the non-agricultural population is only per cent. of the total, it ought to be possible, without great difficulty, to provide enough food for the towns. yet the government has failed badly in this respect. the rations are inadequate and irregular, so that it is impossible to preserve health and vigour without the help of food purchased illicitly in the markets at speculative prices. i have given reasons for thinking that the breakdown of transport, though a contributory cause, is not the main reason for the shortage. the main reason is the hostility of the peasants, which, in turn, is due to the collapse of industry and to the policy of forced requisitions. in regard to corn and flour, the government requisitions all that the peasant produces above a certain minimum required for himself and his family. if, instead, it exacted a fixed amount as rent, it would not destroy his incentive to production, and would not provide nearly such a strong motive for concealment. but this plan would have enabled the peasants to grow rich, and would have involved a confessed abandonment of communist theory. it has therefore been thought better to employ forcible methods, which led to disaster, as they were bound to do. the collapse of industry was the chief cause of the food difficulties, and has in turn been aggravated by them. owing to the fact that there is abundant food in the country, industrial and urban workers are perpetually attempting to abandon their employment for agriculture. this is illegal, and is severely punished, by imprisonment or convict labour. nevertheless it continues, and in so vast a country as russia it is not possible to prevent it. thus the ranks of industry become still further depleted. except as regards munitions of war, the collapse of industry in russia is extraordinarily complete. the resolutions passed by the ninth congress of the communist party (april, ) speak of "the incredible catastrophes of public economy." this language is not too strong, though the recovery of the baku oil has done something to produce a revival along the volga basin. the failure of the whole industrial side of the national economy, including transport, is at the bottom of the other failures of the soviet government. it is, to begin with, the main cause of the unpopularity of the communists both in town and country: in town, because the people are hungry; in the country, because food is taken with no return except paper. if industry had been prosperous, the peasants could have had clothes and agricultural machinery, for which they would have willingly parted with enough food for the needs of the towns. the town population could then have subsisted in tolerable comfort; disease could have been coped with, and the general lowering of vitality averted. it would not have been necessary, as it has been in many cases, for men of scientific or artistic capacity to abandon the pursuits in which they were skilled for unskilled manual labour. the communist republic might have been agreeable to live in--at least for those who had been very poor before. the unpopularity of the bolsheviks, which is primarily due to the collapse of industry, has in turn been accentuated by the measures which it has driven the government to adopt. in view of the fact that it was impossible to give adequate food to the ordinary population of petrograd and moscow, the government decided that at any rate the men employed on important public work should be sufficiently nourished to preserve their efficiency. it is a gross libel to say that the communists, or even the leading people's commissaries, live luxurious lives according to our standards; but it is a fact that they are not exposed, like their subjects, to acute hunger and the weakening of energy that accompanies it. no tone can blame them for this, since the work of government must be carried on; but it is one of the ways in which class distinctions have reappeared where it was intended that they should be banished. i talked to an obviously hungry working man in moscow, who pointed to the kremlin and remarked: "in there they have enough to eat." he was expressing a widespread feeling which is fatal to the idealistic appeal that communism attempts to make. owing to unpopularity, the bolsheviks have had to rely upon the army and the extraordinary commission, and have been compelled to reduce the soviet system to an empty form. more and more the pretence of representing the proletariat has grown threadbare. amid official demonstrations and processions and meetings the genuine proletarian looks on, apathetic and disillusioned, unless he is possessed of unusual energy and fire, in which case he looks to the ideas of syndicalism or the i.w.w. to liberate him from a slavery far more complete than that of capitalism. a sweated wage, long hours, industrial conscription, prohibition of strikes, prison for slackers, diminution of the already insufficient rations in factories where the production falls below what the authorities expect, an army of spies ready to report any tendency to political disaffection and to procure imprisonment for its promoters--this is the reality of a system which still professes to govern in the name of the proletariat. at the same time the internal and external peril has necessitated the creation of a vast army recruited by conscription, except as regards a communist nucleus, from among a population utterly weary of war, who put the bolsheviks in power because they alone promised peace. militarism has produced its inevitable result in the way of a harsh and dictatorial spirit: the men in power go through their day's work with the consciousness that they command three million armed men, and that civilian opposition to their will can be easily crushed. out of all this has grown a system painfully like the old government of the tsar--a system which is asiatic in its centralized bureaucracy, its secret service, its atmosphere of governmental mystery and submissive terror. in many ways it resembles our government of india. like that government, it stands for civilization, for education, sanitation, and western ideas of progress; it is composed in the main of honest and hard-working men, who despise those whom they govern, but believe themselves possessed of something valuable which they must communicate to the population, however little it may be desired. like our government in india, they live in terror of popular risings, and are compelled to resort to cruel repressions in order to preserve their power. like it, they represent an alien philosophy of life, which cannot be forced upon the people without a change of instinct, habit, and tradition so profound as to dry up the vital springs of action, producing listlessness and despair among the ignorant victims of militant enlightenment. it may be that russia needs sternness and discipline more than anything else; it may be that a revival of peter the great's methods is essential to progress. from this point of view, much of what it is natural to criticize in the bolsheviks becomes defensible; but this point of view has little affinity to communism. bolshevism may be defended, possibly, as a dire discipline through which a backward nation is to be rapidly industrialized; but as an experiment in communism it has failed. there are two things that a defender of the bolsheviks may say against the argument that they have failed because the present state of russia is bad. it may be said that it is too soon to judge, and it may be urged that whatever failure there has been is attributable to the hostility of the outside world. as to the contention that it is too soon to judge, that is of course undeniable in a sense. but in a sense it is always too soon to judge of any historical movement, because its effects and developments go on for ever. bolshevism has, no doubt, great changes ahead of it. but the last three years have afforded material for some judgments, though more definitive judgments will be possible later. and, for reasons which i have given in earlier chapters, i find it impossible to believe that later developments will realize more fully the communist ideal. if trade is opened with the outer world, there will be an almost irresistible tendency to resumption of private enterprise. if trade is not re-opened, the plans of asiatic conquest will mature, leading to a revival of yenghis khan and timur. in neither case is the purity of the communist faith likely to survive. as for the hostility of the entente, it is of course true that bolshevism might have developed very differently if it had been treated in a friendly spirit. but in view of its desire to promote world-revolution, no one could expect--and the bolsheviks certainly did not expect--that capitalist governments would be friendly. if germany had won the war, germany would have shown a hostility more effective than that of the entente. however we may blame western governments for their policy, we must realize that, according to the deterministic economic theory of the bolsheviks, no other policy was to be expected from them. other men might have been excused for not foreseeing the attitude of churchill, clemenceau and millerand; but marxians could not be excused, since this attitude was in exact accord with their own formula. we have seen the symptoms of bolshevik failure; i come now to the question of its profounder causes. everything that is worst in russia we found traceable to the collapse of industry. why has industry collapsed so utterly? and would it collapse equally if a communist revolution were to occur in a western country? russian industry was never highly developed, and depended always upon outside aid for much of its plant. the hostility of the world, as embodied in the blockade, left russia powerless to replace the machinery and locomotives worn out during the war. the need of self-defence compelled the bolsheviks to send their best workmen to the front, because they were the most reliable communists, and the loss of them rendered their factories even more inefficient than they were under kerensky. in this respect, and in the laziness and incapacity of the russian workman, the bolsheviks have had to face special difficulties which would be less in other countries. on the other hand, they have had special advantages in the fact that russia is self-supporting in the matter of food; no other country could have endured the collapse of industry so long, and no other great power except the united states could have survived years of blockade. the hostility of the world was in no way a surprise to those who made the october revolution; it was in accordance with their general theory, and its consequences should have been taken into account in making the revolution. other hostilities besides those of the outside world have been incurred by the bolsheviks with open eyes, notably the hostility of the peasants and that of a great part of the industrial population. they have attempted, in accordance with their usual contempt for conciliatory methods, to substitute terror for reward as the incentive to work. some amiable socialists have imagined that, when the private capitalist had been eliminated, men would work from a sense of obligation to the community. the bolsheviks will have none of such sentimentalism. in one of the resolutions of the ninth communist congress they say: every social system, whether based on slavery, feudalism, or capitalism, had its ways and means of labour compulsion and labour education in the interests of the exploiters. the soviet system is faced with the task of developing its own methods of labour compulsion to attain an increase of the intensity and wholesomeness of labour; this method is to be based on the socialization of public economy in the interests of the whole nation. in addition to the propaganda by which the people are to be influenced and the repressions which are to be applied to all idlers, parasites and disorganizers who strive to undermine public zeal--the principal method for the increase of production will become the introduction of the system of compulsory labour. in capitalist society rivalry assumed the character of competition and led to the exploitation of man by man. in a society where the means of production are nationalized, labour rivalry is to increase the products of labour without infringing its solidarity. rivalry between factories, regions, guilds, workshops, and individual workers should become the subject of careful organization and of close study on the side of the trade unions and the economic organs. the system of premiums which is to be introduced should become one of the most powerful means of exciting rivalry. the system of rationing of food supply is to get into line with it; so long as soviet russia suffers from insufficiency of provisions, it is only just that the industrious and conscientious worker receives more than the careless worker. it must be remembered that even the "industrious and conscientious worker" receives less food than is required to maintain efficiency. over the whole development of russia and of bolshevism since the october revolution there broods a tragic fatality. in spite of outward success the inner failure has proceeded by inevitable stages--stages which could, by sufficient acumen, have been foreseen from the first. by provoking the hostility of the outside world the bolsheviks were forced to provoke the hostility of the peasants, and finally the hostility or utter apathy of the urban and industrial population. these various hostilities brought material disaster, and material disaster brought spiritual collapse. the ultimate source of the whole train of evils lies in the bolshevik outlook on life: in its dogmatism of hatred and its belief that human nature can be completely transformed by force. to injure capitalists is not the ultimate goal of communism, though among men dominated by hatred it is the part that gives zest to their activities. to face the hostility of the world may show heroism, but it is a heroism for which the country, not its rulers, has to pay the price. in the principles of bolshevism there is more desire to destroy ancient evils than to build up new goods; it is for this reason that success in destruction has been so much greater than in construction. the desire to destroy is inspired by hatred, which is not a constructive principle. from this essential characteristic of bolshevik mentality has sprung the willingness to subject russia to its present martyrdom. it is only out of a quite different mentality that a happier world can be created. and from this follows a further conclusion. the bolshevik outlook is the outcome of the cruelty of the tsarist régime and the ferocity of the years of the great war, operating upon a ruined and starving nation maddened into universal hatred. if a different mentality is needed for the establishment of a successful communism, then a quite different conjuncture must see its inauguration; men must be persuaded to the attempt by hope, not driven to it by despair. to bring this about should be the aim of every communist who desires the happiness of mankind more than the punishment of capitalists and their governmental satellites. vii conditions for the success of communism the fundamental ideas of communism are by no means impracticable, and would, if realized, add immeasurably to the well-being of mankind. the difficulties which have to be faced are not in regard to the fundamental ideas, but in regard to the transition from capitalism. it must be assumed that those who profit by the existing system will fight to preserve it, and their fight may be sufficiently severe to destroy all that is best in communism during the struggle, as well as everything else that has value in modern civilization. the seriousness of this problem of transition is illustrated by russia, and cannot be met by the methods of the third international. the soviet government, at the present moment, is anxious to obtain manufactured goods from capitalist countries, but the third international is meanwhile endeavouring to promote revolutions which, if they occurred, would paralyse the industries of the countries concerned, and leave them incapable of supplying russian needs. the supreme condition of success in a communist revolution is that it should not paralyse industry. if industry is paralysed, the evils which exist in modern russia, or others just as great, seem practically unavoidable. there will be the problem of town and country, there will be hunger, there will be fierceness and revolts and military tyranny. all these things follow in a fatal sequence; and the end of them is almost certain to be something quite different from what genuine communists desire. if industry is to survive throughout a communist revolution, a number of conditions must be fulfilled which are not, at present, fulfilled anywhere. consider, for the sake of definiteness, what would happen if a communist revolution were to occur in england to-morrow. immediately america would place an embargo on all trade with us. the cotton industry would collapse, leaving about five million of the most productive portion of the population idle. the food supply would become inadequate, and would fail disastrously if, as is to be expected, the navy were hostile or disorganized by the sabotage of the officers. the result would be that, unless there were a counter-revolution, about half the population would die within the first twelve months. on such a basis it would evidently be impossible to erect a successful communist state. what applies to england applies, in one form or another, to the remaining countries of europe. italian and german socialists are, many of them, in a revolutionary frame of mind and could, if they chose, raise formidable revolts. they are urged by moscow to do so, but they realize that, if they did, england and america would starve them. france, for many reasons, dare not offend england and america beyond a point. thus, in every country except america, a successful communist revolution is impossible for economico-political reasons. america, being self-contained and strong, would be capable, so far as material conditions go, of achieving a successful revolution; but in america the psychological conditions are as yet adverse. there is no other civilized country where capitalism is so strong and revolutionary socialism so weak as in america. at the present moment, therefore, though it is by no means impossible that communist revolutions may occur all over the continent, it is nearly certain that they cannot be successful in any real sense. they will have to begin by a war against america, and possibly england, by a paralysis of industry, by starvation, militarism and the whole attendant train of evils with which russia has made us familiar. that communism, whenever and wherever it is adopted, will have to begin by fighting the bourgeoisie, is highly probable. the important question is not whether there is to be fighting, but how long and severe it is to be. a short war, in which communism won a rapid and easy victory, would do little harm. it is long, bitter and doubtful wars that must be avoided if anything of what makes communism desirable is to survive. two practical consequences flow from this conclusion: first, that nothing can succeed until america is either converted to communism, or at any rate willing to remain neutral; secondly, that it is a mistake to attempt to inaugurate communism in a country where the majority are hostile, or rather, where the active opponents are as strong as the active supporters, because in such a state of opinion a very severe civil war is likely to result. it is necessary to have a great body of opinion favourable to communism, and a rather weak opposition, before a really successful communist state can be introduced either by revolution or by more or less constitutional methods. it may be assumed that when communism is first introduced, the higher technical and business staff will side with the capitalists and attempt sabotage unless they have no hopes of a counter-revolution. for this reason it is very necessary that among wage-earners there should be as wide a diffusion as possible of technical and business education, so that they may be able immediately to take control of big complex industries. in this respect russia was very badly off, whereas england and america would be much more fortunate. self-government in industry is, i believe, the road by which england can best approach communism. i do not doubt that the railways and the mines, after a little practice, could be run more efficiently by the workers, from the point of view of production, than they are at present by the capitalists. the bolsheviks oppose self-government in industry every where, because it has failed in russia, and their national self-esteem prevents them from admitting that this is due to the backwardness of russia. this is one of the respects in which they are misled by the assumption that russia must be in all ways a model to the rest of the world. i would go so far as to say that the winning of self-government in such industries as railways and mining is an essential preliminary to complete communism. in england, especially, this is the case. the unions can command whatever technical skill they may require; they are politically powerful; the demand for self-government is one for which there is widespread sympathy, and could be much more with adequate propaganda; moreover (what is important with the british temperament) self-government can be brought about gradually, by stages in each trade, and by extension from one trade to another. capitalists value two things, their power and their money; many individuals among them value only the money. it is wiser to concentrate first on the power, as is done by seeking self-government in industry without confiscation of capitalist incomes. by this means the capitalists are gradually turned into obvious drones, their active functions in industry become nil, and they can be ultimately dispossessed without dislocation and without the possibility of any successful struggle on their parts. another advantage of proceeding by way of self-government is that it tends to prevent the communist régime, when it comes, from having that truly terrible degree of centralization which now exists in russia. the russians have been forced to centralize, partly by the problems of the war, but more by the shortage of all kinds of skill. this has compelled the few competent men to attempt each to do the work of ten men, which has not proved satisfactory in spite of heroic efforts. the idea of democracy has become discredited as the result first of syndicalism, and then of bolshevism. but there are two different things that may be meant by democracy: we may mean the system of parliamentary government, or we may mean the participation of the people in affairs. the discredit of the former is largely deserved, and i have no desire to uphold parliament as an ideal institution. but it is a great misfortune if, from a confusion of ideas, men come to think that, because parliaments are imperfect, there is no reason why there should be self-government. the grounds for advocating self-government are very familiar: first, that no benevolent despot can be trusted to know or pursue the interests of his subjects; second, that the practice of self-government is the only effective method of political education; third, that it tends to place the preponderance of force on the side of the constitution, and thus to promote order and stable government. other reasons could be found, but i think these are the chief. in russia self-government has disappeared, except within the communist party. if it is not to disappear elsewhere during a communist revolution, it is very desirable that there should exist already important industries competently administered by the workers themselves. the bolshevik philosophy is promoted very largely by despair of more gradual methods. but this despair is a mark of impatience, and is not really warranted by the facts. it is by no means impossible, in the near future, to secure self-government in british railways and mines by constitutional means. this is not the sort of measure which would bring into operation an american blockade or a civil war or any of the other catastrophic dangers that are to be feared from a full-fledged communist revolution in the present international situation. self-government in industry is feasible, and would be a great step towards communism. it would both afford many of the advantages of communism and also make the transition far easier without a technical break-down of production. there is another defect in the methods advocated by the third international. the sort of revolution which is recommended is never practically feasible except in a time of national misfortune; in fact, defeat in war seems to be an indispensable condition. consequently, by this method, communism will only be inaugurated where the conditions of life are difficult, where demoralization and disorganization make success almost impossible, and where men are in a mood of fierce despair very inimical to industrial construction. if communism is to have a fair chance, it must be inaugurated in a prosperous country. but a prosperous country will not be readily moved by the arguments of hatred and universal upheaval which are employed by the third international. it is necessary, in appealing to a prosperous country, to lay stress on hope rather than despair, and to show how the transition can be effected without a calamitous loss of prosperity. all this requires less violence and subversiveness, more patience and constructive propaganda, less appeal to the armed might of a determined minority. the attitude of uncompromising heroism is attractive, and appeals especially to the dramatic instinct. but the purpose of the serious revolutionary is not personal heroism, nor martyrdom, but the creation of a happier world. those who have the happiness of the world at heart will shrink from attitudes and the facile hysteria of "no parley with the enemy." they will not embark upon enterprises, however arduous and austere, which are likely to involve the martyrdom of their country and the discrediting of their ideals. it is by slower and less showy methods that the new world must be built: by industrial efforts after self-government, by proletarian training in technique and business administration, by careful study of the international situation, by a prolonged and devoted propaganda of ideas rather than tactics, especially among the wage-earners of the united states. it is not true that no gradual approaches to communism are possible: self-government in industry is an important instance to the contrary. it is not true that any isolated european country, or even the whole of the continent in unison, can, after the exhaustion produced by the war, introduce a successful form of communism at the present moment, owing to the hostility and economic supremacy of america. to find fault with those who urge these considerations, or to accuse them of faint-heartedness, is mere sentimental self-indulgence, sacrificing the good we can do to the satisfaction of our own emotions. even under present conditions in russia, it is possible still to feel the inspiration of the essential spirit of communism, the spirit of creative hope, seeking to sweep away the incumbrances of injustice and tyranny and rapacity which obstruct the growth of the human spirit, to replace individual competition by collective action, the relation of master and slave by free co-operation. this hope has helped the best of the communists to bear the harsh years through which russia has been passing, and has become an inspiration to the world. the hope is not chimerical, but it can only be realized through a more patient labour, a more objective study of facts, and above all a longer propaganda, to make the necessity of the transition obvious to the great majority of wage-earners. russian communism may fail and go under, but communism itself will not die. and if hope rather than hatred inspires its advocates, it can be brought about without the universal cataclysm preached by moscow. the war and its sequel have proved the destructiveness of capitalism; let us see to it that the next epoch does not prove the still greater destructiveness of communism, but rather its power to heal the wounds which the old evil system has inflicted upon the human spirit. _printed in great britain by_ unwin brothers, limited, the gresham press, woking and london errata p. , l. . for "teaching" read "reaching" p. , between l. and l. . insert "violence in the transition must be faced. unfortunately," p. , l. . for "dying" read "very ill" p. , last sentence. substitute "but he recovered, and i hope it will recover also." (replacing: "i hope i was mistaken in both respects.") p. , l. from below. for "waving triumphant hands and" read "expressing their delight by" p. , l. . for "professional" read "professorial" p. , l. . for "this" read "thus" p. , l. . for "losses" read "hopes" p. , l. . for "leave" read "leaves" p. , last line. substitute "which has been already discussed in chapter vi" (replacing: "which is better reserved for a separate chapter.") p. , l. for "desires" read "desire" p. , l. from below. for "caunon" read "cannon" p. , l. from below. for "by" read "in" p. , l. . for "scheme" read "schema" p. , l. . for "zenghis" read "yenghis" p. , l. . delete comma. by the same author roads to freedom principles of social reconstruction introduction to mathematical philosophy the analysis of mind * * * * * typographical errors corrected in text: page : happinesss changed to happiness page : genera to general * * * * * this etext was produced from fantastic universe, september . extensive research did not uncover any evidence that the u.s. copyright on this publication was renewed. _it is not always easy to laugh at satan, or take pleasure in his antics. but when the prince of darkness goes on a vacation or holds a mirror up to human nature at its most luciferian chuckles are certain to arise and follow one another in hilarious profusion. here is a yarn contrived by a craftsman with ironic lightning bolts at his fingertips, as mordantly compelling as it is jovial and jovian. if you liked _satan on holiday_, and were hoping for a sequel you can now rejoice in full measure, for ralph bennitt has provided that longed-for delight._ satan and the comrades _by ... ralph bennitt_ lucifer wasn't sure that just the right improvements had been made in hell. so he used a dash of sulfur with satanic skill. nick felt almost good-humoredly buoyant after his year's holiday as a college boy. about a second after leaving earth he slowed his traveling speed down to the medium velocity of light by shifting from fifth dimension to fourth. though still a million miles above the wastes of chaos and twice that distance from the gates of hell, his x-ray eyes were quick to discern a difference in the road far below him. sin and death had built that broad highway eons before. on leaving hell, presumedly forever to carry on their work among men, they had done a mighty good job of the original construction. but time had worked its ravages with the primrose-lined path, and it was not surprising that on starting his sabbatical leave, nick had ordered his chief engineer to repair the road as a first step in his plan to modernize hell. apparently, old mulciber had done a bang-up job, and nick roared in laughter at evidences of the engineer's genius and those of wily belial, the handsome court wag. the propaganda chief had added advertising at numerous new roadhouses along the way, and unwary shades traveling hellward gazed at beautiful scenes of lush vegetation instead of a dreary expanse like the texas panhandle. this "devilish cantraip sleight" also changed the raw chaos climate to a steady °f and gave off a balmy fragrance of fruits and flowers. ten thousand drachmas, a fictitious unit of currency established by foxy old mammon, was the flat fee for use of the road. blissfully unaware of this "transportation charge," or how it would be paid, numerous phantom pilgrims were sliding down the steeper hills--and having a swell time. their shouts of glee reached nick's largish ears despite the lack of air as mortals know it. clever old mulcie had installed freezing plants here and there to surface the road with glare ice. nick poised above a party of phantom men and girls sliding downhill on their _derrieres_ and ending in a heap at the bottom. a nice change from traveling under their own power. their maximum speed while swift and incomprehensible to mortals, seemed relatively slow to one of hell's old timers. only nick and his best scout, cletus, could move at thought speed--"click-click transportation." drifting on, a pleased smile on his red, bony face, nick paused several times to read belial's welcomings. "die and see the original naples in all its natural beauty," said one sign. "try our hot sulphur springs and become a new soul." gayest pleasures were promised to all and golfers had special attention. "register with the pro at your favorite golf club so you can qualify. no charge for pro's services who'll teach you to break . free lunch and drinks at all nineteenth holes." no fool shade would wonder what he'd qualify for, nor suspect he'd have to shovel eighty million tons of coal and ashes before his handicap would be lowered enough to earn him a set of golf clubs or that the free lunch and drinks were chunks of brimstone, the sulphurous air and styx river water which is always just below boiling point at , °f. hell's thousand of new golf courses, gambling joints and bars would be available only after downtrodden souls had worked a millennia or two at common labor jobs. a shady deal, indeed, but all a part of nick's master plan to get him and his legions back to heaven. by modernizing hades he hoped to annoy "the big boss upstairs" while diverting the attention of those two vigilant celestial watchers, michael and raphael, from the main idea. in a series of bold moves, known only to nick and his board or inner council, mankind would be wiped off the earth--and thus bring the bbu to time. or so nick hoped. as a first step, he had spent a year as pudzy, a college boy, studying electronics and modern skills of all kinds. he had enjoyed the holiday on earth though it irked him to recall that he'd been obliged to do good here and there. the thought of these satanic lapses caused him to frown, but his jolly mood returned when he saw the familiar gates of hell wide open in obedience to his whistle. the whistle's high frequency waves also awakened cerberus, the three-headed watch dog, besides actuating "the dingus." this electronic device nick had stolen to operate the three ponderous triple-fold gates of adamantine, brass and iron. he slowed to supersonic speed, brought back his great red wings and made a neat three-point landing without injuring the needle-sharp dart at the end of his long, black tail. still feeling jovial, he kicked all three of cerberus's heads, then zoomed down through the tunnel to the north bank of the river styx. there he halted to view the ten-lane suspension bridge mulciber had thrown across the steamy black water. nick was wondering how the old genius had accomplished such a feat when a thick black wall dropped across the bridgehead. "cost you five thousand rubles to cross, mister," charon called in a thick voice. the old riverman who had ferried new shades across the earth-hell boundary for eons of time, had just returned after a year's vacation in moscow. he hid a bottle under his brimstone bench, then straightened a gaudy red tie as he weaved forward. a changed devil, charon. his year in redland had done more than put him into a natty summer suit. although not very bright, he had unusual powers of observation. he liked to ape the odd speech of his customers, especially american prospectors. these truculent but harmless old timers worked at odd jobs around the nearby palace grounds, and in the ferryman they found a kindred spirit. nick eyed the loyal old fellow's red tie with amazement. "what, for st. pete's sake, are you drinking, char?" "vodka," charon gasped. recognizing the stern voice, he tried to focus his bleary eyes. "'scuse it, your majesty. i've come a long way and alone. your substitute, pudzy, gimme a bottle 'fore he returned to ameriky, and it's durn cold up there in musk-cow, and so i took a few nips, and i felt so goldurned glad to git back i polished off what was left, so i didn't recognize your majesty when you came zoomin' along, and if you'll sort of overlook--" nick patted the frightened old fellow's scrawny shoulder. "better check in and sleep it off, char." "gosh, stoppin' _you_!" "you let everybody in till i tell you different. forget the toll charge too, you old conniver." "yeah, and look!" chortling with glee, charon tottered back to his station and put one hand across the beam of a photo-electric eye. the ponderous gate slid silently upward. "it weighs fifteen hundred tons, mulcie says, and i don't even push a button." "you still smell like a communist, char," nick said, sniffing the good sulphurous air. "how come you're on the job as bridgekeeper if you've just returned from moscow?" "orders from beelzebub, and it's nigh a half hour by now since this fella came across the bridge. i'm sauntering home, friends with everybody, i am--" "what fellow?" charon scratched his grisly thatch. "come to think of it, i never see 'im afore this. i'm standing back there, looking down at my old skiff and wondering about my job, when this fella comes up. 'this is for you, charon,' he says, and held out your official incombusterible letterhead with the cross-bones and dripping blood--" "yeah, yeah. what does this stranger look like? what's his name? who signed the paper?" "beelzebub signed it. i guess i know the john henry of your number two devil even if i am a dumb ferryman." perhaps sensing he had blundered, charon almost wept. "this paper appoints me head bridge-tender from now to the _end_ of eternity, and, bein' worried about my job, i hopped right to it. you're the first--" "which way did he go? what's he look like?" charon almost said "thataway," as he shook his head and pointed a trembling finger to the distant shore. "lemme see. he wore neat clothes about like mine, and he zoomed off like the upper crust shades do when in a hurry--which ain't often. he has mean little eyes, sort of pale blue, is built wide and short, and talks american good as i do. now't i think of it, he had an impederiment in his speech, and he smelt like a bed of sweet peas." "very good, indeed." scanning the paper, nick smiled as he recognized a forgery of the beelzebub signature. he drew out his pen which writes under fire as well as water, and scribbled "nick," then put the document into the eager hands. "this gives you the job forever--or till i revoke the appointment." "boydy-dumb-deals!" charon shouted. "boss, you oughta hear about my adventures in redland. i had a real gabfest with the new premier, andrei broncov, and his minister of culture, vichy volonsky." nick grinned sardonically. "i heard a little about the most recent changes in the kremlin. are my old sidekicks well? and are they having any particular trouble since liquidating the old gang?" "how come you call that fat crumb, broncov, your sidekick?" charon frowned, trying to collect his wits in the dread presence. "he didn't ask about you. he took me for an illegitimate son of joe stalin's, so how would he know you and i are pals? i bought this red tie and hired a sleeping dictionary to catch onto the language better, and--" "your dictionary probably spilled things to the mvd." "not while my gold held out. anyhow, those punks are way overrated. tricky, maybe, and they lie good. they'd rather bump you off than eat breakfast." "purge is the word. the old comrades broncov threw out a month ago now fully understand its meaning. how is the comrade?" "gosh, boss, i'm sick of hearing that word. they say it just before they knife you. broncov's been busy, all right. since taking over the number one job he's been sending a lot of his best friends down this way. to keep joe stalin company, he told me. he looks fat even if bill shakespeare says this new lot--" "i suppose he and his pals plied you with liquor," nick said. "they tried to drink me under the table." charon cut a laugh in half. "gosh, i durn near forgot. y'know what the sidewinder, bronco, babbled 'fore he passed out? top drawer stuff. only he and this vichy volonskyvich know about it. seems bronco learned, somehow, about your taking a vacation, so he's been torturing a lot of his friends into confessing they plotted agin 'im. he promised them an easy death if they'd carry on down here. how you like that?" "the fools. what's his plan?" "i ain't sure i got it all as his tongue got thicker from the vodka. but i learned hell's full of comrades who've sworn to their god, lee-nine, they'll toss you to the wolves. they aim to pull joe stalin off his clinker-picking job and make him secretary here." "go on," nick urged in ominous tones. "how?" "they've swiped some new secret weapon and figure to obliterate you and every devil in authority so things will be organized nice and cozy when they finally get here. the dumb--" "good report, char." the new weapon did not bother nick much, but from his profound studies of atom smashing he decided anything can happen these days even to a top devil. he continued briskly: "hereafter, sniff all your customers and make sure they don't _smell_ like a red. you know the aroma by now--sweet peas with an underlying stink--so keep your nose peeled. when you spot a comrade, radio-phone the guard. those lads will know what to do you can bet your last ruble." ii the rousing welcome home nick received as he climbed the hill to his great palace would have warmed his heart if he'd owned one. "thanks, boys and girls," he intoned in his best golden voice. "it's swell to be back among you. i haven't time for a speech now, but tune in to channel thirteen tomorrow evening for my fireside chat." he wanted to take off for moscow immediately, but decided to start the war by calling the board. also, the boys would be hurt if he didn't inspect what they'd done during his absence. after a hasty, russian-style dinner of caviar, cabbage and cold horse with a gold flagon of vodka, he ordered azazel, flag bearer and statistician chief, to call a meeting in the throne room. little cletus waylaid his big boss. the scout among the celestials looked like a chubby cherub what with his dimpled cheeks and curly black hair, but he'd proved to be the trickiest imp south of the pearly gates. knowing that raphael had cajoled the little imp into revealing something of the improvements in hades, nick suspected treachery by one of his most trusted scouts. "i hear you've been seeing raphael!" he barked. "aw, i told 'im a pack of lies," cletus scoffed. "maybe rafe figured out something; he's a smart apple. i told 'im everybody here is hot and unhappy like you ordered me to say if they ever caught me. i said our air-conditioning system goes haywire and that we were ripping out a thousand old boilers and coolers. stuff like that." "don't lie to me, you ornery little brat. okay to anybody else but not to me. i happened to hear rafe talking to mike, and they're wise to my plan of making hell attractive." "well, hell," cletus protested, "they saw mulcie's gangs fixing the road. if rafe and them extra-extrapopulated that dope to figure out the truth, why blame me?" "we'll forget it," nick said, vastly relieved to believe his scout had not betrayed him. "i have a job for you. i'm going to moscow and i want your help. light out as soon as you can. requisition as much gold as you can handle by the usual translation method, and include a sack of polished diamonds and rubies. i'll tell mammon it's okay when i arrange for my own supply." "okay, boss. where do we meet? and what am i supposed to look like, and do?" "make yourself bellhop size and register at the droshky hotel as prince navi from baghdad with fifty persian oil wells to sell. let 'em see your gold and jewels. and, remember, you'll account for any dough you toss away to women and bribes. get going!" nick could see into the _near_ future, at least, and he chuckled after cletus vanished through the wall. "the little devil doesn't know what's in store for him." in the throne room, sage old beelzebub sat at the right of his majesty's chair; huge moloch with his evil grin and snaggle teeth, at the left. tall, prissy azazel, always acting important, planted satan's flag and then sat down at a table opposite wide-shouldered mulciber and handsome belial. charter members all of the original organization booted out of heaven some eighteen million years ago when nick's first but not last rebellion flopped. after the customary ritual of renewing their vow to get back to heaven, the gang sat down. nick rapped the arm of his throne and glared at chemos, the lustful one. "cheme," he said, "if you will quit flirting with astarte, the board will take up business." belial snickered when the culprits' red faces grew even redder, and after a wink at the court wit, nick went on: "i intend to take off for moscow after a quick look about with mulcie and belial. incidentally, my compliments on the good work you did on the road." "egad, boss," moloch complained, "why can't you stay home more and line things up for us?" "time enough--" nick sniffed, scowled, then pointed toward a thick pillar near the rear of the big room. "i smell an interloper. thammuz, dagon, drag 'im up here! beel, i fancy he's the one who forged your signature." beelzebub rose in anger when a shadowy figure darted for the door. the intruder moved as fast as any wraith but the two former gods were too quick for him. a brief struggle, then they dragged the eavesdropper before the throne where they held him upside down. "it's the paperhanger!" beelzebub roared. "i guessed that from charon's description," nick said calmly. "he's siding with the reds again--smell him? stand up, adolf, and hear your sentence!" "i didn't do a thing, your majesty," hitler began, but the hot, glowing eyes were too much to face. his knees buckled and he sank, groveling, on the floor. "didn't i send you millions of customers?" he wailed. "haven't i done a good job of sweeping out and collecting garbage? have a heart, nick. i came in here to sweep, and how would i know about this private conference?" "you talk about hearts?" nick flared. "you hung around to listen. you forged beelzebub's signature on my official paper, then put charon in charge of the bridge, thinking he's too dumb to report any commies coming here." "i can prove--" "you get the same chance at that which you gave people in berlin. down the chute with him, boys!" the chute, connecting with a main one leading down to the burning lake, has a flap which belial gleefully lifted. since shades have no mass worth mentioning, the long duct acts like a department store vacuum tube. "oh, my beloved emperor, forgive me," adolf yelled as he felt the suction. "i only wanted to organize a counter-revolution against the communists and--" "ratting on your pals again, eh?" nick sneered. "you stay in the burning lake a thousand earth years. you'll have plenty of time and company for your plotting. let 'im rip!" "no! i'll be forgotten--" "no one remembers you now except as a dung heap." nick turned a thumb downward, and the screeching shade vanished. "like a paper towel in a gale," belial said as he let the flap clang shut. "how'd that creep get a job where he could snoop?" "my fault," beelzebub admitted. "he's a smooth talker. i saw him not long after you left, your majesty, when i went out to inspect the garbage incinerator. he had shaved off his dinky mustache and changed the color of his eyes, but i recognized him." "it's okay, beel." nick patted the heavy shoulder of his top assistant. "the punk did us a left-handed favor in bringing things to a head." he told of how charon had discovered the red plot, then outlined his general plan. "those commies can't stand ridicule," nick summed up. "while i'm gone i want every communist son tossed into the burning lake. alarm all guards and tell them how to identify them--the fragrance of sweet peas with an underlying stink. no one in the ussr has used up a cake of soap in twenty years, and the perfume they add can't quite cover the bo." "must be a lot of commies here," mulciber commented. "how many guards have we, azzy?" azazel, statistics chief, glanced at a roll of incombustible microfilm, and cleared his throat. he liked being called upon, and since he had the history of every shade while on earth, he was the second most feared devil in hades. "after promoting the last batch who qualified for better jobs during the minimum millennium at common labor," azazel said, "and adding--" "never mind the commercial!" grouchy moloch roared. "boss, how do we know all our guards are to be trusted?" "we don't," nick said. "when did we ever trust anybody? but our system of checkers, checkers checking the checkers, super-checkers on up to charter members, hasn't failed yet." "if his eminence, the corpse-snatcher, is satisfied," azazel said, smoothing his sleek black hair, "i shall answer prince mulciber's polite question. we now have on the guards' roll exactly thirteen million four hundred--" "that's close enough." plainly pleased with his title, moloch grinned at the big engineer. "mulcie, why not build a chute straight up into moscow? save the boss trouble. he could take along a few gorillas and toss all those troublemaking stinkers straight into a hot bath." nick joined in the laughter. "trouble with that, molly, the bbu wouldn't stand for it. only death can give the final sting, and even he has to wait for the call. our game is to play it cagey, stick by the few rules the bbu laid down, and stay out of trouble." "how do you aim to handle those fellas?" belial asked. "tell you after i do it." nick guessed the fun-loving propaganda chief wanted to go along, but decided cletus would be a better assistant in a plan already formulated. a boon companion, belial, for any nefarious project. true, he had the quickest wit of the lot, but had worked over-long in the advertising racket, and many of his schemes resembled those of a hen on a hot griddle. nick turned to the secretary. "if you have all this down, asta, i'll consider a motion to adjourn." iii it was an hour short of midnight and snowing in moscow when nick landed in the printing room of pravda, the official red journal. as he had calculated, several sample newspapers had been run off. vichy volonsky, a short, roundheaded man, had held up the rest of the issue while he studied the content through his nose-glasses. editor blochensk and the mechanics anxiously awaited the great man's verdict. an unfavorable one meant the concentration camp for everybody. as minister of culture, volonsky previewed all news personally when not running errands for andrei broncov at a meeting of the inner council. the number two ranking man in the kremlin clique frowned most frighteningly, then, moved by an odd compulsion, walked into a sound-insulated telephone room. he closed the door and stared at it stupidly while looking through the invisible nick. "why did i come in here?" he said. "there's only the usual bilge in the sheet, nothing to telephone the fat slob about. yet something made me." "i did," nick said, suddenly visible. "when i finish, pravda will never be the same again. lie down, vichy!" volonsky opened his mouth, but nick wiggled a finger, and no yell came out. in the wink of an eye, he squeezed out the minister's shade and took its place. "pretty cramped and smelly quarters," nick told himself, "but do or die for good old hades." "what? who are you?" volonsky's phantom teeth chattered. "you must be nick, himself." "russia's patron saint till you amateurs took over. i have business with your boss. i mean andrei broncov. not that it matters, but who conceived the idea of deposing satan? talk, _mujik_, and tell the truth. all of it." "blame broncov, not me," volonsky pleaded. "it was his scheme to kill off several thousand loyal party comrades. they got a choice: be tortured to death, or die quickly and work for a revolution in hell as soon as they arrived. naturally--" "i've heard enough, rat." nick spat contemptuously, and a puff of gray smoke spread rapidly over walls, ceiling and floor. "that will hold you," he jeered, and opened the door. aping the minister's important waddle, he walked over to the great press. editor blochensk stared with fear-bulged eyes. "anything--anything wrong, your excellency comrade?" he asked shakily. "nothing i can't fix." "oh!" the editor clutched his throat. "thank--uh--uh--" "never mind, i know who you mean." muttering words in hell's silent language, nick walked completely around the press. "it's perfect, blochy. don't let the content worry you. it's part of the plan. roll out your papers and deliver them fast. don't question anything. orders from--you know." only minutes ahead of the new volonsky, cletus had entered the lobby of the droshky hotel on red square. the cherubic scout had obeyed orders and made himself bellhop size, large size. he didn't exactly resemble the one in the cigarette ad but he had the kid's twinkle in his dark eyes. and he had already latched onto a luscious blonde; or, more likely, nick concluded, the reverse. having just registered as a persian prince, cletus again clanked down a large sack of gold pieces and a smaller one of jewels. "put these diamonds and rubies into your best safe," he ordered in perfect russian. the clerk's eyes began popping, so did the blonde's and those of a score of spectators, including four hard-faced mvd boys. "and i'll take care of you, honey-navi," the blonde said. "ah, you just love me for my two billion dollars," the imp retorted, and winked at her. as did nick, cletus could plainly see the twist operated on the mvd payroll as well as in her own interests. "i'm selling out my fifty oil wells," he announced, "and i've come to town to see the head man, whoever he is today. i thought i'd let you dumb _mujiks_ bid for the wells before i practically give them to super-san oil company for a measly two hundred million dollars." "of course, prince navi," the clerk said loudly. he nodded toward the four tough lads who, likewise, had not yet noticed the great volonsky. nick rapped on the counter with his six-carat diamond ring. "how about a little service here, comrade?" "one moment, comrade," the clerk said nervously. "what you mean, one moment?" nick roared. "i haven't flown all the way from new york to have a two-bit clerk tell me to wait. i represent super-san oil and i'm here to meet a persian prince navi." "quiet, amerikaner, till--oh, your excellency comrade vychy volonsky!" the mouth of the astonished clerk fell open. then, fearful of making a wrong move in the red game of dirty politics, he failed to guess why the great one should act as a miserable capitalist. "a thousand pardons, your excellency comrade. what can i do for the beloved comrade? i didn't recognize you--" "hush, fool!" nick looked toward cletus just then gazing into the blonde's blue eyes. the four mvd agents went into a quick huddle, then the one with a broken nose bowed to the fake volonsky. "if your excellency comrade will step aside with us, we'll explain this fool's mistake." "put him in the can and question him tomorrow," nick snarled. "anybody can see he's working for the filthy capitalists." "of course, your excellency comrade." broken nose and his three pals escorted nick to a chair beside a column. "i'm lieutenant putov of the mvd," he whispered. "we picked up this prince navi the instant he entered, and have been watching him." "skip the commercial," nick said, almost laughing as he gave moloch's favorite expression. "how come you didn't spot him at one of our airports?" "he must have landed on an abandoned field in his private plane, your excellency comrade." lieutenant putov glanced at the other three equally worried looking plug-uglies. "he's a prince, all right. look at the gold and jewels he tossed to the clerk, several million dol--i mean, several billion rubles. we haven't checked his story, but he claims he's here to sell fifty persian oil wells." "i know _that_, idiot. our spies in baghdad advised us yesterday. that's why i pretend to be with the stinking super-san--wggh!" "what are your excellency comrade's wishes?" "get him away from that blonde before she ruins our plans." "ah, that's nishka, one of us." astonishment widened putov's watery blue eyes. "have you forgotten the night you and she drank--" "you talk too much, putov." nick flapped a hand. "get a car to take me and the prince to the kremlin. hurry it! comrade andrei broncov and i have a council meeting at midnight. you three, bring the prince to me here." cletus and nishka had withdrawn to a sofa in an alcove off the lobby. without effort, nick could see them and hear the female agent saying: "how do i know you have all that money, navi-honey? i'll bet you brought gilt lead and fake jewels just to impress me." "no, but i've been to america," cletus bragged, knowing well his boss would be listening. "so be nice and i'll prove they're real. i've been everywhere but this lousy place. i even lived in egypt." "talk some egyptian for me," nishka wheedled. "i've forgotten most of it," cletus said, cannily dodging the trap. "but i once made a study of the ancient language." he ripped out a stream of what had once been his native tongue. then, partly at least to test nishka's knowledge, he added in english, "how's for looking at my room before we go out on the town?" "wha-at? why, you bad boy!" the girl winked at her three fellow agents coming toward them in a crablike walk, then spoke in cletus' ear: "it's the law, navi-honey, but don't let them worry you. little nishka will stay with you--to the limit." cletus leered at her and rose to accompany the mvd to the front of the lobby. he and nick put on an act, then went to the street followed by a chattering crowd. once inside the sleek car putov had conjured up, nick said: "the heap is wired so we'll talk only in hell language." iv it wasn't far to the grim walls of the kremlin, and as the big car purred across the snowy, radio-stricken square, nick gave cletus the main points of his plan. obviously warned, the police gave a snappy salute and let the car enter the courtyard. a few moments later, hell's emissaries were zooming through long corridors and up to the second floor; walking the last fifty yards. six husky guards armed with sub-machine guns opened the great doors to the premier's private study. "he's been asking for you," a huge guard whispered. "he would, the brainless pup," nick snarled, reading the big fellow's thoughts. a volonsky man called gorkzy. "don't announce us." inside the great room, at a desk almost large enough for a roller skating rink, andrei broncov appeared to be studying a document. true executive, he went on reading till nick coughed. "your excellency comrade broncov, i have brought prince navi. where is the rest of the council?" "ah!" broncov's plump face widened in a smile for cletus. "this is an honor, your highness. i trust you will pardon my preoccupation with affairs of state. they're in a mess--as are all capitals when the old order departs. i supposed you'd be announced." andrei broncov glared at the pseudo volonsky and whispered in a dialect, "the council is waiting below, fool." "nuts," cletus said. "talk english, will you? i can hardly understand your outlandish language. or, speak persian." "my knowledge of your native tongue is not good, but i'm quite at home in english or amerikaner. a russian invented--" "yeah, he knows," nick cut in. "forget the malarkey, bronco. this lad is here on business and has no time for our phoney hooptedo. from his grandfather, the old shah, he inherited fifty of the richest oil wells in asia, and he's giving us a chance to bid on them instead of carrying on a, quote, cold, unquote, war, and steal--" "i understand," broncov said through his big teeth. his lips tightened in his rage over volonsky's direct speech, but he managed to say fairly suavely: "your highness, we appreciate your giving us a chance to buy your wells. surely, a banquet is in order." "no, i want to get out of this place. it's too cold." nick peered over his volonsky nose-glasses. "how much, kid? no fooling." "volonsky!" broncov barked. "mind your speech. i'll handle this little deal. you're excused." "uh-uh." nick grinned. "i stay for _my_ cut." "you both look like a couple of crooks to me," said the young prince. "i want two hundred million dollars--in gold." broncov's hand shook as he reached for a row of buttons. "how about a bit of tea and cakes, or, perhaps something stronger before we discuss this matter with the council? they're waiting just below us, and i'd like to present the deal already consummated." "got any old style lager around?" cletus asked. "we have some good bavarian beer, a stock we--ah--bought some time ago." "i've heard how much you paid the heinies. the beer i want is made in wisconsin, usa, so i think i'll fly over there tonight. super-san oil keeps begging me to visit their country. offered me two hundred million for my wells but only half in gold. i want all gold, and i won't discuss any other terms." "bungler!" broncov whispered in dialect. "why didn't you get him drunk, first? without oil we can't carry on this cold war or kid the peasants much longer. where in hell could we get even two hundred dollars in gold?" "go to hell and find all you want," nick said with a wicked grin. "i understood what you high-binders said," cletus put in. "my cousin told me before i left home communist clucks don't savvy saturday from sunday. everybody knows you top boys have stolen everything not nailed down, and have stashed it away against the time your own people kick out communism for good." "oh, come, prince navi, i don't understand how such an evil story started. our people wouldn't dare--" "wouldn't they?" cletus laughed nastily. "we have spies too, and we know your common herd would settle for anything else. most of them want their church and their tsar back, bad as he was." "bah! the capitalist press started that myth." "why, bronco," nick protested, "you can read that story in pravda, 'the organ of truth.'" the fake minister of culture cleared his throat to keep from laughing when the glowering premier began thinking of various ways to torture unsympathetic comrades. in silent hell language, nick added: "good work, cleet. i'll take it from here." "lies put out by the war mongerers of wall street," broncov shouted. he continued raving, but nick no longer listened. sounds outside the window told him time had begun pressing. he shook the hat he'd been carrying. "gold, is it you want, prince navi? you think we have none? how about this?" a glittering gold piece tinkled on the floor and rolled toward the amazed red premier. puffing, he bent over and scooped up a newly minted coin the size of the american gold eagle. "it's a new issue--i--never mind. we have lots more where this came from, haven't we, comrade vychy?" "i'll say," nick said. "watch!" gold pieces continued falling from the hat, one by one, then in a steady stream. stunned, broncov clutched his throat, muttering: "it can't be true. miracles don't happen." he watched in silence while his minister of culture made a pile of gold coins four feet high. when the floor timbers began creaking, nick made another similar heap; then, others, till the thick walls began bulging inward. "stop!" broncov cried. "a couple of tons is enough." eyes now popping, he waved his arms as the floor sagged under fifty times that weight. "there's the two hundred million for you, prince. the rest is for--us. we'll sign the papers in another room." ignoring frightened cries, nick made more piles of gold next to the windows. outside on red square, people were running in all directions, shouting and waving newspapers. a cannon roared. a hundred or more machine guns began rattling. plainly, the bullets were not fired at any one, for the people were laughing and weeping, singing and dancing. "come here and have a look, bronco," nick suggested. "it's--a trick, a revolution," broncov panted. "damn you, volonsky, you started it." he snatched a heavy revolver from his desk and fired it at nick without warning. the false volonsky laughed when five of the slugs bounced off the invisible shield around him. a sixth bullet splintered the window glass. the other five returned and struck the raging red boss, cutting his face and arms enough to bring streams of blood. he dashed for the door but collided with the six guards who burst into the room. broncov wiped off some of the blood running into his eyes well enough to see all six waving copies of pravda. "what's going on here?" he screamed. "read about it in pravda," bellowed gorkzy, the huge guard. "it always prints the truth--you've taught us." "what truth?" quavered the premier. "put down those guns!" "oh, no. pravda says you were shot trying to escape, and for once it really told the truth." implacably, the big guard brought up his tommy-gun and let it rattle. the stricken red leader took two steps backward and fell to the floor as the other five guns opened up on him in a hell's chatter of death. his falling weight added the last straw to the overstrained floor timbers. they gave way in a roar, and a hundred tons of yellow gold streamed downward in a cataclysmic wave of wealth and death to the council members below. * * * * * poised on air, nick and cletus became invisible to mortal eyes. "that wraps it, cleet. let's see how the boys take it." the six guards were peering down into the ruin below, and at some of the fortune still clinging to the slanting floor. "great nicholas!" gorkzy yelled. "gold!" "just like pravda says," howled another man. "listen! it says: 'volonsky and the mysterious persian prince have disappeared. broncov executed by heroic guards. all members of the once-feared inner council crushed almost beyond recognition when floor crashed upon them from the weight of the gold brought by the prince.'" "and look at this!" roared the big gorkzy. "'all soldiers and police throw down their arms. refuse to shoot the people shouting they want their tsar and church back. satellite countries freed of the odious communist yoke. concentration camps, collective farming, and slave labor abolished. all spies and saboteurs recalled to moscow for trial and punishment. ivan, the tsar, to issue proclamation.'" "what tsar?" the six stared stupidly at one another. one man picked up a shiny gold piece and tested it with his teeth. "the bolsheviks murdered the old goat and all his family. how can this be?" "he probably left plenty of bastards," another man hazarded. "i get it," gorkzy shouted. "prince navi is a grandson. his name is n-a-v-i--ivan spelled backward. why, the smart little devil! and now he's here some place to reign over us." "oh, no," cletus protested as he and nick slithered through the wall. "you aren't going to make me rule over these dopes, boss. have a heart. it's cold here, and the whole country stinks." "that's your punishment, m'lad, for letting raphael and michael catch onto you. you can't prowl around heaven just now so you'll have to work here in hell's rear annex for a while. look!" nick thumbed one of the gold pieces. "your image stamped on all of them. also 'ivan--tsar. in god we trust.'" "okay," cletus said, shuffling a little, then brightening. "anyhow, i'll have nishka." "not if the common folks find out she worked for the mvd." as if to punctuate nick's prophesy, a dozen bombs exploded inside police headquarters. "heck!" cletus shrugged resignedly. "well, lend me that hat, and conjure up a couple million tons of soap--not perfumed." roaring with laughter, nick promised to spread soap over the entire country, then watched the little imp zooming back and forth across red square--sprinkling the snowy pavement with ivan-tsar pieces of gold. * * * * * the satanic laughter lasted till nick had whizzed half way across chaos. "that caper," he told himself gleefully, "will fool the bbu about my plan. or, will it? great hades! i did a _good_ deed." a million miles above the wastes of chaos, he remembered he still wore volonsky whose shade would still be imprisoned in the pravda room. nick shucked out of his unpleasant quarters, halted to watch the thing spinning downward. "cheer up, vych," he laughed. "next century i'll gather up what's left and give it back to you--maybe." none available by internet archive (https://archive.org) note: images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/mydisillusionmen golduoft my disillusionment in russia by emma goldman [illustration: decoration] garden city new york doubleday, page & company copyright, , by doubleday, page & company all rights reserved, including that of translation into foreign languages, including the scandinavian printed in the united states at the country life press, garden city, n. y. first edition preface the decision to record my experiences, observations, and reactions during my stay in russia i had made long before i thought of leaving that country. in fact, that was my main reason for departing from that tragically heroic land. the strongest of us are loath to give up a long-cherished dream. i had come to russia possessed by the hope that i should find a new-born country, with its people wholly consecrated to the great, though very difficult, task of revolutionary reconstruction. and i had fervently hoped that i might become an active part of the inspiring work. i found reality in russia grotesque, totally unlike the great ideal that had borne me upon the crest of high hope to the land of promise. it required fifteen long months before i could get my bearings. each day, each week, each month added new links to the fatal chain that pulled down my cherished edifice. i fought desperately against the disillusionment. for a long time i strove against the still voice within me which urged me to face the overpowering facts. i would not and could not give up. then came kronstadt. it was the final wrench. it completed the terrible realization that the russian revolution was no more. i saw before me the bolshevik state, formidable, crushing every constructive revolutionary effort, suppressing, debasing, and disintegrating everything. unable and unwilling to become a cog in that sinister machine, and aware that i could be of no practical use to russia and her people, i decided to leave the country. once out of it, i would relate honestly, frankly, and as objectively as humanly possible to me the story of my two years' stay in russia. i left in december, . i could have written then, fresh under the influence of the ghastly experience. but i waited four months before i could bring myself to write a series of articles. i delayed another four months before beginning the present volume. i do not pretend to write a history. removed by fifty or a hundred years from the events he is describing, the historian may seem to be objective. but real history is not a compilation of mere data. it is valueless without the human element which the historian necessarily gets from the writings of the contemporaries of the events in question. it is the personal reactions of the participants and observers which lend vitality to all history and make it vivid and alive. thus, numerous histories have been written of the french revolution; yet there are only a very few that stand out true and convincing, illuminative in the degree in which the historian has _felt_ his subject through the medium of human documents left by the contemporaries of the period. i myself--and i believe, most students of history--have felt and visualized the great french revolution much more vitally from the letters and diaries of contemporaries, such as mme. roland, mirabeau, and other eye witnesses, than from the so-called objective historians. by a strange coincidence a volume of letters written during the french revolution, and compiled by the able german anarchist publicist, gustav landauer, came into my hands during the most critical period of my russian experience. i was actually reading them while hearing the bolshevik artillery begin the bombardment of the kronstadt rebels. those letters gave me a most vivid insight into the events of the french revolution. as never before they brought home to me the realization that the bolshevik régime in russia was, on the whole, a significant replica of what had happened in france more than a century before. great interpreters of the french revolution, like thomas carlyle and peter kropotkin, drew their understanding and inspiration from the human records of the period. similarly will the future historians of the great russian revolution--if they are to write real history and not a mere compilation of facts--draw from the impressions and reactions of those who have lived through the russian revolution, who have shared the misery and travail of the people, and who actually participated in or witnessed the tragic panorama in its daily unfoldment. while in russia i had no clear idea how much had already been written on the subject of the russian revolution. but the few books which reached me occasionally impressed me as most inadequate. they were written by people with no first-hand knowledge of the situation and were sadly superficial. some of the writers had spent from two weeks to two months in russia, did not know the language of the country, and in most instances were chaperoned by official guides and interpreters. i do not refer here to the writers who, in and out of russia, play the rôle of bolshevik court functionaries. they are a class apart. with them i deal in the chapter on the "travelling salesmen of the revolution." here i have in mind the sincere friends of the russian revolution. the work of most of them has resulted in incalculable confusion and mischief. they have helped to perpetuate the myth that the bolsheviki and the revolution are synonymous. yet nothing is further from the truth. the _actual_ russian revolution took place in the summer months of . during that period the peasants possessed themselves of the land, the workers of the factories, thus demonstrating that they knew well the meaning of social revolution. the october change was the finishing touch to the work begun six months previously. in the great uprising the bolsheviki assumed the voice of the people. they clothed themselves with the agrarian programme of the social revolutionists and the industrial tactics of the anarchists. but after the high tide of revolutionary enthusiasm had carried them into power, the bolsheviki discarded their false plumes. it was then that began the spiritual separation between the bolsheviki and the russian revolution. with each succeeding day the gap grew wider, their interests more conflicting. to-day it is no exaggeration to state that the bolsheviki stand as the arch enemies of the russian revolution. superstitions die hard. in the case of this modern superstition the process is doubly hard because various factors have combined to administer artificial respiration. international intervention, the blockade, and the very efficient world propaganda of the communist party have kept the bolshevik myth alive. even the terrible famine is being exploited to that end. how powerful a hold that superstition wields i realize from my own experience. i had always known that the bolsheviki are marxists. for thirty years i fought the marxian theory as a cold, mechanistic, enslaving formula. in pamphlets, lectures, and debates i argued against it. i was therefore not unaware of what might be expected from the bolsheviki. but the allied attack upon them made them the symbol of the russian revolution, and brought me to their defence. from november, , until february, , while out on bail for my attitude against the war, i toured america in defence of the bolsheviki. i published a pamphlet in elucidation of the russian revolution and in justification of the bolsheviki. i defended them as embodying _in practice_ the spirit of the revolution, in spite of their theoretic marxism. my attitude toward them at that time is characterized in the following passages from my pamphlet, "the truth about the bolsheviki:"[ ] the russian revolution is a miracle in more than one respect. among other extraordinary paradoxes it presents the phenomenon of the marxian social democrats, lenin and trotsky, adopting anarchist revolutionary tactics, while the anarchists kropotkin, tcherkessov, tschaikovsky are denying these tactics and falling into marxian reasoning, which they had all their lives repudiated as "german metaphysics." the bolsheviki of , though revolutionists, adhered to the marxian doctrine concerning the industrialization of russia and the historic mission of the bourgeoisie as a necessary evolutionary process before the russian masses could come into their own. the bolsheviki of no longer believe in the predestined function of the bourgeoisie. they have been swept forward on the waves of the revolution to the point of view held by the anarchists since bakunin; namely, that once the masses become conscious of their economic power, they make their own history and need not be bound by traditions and processes of a dead past which, like secret treaties, are made at a round table and are not dictated by life itself. in , madame breshkovsky visited the united states and began her campaign against the bolsheviki. i was then in the missouri penitentiary. grieved and shocked by the work of the "little grandmother of the russian revolution," i wrote imploring her to bethink herself and not betray the cause she had given her life to. on that occasion i emphasized the fact that while neither of us agreed with the bolsheviki in theory, we should yet be one with them in defending the revolution. when the courts of the state of new york upheld the fraudulent methods by which i was disfranchised and my american citizenship of thirty-two years denied me, i waived my right of appeal in order that i might return to russia and help in the great work. i believed fervently that the bolsheviki were furthering the revolution and exerting themselves in behalf of the people. i clung to my faith and belief for more than a year after my coming to russia. observation and study, extensive travel through various parts of the country, meeting with every shade of political opinion and every variety of friend and enemy of the bolsheviki--all convinced me of the ghastly delusion which had been foisted upon the world. i refer to these circumstances to indicate that my change of mind and heart was a painful and difficult process, and that my final decision to speak out is for the sole reason that the people everywhere may learn to differentiate between the bolsheviki and the russian revolution. the conventional conception of gratitude is that one must not be critical of those who have shown him kindness. thanks to this notion parents enslave their children more effectively than by brutal treatment; and by it friends tyrannize over one another. in fact, all human relationships are to-day vitiated by this noxious idea. some people have upbraided me for my critical attitude toward the bolsheviki. "how ungrateful to attack the communist government after the hospitality and kindness she enjoyed in russia," they indignantly exclaim. i do not mean to gainsay that i have received advantages while i was in russia. i could have received many more had i been willing to serve the powers that be. it is that very circumstance which has made it bitter hard for me to speak out against the evils as i saw them day by day. but finally i realized that silence is indeed a sign of consent. not to cry out against the betrayal of the russian revolution would have made me a party to that betrayal. the revolution and the welfare of the masses in and out of russia are by far too important to me to allow any personal consideration for the communists i have met and learned to respect to obscure my sense of justice and to cause me to refrain from giving to the world my two years' experience in russia. in certain quarters objections will no doubt be raised because i have given no names of the persons i am quoting. some may even exploit the fact to discredit my veracity. but i prefer to face that rather than to turn any one over to the tender mercies of the tcheka, which would inevitably result were i to divulge the names of the communists or non-communists who felt free to speak to me. those familiar with the real situation in russia and who are not under the mesmeric influence of the bolshevik superstition or in the employ of the communists will bear me out that i have given a true picture. the rest of the world will learn in due time. friends whose opinion i value have been good enough to suggest that my quarrel with the bolsheviki is due to my social philosophy rather than to the failure of the bolshevik régime. as an anarchist, they claim, i would naturally insist on the importance of the individual and of personal liberty, but in the revolutionary period both must be subordinated to the good of the whole. other friends point out that destruction, violence, and terrorism are inevitable factors in a revolution. as a revolutionist, they say, i cannot consistently object to the violence practised by the bolsheviki. both these criticisms would be justified had i come to russia expecting to find anarchism realized, or if i were to maintain that revolutions can be made peacefully. anarchism to me never was a mechanistic arrangement of social relationships to be imposed upon man by political scene-shifting or by a transfer of power from one social class to another. anarchism to me was and is the child, not of destruction, but of construction--the result of growth and development of the conscious creative social efforts of a regenerated people. i do not therefore expect anarchism to follow in the immediate footsteps of centuries of despotism and submission. and i certainly did not expect to see it ushered in by the marxian theory. i did, however, hope to find in russia at least the beginnings of the social changes for which the revolution had been fought. not the fate of the individual was my main concern as a revolutionist. i should have been content if the russian workers and peasants as a whole had derived essential social betterment as a result of the bolshevik régime. two years of earnest study, investigation, and research convinced me that the great benefits brought to the russian people by bolshevism exist only on paper, painted in glowing colours to the masses of europe and america by efficient bolshevik propaganda. as advertising wizards the bolsheviki excel anything the world had ever known before. but in reality the russian people have gained nothing from the bolshevik experiment. to be sure, the peasants have the land; not by the grace of the bolsheviki, but through their own direct efforts, set in motion long before the october change. that the peasants were able to retain the land is due mostly to the static slav tenacity; owing to the circumstance that they form by far the largest part of the population and are deeply rooted in the soil, they could not as easily be torn away from it as the workers from their means of production. the russian workers, like the peasants, also employed direct action. they possessed themselves of the factories, organized their own shop committees, and were virtually in control of the economic life of russia. but soon they were stripped of their power and placed under the industrial yoke of the bolshevik state. chattel slavery became the lot of the russian proletariat. it was suppressed and exploited in the name of something which was later to bring it comfort, light, and warmth. try as i might i could find nowhere any evidence of benefits received either by the workers or the peasants from the bolshevik régime. on the other hand, i did find the revolutionary faith of the people broken, the spirit of solidarity crushed, the meaning of comradeship and mutual helpfulness distorted. one must have lived in russia, close to the everyday affairs of the people; one must have seen and felt their utter disillusionment and despair to appreciate fully the disintegrating effect of the bolshevik principle and methods--disintegrating all that was once the pride and the glory of revolutionary russia. the argument that destruction and terror are part of revolution i do not dispute. i know that in the past every great political and social change necessitated violence. america might still be under the british yoke but for the heroic colonists who dared to oppose british tyranny by force of arms. black slavery might still be a legalized institution in the united states but for the militant spirit of the john browns. i have never denied that violence is inevitable, nor do i gainsay it now. yet it is one thing to employ violence in combat, as a means of defence. it is quite another thing to make a principle of terrorism, to institutionalize it, to assign it the most vital place in the social struggle. such terrorism begets counter-revolution and in turn itself becomes counter-revolutionary. rarely has a revolution been fought with as little violence as the russian revolution. nor would have red terror followed had the people and the cultural forces remained in control of the revolution. this was demonstrated by the spirit of fellowship and solidarity which prevailed throughout russia during the first months after the october revolution. but an insignificant minority bent on creating an absolute state is necessarily driven to oppression and terrorism. there is another objection to my criticism on the part of the communists. russia is on strike, they say, and it is unethical for a revolutionist to side against the workers when they are striking against their masters. that is pure demagoguery practised by the bolsheviki to silence criticism. it is not true that the russian people are on strike. on the contrary, the truth of the matter is that the russian people have been _locked out_ and that the bolshevik state--even as the bourgeois industrial master--uses the sword and the gun to keep the people out. in the case of the bolsheviki this tyranny is masked by a world-stirring slogan: thus they have succeeded in blinding the masses. just because i am a revolutionist i refuse to side with the master class, which in russia is called the communist party. till the end of my days my place shall be with the disinherited and oppressed. it is immaterial to me whether tyranny rules in the kremlin or in any other seat of the mighty. i could do nothing for suffering russia while in that country. perhaps i can do something now by pointing out the lessons of the russian experience. not my concern for the russian people only has prompted the writing of this volume: it is my interest in the masses everywhere. the masses, like the individual, may not readily learn from the experience of others. yet those who have gained the experience must speak out, if for no other reason than that they cannot in justice to themselves and their ideal support the great delusion revealed to them. emma goldman. berlin, july, . footnote: [ ] mother earth publishing association, new york, february, . contents page preface v chapter i. deportation to russia ii. petrograd iii. disturbing thoughts iv. moscow: first impressions v. meeting people vi. preparing for american deportees vii. rest homes for workers viii. the first of may in petrograd ix. industrial militarization x. the british labour mission xi. a visit from the ukraina xii. beneath the surface xiii. joining the museum of the revolution xiv. petropavlovsk and schlÜsselburg xv. the trade unions xvi. maria spiridonova xvii. another visit to peter kropotkin xviii. en route xix. in kharkov xx. poltava xxi. kiev my disillusionment in russia chapter i deportation to russia on the night of december , , together with two hundred and forty-eight other political prisoners, i was deported from america. although it was generally known we were to be deported, few really believed that the united states would so completely deny her past as an asylum for political refugees, some of whom had lived and worked in america for more than thirty years. in my own case, the decision to eliminate me first became known when, in , the federal authorities went out of their way to disfranchise the man whose name gave me citizenship. that washington waited till was due to the circumstance that the psychologic moment for the finale was lacking. perhaps i should have contested my case at that time. with the then-prevalent public opinion, the courts would probably not have sustained the fraudulent proceedings which robbed me of citizenship. but it did not seem credible then that america would stoop to the tsaristic method of deportation. our anti-war agitation added fuel to the war hysteria of , and thus furnished the federal authorities with the desired opportunity to complete the conspiracy begun against me in rochester, n. y., . it was on december , , while in chicago lecturing, that i was telegraphically apprised of the fact that the order for my deportation was final. the question of my citizenship was then raised in court, but was of course decided adversely. i had intended to take the case to a higher tribunal, but finally i decided to carry the matter no further: soviet russia was luring me. ludicrously secretive were the authorities about our deportation. to the very last moment we were kept in ignorance as to the time. then, unexpectedly, in the wee small hours of december st we were spirited away. the scene set for this performance was most thrilling. it was six o'clock sunday morning, december , , when under heavy military convoy we stepped aboard the _buford_. for twenty-eight days we were prisoners. sentries at our cabin doors day and night, sentries on deck during the hour we were daily permitted to breathe the fresh air. our men comrades were cooped up in dark, damp quarters, wretchedly fed, all of us in complete ignorance of the direction we were to take. yet our spirits were high--russia, free, new russia was before us. all my life russia's heroic struggle for freedom was as a beacon to me. the revolutionary zeal of her martyred men and women, which neither fortress nor _katorga_ could suppress, was my inspiration in the darkest hours. when the news of the february revolution flashed across the world, i longed to hasten to the land which had performed the miracle and had freed her people from the age-old yoke of tsarism. but america held me. the thought of thirty years of struggle for my ideals, of my friends and associates, made it impossible to tear myself away. i would go to russia later, i thought. then came america's entry into the war and the need of remaining true to the american people who were swept into the hurricane against their will. after all, i owed a great debt, i owed my growth and development to what was finest and best in america, to her fighters for liberty, to the sons and daughters of the revolution to come. i would be true to them. but the frenzied militarists soon terminated my work. at last i was bound for russia and all else was almost blotted out. i would behold with mine own eyes _matushka rossiya_, the land freed from political and economic masters; the russian _dubinushka_, as the peasant was called, raised from the dust; the russian worker, the modern samson, who with a sweep of his mighty arm had pulled down the pillars of decaying society. the twenty-eight days on our floating prison passed in a sort of trance. i was hardly conscious of my surroundings. finally we reached finland, across which we were forced to journey in sealed cars. on the russian border we were met by a committee of the soviet government, headed by zorin. they had come to greet the first political refugees driven from america for opinion's sake. it was a cold day, with the earth a sheet of white, but spring was in our hearts. soon we were to behold revolutionary russia. i preferred to be alone when i touched the sacred soil: my exaltation was too great, and i feared i might not be able to control my emotion. when i reached beloöstrov the first enthusiastic reception tendered the refugees was over, but the place was still surcharged with intensity of feeling. i could sense the awe and humility of our group who, treated like felons in the united states, were here received as dear brothers and comrades and welcomed by the red soldiers, the liberators of russia. from beloöstrov we were driven to the village where another reception had been prepared: a dark hall filled to suffocation, the platform lit up by tallow candles, a huge red flag, on the stage a group of women in black nuns' attire. i stood as in a dream in the breathless silence. suddenly a voice rang out. it beat like metal on my ears and seemed uninspired, but it spoke of the great suffering of the russian people and of the enemies of the revolution. others addressed the audience, but i was held by the women in black, their faces ghastly in the yellow light. were these really nuns? had the revolution penetrated even the walls of superstition? had the red dawn broken into the narrow lives of these ascetics? it all seemed strange, fascinating. somehow i found myself on the platform. i could only blurt out that like my comrades i had not come to russia to teach: i had come to learn, to draw sustenance and hope from her, to lay down my life on the altar of the revolution. after the meeting we were escorted to the waiting petrograd train, the women in the black hood intoning the "internationale," the whole audience joining in. i was in the car with our host, zorin, who had lived in america and spoke english fluently. he talked enthusiastically about the soviet government and its marvellous achievements. his conversation was illuminative, but one phrase struck me as discordant. speaking of the political organization of his party, he remarked: "tammany hall has nothing on us, and as to boss murphy, we could teach him a thing or two." i thought the man was jesting. what relation could there be between tammany hall, boss murphy, and the soviet government? i inquired about our comrades who had hastened from america at the first news of the revolution. many of them had died at the front, zorin informed me, others were working with the soviet government. and shatov? william shatov, a brilliant speaker and able organizer, was a well-known figure in america, frequently associated with us in our work. we had sent him a telegram from finland and were much surprised at his failure to reply. why did not shatov come to meet us? "shatov had to leave for siberia, where he is to take the post of minister of railways," said zorin. in petrograd our group again received an ovation. then the deportees were taken to the famous tauride palace, where they were to be fed and housed for the night. zorin asked alexander berkman and myself to accept his hospitality. we entered the waiting automobile. the city was dark and deserted; not a living soul to be seen anywhere. we had not gone very far when the car was suddenly halted, and an electric light flashed into our eyes. it was the militia, demanding the password. petrograd had recently fought back the yudenitch attack and was still under martial law. the process was repeated frequently along the route. shortly before we reached our destination we passed a well-lighted building. "it is our station house," zorin explained, "but we have few prisoners there now. capital punishment is abolished and we have recently proclaimed a general political amnesty." presently the automobile came to a halt. "the first house of the soviets," said zorin, "the living place of the most active members of our party." zorin and his wife occupied two rooms, simply but comfortably furnished. tea and refreshments were served, and our hosts entertained us with the absorbing story of the marvellous defence the petrograd workers had organized against the yudenitch forces. how heroically the men and women, even the children, had rushed to the defence of the red city! what wonderful self-discipline and coöperation the proletariat demonstrated. the evening passed in these reminiscences, and i was about to retire to the room secured for me when a young woman arrived who introduced herself as the sister-in-law of "bill" shatov. she greeted us warmly and asked us to come up to see her sister who lived on the floor above. when we reached their apartment i found myself embraced by big jovial bill himself. how strange of zorin to tell me that shatov had left for siberia! what did it mean? shatov explained that he had been ordered not to meet us at the border, to prevent his giving us our first impressions of soviet russia. he had fallen into disfavour with the government and was being sent to siberia into virtual exile. his trip had been delayed and therefore we still happened to find him. we spent much time with shatov before he left petrograd. for whole days i listened to his story of the revolution, with its light and shadows, and the developing tendency of the bolsheviki toward the right. shatov, however, insisted that it was necessary for all the revolutionary elements to work with the bolsheviki government. of course, the communists had made many mistakes, but what they did was inevitable, imposed upon them by allied interference and the blockade. a few days after our arrival zorin asked alexander berkman and myself to accompany him to smolny. smolny, the erstwhile boarding school for the daughters of the aristocracy, had been the centre of revolutionary events. almost every stone had played its part. now it was the seat of the petrograd government. i found the place heavily guarded and giving the impression of a beehive of officials and government employees. the department of the third international was particularly interesting. it was the domain of zinoviev. i was much impressed by the magnitude of it all. after showing us about, zorin invited us to the smolny dining room. the meal consisted of good soup, meat and potatoes, bread and tea--rather a good meal in starving russia, i thought. our group of deportees was quartered in smolny. i was anxious about my travelling companions, the two girls who had shared my cabin on the _buford_. i wished to take them back with me to the first house of the soviet. zorin sent for them. they arrived greatly excited and told us that the whole group of deportees had been placed under military guard. the news was startling. the people who had been driven out of america for their political opinions, now in revolutionary russia again prisoners--three days after their arrival. what had happened? we turned to zorin. he seemed embarrassed. "some mistake," he said, and immediately began to make inquiries. it developed that four ordinary criminals had been found among the politicals deported by the united states government, and therefore a guard was placed over the whole group. the proceeding seemed to me unjust and uncalled for. it was my first lesson in bolshevik methods. chapter ii petrograd my parents had moved to st. petersburg when i was thirteen. under the discipline of a german school in königsberg and the prussian attitude toward everything russian, i had grown up in the atmosphere of hatred to that country. i dreaded especially the terrible nihilists who had killed tsar alexander ii, so good and kind, as i had been taught. st. petersburg was to me an evil thing. but the gayety of the city, its vivacity and brilliancy, soon dispelled my childish fancies and made the city appear like a fairy dream. then my curiosity was aroused by the revolutionary mystery which seemed to hang over everyone, and of which no one dared to speak. when four years later i left with my sister for america i was no longer the german gretchen to whom russia spelt evil. my whole soul had been transformed and the seed planted for what was to be my life's work. especially did st. petersburg remain in my memory a vivid picture, full of life and mystery. i found petrograd of quite a different place. it was almost in ruins, as if a hurricane had swept over it. the houses looked like broken old tombs upon neglected and forgotten cemeteries. the streets were dirty and deserted; all life had gone from them. the population of petrograd before the war was almost two million; in it had dwindled to five hundred thousand. the people walked about like living corpses; the shortage of food and fuel was slowly sapping the city; grim death was clutching at its heart. emaciated and frost-bitten men, women, and children were being whipped by the common lash, the search for a piece of bread or a stick of wood. it was a heart-rending sight by day, an oppressive weight at night. especially were the nights of the first month in petrograd dreadful. the utter stillness of the large city was paralysing. it fairly haunted me, this awful oppressive silence broken only by occasional shots. i would lay awake trying to pierce the mystery. did not zorin say that capital punishment had been abolished? why this shooting? doubts disturbed my mind, but i tried to wave them aside. i had come to learn. much of my first knowledge and impressions of the october revolution and the events that followed i received from the zorins. as already mentioned, both had lived in america, spoke english, and were eager to enlighten me upon the history of the revolution. they were devoted to the cause and worked very hard; he, especially, who was secretary of the petrograd committee of his party, besides editing the daily, _krasnaya gazetta_, and participating in other activities. it was from zorin that i first learned about that legendary figure, makhno. the latter was an anarchist, i was informed, who under the tsar had been sentenced to _katorga_. liberated by the february revolution, he became the leader of a peasant army in the ukraina, proving himself extremely able and daring and doing splendid work in the defence of the revolution. for some time makhno worked in harmony with the bolsheviki, fighting the counter-revolutionary forces. then he became antagonistic, and now his army, recruited from bandit elements, was fighting the bolsheviki. zorin related that he had been one of a committee sent to makhno to bring about an understanding. but makhno would not listen to reason. he continued his warfare against the soviets and was considered a dangerous counter-revolutionist. i had no means of verifying the story, and i was far from disbelieving the zorins. both appeared most sincere and dedicated to their work, types of religious zealots ready to burn the heretic, but equally ready to sacrifice their own lives for their cause. i was much impressed by the simplicity of their lives. holding a responsible position, zorin could have received special rations, but they lived very poorly, their supper often consisting only of herring, black bread, and tea. i thought it especially admirable because lisa zorin was with child at the time. two weeks after my arrival in russia i was invited to attend the alexander herzen commemoration in the winter palace. the white marble hall where the gathering took place seemed to intensify the bitter frost, but the people present were unmindful of the penetrating cold. i also was conscious only of the unique situation: alexander herzen, one of the most hated revolutionists of his time, honoured in the winter palace! frequently before the spirit of herzen had found its way into the house of the romanovs. it was when the "kolokol," published abroad and sparkling with the brilliancy of herzen and turgenev, would in some mysterious manner be discovered on the desk of the tsar. now the tsars were no more, but the spirit of herzen had risen again and was witnessing the realization of the dream of one of russia's great men. one evening i was informed that zinoviev had returned from moscow and would see me. he arrived about midnight. he looked very tired and was constantly disturbed by urgent messages. our talk was of a general nature, of the grave situation in russia, the shortage of food and fuel then particularly poignant, and about the labour situation in america. he was anxious to know "how soon the revolution could be expected in the united states." he left upon me no definite impression, but i was conscious of something lacking in the man, though i could not determine at the time just what it was. another communist i saw much of the first weeks was john reed. i had known him in america. he was living in the astoria, working hard and preparing for his return to the united states. he was to journey through latvia and he seemed apprehensive of the outcome. he had been in russia during the october days and this was his second visit. like shatov he also insisted that the dark sides of the bolshevik régime were inevitable. he believed fervently that the soviet government would emerge from its narrow party lines and that it would presently establish the communistic commonwealth. we spent much time together, discussing the various phases of the situation. so far i had met none of the anarchists and their failure to call rather surprised me. one day a friend i had known in the states came to inquire whether i would see several members of an anarchist organization. i readily assented. from them i learned a version of the russian revolution and the bolshevik régime utterly different from what i had heard before. it was so startling, so terrible that i could not believe it. they invited me to attend a small gathering they had called to present to me their views. the following sunday i went to their conference. passing nevsky prospekt, near liteiny street, i came upon a group of women huddled together to protect themselves from the cold. they were surrounded by soldiers, talking and gesticulating. those women, i learned, were prostitutes who were selling themselves for a pound of bread, a piece of soap or chocolate. the soldiers were the only ones who could afford to buy them because of their extra rations. prostitution in revolutionary russia. i wondered. what is the communist government doing for these unfortunates? what are the workers' and peasants' soviets doing? my escort smiled sadly. the soviet government had closed the houses of prostitution and was now trying to drive the women off the streets, but hunger and cold drove them back again; besides, the soldiers had to be humoured. it was too ghastly, too incredible to be real, yet there they were--those shivering creatures for sale and their buyers, the red defenders of the revolution. "the cursed interventionists, the blockade--they are responsible," said my escort. why, yes, the counter-revolutionists and the blockade are responsible, i reassured myself. i tried to dismiss the thought of that huddled group, but it clung to me. i felt something snap within me. at last we reached the anarchist quarters, in a dilapidated house in a filthy backyard. i was ushered into a small room crowded with men and women. the sight recalled pictures of thirty years ago when, persecuted and hunted from place to place, the anarchists in america were compelled to meet in a dingy hall on orchard street, new york, or in the dark rear room of a saloon. that was in capitalistic america. but this is revolutionary russia, which the anarchists had helped to free. why should they have to gather in secret and in such a place? that evening and the following day i listened to a recital of the betrayal of the revolution by the bolsheviki. workers from the baltic factories spoke of their enslavement, kronstadt sailors voiced their bitterness and indignation against the people they had helped to power and who had become their masters. one of the speakers had been condemned to death by the bolsheviki for his anarchist ideas, but had escaped and was now living illegally. he related how the sailors had been robbed of the freedom of their soviets, how every breath of life was being censored. others spoke of the red terror and repression in moscow, which resulted in the throwing of a bomb into the gathering of the moscow section of the communist party in september, . they told me of the over-filled prisons, of the violence practised on the workers and peasants. i listened rather impatiently, for everything in me cried out against this indictment. it sounded impossible; it could not be. someone was surely at fault, but probably it was they, my comrades, i thought. they were unreasonable, impatient for immediate results. was not violence inevitable in a revolution, and was it not imposed upon the bolsheviki by the interventionists? my comrades were indignant. "disguise yourself so the bolsheviki do not recognize you; take a pamphlet of kropotkin and try to distribute it in a soviet meeting. you will soon see whether we told you the truth. above all, get out of the first house of the soviet. live among the people and you will have all the proofs you need." how childish and trifling it all seemed in the face of the world event that was taking place in russia! no, i could not credit their stories. i would wait and study conditions. but my mind was in a turmoil, and the nights became more oppressive than ever. the day arrived when i was given a chance to attend the meeting of the petro-soviet. it was to be a double celebration in honour of the return of karl radek to russia and joffe's report on the peace treaty with esthonia. as usual i went with the zorins. the gathering was in the tauride palace, the former meeting place of the russian duma. every entrance to the hall was guarded by soldiers, the platform surrounded by them holding their guns at attention. the hall was crowded to the very doors. i was on the platform overlooking the sea of faces below. starved and wretched they looked, these sons and daughters of the people, the heroes of red petrograd. how they had suffered and endured for the revolution! i felt very humble before them. zinoviev presided. after the "internationale" had been sung by the audience standing, zinoviev opened the meeting. he spoke at length. his voice is high pitched, without depth. the moment i heard him i realized what i had missed in him at our first meeting--depth, strength of character. next came radek. he was clever, witty, sarcastic, and he paid his respects to the counter-revolutionists and to the white guards. altogether an interesting man and an interesting address. joffe looked the diplomat. well fed and groomed, he seemed rather out of place in that assembly. he spoke of the peace conditions with esthonia, which were received with enthusiasm by the audience. certainly these people wanted peace. would it ever come to russia? last spoke zorin, by far the ablest and most convincing that evening. then the meeting was thrown open to discussion. a menshevik asked for the floor. immediately pandemonium broke loose. yells of "traitor!" "kolchak!" "counter-revolutionist!" came from all parts of the audience and even from the platform. it looked to me like an unworthy proceeding for a revolutionary assembly. on the way home i spoke to zorin about it. he laughed. "free speech is a bourgeois superstition," he said; "during a revolutionary period there can be no free speech." i was rather dubious about the sweeping statement, but i felt that i had no right to judge. i was a newcomer, while the people at the tauride palace had sacrificed and suffered so much for the revolution. i had no right to judge. chapter iii disturbing thoughts life went on. each day brought new conflicting thoughts and emotions. the feature which affected me most was the inequality i witnessed in my immediate environment. i learned that the rations issued to the tenants of the first house of the soviet (astoria) were much superior to those received by the workers in the factories. to be sure, they were not sufficient to sustain life--but no one in the astoria lived from these rations alone. the members of the communist party, quartered in the astoria, worked in smolny, and the rations in smolny were the best in petrograd. moreover, trade was not entirely suppressed at that time. the markets were doing a lucrative business, though no one seemed able or willing to explain to me where the purchasing capacity came from. the workers could not afford to buy butter which was then , rubles a pound, sugar at , , or meat at , . the inequality was most apparent in the astoria kitchen. i went there frequently, though it was torture to prepare a meal: the savage scramble for an inch of space on the stove, the greedy watching of the women lest any one have something extra in the saucepan, the quarrels and screams when someone fished out a piece of meat from the pot of a neighbour! but there was one redeeming feature in the picture--it was the resentment of the servants who worked in the astoria. they were servants, though called comrades, and they felt keenly the inequality: the revolution to them was not a mere theory to be realized in years to come. it was a living thing. i was made aware of it one day. the rations were distributed at the commissary, but one had to fetch them himself. one day, while waiting my turn in the long line, a peasant girl came in and asked for vinegar. "vinegar! who is it calls for such a luxury?" cried several women. it appeared that the girl was zinoviev's servant. she spoke of him as her master, who worked very hard and was surely entitled to something extra. at once a storm of indignation broke loose. "master! is that what we made the revolution for, or was it to do away with masters? zinoviev is no more than we, and he is not entitled to more." these workingwomen were crude, even brutal, but their sense of justice was instinctive. the revolution to them was something fundamentally vital. they saw the inequality at every step and bitterly resented it. i was disturbed. i sought to reassure myself that zinoviev and the other leaders of the communists would not use their power for selfish benefit. it was the shortage of food and the lack of efficient organization which made it impossible to feed all alike, and of course the blockade and not the bolsheviki was responsible for it. the allied interventionists, who were trying to get at russia's throat, were the cause. every communist i met reiterated this thought; even some of the anarchists insisted on it. the little group antagonistic to the soviet government was not convincing. but how to reconcile the explanation given to me with some of the stories i learned every day--stories of systematic terrorism, of relentless persecution, and suppression of other revolutionary elements? another circumstance which perplexed me was that the markets were stacked with meat, fish, soap, potatoes, even shoes, every time that the rations were given out. how did these things get to the markets? everyone spoke about it, but no one seemed to know. one day i was in a watchmaker's shop when a soldier entered. he conversed with the proprietor in yiddish, relating that he had just returned from siberia with a shipment of tea. would the watchmaker take fifty pounds? tea was sold at a premium at the time--no one but the privileged few could permit themselves such a luxury. of course the watchmaker would take the tea. when the soldier left i asked the shopkeeper if he did not think it rather risky to transact such illegal business so openly. i happen to understand yiddish, i told him. did he not fear i would report him? "that's nothing," the man replied nonchalantly, "the tcheka knows all about it--it draws its percentage from the soldier and myself." i began to suspect that the reason for much of the evil was also within russia, not only outside of it. but then, i argued, police officials and detectives graft everywhere. that is the common disease of the breed. in russia, where scarcity of food and three years of starvation must needs turn most people into grafters, theft is inevitable. the bolsheviki are trying to suppress it with an iron hand. how can they be blamed? but try as i might i could not silence my doubts. i groped for some moral support, for a dependable word, for someone to shed light on the disturbing questions. it occurred to me to write to maxim gorki. he might help. i called his attention to his own dismay and disappointment while visiting america. he had come believing in her democracy and liberalism, and found bigotry and lack of hospitality instead. i felt sure gorki would understand the struggle going on within me, though the cause was not the same. would he see me? two days later i received a short note asking me to call. i had admired gorki for many years. he was the living affirmation of my belief that the creative artist cannot be suppressed. gorki, the child of the people, the pariah, had by his genius become one of the world's greatest, one who by his pen and deep human sympathy made the social outcast our kin. for years i toured america interpreting gorki's genius to the american people, elucidating the greatness, beauty, and humanity of the man and his works. now i was to see him and through him get a glimpse into the complex soul of russia. i found the main entrance of his house nailed up, and there seemed to be no way of getting in. i almost gave up in despair when a woman pointed to a dingy staircase. i climbed to the very top and knocked on the first door i saw. it was thrown open, momentarily blinding me with a flood of light and steam from an overheated kitchen. then i was ushered into a large dining room. it was dimly lit, chilly and cheerless in spite of a fire and a large collection of dutch china on the walls. one of the three women i had noticed in the kitchen sat down at the table with me, pretending to read a book but all the while watching me out of the corner of her eye. it was an awkward half hour of waiting. presently gorki arrived. tall, gaunt, and coughing, he looked ill and weary. he took me to his study, semi-dark and of depressing effect. no sooner had we seated ourselves than the door flew open and another young woman, whom i had not observed before, brought him a glass of dark fluid, medicine evidently. then the telephone began to ring; a few minutes later gorki was called out of the room. i realized that i would not be able to talk with him. returning, he must have noticed my disappointment. we agreed to postpone our talk till some less disturbed opportunity presented itself. he escorted me to the door, remarking, "you ought to visit the baltflot [baltic fleet]. the kronstadt sailors are nearly all instinctive anarchists. you would find a field there." i smiled. "instinctive anarchists?" i said, "that means they are unspoiled by preconceived notions, unsophisticated, and receptive. is that what you mean?" "yes, that is what i mean," he replied. the interview with gorki left me depressed. nor was our second meeting more satisfactory on the occasion of my first trip to moscow. by the same train travelled radek, demyan bedny, the popular bolshevik versifier, and zipperovitch, then the president of the petrograd unions. we found ourselves in the same car, the one reserved for bolshevik officials and state dignitaries, comfortable and roomy. on the other hand, the "common" man, the non-communist without influence, had literally to fight his way into the always overcrowded railway carriages, provided he had a _propusk_ to travel--a most difficult thing to procure. i spent the time of the journey discussing russian conditions with zipperovitch, a kindly man of deep convictions, and with demyan bedny, a big coarse-looking man. radek held forth at length on his experiences in germany and german prisons. i learned that gorki was also on the train, and i was glad of another opportunity for a chat with him when he called to see me. the one thing uppermost in my mind at the moment was an article which had appeared in the petrograd _pravda_ a few days before my departure. it treated of morally defective children, the writer urging prison for them. nothing i had heard or seen during my six weeks in russia so outraged me as this brutal and antiquated attitude toward the child. i was eager to know what gorki thought of the matter. of course, he was opposed to prisons for the morally defective, he would advocate reformatories instead. "what do you mean by morally defective?" i asked. "our young are the result of alcoholism rampant during the russian-japanese war, and of syphilis. what except moral defection could result from such a heritage?" he replied. i argued that morality changes with conditions and climate, and that unless one believed in the theory of free will one cannot consider morality a fixed matter. as to children, their sense of responsibility is primitive, and they lack the spirit of social adherence. but gorki insisted that there was a fearful spread of moral defection among children and that such cases should be isolated. i then broached the problem that was troubling me most. what about persecution and terror--were all the horrors inevitable, or was there some fault in bolshevism itself? the bolsheviki were making mistakes, but they were doing the best they knew how, gorki said drily. nothing more could be expected, he thought. i recalled a certain article by gorki, published in his paper, _new life_, which i had read in the missouri penitentiary. it was a scathing arraignment of the bolsheviki. there must have been powerful reasons to change gorki's point of view so completely. perhaps he is right. i must wait. i must study the situation; i must get at the facts. above all, i must see for myself bolshevism at work. we spoke of the drama. on my first visit, by way of introduction, i had shown gorki an announcement card of the dramatic course i had given in america. john galsworthy was among the playwrights i had discussed then. gorki expressed surprise that i considered galsworthy an artist. in his opinion galsworthy could not be compared with bernard shaw. i had to differ. i did not underestimate shaw, but considered galsworthy the greater artist. i detected irritation in gorki, and as his hacking cough continued, i broke off the discussion. he soon left. i remained dejected from the interview. it gave me nothing. when we pulled into the moscow station my chaperon, demyan bedny, had vanished and i was left on the platform with all my traps. radek came to my rescue. he called a porter, took me and my baggage to his waiting automobile and insisted that i come to his apartments in the kremlin. there i was graciously received by his wife and invited to dinner served by their maid. after that radek began the difficult task of getting me quartered in the hotel national, known as the first house of the moscow soviet. with all his influence it required hours to secure a room for me. radek's luxurious apartment, the maidservant, the splendid dinner seemed strange in russia. but the comradely concern of radek and the hospitality of his wife were grateful to me. except at the zorins and the shatovs i had not met with anything like it. i felt that kindliness, sympathy, and solidarity were still alive in russia. chapter iv moscow: first impressions coming from petrograd to moscow is like being suddenly transferred from a desert to active life, so great is the contrast. on reaching the large open square in front of the main moscow station i was amazed at the sight of busy crowds, cabbies, and porters. the same picture presented itself all the way from the station to the kremlin. the streets were alive with men, women, and children. almost everybody carried a bundle, or dragged a loaded sleigh. there was life, motion, and movement, quite different from the stillness that oppressed me in petrograd. i noticed considerable display of the military in the city, and scores of men dressed in leather suits with guns in their belts. "tcheka men, our extraordinary commission," explained radek. i had heard of the tcheka before: petrograd talked of it with dread and hatred. however, the soldiers and tchekists were never much in evidence in the city on the neva. here in moscow they seemed everywhere. their presence reminded me of a remark jack reed had made: "moscow is a military encampment," he had said; "spies everywhere, the bureaucracy most autocratic. i always feel relieved when i get out of moscow. but, then, petrograd is a proletarian city and is permeated with the spirit of the revolution. moscow always was hierarchical. it is much more so now." i found that jack reed was right. moscow was indeed hierarchical. still the life was intense, varied, and interesting. what struck me most forcibly, besides the display of militarism, was the preoccupation of the people. there seemed to be no common interest between them. everyone rushed about as a detached unit in quest of his own, pushing and knocking against everyone else. repeatedly i saw women or children fall from exhaustion without any one stopping to lend assistance. people stared at me when i would bend over the heap on the slippery pavement or gather up the bundles that had fallen into the street. i spoke to friends about what looked to me like a strange lack of fellow-feeling. they explained it as a result partly of the general distrust and suspicion created by the tcheka, and partly due to the absorbing task of getting the day's food. one had neither vitality nor feeling left to think of others. yet there did not seem to be such a scarcity of food as in petrograd, and the people were warmer and better dressed. i spent much time on the streets and in the market places. most of the latter, as also the famous soukharevka, were in full operation. occasionally soldiers would raid the markets; but as a rule they were suffered to continue. they presented the most vital and interesting part of the city's life. here gathered proletarian and aristocrat, communist and bourgeois, peasant and intellectual. here they were bound by the common desire to sell and buy, to trade and bargain. here one could find for sale a rusty iron pot alongside of an exquisite ikon; an old pair of shoes and intricately worked lace; a few yards of cheap calico and a beautiful old persian shawl. the rich of yesterday, hungry and emaciated, denuding themselves of their last glories; the rich of to-day buying--it was indeed an amazing picture in revolutionary russia. who was buying the finery of the past, and where did the purchasing power come from? the buyers were numerous. in moscow one was not so limited as to sources of information as in petrograd; the very streets furnished that source. the russian people even after four years of war and three years of revolution remained unsophisticated. they were suspicious of strangers and reticent at first. but when they learned that one had come from america and did not belong to the governing political party, they gradually lost their reserve. much information i gathered from them and some explanation of the things that perplexed me since my arrival. i talked frequently with the workers and peasants and the women on the markets. the forces which had led up to the russian revolution had remained _terra incognita_ to these simple folk, but the revolution itself had struck deep into their souls. they knew nothing of theories, but they believed that there was to be no more of the hated _barin_ (master) and now the _barin_ was again upon them. "the _barin_ has everything," they would say, "white bread, clothing, even chocolate, while we have nothing." "communism, equality, freedom," they jeered, "lies and deception." i would return to the national bruised and battered, my illusions gradually shattered, my foundations crumbling. but i would not let go. after all, i thought, the common people could not understand the tremendous difficulties confronting the soviet government: the imperialist forces arraigned against russia, the many attacks which drained her of her men who otherwise would be employed in productive labour, the blockade which was relentlessly slaying russia's young and weak. of course, the people could not understand these things, and i must not be misled by their bitterness born of suffering. i must be patient. i must get to the source of the evils confronting me. the national, like the petrograd astoria, was a former hotel but not nearly in as good condition. no rations were given out there except three quarters of a pound of bread every two days. instead there was a common dining room where dinners and suppers were served. the meals consisted of soup and a little meat, sometimes fish or pancakes, and tea. in the evening we usually had _kasha_ and tea. the food was not too plentiful, but one could exist on it were it not so abominably prepared. i saw no reason for this spoiling of provisions. visiting the kitchen i discovered an array of servants controlled by a number of officials, commandants, and inspectors. the kitchen staff were poorly paid; moreover, they were not given the same food served to us. they resented this discrimination and their interest was not in their work. this situation resulted in much graft and waste, criminal in the face of the general scarcity of food. few of the tenants of the national, i learned, took their meals in the common dining room. they prepared or had their meals prepared by servants in a separate kitchen set aside for that purpose. there, as in the astoria, i found the same scramble for a place on the stove, the same bickering and quarrelling, the same greedy, envious watching of each other. was that communism in action, i wondered. i heard the usual explanation: yudenitch, denikin, kolchak, the blockade--but the stereotyped phrases no longer satisfied me. before i left petrograd jack reed said to me: "when you reach moscow, look up angelica balabanova. she will receive you gladly and will put you up should you be unable to find a room." i had heard of balabanova before, knew of her work, and was naturally anxious to meet her. a few days after reaching moscow i called her up. would she see me? yes, at once, though she was not feeling well. i found balabanova in a small, cheerless room, lying huddled up on the sofa. she was not prepossessing but for her eyes, large and luminous, radiating sympathy and kindness. she received me most graciously, like an old friend, and immediately ordered the inevitable samovar. over our tea we talked of america, the labour movement there, our deportation, and finally about russia. i put to her the questions i had asked many communists regarding the contrasts and discrepancies which confronted me at every step. she surprised me by not giving the usual excuses; she was the first who did not repeat the old refrain. she did refer to the scarcity of food, fuel, and clothing which was responsible for much of the graft and corruption; but on the whole she thought life itself mean and limited. "a rock on which the highest hopes are shattered. life thwarts the best intentions and breaks the finest spirits," she said. rather an unusual view for a marxian, a communist, and one in the thick of the battle. i knew she was then secretary of the third international. here was a personality, one who was not a mere echo, one who felt deeply the complexity of the russian situation. i went away profoundly impressed, and attracted by her sad, luminous eyes. i soon discovered that balabanova--or balabanoff, as she preferred to be called--was at the beck and call of everybody. though poor in health and engaged in many functions, she yet found time to minister to the needs of her legion callers. often she went without necessaries herself, giving away her own rations, always busy trying to secure medicine or some little delicacy for the sick and suffering. her special concern were the stranded italians of whom there were quite a number in petrograd and moscow. balabanova had lived and worked in italy for many years until she almost became italian herself. she felt deeply with them, who were as far away from their native soil as from events in russia. she was their friend, their advisor, their main support in a world of strife and struggle. not only the italians but almost everyone else was the concern of this remarkable little woman: no one needed a communist membership card to angelica's heart. no wonder some of her comrades considered her a "sentimentalist who wasted her precious time in philanthropy." many verbal battles i had on this score with the type of communist who had become callous and hard, altogether barren of the qualities which characterized the russian idealist of the past. similar criticism as of balabanova i heard expressed of another leading communist, lunacharsky. already in petrograd i was told sneeringly, "lunacharsky is a scatterbrain who wastes millions on foolish ventures." but i was eager to meet the man who was the commissar of one of the important departments in russia, that of education. presently an opportunity presented itself. the kremlin, the old citadel of tsardom, i found heavily guarded and inaccessible to the "common" man. but i had come by appointment and in the company of a man who had an admission card, and therefore passed the guard without trouble. we soon reached the lunacharsky apartments, situated in an old quaint building within the walls. though the reception room was crowded with people waiting to be admitted, lunacharsky called me in as soon as i was announced. his greeting was very cordial. did i "intend to remain a free bird" was one of his first questions, or would i be willing to join him in his work? i was rather surprised. why should one have to give up his freedom, especially in educational work? were not initiative and freedom essential? however, i had come to learn from lunacharsky about the revolutionary system of education in russia, of which we had heard so much in america. i was especially interested in the care the children were receiving. the moscow _pravda_, like the petrograd newspapers, had been agitated by a controversy about the treatment of the morally defective. i expressed surprise at such an attitude in soviet russia. "of course, it is all barbarous and antiquated," lunacharsky said, "and i am fighting it tooth and nail. the sponsors of prisons for children are old criminal jurists, still imbued with tsarist methods. i have organized a commission of physicians, pedagogues, and psychologists to deal with this question. of course, those children must not be punished." i felt tremendously relieved. here at last was a man who had gotten away from the cruel old methods of punishment. i told him of the splendid work done in capitalist america by judge lindsay and of some of the experimental schools for backward children. lunacharsky was much interested. "yes, that is just what we want here, the american system of education," he exclaimed. "you surely do not mean the american public school system?" i asked. "you know of the insurgent movement in america against our public school method of education, the work done by professor dewey and others?" lunacharsky had heard little about it. russia had been so long cut off from the western world and there was great lack of books on modern education. he was eager to learn of the new ideas and methods. i sensed in lunacharsky a personality full of faith and devotion to the revolution, one who was carrying on the great work of education in a physically and spiritually difficult environment. he suggested the calling of a conference of teachers if i would talk to them about the new tendencies in education in america, to which i readily consented. schools and other institutions in his charge were to be visited later. i left lunacharsky filled with new hope. i would join him in his work, i thought. what greater service could one render the russian people? during my visit to moscow i saw lunacharsky several times. he was always the same kindly gracious man, but i soon began to notice that he was being handicapped in his work by forces within his own party: most of his good intentions and decisions never saw the light. evidently lunacharsky was caught in the same machine that apparently held everything in its iron grip. what was that machine? who directed its movements? although the control of visitors at the national was very strict, no one being able to go in or out without a special _propusk_ [permit], men and women of different political factions managed to call on me: anarchists, left social revolutionists, coöperators, and people i had known in america and who had returned to russia to play their part in the revolution. they had come with deep faith and high hope, but i found almost all of them discouraged, some even embittered. though widely differing in their political views, nearly all of my callers related an identical story, the story of the high tide of the revolution, of the wonderful spirit that led the people forward, of the possibilities of the masses, the rôle of the bolsheviki as the spokesmen of the most extreme revolutionary slogans and their betrayal of the revolution after they had secured power. all spoke of the brest litovsk peace as the beginning of the downward march. the left social revolutionists especially, men of culture and earnestness, who had suffered much under the tsar and now saw their hopes and aspirations thwarted, were most emphatic in their condemnation. they supported their statements by evidence of the havoc wrought by the methods of forcible requisition and the punitive expeditions to the villages, of the abyss created between town and country, the hatred engendered between peasant and worker. they told of the persecution of their comrades, the shooting of innocent men and women, the criminal inefficiency, waste, and destruction. how, then, could the bolsheviki maintain themselves in power? after all, they were only a small minority, about five hundred thousand members as an exaggerated estimate. the russian masses, i was told, were exhausted by hunger and cowed by terrorism. moreover, they had lost faith in all parties and ideas. nevertheless, there were frequent peasant uprisings in various parts of russia, but these were ruthlessly quelled. there were also constant strikes in moscow, petrograd, and other industrial centres, but the censorship was so rigid little ever became known to the masses at large. i sounded my visitors on intervention. "we want none of outside interference," was the uniform sentiment. they held that it merely strengthened the hands of the bolsheviki. they felt that they could not publicly even speak out against them so long as russia was being attacked, much less fight their régime. "have not their tactics and methods been imposed on the bolsheviki by intervention and blockade?" i argued. "only partly so," was the reply. "most of their methods spring from their lack of understanding of the character and the needs of the russian people and the mad obsession of dictatorship, which is not even the dictatorship of the proletariat but the dictatorship of a small group _over_ the proletariat." when i broached the subject of the people's soviets and the elections my visitors smiled. "elections! there are no such things in russia, unless you call threats and terrorism elections. it is by these alone that the bolsheviki secure a majority. a few mensheviki, social revolutionists, or anarchists are permitted to slip into the soviets, but they have not the shadow of a chance to be heard." the picture painted looked black and dismal. still i clung to my faith. chapter v meeting people at a conference of the moscow anarchists in march i first learned of the part some anarchists had played in the russian revolution. in the july uprising of the kronstadt sailors were led by the anarchist yarchuck; the constituent assembly was dispersed by zhelezniakov; the anarchists had participated on every front and helped to drive back the allied attacks. it was the consensus of opinion that the anarchists were always among the first to face fire, as they were also the most active in the reconstructive work. one of the biggest factories near moscow, which did not stop work during the entire period of the revolution, was managed by an anarchist. anarchists were doing important work in the foreign office and in all other departments. i learned that the anarchists had virtually helped the bolsheviki into power. five months later, in april, , machine guns were used to destroy the moscow anarchist club and to suppress their press. that was before mirbach arrived in moscow. the field had to be "cleared of disturbing elements," and the anarchists were the first to suffer. since then the persecution of the anarchists has never ceased. the moscow anarchist conference was critical not only toward the existing régime, but toward its own comrades as well. it spoke frankly of the negative sides of the movement, and of its lack of unity and coöperation during the revolutionary period. later i was to learn more of the internal dissensions in the anarchist movement. before closing, the conference decided to call on the soviet government to release the imprisoned anarchists and to legalize anarchist educational work. the conference asked alexander berkman and myself to sign the resolution to that effect. it was a shock to me that anarchists should ask any government to legalize their efforts, but i still believed the soviet government to be at least to some extent expressive of the revolution. i signed the resolution, and as i was to see lenin in a few days i promised to take the matter up with him. the interview with lenin was arranged by balabanova. "you must see ilitch, talk to him about the things that are disturbing you and the work you would like to do," she had said. but some time passed before the opportunity came. at last one day balabanova called up to ask whether i could go at once. lenin had sent his car and we were quickly driven over to the kremlin, passed without question by the guards, and at last ushered into the workroom of the all-powerful president of the people's commissars. when we entered lenin held a copy of the brochure _trial and speeches_[ ] in his hands. i had given my only copy to balabanova, who had evidently sent the booklet on ahead of us to lenin. one of his first questions was, "when could the social revolution be expected in america?" i had been asked the question repeatedly before, but i was astounded to hear it from lenin. it seemed incredible that a man of his information should know so little about conditions in america. my russian at this time was halting, but lenin declared that though he had lived in europe for many years he had not learned to speak foreign languages: the conversation would therefore have to be carried on in russian. at once he launched into a eulogy of our speeches in court. "what a splendid opportunity for propaganda," he said; "it is worth going to prison, if the courts can so successfully be turned into a forum." i felt his steady cold gaze upon me, penetrating my very being, as if he were reflecting upon the use i might be put to. presently he asked what i would want to do. i told him i would like to repay america what it had done for russia. i spoke of the society of the friends of russian freedom, organized thirty years ago by george kennan and later reorganized by alice stone blackwell and other liberal americans. i briefly sketched the splendid work they had done to arouse interest in the struggle for russian freedom, and the great moral and financial aid the society had given through all those years. to organize a russian society for american freedom was my plan. lenin appeared enthusiastic. "that is a great idea, and you shall have all the help you want. but, of course, it will be under the auspices of the third international. prepare your plan in writing and send it to me." i broached the subject of the anarchists in russia. i showed him a letter i had received from martens, the soviet representative in america, shortly before my deportation. martens asserted that the anarchists in russia enjoyed full freedom of speech and press. since my arrival i found scores of anarchists in prison and their press suppressed. i explained that i could not think of working with the soviet government so long as my comrades were in prison for opinion's sake. i also told him of the resolutions of the moscow anarchist conference. he listened patiently and promised to bring the matter to the attention of his party. "but as to free speech," he remarked, "that is, of course, a bourgeois notion. there can be no free speech in a revolutionary period. we have the peasantry against us because we can give them nothing in return for their bread. we will have them on our side when we have something to exchange. then you can have all the free speech you want--but not now. recently we needed peasants to cart some wood into the city. they demanded salt. we thought we had no salt, but then we discovered seventy poods in moscow in one of our warehouses. at once the peasants were willing to cart the wood. your comrades must wait until we can meet the needs of the peasants. meanwhile, they should work with us. look at william shatov, for instance, who has helped save petrograd from yudenitch. he works with us and we appreciate his services. shatov was among the first to receive the order of the red banner." free speech, free press, the spiritual achievements of centuries, what were they to this man? a puritan, he was sure his scheme alone could redeem russia. those who served his plans were right, the others could not be tolerated. a shrewd asiatic, this lenin. he knows how to play on the weak sides of men by flattery, rewards, medals. i left convinced that his approach to people was purely utilitarian, for the use he could get out of them for his scheme. and his scheme--was it the revolution? i prepared the plan for the society of the russian friends of american freedom and elaborated the details of the work i had in mind, but refused to place myself under the protecting wing of the third international. i explained to lenin that the american people had little faith in politics, and would certainly consider it an imposition to be directed and guided by a political machine from moscow. i could not consistently align myself with the third international. some time later i saw tchicherin. i believe it was a. m. when our interview took place. he also asked about the possibilities of a revolution in america, and seemed to doubt my judgment when i informed him that there was no hope of it in the near future. we spoke of the i. w. w., which had evidently been misrepresented to him. i assured tchicherin that while i am not an i. w. w. i must state that they represented the only conscious and effective revolutionary proletarian organization in the united states, and were sure to play an important rôle in the future labour history of the country. next to balabanova, tchicherin impressed me as the most simple and unassuming of the leading communists in moscow. but all were equally naïve in their estimate of the world outside of russia. was their judgment so faulty because they had been cut off from europe and america so long? or was their great need of european help father to their wish? at any rate, they all clung to the idea of approaching revolutions in the western countries, forgetful that revolutions are not made to order, and apparently unconscious that their own revolution had been twisted out of shape and semblance and was gradually being done to death. the editor of the london _daily herald_, accompanied by one of his reporters, had preceded me to moscow. they wanted to visit kropotkin, and they had been given a special car. together with alexander berkman and a. shapiro, i was able to join mr. lansbury. the kropotkin cottage stood back in the garden away from the street. only a faint ray from a kerosene lamp lit up the path to the house. kropotkin received us with his characteristic graciousness, evidently glad at our visit. but i was shocked at his altered appearance. the last time i had seen him was in , in paris, which i visited after the anarchist congress in amsterdam. kropotkin, barred from france for many years, had just been given the right to return. he was then sixty-five years of age, but still so full of life and energy that he seemed much younger. now he looked old and worn. i was eager to get some light from kropotkin on the problems that were troubling me, particularly on the relation of the bolsheviki to the revolution. what was his opinion? why had he been silent so long? i took no notes and therefore i can give only the gist of what kropotkin said. he stated that the revolution had carried the people to great spiritual heights and had paved the way for profound social changes. if the people had been permitted to apply their released energies, russia would not be in her present condition of ruin. the bolsheviki, who had been carried to the top by the revolutionary wave, first caught the popular ear by extreme revolutionary slogans, thereby gaining the confidence of the masses and the support of militant revolutionists. he continued to narrate that early in the october period the bolsheviki began to subordinate the interests of the revolution to the establishment of their dictatorship, which coerced and paralysed every social activity. he stated that the coöperatives were the main medium that could have bridged the interests of the peasants and the workers. the coöperatives were among the first to be crushed. he spoke with much feeling of the oppression, the persecution, the hounding of every shade of opinion, and cited numerous instances of the misery and distress of the people. he emphasized that the bolsheviki had discredited socialism and communism in the eyes of the russian people. "why haven't you raised your voice against these evils, against this machine that is sapping the life blood of the revolution?" i asked. he gave two reasons. as long as russia was being attacked by the combined imperialists, and russian women and children were dying from the effects of the blockade, he could not join the shrieking chorus of the ex-revolutionists in the cry of "crucify!" he preferred silence. secondly, there was no medium of expression in russia itself. to protest to the government was useless. its concern was to maintain itself in power. it could not stop at such "trifles" as human rights or human lives. then he added: "we have always pointed out the effects of marxism in action. why be surprised now?" i asked kropotkin whether he was noting down his impressions and observations. surely he must see the importance of such a record to his comrades and to the workers; in fact, to the whole world. "no," he said; "it is impossible to write when one is in the midst of great human suffering, when every hour brings new tragedies. then there may be a raid at any moment. the tcheka comes swooping down in the night, ransacks every corner, turns everything inside out, and marches off with every scrap of paper. under such constant stress it is impossible to keep records. but besides these considerations there is my book on ethics. i can only work a few hours a day, and i must concentrate on that to the exclusion of everything else." after a tender embrace which peter never failed to give those he loved, we returned to our car. my heart was heavy, my spirit confused and troubled by what i had heard. i was also distressed by the poor state of health of our comrade: i feared he could not survive till spring. the thought that peter kropotkin might go to his grave and that the world might never know what he thought of the russian revolution was appalling. footnote: [ ] _trial and speeches of alexander berkman and emma goldman before the federal court of new york, june-july, ._ mother earth publishing co., new york. chapter vi preparing for american deportees events in moscow, quickly following each other, were full of interest. i wanted to remain in that vital city, but as i had left all my effects in petrograd i decided to return there and then come back to moscow to join lunacharsky in his work. a few days before my departure a young woman, an anarchist, came to visit me. she was from the petrograd museum of the revolution and she called to inquire whether i would take charge of the museum branch work in moscow. she explained that the original idea of the museum was due to the famous old revolutionist vera nikolaievna figner, and that it had recently been organized by non-partisan elements. the majority of the men and women who worked in the museum were not communists, she said; but they were devoted to the revolution and anxious to create something which could in the future serve as a source of information and inspiration to earnest students of the great russian revolution. when my caller was informed that i was about to return to petrograd, she invited me to visit the museum and to become acquainted with its work. upon my arrival in petrograd i found unexpected work awaiting me. zorin informed me that he had been notified by tchicherin that a thousand russians had been deported from america and were on their way to russia. they were to be met at the border and quarters were to be immediately prepared for them in petrograd. zorin asked me to join the commission about to be organized for that purpose. the plan of such a commission for american deportees had been broached to zorin soon after our arrival in russia. at that time zorin directed us to talk the matter over with tchicherin, which we did. but three months passed without anything having been done about it. meanwhile, our comrades of the _buford_ were still walking from department to department, trying to be placed where they might do some good. they were a sorry lot, those men who had come to russia with such high hopes, eager to render service to the revolutionary people. most of them were skilled workers, mechanics--men russia needed badly; but the cumbersome bolshevik machine and general inefficiency made it a very complex matter to put them to work. some had tried independently to secure jobs, but they could accomplish very little. moreover, those who found employment were soon made to feel that the russian workers resented the eagerness and intensity of their brothers from america. "wait till you have starved as long as we," they would say, "wait till you have tasted the blessings of commissarship, and we will see if you are still so eager." in every way the deportees were discouraged and their enthusiasm dampened. to avoid this unnecessary waste of energy and suffering the commission was at last organized in petrograd. it consisted of ravitch, the then minister of internal affairs for the northern district; her secretary, kaplun; two members of the bureau of war prisoners; alexander berkman, and myself. the new deportees were due in two weeks, and much work was to be done to prepare for their reception. it was unfortunate that no active participation could be expected from ravitch because her time was too much occupied. besides holding the post of minister of the interior she was chief of the petrograd militia, and she also represented the moscow foreign office in petrograd. her regular working hours were from a. m. to a. m. kaplun, a very able administrator, had charge of the entire internal work of the department and could therefore give us very little of his time. there remained only four persons to accomplish within a short time the big task of preparing living quarters for a thousand deportees in starved and ruined russia. moreover, alexander berkman, heading the reception committee, had to leave for the latvian border to meet the exiles. it was an almost impossible task for one person, but i was very anxious to save the second group of deportees the bitter experiences and the disappointments of my fellow companions of the _buford_. i could undertake the work only by making the condition that i be given the right of entry to the various government departments, for i had learned by that time how paralysing was the effect of the bureaucratic red tape which delayed and often frustrated the most earnest and energetic efforts. kaplun consented. "call on me at any time for anything you may require," he said; "i will give orders that you be admitted everywhere and supplied with everything you need. if that should not help, call on the tcheka," he added. i had never called upon the police before, i informed him; why should i do so in revolutionary russia? "in bourgeois countries that is a different matter," explained kaplun; "with us the tcheka defends the revolution and fights sabotage." i started on my work determined to do without the tcheka. surely there must be other methods, i thought. then began a chase over petrograd. materials were very scarce and it was most difficult to procure them owing to the unbelievably centralized bolshevik methods. thus to get a pound of nails one had to file applications in about ten or fifteen bureaus; to secure some bed linen or ordinary dishes one wasted days. everywhere in the offices crowds of government employees stood about smoking cigarettes, awaiting the hour when the tedious task of the day would be over. my co-workers of the war prisoners' bureau fumed at the irritating and unnecessary delays, but to no purpose. they threatened with the tcheka, with the concentration camp, even with _raztrel_ (shooting). the latter was the most favourite argument. whenever any difficulty arose one immediately heard _raztreliat_--to be shot. but the expression, so terrible in its significance, was gradually losing its effect upon the people: man gets used to everything. i decided to try other methods. i would talk to the employees in the departments about the vital interest the conscious american workers felt in the great russian revolution, and of their faith and hope in the russian proletariat. the people would become interested immediately, but the questions they would ask were as strange as they were pitiful: "have the people enough to eat in america? how soon will the revolution be there? why did you come to starving russia?" they were eager for information and news, these mentally and physically starved people, cut off by the barbarous blockade from all touch with the western world. things american were something wonderful to them. a piece of chocolate or a cracker were unheard-of dainties--they proved the key to everybody's heart. within two weeks i succeeded in procuring most of the things needed for the expected deportees, including furniture, linen, and dishes. a miracle, everybody said. however, the renovation of the houses that were to serve as living quarters for the exiles was not accomplished so easily. i inspected what, as i was told, had once been first-class hotels. i found them located in the former prostitute district; cheap dives they were, until the bolsheviki closed all brothels. they were germ-eaten, ill-smelling, and filthy. it was no small problem to turn those dark holes into a fit habitation within two weeks. a coat of paint was a luxury not to be thought of. there was nothing else to do but to strip the rooms of furniture and draperies, and have them thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. one morning a group of forlorn-looking creatures, in charge of two militiamen, were brought to my temporary office. they came to work, i was informed. the group consisted of a one-armed old man, a consumptive woman, and eight boys and girls, mere children, pale, starved, and in rags. "where do these unfortunates come from?" i inquired. "they are speculators," one of the militiamen replied; "we rounded them up on the market." the prisoners began to weep. they were no speculators, they protested; they were starving, they had received no bread in two days. they were compelled to go out to the market to sell matches or thread to secure a little bread. in the midst of this scene the old man fainted from exhaustion, demonstrating better than words that he had speculated only in hunger. i had seen such "speculators" before, driven in groups through the streets of moscow and petrograd by convoys with loaded guns pointed at the backs of the prisoners. i could not think of having the work done by these starved creatures. but the militiamen insisted that they would not let them go; they had orders to make them work. i called up kaplun and informed him that i considered it out of the question to have quarters for american deportees prepared by russian convicts whose only crime was hunger. thereupon kaplun ordered the group set free and consented that i give them of the bread sent for the workers' rations. but a valuable day was lost. the next morning a group of boys and girls came singing along the nevski prospekt. they were _kursanti_ from the tauride palace who were sent to my office to work. on my first visit to the palace i had been shown the quarters of the _kursanti_, the students of the bolshevik academy. they were mostly village boys and girls housed, fed, clothed, and educated by the government, later to be placed in responsible positions in the soviet régime. at the time i was impressed by the institutions, but by april i had looked somewhat beneath the surface. i recalled what a young woman, a communist, had told me in moscow about these students. "they are the special caste now being reared in russia," she had said. "like the church which maintains and educates its religious priesthood, our government trains a military and civic priesthood. they are a favoured lot." i had more than one occasion to convince myself of the truth of it. the _kursanti_ were being given every advantage and many special privileges. they knew their importance and they behaved accordingly. their first demand when they came to me was for the extra rations of bread they had been promised. this demand satisfied, they stood about and seemed to have no idea of work. it was evident that whatever else the _kursanti_ might be taught, it was not to labour. but, then, few people in russia know how to work. the situation looked hopeless. only ten days remained till the arrival of the deportees, and the "hotels" assigned for their use were still in as uninhabitable a condition as before. it was no use to threaten with the tcheka, as my co-workers did. i appealed to the boys and girls in the spirit of the american deportees who were about to arrive in russia full of enthusiasm for the revolution and eager to join in the great work of reconstruction. the _kursanti_ were the pampered charges of the government, but they were not long from the villages, and they had had no time to become corrupt. my appeal was effective. they took up the work with a will, and at the end of ten days the three famous hotels were ready as far as willingness to work and hot water without soap could make them. we were very proud of our achievement and we eagerly awaited the arrival of the deportees. at last they came, but to our great surprise they proved to be no deportees at all. they were russian war prisoners from germany. the misunderstanding was due to the blunder of some official in tchicherin's office who misread the radio information about the party due at the border. the prepared hotels were locked and sealed; they were not to be used for the returned war prisoners because "they were prepared for american deportees who still might come." all the efforts and labour had been in vain. chapter vii rest homes for workers since my return from moscow i noticed a change in zorin's attitude: he was reserved, distant, and not as friendly as when we first met. i ascribed it to the fact that he was overworked and fatigued, and not wishing to waste his valuable time i ceased visiting the zorins as frequently as before. one day, however, he called up to ask if alexander berkman and myself would join him in certain work he was planning, and which was to be done in hurry-up american style, as he put it. on calling to see him we found him rather excited--an unusual thing for zorin who was generally quiet and reserved. he was full of a new scheme to build "rest homes" for workers. he explained that on kameniy ostrov were the magnificent mansions of the stolypins, the polovtsovs, and others of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and that he was planning to turn them into recreation centres for workers. would we join in the work? of course, we consented eagerly, and the next morning we went over to inspect the island. it was indeed an ideal spot, dotted with magnificent mansions, some of them veritable museums, containing rare gems of painting, tapestry, and furniture. the man in charge of the buildings called our attention to the art treasures, protesting that they would be injured or entirely destroyed if put to the planned use. but zorin was set on his scheme. "recreation homes for workers are more important than art," he said. we returned to the astoria determined to devote ourselves to the work and to go at it intensively, as the houses were to be ready for the first of may. we prepared detailed plans for dining rooms, sleeping chambers, reading rooms, theatre and lecture halls, and recreation places for the workers. as the first and most necessary step we proposed the organization of a dining room to feed the workers who were to be employed in preparing the place for their comrades. i had learned from my previous experience with the hotels that much valuable time was lost because of the failure to provide for those actually employed on such work. zorin consented and promised that we were to take charge within a few days. but a week passed and nothing further was heard about what was to be a rush job. some time later zorin called up to ask us to accompany him to the island. on our arrival there we found half-a-dozen commissars already in charge, with scores of people idling about. zorin reassured us that matters would arrange themselves and that we should have an opportunity to organize the work as planned. however, we soon realized that the newly fledged officialdom was as hard to cope with as the old bureaucracy. every commissar had his favourites whom he managed to list as employed on the job, thereby entitling them to bread rations and a meal. thus almost before any actual workers appeared on the scene, eighty alleged "technicians" were already in possession of dinner tickets and bread cards. the men actually mobilized for the work received hardly anything. the result was general sabotage. most of the men sent over to prepare the rest homes for the workers came from concentration camps: they were convicts and military deserters. i had often watched them at work, and in justice to them it must be said that they did not overexert themselves. "why should we," they would say; "we are fed on sovietski soup; dirty dishwater it is, and we receive only what is left over from the idlers who order us about. and who will rest in these homes? not we or our brothers in the factories. only those who belong to the party or who have a pull will enjoy this place. besides, the spring is near; we are needed at home on the farm. why are we kept here?" indeed, they did not exert themselves, those stalwart sons of russia's soil. there was no incentive: they had no point of contact with the life about them, and there was no one who could translate to them the meaning of work in revolutionary russia. they were dazed by war, revolution, and hunger--nothing could rouse them out of their stupor. many of the buildings on kameniy ostrov had been taken up for boarding schools and homes for defectives; some were occupied by old professors, teachers, and other intellectuals. since the revolution these people lived there unmolested, but now orders came to vacate, to make room for the rest homes. as almost no provision had been made to supply the dispossessed ones with other quarters, they were practically forced into the streets. those friendly with zinoviev, gorki, or other influential communists took their troubles to them, but persons lacking "pull" found no redress. the scenes of misery which i was compelled to witness daily exhausted my energies. it was all unnecessarily cruel, impractical, without any bearing on the revolution. added to this was the chaos and confusion which prevailed. the bureaucratic officials seemed to take particular delight in countermanding each other's orders. houses already in the process of renovation, and on which much work and material were spent, would suddenly be left unfinished and some other work begun. mansions filled with art treasures were turned into night lodgings, and dirty iron cots put among antique furniture and oil paintings--an incongruous, stupid waste of time and energy. zorin would frequently hold consultations by the hour with the staff of artists and engineers making plans for theatres, lecture halls, and amusement places, while the commissars sabotaged the work. i stood the painful and ridiculous situation for two weeks, then gave up the matter in despair. early in may the workers' rest homes on kameniy ostrov were opened with much pomp, music, and speeches. glowing accounts were sent broadcast of the marvellous things done for the workers in russia. in reality, it was coney island transferred to the environs of petrograd, a gaudy showplace for credulous visitors. from that time on zorin's demeanour to me changed. he became cold, even antagonistic. no doubt he began to sense the struggle which was going on within me, and the break which was bound to come. i did, however, see much of lisa zorin, who had just become a mother. i nursed her and her baby, glad of the opportunity thus to express my gratitude for the warm friendship the zorins had shown me during my first months in russia. i appreciated their sterling honesty and devotion. both were so favourably placed politically that they could be supplied with everything they wanted, yet lisa zorin lacked the simplest garments for her baby. "thousands of russian working women have no more, and why should i?" lisa would say. when she was so weak that she could not nurse her baby, zorin could not be induced to ask for special rations. i had to conspire against them by buying eggs and butter on the market to save the lives of mother and child. but their fine quality of character made my inner struggle the more difficult. reason urged me to look the social facts in the face. my personal attachment to the communists i had learned to know and esteem refused to accept the facts. never mind the evils--i would say to myself--as long as there are such as the zorins and the balabanovas, there must be something vital in the ideas they represent. i held on tenaciously to the phantom i had myself created. chapter viii the first of may in petrograd in the first of may was for the first time celebrated in america as labour's international holiday. may day became to me a great, inspiring event. to witness the celebration of the first of may in a free country--it was something to dream of, to long for, but perhaps never to be realized. and now, in , the dream of many years was about to become real in revolutionary russia. i could hardly await the morning of may first. it was a glorious day, with the warm sun melting away the last crust of the hard winter. early in the morning strains of music greeted me: groups of workers and soldiers were marching through the streets, singing revolutionary songs. the city was gaily decorated: the uritski square, facing the winter palace, was a mass of red, the streets near by a veritable riot of colour. great crowds were about, all wending their way to the field of mars where the heroes of the revolution were buried. though i had an admission card to the reviewing stand i preferred to remain among the people, to feel myself a part of the great hosts that had brought about the world event. this was their day--the day of their making. yet--they seemed peculiarly quiet, oppressively silent. there was no joy in their singing, no mirth in their laughter. mechanically they marched, automatically they responded to the claqueurs on the reviewing stand shouting "hurrah" as the columns passed. in the evening a pageant was to take place. long before the appointed hour the uritski square down to the palace and to the banks of the neva was crowded with people gathered to witness the open-air performance symbolizing the triumph of the people. the play consisted of three parts, the first portraying the conditions which led up to the war and the rôle of the german socialists in it; the second reproduced the february revolution, with kerensky in power; the last--the october revolution. it was a play beautifully set and powerfully acted, a play vivid, real, fascinating. it was given on the steps of the former stock exchange, facing the square. on the highest step sat kings and queens with their courtiers, attended by soldiery in gay uniforms. the scene represents a gala court affair: the announcement is made that a monument is to be built in honour of world capitalism. there is much rejoicing, and a wild orgy of music and dance ensues. then from the depths there emerge the enslaved and toiling masses, their chains ringing mournfully to the music above. they are responding to the command to build the monument for their masters: some are seen carrying hammers and anvils; others stagger under the weight of huge blocks of stone and loads of brick. the workers are toiling in their world of misery and darkness, lashed to greater effort by the whip of the slave drivers, while above there is light and joy, and the masters are feasting. the completion of the monument is signalled by large yellow disks hoisted on high amidst the rejoicing of the world on top. at this moment a little red flag is seen waving below, and a small figure is haranguing the people. angry fists are raised and then flag and figure disappear, only to reappear again in different parts of the underworld. again the red flag waves, now here, now there. the people slowly gain confidence and presently become threatening. indignation and anger grow--the kings and queens become alarmed. they fly to the safety of the citadels, and the army prepares to defend the stronghold of capitalism. it is august, . the rulers are again feasting, and the workers are slaving. the members of the second international attend the confab of the mighty. they remain deaf to the plea of the workers to save them from the horrors of war. then the strains of "god save the king" announce the arrival of the english army. it is followed by russian soldiers with machine guns and artillery, and a procession of nurses and cripples, the tribute to the moloch of war. the next act pictures the february revolution. red flags appear everywhere, armed motor cars dash about. the people storm the winter palace and haul down the emblem of tsardom. the kerensky government assumes control, and the people are driven back to war. then comes the marvellous scene of the october revolution, with soldiers and sailors galloping along the open space before the white marble building. they dash up the steps into the palace, there is a brief struggle, and the victors are hailed by the masses in wild jubilation. the "internationale" floats upon the air; it mounts higher and higher into exultant peals of joy. russia is free--the workers, sailors, and soldiers usher in the new era, the beginning of the world commune! tremendously stirring was the picture. but the vast mass remained silent. only a faint applause was heard from the great throng. i was dumbfounded. how explain this astonishing lack of response? when i spoke to lisa zorin about it she said that the people had actually lived through the october revolution, and that the performance necessarily fell flat by comparison with the reality of . but my little communist neighbour gave a different version. "the people had suffered so many disappointments since october, ," she said, "that the revolution has lost all meaning to them. the play had the effect of making their disappointment more poignant." chapter ix industrial militarization the ninth congress of the all-russian communist party, held in march, , was characterized by a number of measures which meant a complete turn to the right. foremost among them was the militarization of labour and the establishment of one-man management of industry, as against the collegiate shop system. obligatory labour had long been a law upon the statutes of the socialist republic, but it was carried out, as trotsky said, "only in a small private way." now the law was to be made effective in earnest. russia was to have a militarized industrial army to fight economic disorganization, even as the red army had conquered on the various fronts. such an army could be whipped into line only by rigid discipline, it was claimed. the factory collegiate system had to make place for military industrial management. the measure was bitterly fought at the congress by the communist minority, but party discipline prevailed. however, the excitement did not abate: discussion of the subject continued long after the congress adjourned. many of the younger communists agreed that the measure indicated a step to the right, but they defended the decision of their party. "the collegiate system has proven a failure," they said. "the workers will not work voluntarily, and our industry must be revived if we are to survive another year." jack reed also held this view. he had just returned after a futile attempt to reach america through latvia, and for days we argued about the new policy. jack insisted it was unavoidable so long as russia was being attacked and blockaded. "we have been compelled to mobilize an army to fight our external enemies why not an army to fight our worst internal enemy, hunger? we can do it only by putting our industry on its feet." i pointed out the danger of the military method and questioned whether the workers could be expected to become efficient or to work intensively under compulsion. still, jack thought mobilization of labour unavoidable. "it must be tried, anyhow," he said. petrograd at the time was filled with rumours of strikes. the story made the rounds that zinoviev and his staff, while visiting the factories to explain the new policies, were driven by the workers from the premises. to learn about the situation at first hand i decided to visit the factories. already during my first months in russia i had asked zorin for permission to see them. lisa zorin had requested me to address some labour meetings, but i declined because i felt that it would be presumptuous on my part to undertake to teach those who had made the revolution. besides, i was not quite at home with the russian language then. but when i asked zorin to let me visit some factories, he was evasive. after i had become acquainted with ravitch i approached her on the subject, and she willingly consented. the first works to be visited were the putilov, the largest and most important engine and car manufacturing establishment. forty thousand workers had been employed there before the war. now i was informed that only , were at work. i had heard much of the putilovtsi: they had played a heroic part in the revolutionary days and in the defence of petrograd against yudenitch. at the putilov office we were cordially received, shown about the various departments, and then turned over to a guide. there were four of us in the party, of whom only two could speak russian. i lagged behind to question a group working at a bench. at first i was met with the usual suspicion, which i overcame by telling the men that i was bringing the greetings of their brothers in america. "and the revolution there?" i was immediately asked. it seemed to have become a national obsession, this idea of a near revolution in europe and america. everybody in russia clung to that hope. it was hard to rob those misinformed people of their naïve faith. "the american revolution is not yet," i told them, "but the russian revolution has found an echo among the proletariat in america." i inquired about their work, their lives, and their attitude toward the new decrees. "as if we had not been driven enough before," complained one of the men. "now we are to work under the military _nagaika_ [whip]. of course, we will have to be in the shop or they will punish us as industrial deserters. but how can they get more work out of us? we are suffering hunger and cold. we have no strength to give more." i suggested that the government was probably compelled to introduce such methods, and that if russian industry were not revived the condition of the workers would grow even worse. besides, the putilov men were receiving the preferred _payok_. "we understand the great misfortune that has befallen russia," one of the workers replied, "but we cannot squeeze more out of ourselves. even the two pounds of bread we are getting is not enough. look at the bread," he said, holding up a black crust; "can we live on that? and our children? if not for our people in the country or some trading on the market we would die altogether. now comes the new measure which is tearing us away from our people, sending us to the other end of russia while our brothers from there are going to be dragged here, away from their soil. it's a crazy measure and it won't work." "but what can the government do in the face of the food shortage?" i asked. "food shortage!" the man exclaimed; "look at the markets. did you see any shortage of food there? speculation and the new bourgeoisie, that's what's the matter. the one-man management is our new slave driver. first the bourgeoisie sabotaged us, and now they are again in control. but just let them try to boss us! they'll find out. just let them try!" the men were bitter and resentful. presently the guide returned to see what had become of me. he took great pains to explain that industrial conditions in the mill had improved considerably since the militarization of labour went into effect. the men were more content and many more cars had been renovated and engines repaired than within an equal period under the previous management. there were , productively employed in the works, he assured me. i learned, however, that the real figure was less than , and that of these only about , were actual workers. the others were government officials and clerks. after the putilov works we visited the treugolnik, the great rubber factory of russia. the place was clean and the machinery in good order--a well-equipped modern plant. when we reached the main workroom we were met by the superintendent, who had been in charge for twenty-five years. he would show us around himself, he said. he seemed to take great pride in the factory, as if it were his own. it rather surprised me that they had managed to keep everything in such fine shape. the guide explained that it was because nearly the whole of the old staff had been left in charge. they felt that whatever might happen they must not let the place go to ruin. it was certainly very commendable, i thought, but soon i had occasion to change my mind. at one of the tables, cutting rubber, was an old worker with kindly eyes looking out of a sad, spiritual face. he reminded me of the pilgrim lucca in gorki's "night lodgings." our guide kept a sharp vigil, but i managed to slip away while the superintendent was explaining some machinery to the other members of our group. "well, _batyushka_, how is it with you?" i greeted the old worker. "bad, _matushka_," he replied; "times are very hard for us old people." i told him how impressed i was to find everything in such good condition in the shop. "that is so," commented the old worker, "but it is because the superintendent and his staff are hoping from day to day that there may be a change again, and that the treugolnik will go back to its former owners. i know them. i have worked here long before the german master of this plant put in the new machinery." passing through the various rooms of the factory i saw the women and girls look up in evident dread. it seemed strange in a country where the proletarians were the masters. apparently the machines were not the only things that had been carefully watched over--the old discipline, too, had been preserved: the employees thought us bolshevik inspectors. the great flour mill of petrograd, visited next, looked as if it were in a state of siege, with armed soldiers everywhere, even inside the workrooms. the explanation given was that large quantities of precious flour had been vanishing. the soldiers watched the millmen as if they were galley slaves, and the workers naturally resented such humiliating treatment. they hardly dared to speak. one young chap, a fine-looking fellow, complained to me of the conditions. "we are here virtual prisoners," he said; "we cannot make a step without permission. we are kept hard at work eight hours with only ten minutes for our _kipyatok_ [boiled water] and we are searched on leaving the mill." "is not the theft of flour the cause of the strict surveillance?" i asked. "not at all," replied the boy; "the commissars of the mill and the soldiers know quite well where the flour goes to." i suggested that the workers might protest against such a state of affairs. "protest, to whom?" the boy exclaimed; "we'd be called speculators and counter-revolutionists and we'd be arrested." "has the revolution given you nothing?" i asked. "ah, the revolution! but that is no more. finished," he said bitterly. the following morning we visited the laferm tobacco factory. the place was in full operation. we were conducted through the plant and the whole process was explained to us, beginning with the sorting of the raw material and ending with the finished cigarettes packed for sale or shipment. the air in the workrooms was stifling, nauseating. "the women are used to this atmosphere," said the guide; "they don't mind." there were some pregnant women at work and girls no older than fourteen. they looked haggard, their chests sunken, black rings under their eyes. some of them coughed and the hectic flush of consumption showed on their faces. "is there a recreation room, a place where they can eat or drink their tea and inhale a bit of fresh air?" there was no such thing, i was informed. the women remained at work eight consecutive hours; they had their tea and black bread at their benches. the system was that of piece work, the employees receiving twenty-five cigarettes daily above their pay with permission to sell or exchange them. i spoke to some of the women. they did not complain except about being compelled to live far away from the factory. in most cases it required more than two hours to go to and from work. they had asked to be quartered near the laferm and they received a promise to that effect, but nothing more was heard of it. life certainly has a way of playing peculiar pranks. in america i should have scorned the idea of social welfare work: i should have considered it a cheap palliative. but in socialist russia the sight of pregnant women working in suffocating tobacco air and saturating themselves and their unborn with the poison impressed me as a fundamental evil. i spoke to lisa zorin to see whether something could not be done to ameliorate the evil. lisa claimed that "piece work" was the only way to induce the girls to work. as to rest rooms, the women themselves had already made a fight for them, but so far nothing could be done because no space could be spared in the factory. "but if even such small improvements had not resulted from the revolution," i argued, "what purpose has it served?" "the workers have achieved control," lisa replied; "they are now in power, and they have more important things to attend to than rest rooms--they have the revolution to defend." lisa zorin had remained very much the proletarian, but she reasoned like a nun dedicated to the service of the church. the thought oppressed me that what she called the "defence of the revolution" was really only the defence of her party in power. at any rate, nothing came of my attempt at social welfare work. chapter x the british labour mission i was glad to learn that angelica balabanova arrived in petrograd to prepare quarters for the british labour mission. during my stay in moscow i had come to know and appreciate the fine spirit of angelica. she was very devoted to me and when i fell ill she gave much time to my care, procured medicine which could be obtained only in the kremlin drug store, and got special sick rations for me. her friendship was generous and touching, and she endeared herself very much to me. the narishkin palace was to be prepared for the mission, and angelica invited me to accompany her there. i noticed that she looked more worn and distressed than when i had seen her in moscow. our conversation made it clear to me that she suffered keenly from the reality which was so unlike her ideal. but she insisted that what seemed failure to me was conditioned in life itself, itself the greatest failure. narishkin palace is situated on the southern bank of the neva, almost opposite the peter-and-paul fortress. the place was prepared for the expected guests and a number of servants and cooks installed to minister to their needs. soon the mission arrived--most of them typical workingmen delegates--and with them a staff of newspaper men and mrs. snowden. the most outstanding figure among them was bertrand russell, who quickly demonstrated his independence and determination to be free to investigate and learn at first hand. in honour of the mission the bolsheviki organized a great demonstration on the uritski square. thousands of people, among them women and children, came to show their gratitude to the english labour representatives for venturing into revolutionary russia. the ceremony consisted of the singing of the "internationale," followed by music and speeches, the latter translated by balabanova in masterly fashion. then came the military exercises. i heard mrs. snowden say disapprovingly, "what a display of military!" i could not resist the temptation of remarking: "madame, remember that the big russian army is largely the making of your own country. had england not helped to finance the invasions into russia, the latter could put its soldiers to useful labour." the british mission was entertained royally with theatres, operas, ballets, and excursions. luxury was heaped upon them while the people slaved and went hungry. the soviet government left nothing undone to create a good impression and everything of a disturbing nature was kept from the visitors. angelica hated the display and sham, and suffered keenly under the rigid watch placed upon every movement of the mission. "why should they not see the true state of russia? why should they not learn how the russian people live?" she would lament. "yet i am so impractical," she would correct herself; "perhaps it is all necessary." at the end of two weeks a farewell banquet was given to the visitors. angelica insisted that i must attend. again there were speeches and toasts, as is the custom at such functions. the speeches which seemed to ring most sincere were those of balabanova and madame ravitch. the latter asked me to interpret her address, which i did. she spoke in behalf of the russian women proletarians and praised their fortitude and devotion to the revolution. "may the english proletarians learn the quality of their heroic russian sisters," concluded madame ravitch. mrs. snowden, the erstwhile suffragette, had not a word in reply. she preserved a "dignified" aloofness. however, the lady became enlivened when the speeches were over and she got busy collecting autographs. chapter xi a visit from the ukraina early in may two young men from the ukraina arrived in petrograd. both had lived in america for a number of years and had been active in the yiddish labour and anarchist movements. one of them had also been editor of an english weekly anarchist paper, _the alarm_, published in chicago. in , at the outbreak of the revolution, they left for russia together with other emigrants. arriving in their native country, they joined the anarchist activities there which had gained tremendous impetus through the revolution. their main field was the ukraina. in they aided in the organization of the anarchist federation _nabat_ [alarm], and began the publication of a paper by that name. theoretically, they were at variance with the bolsheviki; practically the federation anarchists, even as the anarchists throughout russia, worked with the bolsheviki and also fought on every front against the counter-revolutionary forces. when the two ukrainian comrades learned of our arrival in russia they repeatedly tried to reach us, but owing to the political conditions and the practical impossibility of travelling, they could not come north. subsequently they had been arrested and imprisoned by the bolsheviki. immediately upon their release they started for petrograd, travelling illegally. they knew the dangers confronting them--arrest and possible shooting for the possession and use of false documents--but they were willing to risk anything because they were determined that we should learn the facts about the _povstantsi_ [revolutionary peasants] movements led by that extraordinary figure, nestor makhno. they wanted to acquaint us with the history of the anarchist activities in russia and relate how the iron hand of the bolsheviki had crushed them. during two weeks, in the stillness of the petrograd nights, the two ukrainian anarchists unrolled before us the panorama of the struggle in the ukraina. dispassionately, quietly, and with almost uncanny detachment the young men told their story. thirteen different governments had "ruled" ukraina. each of them had robbed and murdered the peasantry, made ghastly pogroms, and left death and ruin in its way. the ukrainian peasants, a more independent and spirited race than their northern brothers, had come to hate all governments and every measure which threatened their land and freedom. they banded together and fought back their oppressors all through the long years of the revolutionary period. the peasants had no theories; they could not be classed in any political party. theirs was an instinctive hatred of tyranny, and practically the whole of ukraina soon became a rebel camp. into this seething cauldron there came, in , nestor makhno. makhno was a ukrainian born. a natural rebel, he became interested in anarchism at an early age. at seventeen he attempted the life of a tsarist spy and was sentenced to death, but owing to his extreme youth the sentence was commuted to _katorga_ for life [severe imprisonment, one third of the term in chains]. the february revolution opened the prison doors for all political prisoners, makhno among them. he had then spent ten years in the butirky prison, in moscow. he had but a limited schooling when first arrested, but in prison he had used his leisure to good advantage. by the time of his release he had acquired considerable knowledge of history, political economy, and literature. shortly after his liberation makhno returned to his native village, gulyai-poleh, where he organized a trade union and the local soviet. then he threw himself in the revolutionary movement and during all of he was the spiritual teacher and leader of the rebel peasants, who had risen against the landed proprietors. in , when the brest peace opened ukraina to german and austrian occupation, makhno organized the rebel peasant bands in defence against the foreign armies. he fought against skoropadski, the ukrainian hetman, who was supported by german bayonets. he waged successful guerilla warfare against petlura, kaledin, grigoriev, and denikin. a conscious anarchist, he laboured to give the instinctive rebellion of the peasantry definite aim and purpose. it was the makhno idea that the social revolution was to be defended against all enemies, against every counter-revolutionary or reactionary attempt from right and left. at the same time educational and cultural work was carried on among the peasants to develop them along anarchist-communist lines with the aim of establishing free peasant communes. in february, , makhno entered into an agreement with the red army. he was to continue to hold the southern front against denikin and to receive from the bolsheviki the necessary arms and ammunition. makhno was to remain in charge of the _povstantsi_, now grown into an army, the latter to have autonomy in its local organizations, the revolutionary soviets of the district, which covered several provinces. it was agreed that the _povstantsi_ should have the right to hold conferences, freely discuss their affairs, and take action upon them. three such conferences were held in february, march, and april. but the bolsheviki failed to live up to the agreement. the supplies which had been promised makhno, and which he needed desperately, would arrive after long delays or failed to come altogether. it was charged that this situation was due to the orders of trotsky who did not look favourably upon the independent rebel army. however it be, makhno was hampered at every step, while denikin was gaining ground constantly. presently the bolsheviki began to object to the free peasant soviets, and in may, , the commander-in-chief of the southern armies, kamenev, accompanied by members of the kharkov government, arrived at the makhno headquarters to settle the disputed matters. in the end the bolshevik military representatives demanded that the _povstantsi_ dissolve. the latter refused, charging the bolsheviki with a breach of their revolutionary agreement. meanwhile, the denikin advance was becoming more threatening, and makhno still received no support from the bolsheviki. the peasant army then decided to call a special session of the soviet for june th. definite plans and methods were to be decided upon to check the growing menace of denikin. but on june th trotsky issued an order prohibiting the holding of the conference and declaring makhno an outlaw. in a public meeting in kharkov trotsky announced that it were better to permit the whites to remain in the ukraina than to suffer makhno. the presence of the whites, he said, would influence the ukrainian peasantry in favour of the soviet government, whereas makhno and his _povstantsi_ would never make peace with the bolsheviki; they would attempt to possess themselves of some territory and to practice their ideas, which would be a constant menace to the communist government. it was practically a declaration of war against makhno and his army. soon the latter found itself attacked on two sides at once--by the bolsheviki and denikin. the _povstantsi_ were poorly equipped and lacked the most necessary supplies for warfare, yet the peasant army for a considerable time succeeded in holding its own by the sheer military genius of its leader and the reckless courage of his devoted rebels. at the same time the bolsheviki began a campaign of denunciation against makhno and his _povstantsi_. the communist press accused him of having treacherously opened the southern front to denikin, and branded makhno's army a bandit gang and its leader a counter-revolutionist who must be destroyed at all cost. but this "counter-revolutionist" fully realized the denikin menace to the revolution. he gathered new forces and support among the peasants and in the months of september and october, , his campaign against denikin gave the latter its death blow on the ukraina. makhno captured denikin's artillery base at mariopol, annihilated the rear of the enemy's army, and succeeded in separating the main body from its base of supply. this brilliant manoeuvre of makhno and the heroic fighting of the rebel army again brought about friendly contact with the bolsheviki. the ban was lifted from the _povstantsi_ and the communist press now began to eulogize makhno as a great military genius and brave defender of the revolution in the ukraina. but the differences between makhno and the bolsheviki were deep-rooted: he strove to establish free peasant communes in the ukraina, while the communists were bent on imposing the moscow rule. ultimately a clash was inevitable, and it came early in january, . at that period a new enemy was threatening the revolution. grigoriev, formerly of the tsarist army, later friend of the bolsheviki, now turned against them. having gained considerable support in the south because of his slogans of freedom and free soviets, grigoriev proposed to makhno that they join forces against the communist régime. makhno called a meeting of the two armies and there publicly accused grigoriev of counter-revolution and produced evidence of numerous pogroms organized by him against the jews. declaring grigoriev an enemy of the people and of the revolution, makhno and his staff condemned him and his aides to death, executing them on the spot. part of grigoriev's army joined makhno. meanwhile, denikin kept pressing makhno, finally forcing him to withdraw from his position. not of course without bitter fighting all along the line of nine hundred versts, the retreat lasting four months, makhno marching toward galicia. denikin advanced upon kharkov, then farther north, capturing orel and kursk, and finally reached the gates of tula, in the immediate neighbourhood of moscow. the red army seemed powerless to check the advance of denikin, but meanwhile makhno had gathered new forces and attacked denikin in the rear. the unexpectedness of this new turn and the extraordinary military exploits of makhno's men in this campaign disorganized the plans of denikin, demoralized his army, and gave the red army the opportunity of taking the offensive against the counter-revolutionary enemy in the neighbourhood of tula. when the red army reached alexandrovsk, after having finally beaten the denikin forces, trotsky again demanded of makhno that he disarm his men and place himself under the discipline of the red army. the _povstantsi_ refused, whereupon an organized military campaign against the rebels was inaugurated, the bolsheviki taking many prisoners and killing scores of others. makhno, who managed to escape the bolshevik net, was again declared an outlaw and bandit. since then makhno had been uninterruptedly waging guerilla warfare against the bolshevik régime. the story of the ukrainian friends, which i have related here in very condensed form, sounded as romantic as the exploits of stenka rasin, the famous cossack rebel immortalized by gogol. romantic and picturesque, but what bearing did the activities of makhno and his men have upon anarchism, i questioned the two comrades. makhno, my informants explained, was himself an anarchist seeking to free ukraina from all oppression and striving to develop and organize the peasants' latent anarchistic tendencies. to this end makhno had repeatedly called upon the anarchists of the ukraina and of russia to aid him. he offered them the widest opportunity for propagandistic and educational work, supplied them with printing outfits and meeting places, and gave them the fullest liberty of action. whenever makhno captured a city, freedom of speech and press for anarchists and left social revolutionists was established. makhno often said: "i am a military man and i have no time for educational work. but you who are writers and speakers, you can do that work. join me and together we shall be able to prepare the field for a real anarchist experiment." but the chief value of the makhno movement lay in the peasants themselves, my comrades thought. it was a spontaneous, elemental movement, the peasants' opposition to all governments being the result not of theories but of bitter experience and of instinctive love of liberty. they were fertile ground for anarchist ideas. for this reason a number of anarchists joined makhno. they were with him in most of his military campaigns and energetically carried on anarchist propaganda during that time. i have been told by zorin and other communists that makhno was a jew-baiter and that his _povstantsi_ were responsible for numerous brutal pogroms. my visitors emphatically denied the charges. makhno bitterly fought pogroms, they stated; he had often issued proclamations against such outrages, and he had even with his own hand punished some of those guilty of assault on jews. hatred of the hebrew was of course common in the ukraina; it was not eradicated even among the red soldiers. they, too, have assaulted, robbed, and outraged jews; yet no one holds the bolsheviki responsible for such isolated instances. the ukraina is infested with armed bands who are often mistaken for makhnovtsi and who have made pogroms. the bolsheviki, aware of this, have exploited the confusion to discredit makhno and his followers. however, the anarchist of the ukraina--i was informed--did not idealize the makhno movement. they knew that the _povstantsi_ were not conscious anarchists. their paper _nabat_ had repeatedly emphasized this fact. on the other hand, the anarchists could not overlook the importance of popular movement which was instinctively rebellious, anarchistically inclined, and successful in driving back the enemies of the revolution, which the better organized and equipped bolshevik army could not accomplish. for this reason many anarchists considered it their duty to work with makhno. but the bulk remained away; they had their larger cultural, educational, and organizing work to do. the invading counter-revolutionary forces, though differing in character and purpose, all agreed in their relentless persecution of the anarchists. the latter were made to suffer, whatever the new régime. the bolsheviki were no better in this regard than denikin or any other white element. anarchists filled bolshevik prisons; many had been shot and all legal anarchist activities were suppressed. the tcheka especially was doing ghastly work, having resurrected the old tsarist methods, including even torture. my young visitors spoke from experience: they had repeatedly been in bolshevik prisons themselves. chapter xii beneath the surface the terrible story i had been listening to for two weeks broke over me like a storm. was this the revolution i had believed in all my life, yearned for, and strove to interest others in, or was it a caricature--a hideous monster that had come to jeer and mock me? the communists i had met daily during six months--self-sacrificing, hard-working men and women imbued with a high ideal--were such people capable of the treachery and horrors charged against them? zinoviev, radek, zorin, ravitch, and many others i had learned to know--could they in the name of an ideal lie, defame, torture, kill? but, then--had not zorin told me that capital punishment had been abolished in russia? yet i learned shortly after my arrival that hundreds of people had been shot on the very eve of the day when the new decree went into effect, and that as a matter of fact shooting by the tcheka had never ceased. that my friends were not exaggerating when they spoke of tortures by the tcheka, i also learned from other sources. complaints about the fearful conditions in petrograd prisons had become so numerous that moscow was apprised of the situation. a tcheka inspector came to investigate. the prisoners being afraid to speak, immunity was promised them. but no sooner had the inspector left than one of the inmates, a young boy, who had been very outspoken about the brutalities practised by the tcheka, was dragged out of his cell and cruelly beaten. why did zorin resort to lies? surely he must have known that i would not remain in the dark very long. and then, was not lenin also guilty of the same methods? "anarchists of ideas [_ideyni_] are not in our prisons," he had assured me. yet at that very moment numerous anarchists filled the jails of moscow and petrograd and of many other cities in russia. in may, , scores of them had been arrested in petrograd, among them two girls of seventeen and nineteen years of age. none of the prisoners were charged with counter-revolutionary activities: they were "anarchists of ideas," to use lenin's expression. several of them had issued a manifesto for the first of may, calling attention to the appalling conditions in the factories of the socialist republic. the two young girls who had circulated a handbill against the "labour book," which had then just gone into effect, were also arrested. the labour book was heralded by the bolsheviki as one of the great communist achievements. it would establish equality and abolish parasitism, it was claimed. as a matter of fact, the labour book was somewhat of the character of the yellow ticket issued to prostitutes under the tsarist régime. it was a record of every step one made, and without it no step could be made. it bound its holder to his job, to the city he lived in, and to the room he occupied. it recorded one's political faith and party adherence, and the number of times he was arrested. in short, a yellow ticket. even some communists resented the degrading innovation. the anarchists who protested against it were arrested by the tcheka. when certain leading communists were approached in the matter they repeated what lenin had said: "no anarchists of ideas are in our prisons." the aureole was falling from the communists. all of them seemed to believe that the end justified the means. i recalled the statements of radek at the first anniversary of the third international, when he related to his audience the "marvellous spread of communism" in america. "fifty thousand communists are in american prisons," he exclaimed. "molly stimer, a girl of eighteen, and her male companions, all communists, had been deported from america for their communist activities." i thought at the time that radek was misinformed. yet it seemed strange that he did not make sure of his facts before making such assertions. they were dishonest and an insult to molly stimer and her anarchist comrades, added to the injustice they had suffered at the hands of the american plutocracy. during the past several months i had seen and heard enough to become somewhat conversant with the communist psychology, as well as with the theories and methods of the bolsheviki. i was no longer surprised at the story of their double-dealing with makhno, the brutalities practised by the tcheka, the lies of zorin. i had come to realize that the communists believed implicitly in the jesuitic formula that the end justifies _all_ means. in fact, they gloried in that formula. any suggestion of the value of human life, quality of character, the importance of revolutionary integrity as the basis of a new social order, was repudiated as "bourgeois sentimentality," which had no place in the revolutionary scheme of things. for the bolsheviki the end to be achieved was the communist state, or the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. everything which advanced that end was justifiable and revolutionary. the lenins, radeks, and zorins were therefore quite consistent. obsessed by the infallibility of their creed, giving of themselves to the fullest, they could be both heroic and despicable at the same time. they could work twenty hours a day, live on herring and tea, and order the slaughter of innocent men and women. occasionally they sought to mask their killings by pretending a "misunderstanding," for doesn't the end justify all means? they could employ torture and deny the inquisition, they could lie and defame, and call themselves idealists. in short, they could make themselves and others believe that everything was legitimate and right from the revolutionary viewpoint; any other policy was weak, sentimental, or a betrayal of the revolution. on a certain occasion, when i passed criticism on the brutal way delicate women were driven into the streets to shovel snow, insisting that even if they had belonged to the bourgeoisie they were human, and that physical fitness should be taken into consideration, a communist said to me: "you should be ashamed of yourself; you, an old revolutionist, and yet so sentimental." it was the same attitude that some communists assumed toward angelica balabanova, because she was always solicitous and eager to help wherever possible. in short, i had come to see that the bolsheviki were social puritans who sincerely believed that they alone were ordained to save mankind. my relations with the bolsheviki became more strained, my attitude toward the revolution as i found it more critical. one thing grew quite clear to me: i could not affiliate myself with the soviet government; i could not accept any work which would place me under the control of the communist machine. the commissariat of education was so thoroughly dominated by that machine that it was hopeless to expect anything but routine work. in fact, unless one was a communist one could accomplish almost nothing. i had been eager to join lunacharsky, whom i considered one of the most cultivated and least dogmatic of the communists in high position. but i became convinced that lunacharsky himself was a helpless cog in the machine, his best efforts constantly curtailed and checked. i had also learned a great deal about the system of favouritism and graft that prevailed in the management of the schools and the treatment of children. some schools were in splendid condition, the children well fed and well clad, enjoying concerts, theatricals, dances, and other amusements. but the majority of the schools and children's homes were squalid, dirty, and neglected. those in charge of the "preferred" schools had little difficulty in procuring everything needed for their charges, often having an over-supply. but the caretakers of the "common" schools would waste their time and energies by the week going about from one department to another, discouraged and faint with endless waiting before they could obtain the merest necessities. at first i ascribed this condition of affairs to the scarcity of food and materials. i heard it said often enough that the blockade and intervention were responsible. to a large extent that was true. had russia not been so starved, mismanagement and graft would not have had such fatal results. but added to the prevalent scarcity of things was the dominant notion of communist propaganda. even the children had to serve that end. the well-kept schools were for show, for the foreign missions and delegates who were visiting russia. everything was lavished on these show schools at the cost of the others. i remembered how everybody was startled in petrograd by an article in the petrograd _pravda_ of may, disclosing appalling conditions in the schools. a committee of the young communist organizations investigated some of the institutions. they found the children dirty, full of vermin, sleeping on filthy mattresses, fed on miserable food, punished by being locked in dark rooms for the night, forced to go without their suppers, and even beaten. the number of officials and employees in the schools was nothing less than criminal. in one school, for instance, there were of them to children. in another, to children. all these parasites were taking the bread from the very mouths of the unfortunate children. the zorins had spoken to me repeatedly of lillina, the woman in charge of the petrograd educational department. she was a wonderful worker, they said, devoted and able. i had heard her speak on several occasions, but was not impressed: she looked prim and self-satisfied, a typical puritan schoolma'am. but i would not form an opinion until i had talked with her. at the publication of the school disclosures i decided to see lillina. we conversed over an hour about the schools in her charge, about education in general, the problem of defective children and their treatment. she made light of the abuses in her schools, claiming that "the young comrades had exaggerated the defects." at any rate, she added, the guilty had already been removed from the schools. similarly to many other responsible communists lillina was consecrated to her work and gave all her time and energies to it. naturally, she could not personally oversee everything; the show schools being the most important in her estimation, she devoted most of her time to them. the other schools were left in the care of her numerous assistants, whose fitness for the work was judged largely according to their political usefulness. our talk strengthened my conviction that i could have no part in the work of the bolshevik board of education. the board of health offered as little opportunity for real service--service that should not discriminate in favour of show hospitals or the political views of the patients. this principle of discrimination prevailed, unfortunately, even in the sick rooms. like all communist institutions, the board of health was headed by a political commissar, doctor pervukhin. he was anxious to secure my assistance, proposing to put me in charge of factory, dispensary, or district nursing--a very flattering and tempting offer, and one that appealed to me strongly. i had several conferences with doctor pervukhin, but they led to no practical result. whenever i visited his department i found groups of men and women waiting, endlessly waiting. they were doctors and nurses, members of the _intelligentsia_--none of them communists--who were employed in various medical branches, but their time and energies were being wasted in the waiting rooms of doctor pervukhin, the political commissar. they were a sorry lot, dispirited and dejected, those men and women, once the flower of russia. was i to join this tragic procession, submit to the political yoke? not until i should become convinced that the yoke was indispensable to the revolutionary process would i consent to it. i felt that i must first secure work of a non-partisan character, work that would enable me to study conditions in russia and get into direct touch with the people, the workers and peasants. only then should i be able to find my way out of the chaos of doubt and mental anguish that i had fallen prey to. chapter xiii joining the museum of the revolution the museum of the revolution is housed in the winter palace, in the suite once used as the nursery of the tsar's children. the entrance to that part of the palace is known as _detsky podyezd_. from the windows of the palace the tsar must have often looked across the neva at the peter-and-paul fortress, the living tomb of his political enemies. how different things were now! the thought of it kindled my imagination. i was full of the wonder and the magic of the great change when i paid my first visit to the museum. i found groups of men and women at work in the various rooms, huddled up in their wraps and shivering with cold. their faces were bloated and bluish, their hands frost-bitten, their whole appearance shadow-like. what must be the devotion of these people, i thought, when they can continue to work under such conditions. the secretary of the museum, m. b. kaplan, received me very cordially and expressed "the hope that i would join in the work of the museum." he and another member of the staff spent considerable time with me on several occasions, explaining the plans and purposes of the museum. they asked me to join the expedition which the museum was then organizing, and which was to go south to the ukraina and the caucasus. valuable material of the revolutionary period was to be gathered there, they explained. the idea attracted me. aside from my general interest in the museum and its efforts, it meant non-partisan work, free from commissars, and an exceptional opportunity to see and study russia. in the course of our acquaintance i learned that neither mr. kaplan nor his friend was a communist. but while mr. kaplan was strongly pro-bolshevik and tried to defend and explain away everything, the other man was critical though by no means antagonistic. during my stay in petrograd i saw much of both men, and i learned from them a great deal about the revolution and the methods of the bolsheviki. kaplan's friend, whose name for obvious reasons i cannot mention, often spoke of the utter impossibility of doing creative work within the communist machine. "the bolsheviki," he would say, "always complain about lack of able help, yet no one--unless a communist--has much of a chance." the museum was among the least interfered with institutions, and work there had been progressing well. then a group of twenty youths were sent over, young and inexperienced boys unfamiliar with the work. being communists they were placed in positions of authority, and friction and confusion resulted. everyone felt himself watched and spied upon. "the bolsheviki care not about merit," he said; "their chief concern is a membership card." he was not enthusiastic about the future of the museum, yet believed that the coöperation of the "americans" would aid its proper development. finally i decided on the museum as offering the most suitable work for me, mainly because that institution was non-partisan. i had hoped for a more vital share in russia's life than the collecting of historical material; still i considered it valuable and necessary work. when i had definitely consented to become a member of the expedition, i visited the museum daily to help with the preparations for the long journey. there was much work. it was no easy matter to obtain a car, equip it for the arduous trip, and secure the documents which would give us access to the material we set out to collect. while i was busy aiding in these preparations angelica balabanova arrived in petrograd to meet the italian mission. she seemed transformed. she had longed for her italian comrades: they would bring her a breath of her beloved italy, of her former life and work there. though russian by birth, training, and revolutionary traditions, angelica had become rooted in the soil of italy. well i understood her and her sense of strangeness in the country, the hard soil of which was to bear a new and radiant life. angelica would not admit even to herself that the much hoped-for life was stillborn. but knowing her as i did, it was not difficult for me to understand how bitter was her grief over the hapless and formless thing that had come to russia. but now her beloved italians were coming! they would bring with them the warmth and colour of italy. the italians came and with them new festivities, demonstrations, meetings, and speeches. how different it all appeared to me from my memorable first days on belo-ostrov. no doubt the italians now felt as awed as i did then, as inspired by the seeming wonder of russia. six months and the close proximity with the reality of things quite changed the picture for me. the spontaneity, the enthusiasm, the vitality had all gone out of it. only a pale shadow remained, a grinning phantom that clutched at my heart. on the uritski square the masses were growing weary with long waiting. they had been kept there for hours before the italian mission arrived from the tauride palace. the ceremonies were just beginning when a woman leaning against the platform, wan and pale, began to weep. i stood close by. "it is easy for them to talk," she moaned, "but we've had no food all day. we received orders to march directly from our work on pain of losing our bread rations. since five this morning i am on my feet. we were not permitted to go home after work to our bit of dinner. we had to come here. seventeen hours on a piece of bread and some _kipyatok_ [boiled water]. do the visitors know anything about us?" the speeches went on, the "internationale" was being repeated for the tenth time, the sailors performed their fancy exercises and the claqueurs on the reviewing stand were shouting hurrahs. i rushed away. i, too, was weeping, though my eyes remained dry. the italian, like the english, mission was quartered in the narishkin palace. one day, on visiting angelica there, i found her in a perturbed state of mind. through one of the servants she had learned that the ex-princess narishkin, former owner of the palace, had come to beg for the silver ikon which had been in the family for generations. "just that ikon," she had implored. but the ikon was now state property, and balabanova could do nothing about it. "just think," angelica said, "narishkin, old and desolate, now stands on the street corner begging, and i live in this palace. how dreadful is life! i am no good for it; i must get away." but angelica was bound by party discipline; she stayed on in the palace until she returned to moscow. i know she did not feel much happier than the ragged and starving ex-princess begging on the street corner. balabanova, anxious that i should find suitable work, informed me one day that petrovsky, known in america as doctor goldfarb, had arrived in petrograd. he was chief of the central military education department, which included nurses' training schools. i had never met the man in the states, but i had heard of him as the labour editor of the new york _forward_, the jewish socialist daily. he offered me the position of head instructress in the military nurses' training school, with a view to introducing american methods of nursing, or to send me with a medical train to the polish front. i had proffered my services at the first news of the polish attack on russia: i felt the revolution in danger, and i hastened to zorin to ask to be assigned as a nurse. he promised to bring the matter before the proper authorities, but i heard nothing further about it. i was, therefore, somewhat surprised at the proposition of petrovsky. however, it came too late. what i had since learned about the situation in the ukraina, the bolshevik methods toward makhno and the _povstantsi_ movement, the persecution of anarchists, and the tcheka activities, had completely shaken my faith in the bolsheviki as revolutionists. the offer came too late. but moscow perhaps thought it unwise to let me see behind the scenes at the front; petrovsky failed to inform me of the moscow decision. i felt relieved. at last we received the glad tidings that the greatest difficulty had been overcome: a car for the museum expedition had been secured. it consisted of six compartments and was newly painted and cleaned. now began the work of equipment. ordinarily it would have taken another two months, but we had the coöperation of the man at the head of the museum, chairman yatmanov, a communist. he was also in charge of all the properties of the winter palace where the museum is housed. the largest part of the linen, silver, and glassware from the tsar's storerooms had been removed, but there was still much left. supplied with an order of the chairman i was shown over what was once guarded as sacred precincts by romanov flunkeys. i found rooms stacked to the ceiling with rare and beautiful china and compartments filled with the finest linen. the basement, running the whole length of the winter palace, was stocked with kitchen utensils of every size and variety. tin plates and pots would have been more appropriate for the expedition, but owing to the ruling that no institution may draw upon another for anything it has in its own possession, there was nothing to do but to choose the simplest obtainable at the winter palace. i went home reflecting upon the strangeness of life: revolutionists eating out of the crested service of the romanovs. but i felt no elation over it. chapter xiv petropavlovsk and schlÜsselburg as some time was to pass before we could depart, i took advantage of the opportunity which presented itself to visit the historic prisons, the peter-and-paul fortress and schlüsselburg. i recollected the dread and awe the very names of these places filled me with when i first came to petrograd as a child of thirteen. in fact, my dread of the petropavlovsk fortress dated back to a much earlier time. i think i must have been six years old when a great shock had come to our family: we learned that my mother's oldest brother, yegor, a student at the university of petersburg, had been arrested and was held in the fortress. my mother at once set out for the capital. we children remained at home in fear and trepidation lest mother should not find our uncle among the living. we spent anxious weeks and months till finally mother returned. great was our rejoicing to hear that she had rescued her brother from the living dead. but the memory of the shock remained with me for a long time. seven years later, my family then living in petersburg, i happened to be sent on an errand which took me past the peter-and-paul fortress. the shock i had received many years before revived within me with paralyzing force. there stood the heavy mass of stone, dark and sinister. i was terrified. the great prison was still to me a haunted house, causing my heart to palpitate with fear whenever i had to pass it. years later, when i had begun to draw sustenance from the lives and heroism of the great russian revolutionists, the peter-and-paul fortress became still more hateful. and now i was about to enter its mysterious walls and see with my own eyes the place which had been the living grave of so many of the best sons and daughters of russia. the guide assigned to take us through the different ravelins had been in the prison for ten years. he knew every stone in the place. but the silence told me more than all the information of the guide. the martyrs who had beaten their wings against the cold stone, striving upward toward the light and air, came to life for me. the dekabristi, tchernishevsky, dostoyevsky, bakunin, kropotkin, and scores of others spoke in a thousand-throated voice of their social idealism and their personal suffering--of their high hopes and fervent faith in the ultimate liberation of russia. now the fluttering spirits of the heroic dead may rest in peace: their dream has come true. but what is this strange writing on the wall? "to-night i am to be shot because i had once acquired an education." i had almost lost consciousness of the reality. the inscription roused me to it. "what is this?" i asked the guard. "those are the last words of an _intelligent_," he replied. "after the october revolution the _intelligentsia_ filled this prison. from here they were taken out and shot, or were loaded on barges never to return. those were dreadful days and still more dreadful nights." so the dream of those who had given their lives for the liberation of russia had not come true, after all. is there any change in the world? or is it all an eternal recurrence of man's inhumanity to man? we reached the strip of enclosure where the prisoners used to be permitted a half-hour's recreation. one by one they had to walk up and down the narrow lane in dead silence, with the sentries on the wall ready to shoot for the slightest infraction of the rules. and while the caged and fettered ones treaded the treeless walk, the all-powerful romanovs looked out of the winter palace toward the golden spire topping the fortress to reassure themselves that their hated enemies would never again threaten their safety. but not even petropavlovsk could save the tsars from the slaying hand of time and revolution. indeed, there _is_ change; slow and painful, but come it does. in the enclosure we met angelica balabanova and the italians. we walked about the huge prison, each absorbed in his own thoughts set in motion by what he saw. would angelica notice the writing on the wall, i wondered. "to-night i am to be shot because i had once acquired an education." some time later several of our group made a trip to schlüsselburg, the even more dreadful tomb of the political enemies of tsarism. it is a journey of several hours by boat up the beautiful river neva. the day was chilly and gray, as was our mood; just the right state of mind to visit schlüsselburg. the fortress was strongly guarded, but our museum permit secured for us immediate admission. schlüsselburg is a compact mass of stone perched upon a high rock in the open sea. for many decades only the victims of court intrigues and royal disfavour were immured within its impenetrable walls, but later it became the golgotha of the political enemies of the tsarist régime. i had heard of schlüsselburg when my parents first came to petersburg; but unlike my feeling toward the peter-and-paul fortress, i had no personal reaction to the place. it was russian revolutionary literature which brought the meaning of schlüsselburg home to me. especially the story of volkenstein, one of the two women who had spent long years in the dreaded place, left an indelible impression on my mind. yet nothing i had read made the place quite so real and terrifying as when i climbed up the stone steps and stood before the forbidding gates. as far as any effect upon the physical condition of the peter-and-paul fortress was concerned, the revolution might never have taken place. the prison remained intact, ready for immediate use by the new régime. not so schlüsselburg. the wrath of the proletariat struck that house of the dead almost to the ground. how cruel and perverse the human mind which could create a schlüsselburg! verily, no savage could be guilty of the fiendish spirit that conceived this appalling tomb. cells built like a bag, without doors or windows and with only a small opening through which the victims were lowered into their living grave. other cells were stone cages to drive the mind to madness and lacerate the heart of the unfortunates. yet men and women endured twenty years in this terrible place. what fortitude, what power of endurance, what sublime faith one must have had to hold out, to emerge from it alive! here netchaev, lopatin, morosov, volkenstein, figner, and others of the splendid band spent their tortured lives. here is the common grave of ulianov, mishkin, kalayev, balmashev, and many more. the black tablet inscribed with their names speaks louder than the voices silenced for ever. not even the roaring waves dashing against the rock of schlüsselburg can drown that accusing voice. petropavlovsk and schlüsselburg stand as the living proof of how futile is the hope of the mighty to escape the frankensteins of their own making. chapter xv the trade unions it was the month of june and the time of our departure was approaching. petrograd seemed more beautiful than ever; the white nights had come--almost broad daylight without its glare, the mysterious soothing white nights of petrograd. there were rumours of counter-revolutionary danger and the city was guarded against attack. martial law prevailing, it was forbidden to be out on the streets after a. m., even though it was almost daylight. occasionally special permits were obtained by friends and then we would walk through the deserted streets or along the banks of the dark neva, discussing in whispers the perplexing situation. i sought for some outstanding feature in the blurred picture--the russian revolution, a huge flame shooting across the world illuminating the black horizon of the disinherited and oppressed--the revolution, the new hope, the great spiritual awakening. and here i was in the midst of it, yet nowhere could i see the promise and fulfilment of the great event. had i misunderstood the meaning and nature of revolution? perhaps the wrong and the evil i have seen during those five months were inseparable from a revolution. or was it the political machine which the bolsheviki have created--is that the force which is crushing the revolution? if i had witnessed the birth of the latter i should now be better able to judge. but apparently i arrived at the end--the agonizing end of a people. it is all so complex, so impenetrable, a _tupik_, a blind alley, as the russians call it. only time and earnest study, aided by sympathetic understanding, will show me the way out. meanwhile, i must keep up my courage and--away from petrograd, out among the people. presently the long-awaited moment arrived. on june , , our car was coupled to a slow train called "maxim gorki," and we pulled out of the nikolayevski station, bound for moscow. in moscow there were many formalities to go through with. we thought a few days would suffice, but we remained two weeks. however, our stay was interesting. the city was alive with delegates to the second congress of the third international; from all parts of the world the workers had sent their comrades to the promised land, revolutionary russia, the first republic of the workers. among the delegates there were also anarchists and syndicalists who believed as firmly as i did six months previously that the bolsheviki were the symbol of the revolution. they had responded to the moscow call with enthusiasm. some of them i had met in petrograd and now they were eager to hear of my experiences and learn my opinions. but what was i to tell them, and would they believe me if i did? would i have believed any adverse criticism before i came to russia? besides, i felt that my views regarding the bolsheviki were still too unformed, too vague, a conglomeration of mere impressions. my old values had been shattered and so far i have been unable to replace them. i could therefore not speak on the fundamental questions, but i did inform my friends that the moscow and petrograd prisons were crowded with anarchists and other revolutionists, and i advised them not to content themselves with the official explanations but to investigate for themselves. i warned them that they would be surrounded by guides and interpreters, most of them men of the tcheka, and that they would not be able to learn the facts unless they made a determined, independent effort. there was considerable excitement in moscow at the time. the printers' union had been suppressed and its entire managing board sent to prison. the union had called a public meeting to which members of the british labour mission were invited. there the famous socialist revolutionist tchernov had unexpectedly made his appearance. he severely criticised the bolshevik régime, received an ovation from the huge audience of workers, and then vanished as mysteriously as he had come. the menshevik dan was less successful. he also addressed the meeting, but he failed to make his escape: he landed in the tcheka. the next morning the moscow _pravda_ and the _izvestia_ denounced the action of the printers' union as counter-revolutionary, and raged about tchernov having been permitted to speak. the papers called for exemplary punishment of the printers who dared defy the soviet government. the bakers' union, a very militant organization, had also been suppressed, and its management replaced by communists. several months before, in march, i had attended a convention of the bakers. the delegates impressed me as a courageous group who did not fear to criticise the bolshevik régime and present the demands of the workers. i wondered then that they were permitted to continue the conference, for they were outspoken in their opposition to the communists. "the bakers are 'shkurniki' [skinners]," i was told; "they always instigate strikes, and only counter-revolutionists can wish to strike in the workers' republic." but it seemed to me that the workers could not follow such reasoning. they did strike. they even committed a more heinous crime: they refused to vote for the communist candidate, electing instead a man of their own choice. this action of the bakers was followed by the arrest of several of their more active members. naturally the workers resented the arbitrary methods of the government. later i met some of the bakers and found them much embittered against the communist party and the government. i inquired about the condition of their union, telling them that i had been informed that the russian unions were very powerful and had practical control of the industrial life of the country. the bakers laughed. "the trade unions are the lackeys of the government," they said; "they have no independent function, and the workers have no say in them. the trade unions are doing mere police duty for the government." that sounded quite different from the story told by melnichansky, the chairman of the moscow trade union soviet, whom i had met on my first visit to moscow. on that occasion he had shown me about the trade union headquarters known as the _dom soyusov_, and explained how the organization worked. seven million workers were in the trade unions, he said; all trades and professions belonged to it. the workers themselves managed the industries and owned them. "the building you are in now is also owned by the unions," he remarked with pride; "formerly it was the house of the nobility." the room we were in had been used for festive assemblies and the great nobles sat in crested chairs around the table in the centre. melnichansky showed me the secret underground passage hidden by a little turntable, through which the nobles could escape in case of danger. they never dreamed that the workers would some day gather around the same table and sit in the beautiful hall of marble columns. the educational and cultural work done by the trade unions, the chairman further explained, was of the greatest scope. "we have our workers' colleges and other cultural institutions giving courses and lectures on various subjects. they are all managed by the workers. the unions own their own means of recreation, and we have access to all the theatres." it was apparent from his explanation that the trade unions of russia had reached a point far beyond anything known by labour organizations in europe and america. a similar account i had heard from tsiperovitch, the chairman of the petrograd trade unions, with whom i had made my first trip to moscow. he had also shown me about the petrograd labour temple, a beautiful and spacious building where the petrograd unions had their offices. his recital also made it clear that the workers of russia had at last come into their own. but gradually i began to see the other side of the medal. i found that like most things in russia the trade union picture had a double facet: one paraded before foreign visitors and "investigators," the other known by the masses. the bakers and the printers had recently been shown the other side. it was a lesson of the benefits that accrued to the trade unions in the socialist republic. in march i had attended an election meeting arranged by the workers of one of the large moscow factories. it was the most exciting gathering i had witnessed in russia--the dimly lit hall in the factory club rooms, the faces of the men and women worn with privation and suffering, the intense feeling over the wrong done them, all impressed me very strongly. their chosen representative, an anarchist, had been refused his mandate by the soviet authorities. it was the third time the workers gathered to re-elect their delegate to the moscow soviet, and every time they elected the same man. the communist candidate opposing him was semashko, the commissar of the department of health. i had expected to find an educated and cultured man. but the behaviour and language of the commissar at that election meeting would have put a hod-carrier to shame. he raved against the workers for choosing a non-communist, called anathema upon their heads, and threatened them with the tcheka and the curtailment of their rations. but he had no effect upon the audience except to emphasize their opposition to him, and to arouse antagonism against the party he represented. the final victory, however, was with semashko. the workers' choice was repudiated by the authorities and later even arrested and imprisoned. that was in march. in may, during the visit of the british labour mission, the factory candidate together with other political prisoners declared a hunger strike, which resulted in their liberation. the story told me by the bakers of their election experiences had the quality of our own wild west during its pioneer days. tchekists with loaded guns were in the habit of attending gatherings of the unions and they made it clear what would happen if the workers should fail to elect a communist. but the bakers, a strong and militant organization, would not be intimidated. they declared that no bread would be baked in moscow unless they were permitted to elect their own candidate. that had the desired effect. after the meeting the tchekists tried to arrest the candidate-elect, but the bakers surrounded him and saw him safely home. the next day they sent their ultimatum to the authorities, demanding recognition of their choice and threatening to strike in case of refusal. thus the bakers triumphed and gained an advantage over their less courageous brothers in the other labour organizations of minor importance. in starving russia the work of the bakers was as vital as life itself. chapter xvi maria spiridonova the commissariat of education also included the department of museums. the petrograd museum of the revolution had two chairmen; lunacharsky being one of them, it was necessary to secure his signature to our credentials which had already been signed by zinoviev, the second chairman of the museum. i was commissioned to see lunacharsky. i felt rather guilty before him. i left moscow in march promising to return within a week to join him in his work. now, four months later, i came to ask his coöperation in an entirely different field. i went to the kremlin determined to tell lunacharsky how i felt about the situation in russia. but i was relieved of the necessity by the presence of a number of people in his office; there was no time to take the matter up. i could merely inform lunacharsky of the purpose of the expedition and request his aid in the work. it met with his approval. he signed our credentials and also supplied me with letters of introduction and recommendation to facilitate our efforts in behalf of the museum. while our commission was making the necessary preparations for the trip to the ukraine, i found time to visit various institutions in moscow and to meet some interesting people. among them were certain well-known left social revolutionists whom i had met on my previous visit. i had told them then that i was eager to visit maria spiridonova, of whose condition i had heard many conflicting stories. but at that time no meeting could be arranged: it might have exposed spiridonova to danger, for she was living illegally, as a peasant woman. history indeed repeats itself. under the tsar spiridonova, also disguised as a country girl, had shadowed lukhanovsky, the governor of tamboy, of peasant-flogging fame. having shot him, she was arrested, tortured, and later sentenced to death. the western world became aroused, and it was due to its protests that the sentence of spiridonova was changed to siberian exile for life. she spent eleven years there; the february revolution brought her freedom and back to russia. maria spiridonova immediately threw herself into revolutionary activity. now, in the socialist republic, maria was again living in disguise after having escaped from the prison in the kremlin. arrangements were finally made to enable me to visit spiridonova, and i was cautioned to make sure that i was not followed by tcheka men. we agreed with maria's friends upon a meeting place and from there we zigzagged a number of streets till we at last reached the top floor of a house in the back of a yard. i was led into a small room containing a bed, small desk, bookcase, and several chairs. before the desk, piled high with letters and papers, sat a frail little woman, maria spiridonova. this, then, was one of russia's great martyrs, this woman who had so unflinchingly suffered the tortures inflicted upon her by the tsar's henchmen. i had been told by zorin and jack reed that spiridonova had suffered a breakdown, and was kept in a sanatorium. her malady, they said, was acute neurasthenia and hysteria. when i came face to face with maria, i immediately realized that both men had deceived me. i was no longer surprised at zorin: much of what he had told me i gradually discovered to be utterly false. as to reed, unfamiliar with the language and completely under the sway of the new faith, he took too much for granted. thus, on his return from moscow he came to inform me that the story of the shooting of prisoners _en masse_ on the eve of the abolition of capital punishment was really true; but, he assured me, it was all the fault of a certain official of the tcheka who had already paid with his life for it. i had opportunity to investigate the matter. i found that jack had again been misled. it was not that a certain man was responsible for the wholesale killing on that occasion. the act was conditioned in the whole system and character of the tcheka. i spent two days with maria spiridonova, listening to her recital of events since october, . she spoke at length about the enthusiasm and zeal of the masses and the hopes held out by the bolsheviki; of their ascendancy to power and gradual turn to the right. she explained the brest-litovsk peace which she considered as the first link in the chain that has since fettered the revolution. she dwelt on the _razverstka_, the system of forcible requisition, which was devastating russia and discrediting everything the revolution had been fought for; she referred to the terrorism practised by the bolsheviki against every revolutionary criticism, to the new communist bureaucracy and inefficiency, and the hopelessness of the whole situation. it was a crushing indictment against the bolsheviki, their theories and methods. if spiridonova had really suffered a breakdown, as i had been assured, and was hysterical and mentally unbalanced, she must have had extraordinary control of herself. she was calm, self-contained, and clear on every point. she had the fullest command of her material and information. on several occasions during her narrative, when she detected doubt in my face, she remarked: "i fear you don't quite believe me. well, here is what some of the peasants write me," and she would reach over to a pile of letters on her desk and read to me passages heart-rending with misery and bitter against the bolsheviki. in stilted handwriting, sometimes almost illegible, the peasants of the ukraine and siberia wrote of the horrors of the _razverstka_ and what it had done to them and their land. "they have taken away everything, even the last seeds for the next sowing." "the commissars have robbed us of everything." thus ran the letters. frequently peasants wanted to know whether spiridonova had gone over to the bolsheviki. "if you also forsake us, _matushka_, we have no one to turn to," one peasant wrote. the enormity of her accusations challenged credence. after all, the bolsheviki were revolutionists. how could they be guilty of the terrible things charged against them? perhaps they were not responsible for the situation as it had developed; they had the whole world against them. there was the brest peace, for instance. when the news of it first reached america i happened to be in prison. i reflected long and carefully whether soviet russia was justified in negotiating with german imperialism. but i could see no way out of the situation. i was in favour of the brest peace. since i came to russia i heard conflicting versions of it. nearly everyone, excepting the communists, considered the brest agreement as much a betrayal of the revolution as the rôle of the german socialists in the war--a betrayal of the spirit of internationalism. the communists, on the other hand, were unanimous in defending the peace and denouncing as counter-revolutionist everybody who questioned the wisdom and the revolutionary justification of that agreement. "we could do nothing else," argued the communists. "germany had a mighty army, while we had none. had we refused to sign the brest treaty we should have sealed the fate of the revolution. we realized that brest meant a compromise, but we knew that the workers of russia and the rest of the world would understand that we had been forced to it. our compromise was similar to that of workers when they are forced to accept the conditions of their masters after an unsuccessful strike." but spiridonova was not convinced. "there is not one word of truth in the argument advanced by the bolsheviki," she said. it is true that russia had no disciplined army to meet the german advance, but it had something infinitely more effective: it had a conscious revolutionary people who would have fought back the invaders to the last drop of blood. as a matter of fact, it was the people who had checked all the counter-revolutionary military attempts against russia. who else but the people, the peasants and the workers, made it impossible for the german and austrian army to remain in the ukraine? who defeated denikin and the other counter-revolutionary generals? who triumphed over koltchak and yudenitch? lenin and trotsky claim that it was the red army. but the historic truth was that the voluntary military units of the workers and peasants--the _povstantsi_--in siberia as well as in the south of russia--had borne the brunt of the fighting on every front, the red army usually only completing the victories of the former. trotsky would have it now that the brest treaty had to be accepted, but he himself had at one time refused to sign the treaty and radek, joffe, and other leading communists had also been opposed to it. it is claimed now that they submitted to the shameful terms because they realized the hopelessness of their expectation that the german workers would prevent the junkers from marching against revolutionary russia. but that was not the true reason. it was the whip of the party discipline which lashed trotsky and others into submission. "the trouble with the bolsheviki," continued spiridonova, "is that they have no faith in the masses. they proclaimed themselves a proletarian party, but they refused to trust the workers." it was this lack of faith, maria emphasized, which made the communists bow to german imperialism. and as concerns the revolution itself, it was precisely the brest peace which struck it a fatal blow. aside from the betrayal of finland, white russia, latvia, and the ukraine--which were turned over to the mercy of the german junkers by the brest peace--the peasants saw thousands of their brothers slain, and had to submit to being robbed and plundered. the simple peasant mind could not understand the complete reversal of the former bolshevik slogans of "no indemnity and no annexations." but even the simplest peasant could understand that his toil and his blood were to pay the indemnities imposed by the brest conditions. the peasants grew bitter and antagonistic to the soviet régime. disheartened and discouraged they turned from the revolution. as to the effect of the brest peace upon the german workers, how could they continue in their faith in the russian revolution in view of the fact that the bolsheviki negotiated and accepted the peace terms with the german masters over the heads of the german proletariat? the historic fact remains that the brest peace was the beginning of the end of the russian revolution. no doubt other factors contributed to the debacle, but brest was the most fatal of them. spiridonova asserted that the left socialist revolutionary elements had warned the bolsheviki against that peace and fought it desperately. they refused to accept it even after it had been signed. the presence of mirbach in revolutionary russia they considered an outrage against the revolution, a crying injustice to the heroic russian people who had sacrificed and suffered so much in their struggle against imperialism and capitalism. spiridonova's party decided that mirbach could not be tolerated in russia: mirbach had to go. wholesale arrests and persecutions followed upon the execution of mirbach, the bolsheviki rendering service to the german kaiser. they filled the prisons with the russian revolutionists. in the course of our conversation i suggested that the method of _razverstka_ was probably forced upon the bolsheviki by the refusal of the peasants to feed the city. in the beginning of the revolutionary period, spiridonova explained, so long as the peasant soviets existed, the peasants gave willingly and generously. but when the bolshevik government began to dissolve these soviets and arrested peasant delegates, the peasantry became antagonistic. moreover, they daily witnessed the inefficiency of the communist régime: they saw their products lying at side stations and rotting away, or in possession of speculators on the market. naturally under such conditions they would not continue to give. the fact that the peasants had never refused to contribute supplies to the red army proved that other methods than those used by the bolsheviki could have been employed. the _razverstka_ served only to widen the breach between the village and the city. the bolsheviki resorted to punitive expeditions which became the terror of the country. they left death and ruin wherever they came. the peasants, at last driven to desperation, began to rebel against the communist régime. in various parts of russia, in the south, on the ural, and in siberia, peasants' insurrections have taken place, and everywhere they were being put down by force of arms and with an iron hand. spiridonova did not speak of her own sufferings since she had parted ways with the bolsheviki. but i learned from others that she had been arrested twice and imprisoned for a considerable length of time. even when free she was kept under surveillance, as she had been in the time of the tsar. on several occasions she was tortured by being taken out at night and informed that she was to be shot--a favoured tcheka method. i mentioned the subject to spiridonova. she did not deny the facts, though she was loath to speak of herself. she was entirely absorbed in the fate of the revolution and of her beloved peasantry. she gave no thought to herself, but she was eager to have the world and the international proletariat learn the true condition of affairs in bolshevik russia. of all the opponents of the bolsheviki i had met maria spiridonova impressed me as one of the most sincere, well-poised, and convincing. her heroic past and her refusal to compromise her revolutionary ideas under tsarism as well as under bolshevism were sufficient guarantee of her revolutionary integrity. chapter xvii another visit to peter kropotkin a few days before our expedition started for the ukraine the opportunity presented itself to pay another visit to peter kropotkin. i was delighted at the chance to see the dear old man under more favourable conditions than i had seen him in march. i expected at least that we would not be handicapped by the presence of newspaper men as we were on the previous occasion. on my first visit, in snow-clad march, i arrived at the kropotkin cottage late in the evening. the place looked deserted and desolate. but now it was summer time. the country was fresh and fragrant; the garden at the back of the house, clad in green, smiled cheerfully, the golden rays of the sun spreading warmth and light. peter, who was having his afternoon nap, could not be seen, but sofya grigorievna, his wife, was there to greet us. we had brought some provisions given to sasha kropotkin for her father, and several baskets of things sent by an anarchist group. while we were unpacking those treasures peter alekseyevitch surprised us. he seemed a changed man: the summer had wrought a miracle in him. he appeared healthier, stronger, more alive than when i had last seen him. he immediately took us to the vegetable garden which was almost entirely sofya's own work and served as the main support of the family. peter was very proud of it. "what do you say to this!" he exclaimed; "all sofya's labour. and see this new species of lettuce"--pointing at a huge head. he looked young; he was almost gay, his conversation sparkling. his power of observation, his keen sense of humour and generous humanity were so refreshing, he made one forget the misery of russia, one's own conflicts and doubts, and the cruel reality of life. after dinner we gathered in peter's study--a small room containing an ordinary table for a desk, a narrow cot, a wash-stand, and shelves of books. i could not help making a mental comparison between this simple, cramped study of kropotkin and the gorgeous quarters of radek and zinoviev. peter was interested to know my impressions since he saw me last. i related to him how confused and harassed i was, how everything seemed to crumble beneath my feet. i told him that i had come to doubt almost everything, even the revolution itself. i could not reconcile the ghastly reality with what the revolution had meant to me when i came to russia. were the conditions i found inevitable--the callous indifference to human life, the terrorism, the waste and agony of it all? of course, i knew revolutions could not be made with kid gloves. it is a stern necessity involving violence and destruction, a difficult and terrible process. but what i had found in russia was utterly unlike revolutionary conditions, so fundamentally unlike as to be a caricature. peter listened attentively; then he said: "there is no reason whatever to lose faith. i consider the russian revolution even greater than the french, for it has struck deeper into the soul of russia, into the hearts and minds of the russian people. time alone can demonstrate its full scope and depth. what you see to-day is only the surface, conditions artificially created by a governing class. you see a small political party which by its false theories, blunders, and inefficiency has demonstrated how revolutions must _not_ be made." it was unfortunate--kropotkin continued--that so many of the anarchists in russia and the masses outside of russia had been carried away by the ultra-revolutionary pretenses of the bolsheviki. in the great upheaval it was forgotten that the communists are a political party firmly adhering to the idea of a centralized state, and that as such they were bound to misdirect the course of the revolution. the bolsheviki were the jesuits of the socialist church: they believed in the jesuitic motto that the end justifies the means. their end being political power, they hesitate at nothing. the means, however, have paralysed the energies of the masses and have terrorized the people. yet without the people, without the direct participation of the masses in the reconstruction of the country, nothing essential could be accomplished. the bolsheviki had been carried to the top by the high tide of the revolution. once in power they began to stem the tide. they have been trying to eliminate and suppress the cultural forces of the country not entirely in agreement with their ideas and methods. they destroyed the coöperatives which were of utmost importance to the life of russia, the great link between the country and the city. they created a bureaucracy and officialdom which surpasses even that of the old régime. in the village where he lived, in little dmitrov, there were more bolshevik officials than ever existed there during the reign of the romanovs. all those people were living off the masses. they were parasites on the social body, and dmitrov was only a small example of what was going on throughout russia. it was not the fault of any particular individuals: rather was it the state they had created, which discredits every revolutionary ideal, stifles all initiative, and sets a premium on incompetence and waste. it should also not be forgotten, kropotkin emphasized, that the blockade and the continuous attacks on the revolution by the interventionists had helped to strengthen the power of the communist régime. intervention and blockade were bleeding russia to death, and were preventing the people from understanding the real nature of the bolshevik régime. discussing the activities and rôle of the anarchists in the revolution, kropotkin said: "we anarchists have talked much of revolutions, but few of us have been prepared for the actual work to be done during the process. i have indicated some things in this relation in my 'conquest of bread.' pouget and pataud have also sketched a line of action in their work on 'how to accomplish the social revolution.'" kropotkin thought that the anarchists had not given sufficient consideration to the fundamental elements of the social revolution. the real facts in a revolutionary process do not consist so much in the actual fighting--that is, merely the destructive phase necessary to clear the way for constructive effort. the basic factor in a revolution is the organization of the economic life of the country. the russian revolution had proved conclusively that we must prepare thoroughly for that. everything else is of minor importance. he had come to think that syndicalism was likely to furnish what russia most lacked: the channel through which the industrial and economic reconstruction of the country may flow. he referred to anarcho-syndicalism. that and the coöperatives would save other countries some of the blunders and suffering russia was going through. i left dmitrov much comforted by the warmth and light which the beautiful personality of peter kropotkin radiated; and i was much encouraged by what i had heard from him. i returned to moscow to help with the completion of the preparations for our journey. at last, on july , , our car was coupled to a train bound for the ukraine. chapter xviii en route our train was about to leave moscow when we were surprised by an interesting visitor--krasnoschekov, the president of the far eastern republic, who had recently arrived in the capital from siberia. he had heard of our presence in the city, but for some reason he could not locate us. finally he met alexander berkman who invited him to the museum car. in appearance krasnoschekov had changed tremendously since his chicago days, when, known as tobinson, he was superintendent of the workers' institute in that city. then he was one of the many russian emigrants on the west side, active as organizer and lecturer in the socialist movement. now he looked a different man; his expression stern, the stamp of authority on him, he seemed even to have grown taller. but at heart he remained the same--simple and kind, the tobinson we had known in chicago. we had only a short time at our disposal and our visitor employed it to give us an insight into the conditions in the far east and the local form of government. it consisted of representatives of various political factions and "even anarchists are with us," said krasnoschekov; "thus, for instance, shatov is minister of railways. we are independent in the east and there is free speech. come over and try us, you will find a field for your work." he invited alexander berkman and myself to visit him in chita and we assured him that we hoped to avail ourselves of the invitation at some future time. he seemed to have brought a different atmosphere and we were sorry to part so soon. on the way from petrograd to moscow the expedition had been busy putting its house in order. as already mentioned, the car consisted of six compartments, two of which were converted into a dining room and kitchen. they were of diminutive size, but we managed to make a presentable dining room of one, and the kitchen might have made many a housekeeper envy us. a large russian samovar and all necessary copper and zinc pots and kettles were there, making a very effective appearance. we were especially proud of the decorative curtains on our car windows. the other compartments were used for office and sleeping quarters. i shared mine with our secretary, miss a. t. shakol. besides alexander berkman, appointed by the museum as chairman and general manager, shakol as secretary, and myself as treasurer and housekeeper, the expedition consisted of three other members, including a young communist, a student of the petrograd university. en route we mapped out our plan of work, each member of the expedition being assigned some particular branch of it. i was to gather data in the departments of education and health, the bureaus of social welfare and labour distribution, as well as in the organization known as workers' and peasants' inspection. after the day's work all the members were to meet in the car to consider and classify the material collected during the day. our first stop was kursk. nothing of importance was collected there except a pair of _kandai_ [iron handcuffs] which had been worn by a revolutionist in schlüsselburg. it was donated to us by a chance passer-by who, noticing the inscription on our car, "extraordinary commission of the museum of the revolution," became interested and called to pay us a visit. he proved to be an intellectual, a tolstoian, the manager of a children's colony. he succeeded in maintaining the latter by giving the soviet government a certain amount of labour required of him: three days a week he taught in the soviet schools of kursk. the rest of his time he devoted to his little colony, or the "children's commune," as he affectionately called it. with the help of the children and some adults they raised the vegetables necessary for the support of the colony and made all the repairs of the place. he stated that he had not been directly interfered with by the government, but that his work was considerably handicapped by discrimination against him as a pacifist and tolstoian. he feared that because of it his place could not be continued much longer. there was no trading of any sort in kursk at the time, and one had to depend for supplies on the local authorities. but discrimination and antagonism manifested themselves against independent initiative and effort. the tolstoian, however, was determined to make a fight, spiritually speaking, for the life of his colony. he was planning to go to the centre, to moscow, where he hoped to get support in favour of his commune. the personality of the man, his eagerness to make himself useful, did not correspond with the information i had received from communists about the _intelligentsia_, their indifference and unwillingness to help revolutionary russia. i broached the subject to our visitor. he could only speak of the professional men and women of kursk, his native city, but he assured us that he found most of them, and especially the teachers, eager to coöperate and even self-sacrificing. but they were the most neglected class, living in semi-starvation all the time. like himself, they were exposed to general antagonism, even on the part of the children whose minds had been poisoned by agitation against the _intelligentsia_. kursk is a large industrial centre and i was interested in the fate of the workers there. we learned from our visitor that there had been repeated skirmishes between the workers and the soviet authorities. a short time before our arrival a strike had broken out and soldiers were sent to quell it. the usual arrests followed and many workers were still in the tcheka. this state of affairs, the tolstoian thought, was due to general communist incompetence rather than to any other cause. people were placed in responsible positions not because of their fitness but owing to their party membership. political usefulness was the first consideration and it naturally resulted in general abuse of power and confusion. the communist dogma that the end justifies all means was also doing much harm. it had thrown the door wide open to the worst human passions, and discredited the ideals of the revolution. the tolstoian spoke sadly, as one speaks of a hope cherished and loved, and lost. the next morning our visitor donated to our collection the _kandali_ he had worn for many years in prison. he hoped that we might return by way of kursk so that we could pay a visit to some tolstoian communes in the environs of the city. not far from yasnaya polyana there lived an old peasant friend of tolstoi, he told us. he had much valuable material that he might contribute to the museum. our visitor remained to the moment of our departure; he was starved for intellectual companionship and was loath to see us go. chapter xix in kharkov arriving in kharkov, i visited the anarchist book store, the address of which i had secured in moscow. there i met many friends whom i had known in america. among them were joseph and leah goodman, formerly from detroit; fanny baron, from chicago, and sam fleshin who had worked in the mother earth office in new york, in , before he left for russia. with thousands of other exiles they had all hastened to their native country at the first news of the revolution, and they had been in the thick of it ever since. they would have much to tell me, i thought; they might help me to solve some of the problems that were perplexing me. kharkov lay several miles away from the railroad station, and it would have therefore been impractical to continue living in the car during our stay in the city. the museum credentials would secure quarters for us, but several members of the expedition preferred to stay with their american friends. through the help of one of our comrades, who was commandant of an apartment house, i secured a room. it had been quite warm in moscow, but kharkov proved a veritable furnace, reminding me of new york in july. sanitary and plumbing arrangements had been neglected or destroyed, and water had to be carried from a place several blocks distant up three flights of stairs. still it was a comfort to have a private room. the city was alive. the streets were full of people and they looked better fed and dressed than the population of petrograd and moscow. the women were handsomer than in northern russia; the men of a finer type. it was rather odd to see beautiful women, wearing evening gowns in the daytime, walk about barefoot or clad in wooden sandals without stockings. the coloured kerchiefs most of them had on lent life and colour to the streets, giving them a cheerful appearance which contrasted favourably with the gray tones of petrograd. my first official visit was paid to the department of education. i found a long line of people waiting admission, but the museum credentials immediately opened the doors, the chairman receiving me most cordially. he listened attentively to my explanation of the purposes of the expedition and promised to give me an opportunity to collect all the available material in his department, including the newly prepared charts of its work. on the chairman's desk i noticed a copy of such a chart, looking like a futurist picture, all lined and dotted with red, blue, and purple. noticing my puzzled expression the chairman explained that the red indicated the various phases of the educational system, the other colours representing literature, drama, music, and the plastic arts. each department was subdivided into bureaus embracing every branch of the educational and cultural work of the socialist republic. concerning the system of education the chairman stated that from three to eight years of age the child attended the kindergarten or children's home. war orphans from the south, children of red army soldiers and of proletarians in general received preference. if vacancies remained, children of the bourgeoisie were also accepted. from eight to thirteen the children attended the intermediary schools where they received elementary education which inculcates the general idea of the political and economic structure of r.s.f.s.r. modern methods of instruction by means of technical apparatus, so far as the latter could be secured, had been introduced. the children were taught processes of production as well as natural sciences. the period from twelve to seventeen embraced vocational training. there were also higher institutions of learning for young people who showed special ability and inclination. besides this, summer schools and colonies had been established where instruction was given in the open. all children belonging to the soviet republic were fed, clothed, and housed at the expense of the government. the scheme of education also embraced workers' colleges and evening courses for adults of both sexes. here also everything was supplied to the pupils free, even special rations. for further particulars the chairman referred me to the literature of his department and advised me to study the plan in operation. the educational work was much handicapped by the blockade and counter-revolutionary attempts; else russia would demonstrate to the world what the socialist republic could do in the way of popular enlightenment. they lacked even the most elemental necessaries, such as paper, pencils, and books. in the winter most of the schools had to be closed for lack of fuel. the cruelty and infamy of the blockade was nowhere more apparent and crying than in its effect upon the sick and the children. "it is the blackest crime of the century," the chairman concluded. it was agreed that i return within a week to receive the material for our collection. in the social welfare department i also found a very competent man in charge. he became much interested in the work of the expedition and promised to collect the necessary material for us, though he could not offer very much because his department had but recently been organized. its work was to look after the disabled and sick proletarians and those of old age exempt from labour. they were given certain rations in food and clothing; in case they were employed they received also a certain amount of money, about half of their earnings. besides that the department was supporting living quarters and dining rooms for its charges. in the corridor leading to the various offices of the department there were lines of emaciated and crippled figures, men and women, waiting for their turn to receive aid. they looked like war veterans awaiting their pittance in the form of rations; they reminded me of the decrepit unemployed standing in line in the salvation army quarters in america. one woman in particular attracted my attention. she was angry and excited and she complained loudly. her husband had been dead two days and she was trying to obtain a permit for a coffin. she had been in line ever since but could procure no order. "what am i to do?" she wailed; "i cannot carry him on my own back or bury him without a coffin, and i cannot keep him in my room much longer in this heat." the woman's lament remained unanswered for everyone was absorbed in his own troubles. sick and disabled workers are thrown everywhere on the scrap pile--i thought--but in russia an effort is being made to prevent such cruelty. yet judging from what i saw in kharkov i felt that not much was being accomplished. it was a most depressing picture, that long waiting line. i felt as if it was adding insult to injury. i visited a house where the social derelicts lived. it was fairly well kept, but breathing the spirit of cold institutionalism. it was, of course, better than sleeping in the streets or lying all night in the doorways, as the sick and poor are often compelled to do in capitalist countries, in america, for instance. still it seemed incongruous that something more cheerful and inviting could not be devised in soviet russia for those who had sacrificed their health and had given their labour to the common good. but apparently it was the best that the social welfare department could do in the present condition of russia. in the evening our american friends visited us. each of them had a rich experience of struggle, suffering, and persecution and i was surprised to learn that most of them had also been imprisoned by the bolsheviki. they had endured much for the sake of their ideas and had been hounded by every government of ukraina, there having been fourteen political changes in some parts of the south during the last two years. the communists were no different: they also persecuted the anarchists as well as other revolutionists of the left. still the anarchists continued their work. their faith in the revolution, in spite of all they endured, and even in the face of the worst reaction, was truly sublime. they agreed that the possibilities of the masses during the first months after the october revolution were very great, but expressed the opinion that revolutionary development had been checked, and gradually entirely paralysed, by the deadening effect of the communist state. in the ukraina, they explained, the situation differed from that of russia, because the peasants lived in comparatively better material conditions. they had also retained greater independence and more of a rebellious spirit. for these reasons the bolsheviki had failed to subdue the south. our visitors spoke of makhno as a heroic popular figure, and related his daring exploits and the legends the peasants had woven about his personality. there was considerable difference of opinion, however, among the anarchists concerning the significance of the makhno movement. some regarded it as expressive of anarchism and believed that the anarchists should devote all their energies to it. others held that the _povstantsi_ represented the native rebellious spirit of the southern peasants, but that their movement was not anarchism, though anarchistically tinged. they were not in favour of limiting themselves to that movement; they believed their work should be of a more embracing and universal character. several of our friends took an entirely different position, denying to the makhno movement any anarchistic meaning whatever. most enthusiastic about makhno and emphatic about the anarchist value of that movement was joseph, known as the "emigrant"--the very last man one would have expected to wax warm over a military organization. joseph was as mild and gentle as a girl. in america he had participated in the anarchist and labour movements in a quiet and unassuming manner, and very few knew the true worth of the man. since his return to russia he had been in the thick of the struggle. he had spent much time with makhno and had learned to love and admire him for his revolutionary devotion and courage. joseph related an interesting experience of his first visit to the peasant leader. when he arrived the _povstantsi_ for some reason conceived the notion that he had come to harm their chief. one of makhno's closest friends claimed that joseph, being a jew, must also be an emissary of the bolsheviki sent to kill makhno. when he saw how attached makhno became to joseph, he decided to kill "the jew." fortunately he first warned his leader, whereupon makhno called his men together and addressed them somewhat in this manner: "joseph is a jew and an idealist; he is an anarchist. i consider him my comrade and friend and i shall hold everyone responsible for his safety." idolized by his army, makhno's word was enough: joseph became the trusted friend of the _povstantsi_. they believed in him because their _batka_ [father] had faith in him, and joseph in return became deeply devoted to them. now he insisted that he must return to the rebel camp: they were heroic people, simple, brave, and devoted to the cause of liberty. he was planning to join makhno again. yet i could not free myself of the feeling that if joseph went back i should never see him alive any more. he seemed to me like one of those characters in zola's "germinal" who loves every living thing and yet is able to resort to dynamite for the sake of the striking miners. i expressed the view to my friends that, important as the makhno movement might be, it was of a purely military nature and could not, therefore, be expressive of the anarchist spirit. i was sorry to see joseph return to the makhno camp, for his work for the anarchist movement in russia could be of much greater value. but he was determined, and i felt that it was joseph's despair at the reactionary tendencies of the bolsheviki which drove him, as it did so many others of his comrades, away from the communists and into the ranks of makhno. during our stay in kharkov i also visited the department of labour distribution, which had come into existence since the militarization of labour. according to the bolsheviki it became necessary then to return the workers from the villages to which they had streamed from the starving cities. they had to be registered and classified according to trades and distributed to points where their services were most needed. in the carrying out of this plan many people were daily rounded up on the streets and in the market place. together with the large numbers arrested as speculators or for possession of tsarist money, they were put on the list of the labour distribution department. some were sent to the donetz basin, while the weaker ones went on to concentration camps. the communists justified this system and method as necessary during a revolutionary period in order to build up the industries. everybody must work in russia, they said, or be forced to work. they claimed that the industrial output had increased since the introduction of the compulsory labour law. i had occasion to discuss these matters with many communists and i doubted the efficacy of the new policy. one evening a woman called at my room and introduced herself as the former owner of the apartment. since all the houses had been nationalized she was allowed to keep three rooms, the rest of her apartment having been put in charge of the house bureau. her family consisted of eight members, including her parents and a married daughter with her family. it was almost impossible to crowd all into three rooms, especially considering the terrific heat of the kharkov summer; yet somehow they had managed. but two weeks prior to our arrival in kharkov zinoviev visited the city. at a public meeting he declared that the bourgeoisie of the city looked too well fed and dressed. "it proves," he said, "that the comrades and especially the tcheka are neglecting their duty." no sooner had zinoviev departed than wholesale arrests and night raids began. confiscation became the order of the day. her apartment, the woman related, had also been visited and most of her effects taken away. but worst of all was that the tcheka ordered her to vacate one of the rooms, and now the whole family was crowded into two small rooms. she was much worried lest a member of the tcheka or a red army man be assigned to the vacant room. "we felt much relieved," she said, "when we were informed that someone from america was to occupy this room. we wish you would remain here for a long time." till then i had not come in personal contact with the members of the expropriated bourgeoisie who had actually been made to suffer by the revolution. the few middle-class families i had met lived well, which was a source of surprise to me. thus in petrograd a certain chemist i had become acquainted with in shatov's house lived in a very expensive way. the soviet authorities permitted him to operate his factory, and he supplied the government with chemicals at a cost much less than the government could manufacture them at. he paid his workers comparatively high wages and provided them with rations. on a certain occasion i was invited to dinner by the chemist's family. i found them living in a luxurious apartment containing many valuable objects and art treasures. my hostess, the chemist's wife, was expensively gowned and wore a costly necklace. dinner consisted of several courses and was served in an extravagant manner with exquisite damask linen in abundance. it must have cost several hundred thousand rubles, which in was a small fortune in russia. the astonishing thing to me was that almost everybody in petrograd knew the chemist and was familiar with his mode of life. but i was informed that he was needed by the soviet government and that he was therefore permitted to live as he pleased. once i expressed my surprise to him that the bolsheviki had not confiscated his wealth. he assured me that he was not the only one of the bourgeoisie who had retained his former condition. "the bourgeoisie is by no means dead," he said; "it has only been chloroformed for a while, so to speak, for the painful operation. but it is already recovering from the effect of the anesthetic and soon it will have recuperated entirely. it only needs a little more time." the woman who visited me in the kharkov room had not managed so well as the petrograd chemist. she was a part of the wreckage left by the revolutionary storm that had swept over russia. during my stay in the ukrainian capital i met some interesting people of the professional classes, among them an engineer who had just returned from the donetz basin and a woman employed in a soviet bureau. both were cultured persons and keenly alive to the fate of russia. we discussed the zinoviev visit. they corroborated the story told me before. zinoviev had upbraided his comrades for their laxity toward the bourgeoisie and criticized them for not suppressing trade. immediately upon zinoviev's departure the tcheka began indiscriminate raids, the members of the bourgeoisie losing on that occasion almost the last things they possessed. the most tragic part of it, according to the engineer, was that the workers did not benefit by such raids. no one knew what became of the things confiscated--they just disappeared. both the engineer and the woman soviet employee spoke with much concern about the general disintegration of ideas. the russians once believed, the woman said, that hovels and palaces were equally wrong and should be abolished. it never occurred to them that the purpose of a revolution is merely to cause a transfer of possessions--to put the rich into the hovels and the poor into the palaces. it was not true that the workers have gotten into the palaces. they were only made to believe that that is the function of a revolution. in reality, the masses remained where they had been before. but now they were not alone there: they were in the company of the classes they meant to destroy. the civil engineer had been sent by the soviet government to the donetz basin to build homes for the workers, and i was glad of the opportunity to learn from him about the conditions there. the communist press was publishing glowing accounts about the intensive coal production of the basin, and official calculations claimed that the country would be provided with sufficient coal for the approaching winter. in reality, the donetz mines were in a most deplorable state, the engineer informed me. the miners were herded like cattle. they received abominable rations, were almost barefoot, and were forced to work standing in water up to their ankles. as a result of such conditions very little coal was being produced. "i was one of a committee ordered to investigate the situation and report our findings," said the engineer. "our report is far from favourable. we know that it is dangerous to relate the facts as we found them: it may land us in the tcheka. but we decided that moscow must face the facts. the system of political commissars, general bolshevik inefficiency, and the paralysing effect of the state machinery have made our constructive work in the basin almost impossible. it was a dismal failure." could such a condition of affairs be avoided in a revolutionary period and in a country so little developed industrially as russia? i questioned. the revolution was being attacked by the bourgeoisie within and without; there was compelling need of defence and no energies remained for constructive work. the engineer scorned my viewpoint. the russian bourgeoisie was weak and could offer practically no resistance, he claimed. it was numerically insignificant and it suffered from a sick conscience. there was neither need nor justification for bolshevik terrorism and it was mainly the latter that paralysed the constructive efforts. middle-class intellectuals had been active for many years in the liberal and revolutionary movements of russia, and thus the members of the bourgeoisie had become closer to the masses. when the great day arrived the bourgeoisie, caught unawares, preferred to give up rather than to put up a fight. it was stunned by the revolution more than any other class in russia. it was quite unprepared and has not gotten its bearings even to this day. it was not true, as the bolsheviki claimed, that the russian bourgeoisie was an active menace to the revolution. i had been advised to see the chief of the department of workers' and peasants' inspection, the position being held by a woman, formerly an officer of the tcheka, reputed to be very severe, even cruel, but efficient. she could supply me with much valuable material, i was told, and give me entrance to the prisons and concentration camps. on my visiting the workers' and peasants' inspection offices i found the lady in charge not at all cordial at first. she ignored my credentials, apparently not impressed by zinoviev's signature. presently a man stepped out from an inner office. he proved to be dibenko, a high red army officer, and he informed me that he had heard of me from alexandra kollontay, whom he referred to as his wife. he promised that i should get all available material and asked me to return later in the day. when i called again i found the lady much more amiable and willing to give me information about the activities of her department. it appeared that the latter had been organized to fight growing sabotage and graft. it was part of the duties of the tcheka, but it was found necessary to create the new department for the inspection and correction of abuses. "it is the tribunal to which cases may be appealed," said the woman; "just now, for instance, we are investigating complaints of prisoners who had been wrongly convicted or received excessive sentences." she promised to secure for us permission to inspect the penal institutions and several days later several members of the expedition were given the opportunity. first we visited the main concentration camp of kharkov. we found a number of prisoners working in the yard, digging a new sewer. it was certainly needed, for the whole place was filled with nauseating smells. the prison building was divided into a number of rooms, all of them overcrowded. one of the compartments was called the "speculators' apartment," though almost all its inmates protested against being thus classed. they looked poor and starved, everyone of them anxious to tell us his tale of woe, apparently under the impression that we were official investigators. in one of the corridors we found several communists charged with sabotage. evidently the soviet government did not discriminate in favour of its own people. there were in the camp white officers taken prisoners at the polish front, and scores of peasant men and women held on various charges. they presented a pitiful sight, sitting there on the floor for lack of benches, a pathetic lot, bewildered and unable to grasp the combination of events which had caught them in the net. more than one thousand able-bodied men were locked up in the concentration camp, of no service to the community and requiring numerous officials to guard and attend them. and yet russia was badly in need of labour energy. it seemed to me an impractical waste. later we visited the prison. at the gates an angry mob was gesticulating and shouting. i learned that the weekly parcels brought by relatives of the inmates had that morning been refused acceptance by the prison authorities. some of the people had come for miles and had spent their last ruble for food for their arrested husbands and brothers. they were frantic. our escort, the woman in charge of the bureau, promised to investigate the matter. we made the rounds of the big prison--a depressing sight of human misery and despair. in the solitary were those condemned to death. for days their look haunted me--their eyes full of terror at the torturing uncertainty, fearing to be called at any moment to face death. we had been asked by our kharkov friends to find a certain young woman in the prison. trying to avoid arousing attention we sought her with our eyes in various parts of the institution, till we saw someone answering her description. she was an anarchist, held as a political. the prison conditions were bad, she told us. it had required a protracted hunger strike to compel the authorities to treat the politicals more decently and to keep the doors of those condemned to death open during the day, so that they could receive a little cheer and comfort from the other prisoners. she told of many unjustly arrested and pointed out an old stupid-looking peasant woman locked up in solitary as a makhno spy, a charge obviously due to a misunderstanding. the prison régime was very rigid. among other things, it was forbidden the prisoners to climb up on the windows or to look out into the yard. the story was related to us of a prisoner being shot for once disobeying that rule. he had heard some noise in the street below and, curious to know what was going on, he climbed up on the window sill of his cell. the sentry in the yard gave no warning. he fired, severely wounding the man. many similar stories of severity and abuse we heard from the prisoners. on our way to town i expressed surprise at the conditions that were being tolerated in the prisons. i remarked to our guide that it would cause a serious scandal if the western world were to learn under what conditions prisoners live and how they are treated in socialist russia. nothing could justify such brutality, i thought. but the chairman of the workers' and peasants' inspection remained unmoved. "we are living in a revolutionary period," she replied; "these matters cannot be helped." but she promised to investigate some cases of extreme injustice which we had pointed out to her. i was not convinced that the revolution was responsible for the existing evils. if the revolution really had to support so much brutality and crime, what was the purpose of the revolution, after all? at the end of our first week in kharkov i returned to the department of education where i had been promised material. to my surprise i found that nothing had been prepared. i was informed that the chairman was absent, and again assured that the promised data would be collected and ready before our departure. i was then referred to the man in charge of a certain school experimental department. the chairman had told me that some interesting educational methods were being developed, but i found the manager unintelligent and dull. he could tell me nothing of the new methods, but he was willing to send for one of the instructors to explain things to me. a messenger was dispatched, but he soon returned with the information that the teacher was busy demonstrating to his class and could not come. the manager flew into a rage. "he must come," he shouted; "the bourgeoisie are sabotaging like the other damnable _intelligentsia_. they ought all to be shot. we can do very well without them." he was one of the type of narrow-minded fanatical and persecuting communists who did more harm to the revolution than any counter-revolutionary. during our stay in kharkov we also had time to visit some factories. in a plough manufacturing plant we found a large loft stacked with the finished product. i was surprised that the ploughs were kept in the factory instead of being put to practical use on the farms. "we are awaiting orders from moscow," the manager explained; "it was a rush order and we were threatened with arrest for sabotage in case it should not be ready for shipment within six weeks. that was six months ago, and as you see the ploughs are still here. the peasants need them badly, and we need their bread. but we cannot exchange. we must await orders from moscow." i recalled a remark of zinoviev when on our first meeting he stated that petrograd lacked fuel, notwithstanding the fact that less than a hundred versts from the city there was enough to supply almost half the country. i suggested on that occasion that the workers of petrograd be called upon to get the fuel to the city. zinoviev thought it very naïve. "should we grant such a thing in petrograd," he said, "the same demand would be made in other cities. it would create communal competition which is a bourgeois institution. it would interfere with our plan of nationalized and centralized control." that was the dominating principle, and as a result of it the kharkov workers lacked bread until moscow should give orders to have the ploughs sent to the peasants. the supremacy of the state was the cornerstone of marxism. several days before leaving kharkov i once more visited the board of education and again i failed to find its chairman. to my consternation i was informed that i would receive no material because it had been decided that ukraina was to have its own museum and the chairman had gone to kiev to organize it. i felt indignant at the miserable deception practised upon us by a man in high communist position. surely ukraina had the right to have its own museum, but why this petty fraud which caused the expedition to lose so much valuable time. the sequel to this incident came a few days later when we were surprised by the hasty arrival of our secretary who informed us that we must leave kharkov immediately and as quietly as possible, because the local executive committee of the party had decided to prevent our carrying out statistical material from ukraina. accordingly, we made haste to leave in order to save what we had already collected. we knew the material would be lost if it remained in kharkov and that the plan of an independent ukrainian museum would for many years remain only on paper. before departing we made arrangements for a last conference with our local friends. we felt that we might never see them again. on that occasion the work of the "nabat" federation was discussed in detail. that general anarchist organization of the south had been founded as a result of the experiences of the russian anarchists and the conviction that a unified body was necessary to make their work more effective. they wanted not merely to die but to live for the revolution. it appeared that the anarchists of russia had been divided into several factions, most of them numerically small and of little practical influence upon the progress of events in russia. they had been unable to establish a permanent hold in the ranks of the workers. it was therefore decided to gather all the anarchist elements of the ukraina into one federation and thus be in condition to present a solid front in the struggle not only against invasion and counter-revolution, but also against communist persecution. by means of unified effort the "nabat" was able to cover most of the south and get in close touch with the life of the workers and the peasantry. the frequent changes of government in the ukraina finally drove the anarchists to cover, the relentless persecution of the bolsheviki having depleted their ranks of the most active workers. still the federation had taken root among the people. the little band was in constant danger, but it was energetically continuing its educational and propaganda work. the kharkov anarchists had evidently expected much from our presence in russia. they hoped that alexander berkman and myself would join them in their work. we were already seven months in russia but had as yet taken no direct part in the anarchist movement. i could sense the disappointment and impatience of our comrades. they were eager we should at least inform the european and american anarchists of what was going on in russia, particularly about the ruthless persecution of the left revolutionary elements. well could i understand the attitude of my ukrainian friends. they had suffered much during the last years: they had seen the high hopes of the revolution crushed and russia breaking down beneath the heel of the bolshevik state. yet i could not comply with their wishes. i still had faith in the bolsheviki, in their revolutionary sincerity and integrity. moreover, i felt that as long as russia was being attacked from the outside i could not speak in criticism. i would not add fuel to the fires of counter-revolution. i therefore had to keep silent, and stand by the bolsheviki as the organized defenders of the revolution. but my russian friends scorned this view. i was confounding the communist party with the revolution, they said; they were not the same; on the contrary, they were opposed, even antagonistic. the communist state, according to the "nabat" anarchists, had proven fatal to the revolution. within a few hours before our departure we received the confidential information that makhno had sent a call for alexander berkman and myself to visit him. he wished to place his situation before us, and, through us, before the anarchist movement of the world. he desired to have it widely understood that he was not the bandit, jew-baiter, and counter-revolutionist the bolsheviki had proclaimed him. he was devoted to the revolution and was serving the interests of the people as he conceived them. it was a great temptation to meet the modern stenka rasin, but we were pledged to the museum and could not break faith with the other members of the expedition. chapter xx poltava in the general dislocation of life in russia and the breaking down of her economic machinery the railroad system had suffered most. the subject was discussed in almost every meeting and every soviet paper often wrote about it. between petrograd and moscow, however, the real state of affairs was not so noticeable, though the main stations were always overcrowded and the people waited for days trying to secure places. still, trains between petrograd and moscow ran fairly regularly. if one was fortunate enough to procure the necessary permission to travel, and a ticket, one could manage to make the journey without particular danger to life or limb. but the farther south one went the more apparent became the disorganization. broken cars dotted the landscape, disabled engines lay along the route, and frequently the tracks were torn up. everywhere in the ukraina the stations were filled to suffocation, the people making a wild rush whenever a train was sighted. most of them remained for weeks on the platforms before succeeding in getting into a train. the steps and even the roofs of the cars were crowded by men and women loaded with bundles and bags. at every station there was a savage scramble for a bit of space. soldiers drove the passengers off the steps and the roofs, and often they had to resort to arms. yet so desperate were the people and so determined to get to some place where there was hope of securing a little food, that they seemed indifferent to arrest and risked their lives continuously in this mode of travel. as a result of this situation there were numberless accidents, scores of travellers being often swept to their death by low bridges. these sights had become so common that practically no attention was paid to them. travelling southward and on our return we frequently witnessed these scenes. constantly the _meshotchniki_ [people with bags] mobbed the cars in search of food, or when returning laden with their precious burden of flour and potatoes. day and night the terrible scenes kept repeating themselves at every station. it was becoming a torture to travel in our well-equipped car. it contained only six persons, leaving considerable room for more; yet we were forbidden to share it with others. it was not only because of the danger of infection or of insects but because the museum effects and the material collected would have surely vanished had we allowed strangers on board. we sought to salve our conscience by permitting women and children or cripples to travel on the rear platform of our car, though even that was contrary to orders. another feature which caused us considerable annoyance was the inscription on our car, which read: extraordinary commission of the museum of the revolution. our friends at the museum had assured us that the "title" would help us to secure attention at the stations and would also be effective in getting our car attached to such trains as we needed. but already the first few days proved that the inscription roused popular feeling against us. the name "extraordinary commission" signified to the people the tcheka. they paid no attention to the other words, being terrorized by the first. early in the journey we noticed the sinister looks that met us at the stations and the unwillingness of the people to enter into friendly conversation. presently it dawned on us what was wrong; but it required considerable effort to explain the misunderstanding. once put at his ease, the simple russian opened up his heart to us. a kind word, a solicitous inquiry, a cigarette, changed his attitude. especially when assured that we were not communists and that we had come from america, the people along the route would soften and become more talkative, sometimes even confidential. they were unsophisticated and primitive, often crude. but illiterate and undeveloped as they were, these plain folk were clear about their needs. they were unspoiled and possessed of a deep faith in elementary justice and equality. i was often moved almost to tears by these russian peasant men and women clinging to the steps of the moving train, every moment in danger of their lives, yet remaining good-humoured and indifferent to their miserable condition. they would exchange stories of their lives or sometimes break out in the melodious, sad songs of the south. at the stations, while the train waited for an engine, the peasants would gather into groups, form a large circle, and then someone would begin to play the accordion, the bystanders accompanying with song. it was strange to see these hungry and ragged peasants, huge loads on their backs, standing about entirely forgetful of their environment, pouring their hearts out in folk songs. a peculiar people, these russians, saint and devil in one, manifesting the highest as well as the most brutal impulses, capable of almost anything except sustained effort. i have often wondered whether this lack did not to some extent explain the disorganization of the country and the tragic condition of the revolution. we reached poltava in the morning. the city looked cheerful in the bright sunlight, the streets lined with trees, with little garden patches between them. vegetables in great variety were growing on them, and it was refreshing to note that no fences were about and still the vegetables were safe, which would surely not have been the case in petrograd or moscow. apparently there was not so much hunger in this city as in the north. together with the expedition secretary i visited the government headquarters. instead of the usual _ispolkom_ [executive committee of the soviet] poltava was ruled by a revolutionary committee known as the _revkom_. this indicated that the bolsheviki had not yet had time to organize a soviet in the city. we succeeded in getting the chairman of the _revkom_ interested in the purpose of our journey and he promised to coöperate and to issue an order to the various departments that material be collected and prepared for us. our gracious reception augured good returns. in the bureau for the care of mothers and infants i met two very interesting women--one the daughter of the great russian writer, korolenko, the other the former chairman of the save-the-children society. learning of the purpose of my presence in poltava the women offered their aid and invited me to visit their school and the near-by home of korolenko. the school was located in a small house set deep in a beautiful garden, the place hardly visible from the street. the reception room contained a rich collection of dolls of every variety. there were handsome ukrainian lassies, competing in colourful dress and headgear with their beautiful sisters from the caucasus; dashing cossacks from the don looked proudly at their less graceful brothers from the volga. there were dolls of every description, representing local costumes of almost every part of russia. the collection also contained various toys, the handwork of the villages, and beautiful designs of the _kustarny_ manufacture, representing groups of children in russian and siberian peasant attire. the ladies of the house related the story of the save-the-children society. the organization in existence, for a number of years, was of very limited scope until the february revolution. then new elements, mainly of revolutionary type, joined the society. they strove to extend its work and to provide not only for the physical well-being of the children but also to educate them, teach them to love work and develop their appreciation of beauty. toys and dolls, made chiefly of waste material, were exhibited and the proceeds applied to the needs of the children. after the october revolution, when the bolsheviki possessed themselves of poltava, the society was repeatedly raided and some of the instructors arrested on suspicion that the institution was a counter-revolutionary nest. the small band which remained went on, however, with their efforts on behalf of the children. they succeeded in sending a delegation to lunacharsky to appeal for permission to carry on their work. lunacharsky proved sympathetic, issued the requested document, and even provided them with a letter to the local authorities, pointing out the importance of their labours. but the society continued to be subjected to annoyance and discrimination. to avoid being charged with sabotage the women offered their services to the poltava department of education. there they worked from nine in the morning till three in the afternoon, devoting their leisure time to their school. but the antagonism of the communist authorities was not appeased: the society remained in disfavour. the women pointed out that the soviet government pretended to stand for self-determination and yet every independent effort was being discredited and all initiative discouraged, if not entirely suppressed. not even the ukrainian communists were permitted self-determination. the majority of the chiefs of the departments were moscow appointees, and ukraina was practically deprived of opportunity for independent action. a bitter struggle was going on between the communist party of ukraina and the central authorities in moscow. the policy of the latter was to control everything. the women were devoted to the cause of the children and willing to suffer misunderstanding and even persecution for the sake of their interest in the welfare of their charges. both had understanding for and sympathy with the revolution, though they could not approve of the terroristic methods of the bolsheviki. they were intelligent and cultured people and i felt their home an oasis in the desert of communist thought and feeling. before i left the ladies supplied me with a collection of the children's work and some exquisite colour drawings by miss korolenko, begging me to send the things to america as specimens of their labours. they were very eager to have the american people learn about their society and its efforts. subsequently i had the opportunity of meeting korolenko who was still very feeble from his recent illness. he looked the patriarch, venerable and benign; he quickly warmed one's heart by his melodious voice and the fine face that lit up when he spoke of the people. he referred affectionately to america and his friends there. but the light faded out of his eyes and his voice quivered with grief as he spoke of the great tragedy of russia and the suffering of the people. "you want to know my views on the present situation and my attitude toward the bolsheviki?" he asked. "it would take too long to tell you about it. i am writing to lunacharsky a series of letters for which he had asked and which he promised to publish. the letters deal with this subject. frankly speaking, i do not believe they will ever appear in print, but i shall send you a copy of the letters for the museum as soon as they are complete. there will be six of them. i can give you two right now. briefly, my opinion is summarized in a certain passage in one of these letters. i said there that if the gendarmes of the tsar would have had the power not only to arrest but also to shoot us, the situation would have been like the present one. that is what is happening before my eyes every day. the bolsheviki claim that such methods are inseparable from the revolution. but i cannot agree with them that persecution and constant shooting will serve the interests of the people or of the revolution. it was always my conception that revolution meant the highest expression of humanity and of justice. in russia to-day both are absent. at a time when the fullest expression and coöperation of all intellectual and spiritual forces are necessary to reconstruct the country, a gag has been placed upon the whole people. to dare question the wisdom and efficacy of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat or of the communist party leaders is considered a crime. we lack the simplest requisites of the real essence of a social revolution, and yet we pretend to have placed ourselves at the head of a world revolution. poor russia will have to pay dearly for this experiment. it may even delay for a long time fundamental changes in other countries. the bourgeoisie will be able to defend its reactionary methods by pointing to what has happened in russia." with heavy heart i took leave of the famous writer, one of the last of the great literary men who had been the conscience and the spiritual voice of intellectual russia. again i felt him uttering the cry of that part of the russian _intelligentsia_ whose sympathies were entirely with the people and whose life and work were inspired only by the love of their country and the interest for its welfare. in the evening i visited a relative of korolenko, a very sympathetic old lady who was the chairman of the poltava political red cross. she told me much about things that korolenko himself was too modest to mention. old and feeble as he was, he was spending most of his time in the tcheka, trying to save the lives of those innocently condemned to death. he frequently wrote letters of appeal to lenin, gorki, and lunacharsky, begging them to intervene to prevent senseless executions. the present chairman of the poltava tcheka was a man relentless and cruel. his sole solution of difficult problems was shooting. the lady smiled sadly when i told her that the man had been very gracious to the members of our expedition. "that was for show," she said, "we know him better. we have daily occasion to see his graciousness from this balcony. here pass the victims taken to slaughter." poltava is famous as a manufacturing centre of peasant handicrafts. beautiful linen, embroidery, laces, and basket work were among the products of the province's industry. i visited the department of social economy, the _sovnarkhoz_, where i learned that those industries were practically suspended. only a small collection remained in the department. "we used to supply the whole world, even america, with our _kustarny_ work," said the woman in charge, who had formerly been the head of the _zemstvo_, which took special pride in fostering those peasant efforts. "our needlework was known all over the country as among the finest specimens of art, but now it has all been destroyed. the peasants have lost their art impulse, they have become brutalized and corrupted." she was bemoaning the loss of peasant art as a mother does that of her child. during our stay in poltava we got in touch with representatives of various other social elements. the reaction of the zionists toward the bolshevik régime was particularly interesting. at first they refused to speak with us, evidently made very cautious by previous experience. it was also the presence of our secretary, a gentile, that aroused their distrust. i arranged to meet some of the zionists alone, and gradually they became more confidential. i had learned in moscow, in connection with the arrest of the zionists there, that the bolsheviki were inclined to consider them counter-revolutionary. but i found the poltava zionists very simple orthodox jews who certainly could not impress any one as conspirators or active enemies. they were passive, though bitter against the bolshevik régime. it was claimed that the bolsheviki made no pogroms and that they do not persecute the jews, they said; but that was true only in a certain sense. there were two kinds of pogroms: the loud, violent ones, and the silent ones. of the two the zionists considered the former preferable. the violent pogrom might last a day or a week; the jews are attacked and robbed, sometimes even murdered; and then it is over. but the silent pogroms continued all the time. they consisted of constant discrimination, persecution, and hounding. the bolsheviki had closed the jewish hospitals and now sick jews were forced to eat _treife_ in the gentile hospitals. the same applied to the jewish children in the bolshevik feeding houses. if a jew and a gentile happened to be arrested on the same charge, it was certain that the gentile would go free while the jew would be sent to prison and sometimes even shot. they were all the time exposed to insult and indignities, not to mention the fact that they were doomed to slow starvation, since all trade had been suppressed. the jews in the ukraina were suffering a continuous silent pogrom. i felt that the zionist criticism of the bolshevik régime was inspired by a narrow religious and nationalistic attitude. they were orthodox jews, mostly tradesmen whom the revolution had deprived of their sphere of activity. nevertheless, their problem was real--the problem of the jew suffocating in the atmosphere of active anti-semitism. in poltava the leading communist and bolshevik officials were gentiles. their dislike of the jews was frank and open. anti-semitism throughout the ukraine was more virulent than even in pre-revolutionary days. after leaving poltava we continued on our journey south, but we did not get farther than fastov owing to the lack of engines. that town, once prosperous, was now impoverished and reduced to less than one third of its former population. almost all activity was at a standstill. we found the market place, in the centre of the town, a most insignificant affair, consisting of a few stalls having small supplies of white flour, sugar, and butter. there were more women about than men, and i was especially struck by the strange expression in their eyes. they did not look you full in the face; they stared past you with a dumb, hunted animal expression. we told the women that we had heard many terrible pogroms had taken place in fastov and we wished to get data on the subject to be sent to america to enlighten the people there on the condition of the ukrainian jews. as the news of our presence spread many women and children surrounded us, all much excited and each trying to tell her story of the horrors of fastov. fearful pogroms, they related, had taken place in that city, the most terrible of them by denikin, in september, . it lasted eight days, during which , persons were killed, while several thousand died as the result of wounds and shock. seven thousand perished from hunger and exposure on the road to kiev, while trying to escape the denikin savages. the greater part of the city had been destroyed or burned; many of the older jews were trapped in the synagogue and there murdered, while others had been driven to the public square where they were slaughtered. not a woman, young or old, that had not been outraged, most of them in the very sight of their fathers, husbands, and brothers. the young girls, some of them mere children, had suffered repeated violation at the hands of the denikin soldiers. i understood the dreadful look in the eyes of the women of fastov. men and women besieged us with appeals to inform their relatives in america about their miserable condition. almost everyone, it seemed, had some kin in that country. they crowded into our car in the evenings, bringing scores of letters to be forwarded to the states. some of the messages bore no addresses, the simple folk thinking the name sufficient. others had not heard from their american kindred during the years of war and revolution but still hoped that they were to be found somewhere across the ocean. it was touching to see the people's deep faith that their relatives in america would save them. every evening our car was filled with the unfortunates of fastov. among them was a particularly interesting visitor, a former attorney, who had repeatedly braved the pogrom makers and saved many jewish lives. he had kept a diary of the pogroms and we spent a whole evening listening to the reading of his manuscript. it was a simple recital of facts and dates, terrible in its unadorned objectivity. it was the soul cry of a people continuously violated and tortured and living in daily fear of new indignities and outrages. only one bright spot there was in the horrible picture: no pogroms had taken place under the bolsheviki. the gratitude of the fastov jews was pathetic. they clung to the communists as to a saving straw. it was encouraging to think that the bolshevik régime was at least free from that worst of all russian curses, pogroms against jews. chapter xxi kiev owing to the many difficulties and delays the journey from fastov to kiev lasted six days and was a continuous nightmare. the railway situation was appalling. at every station scores of freight cars clogged the lines. nor were they loaded with provisions to feed the starving cities; they were densely packed with human cargo among whom the sick were a large percentage. all along the route the waiting rooms and platforms were filled with crowds, bedraggled and dirty. even more ghastly were the scenes at night. everywhere masses of desperate people, shouting and struggling to gain a foothold on the train. they resembled the damned of dante's inferno, their faces ashen gray in the dim light, all frantically fighting for a place. now and then an agonized cry would ring through the night and the already moving train would come to a halt: somebody had been thrown to his death under the wheels. it was a relief to reach kiev. we had expected to find the city almost in ruins, but we were pleasantly disappointed. when we left petrograd the soviet press contained numerous stories of vandalism committed by poles before evacuating kiev. they had almost demolished the famous ancient cathedral in the city, the papers wrote, destroyed the water works and electric stations, and set fire to several parts of the city. tchicherin and lunacharsky issued passionate appeals to the cultured people of the world in protest against such barbarism. the crime of the poles against art was compared with that committed by the germans in rheims, whose celebrated cathedral had been injured by prussian artillery. we were, therefore, much surprised to find kiev in even better condition than petrograd. in fact, the city had suffered very little, considering the numerous changes of government and the accompanying military operations. it is true that some bridges and railroad tracks had been blown up on the outskirts of the city, but kiev itself was almost unharmed. people looked at us in amazement when we made inquiries about the condition of the cathedral: they had not heard the moscow report. unlike our welcome in kharkov and poltava, kiev proved a disappointment. the secretary of the _ispolkom_ was not very amiable and appeared not at all impressed by zinoviev's signature on our credentials. our secretary succeeded in seeing the chairman of the executive committee, but returned very discouraged: that high official was too impatient to listen to her representations. he was busy, he said, and could not be troubled. it was decided that i try my luck as an american, with the result that the chairman finally agreed to give us access to the available material. it was a sad reflection on the irony of life. america was in league with world imperialism to starve and crush russia. yet it was sufficient to mention that one came from america to find the key to everything russian. it was pathetic, and rather distasteful to make use of that key. in kiev antagonism to communism was intense, even the local bolsheviki being bitter against moscow. it was out of the question for anyone coming from "the centre" to secure their coöperation unless armed with state powers. the government employees in soviet institutions took no interest in anything save their rations. bureaucratic indifference and incompetence in ukraina were even worse than in moscow and were augmented by nationalistic resentment against the "russians." it was true also of kharkov and poltava, though in a lesser degree. here the very atmosphere was charged with distrust and hatred of everything muscovite. the deception practised on us by the chairman of the educational department of kharkov was characteristic of the resentment almost every ukrainian official felt toward moscow. the chairman was a ukrainian to the core, but he could not openly ignore our credentials signed by zinoviev and lunacharsky. he promised to aid our efforts but he disliked the idea of petrograd "absorbing" the historic material of the ukraina. in kiev there was no attempt to mask the opposition to moscow. one was made to feel it everywhere. but the moment the magic word "america" was spoken and the people made to understand that one was not a communist, they became interested and courteous, even confidential. the ukrainian communists were also no exception. the information and documents collected in kiev were of the same character as the data gathered in former cities. the system of education, care of the sick, distribution of labour and so forth were similar to the general bolshevik scheme. "we follow the moscow plan," said a ukrainian teacher, "with the only difference that in our schools the ukrainian language is taught together with russian." the people, and especially the children, looked better fed and clad than those of russia proper: food was comparatively more plentiful and cheaper. there were show schools as in petrograd and moscow, and no one apparently realized the corrupting effect of such discrimination upon the teachers as well as the children. the latter looked with envy upon the pupils of the favoured schools and believed that they were only for communist children, which in reality was not the case. the teachers, on the other hand, knowing how little attention was paid to ordinary schools, were negligent in their work. all tried to get a position in the show schools which were enjoying special and varied rations. the chairman of the board of health was an alert and competent man, one of the few officials in kiev who showed interest in the expedition and its work. he devoted much time to explaining to us the methods of his organization and pointing out interesting places to visit and the material which could be collected for the museum. he especially called our attention to the jewish hospital for crippled children. i found the latter in charge of a cultivated and charming man, dr. n----. for twenty years he had been head of the hospital and he took interest as well as pride in showing us about his institution and relating its history. the hospital had formerly been one of the most famous in russia, the pride of the local jews who had built and maintained it. but within recent years its usefulness had become curtailed owing to the frequent changes of government. it had been exposed to persecution and repeated pogroms. jewish patients critically ill were often forced out of their beds to make room for the favourites of this or that régime. the officers of the denikin army were most brutal. they drove the jewish patients out into the street, subjected them to indignities and abuse, and would have killed them had it not been for the intercession of the hospital staff who at the risk of their own lives protected the sick. it was only the fact that the majority of the staff were gentiles that saved the hospital and its inmates. but the shock resulted in numerous deaths and many patients were left with shattered nerves. the doctor also related to me the story of some of the patients, most of them victims of the fastov pogroms. among them were children between the ages of six and eight, gaunt and sickly looking, terror stamped on their faces. they had lost all their kin, in some cases the whole family having been killed before their eyes. these children often waked at night, the physician said, in fright at their horrible dreams. everything possible was being done for them, but so far the unfortunate children had not been freed from the memory of their terrible experiences at fastov. the doctor pointed out a group of young girls between the ages of fourteen and eighteen, the worst victims of the denikin pogrom. all of them had been repeatedly outraged and were in a mutilated state when they came to the hospital; it would take years to restore them to health. the doctor emphasized the fact that no pogroms had taken place during the bolshevik régime. it was a great relief to him and his staff to know that his patients were no longer in such danger. but the hospital had other difficulties. there was the constant interference by political commissars and the daily struggle for supplies. "i spend most of my time in the various bureaus," he said, "instead of devoting myself to my patients. ignorant officials are given power over the medical profession, continuously harassing the doctors in their work." the doctor himself had been repeatedly arrested for sabotage because of his inability to comply with the numerous decrees and orders, frequently mutually contradictory. it was the result of a system in which political usefulness rather than professional merit played the main rôle. it often happened that a first-class physician of well-known repute and long experience would be suddenly ordered to some distant part to place a communist doctor in his position. under such conditions the best efforts were paralysed. moreover, there was the general suspicion of the _intelligentsia_, which was a demoralizing factor. it was true that many of that class had sabotaged, but there were also those who did heroic and self-sacrificing work. the bolsheviki, by their indiscriminate antagonism toward the _intelligentsia_ as a class, roused prejudices and passions which poisoned the mainsprings of the cultural life of the country. the russian _intelligentsia_ had with its very blood fertilized the soil of the revolution, yet it was not given it to reap the fruits of its long struggle. "a tragic fate," the doctor remarked; "unless one forget it in his work, existence would be impossible." the institution for crippled children proved a very model and modern hospital, located in the heart of a large park. it was devoted to the marred creatures with twisted limbs and deformed bodies, victims of the great war, disease, and famine. the children looked aged and withered; like father time, they had been born old. they lay in rows on clean white beds, baking in the warm sun of the ukrainian summer. the head physician, who guided us through the institution, seemed much beloved by his little charges. they were eager and pleased to see him as he approached each helpless child and bent over affectionately to make some inquiries about its health. the hospital had been in existence for many years and was considered the first of its kind in russia. its equipment for the care of deformed and crippled children was among the most modern. "since the war and the revolution we feel rather behind the times," the doctor said; "we have been cut off from the civilized world for so many years. but in spite of the various government changes we have striven to keep up our standards and to help the unfortunate victims of strife and disease." the supplies for the institution were provided by the government and the hospital force was exposed to no interference, though i understood from the doctor that because of his political neutrality he was looked upon by the bolsheviki as inclined to counter-revolution. the hospital contained a large number of children; some of those who could walk about studied music and art, and we had the opportunity of attending an informal concert arranged by the children and their teachers in our honour. some of them played the _balalaika_ in a most artistic manner, and it was consoling to see those marred children finding forgetfulness in the rhythm of the folk melodies of the ukraina. early during our stay in kiev we learned that the most valuable material for the museum was not to be found in the soviet institutions, but that it was in the possession of other political groups and private persons. the best statistical information on pogroms, for instance, was in the hands of a former minister of the rada régime in the ukraina. i succeeded in locating the man and great was my surprise when, upon learning my identity, he presented me with several copies of the _mother earth_ magazine i had published in america. the ex-minister arranged a small gathering to which were invited some writers and poets and men active in the jewish _kulturliga_ to meet several members of our expedition. the gathering consisted of the best elements of the local jewish _intelligentsia_. we discussed the revolution, the bolshevik methods, and the jewish problem. most of those present, though opposed to the communist theories, were in favour of the soviet government. they felt that the bolsheviki, in spite of their many blunders, were striving to further the interests of russia and the revolution. at any rate, under the communist régime the jews were not exposed to the pogroms practised upon them by all the other régimes of ukraina. those jewish intellectuals argued that the bolsheviki at least permitted the jews to live, and that they were therefore to be preferred to any other governments and should be supported by the jews. they were fearful of the growth of anti-semitism in russia and were horrified at the possibility of the bolsheviki being overthrown. wholesale slaughter of the jews would undoubtedly follow, they believed. some of the younger set held a different view. the bolshevik régime had resulted in increased hatred toward the jews, they said, for the masses were under the impression that most of the communists were jews. communism stood for forcible tax-collection, punitive expeditions, and the tcheka. popular opposition to the communists therefore expressed itself in the hatred of the whole jewish race. thus bolshevik tyranny had added fuel to the latent anti-semitism of the ukraina. moreover, to prove that they were not discriminating in favour of the jews, the bolsheviki had gone to the other extreme and frequently arrested and punished jews for things that the gentiles could do with impunity. the bolsheviki also fostered and endowed cultural work in the south in the ukrainian language, while at the same time they discouraged such efforts in the jewish language. it was true that the _kulturliga_ was still permitted to exist, but its work was hampered at every step. in short, the bolsheviki permitted the jews to live, but only in a physical sense. culturally, they were condemned to death. the _yevkom_ (jewish communist section) was receiving, of course, every advantage and support from the government, but then its mission was to carry the gospel of the proletarian dictatorship to the jews of the ukraina. it was significant that the _yevkom_ was more anti-semitic than the ukrainians themselves. if it had the power it would pogrom every non-communist jewish organization and destroy all jewish educational efforts. this young element emphasized that they did not favour the overthrow of the bolshevik government; but they could not support it, either. i felt that both jewish factions took a purely nationalistic view of the russian situation. i could well understand their personal attitude, the result of their own suffering and the persecution of the jewish race. still, my chief concern was the revolution and its effects upon russia _as a whole_. whether the bolsheviki should be supported or not could not depend merely on their attitude to the jews and the jewish question. the latter was surely a very vital and pressing issue, especially in the ukraina; yet the general problem involved was much greater. it embraced the complete economic and social emancipation of the whole people of russia, the jews included. if the bolshevik methods and practices were not imposed upon them by the force of circumstances, if they were conditioned in their own theories and principles, and if their sole object was to secure their own power, i could not support them. they might be innocent of pogroms against the jews, but if they were pogroming the whole of russia then they had failed in their mission as a revolutionary party. i was not prepared to say that i had reached a clear understanding of all the problems involved, but my experience so far led me to think that it was the basic bolshevik conception of the revolution which was false, its practical application necessarily resulting in the great russian catastrophe of which the jewish tragedy was but a minor part. my host and his friends could not agree with my viewpoint: we represented opposite camps. but the gathering was nevertheless intensely interesting and it was arranged that we meet again before our departure from the city. returning to our car one day i saw a detachment of red army soldiers at the railway station. on inquiry i found that foreign delegates were expected from moscow and that the soldiers had been ordered out to participate in a demonstration in their honour. groups of the uniformed men stood about discussing the arrival of the mission. there were many expressions of dissatisfaction because the soldiers had been kept waiting so long. "these people come to russia just to look us over," one of the red army men said; "do they know anything about us or are they interested in how we live? not they. it's a holiday for them. they are dressed up and fed by the government, but they never talk to us and all they see is how we march past. here we have been lying around in the burning sun for hours while the delegates are probably being feasted at some other station. that's comradeship and equality for you!" i had heard such sentiments voiced before, but it was surprising to hear them from soldiers. i thought of angelica balabanova, who was accompanying the italian mission, and i wondered what she would think if she knew how the men felt. it had probably never occurred to her that those "ignorant russian peasants" in military uniform had looked through the sham of official demonstrations. the following day we received an invitation from balabanova to attend a banquet given in honour of the italian delegates. anxious to meet the foreign guests, several members of our expedition accepted the invitation. the affair took place in the former chamber of commerce building, profusely decorated for the occasion. in the main banquet hall long tables were heavily laden with fresh-cut flowers, several varieties of southern fruit, and wine. the sight reminded one of the feasts of the old bourgeoisie, and i could see that angelica felt rather uncomfortable at the lavish display of silverware and wealth. the banquet opened with the usual toasts, the guests drinking to lenin, trotsky, the red army, and the third international, the whole company rising as the revolutionary anthem was intoned after each toast, with the soldiers and officers standing at attention in good old military style. among the delegates were two young french anarcho-syndicalists. they had heard of our presence in kiev and had been looking for us all day without being able to locate us. after the banquet they were immediately to leave for petrograd, so that we had only a short time at our disposal. on our way to the station the delegates related that they had collected much material on the revolution which they intended to publish in france. they had become convinced that all was not well with the bolshevik régime: they had come to realize that the dictatorship of the proletariat was in the exclusive hands of the communist party, while the common worker was enslaved as much as ever. it was their intention, they said, to speak frankly about these matters to their comrades at home and to substantiate their attitude by the material in their possession. "do you expect to get the documents out?" i asked la petit, one of the delegates. "you don't mean that i might be prevented from taking out my own notes," he replied. "the bolsheviki would not dare to go so far--not with foreign delegates, at any rate." he seemed so confident that i did not care to pursue the subject further. that night the delegates left kiev and a short time afterward they departed from russia. they were never seen alive again. without making any comment upon their disappearance i merely want to mention that when i returned to moscow several months later it was generally related that the two anarcho-syndicalists, with several other men who had accompanied them, were overtaken by a storm somewhere off the coast of finland, and were all drowned. there were rumours of foul play, though i am not inclined to credit the story, especially in view of the fact that together with the anarcho-syndicalists also perished a communist in good standing in moscow. but their disappearance with all the documents they had collected has never been satisfactorily explained. the rooms assigned to the members of our expedition were located in a house within a _passage_ leading off the kreschatik, the main street of kiev. it had formerly been the wealthy residential section of the city and its fine houses, though lately neglected, still looked imposing. the _passage_ also contained a number of shops, ruins of former glory, which catered to the well-to-do of the neighbourhood. those stores still had good supplies of vegetables, fruit, milk, and butter. they were owned mostly by old jews whose energies could not be applied to any other usefulness--orthodox jews to whom the revolution and the bolsheviki were a _bête noire_, because that had "ruined all business." the little shops barely enabled their owners to exist; moreover, they were in constant danger of tcheka raids, on which occasions the provisions would be expropriated. the appearance of those stores did not justify the belief that the government would find it worth while raiding them. "would not the tcheka prefer to confiscate the goods of the big delicatessen and fruit stores on the kreschatik?" i asked an old jew storekeeper. "not at all," he replied; "those stores are immune because they pay heavy taxes." the morning following the banquet i went down to the little grocery store i used to do my shopping in. the place was closed, and i was surprised to find that not one of the small shops near by was open. two days later i learned that the places had all been raided on the eve of the banquet in order to feast the foreign delegates. i promised myself never to attend another bolshevik banquet. among the members of the _kulturliga_ i met a man who had lived in america, but for several years now was with his family in kiev. his home proved one of the most hospitable during my stay in the south, and as he had many callers belonging to various social classes i was able to gather much information about the recent history of ukraina. my host was not a communist: though critical of the bolshevik régime, he was by no means antagonistic. he used to say that the main fault of the bolsheviki was their lack of psychological perception. he asserted that no government had ever such a great opportunity in the ukraina as the communists. the people had suffered so much from the various occupations and were so oppressed by every new régime that they rejoiced when the bolsheviki entered kiev. everybody hoped that they would bring relief. but the communists quickly destroyed all illusions. within a few months they proved themselves entirely incapable of administering the affairs of the city; their methods antagonized the people, and the terrorism of the tcheka turned even the friends of the communists to bitter enmity. nobody objected to the nationalization of industry and it was of course expected that the bolsheviki would expropriate. but when the bourgeoisie had been relieved of its possessions it was found that only the raiders benefited. neither the people at large nor even the proletarian class gained anything. precious jewellery, silverware, furs, practically the whole wealth of kiev seemed to disappear and was no more heard of. later members of the tcheka strutted about the streets with their women gowned in the finery of the bourgeoisie. when private business places were closed, the doors were locked and sealed and guards placed there. but within a few weeks the stores were found empty. this kind of "management" and the numerous new laws and edicts, often mutually conflicting, served the tcheka as a pretext to terrorize and mulct the citizens and aroused general hatred against the bolsheviki. the people had turned against petlura, denikin, and the poles. they welcomed the bolsheviki with open arms. but the last disappointed them as the first. "now we have gotten used to the situation," my host said, "we just drift and manage as best we can." but he thought it a pity that the bolsheviki lost such a great chance. they were unable to hold the confidence of the people and to direct that confidence into constructive channels. not only had the bolsheviki failed to operate the big industries: they also destroyed the small _kustarnaya_ work. there had been thousands of artisans in the province of kiev, for instance; most of them had worked by themselves, without exploiting any one. they were independent producers who supplied a certain need of the community. the bolsheviki in their reckless scheme of nationalization suspended those efforts without being able to replace them by aught else. they had nothing to give either to the workers or to the peasants. the city proletariat faced the alternative of starving in the city or going back to the country. they preferred the latter, of course. those who could not get to the country engaged in trade, buying and selling jewellery, for instance. practically everybody in russia had become a tradesman, the bolshevik government no less than private speculators. "you have no idea of the amount of illicit business carried on by officials in soviet institutions," my host informed me; "nor is the army free from it. my nephew, a red army officer, a communist, has just returned from the polish front. he can tell you about these practices in the army." i was particularly eager to talk to the young officer. in my travels i had met many soldiers, and i found that most of them had retained the old slave psychology and bowed absolutely to military discipline. some, however, were very wide awake and could see clearly what was happening about them. a certain small element in the red army was entirely transformed by the revolution. it was proof of the gestation of new life and new forms which set russia apart from the rest of the world, notwithstanding bolshevik tyranny and oppression. for that element the revolution had a deep significance. they saw in it something vital which even the daily decrees could not compress within the narrow communist mould. it was their attitude and general sentiment that the bolsheviki had not kept faith with the people. they saw the communist state growing at the cost of the revolution, and some of them even went so far as to voice the opinion that the bolsheviki had become the enemies of the revolution. but they all felt that for the time being they could do nothing. they were determined to dispose of the foreign enemies first. "then," they would say, "we will face the enemy at home." the red army officer proved a fine-looking young fellow very deeply in earnest. at first he was disinclined to talk, but in the course of the evening he grew less embarrassed and expressed his feelings freely. he had found much corruption at the front, he said. but it was even worse at the base of supplies where he had done duty for some time. the men at the front were practically without clothes or shoes. the food was insufficient and the army was ravaged by typhoid and cholera. yet the spirit of the men was wonderful. they fought bravely, enthusiastically, because they believed in their ideal of a free russia. but while they were fighting and dying for the great cause, the higher officers, the so-called _tovaristchi_, sat in safe retreat and there drank and gambled and got rich by speculation. the supplies so desperately needed at the front were being sold at fabulous prices to speculators. the young officer had become so disheartened by the situation, he had thought of committing suicide. but now he was determined to return to the front. "i shall go back and tell my comrades what i have seen," he said; "our real work will begin when we have defeated foreign invasion. then we shall go after those who are trading away the revolution." i felt there was no cause to despair so long as russia possessed such spirits. i returned to my room to find our secretary waiting to report the valuable find she had made. it consisted of rich denikin material stacked in the city library and apparently forgotten by everybody. the librarian, a zealous ukrainian nationalist, refused to permit the "russian" museum to take the material, though it was of no use to kiev, literally buried in an obscure corner and exposed to danger and ruin. we decided to appeal to the department of education and to apply the "american amulet." it grew to be a standing joke among the members of the expedition to resort to the "amulet" in difficult situations. such matters were always referred to alexander berkman and myself as the "americans." it required considerable persuasion to interest the chairman in the matter. he persisted in refusing till i finally asked him: "are you willing that it become known in america that you prefer to have valuable historical material rot away in kiev rather than give it to the petrograd museum, which is sure to become a world centre for the study of the russian revolution and where ukraina is to have such an important part?" at last the chairman issued the required order and our expedition took possession of the material, to the great elation of our secretary, to whom the museum represented the most important interest in life. in the afternoon of the same day i was visited by a woman anarchist who was accompanied by a young peasant girl, confidentially introduced as the wife of makhno. my heart stood still for a moment: the presence of that girl in kiev meant certain death were she discovered by the bolsheviki. it also involved grave danger to my landlord and his family, for in communist russia harbouring--even if unwittingly--a member of the makhno _povstantsi_ often incurred the worst consequences. i expressed surprise at the young woman's recklessness in thus walking into the very jaws of the enemy. but she explained that makhno was determined to reach us; he would trust no one else with the message, and therefore she had volunteered to come. it was evident that danger had lost all terror for her. "we have been living in constant peril for years," she said simply. divested of her disguise, she revealed much beauty. she was a woman of twenty-five, with a wealth of jet-black hair of striking lustre. "nestor had hoped that you and alexander berkman would manage to come, but he waited in vain," she began. "now he sent me to tell you about the struggle he is waging and he hopes that you will make his purpose known to the world outside." late into the night she related the story of makhno which tallied in all important features with that told us by the two ukrainian visitors in petrograd. she dwelt on the methods employed by the bolsheviki to eliminate makhno and the agreements they had repeatedly made with him, every one of which had been broken by the communists the moment immediate danger from invaders was over. she spoke of the savage persecution of the members of the makhno army and of the numerous attempts of the bolsheviki to trap and kill nestor. that failing, the bolsheviki had murdered his brother and had exterminated her own family, including her father and brother. she praised the revolutionary devotion, the heroism and endurance of the _povstantsi_ in the face of the greatest difficulties, and she entertained us with the legends the peasants had woven about the personality of makhno. thus, for instance, there grew up among the country folk the belief that makhno was invulnerable because he had never been wounded during all the years of warfare, in spite of his practice of always personally leading every charge. she was a good conversationalist, and her tragic story was relieved by bright touches of humour. she told many anecdotes about the exploits of makhno. once he had caused a wedding to be celebrated in a village occupied by the enemy. it was a gala affair, everybody attending. while the people were making merry on the market place and the soldiers were succumbing to the temptation of drink, makhno's men surrounded the village and easily routed the superior forces stationed there. having taken a town it was always makhno's practice to compel the rich peasants, the _kulaki_, to give up their surplus wealth, which was then divided among the poor, makhno keeping a share for his army. then he would call a meeting of the villagers, address them on the purposes of the _povstantsi_ movement, and distribute his literature. late into the night the young woman related the story of makhno and _makhnovstchina_. her voice, held low because of the danger of the situation, was rich and mellow, her eyes shone with the intensity of emotion. "nestor wants you to tell the comrades of america and europe," she concluded, "that he is one of them--an anarchist whose aim is to defend the revolution against all enemies. he is trying to direct the innate rebellious spirit of the ukrainian peasant into organized anarchist channels. he feels that he cannot accomplish it himself without the aid of the anarchists of russia. he himself is entirely occupied with military matters, and he has therefore invited his comrades throughout the country to take charge of the educational work. his ultimate plan is to take possession of a small territory in ukraina and there establish a free commune. meanwhile, he is determined to fight every reactionary force." makhno was very anxious to confer personally with alexander berkman and myself, and he proposed the following plan. he would arrange to take any small town or village between kiev and kharkov where our car might happen to be. it would be carried out without any use of violence, the place being captured by surprise. the stratagem would have the appearance of our having been taken prisoners, and protection would be guaranteed to the other members of the expedition. after our conference we would be given safe conduct to our car. it would at the same time insure us against the bolsheviki, for the whole scheme would be carried out in military manner, similar to a regular makhno raid. the plan promised a very interesting adventure and we were anxious for an opportunity to meet makhno personally. yet we could not expose the other members of the expedition to the risk involved in such an undertaking. we decided not to avail ourselves of the offer, hoping that another occasion might present itself to meet the _povstantsi_ leader. makhno's wife had been a country school teacher; she possessed considerable information and was intensely interested in all cultural problems. she plied me with questions about american women, whether they had really become emancipated and enjoyed equal rights. the young woman had been with makhno and his army for several years, but she could not reconcile herself to the primitive attitude of her people in regard to woman. the ukrainian woman, she said, was considered an object of sex and motherhood only. nestor himself was no exception in this matter. was it different in america? did the american woman believe in free motherhood and was she familiar with the subject of birth control? it was astonishing to hear such questions from a peasant girl. i thought it most remarkable that a woman born and reared so far from the scene of woman's struggle for emancipation should yet be so alive to its problems. i spoke to the girl of the activities of the advanced women of america, of their achievements and of the work yet to be done for woman's emancipation. i mentioned some of the literature dealing with these subjects. she listened eagerly. "i must get hold of something to help our peasant women. they are just beasts of burden," she said. early the next morning we saw her safely out of the house. the same day, while visiting the anarchist club, i witnessed a peculiar sight. the club had recently been reopened after having been raided by the tcheka. the local anarchists met in the club rooms for study and lectures; anarchist literature was also to be had there. while conversing with some friends i noticed a group of prisoners passing on the street below. just as they neared the anarchist headquarters several of them looked up, having evidently noticed the large sign over the club rooms. suddenly they straightened up, took off their caps, bowed, and then passed on. i turned to my friends. "those peasants are probably _makhnovstsi_" they said; "the anarchist headquarters are sacred precincts to them." how exceptional the russian soul, i thought, wondering whether a group of american workers or farmers could be so imbued with an ideal as to express it in the simple and significant way the _makhnovstsi_ did. to the russian his belief is indeed an inspiration. our stay in kiev was rich in varied experiences and impressions. it was a strenuous time during which we met people of different social strata and gathered much valuable information and material. we closed our visit with a short trip on the river dniepr to view some of the old monasteries and cathedrals, among them the celebrated sophievski and vladimir. imposing edifices, which remained intact during all the revolutionary changes, even their inner life continuing as before. in one of the monasteries we enjoyed the hospitality of the sisters who treated us to real russian tea, black bread, and honey. they lived as if nothing had happened in russia since ; it was as if they had passed the last years outside of the world. the monks still continued to show to the curious the sacred caves of the vladimir cathedral and the places where the saints had been walled in, their ossified bodies now on exhibition. visitors were daily taken through the vaults, the accompanying priests pointing out the cells of the celebrated martyrs and reciting the biographies of the most important of the holy family. some of the stories related were wonderful beyond all human credence, breathing holy superstition with every pore. the red army soldiers in our group looked rather dubious at the fantastic tales of the priests. evidently the revolution had influenced their religious spirit and developed a sceptical attitude toward miracle workers. annajanska, the bolshevik empress by george bernard shaw annajanska is frankly a bravura piece. the modern variety theatre demands for its "turns" little plays called sketches, to last twenty minutes or so, and to enable some favorite performer to make a brief but dazzling appearance on some barely passable dramatic pretext. miss lillah mccarthy and i, as author and actress, have helped to make one another famous on many serious occasions, from man and superman to androcles; and mr charles ricketts has not disdained to snatch moments from his painting and sculpture to design some wonderful dresses for us. we three unbent as mrs siddons, sir joshua reynolds and dr johnson might have unbent, to devise a turn for the coliseum variety theatre. not that we would set down the art of the variety theatre as something to be condescended to, or our own art as elephantine. we should rather crave indulgence as three novices fresh from the awful legitimacy of the highbrow theatre. well, miss mccarthy and mr ricketts justified themselves easily in the glamor of the footlights, to the strains of tchaikovsky's . i fear i did not. i have received only one compliment on my share; and that was from a friend who said, "it is the only one of your works that is not too long." so i have made it a page or two longer, according to my own precept: embrace your reproaches: they are often glories in disguise. annajanska was first performed at the coliseum theatre in london on the st january, , with lillah mccarthy as the grand duchess, henry miller as schneidekind, and randle ayrton as general strammfest. annajanska, the bolshevik empress the general's office in a military station on the east front in beotia. an office table with a telephone, writing materials, official papers, etc., is set across the room. at the end of the table, a comfortable chair for the general. behind the chair, a window. facing it at the other end of the table, a plain wooden bench. at the side of the table, with its back to the door, a common chair, with a typewriter before it. beside the door, which is opposite the end of the bench, a rack for caps and coats. there is nobody in the room. general strammfest enters, followed by lieutenant schneidekind. they hang up their cloaks and caps. schneidekind takes a little longer than strammfest, who comes to the table. strammfest. schneidekind. schneidekind. yes, sir. strammfest. have you sent my report yet to the government? [he sits down.] schneidekind [coming to the table]. not yet, sir. which government do you wish it sent to? [he sits down.] strammfest. that depends. what's the latest? which of them do you think is most likely to be in power tomorrow morning? schneidekind. well, the provisional government was going strong yesterday. but today they say that the prime minister has shot himself, and that the extreme left fellow has shot all the others. strammfest. yes: that's all very well; but these fellows always shoot themselves with blank cartridge. schneidekind. still, even the blank cartridge means backing down. i should send the report to the maximilianists. strammfest. they're no stronger than the oppidoshavians; and in my own opinion the moderate red revolutionaries are as likely to come out on top as either of them. schneidekind. i can easily put a few carbon sheets in the typewriter and send a copy each to the lot. strammfest. waste of paper. you might as well send reports to an infant school. [he throws his head on the table with a groan.] schneidekind. tired out, sir? strammfest. o schneidekind, schneidekind, how can you bear to live? schneidekind. at my age, sir, i ask myself how can i bear to die? strammfest. you are young, young and heartless. you are excited by the revolution: you are attached to abstract things like liberty. but my family has served the panjandrums of beotia faithfully for seven centuries. the panjandrums have kept our place for us at their courts, honored us, promoted us, shed their glory on us, made us what we are. when i hear you young men declaring that you are fighting for civilization, for democracy, for the overthrow of militarism, i ask myself how can a man shed his blood for empty words used by vulgar tradesmen and common laborers: mere wind and stink. [he rises, exalted by his theme.] a king is a splendid reality, a man raised above us like a god. you can see him; you can kiss his hand; you can be cheered by his smile and terrified by his frown. i would have died for my panjandrum as my father died for his father. your toiling millions were only too honored to receive the toes of our boots in the proper spot for them when they displeased their betters. and now what is left in life for me? [he relapses into his chair discouraged.] my panjandrum is deposed and transported to herd with convicts. the army, his pride and glory, is paraded to hear seditious speeches from penniless rebels, with the colonel actually forced to take the chair and introduce the speaker. i myself am made commander-in-chief by my own solicitor: a jew, schneidekind! a hebrew jew! it seems only yesterday that these things would have been the ravings of a madman: today they are the commonplaces of the gutter press. i live now for three objects only: to defeat the enemy, to restore the panjandrum, and to hang my solicitor. schneidekind. be careful, sir: these are dangerous views to utter nowadays. what if i were to betray you? strammfest. what! schneidekind. i won't, of course: my own father goes on just like that; but suppose i did? strammfest [chuckling]. i should accuse you of treason to the revolution, my lad; and they would immediately shoot you, unless you cried and asked to see your mother before you died, when they would probably change their minds and make you a brigadier. enough. [he rises and expands his chest.] i feel the better for letting myself go. to business. [he takes up a telegram: opens it: and is thunderstruck by its contents.] great heaven! [he collapses into his chair.] this is the worst blow of all. schneidekind. what has happened? are we beaten? strammfest. man, do you think that a mere defeat could strike me down as this news does: i, who have been defeated thirteen times since the war began? o, my master, my master, my panjandrum! [he is convulsed with sobs.] schneidekind. they have killed him? strammfest. a dagger has been struck through his heart-- schneidekind. good god! strammfest. --and through mine, through mine. schneidekind [relieved]. oh, a metaphorical dagger! i thought you meant a real one. what has happened? strammfest. his daughter the grand duchess annajanska, she whom the panjandrina loved beyond all her other children, has--has-- [he cannot finish.] schneidekind. committed suicide? strammfest. no. better if she had. oh, far far better. schneidekind [in hushed tones]. left the church? strammfest [shocked]. certainly not. do not blaspheme, young man. schneidekind. asked for the vote? strammfest. i would have given it to her with both hands to save her from this. schneidekind. save her from what? dash it, sir, out with it. strammfest. she has joined the revolution. schneidekind. but so have you, sir. we've all joined the revolution. she doesn't mean it any more than we do. strammfest. heaven grant you may be right! but that is not the worst. she had eloped with a young officer. eloped, schneidekind, eloped! schneidekind [not particularly impressed]. yes, sir. strammfest. annajanska, the beautiful, the innocent, my master's daughter! [he buries his face in his hands.] the telephone rings. schneidekind [taking the receiver]. yes: g.h.q. yes... don't bawl: i'm not a general. who is it speaking?... why didn't you say so? don't you know your duty? next time you will lose your stripe... oh, they've made you a colonel, have they? well, they've made me a field-marshal: now what have you to say?... look here: what did you ring up for? i can't spend the day here listening to your cheek... what! the grand duchess [strammfest starts.] where did you catch her? strammfest [snatching the telephone and listening for the answer]. speak louder, will you: i am a general i know that, you dolt. have you captured the officer that was with her?... damnation! you shall answer for this: you let him go: he bribed you. you must have seen him: the fellow is in the full dress court uniform of the panderobajensky hussars. i give you twelve hours to catch him or... what's that you say about the devil? are you swearing at me, you... thousand thunders! [to schneidekind.] the swine says that the grand duchess is a devil incarnate. [into the telephone.] filthy traitor: is that the way you dare speak of the daughter of our anointed panjandrum? i'll-- schneidekind [pulling the telephone from his lips]. take care, sir. strammfest. i won't take care: i'll have him shot. let go that telephone. schneidekind. but for her own sake, sir-- strammfest. eh?-- schneidekind. for her own sake they had better send her here. she will be safe in your hands. strammfest [yielding the receiver]. you are right. be civil to him. i should choke [he sits down]. schneidekind [into the telephone]. hullo. never mind all that: it's only a fellow here who has been fooling with the telephone. i had to leave the room for a moment. wash out: and send the girl along. we'll jolly soon teach her to behave herself here... oh, you've sent her already. then why the devil didn't you say so, you--[he hangs up the telephone angrily]. just fancy: they started her off this morning: and all this is because the fellow likes to get on the telephone and hear himself talk now that he is a colonel. [the telephone rings again. he snatches the receiver furiously.] what's the matter now?... [to the general.] it's our own people downstairs. [into the receiver.] here! do you suppose i've nothing else to do than to hang on to the telephone all day?... what's that? not men enough to hold her! what do you mean? [to the general.] she is there, sir. strammfest. tell them to send her up. i shall have to receive her without even rising, without kissing her hand, to keep up appearances before the escort. it will break my heart. schneidekind [into the receiver]. send her up... tcha! [he hangs up the receiver.] he says she is halfway up already: they couldn't hold her. the grand duchess bursts into the room, dragging with her two exhausted soldiers hanging on desperately to her arms. she is enveloped from head to foot by a fur-lined cloak, and wears a fur cap. schneidekind [pointing to the bench]. at the word go, place your prisoner on the bench in a sitting posture; and take your seats right and left of her. go. the two soldiers make a supreme effort to force her to sit down. she flings them back so that they are forced to sit on the bench to save themselves from falling backwards over it, and is herself dragged into sitting between them. the second soldier, holding on tight to the grand duchess with one hand, produces papers with the other, and waves them towards schneidekind, who takes them from him and passes them on to the general. he opens them and reads them with a grave expression. schneidekind. be good enough to wait, prisoner, until the general has read the papers on your case. the grand duchess [to the soldiers]. let go. [to strammfest]. tell them to let go, or i'll upset the bench backwards and bash our three heads on the floor. first soldier. no, little mother. have mercy on the poor. strammfest [growling over the edge of the paper he is reading]. hold your tongue. the grand duchess [blazing]. me, or the soldier? strammfest [horrified]. the soldier, madam. the grand duchess. tell him to let go. strammfest. release the lady. the soldiers take their hands off her. one of them wipes his fevered brow. the other sucks his wrist. schneidkind [fiercely]. 'ttention! the two soldiers sit up stiffly. the grand duchess. oh, let the poor man suck his wrist. it may be poisoned. i bit it. strammfest [shocked]. you bit a common soldier! grand duchess. well, i offered to cauterize it with the poker in the office stove. but he was afraid. what more could i do? schneidekind. why did you bite him, prisoner? the grand duchess. he would not let go. strammfest. did he let go when you bit him? the grand duchess. no. [patting the soldier on the back]. you should give the man a cross for his devotion. i could not go on eating him; so i brought him along with me. strammfest. prisoner-- the grand duchess. don't call me prisoner, general strammfest. my grandmother dandled you on her knee. strammfest [bursting into tears]. o god, yes. believe me, my heart is what it was then. the grand duchess. your brain also is what it was then. i will not be addressed by you as prisoner. strammfest. i may not, for your own sake, call you by your rightful and most sacred titles. what am i to call you? the grand duchess. the revolution has made us comrades. call me comrade. strammfest. i had rather die. the grand duchess. then call me annajanska; and i will call you peter piper, as grandmamma did. strammfest [painfully agitated]. schneidekind, you must speak to her: i cannot--[he breaks down.] schneidekind [officially]. the republic of beotia has been compelled to confine the panjandrum and his family, for their own safety, within certain bounds. you have broken those bounds. strammfest [taking the word from him]. you are i must say it--a prisoner. what am i to do with you? the grand duchess. you should have thought of that before you arrested me. strammfest. come, come, prisoner! do you know what will happen to you if you compel me to take a sterner tone with you? the grand duchess. no. but i know what will happen to you. stramaifest. pray what, prisoner? the gland duchess. clergyman's sore throat. schneidekind splutters; drops a paper: and conceals his laughter under the table. strammfest [thunderously]. lieutenant schneidekind. schneidekind [in a stifled voice]. yes, sir. [the table vibrates visibly.] strammfest. come out of it, you fool: you're upsetting the ink. schneidekind emerges, red in the face with suppressed mirth. strammfest. why don't you laugh? don't you appreciate her imperial highness's joke? schneidekind [suddenly becoming solemn]. i don't want to, sir. strammfest. laugh at once, sir. i order you to laugh. schneidekind [with a touch of temper]. i really can't, sir. [he sits down decisively.] strammfest [growling at him]. yah! [he turns impressively to the grand duchess.] your imperial highness desires me to address you as comrade? the grand duchess [rising and waving a red handkerchief]. long live the revolution, comrade! strammfest [rising and saluting]. proletarians of all lands, unite. lieutenant schneidekind, you will rise and sing the marseillaise. schneidekind [rising]. but i cannot, sir. i have no voice, no ear. strammfest. then sit down; and bury your shame in your typewriter. [schneidekind sits down.] comrade annajanska, you have eloped with a young officer. the grand duchess [astounded]. general strammfest, you lie. strammfest. denial, comrade, is useless. it is through that officer that your movements have been traced. [the grand duchess is suddenly enlightened, and seems amused. strammfest continues an a forensic manner.] he joined you at the golden anchor in hakonsburg. you gave us the slip there; but the officer was traced to potterdam, where you rejoined him and went alone to premsylople. what have you done with that unhappy young man? where is he? the grand duchess [pretending to whisper an important secret]. where he has always been. strammfest [eagerly]. where is that? the grand duchess [impetuously]. in your imagination. i came alone. i am alone. hundreds of officers travel every day from hakonsburg to potterdam. what do i know about them? strammfest. they travel in khaki. they do not travel in full dress court uniform as this man did. schneidekind. only officers who are eloping with grand duchesses wear court uniform: otherwise the grand duchesses could not be seen with them. strammfest. hold your tongue. [schneidekind, in high dudgeon, folds his arms and retires from the conversation. the general returns to his paper and to his examination of the grand duchess.] this officer travelled with your passport. what have you to say to that? the grand duchess. bosh! how could a man travel with a woman's passport? strammfest. it is quite simple, as you very well know. a dozen travellers arrive at the boundary. the official collects their passports. he counts twelve persons; then counts the passports. if there are twelve, he is satisfied. the grand duchess. then how do you know that one of the passports was mine? strammfest. a waiter at the potterdam hotel looked at the officer's passport when he was in his bath. it was your passport. the grand duchess. stuff! why did he not have me arrested? strammfest. when the waiter returned to the hotel with the police the officer had vanished; and you were there with your own passport. they knouted him. the grand duchess. oh! strammfest, send these men away. i must speak to you alone. strammfest [rising in horror]. no: this is the last straw: i cannot consent. it is impossible, utterly, eternally impossible, that a daughter of the imperial house should speak to any one alone, were it even her own husband. the grand duchess. you forget that there is an exception. she may speak to a child alone. [she rises.] strammfest, you have been dandled on my grandmother's knee. by that gracious action the dowager panjandrina made you a child forever. so did nature, by the way. i order you to speak to me alone. do you hear? i order you. for seven hundred years no member of your family has ever disobeyed an order from a member of mine. will you disobey me? strammfest. there is an alternative to obedience. the dead cannot disobey. [he takes out his pistol and places the muzzle against his temple.] schneidekind [snatching the pistol from him]. for god's sake, general-- strammfest [attacking him furiously to recover the weapon]. dog of a subaltern, restore that pistol and my honor. schneidekind [reaching out with the pistol to the grand duchess]. take it: quick: he is as strong as a bull. the grand duchess [snatching it]. aha! leave the room, all of you except the general. at the double! lightning! electricity! [she fires shot after shot, spattering the bullets about the ankles of the soldiers. they fly precipitately. she turns to schneidekind, who has by this time been flung on the floor by the general.] you too. [he scrambles up.] march. [he flies to the door.] schneidekind [turning at the door]. for your own sake, comrade-- the grand duchess [indignantly]. comrade! you!!! go. [she fires two more shots. he vanishes.] strammfest [making an impulsive movement towards her]. my imperial mistress-- the grand duchess. stop. i have one bullet left, if you attempt to take this from me [putting the pistol to her temple]. strammfest [recoiling, and covering his eyes with his hands]. no no: put it down: put it down. i promise everything: i swear anything; but put it down, i implore you. the grand duchess [throwing it on the table]. there! strammfest [uncovering his eyes]. thank god! the grand duchess [gently]. strammfest: i am your comrade. am i nothing more to you? strammfest [falling on his knee]. you are, god help me, all that is left to me of the only power i recognize on earth [he kisses her hand]. the grand duchess [indulgently]. idolater! when will you learn that our strength has never been in ourselves, but in your illusions about us? [she shakes off her kindliness, and sits down in his chair.] now tell me, what are your orders? and do you mean to obey them? strammfest [starting like a goaded ox, and blundering fretfully about the room]. how can i obey six different dictators, and not one gentleman among the lot of them? one of them orders me to make peace with the foreign enemy. another orders me to offer all the neutral countries hours to choose between adopting his views on the single tax and being instantly invaded and annihilated. a third orders me to go to a damned socialist conference and explain that beotia will allow no annexations and no indemnities, and merely wishes to establish the kingdom of heaven on earth throughout the universe. [he finishes behind schneidekind's chair.] the grand duchess. damn their trifling! strammfest. i thank your imperial highness from the bottom of my heart for that expression. europe thanks you. the grand duchess. m'yes; but--[rising]. strammfest, you know that your cause--the cause of the dynasty--is lost. strammfest. you must not say so. it is treason, even from you. [he sinks, discouraged, into the chair, and covers his face with his hand.] the grand duchess. do not deceive yourself, general: never again will a panjandrum reign in beotia. [she walks slowly across the room, brooding bitterly, and thinking aloud.] we are so decayed, so out of date, so feeble, so wicked in our own despite, that we have come at last to will our own destruction. strammfest. you are uttering blasphemy. the grand duchess. all great truths begin as blasphemies. all the king's horses and all the king's men cannot set up my father's throne again. if they could, you would have done it, would you not? strammfest. god knows i would! the grand duchess. you really mean that? you would keep the people in their hopeless squalid misery? you would fill those infamous prisons again with the noblest spirits in the land? you would thrust the rising sun of liberty back into the sea of blood from which it has risen? and all because there was in the middle of the dirt and ugliness and horror a little patch of court splendor in which you could stand with a few orders on your uniform, and yawn day after day and night after night in unspeakable boredom until your grave yawned wider still, and you fell into it because you had nothing better to do. how can you be so stupid, so heartless? strammfest. you must be mad to think of royalty in such a way. i never yawned at court. the dogs yawned; but that was because they were dogs: they had no imagination, no ideals, no sense of honor and dignity to sustain them. the grand duchess. my poor strammfest: you were not often enough at court to tire of it. you were mostly soldiering; and when you came home to have a new order pinned on your breast, your happiness came through looking at my father and mother and at me, and adoring us. was that not so? strammfest. do you reproach me with it? i am not ashamed of it. the grand duchess. oh, it was all very well for you, strammfest. but think of me, of me! standing there for you to gape at, and knowing that i was no goddess, but only a girl like any other girl! it was cruelty to animals: you could have stuck up a wax doll or a golden calf to worship; it would not have been bored. strammfest. stop; or i shall renounce my allegiance to you. i have had women flogged for such seditious chatter as this. the grand duchess. do not provoke me to send a bullet through your head for reminding me of it. strammfest. you always had low tastes. you are no true daughter of the panjandrums: you are a changeling, thrust into the panjandrina's bed by some profligate nurse. i have heard stories of your childhood: of how-- the grand duchess. ha, ha! yes: they took me to the circus when i was a child. it was my first moment of happiness, my first glimpse of heaven. i ran away and joined the troupe. they caught me and dragged me back to my gilded cage; but i had tasted freedom; and they never could make me forget it. strammfest. freedom! to be the slave of an acrobat! to be exhibited to the public! to-- the grand duchess. oh, i was trained to that. i had learnt that part of the business at court. strammfest. you had not been taught to strip yourself half naked and turn head over heels-- the grand duchess. man, i wanted to get rid of my swaddling clothes and turn head over heels. i wanted to, i wanted to, i wanted to. i can do it still. shall i do it now? strammfest. if you do, i swear i will throw myself from the window so that i may meet your parents in heaven without having my medals torn from my breast by them. the grand duchess. oh, you are incorrigible. you are mad, infatuated. you will not believe that we royal divinities are mere common flesh and blood even when we step down from our pedestals and tell you ourselves what a fool you are. i will argue no more with you: i will use my power. at a word from me your men will turn against you: already half of them do not salute you; and you dare not punish them: you have to pretend not to notice it. strammfest. it is not for you to taunt me with that if it is so. the grand duchess. [haughtily]. taunt! i condescend to taunt! to taunt a common general! you forget yourself, sir. strammfest [dropping on his knee submissively]. now at last you speak like your royal self. the grand duchess. oh, strammfest, strammfest, they have driven your slavery into your very bones. why did you not spit in my face? strammfest [rising with a shudder]. god forbid! the grand duchess. well, since you will be my slave, take your orders from me. i have not come here to save our wretched family and our bloodstained crown. i am come to save the revolution. strammfest. stupid as i am, i have come to think that i had better save that than save nothing. but what will the revolution do for the people? do not be deceived by the fine speeches of the revolutionary leaders and the pamphlets of the revolutionary writers. how much liberty is there where they have gained the upper hand? are they not hanging, shooting, imprisoning as much as ever we did? do they ever tell the people the truth? no: if the truth does not suit them they spread lies instead, and make it a crime to tell the truth. the grand duchess. of course they do. why should they not? strammfest [hardly able to believe his ears]. why should they not? the grand duchess. yes: why should they not? we did it. you did it, whip in hand: you flogged women for teaching children to read. strammfest. to read sedition. to read karl marx. the grand duchess. pshaw! how could they learn to read the bible without learning to read karl marx? why do you not stand to your guns and justify what you did, instead of making silly excuses? do you suppose i think flogging a woman worse than flogging a man? i, who am a woman myself! strammfest. i am at a loss to understand your imperial highness. you seem to me to contradict yourself. the grand duchess. nonsense! i say that if the people cannot govern themselves, they must be governed by somebody. if they will not do their duty without being half forced and half humbugged, somebody must force them and humbug them. some energetic and capable minority must always be in power. well, i am on the side of the energetic minority whose principles i agree with. the revolution is as cruel as we were; but its aims are my aims. therefore i stand for the revolution. strammfest. you do not know what you are saying. this is pure bolshevism. are you, the daughter of a panjandrum, a bolshevist? the grand duchess. i am anything that will make the world less like a prison and more like a circus. strammfest. ah! you still want to be a circus star. the grand duchess. yes, and be billed as the bolshevik empress. nothing shall stop me. you have your orders, general strammfest: save the revolution. strammfest. what revolution? which revolution? no two of your rabble of revolutionists mean the same thing by the revolution what can save a mob in which every man is rushing in a different direction? the grand duchess. i will tell you. the war can save it. strammfest. the war? the grand duchess. yes, the war. only a great common danger and a great common duty can unite us and weld these wrangling factions into a solid commonwealth. strammfest. bravo! war sets everything right: i have always said so. but what is a united people without a united army? and what can i do? i am only a soldier. i cannot make speeches: i have won no victories: they will not rally to my call [again he sinks into his chair with his former gesture of discouragement]. the grand duchess. are you sure they will not rally to mine? strammfest. oh, if only you were a man and a soldier! the grand duchess. suppose i find you a man and a soldier? strammfest [rising in a fury]. ah! the scoundrel you eloped with! you think you will shove this fellow into an army command, over my head. never. the grand duchess. you promised everything. you swore anything. [she marches as if in front of a regiment.] i know that this man alone can rouse the army to enthusiasm. strammfest. delusion! folly! he is some circus acrobat; and you are in love with him. the grand duchess. i swear i am not in love with him. i swear i will never marry him. strammfest. then who is he? the grand duchess. anybody in the world but you would have guessed long ago. he is under your very eyes. strammfest [staring past her right and left]. where? the grand duchess. look out of the window. he rushes to the window, looking for the officer. the grand duchess takes off her cloak and appears in the uniform of the panderobajensky hussars. strammfest [peering through the window]. where is he? i can see no one. the grand duchess. here, silly. strammfest [turning]. you! great heavens! the bolshevik empress! transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). the russian turmoil [illustration: the stavka quartermaster-general's branch. standing on the pathway, from left to right (centre): generals denikin (chief of staff), alexeiev (supreme c.-in-c.), josephovitch and markov (first and second quartermasters-general).] the russian turmoil memoirs: military, social, and political by general a. i. denikin with illustrations, diagrams and maps london: hutchinson & co. paternoster row contents page foreword chapter i. the foundations of the old power: faith, the czar, and the mother country chapter ii. the army chapter iii. the old army and the emperor chapter iv. the revolution in petrograd chapter v. the revolution and the imperial family chapter vi. the revolution and the army chapter vii. impressions of petrograd at the end of march, chapter viii. the stavka: its rÔle and position chapter ix. general markov chapter x. the power--the duma--the provisional government--the high command--the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates chapter xi. the bolshevik struggle for power--the power of the army and the idea of a dictatorship chapter xii. the activities of the provisional government--internal politics, civil administration--the town, the village, and the agrarian problem chapter xiii. the activities of the provisional government: food supplies, industry, transport, and finance chapter xiv. the strategical position of the russian front chapter xv. the question of the advance of the russian army chapter xvi. military reforms--the generals--the dismissal from the high command chapter xvii. "democratisation of the army"--administration, service and routine chapter xviii. the declaration of the rights of the soldier and committees chapter xix. the democratisation of the army: the commissars chapter xx. the democratisation of the army--the story of "the declaration of the rights of the soldier" chapter xxi. the press and propaganda chapter xxii. the condition of the army at the july advance chapter xxiii. officers' organisations chapter xxiv. the revolution and the cossacks chapter xxv. national units chapter xxvi. may and the beginning of june in the sphere of military administration--the resignation of gutchkov and general alexeiev--my departure from the stavka--the administration of kerensky and general brussilov chapter xxvii. my term as commander-in-chief on the western russian front chapter xxviii. the russian advance in the summer of --the dÉbÂcle chapter xxix. the conference at the stavka of ministers and commanders-in-chief on july th chapter xxx. general kornilov chapter xxxi. my service as commander-in-chief of the south-western front--the moscow conference--the fall of riga chapter xxxii. general kornilov's movement and its repercussion on the south-west front chapter xxxiii. in berdichev gaol--the transfer of the "berdichev group" of prisoners to bykhov chapter xxxiv. some conclusions as to the first period of the revolution [illustration: the old banner] [illustration: and the new.] list of illustrations the stavka quartermaster-general's branch _frontispiece_ the old banner and the new facing page the grand duke nicholas distributes crosses of st. george " " funeral of the first victims of the march revolution in petrograd " " general alexeiev " " general kornilov " " general markov " " foreign military representatives at the stavka " " the conference of commanders-in-chief " " a group of "prisoners" at berdichev " " the old army: a review. general ivanov " " the revolutionary army: a review. kerensky " " before the battle in the revolutionary army: a meeting " " types of men in the revolutionary army " " before the battle in the old army: prayers " " types of soldiers of the old army " " general alexeiev's farewell " " kerensky addressing soldiers' meeting " " general kornilov's arrival at petrograd " " general kornilov in the trenches " " general kornilov's welcome in moscow " " list of diagrams and maps page . diagram of the comparative forces of the germans in different theatres of war . diagram indicating the political party divisions in russia after the revolution . map of the russian european front in . map of the russian caucasian front in . map of the russian front in june and july, . map of the russian front till august th and after foreword in the midst of the turmoil and bloodshed in russia people perish and the real outlines of historical events are obliterated. it is for this reason that i have decided to publish these memoirs, in spite of the difficulties of work in my present condition of a refugee, unable to refer to any archives or documents and deprived of the possibility of discussing events with those who have taken part in them. the first part of my book deals chiefly with the russian army, with which my life has been closely linked up. political, social and economic questions are discussed only in so far as i have found it necessary to describe their influence upon the course of events. in the army played a decisive part in the fate of russia. its participation in the progress of the revolution, its life, degradation and collapse should serve as a great warning and a lesson to the new builders of russian life. this applies not only to the struggle against the present tyrants. when bolshevism is defeated, the russian people will have to undertake the tremendous task of reviving its moral and material forces, as well as that of preserving its sovereign existence. never in history has this task been as arduous as it is now, because there are many outside russia's borders waiting eagerly for her end. they are waiting in vain. the russian people will rise in strength and wisdom from the deathbed of blood, horror and poverty, moral and physical. the russian turmoil chapter i. the foundations of the old power: faith, the czar and the mother country. the inevitable historical process which culminated in the revolution of march, , has resulted in the collapse of the russian state. philosophers, historians and sociologists, in studying the course of russian life, may have foreseen the impending catastrophe. but nobody could foresee that the people, rising like a tidal wave, would so rapidly and so easily sweep away all the foundations of their existence: the supreme power and the governing classes which disappeared without a struggle; the intelligencia, gifted but weak, isolated and lacking will-power, which at first, in the midst of a deadly struggle, had only words as a weapon, later submissively bent their necks under the knife of the victors; and last, but not least, an army of ten million, powerful and imbued with historic traditions. that army was destroyed in three or four months. this last event--the collapse of the army--was not, however, quite unexpected, as the epilogue of the manchurian war and the subsequent events in moscow, kronstadt and sevastopol were a terrible warning. at the end of november, , i lived for a fortnight in harbin, and travelled on the siberian railway for thirty-one days in december, , through a series of "republics" from harbin to petrograd. i thus gained a clear indication of what might be expected from a licentious mob of soldiers utterly devoid of restraining principles. all the meetings, resolutions, soviets--in a word, all the manifestations of a mutiny of the military--were repeated in with photographic accuracy, but with greater impetus and on a much larger scale. it should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological transformation was not characteristic of the russian army alone. there can be no doubt that war-weariness after three years of bloodshed played an important part in these events, as the armies of the whole world were affected by it and were rendered more accessible to the disintegrating influences of extreme socialist doctrines. in the autumn of the german army corps that occupied the region of the don and little russia were demoralised in one week, and they repeated to a certain extent the process which we had already lived through of meetings, soviets, committees, of doing away with commanding officers, and in some units of the sale of military stores, horses and arms. it was not till then that the germans understood the tragedy of the russian officers. more than once our volunteers saw the german officers, formerly so haughty and so frigid, weeping bitterly over their degradation. "you have done the same to us; you have done it with your own hands," we said. "not we; it was our government," was their reply. in the winter of , as commander-in-chief of the volunteer army, i received an offer from a group of german officers to join our army as volunteers in the ranks. the collapse of the army cannot be explained away as the psychological result of defeats and disasters. even the victors experienced disturbances in the army. there was a certain amount of disaffection among the french troops occupying, in the beginning of , the region of odessa and roumania, in the french fleet cruising in the black sea, among the british troops in the region of constantinople and transcaucasia. the troops did not always obey the orders of their commanding officers. rapid demobilisation and the arrival of fresh, partly volunteer elements, altered the situation. [illustration: the grand duke nicholas distributes crosses of st. george.] what was the condition of the russian army at the outbreak of the revolution? from time immemorial the entire ideology of our soldiers was contained in the well-known formula: "for god, for the czar and for the mother country." generation after generation was born and bred on that formula. these ideas, however, did not penetrate deeply enough into the masses of the people and of the army. for many centuries the russian people had been deeply religious, but their faith was somewhat shaken in the beginning of the twentieth century. the russian people, as the russian saying goes, was "the bearer of christ"--a people inwardly disposed towards universal brotherhood, great in its simplicity, truthfulness, humility and forgiveness. that people, christian in the fullest sense of the word, was gradually changing as it came under the influence of material interests, and learnt or was taught to see in the gratifying of those interests the sole purpose of life. the link between the people and its spiritual leaders was gradually weakening as these leaders were detached from the people, entered into the service of the governing powers, and shared the latter's deficiencies. the development of this moral transformation of the russian people is too deep and too complex to fall within the scope of these memoirs. it is undeniable that the youngsters who joined the ranks treated questions of the faith and of the church with indifference. in barracks they lost the habits of their homes, and were forcibly removed from a more wholesome and settled atmosphere, with all its creeds and superstitions. they received no spiritual or moral education, which in barracks was considered a matter of minor importance, completely overshadowed by practical and material cares and requirements. a proper spirit could not be created in barracks, where christian morals, religious discourses, and even the rites of the church bore an official and sometimes even compulsory character. commanding officers know how difficult it was to find a solution of the vexed question of attendance at church services. war introduced two new elements into the spiritual life of the army. on the one hand, there was a certain moral coarseness and cruelty; on the other, it seemed as if faith had been deepened by constant danger. i do not wish to accuse the orthodox military clergy as a body. many of its representatives proved their high valour, courage and self-sacrifice. it must, however, be admitted that the clergy failed to produce a religious revival among the troops. it is not their fault, because the world-war into which russia was drawn was due to intricate political and economic causes, and there was no room for religious fervour. the clergy, however, likewise failed to establish closer connection with the troops. after the outbreak of the revolution the officers continued for a long time to struggle to keep their waning power and authority, but the voice of the priests was silenced almost at once, and they ceased to play any part whatsoever in the life of the troops. i recall an episode typical of the mental attitude of military circles in those days. one of the regiments of the fourth rifle division had built a camp church quite close to its lines, and had built it with great care and very artistically. the revolution came. a demagogue captain decided that his company had inadequate quarters and that a church was a superstition. on his own authority he converted the church into quarters for his company, and dug a hole where the altar stood for purposes which it is better not to mention. i am not surprised that such a scoundrel was found in the regiment or that the higher command was terrorised and silent. but why did two or three thousand orthodox russians, bred in the mystic rites of their faith, remain indifferent to such a sacrilege? be that as it may, there can hardly be any doubt that religion ceased to be one of the moral impulses which upheld the spirit of the russian army and prompted it to deeds of valour or protected it later from the development of bestial instincts. the orthodox clergy, generally speaking, was thrown overboard during the storm. some of the high dignitaries of the church--the metropolitans--pitirim and makarius--the archbishop varnava and others, unfortunately were closely connected with the governing bureaucracy of the rasputin period of petrograd history. the lower grades of the clergy, on the other hand, were in close touch with the russian intellectuals. i cannot take it upon myself to judge of the extent to which the russian church remained an active force after it came under the yoke of the bolsheviks. an impenetrable veil hangs over the life of the russian church in soviet russia, but there can be no doubt that spiritual renaissance is progressing and spreading, that the martyrdom of hundreds, nay, thousands, of priests is waking the dormant conscience of the people and is becoming a legend in their minds. the czar. it is hardly necessary to prove that the enormous majority of the commanding officers were thoroughly loyal to the monarchist idea and to the czar himself. the subsequent behaviour of the higher commanding officers who had been monarchists was due partly to motives of self-seeking, partly to pusillanimity and to the desire to conceal their real feelings in order to remain in power and to carry out their own plans. cases in which a change of front was the result of the collapse of ideals, of a new outlook, or was prompted by motives of practical statesmanship, were rare. for example, it would have been childish to have believed general brussilov when he asserted that from the days of his youth he had been "a socialist and a republican." he was bred in the traditions of the old guards, was closely connected with circles of the court, and permeated with their outlook. his habits, tastes, sympathies and surroundings were those of a _barin_.[ ] no man can be a lifelong liar to himself and to others. the majority of the officers of the regular russian army had monarchist principles and were undoubtedly loyal. after the japanese war, as a result of the first revolution, the officers' corps was, nevertheless, placed, for reasons which are not sufficiently clear, under the special supervision of the police department, and regimental commanding officers received from time to time "black lists." the tragedy of it was that it was almost useless to argue against the verdict of "unreliability," while, at the same time, it was forbidden to conduct one's own investigation, even in secret. this system of spying introduced an unwholesome spirit into the army. not content with this system, the war minister, general sukhomlinov, introduced his own branch of counter-spies, which was headed unofficially by colonel miassoyedov, who was afterwards shot as a german spy. at every military district headquarters an organ was instituted, headed by an officer of the gendarmerie dressed up in g.h.q. uniform. officially, he was supposed to deal with foreign espionage, but general dukhonin (who was killed by the bolsheviks), when chief of the intelligence bureau of the kiev g.h.q. before the war, bitterly complained to me of the painful atmosphere created by this new organ, which was officially subordinate to the quartermaster-general, but in reality looked on him with suspicion, and was spying not only upon the staff, but upon its own chiefs. life itself seemed to induce the officers to utter some kind of protest against the existing order. of all the classes that served the state, there had been for a long time no element so downtrodden and forlorn or so ill-provided for as the officers of the regular russian army. they lived in abject poverty. their rights and their self-esteem were constantly ignored by the senior officers. the utmost the rank and file could hope for as the crowning of their career was the rank of colonel and an old age spent in sickness and semi-starvation. from the middle of the nineteenth century the officers' corps had completely lost its character as a class and a caste. since universal compulsory service was introduced and the nobility ceased to be prosperous the gates of military schools were opened wide to people of low extraction and to young men belonging to the lower strata of the people, but with a diploma from the civil schools. they formed a majority in the army. mobilisations, on the other hand, reinforced the officers' corps by the infusion of a great many men of the liberal professions, who introduced new ideas and a new outlook. finally, the tremendous losses suffered by the regular officers' corps compelled the high command to relax to a certain extent the regulations concerning military training and education, and to introduce on a broad scale promotions from the ranks for deeds of valour, and to give rankers a short training in elementary schools to fit them to be temporary officers. these circumstances, characteristic of all armies formed from the masses, undoubtedly reduced the fighting capacity of the officers' corps, and brought about a certain change in its political outlook, bringing it nearer to that of the average russian intellectual and to democracy. this the leaders of the revolutionary democracy did not, or, to be more accurate, would not, understand in the first days of the revolution. in the course of my narrative i will differentiate between the "revolutionary democracy"--an agglomeration of socialist parties--and the true russian democracy, to which the middle-class intelligencia and the civil service elements undoubtedly belong. the spirit of the regular officers was, however, gradually changing. the japanese war, which disclosed the grave shortcomings of the country and of the army, the duma and the press, which had gained a certain liberty after , played an important part in the political education of the officers. the mystic adoration of the monarch began gradually to vanish. among the junior generals and other officers there appeared men in increasing numbers capable of differentiating between the idea of the monarchy and personalities, between the welfare of the country and the form of government. in officer circles opportunities occurred for criticism, analysis, and sometimes for severe condemnation. it is to be wondered that in these circumstances our officers remained steadfast and stoutly resisted the extremist, destructive currents of political thought. the percentage of men who reached the depths and were unmasked by the authorities was insignificant. with regard to the throne, generally speaking, there was a tendency among the officers to separate the person of the emperor from the miasma with which he was surrounded, from the political errors and misdeeds of the government, which was leading the country steadily to ruin and the army to defeat. they wanted to forgive the emperor, and tried to make excuses for him. in spite of the accepted view, the monarchical idea had no deep, mystic roots among the rank and file, and, of course, the semi-cultured masses entirely failed to realise the meaning of other forms of government preached by socialists of all shades of opinion. owing to a certain innate conservatism, to habits dating from time immemorial, and to the teaching of the church, the existing régime was considered as something quite natural and inevitable. in the mind and in the heart of the soldier the idea of a monarch was, if i may so express it, "in a potential state," rising sometimes to a point of high exaltation when the monarch was personally approached (at reviews, parades and casual meetings), and sometimes falling to indifference. at any rate, the army was in a disposition sufficiently favourable to the idea of a monarchy and to the dynasty, and that disposition could have easily been maintained. but a sticky cobweb of licentiousness and crime was being woven at petrograd and czarskoe selo. the truth, intermingled with falsehood, penetrated into the remotest corners of the country and into the army, and evoked painful regrets and sometimes malicious rejoicings. the members of the house of romanov did not preserve the "idea" which the orthodox monarchists wished to surround with a halo of greatness, nobility and reverence. i recall the impression of a sitting of the duma which i happened to attend. for the first time, gutchkov uttered a word of warning from the tribune of the duma about rasputin. "all is not well with our land." the house, which had been rather noisy, was silent, and every word, spoken in a low voice, was distinctly audible in remote corners. a mysterious cloud, pregnant with catastrophe, seemed to hang over the normal course of russian history. i will not dwell on the corrupt influences prevailing in ministerial dwellings and imperial palaces to which the filthy and cynical impostor found access, who swayed ministers and rulers. the grand duke nicholas is supposed to have threatened to hang rasputin should he venture to appear at g.h.q. general alexeiev also disapproved strongly of the man. that the influence of rasputin did not spread to the old army is due entirely to the attitude of the above-named generals. all sorts of stories about rasputin's influence was circulated at the front, and the censor collected an enormous amount of material on the subject, even from soldiers' letters from the front; but the gravest impression was produced by the word "treason" with reference to the empress. in the army, openly and everywhere, conversations were heard about the empress' persistent demands for a separate peace and of her treachery towards lord kitchener, of whose journey she was supposed to have informed the germans. as i recall the past, and the impression produced in the army by the _rumour_ of the empress' treason, i consider that this circumstance had a very great influence upon the attitude of the army towards the dynasty and the revolution. in the spring of i questioned general alexeiev on this painful subject. his answer, reluctantly given, was vague. he said: "when the empress' papers were examined she was found to be in possession of a map indicating in detail the disposition of the troops along the entire front. only two copies were prepared of this map, one for the emperor and one for myself. i was very painfully impressed. god knows who may have made use of this map." history will undoubtedly throw light on the fateful influence exercised by the empress alexandra upon the russian government in the period preceding the revolution. as regards the question of treason, this disastrous rumour has not been confirmed by a single fact, and was afterwards contradicted by the investigations of a commission specially appointed by the provisional government, on which representatives of the soviet of workmen and soldiers served. we now come to the third foundation--the _mother country_. deafened as we were, alas! by the thunder and rattle of conventional patriotic phrases, endlessly repeated along the whole length and breadth of russia, we failed to detect the fundamental, innate defect of the russian people--its lack of patriotism. it is no longer necessary to force an open door by proving this statement. the brest-litovsk treaty provoked no outburst of popular wrath. russian society was indifferent to the separation of the border states, even those that were russian in spirit and in blood. what is more, russian society approved of this dismemberment. we know of the agreement between poland and petlura, between poland and the soviet. we know that russian territorial and material riches were sold for a song to international, political usurers. need we adduce further proofs? there can be no doubt that the collapse of russian statehood as manifested in "self-determination" was in several instances caused by the desire to find a temporary safeguard against the bedlam of the soviet republic. life, however, unfortunately does not stop at the practical application of this peculiar "sanitary cordon," but strikes at the very idea of statehood. this occurred even in such stable districts as the cossack provinces, not, however, among the masses, but among the leaders themselves. thus at ekaterinodar in , at the "high krug" (assembly) of the three cossack armies, the mention of russia was omitted after a heated discussion from the proposed formula of the oath.... is crucified russia unworthy of our love? what, then, was the effect of the mother country idea upon the conscience of the old army? the upper strata of the russian intellectuals were well aware of the reasons for the world conflagration, of the conflict of the powers for political and economic supremacy, for free routes, for markets and colonies--a conflict in which russia's part was merely one of self-defence. on the other hand, the average number of the russian _intelligencia_, as well as officers, were often satisfied merely with the immediate and more obvious and easily comprehensible causes. nobody wanted the war, except, perhaps, the impressionable young officers yearning for exploits. it was believed that the powers-that-be would take every precaution in order to avoid a rupture. gradually, however, the fatal inevitability of war was understood. there was no question on our part of aggressiveness or self-interest. to sympathise sincerely with the weak and the oppressed was in keeping with the traditional attitude of russia. also, we did not draw the sword--the sword was drawn against us. that is why, when the war began, the voices were silenced of those who feared that, owing to the low level of her culture and economic development, russia would be unable to win in the contest with a strong and cultured enemy. war was accepted in a patriotic spirit, which was at times akin to enthusiasm. like the majority of the intellectuals, the officers did not take much interest in the question of war aims. the war began; defeat would have led to immeasurable disaster to our country in every sphere of its life, to territorial losses, political decadence and economic slavery. victory was, therefore, a necessity. all other questions were relegated to the background. there was plenty of time for their discussion, for new decisions and for changes. this simplified attitude towards the war, coupled with a profound understanding and with a national self-consciousness, was not understood by the left wing of the russian politicians, who were driven to zimmerwald and kienthal. no wonder, therefore, that when the anonymous and the russian leaders of the revolutionary democracy were confronted in february, , before the army was deliberately destroyed, with the dilemma: "are we to save the country or the revolution?" they chose the latter. still less did the illiterate masses of the people understand the idea of national self-preservation. the people went to war submissively, but without enthusiasm and without any clear perception of the necessity for a great sacrifice. their psychology did not rise to the understanding of abstract national principles. "the people-in-arms," for that was what the army really was, were elated by victory and downhearted when defeated. they did not fully understand the necessity for crossing the carpathians, and had, perhaps, a clearer idea of the meaning of the struggle on the styr and the pripet. and yet it found solace in the thought: "we are from tambov; the germans will not reach us." it is necessary to repeat this stale saying, because it expresses the deep-rooted psychology of the average russian. as a result of this predominance of material interests in the outlook of "the people-in-arms," they grasped more easily the simple arguments based on realities in favour of a stubborn fight and of victory, as well as the impossibility of admitting defeat. these arguments were: a foreign german domination, the ruin of the country and of the home, the weight of the taxes which would inevitably be levied after defeat, the fall in the price of grain, which would have to go through foreign channels, etc. in addition, there was some feeling of confidence that the government was doing the right thing, the more so as the nearest representatives of that power, the officers, were going forward with the troops and were dying in the same spirit of readiness and submission as the men, either because they had been ordered to do so, or else because they thought it their duty. the rank and file, therefore, bravely faced death. afterwards when confidence was shaken, the masses of the army were completely perplexed. the formulas, "without annexations and indemnities," "the self-determination of peoples," etc., proved more abstract and less intelligible than the old repudiated and rusty idea of the mother country, which still persisted underneath them. in order to keep the men at the front, the well-known arguments of a materialistic nature, such as the threat of german domination, the ruin of the home, the weight of taxes, were expounded from platforms decorated with red flags. they were taught by socialists, who favoured a war of defence. thus the three principles which formed the foundations of the army were undermined. in describing the anomalies and spiritual shortcomings of the russian army, far be it from me to place it below the level of armies of other countries. these shortcomings are inherent in all armies formed from the masses, which are almost akin to a militia, but this did not prevent these armies or our own from gaining victories and continuing the war. it is necessary, however, to draw a complete picture of the spirit of the army in order to understand its subsequent destiny. chapter ii. the army. the russo-japanese war had a very great influence upon the development of the russian army. the bitterness of defeat and the clear consciousness that the policy governing military affairs was disastrously out of date gave a great impulse to the junior military elements and forced the slack and inert elements gradually to alter their ways or else to retire. in spite of the passive resistance of several men at the head of the war ministry and the general staff, who were either incompetent or else treated the interests of the army with levity and indifference, work was done at full speed. in ten years the russian army, without of course attaining the ideal, made tremendous progress. it may be confidently asserted that, had it not been for the hard lessons of the manchurian campaign, russia would have been crushed in the first months of the great war. yet the cleansing of the commanding personnel went too slowly. our softness ("poor devil! we must give him a job"), wire-pulling, intrigues, and too slavish an observance of the rules of seniority resulted in the ranks of senior commanding officers being crowded with worthless men. the high commission for granting testimonials, which sat twice a year in petrograd, hardly knew any of those to whom these testimonials were given. therein lies the reason for the mistakes made at the outbreak of war in many appointments to high commands. four commanders-in-chief (one of them suffered from mental paralysis--it is true that his appointment was only temporary), several army commanders, many army corps and divisional commanders had to be dismissed. in the very first days of the concentration of the eighth army, in july, , general brussilov dismissed three divisional and one army corps commanders. yet nonentities retained their commands, and they ruined the troops and the operations. under the same general brussilov, general d., relieved several times of his command, went from a cavalry division to three infantry divisions in turn, and found final repose in german captivity. most unfortunately, the whole army was aware of the incompetence of these commanding officers, and wondered at their appointments. owing to these deficiencies, the strategy of the entire campaign lacked inspiration and boldness. such, for example, were the operations of the north-western front in east prussia, prompted solely by the desire of g.h.q. to save the french army from a desperate position. such, in particular, was rennenkampf's shameful manoeuvre, as well as the stubborn forcing of the carpathians, which dismembered the troops of the south-western front in , and finally our advance in the spring of . the last episode was so typical of the methods of our high command and its consequences were so grave that it is worth our while to recall it. when the armies of the south-western front took the offensive in may, the attack was eminently successful and several austrian divisions were heavily defeated. when my division, after the capture of lutsk, was moving by forced marches to vladimir volynsk, i considered--and we all considered--that our manoeuvre represented the entire scheme of the advance, that our front was dealing the main blow. we learnt afterwards that the task of dealing the main blow had been entrusted to the western front, and that brussilov's armies were only making a demonstration. there, towards vilna, large forces had been gathered, equipped with artillery and technical means such as we had never had before. for several months the troops had been preparing _places d'armes_ for the advance. at last all was ready, and the success of the southern armies that diverted the enemy's attention and his reserves also promised success to the western front. almost on the eve of the contemplated offensive the historical conversation took place on the telephone between general evert, c.-in-c. of the western front, and general alexeiev, chief of staff of the supreme commander-in-chief. the gist of the conversation was the following: _a._ circumstances require an immediate decision. are you ready for the advance and are you certain to be successful? _e._ i have no certainty of success. the enemy's positions are very strong. our troops will have to attack the positions against which their previous attacks have failed. _a._ if that is the case, you must give immediate orders for the transfer of troops to the south-western front. i will report to the emperor. so the operation, so long awaited and so methodically prepared, collapsed. the western army corps, sent to reinforce us, came too late. our advance was checked. the senseless slaughter on the swampy banks of the stokhod then began. incidentally, the guards lost the flower of their men in those battles. meanwhile, the german eastern front was going through a period of intense anxiety. "it was a critical time," says ludendorff in his _mes souvenirs de guerre_. "we had spent ourselves, and we knew full well that no one would come to our assistance if the russians chose to attack us." an episode may be mentioned in this connection, which occurred to general brussilov. the story is not widely known, and may serve as an interesting sidelight on the character of the general--one of the leaders of the campaign. after the brilliant operations of the eighth army, which ended in the crossing of the carpathians and the invasion of hungary, the c.-in-c., general brussilov, suffered a curious psychological breakdown. under the impression that a partial reverse had been sustained by one of the army corps, he issued an order for a general retreat, and the army began rapidly to roll back. he was haunted by imaginary dangers of the enemy breaking through, surrounding our troops, of attacks of enemy cavalry which were supposed to threaten the g.h.q. twice general brussilov moved his h.q. with a swiftness akin to a panicky flight. the c.-in-c. was thus detached from his armies and out of touch with them. we were retreating day after day in long, weary marches, and utterly bewildered. the austrians did not outnumber us, and their moral was no higher than ours. they did not press us. every day, my riflemen and kornilov's troops in our vicinity delivered short counter-attacks, took many prisoners, and captured machine-guns. the quartermaster-general's branch of the army was even more puzzled. every day it reported that the news of the retreat was unfounded; but brussilov at first disregarded these reports, and later became greatly incensed. the general staff then had recourse to another stratagem: they approached brussilov's old friend, the veteran general panchulidzev, chief of the army sanitation branch, and persuaded him that, if this retreat continued, the army might suspect treason and things might take an ugly turn. panchulidzev visited brussilov. an intensely painful scene took place. as a result, brussilov was found weeping bitterly and panchulidzev fainted. on the same day, an order was issued for an advance, and the troops went forward rapidly and easily, driving the austrians before them. the strategical position was restored as well as the reputation of the army commander. it must be admitted that not only the troops but the commanders were but scantily informed of the happenings of the front, and had hazy ideas on the general strategical scheme. the troops criticised them only when it was obvious that they had to pay the price of blood for these schemes. so it was in the carpathians, at stokhod, during the second attack on przemyshl in the spring of , etc. the moral of the troops was affected chiefly by the great galician retreat, the unhappy progress of the war on the northern and western fronts--where no victories were won--and by the tedious lingering for over a year in positions of which everyone was sick to death. * * * * * i have already mentioned the cadres of commissioned officers. the great and small shortcomings of these cadres increased as the cadres became separated. no one expected the campaign to be protracted, and the army organisation was not careful to preserve the cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers. they were drafted wholesale into the ranks at the outbreak of war. i remember so well a conversation that took place during the period of mobilisation, which was then contemplated against austria alone. it occurred in the flat of general v. m. dragomirov, one of the prominent leaders of the army. a telegram was brought in announcing that germany had declared war. there was a dead silence. everyone was deep in thought. somebody asked dragomirov: "how long do you think the war will last?" "four months." companies went to the front sometimes with five to six officers. regular officers, and later the majority of other officers, invariably and in all circumstances gave the example of prowess, pluck and self-sacrifice. it is only natural that most of them were killed. another reliable element--the n.c.o.'s of the reserve--was also recklessly squandered. in the beginning of the war they formed sometimes per cent. of the rank and file. relations between officers and men in the old army were not always based upon healthy principles. it cannot be denied that there was a certain aloofness caused by the insufficient attention paid by the officers to the spiritual requirements of the soldier's life. these relations, however, gradually improved as the barriers of caste and class were broken down. the war drew officers and men ever closer together, and in some regiments, mostly of the line, there was a true brotherhood in arms. one reservation must here be made. the outward intercourse bore the stamp of the general lack of culture from which not only the masses but also the russian intellectuals suffered. heartfelt solicitude, touching care of the men's needs, simplicity and friendliness--all these qualities of the russian officer, who lay for months on end in the wet, dirty trenches beside their men, ate out of the same pot, died quietly and without a murmur, was buried in the same "fraternal grave"--were marred by an occasional roughness, swearing, and sometimes by arbitrariness and blows. there can be no doubt that the same conditions existed within the ranks, and the only difference was that the sergeant and the corporal were rougher and more cruel than the officers. these deplorable circumstances coupled with the boredom and stupidity of barrack life, and the petty restrictions imposed upon the men by the military regulations, gave ample scope for underground seditious propaganda in which the soldier was described as the "victim of the arbitrariness of the men with golden epaulettes." the sound feeling and naturally healthy outlook of the men was not mentioned while the discomforts of military life were insisted on in order to foster a spirit of discontent. this state of affairs was all the more serious because during the war the process of consolidating the different units became more and more difficult. these units, and especially the infantry regiments, suffering terrible losses and changing their personnel ten or twelve times, became to some extent recruiting stations through which men flowed in an uninterrupted stream. they remained there but a short time, and failed to become imbued with the military traditions of their unit. the artillery and some other special branches remained comparatively solid, and this was due in some measure to the fact that their losses were, as compared with the losses suffered by the infantry, only in the proportion of one to ten or one to twenty. on the whole the atmosphere in the army and in the navy was not, therefore, particularly wholesome. in varying degrees, the two elements of the army--the rank and file and the commanding cadres--were divided. for this the russian officers, as well as the intellectuals, were undoubtedly responsible. their misdeeds resulted in the idea gaining ground that the _barin_ (master) and the officer were opposed to the _moujik_ and the soldier. a favourable atmosphere was thus created for the work of destructive forces. anarchist elements were by no means predominant in the army. the foundations, though somewhat unstable, had to be completely shattered; the new power had to commit a long series of mistakes and crimes to convert the state of smouldering discontent into active rebellion, the bloody spectre of which will for some time to come hang over our hapless russian land. destructive outside influences were not counteracted in the army by a reasonable process of education. this was due partly to the political unpreparedness of the officers, partly to the instinctive fear felt by the old régime of introducing "politics" into barracks, even with a view to criticising subversive doctrines. this fear was felt not only in respect of social and internal problems but even in respect of foreign policy. thus, for example, an imperial order was issued shortly before the war, strictly prohibiting any discussion amongst the soldiers on the subject of the political issues of the moment (the balkan question, the austro-serbian conflict, etc.). on the eve of the inevitable national war, the authorities persistently refrained from awakening wholesome patriotism by explaining the causes and aims of the war, and instructing the rank and file on the slav question and our long-drawn struggle against germanism. i must confess that, like many others, i did not carry out that order, and that i endeavoured properly to influence the moral of the archangel regiment which i then commanded. i published an impassioned article against the order in the military press, under the title _do not quench the spirit_. i feel certain that the statue of strassbourg in the place de la concorde in paris, draped in a black veil, played an important part in fostering the heroic spirit of the french army. propaganda penetrated into the old russian armies from all sides. there can be no doubt that the fitful attempts of the ever-changing governments of goremykin, sturmer, trepov, etc., to arrest the normal course of life in russia, provided ample material for propaganda and roused the anger of the people, which was reflected in the army. socialist and defeatist writers took advantage of this state of affairs. lenin first contrived to introduce his doctrines into russia through the social democratic party of the duma. the germans worked with even greater intensity. it should, however, be noted that all this propaganda from outside and from within affected chiefly the units of the rear, the garrisons and reserve battalions of the main centres, and especially of petrograd, and that, before the revolution, its influence at the front was comparatively insignificant. reinforcements reached the front in a state of perplexity, but under the influence of a saner atmosphere, and of healthier, albeit more arduous, conditions of warfare, they rapidly improved. the effect of destructive propaganda was, however, noticeable in certain units where the ground was favourable, and two or three cases of insubordination of entire units occurred before the revolution, and were severely repressed. finally, the bulk of the army--the peasantry--was confronted with one practical question which _prompted them instinctively to delay the social revolution_: "the land would be divided in our absence. when we return we shall divide it." * * * * * the inadequate organisation of the rear, the orgy of theft, high prices, profiteering and luxury, for which the front paid in blood, naturally afforded material for propaganda. the army, however, suffered most heavily from the lack of technical means, especially of ammunition. it was only in that general sukhomlinov's trial disclosed to the russian army and to public opinion the main causes of the military catastrophe of . plans for replenishing the russian army stores had been completed, and credits for that purpose assigned as early as in . curiously enough, these credits were increased on the initiative of the commission for national defence, not of the ministry of war. as a rule, neither the duma nor the ministry of finance ever refused war credits or reduced them. during sukhomlinov's tenure of office the war ministry obtained a special credit of million roubles, of which less than millions were spent. before the war, the question of providing the army with munitions after the peace-time stores were exhausted was never even raised. it is true that the intensity of firing reached, from the very outbreak of war, unexpected and unheard-of proportions, which upset all the theoretical calculations of military specialists in russia and abroad. naturally, heroic measures were necessary in order to deal with this tragic situation. meanwhile, the supplies of ammunition for the reinforcements that came to the front--at first only / th equipped, and later without any rifles at all--were exhausted as early as in october, . the commander-in-chief of the south-western front telegraphed to g.h.q.: "the machinery for providing ammunition has completely broken down. in the absence of fresh supplies, we shall have to cease fighting, or else send troops to the front in an extremely precarious condition." at the same time (the end of september) marshal joffre inquired "whether the imperial russian army was adequately supplied with shells for the uninterrupted conduct of war." the war minister, general sukhomlinov, replied: "the present condition of the russian army in respect of ammunition gives no ground for serious apprehension." orders were not placed abroad, and japanese and american rifles were refused "in order to avoid the inconvenience due to different calibres." when the man who was responsible for the military catastrophe faced his judges in august, , his personality produced a pitiful impression. the trial raised a more serious, painful question: "how could this irresponsible man, with no real knowledge of military matters, and perhaps even consciously a criminal, have remained in power for six years?" how "shamelessly indifferent to good and evil," according to pushkin's saying, the military bureaucracy must have been, that surrounded him and tolerated the sins of omission and commission, which invariably and systematically injured the interests of the state. the final catastrophe came in . i shall never forget the spring of , the great tragedy of the russian army---the galician retreat. we had neither cartridges nor shells. from day to day, we fought heavy battles and did lengthy marches. we were desperately tired--physically and morally. from hazy hopes we plunged into the depths of gloom. i recall an action near przemyshl in the middle of may. the fourth rifle division fought fiercely for eleven days. for eleven days the german heavy guns were roaring, and they literally blew up rows of trenches, with all their defenders. we scarcely replied at all--we had nothing to reply with. utterly exhausted regiments were beating off one attack after another with bayonets, or firing at a close range. blood was flowing, the ranks were being thinned, and graveyards growing. two regiments were almost entirely annihilated by firing. i would that our french and british friends, whose technical achievement is so wondrous, could note the following grotesque fact, which belongs to russian history: our only six-inch battery had been silent for three days. when it received fifty shells the fact was immediately telephoned to all regiments and companies, and all the riflemen heaved a sigh of relief and joy. what painful, insulting irony there was in brussilov's circular, in which the c.-in-c., incapable of providing us with ammunition, and with a view to raising our spirits and our moral, advised us not to lay too much stress upon the german superiority in heavy guns, because there had been many cases of the germans inflicting but small losses in our ranks by spending an enormous amount of shells.... on may st, general yanushkevitch (chief of the staff of the supreme c.-in-c., the grand duke nicholas nicholaievitch) telegraphed to the war minister: "the evacuation of przemyshl is an accomplished fact. brussilov alleges a shortage of ammunition, that _bête noire_, yours and mine ... a loud cry comes from all the armies: 'give us cartridges.'" * * * * * i am not inclined to idealise our army. i have to speak many sad truths about it. but when the pharisees--the leaders of the russian revolutionary democracy--endeavour to explain away the collapse of the army for which they are mainly responsible, by saying that the army was already on the verge of collapse, they are lying. i do not deny the grave shortcomings of our system of appointments to the high command, the errors of our strategy, tactics and organisation, the technical backwardness of our army, the defects of the officers' corps, the ignorance of the rank and file, and the vices of barrack life. i know the extent of desertions and shirking, of which our intellectuals were hardly less guilty than the ignorant masses. the revolutionary democracy did not, however, devote special attention to _these_ serious defects of the army. it could not remedy these evils, did not know how to cure them, and, in fact, did not combat them at all. speaking for myself, i do not know that the revolutionary democracy has cured or even dealt seriously and effectively with any one of these evils. what of the famous "freedom from bondage" of the soldier? discarding all the exaggerations which this term implies, it may be said that the mere fact of the revolution brought about a certain change in the relations between the officers and the men. in normal circumstances, and without coarse and malicious outside interference, this change might have become a source of great moral strength, instead of a disaster. it was into this sore that the revolutionary democracy poured poison. the very essence of the military organisation: its eternal, unchangeable characteristics, discipline, individual authority, and the non-political spirit of the army, were ruthlessly assailed by the revolutionary democracy. these characteristics were lost. and yet it seemed as if the downfall of the old régime opened new and immense possibilities for cleansing and uplifting the russian people's army and its command morally and technically. like people, like army. after all, the old russian army, albeit suffering from the deficiencies of the russian people, had also the people's virtues, and particularly an exceptional power of endurance in facing the horrors of war. the army fought without a murmur for nearly three years. with extraordinary prowess and self-sacrifice the men went into action with empty hands against the deadly technique of the enemy. the rivers of blood shed by the rank and file atoned for the sins of the supreme power, the government, the people, and of the army itself.[ ] our late allies should never forget that in the middle of january, , the russian army was holding on its front enemy divisions, or per cent. of the enemy's forces operating on the european and asiatic fronts. the old russian army was still strong enough to continue the war and to win victories. [diagram: comparative forces of the germans in different theatres of war] chapter iii. the old army and the emperor. in august, , the emperor, influenced by the entourage of the empress and of rasputin, decided to take the supreme command of the army. eight cabinet ministers and some politicians warned the emperor against this dangerous step, but their pleadings were of no avail. the official motives they adduced were, on the one hand, the difficulty of combining the tasks of governing the country and commanding the army, and, on the other, the risk of assuming responsibility for the army at a time when it was suffering reverses and retreating. the real motive, however, was the fear lest the difficult position of the army be further imperilled by the lack of knowledge and experience of the new supreme c.-in-c., and that the german-rasputin clique that surrounded him, having already brought about the paralysis of the government and its conflict with the duma, would bring about the collapse of the army. there was a rumour, which was afterwards confirmed, that the emperor came to this decision partly because he feared the entourage of the empress, and partly because of the popularity of the grand duke nicholas, which was growing in spite of the reverses suffered by the army. on august rd, an order was issued to the army and navy. to the official text, the emperor added a note in his own hand, a facsimile of which is reproduced overleaf: this decision, in spite of its intrinsic importance, produced no strong impression upon the army. the high commanding officers and the lower grades of commissioned officers were well aware that the emperor's personal part in the supreme command would be purely nominal, and the question in everyone's mind was: "who will be the chief of staff?" the appointment of general alexeiev appeased the anxiety of the officers. the rank and file cared but little for the technical side of the command. to them, the czar had always been the supreme leader of the army. one thing, however, somewhat perturbed them: the belief had gained ground among the people years before that the emperor was unlucky. [illustration: note added by the emperor to army and navy order _translation_:--"with firm faith in the grace of god, and with unshaken assurance of final victory, let us fulfil our sacred duty of defending russia till the end, and let us not bring shame to the russian land.--nicholas."] in reality, it was general m. v. alexeiev who took command of the armed forces of russia. in the history of the russian war and the russian turmoil, general alexeiev holds so prominent a place that his importance cannot be gauged in a few lines. a special historical study would be necessary in order to describe the career of a man whose military and political activities, which some have severely criticised and others extolled, never caused anyone to doubt that (in the words of an army order to the volunteer army) "his path of martyrdom was lighted by crystalline honesty and by a fervent love for his mother country--whether great or downtrodden." alexeiev sometimes did not display sufficient firmness in enforcing his demands, but, in respect of the independence of the "stavka" (g.h.q.) from outside influences, he showed civic courage which the high officials of the old régime, who clung to their offices, completely lacked. one day, after an official dinner at mohilev, the empress took alexeiev's arm, and went for a walk in the garden with him. she mentioned rasputin. in terms of deep emotion she tried to persuade the general that he was wrong in his attitude towards rasputin, that "the old man is a wonderful saint," that he was much calumniated, that he was deeply devoted to the imperial family, and, last but not least, that his visit would bring luck to the "stavka." alexeiev answered dryly that, so far as he was concerned, the question had long since been settled. should rasputin appear at g.h.q., he would immediately resign his post. "is this your last word?" "yes, certainly." the empress cut the conversation short, and left without saying good-bye to the general, who afterwards admitted that the incident had an ill-effect upon the emperor's attitude towards him. contrary to the established opinion, the relations between the emperor and alexeiev, outwardly perfect, were by no means intimate or friendly, or even particularly confidential. the emperor loved no one except his son. therein lies the tragedy of his life as a man and as a ruler. several times general alexeiev, depressed by the growth of popular discontent with the regime and the crown, endeavoured to exceed the limits of a military report and to represent to the emperor the state of affairs in its true light. he referred to rasputin and to the question of a responsible ministry. he invariably met with the impenetrable glance, so well-known to many, and the dry retort: "i know." not another word. in matters of army administration, the emperor fully trusted alexeiev, and listened attentively to the general's long, and perhaps even too elaborate, reports. attentively and patiently he listened, but these matters did not seem to appeal to him. there were differences of opinion in regard to minor matters, appointments to g.h.q., new posts, etc. no doubt was left in my mind as to the emperor's complete indifference in matters of high strategy after i read an important record--that of the deliberations of a military council held at g.h.q. at the end of , under the chairmanship of the emperor. all the commanders-in-chief and the high officials of g.h.q. were present, and the plans of the campaign and of a general advance were discussed. every word uttered at the conference was placed on record. one could not fail to be impressed by the dominating and guiding part played by general gourko--chief of the general staff _pro tem._--by the somewhat selfish designs of various commanders-in-chief, who were trying to adapt strategical axioms to the special interests of their fronts, and finally by the total indifference of the supreme c.-in-c. relations similar to those just described continued between the emperor and the chief of staff when general gourko took charge of that office while alexeiev, who had fallen seriously ill in the autumn of , was undergoing a cure at sevastopol, without, however, losing touch with g.h.q., with which he communicated by direct wire. * * * * * meanwhile, the struggle between the progressive block of the duma and the government (general alexeiev and the majority of the commanding officers undoubtedly sympathised with the former) was gradually becoming more and more acute. the record of the sitting of the duma of november st, (of which the publication was prohibited and an abridged version did not appear in the press till the beginning of january, ), when shulgin and miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was circulated everywhere in the army in the shape of typewritten leaflets. feeling was already running so high that these leaflets were not concealed, but were read and provoked animated discussions in officers' messes. a prominent socialist, an active worker of the union of towns, who paid his first visit to the army in , said to me: "i am amazed at the freedom with which the worthlessness of the government and the court scandals are being discussed in regiments and messes in the presence of commanding officers, at army headquarters, etc., and that in our country of arbitrary repression ... at first it seemed to me that i was dealing with 'agents provocateurs.'" the duma had been in close connection with the officers' corps for a long time. young officers unofficially partook in the work of the commission of national defence during the period of the reorganisation of the army and revival of the fleet after the japanese war. gutchkov had formed a circle, in which savitch, krupensky, count bobrinski and representatives of the officers, headed by general gourko, were included. apparently, general polivanov (who afterwards played such an important part in contributing to the disintegration of the army, as chairman of the "polivanov commission") also belonged to the circle. there was no wish to "undermine the foundations," but merely to push along the heavy, bureaucratic van, to give impetus to the work, and initiative to the offices of the inert military administration. according to gutchkov, the circle worked quite openly, and the war ministry at first even provided the members with materials. subsequently, however, general sukhomlinov's attitude changed abruptly, the circle came under suspicion, and people began to call it "the young turks." the commission of national defence was, nevertheless, very well informed. general lukomski, who was chief of the mobilisation section, and later assistant war minister, told me that reports to the commission had to be prepared extremely carefully, and that general sukhomlinov, trivial and ignorant, produced a pitiful impression on the rare occasions on which he appeared before the commission, and was subjected to a regular cross-examination. in the course of his trial, sukhomlinov himself recounted an episode which illustrates this state of affairs. one day, he arrived at a meeting of the commission when two important military questions were to be discussed. he was stopped by rodzianko,[ ] who said to him: "get away, get away. you are to us as a red rag to a bull. as soon as you come, your requests are turned down." after the galician retreat, the duma succeeded at last in enforcing the participation of its members in the task of placing on a proper basis all orders for the army, and the unions of zemstvos and towns were permitted to create the "general committee for provisioning the army." the hard experience of the war resulted at last in the simple scheme of mobilising the russian industries. no sooner did this undertaking escape from the deadening atmosphere of military offices than it advanced with giant strides. according to official data, in july, , each army received parks of artillery instead of the requisite , whereas, in september, the figure rose to , owing to the fact that private factories had been brought into the scheme. i am in a position to state, not only on the strength of figures, but from personal experience, that, at the end of , our army, albeit falling short of the high standards of the allied armies in respect of equipment, had sufficient stores of ammunition and supplies wherewith to begin an extensive and carefully-planned operation along the entire front. these circumstances were duly appreciated in the army, and confidence in the duma and in social organisations was thereby increased. the conditions of internal policy, however, were not improving. in the beginning of , out of the extremely tense atmosphere of political strife, there arose the idea of a new remedy: "revolution." * * * * * representatives of certain duma and social circles visited alexeiev, who was ill at sevastopol. they told the general quite frankly that a revolution was brewing. they knew what the effect would be in the country, but they could not tell how the front would be impressed, and wanted advice. alexeiev strongly insisted that violent changes during the war were inadmissible, that they would constitute a deadly menace to the front, which, according to his pessimistic view, "was already by no means steady," and pleaded against any irretrievable steps for the sake of preserving the army. the delegates departed, promising to take the necessary measures in order to avert the contemplated revolution. i do not know upon what information general alexeiev based his subsequent statement to the effect that the same delegates afterwards visited generals brussilov and ruzsky, and after these generals had expressed an opposite view to his, altered their previous decision; but the preparations for the revolution continued. it is as yet difficult to elucidate all the details of these negotiations. those who conducted them are silent; there are no records; the whole matter was shrouded in secrecy, and did not reach the bulk of the army. certain facts, however, have been ascertained. several people approached the emperor, and warned him of the impending danger to the country and the dynasty--alexeiev, gourko, the archbishop shavelski, purishkevitch (a reactionary member of the duma), the grand dukes nicholas mikhailovitch and alexander mikhailovitch, and the dowager empress. after rodzianko's visit to the army in the autumn of , copies of his letter to the emperor gained circulation in the army. in that letter the president of the duma warned the emperor of the grave peril to the throne and the dynasty caused by the disastrous activities of the empress alexandra in the sphere of internal policy. on november st, the grand duke nicholas mikhailovitch read a letter to the emperor, in which he pointed out the impossible manner, known to all classes of society, in which ministers were appointed, through the medium of the appalling people who surrounded the empress. the grand duke proceeded: "... if you could succeed in removing this perpetual interference, the renascence of russia would begin at once, and you would recover the confidence of the vast majority of your subjects which is now lost. when the time is ripe--and it is at hand--you can yourself grant from the throne the desired responsibility (of the government) to yourself and the legislature. this will come about naturally, easily, without any pressure from without, and not in the same way as with the memorable act of october th, .[ ] i hesitated for a long time to tell you the truth, but made up my mind when your mother and your sisters persuaded me to do so. you are on the eve of new disturbances, and, if i may say so, new attempts. believe me, if i so strongly emphasise the necessity for your liberation from the existing fetters, i am doing so not for personal motives, but only in the hope of saving you, your throne, and our beloved country from irretrievable consequences of the gravest nature." all these representations were of no avail. several members of the right and of the liberal wing of the duma and of the progressive bloc, members of the imperial family, and officers, joined the circle. one of the grand dukes was to make a last appeal to the emperor before active measures were undertaken. in the event of failure, the imperial train was to be stopped by an armed force on its way from g.h.q. to petrograd. the emperor was to be advised to abdicate, and, in the event of his refusal, he was to be removed by force. the rightful heir, the czarevitch alexis, was to be proclaimed emperor, and the grand duke michael, regent. at the same time, a large group of the progressive bloc of the duma, of representatives of zemstvos and towns--well versed in the activities of the circle--held several meetings, at which the question was discussed of "the part the duma was to play after the _coup d'état_."[ ] the new ministry was then outlined, and of the two suggested candidates for the premiership, rodzianko and prince lvov, the latter was chosen. fate, however, decreed otherwise. before the contemplated _coup d'état_ took place, there began, in the words of albert thomas, "the brightest, the most festive, the most bloodless russian revolution." chapter iv. the revolution in petrograd. i did not learn of the course of events in petrograd and at g.h.q. until some time had elapsed, and i will refer to these events briefly in order to preserve the continuity of my narrative. in a telegram addressed to the emperor by the members of the council of the empire on the night of the th february, the state of affairs was described as follows:-- "owing to the complete disorganisation of transport and to the lack of necessary materials, factories have stopped working. forced unemployment, and the acute food crisis due to the disorganisation of transport, have driven the popular masses to desperation. this feeling is further intensified by hatred towards the government and grave suspicions against the authorities, which have penetrated deeply into the soul of the nation. all this has found expression in a popular rising of elemental dimensions, and the troops are now joining the movement. the government, which has never been trusted in russia, is now utterly discredited and incapable of coping with the dangerous situation." preparations for the revolution found favourable ground in the general condition of the country, and had been made long since. the most heterogeneous elements had taken part in these activities; the german government, which spared no means for socialist and defeatist propaganda in russia, and especially among the workmen; the socialist parties, who had formed "cells" among the workmen and in the regiments; undoubtedly, too, the protopopov ministry, which was said to have been provoking a rising in the streets in order to quell it by armed force, and thus clear the intolerably tense atmosphere. it would seem that all these forces were aiming at the same goal, which they were trying to reach by diverse means, actuated by diametrically opposed motives. at the same time, the progressive block and social organisations began to prepare for great events which they considered inevitable, and other circles, in close touch with these organisations or sharing their views, were completing the arrangements for a "_palace coup d'état_" as the last means of averting the impending revolution. nevertheless, the rebellion started as an elemental force and caught everybody unawares. several days later, when general kornilov visited the executive committee of the petrograd soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies, prominent members of that body incidentally explained that "the soldiers mutinied independently of the workmen, with whom the soldiers had not been in touch on the eve of the rebellion," and that the "mutiny had not been prepared--hence the absence of a corresponding administrative organ." as regards the circles of the duma and the social organisations, they were prepared for a _coup d'état_, but not for the revolution. in the blazing fire of the outbreak they failed to preserve their moral balance and judgment. the first outbreak began on february rd, when crowds filled the streets, meetings were held, and the speakers called for a struggle against the hated power. this lasted till the th, when the popular movement assumed gigantic proportions and there were collisions with the police, in which machine-guns were brought into action. on the th an ukaze was received proroguing the duma, and on the morning of the th the members of the duma decided not to leave petrograd. on the same morning the situation underwent a drastic change, because the rebels were joined by the reserve battalions of the litovski, volynski, preobrajenski, and sapper guards' regiments. they were reserve battalions, as the real guards' regiments were then on the south-western front. these battalions did not differ, either in discipline or spirit, from any other unit of the line. in several battalions the commanding officers were disconcerted, and could not make up their minds as to their own attitude. this wavering resulted, to a certain extent, in a loss of prestige and authority. the troops came out into the streets without their officers, mingled with the crowds, and were imbued with the crowds' psychology. armed throngs, intoxicated with freedom, excited to the utmost, and incensed by street orators, filled the streets, smashed the barricades, and new crowds of waverers joined them. police detachments were mercilessly slaughtered. officers who chanced to be in the way of the crowds were disarmed and some of them killed. the armed mob seized the arsenal, the fortress of peter and paul, and the kresti prison. on that decisive day there were no leaders--there was only the tidal wave. its terrible progress appeared to be devoid of any definite object, plan, or watchword. the only cry that seemed to express the general spirit was "_long live liberty_." somebody was bound to take the movement in hand. after violent discussions, much indecision and wavering, that part was assumed by the duma. a committee of the duma was formed, which proclaimed its objects on february th in the following guarded words:-- "in the strenuous circumstances of internal strife caused by the activities of the old government, the temporary committee of the members of the duma has felt compelled to undertake the task of restoring order in the state and in society.... the committee expresses its conviction that the population and the army will render assistance in the difficult task of creating a new government, which will correspond to the wishes of the population, and which will be in a position to enjoy its confidence." there can be no doubt that the duma, having led the patriotic and national struggle against the government detested by the people, and having accomplished great and fruitful work in the interests of the army, had obtained recognition in the country and in the army. the duma now became the centre of the political life of the country. no one else could have taken the lead in the movement. no one else could have gained the confidence of the country, or such rapid and full recognition as the supreme power, as the power that emanated from the duma. the petrograd soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies was fully aware of this fact, and it did not then claim _officially_ to represent the russian government. such an attitude towards the duma at that moment created the illusion of the _national_ character of the provisional government created by the duma. alongside, therefore, with the troops that mingled with the armed mob and destroyed in their trail everything reminiscent of the old power, alongside with the units that had remained faithful to that power and resisted the mob, regiments began to flock to the taurida palace with their commanding officers, bands and banners. they greeted the new power in the person of rodzianko, president of the duma, according to the rules of the old ritual. the taurida palace presented an unusual sight--legislators, bureaucrats, soldiers, workmen, women; a chamber, a camp, a prison, a headquarters, ministries. everyone foregathered there seeking protection and salvation, demanding guidance and answers to puzzling questions which had suddenly arisen. on the same day, february th, an announcement was made from the taurida palace:-- "citizens. representatives of the workmen, soldiers and people of petrograd, sitting in the duma, declare that the first meeting of their representatives will take place at seven o'clock to-night on the premises of the duma. let the troops that have joined the people immediately elect their representatives--one to each company. let the factories elect their deputies--one to each thousand. factories with less than a thousand workmen to elect one deputy each." this proclamation had a grave and fateful effect upon the entire course of events. in the first place, it created an organ of unofficial, but undoubtedly stronger, power alongside with the provisional government--the soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies, against which the government proved impotent. in the second place, it converted the political and bourgeois revolution, both outwardly and inwardly, into a social revolution, which was unthinkable, considering the condition of the country at that time. such a revolution in war time could not fail to bring about terrible upheavals. lastly, it established a close connection between the soviet, which was inclined towards bolshevism and defeatism, and the army, which was thus infected with a ferment which resulted in its ultimate collapse. when the troops, fully officered, smartly paraded before the taurida palace, it was only for show. the link between the officers and the men had already been irretrievably broken; discipline had been shattered. henceforward, the troops of the petrograd district represented a kind of pretorian guard, whose evil force weighed heavily over the provisional government. all subsequent efforts made by gutchkov, general kornilov and g.h.q. to influence them and to send them to the front were of no avail, owing to the determined resistance of the soviet. the position of the officers was undoubtedly tragic, as they had to choose between loyalty to their oath, the distrust and enmity of the men, and the dictates of practical necessity. a small portion of the officers offered armed resistance to the mutiny, and most of them perished. some avoided taking any part in the events, but the majority in the regiments, where comparative order prevailed, tried to find in the duma a solution of the questions which perturbed their conscience. at a big meeting of officers held in petrograd on march st, a resolution was carried: "to stand by the people and unanimously to recognise the power of the executive committee of the duma, pending the convocation of the constituent assembly; because a speedy organisation of order and of united work in the rear were necessary for the victorious end of the war." * * * * * owing to the unrestrained orgy of power in which the successive rulers appointed at rasputin's suggestion had indulged during their short terms of office, there was in no political party, no class upon which the czarist government could rely. everybody considered that government as the enemy of the people. extreme monarchists and socialists, the united nobility, labour groups, grand dukes and half-educated soldiers--all were of the same opinion. i do not intend to examine the activities of the government which led to the revolution, its struggle against the people and against representative institutions. i will only draw a summary of the accusations which were justly levelled by the duma against the government on the eve of its downfall: all the institutions of the state and of society--the council of the empire, the duma, the nobility, the zemstvos, the municipalities--were under suspicion of disloyalty, and the government was in open opposition to them, and paralysed all their activities in matters of statesmanship and social welfare. lawlessness and espionage had reached unheard-of proportions. the independent russian courts of justice became subservient to "the requirements of the political moment." [illustration: funeral of the first victims of the march revolution in petrograd.] whilst in the allied countries all classes of society worked whole-heartedly for the defence of their countries, in russia that work was repudiated with contempt, and the work was done by unskilled and occasionally criminal hands, which resulted in such disastrous phenomena as the activities of sukhomlinov and protopopov. the committee "of military industries," which had rendered great services in provisioning the army, was being systematically destroyed. shortly before the revolution its labour section was arrested without any reason being assigned, and this very nearly caused sanguinary disturbances in the capital. measures adopted by the government without the participation of social organisations shattered the industrial life of the country. transport was disorganised, and fuel was wasted. the government proved incapable and impotent in combating this disorder, which was undoubtedly caused to a certain extent by the selfish and sometimes rapacious designs of industrial magnates. the villages were derelict. a series of wholesale mobilisations, without any exemptions granted to classes which worked for defence, deprived the villages of labour. prices were unsettled, and the big landowners were given certain privileges. later, the grain contribution was gravely mismanaged. there was no exchange of goods between towns and villages. all this resulted in the stopping of food supplies, famine in the towns, and repression in the villages. government servants of all kinds were impoverished by the tremendous rise in prices of commodities, and were grumbling loudly. ministerial appointments were staggering in their fitfulness, and appeared to the people as a kind of absurdity. the demands of the country for a responsible cabinet were voiced by the duma and by the best men. as late as the morning of february th, the duma considered that the granting of the minimum of the political desiderata of russian society was sufficient to postpone "the last hour in which the fate of the mother country and of the dynasty was to be settled." public opinion and the press were smothered; the military censorship of all internal regions (including moscow and petrograd) had made the widest use of its telephones. it was impregnable, protected by all the powers of martial law. ordinary censorship was no less severe. the following striking fact was discussed in the duma: in february, , a strike movement, prompted to a certain extent by the germans, began to spread in the factories. the labour members of the military industries committee then drafted a proclamation, as follows:--"comrades, workmen of petrograd, we deem it our duty to address to you an urgent request to resume work. the labouring class, fully aware of its present-day responsibilities, must not weaken itself by a protracted strike. the interests of the labouring class are calling upon you to resume work." in spite of gutchkov's appeal to the minister of the interior and to the chief censor, this appeal was twice removed from the printing press, and was prohibited. the question is still open for discussion and investigation as to what proportion of the activities of the old régime in the domain of economics can be attributed to individuals, what to the system, and what to the insuperable obstacles created in the country by a devastating war. but no excuse will ever be found for stifling the conscience, the mind, and the spirit of the people and all social initiative. no wonder, therefore, that moscow and the provinces joined the revolution without any appreciable resistance. outside petrograd, where the terror of street fighting and the rowdiness of a bloodthirsty mob were absent (there were, however, many exceptions), the revolution was greeted with satisfaction, and even with enthusiasm, not only by the revolutionary democracy, but by the real democracy, the bourgeoisie and the civil service. there was tremendous animation; thousands of people thronged the streets. fiery speeches were made. there was great rejoicing at the deliverance from the terrible nightmare; there were bright hopes for the future of russia. there was the word: "liberty." it was in the air. it was reproduced in speeches, drawings, in music, in song. it was stimulating. it was not yet stained by stupidity, by filth and blood. prince eugene troubetskoi wrote: "this revolution is unique. there have been bourgeois revolutions and proletarian revolutions, but such a national revolution, in the broadest sense of the word, as the present russian revolution, there has never been. everyone took part in this revolution, everyone made it: the proletariat, the troops, the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... all the live forces of the country.... may this unity endure!" in these words the hopes and fears of the russian intelligencia, not the sad russian realities, are reflected. the cruel mutinies at helsingfors, kronstadt, reval, and the assassination of admiral nepenin and of many officers were the first warnings to the optimists. * * * * * in the first days of the revolution the victims in the capital were few. according to the registration of the all-russian union of towns, the total number of killed and wounded in petrograd was , , including soldiers (of whom were officers). of course, many wounded were not registered. the condition of petrograd, however, out of gear and full of inflammable material and armed men, remained for a long time strained and unstable. i heard later from members of the duma and of the government that the scales were swaying violently, and that they felt like sitting on a powder-barrel which might explode at any moment and blow to bits both themselves and the structure of the new government which they were creating. the deputy-chairman of the soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies, skobelev, said to a journalist:-- "i must confess that, when in the beginning of the revolution, i went to the entrance of the taurida palace to meet the first band of soldiers that had come to the duma, and when i addressed them, i was almost certain that i was delivering one of my last speeches, and that in the course of the next few days i should be shot or hanged." several officers who had taken part in the events assured me that disorder and the universal incapacity for understanding the position in the capital were so great that _one solid battalion_, commanded by an officer who knew what he wanted, might have upset the entire position. be that as it may, the temporary committee of the duma proclaimed on march nd the formation of a provisional government. after lengthy discussions with the parallel organs of "democratic power," the soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies, the provisional government issued a declaration:-- "( ) full and immediate amnesty for all political, religious and terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. "( ) freedom of speech, the press, meetings, unions and strikes. political liberties to be granted to all men serving in the army within the limits of military requirements. "( ) cancellation of all restrictions of class, religion and nationality. "( ) immediate preparation for the convocation of a constituent assembly elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage for the establishment of a form of government and of the constitution of the country. "( ) the police to be replaced by a people's militia, with elected chiefs, subordinate to the organ of local self-government. "( ) members of local self-governing institutions to be elected by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. "( ) the units of the army that have taken part in the revolutionary movement are not to be disarmed or removed from petrograd. "( ) military discipline to be preserved on parade and on duty. the soldiers, however, are to be free to enjoy all social rights enjoyed by other citizens. "the provisional government deems it its duty to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of wartime to delay carrying out the aforesaid reforms and measures." this declaration was quite obviously drafted under pressure from the "parallel power." in his book, _mes souvenirs de guerre_, general ludendorff says: "i often dreamt of that revolution which was to alleviate the burdens of our war. eternal chimera! to-day, however, the dream suddenly and unexpectedly came true. i felt as if a heavy load had fallen off my shoulders. i could not, however, foresee that it would be the grave of our might." one of the most prominent leaders of germany--the country that had worked so hard for the poisoning of the soul of the russian people--has come to the belated conclusion that "our moral collapse began with the beginning of the russian revolution." chapter v. the revolution and the imperial family. alone in the governor's old palace at mohilev the czar suffered in silence; his wife and children were far away, and there was no one with him in whom he was able or willing to confide. protopopov and the government had at first represented the state of affairs as serious, but not alarming--popular disturbances to be suppressed with "a firm hand." several hundred machine-guns had been placed at the disposal of general habalov, commander of the troops of the petrograd district. both he and prince golitzin, president of the cabinet, had been given full authority to make use of exceptional means of quelling the riots. on the morning of the th general ivanov had been despatched with a small detachment of troops and a secret warrant, to be made public after the occupation of czarskoe selo. the warrant invested him with full military and civic powers. no one could have been less fitted than general ivanov to occupy so highly important a position, which amounted actually to a military dictatorship. ivanov was a very old man--an honest soldier, unfitted to cope with political complications and no longer in possession of strength, energy, will-power, or determination.... his success in dealing with the kronstadt disturbances of most probably suggested his present nomination. afterwards, when looking over habalov's and bieliaiev's[ ] reports, i was aghast at the pusillanimity and the shirking of responsibility which they revealed. the clouds continue to darken. on february th the empress wired to the czar: "am very anxious about the state of affairs in town...." on the same day rodzianko sent his historic telegram: "position serious. anarchy in the capital. government paralysed. transport, supplies of fuel and other necessaries completely disorganised. general discontent grows. disorderly firing in the streets. military units fire at each other. imperative necessity that some person popular in the country should be authorised to form new cabinet. no delay possible. any delay fatal. i pray god that the monarch be not now held responsible." rodzianko forwarded copies of his telegram to all the commanders-in-chief, asking their support. early on the th the president of the duma wired again to the czar: "position constantly aggravated. measures must be taken immediately, as to-morrow may be too late. this hour decides the fate of our country and the dynasty." it is incredible that, after this, the czar should not have realised the impending catastrophe, but, in the weakness and irresolution that characterised him, it is probable that he seized the slightest available excuse to postpone his decision, and in a fatalistic manner, left to fate to carry out her secret decrees.... be that as it may, another impressive warning from general alexeiev, confirmed by telegrams from the commanders-in-chief, yielded no better results, and the czar, anxious about the fate of his family, left for czarskoe selo on the morning of the th, without coming to any final decision on the concessions to be granted to his people. general alexeiev, although straightforward, wise, and patriotic, was lacking in firmness, and his power and influence with the emperor were too slight to permit of his insisting on a step the obvious necessity for which was evident even to the empress. she wired to her husband on the th: "concessions inevitable." the futile journey was two days in accomplishment. two days without any correspondence or news as to the course of events, which were developing and changing every hour.... the imperial train, taking a roundabout course, was stopped at vishera by orders from petrograd. on hearing that the petrograd garrison had acclaimed the provisional committee of the duma, and that the troops of czarskoe selo had sided with the revolution, the czar returned to pskov. at pskov, on the evening of march st, the czar saw general ruzsky, who explained the position to him, but no decision was arrived at, except that on the nd of march, at a.m., the czar again sent for ruzsky, and handed him an ukase, which made the cabinet responsible to the duma. "i knew that this compromise had come too late," said ruzsky to a correspondent, "but i had no right to express my opinion, not having received any instructions from the executive committee of the duma, so i suggested that the emperor should see rodzianko."[ ] all night long discussions full of deep interest and importance to the fate of the country were held over the wire--between ruzsky, rodzianko, and alexeiev; between headquarters and the commanders-in-chief, and between lukomsky[ ] and danilov.[ ] they unanimously agreed that the abdication of the emperor was unavoidable. before midday on march nd ruzsky communicated the opinion of rodzianko and the military commanders to the czar. the emperor heard him calmly, with no sign of emotion on his fixed, immovable countenance, but at p.m. he sent ruzsky a signed act of abdication in favour of his son--a document drawn up at headquarters and forwarded to him at pskov. if the sequence of historical events follows immutable laws of its own, there also seems to be a fate influencing casual happenings of a simple, everyday nature, which otherwise seem quite avoidable. the thirty minutes that elapsed after ruzsky had received the act of abdication materially affected the whole course of subsequent events: before copies of the document could be despatched, a communication, announcing the delegates of the duma, gutchkov and shulgin, was received.... the czar again postponed his decision and stopped the publication of the act. the delegates arrived in the evening. amidst the complete silence of the audience,[ ] gutchkov pictured the abyss that the country was nearing, and pointed out the only course to be taken--the abdication of the czar. "i have been thinking about it all yesterday and to-day, and have decided to abdicate," answered the czar. "until three o'clock to-day i was willing to abdicate in favour of my son, but i then came to realise that i could not bear to part with him. i hope you will understand this? as a consequence, i have decided to abdicate in favour of my brother." the delegates, taken aback by such an unexpected turn of events, made no objection. emotion kept gutchkov silent. "he felt he could not intrude on paternal relations, and considered that any pressure brought to bear upon the emperor would be out of place." shulgin was influenced by political motives. "he feared the little czar might grow up harbouring feelings of resentment against those who had parted him from his father and mother; also the question whether a regent could take the oath to the constitution on behalf of an emperor, who was not of age was a matter of debate."[ ] "the resentment" of the little czar concerned a distant future. as to legality, the very essence of a revolution precludes the legality of its consequences. also the _enforced_ abdication of nicholas ii., his rejection of the rights of inheritance of _his son_, a minor, and, lastly, the transfer of supreme power by michael alexandrovitch, a person who _had never_ held it, to the provisional government by means of an act, in which the grand duke "appeals" to russian citizens to obey the government, are all of doubtful legality. it is not surprising that, "in the minds of those living in those first days of the revolution"--as miliukov says--"the new government, established by the revolution, was looked upon, not as a consequence of the acts of march nd and rd, but as a result of the events of february th...." i may add that later, in the minds of many commanding officers--amongst them, kornilov, alexeiev, romanovsky and markov, who played a leading part in the attempt to save russia--legal, party or dynastic considerations had no place. this circumstance is of primary importance for a proper understanding of subsequent events. about midnight on march nd the czar handed rodzianko and ruzsky two slightly amended copies of the manifesto of his abdication. * * * * * "in the midst of our great conflict with a foreign enemy, who has been striving for close on three years to enslave our country, it has been the will of god to subject russia to new and heavy trials. incipient popular disturbances now imperil the further course of the stubborn war. the fate of russia, the honour of our heroic army, the entire future of our beloved land, demand that the war should be carried to a victorious conclusion. "the cruel foe is nearly at his last gasp, and the hour approaches when our gallant army, together with our glorious allies, will finally crush our enemy's resistance. in these decisive days of russia's existence we feel it our duty to further the firm cohesion and unification of all the forces of the people, and, with the approval of the state duma, consider it best to abdicate the throne of russia and lay down our supreme power. not wishing to part from our beloved son, we transmit our inheritance to our brother, the grand duke michael alexandrovitch, and give him our blessing in ascending the throne of the russian empire. "we command our brother to rule the state in complete and undisturbed union with the representatives of the people in such legislative institutions as the people will see fit to establish, binding himself by oath thereto in the name of our beloved country. "i call all true sons of the fatherland to fulfil their sacred duty--to obey the czar in this time of sore distress and help him, together with the representatives of the people, to lead the russian state along the road to victory, happiness and glory. "may the lord our god help russia! "nicholas." * * * * * late at night the imperial train left for mohilev. dead silence, lowered blinds and heavy, heavy thoughts. no one will ever know what feelings wrestled in the breast of nicholas ii., of the monarch, the father and the man, when, on meeting alexeiev at mohilev, and looking straight at the latter with kindly, tired eyes, he said irresolutely:-- _"i have changed my mind. please send this telegram to petrograd."_ _on a small sheet of paper, in a clear hand, the czar had himself traced his consent to the immediate accession to the throne of his son, alexis_.... alexeiev took the telegram, and--did not send it. it was too late; both manifestoes had already been made public to the army and to the country. for fear of "unsettling public opinion," alexeiev made no mention of the telegram, and kept it in his portfolio until he passed it on to me towards the end of may, when he resigned his post of supreme commander-in-chief. the document, of vast importance to future biographers of the czar, was afterwards kept under seal at the operations department of general headquarters. * * * * * meantime, the members of the cabinet and of the provisional committee[ ] had assembled at the palace of the grand duke michael alexandrovitch about midday on may rd. since the th of february, the latter had been cut off from all communication with headquarters or with the emperor. but the issue of this conference was practically predetermined by the spirit prevailing in the soviet of workmen's delegates, after the gist of the manifesto became known to them, by the resolution of protest passed by their executive committee and forwarded to the government, by kerensky's uncompromising attitude, and by the general correlation of forces. except miliukov and gutchkov, all the others, "without the faintest desire of influencing the grand duke in any way," eagerly advised him to abdicate. miliukov warned them that "the support of a symbol familiar to the masses is necessary, if decided authority is to be maintained, and that the provisional government, if left alone, might founder in the sea of popular disturbances, and that it might not survive until the convocation of the constituent assembly...." after another conference with rodzianko, president of the duma, the grand duke came to his final decision to abdicate. the "declaration" of the grand duke was published on the same day: "a heavy burden has been laid on me by the wish of my brother, who has transferred the imperial throne of all russia to me at a time of unexampled warfare and popular disturbances. "animated, together with the nation, by one thought, that the welfare of our country must prevail over every other consideration, i have decided to accept supreme power only if such be the will of our great people, whose part it is to establish the form of government and new fundamental laws of the russian state through their representatives in the constituent assembly. "with a prayer to god for his blessing, i appeal to all citizens of the russian state to obey the provisional government, which is constituted and invested with full powers by the will of the state duma, until a constituent assembly, convoked at the earliest possible moment by universal, direct, equal and secret suffrage, can establish a form of government which will embody the will of the people." "michael." after his abdication, the grand duke resided in the neighbourhood of gatchino, and stood completely aloof from political life. about the middle of march, , he was arrested by order of the local bolshevik committee, taken to petrograd, and, some time later, exiled to the government of perm. it was rumoured that the grand duke, accompanied by his faithful english valet, had escaped about the middle of july; since then nothing definite has been heard about him. the search organised by the siberian government and by that of southern russia, as also by the desire of the dowager empress, yielded no certain results. the bolsheviks, for their part, volunteered no official information whatever. but subsequent investigations brought some data to light which indicated that the "release" was a deception, and that the grand duke was secretly carried off by bolsheviks, murdered in the vicinity of perm, and his body drowned under the ice. the mystery of the grand duke's fate gave rise to fanciful rumours and even to the appearance of impostors in siberia. during the summer of , at the time of the first successful advance of the siberian troops, it was widely reported both in soviet russia and in the south that the siberian anti-bolshevist forces were led by the grand duke michael alexandrovitch. periodically, until late in , his spurious manifestoes appeared in the provincial press, chiefly in papers of the extreme right. it must be noted, however, that when, in the summer of , the kiev monarchists carried on an active campaign to impart a monarchical character to the anti-bolshevist military movement, they rejected the principle of legitimacy, partly because of the personality of some of the candidates, and, in regard to michael alexandrovitch, because he had "tied himself" by a solemn promise to the constituent assembly. in consideration of the complexity and confusion of the conditions that obtained in march, , i have come to the conclusion that a struggle to retain nicholas ii. at the head of the state would have led to anarchy, disruption of the front, and terrible consequences, both for the czar and for the country. a regency, with michael alexandrovitch as regent, might have involved conflict, but no disturbance, and was certain of success. it would have been more difficult to place michael alexandrovitch on the throne, but even that would have been possible if a constitution on broad, democratic lines had been accepted by him. the members of the provisional government and of the provisional committee--miliukov and gutchkov excepted--terrorised by the soviets of workmen's delegates, and attributing too much importance to them and to the excited workmen and soldier masses in petrograd, took on themselves a heavy responsibility for the future when they persuaded the grand duke to decline the immediate assumption of supreme power.[ ] i am not referring to monarchism or to a particular dynasty. these are secondary questions. i am speaking of russia only. it is certainly hard to say whether this power would have been lasting and stable, whether it would not have undergone changes later on; but, if it had even succeeded in maintaining the army during the war, the subsequent course of russian history might have been one of progress, and the upheavals that now endanger her very existence might have been avoided. * * * * * on march th the provisional government issued an order according to which "the ex-emperor and his consort are deprived of liberty, and the ex-emperor is to be taken to czarskoe selo." the duty of arresting the empress was laid on kornilov, and orthodox monarchists never forgave him for it. but, strangely enough, alexandra fedorovna, after hearing of the warrant, expressed her satisfaction that the renowned general kornilov, and not a member of the new government, had been sent to her. the emperor was arrested by four members of the duma. on march th, after leave-takings at headquarters, the czar quitted mohilev amidst the stony silence of the crowd, and under the tearful eyes of his mother, who never saw her son again. to understand the seemingly incomprehensible behaviour of the government to the imperial family during the period of their residence both at czarskoe selo and at tobolsk, the following circumstances must be kept in mind. notwithstanding that, in the seven and a half months of the existence of the provisional government, not one single serious attempt was made to liberate the captives, yet they attracted the exclusive attention of the soviet of workmen and soldiers' delegates. on march th vice-president sokolov made the following announcement to a unanimously approving audience: "i was informed yesterday that the provisional government had consented to allow nicholas ii. to go to england and that it is discussing arrangements with the british authorities without the knowledge or the consent of the executive committee of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. we have mobilised all the military units that we can influence, and have taken measures to prevent nicholas ii. from leaving czarskoe without our permission. telegrams have been sent down the railway lines ... to detain the train of nicholas ii. should it appear.... we have despatched our commissars with the necessary number of troops and armoured cars, and have closely surrounded the alexander palace. after that we conferred with the provisional government, who confirmed all our orders. at present the late czar is under our protection, as well as under that of the provisional government...." on the st august, , the imperial family was exiled to tobolsk, and, after the establishment of bolshevist rule in siberia, they were transferred to ekaterinburg, and were the victims of incredible insults and cruelty by the mob, until they were put to death.[ ] thus did nicholas ii. atone for his grievous sins, voluntary and involuntary, against the russian people.[ ] in the course of the second kuban campaign i received the news of the death of the emperor nicholas ii., and ordered memorial services for the soul of the former leader of the russian army to be held in the volunteer army. democratic circles and the press criticised me severely for this. the words of wisdom, _vengeance is mine: i will repay_, were obviously forgotten. chapter vi. the revolution and the army. order no. . these events found me far away from the capital, in roumania, where i was commanding the eighth army corps. in our remoteness from the mother country we felt a certain tension in the political atmosphere, but we certainly were not prepared for the sudden _dénouement_ or for the shape it assumed. on the morning of march rd i received a telegram from army headquarters--"for personal information"--to the effect that a mutiny had broken out in petrograd, that the duma had assumed power, and that the publication of important state documents was expected. a few hours later the wire transmitted the manifestoes of the emperor nicholas the second and of the grand duke michael. at first an order was given for their distribution, then, much to my amazement (as the telephones had already been spreading the news) the order was countermanded and finally confirmed. these waverings were apparently due to the negotiations between the temporary committee of the duma and the headquarters of the norman front about postponing the publication of these acts owing to a sudden change in the emperor's fundamental idea, namely, the substitution of the grand duke michael for the grand duke alexis as heir to the throne. it proved, however, impossible to delay the distribution. the troops were thunderstruck. no other word can describe the first impression produced by the _manifestoes_. there was neither sorrow nor rejoicing. there was deep, thoughtful silence. thus did the regiments of the fourteenth and fifteenth divisions take the news of the abdication of their emperor. only occasionally on parade did the rifle waver and tears course down the cheeks of old soldiers. in order accurately to describe the spirit of the moment, undimmed by the passing of time, i will quote extracts from a letter i wrote to a near relation on march th: "a page of history has been turned. the first impression is stunning because it is so unexpected and so grandiose. on the whole, however, the troops have taken the events quietly. they express themselves with caution; but three definite currents in the mentality of the men can easily be traced: ( ) a return to the past is impossible; ( ) the country will receive a constitution worthy of a great people, probably a constitutional limited monarchy; ( ) german domination will come to an end and the war will be victoriously prosecuted." the emperor's abdication was considered as the inevitable result of the internal policy of the last few years. there was, however, no irritation against the emperor personally or against the imperial family. everything was forgiven and forgotten. on the contrary, everyone was interested in their fate, and feared the worst. the appointment of the grand duke nicholas as supreme commander-in-chief, and of general alexeiev as his chief-of-staff, was favourably received, alike by officers and men, and interest was manifested in the question as to whether the army would be represented in the constituent assembly. the composition of the provisional government was treated more or less as a matter of indifference. the appointment of a civilian to the war ministry was criticised, and it was only the part he had taken in the council of national defence, and his close connection with the officers' circles, that mitigated the unfavourable impression. a great many people have found it surprising and incomprehensible that the collapse of a monarchist régime several centuries old should not have provoked in the army, bred in its traditions, either a struggle or even isolated outbreaks, or that the army should not have created its own vendée. i know of three cases only of stout resistance: the march of general ivanov's detachment on czarskoe selo, organised by headquarters in the first days of the risings in petrograd, very badly executed and soon countermanded, and two telegrams addressed to the emperor by the commanding officers of the third cavalry and the guards cavalry corps, count keller (killed in kiev in by petlura's men) and khan nachitchevansky. they both offered themselves and their troops for the suppression of the mutiny. it would be a mistake to assume that the army was quite prepared to accept the provisional "democratic republic," that there were no "loyal" units or "loyal" chiefs ready to engage in the struggle. they undoubtedly existed. there were, however, two circumstances which exercised a restraining influence. in the first place, both acts of abdication were apparently legal, and the second of these acts, in summoning the people to submit to the provisional government "invested with full power," took the wind out of the sails of the monarchists. in the second place, it was apprehended that civil war might open the front to the enemy. the army was _then_ obedient to its leaders, and they--general alexeiev and all the commanders-in-chief--recognised the new power. the newly-appointed supreme commander-in-chief, the grand duke nicholas, said in his first order of the day: "the power is established in the person of the new government. i, the supreme commander-in-chief, have recognised that power for the good of our mother country, serving as an example to us of our duty as soldiers. i order all ranks of our gallant army and navy implicitly to obey the established government through their direct chiefs. only then will god grant us victory." * * * * * the days went by. i began to receive many--both slight and important-- expressions of bewilderment and questions from the units of my corps: who represents the supreme power in russia? is it the temporary committee which created the provisional government, or is it the latter? i sent an inquiry, but received no answer. the provisional government itself, apparently, had no clear notion of the essence of its power. for whom should we pray at divine service? should we sing the national anthem and "o god, save thy people!" (a prayer in which the emperor was mentioned)? these apparent trifles produced, however, a certain confusion in the minds of the men and interfered with established military routine. the commanding officers requested that the oath should be taken as soon as possible. there was also the question whether the emperor nicolas had the right to abdicate not only for himself, but for his son, who had not yet attained his majority. other questions soon began to interest the troops. we received the first order of the day of the war minister, gutchkov, with alterations of the army regulations in favour of the "democratisation of the army" (march th). by this order, inoffensive at first sight, the officers were not to be addressed by the men according to their rank, and were not to speak to the men in the second person singular. a series of petty restrictions established by army regulations for the men, such as no smoking in the streets and other public places, no card-playing, and exclusion from clubs and meetings, were removed. the consequences came as a surprise to those who were ignorant of the psychology of the rank and file. the commanding officers understood that if it were necessary to do away with certain out-of-date forms the process should be gradual and cautious, and should by no means be interpreted as one of "the fruits of the revolutionary victory." the bulk of the men did not trouble to grasp the meaning of these insignificant changes in the army regulations, but merely accepted them as a deliverance from the restrictions imposed on them by routine and by respect to the senior officers. "there is liberty, and that's all there is to it." all these minor alterations of the army regulations, broadly interpreted by the men, affected, to a certain degree, the discipline of the army. but that soldiers should be permitted, during the war and during the revolution, to join in the membership of various unions and societies formed for political purposes, was a menace to the very existence of the army. g.h.q., perturbed by this situation, had recourse to a measure hitherto unknown in the army--to a kind of plébiscite. all commanding officers, including regimental commanders, were advised to address direct telegrams to the minister of war, expressing their views on the new orders. i do not know whether the telegraph was able to cope with this task and whether the enormous mass of telegrams reached their destination, but i know that those that came to my notice were full of criticism and of fears for the future of the army. at the same time, the army council in petrograd, consisting of senior generals--the would-be guardians of the experience and traditions of the army--decided at a meeting held on march th to make the following report to the provisional government: "the army council deems it its duty to declare its full solidarity with the energetic measures contemplated by the provisional government in re-modelling our armed forces in accordance with the new forms of life in the country and in the army. we are convinced that these reforms will be the best means of achieving rapid victory and the deliverance of europe from the yoke of prussian militarism." i cannot help sympathising with a civilian war minister after such an occurrence. it was difficult for us to understand the motives by which the war ministry was guided in issuing its orders of the day. we were unaware of the unrestrained opportunities of the men who surrounded the war minister, as well as of the fact that the provisional government was already dominated by the soviet and had entered upon the path of compromise, being invariably on the losing side. at the congress of the soviets on march th, one of the speakers stated that in the conciliation commission there never was a case in which the provisional commission did not give way on important matters. * * * * * on the first of march the soviet of workmen and soldiers' delegates issued an order of the day no. ., which practically led to the transfer of actual military power to the soldiers' committees, to a system of elections and to the dismissal of commanding officers by the men. that order of the day gained wide and painful notoriety and gave the first impetus to the collapse of the army. _order no. ._ march st, . to the garrison of the petrograd district, to all guardsmen, soldiers of the line, of the artillery, and of the fleet, for immediate and strict observance, and to the workmen of petrograd for information. the soviet of workmen and soldiers' delegates has decreed: ( ) that committees be elected of representatives of the men in all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons and separate services of various military institutions, and on the ships of the fleet. ( ) all military units not yet represented on the soviet of workmen's delegates to elect one representative from each company. these representatives to provide themselves with written certificates and to report to the duma at a.m. on march nd. ( ) in all its political activities the military unit is subordinate to the soviet,[ ] and to its committees. ( ) the orders of the military commission of the duma are to be obeyed only when they are not in contradiction with the orders and decrees of the soviet. ( ) all arms--rifles, machine-guns, armoured cars, etc.--are to be at the disposal and under the control of company and battalion committees, and should never be handed over to the officers even should they claim them. ( ) on parade and on duty the soldiers must comply with strict military discipline; but off parade and off duty, in their political, social and private life, soldiers must suffer no restriction of the rights common to all citizens. in particular, saluting when off duty is abolished. ( ) officers are no longer to be addressed as "your excellency," "your honour," etc. instead, they should be addressed as "mr. general," "mr. colonel," etc. rudeness to soldiers on the part of all ranks, and in particular addressing them in the second person singular, is prohibited, and any infringement of this regulation and misunderstandings between officers and men are to be reported by the latter to the company commanders. (signed) the petrograd soviet. the leaders of the revolutionary democracy understood full well the results of order no. . kerensky is reported to have declared afterwards pathetically that he would have given ten years of his life to prevent the order from being signed. the investigation made by military authorities failed to detect the authors of this order. tchkeidze and other members of the soviet afterwards denied their personal participation and that of the members of the committee in the drafting of the order. pilates! they washed their hands of the writing of their own credo. for their words are placed on record, in the report of the secret sitting of the government, the commanders-in-chief and the executive committee of the workmen and soldiers' deputies of may th, : _tzeretelli_: you might, perhaps, understand order no. if you knew the circumstances in which it was issued. we were confronted with an unorganised mob, and we had to organise. _skobelev_: i consider it necessary to explain the circumstances in which order no. . was issued. among the troops that overthrew the old régime, the commanding officers did not join the rebels. in order to deprive the former of their importance, we were forced to issue order no. . we had inward apprehensions as to the attitude of the front towards the revolution. certain instructions were given, which provoked our distrust. to-day we have ascertained that this distrust was well founded. a member of the soviet, joseph goldenberg, editor of _new life_, was still more outspoken. he said to the french journalist, claude anet: (claude anet: _la révolution russe_) "order no. . was not an error, but a necessity. it was not drafted by sokolov. it is the expression of the unanimous will of the soviet. on the day we 'made the revolution,' we understood that if we did not dismember the old army, it would crush the revolution. we had to choose between the army and the revolution. we did not hesitate--we chose the latter, and i dare say that we were right." order no. . was disseminated rapidly and everywhere along the whole front and in the rear, because the ideas which it embodied had developed for many years, in the slums of petrograd as well as in the remote corners of the empire, such as vladivostock. they had been preached by all local army demagogues and were being repeated by all the delegates who visited the front in vast numbers and were provided with certificates of immunity by the soviet. * * * * * the masses of the soldiery were perturbed. the movement began in the rear, always more easily demoralised than the front, among the half-educated clerks, doctors' assistants, and technical units. in the latter part of march in our units, breaches of discipline only became more frequent. the officer in command of the fourth army was expecting every hour that he would be arrested at his headquarters by the licentious bands of men attached to service battalions for special duty, such as tailoring, cooking, bootmaking, etc. the text of the oath of allegiance to the russian state was received at last. the idea of supreme power was expressed in these words: "i swear to obey the provisional government now at the head of the russian state, pending the expression of the popular will through the medium of the constituent assembly." the oath was taken by the troops everywhere without any disturbance, but the idyllic hopes of the commanding officers were not fulfilled. there was no uplifting of the spirit and the perturbed minds were not quieted. i may quote two characteristic episodes. the commander of one of the corps on the roumanian front died of heart-failure during the ceremony. count keller declared that he would not compel his corps to take the oath because he did not understand the substance and the legal foundations of the supreme power of the provisional government. (replying to a question addressed from the crowd as to who had elected the provisional government, miliukov had answered: "we have been elected by the russian revolution"). count keller said he did not understand how one could swear allegiance to lvov, kerensky and other individuals, because they could be removed or relinquish their posts. was the oath a sham? i think that not only for the monarchists, but for many men who did not look upon the oath as a mere formality, it was in any case a great, moral drama difficult to live through. it was a heavy sacrifice made for the sake of the country's salvation and for the preservation of the army.... in the middle of may i was ordered to attend a council at the headquarters of the general-in-command of the fourth army. a long telegram was read from general alexeiev full of the darkest possible pessimism, recounting the beginning of the administrative machine and of the army. he described the demagogic activities of the soviet, which dominated the will-power and the conscience of the provisional government, the complete impotence of the latter and the interference of both in army administration. in order to counteract the dismemberment of the army, the despatch was contemplated of members of the duma and of the soviet, possessing a certain amount of statesmanlike experience, to the front for purposes of propaganda.... this telegram impressed us all in the same way: _general headquarters had ceased to be the chief administrative authority in the army._ and yet a stern warning and remonstrance from the high command, supported by the army, which in the first fortnight had still retained discipline and obedience might, perhaps, have relegated the soviet, which over-estimated its importance, to its proper place; might have prevented the "democratisation" of the army and might have exercised a corresponding pressure upon the entire course of political events, albeit devoid of any character of counter-revolution or of military dictatorship. the loyalty of the commanding officers and the complete absence of active resistance on their part to the destructive policy of petrograd exceeded all the expectations of the revolutionary democracy. kornilov's movement came too late. we drafted a reply suggesting stringent measures against intrusion into the sphere of military administration. on march th i received orders to proceed forthwith to petrograd and to report to the war minister. i left on the same night and by means of a complex system of carts, motor cars and railway carriages arrived in the capital after five days' journey. on my way i passed through the headquarters of generals letchitski, kaledin, and brussilov. i met many officers and many men connected with the army. everywhere i heard the same bitter complaint and the same request: "tell _them_ that _they_ are ruining the army." the summons i had received gave no indication as to the object of my errand. i was completely in the dark and made all kinds of surmises. in kiev i was struck by the cry of a newsboy who ran past. he shouted: "latest news. general denikin is appointed chief of the staff of the supreme commander-in-chief." chapter vii. impressions of petrograd at the end of march, . before his abdication the emperor signed two ukazes--appointing prince lvov president of the council of ministers and the grand-duke nicholas supreme commander-in-chief. "in view of the general attitude towards the romanov dynasty," as the official petrograd papers said, and in reality for fear of the soviet's attempting a military _coup d'état_, the grand-duke nicholas was informed on march th by the provisional government that it was undesirable that he should remain in supreme command. prince lvov wrote: "the situation makes your resignation imperative. public opinion is definitely and resolutely opposed to any members of the house of romanov holding any office in the state. the provisional government is not entitled to disregard the voice of the people, because such disregard might bring about serious complications. the provisional government is convinced that, for the good of the country, you will bow to the necessity and will resign before returning to g.h.q." this letter reached the grand-duke when he had already arrived at g.h.q. deeply offended, he immediately handed over to general alexeiev and replied to the government: "i am glad once more to prove my love for my country, which russia _heretofore_ has never doubted...." the very serious question then arose of who was to succeed him. there was great excitement at g.h.q., and all sorts of rumours were circulated, but on the day i passed mohilev nothing was known. on the rd i reported to the war minister gutchkov, whom i had never met before. he informed me that the government had decided to appoint general alexeiev to the supreme command. at first there had been differences of opinion. rodzianko and others were against alexeiev. rodzianko suggested brussilov; but now the choice had definitely fallen on alexeiev. the government considered him as a man of lenient disposition, and deemed it necessary to reinforce the supreme command by a fighting general as chief-of-staff. i had been selected on condition that general klembovski, who was then alexeiev's assistant, should remain in charge _pro tem._ until i became familiar with the work. i had been, in part, prepared for this offer by the news columns of the kiev paper. nevertheless, i felt a certain emotion, and apprehended the vast amount of work which was being thrust upon me so unexpectedly and the tremendous moral responsibility inherent in such an appointment. at great length and quite sincerely i adduced arguments against the appointment. i said that my career had been spent among my men and at fighting headquarters, that during the war i had commanded a division and an army corps, and that i was very anxious to continue this work at the front. i said that i had never dealt with matters of policy, of national defence, or of administration on such a colossal scale. the appointment, moreover, had an unpleasant feature. it appears that gutchkov had quite frankly explained to alexeiev the reasons for my appointment on behalf of the provisional government, and had given the matter the character of an ultimatum. a grave complication had thus arisen. a chief-of-staff was being imposed upon the supreme c.-in-c., and for motives not altogether complimentary to the latter. my arguments, however, were unavailing. i succeeded in obtaining a delay and the privilege of discussing the matter with general alexeiev before taking a definite decision. in the war minister's office i met my colleague, general krymov, and we were both present while the minister's assistants reported on uninteresting matters of routine. we then retired into the next room and began to talk frankly. "for god's sake," said krymov, "don't refuse the appointment. it is absolutely necessary." he imparted to me his impressions in abrupt sentences in his own peculiar and somewhat rough language, but with all his usual sincerity. he had arrived on march th, summoned by gutchkov, with whom he had been on friendly terms, and they had worked together. he was offered several prominent posts, had asked leave to look round, and then had refused them all. "i saw that there was nothing for me to do in petrograd, and i disliked it all." he particularly disliked the men who surrounded gutchkov. "i am leaving colonel samarine, of the general staff, as a liaison officer. there will be at least one live man." by the irony of fate that officer whom krymov trusted so well afterwards played a fatal part, as he was the indirect cause of the general's suicide.... krymov was very pessimistic in his account of the political situation: "nothing will come of it in any case. how can business be done when the soviet and the licentious soldiery hold the government pinioned? i offered to cleanse petrograd in two days with one division; but, of course, not without bloodshed. 'not for anything in the world,' they said. gutchkov refused. prince lvov, with a gesture of despair, exclaimed: 'oh! but there would be such a commotion!' things will get worse. one of these days i shall go back to my army corps. i cannot afford to lose touch with the troops, as it is upon them that i base all my hopes. my corps maintains complete order and, perhaps, i shall succeed in preserving that spirit." * * * * * i had not seen petrograd for four years. the impression produced by the capital was painful and strange.... to begin with, the hotel astoria, where i stayed, had been ransacked. in the hall there was a guard of rough and undisciplined sailors of the guards. the streets were crowded, but dirty and filled with the new masters of the situation in khaki overcoats. remote from the sufferings of the front, they were "deepening and saving" the revolution. from whom? i had read a great deal about the enthusiasm in petrograd, but i found none. it was nowhere to be seen. the ministers and rulers were pale, haggard, exhausted by sleepless nights and endless speeches at meetings and councils, by addresses to various delegations and to the mob. their excitement was artificial, their oratory was full of sonorous phrases and commonplaces, of which the orators themselves were presumably thoroughly sick. inwardly in their heart of hearts they were deeply anxious. no practical work was being done; in fact, the ministers had no time to concentrate their thoughts upon the current affairs of state in their departments. the old bureaucratic machine, creaking and groaning, continued to work in a haphazard manner. the old wheels were still revolving while a new handle was being applied. the officers of the regular army felt themselves to be stepsons of the revolution and were unable to hit upon a proper tone in dealing with the men. among the higher ranks, and especially the officers of the general staff, there appeared already a new type of opportunist and demagogue. these men played upon the weaknesses of the soviet and of the new governing class of workmen and soldiers, to flatter the instincts of the crowd, thereby gaining their confidence and making new openings for themselves and for their careers against the background of revolutionary turmoil. i must, however, admit that in those days the military circles proved sufficiently stolid in spite of all the efforts to dismember them, and that the seeds of demoralisation were not allowed to grow. men of the type described above, such as the young assistant of the war minister, kerensky, as well as generals brussilov, cheremissov, bonch-bruevitch, verkhovsky, admiral maximov and others were unable to strengthen their influence and their position with the officers. the citizen of petrograd, in the broadest sense of the word, was by no means enthusiastic. the first enthusiasm was exhausted and was followed by anxiety and indecision. another feature of the life in petrograd deserves to be noticed. men have ceased to be themselves. most of them seem to be acting a part instead of living a life inspired by the new breath of revolution. such was the case even in the councils of the provisional government, in which the deliberations were not altogether sincere, so i was told, owing to the presence of kerensky, the "hostage of democracy." tactical considerations, caution, partisanship, anxiety for one's career, feelings of self-preservation, nervousness and various other good and bad feelings prompted men to wear blinkers and to walk about in these blinkers as apologists for, or at least passive witnesses of, "the conquests of the revolution." such conquests as obviously savoured of death and corruption. hence the false pathos of endless speeches and meetings; hence these seemingly strange contradictions. prince lvov saying in a public speech: "the process of the great russian revolution is not yet complete, but every day strengthens our faith in the inexhaustible creative forces of the russian people, in its statesmanlike wisdom and in the greatness of its soul."... the same prince lvov bitterly complaining to alexeiev of the impossible conditions under which the provisional government was working, owing to the rapid growth of demagogy in the soviet and in the country. kerensky, the exponent of the idea of soldiers' committees, and kerensky sitting in his railway carriage and nervously whispering to his adjutant: "send these d.... committees to h...." tchkheidze and skobelev warmly advocating full democratisation of the army at a joint sitting of the soviet, of the government and of the commanders-in-chief, and during an interval in private conversation admitting the necessity of rigid military discipline and of their own incapacity to convince the soviet of this necessity.... i repeat that even then, at the end of march, one could clearly feel in petrograd that the ringing of the easter bells had lasted too long, and that they would have done better to ring the alarm bell. there were only two men of all those to whom i had the occasion to speak who had no illusions whatever: krymov and kornilov. * * * * * i met kornilov for the first time on the galician plains, near galtich, at the end of august, , when he was appointed to the command of the th infantry division and myself to the th (iron) rifle brigade. since that day, for four months, our troops went forward side by side as part of the th corps, fighting incessant, glorious and heavy battles, defeating the enemy, crossing the carpathians and invading hungary. owing to the wide extent of the front we did not often meet; nevertheless, we knew each other very well. i had already then a clear perception of kornilov's main characteristics as a leader. he had an extraordinary capacity for training troops: out of a second-rate unit from the district of kazan he made, in several weeks, an excellent fighting division. he was resolute and extremely pertinacious in conducting the most difficult and even apparently doomed operations. his personal prowess, which provoked boundless admiration and gave him great popularity among the troops, was admirable. finally, he scrupulously observed military ethics with regard to units fighting by his side and to his comrades-in-arms. many commanding officers and units lacked that quality. after kornilov's astounding escape from austrian captivity, into which he fell when heavily wounded, and covering brussilov's retreat from the carpathians, towards the beginning of the revolution, he commanded the th corps. all those who knew kornilov even slightly felt that he was destined to play an important part in the russian revolution. on march nd rodzianko telegraphed direct to kornilov: "the temporary committee of the duma requests you, for your country's sake, to accept the chief command in petrograd and to arrive at the capital at once. we have no doubt that you will not refuse the appointment, and will thereby render an inestimable service to the country." such a revolutionary method of appointing an officer to a high command, without reference to g.h.q., obviously produced a bad impression at the "stavka." the telegram received at the "stavka" is marked "undelivered," but on the same day general alexeiev, having requested the permission of the emperor, who was then at pskov, issued an order of the day (no. ): "... i agree to general kornilov being in temporary high command of the troops of the petrograd military district." i have mentioned this insignificant episode in order to explain the somewhat abnormal relations between two prominent leaders, which were occasioned by repeated, petty, personal friction. i talked to kornilov at dinner in the war minister's house. it was the only moment of rest he could snatch during the day. kornilov, tired, morose and somewhat pessimistic, discussed at length the conditions of the petrograd garrison, and his intercourse with the soviet. the hero-worship with which he had been surrounded in the army had faded in the unhealthy atmosphere of the capital among the demoralised troops. they were holding meetings, deserting, indulging in petty commerce in shops and in the street, serving as hall-porters and as personal guards to private individuals, partaking in plundering and arbitrary searches, but were not serving. it was difficult for a fighting general to understand their psychology. he often succeeded by personal pluck, disregard of danger, and by a witty, picturesque word in holding the mob, for that was what military units were. there were, however, cases when the troops did not come out of barracks to meet their commander-in-chief, when he was hissed and the flag of st. george was torn from his motor-car (by the finland regiment of the guards). kornilov's description of the political situation was the same as that given by krymov: powerlessness of the government and the inevitability of a fierce cleansing of petrograd. on one point they differed: kornilov stubbornly clung to the hope that he would yet succeed in gaining authority over the majority of the petrograd garrison. as we know, that hope was never fulfilled. chapter viii. the stavka: its rÔle and position. on march th i arrived at the stavka, and was immediately received by general alexeiev. of course he was offended. "well," he said, "if such are the orders, what's to be done?" again, as at the war ministry, i pointed out several reasons against my appointment, among others, my disinclination for staff work. i asked the general to express his views quite frankly, and in disregard of all conventionalities as my old professor, because i would not think of accepting the appointment against his will. alexeiev spoke politely, dryly, evasively, and showed again that he was offended. "the scope," he said, "was wide, work difficult, and much training necessary. let us, however, work harmoniously." in the course of my long career i have never been placed in such a position, and could not, of course, be reconciled to such an attitude. "in these circumstances," i said, "i absolutely refuse to accept the appointment. in order to avoid friction between yourself and the government, i will declare that it is entirely my own personal decision." alexeiev's tone changed immediately. "oh! no," he said, "i am not asking you to refuse. let us work together, and i will help you. also, there is no reason, if you feel that the work is not to your liking, why you should not take command of the first army, in which there will be a vacancy two or three months hence. i will have to talk the matter over with general klembovski. he could not, of course, remain here as my assistant." [illustration: general alexeiev.] [illustration: general kornilov.] our parting was not quite so frigid; but a couple of days went by and there were no results. i lived in a railway carriage, and did not go to the office or to the mess. as i did not intend to tolerate this silly and utterly undeserved position, i was preparing to leave petrograd. on march th the war minister came to the stavka and cut the gordian knot. klembovski was offered the command of an army or membership of the war council. he chose the latter, and on april th i took charge as chief of the staff. nevertheless, such a method of appointing the closest assistant to the supreme commander-in-chief, practically by force, could not but leave a certain trace. a kind of shadow seemed to lie between myself and general alexeiev, and it did not disappear until the last stage of his tenure of office. alexeiev saw in my appointment a kind of tutelage on the part of the government. from the very first moment i was compelled to oppose petrograd. i served our cause and tried to shield the supreme c.-in-c.--and of this he was often unaware--from many conflicts and much friction, taking them upon myself. as time went by friendly relations of complete mutual trust were established, and these did not cease until the day of alexeiev's death. on april nd the general received the following telegram: "the provisional government has appointed you supreme commander-in-chief. it trusts that, under your firm guidance, the army and the navy will fulfil their duty to the country to the end." my appointment was gazetted on april th. * * * * * the stavka, on the whole was not favoured. in the circles of the revolutionary democracy it was considered a nest of counter-revolution, although such a description was utterly undeserved. under alexeiev there was a loyal struggle against the disruption of the army. under brussilov--opportunism slightly tainted with subservience to the revolutionary democracy. as regards the kornilov movement, although it was not essentially counter-revolutionary, it aimed, as we shall see later, at combatting the soviets that were half-bolshevik. but, even then, the loyalty of the officers of the stavka was quite obvious. only a few of them took an active part in the kornilov movement. after the office of supreme commander-in-chief was abolished, and the new office created of supreme commanding committees, nearly all the members of the stavka under kerensky, and the majority of them under krylenko, continued to carry on the routine work. the army also disliked the stavka--sometimes wrongly, sometimes rightly--because the army did not quite understand the distribution of functions among the various branches of the service, and ascribed to the stavka many shortcomings in equipment, organisation, promotion, awards, etc., whereas these questions belonged entirely to the war ministry and its subordinates. the stavka had always been somewhat out of touch with the army. under the comparatively normal and smoothly working conditions of the pre-revolutionary period this circumstance did not greatly prejudice the working of the ruling mechanism; but now, when the army was not in a normal condition, and had been affected by the whirlwind of the revolution, the stavka naturally was behind the times. finally, a certain amount of friction could not fail to arise between the government and the stavka, because the latter constantly protested against many government measures, which exercised a disturbing influence on the army. there were no other serious reasons for difference of opinion, because neither alexeiev nor myself, nor the various sections of the stavka, ever touched upon matters of internal policy. the stavka was non-political in the fullest sense of the word, and during the first months of the revolution was a perfectly reliable technical apparatus in the hands of the provisional government. the stavka did but safeguard the highest interests of the army, and, within the limits of the war and of the army, demanded that full powers be given to the supreme commander-in-chief. i may even say that the personnel of the stavka seemed to me to be bureaucratic and too deeply immersed in the sphere of purely technical interests; they were not sufficiently interested in the political and social questions which events had brought to the fore. * * * * * in discussing the russian strategy in the great war, after august, , one should always bear in mind that it was the personal strategy of general alexeiev. he alone bears the responsibility before history for its course, its successes and failures. a man of exceptional conscientiousness and self-sacrifice, and devoted to his work, he had one serious failing: all his life he did the work of others as well as his own. so it was when he held the post of quartermaster-general of the general staff, of chief-of-staff of the kiev district, and later of the south-western front and finally of chief-of-staff to the supreme c.-in-c. nobody influenced strategical decisions, and, as often as not, final instructions, written in alexeiev's tiny and neat hand-writing, appeared unexpectedly on the desk of the quartermaster-general, whose duty under the law and whose responsibility in these matters were very grave. if such a procedure was to a certain extent justifiable, when the post of quartermaster-general was occupied by a nonentity, there was no excuse for it when he was superseded by other quartermasters-general, such as lukomski or josephovitch. these men could not accept such a position. the former, as a rule, protested by sending in memoranda embodying his opinion, which was adverse to the plan of operations. such protests, of course, were purely academic, but presented a guarantee against the judgment of history. general klembovski, my predecessor, was compelled to demand non-interference with the rightful sphere of his competence as a condition of his tenure of office. till then, alexeiev had directed all the branches of administration. when these branches acquired a still broader scope, this proved practically impossible, and i was given full liberty in my work except ... in respect of strategy. again, alexeiev began to send telegrams in his own hand of a strategical nature, orders and directions, the motives of which the quartermaster-general and myself could not understand. several times, three of us, the quartermaster-general, josephovitch, his assistant, general markov, and myself, discussed this question. the quick-tempered josephovitch was greatly excited, and asked to be appointed to a divisional command. "i cannot be a clerk," he said. "there is no need for a quartermaster-general at the stavka if every clerk can type instructions." the general and myself began to contemplate resignation. markov said that he would not stay for a single day if we went. i finally decided to have a frank talk with alexeiev. we were both under the strain of emotion. we parted as friends, but we did not settle the question. alexeiev said: "do i not give you a full share of the work? i do not understand you." alexeiev was quite sincerely surprised because during the war he had grown accustomed to a régime which appeared to him perfectly normal. so we three held another conference. after a lengthy discussion, we decided that the plan of campaign for had long since been worked out, that preparations for that campaign had reached a stage in which substantial alterations had become impossible, that the details of the concentration and distribution of troops were in the present condition of the army a difficult matter, allowing for differences of opinion; that we could perhaps manage to effect certain alterations of the plan, and that finally our retirement _in corpore_ might be detrimental to the work, and might undermine the position of the supreme c.-in-c., which was already by no means stable. we therefore decided to wait and see. we did not have to wait very long, because, at the end of may, alexeiev left the stavka, and we followed him very soon afterwards. * * * * * what place did the stavka occupy as a military and political factor of the revolutionary period? the importance of the stavka diminished. in the days of the imperial régime, the stavka, from the military point of view, occupied a predominant position. no individual or institution in the state was entitled to issue instructions or to call to account the supreme commander-in-chief, and it was alexeiev and not the czar who in reality held that office. not a single measure of the war ministry, even if indirectly affecting the interests of the army, could be adopted without the sanction of the stavka. the stavka gave direct orders to the war minister and to his department on questions appertaining to the care of the army. the voice of the stavka had a certain weight and importance in the practical domain of administration at the theatre of war, albeit without any connection with the general trend of internal policy. that power was not exercised to a sufficient degree; but on principle it afforded the opportunity of carrying on the defence of the country in co-operation with other branches of the administration, which were to a certain extent subordinate to it. with the beginning of the revolution, these conditions underwent a radical change. contrary to the examples of history and to the dictates of military science, the stavka became practically subordinate to the war minister. this was not due to any act of the government, but merely to the fact that the provisional government combined supreme power with executive power, as well as to the combination of the strong character of gutchkov and the yielding nature of alexeiev. the stavka could no longer address rightful demands to the branches of the war ministry which were attending to army equipments. it conducted a lengthy correspondence and appealed to the ministry of war. the war minister, who now signed orders instead of the emperor, exercised a strong influence upon appointments and dismissals of officers in high command. these appointments were sometimes made by him after consultation with the fronts, but the stavka was not informed. army regulations of the highest importance altering the conditions of the troops in respect of reinforcements, routine and duty, were issued by the ministry without the participation of the supreme command, which learnt of their issue only from the press. in fact, such a participation would have actually been useless. two products of the polivanov commission--the new courts and the committees--which gutchkov _accidentally_ asked me to look through, were returned with a series of substantial objections of my own, and gutchkov expounded them in vain before the representatives of the soviet. the only result was that certain changes in the drafting of the regulations were made. all these circumstances undoubtedly undermined the authority of the stavka in the eyes of the army, and prompted the generals in high command to approach the more powerful central government departments without reference to the stavka, as well as to display excessive individual initiative in matters of paramount importance to the state and to the army. thus, in may, , on the northern front, all the pre-war soldiers were discharged instead of the prescribed percentage, and this created grave difficulties on other fronts. on the south-western front ukranian units were being formed. the admiral in command of the baltic fleet ordered the officers to remove their shoulder-straps, etc. the stavka had lost influence and power, and could no longer occupy the commanding position of an administrative and moral centre. this occurred at the most terrible stage of the world war, when the army was beginning to disintegrate, and when not only the entire strength of the people was being put to the test, but the necessity had arisen for a power exceptionally strong and wide in its bearing. meanwhile, the matter was quite obvious: if alexeiev and denikin did not enjoy the confidence of the government, and were considered inadequate to the requirements of the supreme command, they should have been superseded by new men who did enjoy that confidence and who should have been invested with full powers. as a matter of fact, changes were made twice. but only the men were changed, not the principles of the high command. in the circumstances, when no one actually wielded power, military power was not centred in anybody's hands. neither the chiefs who enjoyed the reputation of serving their country loyally and with exceptional devotion, like alexeiev, and later the "iron chiefs," such as kornilov undoubtedly was and as brussilov was supposed to be, nor all the chameleons that fed from the hand of the socialist reformers of the army had any real power. the entire military hierarchy was shaken to its very foundations, though it retained all the attributes of power and the customary routine--instructions which could not move the armies, orders that were never carried out, verdicts of the courts which were derided. the full weight of oppression, following the line of the least resistance, fell solely upon the loyal commanding officers, who submitted without a murmur to persecution from above as well as from below. the government and the war ministry, having abolished repressions, had recourse to a new method of influencing the masses--to _appeals_. appeals to the people, to the army, to the cossacks, to everybody, flooded the country, inviting all to do their duty. unfortunately, only those appeals were successful that flattered the meanest instincts of the mob, inviting it to neglect its duty. as a result, it was not counter-revolution, buonapartism, or adventure, but the elemental desire of the circles where the ideas of statesmanship still prevailed, to restore the broken laws of warfare, that soon gave rise to a new watchword: "_military power must be seized_." such a task was not congenial to alexeiev or brussilov. kornilov subsequently endeavoured to undertake it, and began independently to carry out a series of important military measures and to address ultimatums on military questions to the government. at first, the only question raised was that of granting "full powers" to the supreme command within the scope of its competence. it is interesting to compare this state of affairs with that of the command of the armies of our powerful foe. ludendorff, the first quartermaster-general of the german army says (_mes souvenirs de guerre_): "in peace-time the imperial government exercised full power over its departments.... when the war began the ministers found it difficult to get used to seeing in g.h.q. a power which was compelled, by the immensity of its task, to act with greater resolution as that resolution weakened in berlin. would that the government could clearly have perceived this simple truth.... the government went its own way, and never abandoned any of its designs in compliance with the wishes of g.h.q. on the contrary, it disregarded much that we considered necessary for the prosecution of the war." if we recall that in march, , the deputy of the reichstag, haase, was more than justified in saying that the chancellor was nothing but a figure-head covering the military party, and that ludendorff was actually governing the country, we will understand the extent of the power which the german command deemed it necessary to exercise in order to win the world war. i have drawn a general picture of the stavka, such as it was when i took charge as chief-of-staff. taking the entire position into consideration, i had two main objects in view: first, to counteract with all my strength the influences which were disrupting the army, so as to preserve that army and to hold the eastern front in the world struggle; and secondly, to reinforce the rights, the power, and the authority of the supreme commander-in-chief. a loyal struggle was at hand. in that struggle, which only lasted two months, all sections of the stavka had their share. [illustration: general markov.] chapter ix. general markov. the duties of the quartermaster-general in the stavka were many-sided and complex. as in the european army, it proved therefore necessary to create the office of a second quartermaster-general. the first dealt merely with matters concerning the conduct of operations. i invited general markov to accept this new office. his fate was linked up with mine until his glorious death at the head of a volunteer division. that division afterwards bore with honour his name, which has become legendary in the volunteer army. at the outbreak of war he was a lecturer at the academy of the general staff. he went to the war as staff-officer to general alexeiev. then he joined the th division, and in december, , he served under my command as chief-of-staff of the th rifle brigade, which i then commanded. when he came to our brigade he was unknown and unexpected, as i had asked the army g.h.q. for another man to be appointed. immediately upon his arrival he told me that he had recently undergone a slight operation, was not feeling well, was unable to ride, and would not go up to the front line. i frowned, and the staff exchanged significant glances. the "professor," as we afterwards often called him as a friendly jest, was obviously out of place in our midst. i started one day with my staff, all mounted, towards the line where my riflemen were fiercely fighting, near the town of friestach. the enemy was upon us, and the fire was intense. suddenly, repeated showers of shrapnel came down upon us. we wondered what it meant, and there was markov gaily smiling, openly driving to the firing line in a huge carriage. "i was bored staying in, so i have come to see what is going on here." from that day the ice was broken, and markov assumed a proper place in the family of the "iron division." i have never met a man who loved military work to such an extent as markov. he was young (when he was killed in the summer of in action he was only years of age), impetuous, communicative, eloquent. he knew how to approach, and closely, too, any _milieu_--officers, soldiers, crowds--sometimes far from sympathetic, and how to instil into them his straightforward, clear, and indisputable articles of faith. he was very quick to grasp the situation in battle, and made work much easier for me. markov had one peculiarity. he was quite exceptionally straightforward, frank, and abrupt when attacking those who, in his opinion, did not display adequate knowledge, energy, or pluck. while he was at headquarters the troops therefore viewed him (as in the brigade) with a certain reserve, and sometimes even with intolerance (as in the rostov period of the volunteer army). no sooner, however, did markov join the division than the attitude towards him became one of love on the part of the riflemen, or even enthusiasm on the part of the volunteers. the army had its own psychology. it would have no abruptness and blame from markov as a staff officer. but when _their_ markov, in his usual short fur coat with his cap at the back of his head, waving his inevitable whip, was in the rifleman's firing line, under the hot fire of the enemy, he could be as violent as possible, he could shout and swear--his words provoked sometimes sorrow, sometimes mirth, but there was always a sincere desire to be worthy of his praise. i recall the heavy days which the brigade endured in february, . the brigade was pushed forward, was surrounded by a semi-circle of hills occupied by the enemy, who was in a position to snipe us. the position was intolerable, the losses were heavy, and nothing could be gained by keeping us on that line. but the th infantry division next to us reported to the army h.q.: "our blood runs cold at the thought of abandoning the position and having afterwards once more to attack the heights which have already cost us rivers of blood." i remained. matters, however, were so serious that one had to be in close touch with the men. i moved the field h.q. up to the position. count keller, in command of our section, having travelled for eleven hours in deep mud and over mountain paths, arrived at that moment, and rested for a while. "let us now drive up to the line." we laughed. "how shall we drive? would you come to the door, enemy machine-guns permitting?" count keller left fully determined to extricate the brigade from the trap. the brigade was melting away. in the rear there was only one ramshackle bridge across the san. we were in the hands of fate. will the torrent swell? if it does, the bridge will be swept away, and our retreat will be cut off. at this difficult moment the colonel in command of the th rifle regiment was severely wounded by a sniper as he was coming out of the house where the h.q. were stationed. all officers of his rank having been killed, there was nobody to replace him. i was pacing up and down the small hut, in a gloomy mood. markov rose. "give me the th regiment, sir," said markov. "of course, with pleasure." i had already thought of doing so. but i hesitated to offer it to markov lest he should think it was my intention to remove him from the staff. markov afterwards went with his regiment from one victory to another. he had already earned the cross of st. george and the sword of st. george, but for nine months the stavka would not confirm his appointment, because he had not reached the dead line of seniority. i recall the days of the heavy galician retreat, when a tidal wave of maddened peasants, with women, children, cattle and carts, was following the army, burning their villages and houses.... markov was in the rear, and was ordered promptly to blow up the bridge at which this human tide had stopped. he was, however, moved by the sufferings of the people, and for six hours he fought for the bridge at the risk of being cut off, until the last cart of the refugees had crossed the bridge. his life was a perpetual fiery impulse. on one occasion i had lost all hope of ever seeing him again. in the beginning of september, , in the course of the lutsk operation, in which our division so distinguished itself, between olyka and klevan, the left column commanded by markov broke the austrian line and disappeared. the austrians closed the line. during the day we heard no news, and the night came. i was anxious for the fate of the th regiment, and rode to a high slope, observing the enemy's firing line in the silent distance. suddenly, from afar, from the dense forest, in the far rear of the austrians, i heard the joyous strains of the regimental march of the th. what a relief it was! "i got into such a fix," said markov afterwards, "the devil himself could not have known which were my riflemen and which were austrians. i decided to cheer up my men and to collect them by making the band play." markov's column had smashed the enemy, had taken two thousand prisoners and a gun, and had put the austrians to disorderly flight towards lutsk. in his impulsiveness he sometimes went from one extreme to another, but, as soon as matters grew really desperate, he immediately regained self-possession. in october, , the th rifle division was conducting the famous chartoriisk operation, had broken the enemy on a front about twelve miles wide and over fifteen miles deep. brussilov, having no reserves, hesitated to bring up troops from another front in order to take advantage of this break. time was short. the germans centred their reserves, and they were attacking me on all sides. the situation was difficult. markov, from the front line, telephoned: "the position is peculiar. i am fighting the four quarters of the earth. it is so hard as to be thoroughly amusing." only once did i see him in a state of utter depression, when, in the spring of , near przemyshl, he was removing from the firing line the remnants of his companies. he was drenched with the blood of the c.o. of the th regiment, who had been standing by, and whose head had been torn off by a shell. markov never took any personal precautions. in september, , the division was fighting in the direction of kovel. on the right our cavalry was operating, was moving forward irresolutely, and was perturbing us by incredible news of the appearance of important enemy forces on its front, on our bank of the river styr. markov became annoyed with this indecision, and reported to me: "i went to the styr with my orderly to give the horses a drink. between our line and the styr there is no one, neither our cavalry nor the enemy." i reported him for promotion to general's rank, as a reward for several battles, but my request was not granted on the plea that he was "a youngster." verily youth was a great defect. in the spring of the division was feverishly preparing for the break-through at lutsk. markov made no secret of his innermost wish: "it is to be either one or the other--a wooden cross or the cross of st. george of the third degree." but the stavka, after several refusals, compelled him to accept "promotion"--once again the office of divisional chief-of-staff. (this measure was due to a great dearth of officers of the general staff, because the normal activities of the academy had come to an end. colonels and generals were made to hold for a second time and on special conditions the office of chief of divisional staff before they were appointed to divisional commands.) after several months on the caucasian front, where markov suffered from inaction, he lectured for some time at the academy, which had then reopened, and later returned to the army. at the outbreak of the revolution he was attached to the commanding officer of the tenth army as general for special missions. * * * * * in the beginning of march a mutiny broke out at briansk in the big garrison. it was attended by pogroms and by the arrest of officers. the townfolk were terribly excited. markov spoke several times in the crowded council of military deputies. after tempestuous and passionate debates, he succeeded in obtaining a resolution for restoring discipline and for freeing twenty of those arrested. nevertheless, after midnight several companies in arms moved to the railway station in order to do away with markov and with the arrested officers. the mob was infuriated and markov seemed to be doomed, but his resourcefulness saved the situation. trying to make his voice heard above the tumult, he addressed an impassioned appeal to the mob. the following sentence occurred in his speech: "had any of my 'iron' riflemen been here, he would have told you who general markov is." "i served in the th regiment," came a voice from the crowd. markov pushed aside several men who were surrounding him, advanced rapidly towards the soldier, and seized him by the scruff of the neck. "you? you? then why don't you thrust the bayonet into me? the enemy's bullet has spared me, so let me perish by the hand of my own rifleman...." the mob was still more intoxicated, but with admiration. accompanied by tempestuous cheering, markov and the arrested officers left for minsk. markov was lifted by the wave of events, and gave himself entirely to the struggle, without a thought for himself or for his family. faith and despair succeeded each other in his mind; he loved his country and felt sorry for the army, which never ceased to occupy a prominent place in his heart and in his mind. reference will be made more than once in the course of this narrative to the personality of markov, but i could not refrain from satisfying my heart's desire in adding a few laurels to his wreath--the wreath that was placed upon his tomb by two faithful friends, with the inscription:-- "he lived and died for the good of his country." chapter x. the power--the duma--the provisional government--the high command--the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. russia's exceptional position, confronted on the one hand with a world war and on the other with a revolution, made the establishment of a strong power an imperative necessity. the duma, which, as i have already said, unquestionably enjoyed the confidence of the country, refused, after lengthy and heated discussions, to head the revolutionary power. temporarily dissolved by the imperial ukaze of february th, it remained loyal, and "did not attempt to hold an official sitting," as it "considered itself a legislative institution of the old régime, co-ordinated by fundamental law with the obviously doomed remnants of autocracy." (miliukov, _history of the second russian revolution_.) the subsequent decrees emanated from the "private conference of the members of the duma." this body elected the "temporary committee of the duma," which exercised supreme power in the first days of the revolution. when power was transferred to the provisional government, the duma and the committee retired to the background, but did not cease to exist, and endeavoured to give moral support and a _raison d'être_ to the first three cabinets of the government. on may nd, during the first government crisis, the committee still struggled for the right to _appoint_ members of the government; subsequently it reduced its demands to that of the right to _participate_ in the formation of the government. thus, on july th, the committee of the duma protested against its exclusion from the formation of a new provisional government by kerensky, as it considered such a course as "legally inadmissible and politically disastrous." the duma, of course, was fully entitled to participate in the direction of the life of the country, as, even in the camp of its enemies, the signal service was recognised which the duma had rendered to the revolution "in converting to it the entire front and all the officers" (stankevitch: _reminiscences_). there can be no doubt that, had the soviet taken the lead in the revolution, there would have been a fierce struggle against it, and the revolution would have been squashed. it might, perhaps, have then given the victory to the liberal democracy, and would have led the country to a normal evolutionary development. who knows? the members of the duma themselves felt the strain of inactivity which was at first voluntary and later compulsory. there were many absentees, and the president of the duma had to combat this attitude. nevertheless, the duma and the committee were quite alive to the importance of the trend events were taking. they issued resolutions condemning, warning, and appealing to the common sense, the heart, and the patriotism of the people, of the army, and of the government. the duma, however, had already been swept aside by the revolutionary elements. its statesmanlike appeals, full of the clear consciousness of impending perils, had ceased to impress the country, and were ignored by the government. even a duma so peaceable that it did not even fight for power aroused the apprehensions of the revolutionary democracy, and the soviets led a violent campaign for the abolition of the council of the state and of the duma. in august the duma relaxed its efforts in issuing proclamations, and when kerensky dissolved the duma at the bidding of the soviets, nineteen days before the expiration of its five years' term, on october th, this news did not produce any appreciable effect in the country. rodzianko kept alive for a long time the idea of the fourth duma or of the assembly of all dumas as the foundation of the power of the state. he stuck to this idea throughout the kuban campaigns and the ekaterinodar volunteer period of the anti-bolshevik struggle. but the duma was dead.... none can tell whether the duma's abdication of power was inevitable in the days of march, and whether it was rendered imperative by the relative strength of the forces that struggled for power, whether the "class" duma could have retained the socialist elements in its midst and have continued to wield a certain influence in the country, acquired as a result of its fight against autocracy. it is at least certain that, in the years of trouble in russia, when no normal, popular representation was possible, all governments invariably felt the necessity for some substitute for this popular representation, were it only as a kind of tribune from which expression could be given to different currents of thought, a rock upon which to stand and to divine moral responsibilities. such was the "temporary council of the russian republic" at petrograd in october, , which, however, had been started by the revolutionary democracy, as a counter-blast to the contemplated bolshevik second congress of soviets. such was the partial constituent assembly of , which was held on the volga in the summer of , and such the proposed convocation of the high council and assembly (_sobor_) of the zemstvos in the south of russia and in siberia in . even the highest manifestation of collective dictatorship--"the soviet of people's commissars"--which reached a level of despotism and had suppressed social life and all the live forces of the country to an extent unknown in history, and reduced the country to a graveyard, still considered it necessary to create a kind of theatrical travesty of such a representative institution by periodically convoking the "all-russian congress of soviets." the authority of the provisional government contained the seed of its own impotence. as miliukov has said, that power was devoid of the "symbol" to which the masses were accustomed. the government yielded to the pressure of the soviet, which was systematically distorting all state functions and making them subservient to the interests of class and party. kerensky, the "hostage of democracy," was in the government. in a speech delivered in the soviet he thus defined his rôle: "i am the representative of democracy, and the provisional government should look upon me as expressing the demands of democracy, and should particularly heed the opinions which i may utter." last, but not least, there were in the government representatives of the russian liberal intelligencia, with all its good and bad qualities, and with the lack of will-power characteristic of that class, the will-power which, by its boundless daring, its cruelty in removing obstacles, and its tenacity in seizing power, gives victory in the struggle for self-preservation to class, caste and nationality. during the four years of the russian turmoil the russian intelligencia and bourgeoisie lived in a state of impotence and of non-resistance, and surrendered every stronghold; they even submitted to physical extermination and extinction. strong will-power appeared to exist only on the two extreme flanks of the social front. unfortunately it was a will to destroy and not to create. one flank has already produced lenin, bronstein, apfelbaum, uritzki, dzerjinski, and peters.... the other flank, defeated in march, , may not yet have said its last word. the russian revolution was undoubtedly national in its origin, being a mode of expressing the universal protest against the old régime. but, when the time came for reconstruction, two forces came into conflict which embodied and led two different currents of political thought, two different outlooks. according to the accepted phrase, it was a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the democracy. but it would be more correct to describe it as a struggle between the bourgeois and the socialist democracies. both sides derived their leading spirits from the same source--the russian intelligencia--by no means numerous and heterogeneous, not so much in respect of class and wealth as of political ideas and methods of political contest. both sides inadequately reflected the thoughts of the popular masses in whose name they spoke. at first these masses were merely an audience applauding the actors who most appealed to its impassioned, but not altogether idealistic, instincts. it was only after this psychological training that the inert masses, and in particular the army, became, in the words of kerensky, "an elemental mass melted in the fire of the revolution and ... exercising tremendous pressure which was felt by the entire organism of the state." to deny this would be tantamount to the denial, in accordance with tolstoi's doctrine, of the influence of leaders upon the life of the people. this theory has been completely shattered by bolshevism, which has conquered for a long time the masses of the people with whom it has nothing in common and who are inimical to the communist creed. in the first weeks of the new government the phenomenon became apparent, which was described in the middle of july by the committee of the duma in its appeal to the government in the following words: "the seizure of the power of the state by irresponsible organisations, the creation by these organisations of a dual power in the centre, and of the absence of power in the country." * * * * * the power of the soviet was also conditional in spite of a series of government crises and of opportunities thereby provided for seizing that power and wielding it without opposition and unreservedly (the provisional government offered no resistance). the revolutionary democracy, as represented by the soviet, categorically declined to assume that rôle because it realised quite clearly that it lacked the strength, the knowledge, and the skill to govern the country in which it had as yet no real support. tzeretelli, one of the leaders of revolutionary democracy, said: "the time is not yet ripe for the fulfilment of the ultimate aims of the proletariat and for the solution of class questions.... we understand that a bourgeois revolution is in progress ... as we are unable fully to attain to our bright ideal ... and we _do not wish to assume that responsibility for the collapse of the movement_, which we could not avoid if we made the desperate attempt to impose our will upon events at the present moment." another representative, nahamkes, said that they preferred "to compel the government to comply with their demands by means of perpetual organised pressure." a member of the executive committee of the soviet, stankevitch, thus describes the soviet in his _reminiscences_, which reflect the incorrigible idealism of a socialist who is off the rails and who has now reached the stage of excusing bolshevism, but who nevertheless impresses one as being sincere: "the soviet, a gathering of illiterate soldiers, took the lead because it asked nothing and because it was only a screen covering what was actually complete anarchy." two thousand soldiers from the rear and eight hundred workmen from petrograd formed an institution which pretended to guide the political, military, economic and social life of an enormous country. the records of the meetings of the soviet, as reported in the press, testify to the extraordinary ignorance and confusion which reigned at these meetings. one could not help being painfully impressed by such a "representation" of russia. an impotent and subdued anger against the soviet was growing in the circles of the intelligencia, the democratic bourgeoisie and the officers. all their hatred was concentrated upon the soviet, which they abused in terms of excessive bitterness. that hatred, often openly expressed, was wrongly interpreted by the revolutionary democracy as abhorrence of the very _idea of democratic representation_. in time the supremacy of the petrograd soviet, which ascribed to itself the exceptional merit of having destroyed the old régime, began to wane. a vast network of committees and soviets, which had flooded the country and the army, claimed the right to participate in the work of the state. in april, therefore, a congress was held of the delegates of workmen and soldiers' soviets. the petrograd soviet was reorganised on the basis of a more regular representation, and in june the all-russian congress of representatives of the soviets was opened. the composition of this fuller representation of democracy is interesting:-- revolutionary socialists social democrats (mensheviks) social democrats (bolsheviks) internationalists other socialists united social democrats members of the "bund" members of the "edimstvo" (unity) group popular socialists trudovik (labour) communist anarchists thus, the overwhelming masses of non-socialist russia were not represented at all; even the elements that were either non-political or belonged to the groups of the right and were elected by the soviets and army committees as non-party members, hastened for motives altogether in the interests of the state to profess the socialistic creed. in these circumstances the revolutionary democracy could hardly be expected to exercise self-restraint, and there could be no hope of keeping the popular movement within the limits of the bourgeois revolution. in reality the ramshackle helm was seized by a block of social revolutionaries and mensheviks, in which first the former and then the latter predominated. it is that narrow partisan block which held in bondage the will of the government and is primarily responsible for the subsequent course of the revolution. the composition of the soviet was heterogeneous: intellectuals, bourgeoisie, workmen, soldiers and many deserters. the soviet and the congresses, and especially the former, were a somewhat inert mass, utterly devoid of political education. action, power and influence afterwards passed therefore into the hands of executive committees in which the socialist intellectual elements were almost exclusively represented. the most devastating criticism of the executive committee of the soviet came from that very institution, and was made by one of its members, stankevitch: the meetings were chaotic, political disorganisation, indecision, haste, and fitfulness showed themselves in its decisions, and there was a complete absence of administrative experience and true democracy. one of the members advocated anarchy in the "izvestia," another sent written permits for the expropriation of the landlords, a third explained to a military delegation which had complained of the commanding officers that these officers should be dismissed and arrested, etc. "the most striking feature of the committee is the preponderance of the alien element," wrote stankevitch. "jews, georgians, letts, poles, and lithuanians were represented out of all proportion to their numbers in petrograd and in the country." russia during the turmoil. +----------+----------+-----------+-------+-----------+ | | | | | | anarcho-communists | non-party | non-party conservatives ######## | ----#### | -------- -------- | (peasants) | | workmen (few) | | | socialists liberals | -------- +-----------+-------------+ | | | | +--------------+ | non-party | | | | ----#### | constitutional- radical- | mostly workmen | -------- -------- | | democrats democrats social-democrats populists | | +--+---+----+ +---------------+-----------+ | | | | | | bolsheviks | edinstvo social popular labour ######## | -------- revolutionaries -------- -------- | | socialists "trudovik" mensheviks | | +------+-------+ +---+-----------+ | | | | | left centre right internationalists defencists #### ---### ---- ######## -------- -------- defencists ----#### partly defencist partly defeatist ######## defeatists the following is a list of the first presidium of the all-russian central committee of the soviets:-- georgian jews armenian pole russian (if his name was not an assumed one). this exceptional preponderance of the alien element, foreign to the russian national idea, could not fail to tinge the entire activities of the soviet with a spirit harmful to the interests of the russian state. the provisional government was the captive of the soviet from the very first day, as it had under-estimated the importance and the power of that institution, and was unable to display either determination or strength in resisting the soviet. the government did not even hope for victory in that struggle, as, in its endeavour to save the country, it could not very well proclaim watchwords which would have suited the licentious mob and which emanated from the soviet. the government talked about duty, the soviet about rights. the former "prohibited," the latter "permitted." the government was linked with the old power by the inheritance of statesmanship and organisation, as well as the external methods of administration; whereas the soviet, springing from mutiny and from the slums, was the direct negation of the entire old régime. it is a delusion to think, as a small portion of the moderate democracy still appear to do, that the soviet played the part of "restraining the tidal wave of the people." _the soviet did not actually destroy the russian state, but was shattering it, and did so to the extent of smashing the army and imposing bolshevism on it._ hence the duplicity and insincerity of its activities. apart from its declarations, all the speeches, conversations, comments, and articles of the soviet and of the executive committee, of its groups and individuals, came to the knowledge of the country and of the front, and tended towards the destruction of the authority of the government. stankevitch wrote that not deliberately, but persistently, the committee was dealing death-blows to the government. who, then, were the men who were trying to democratise the army regulations, smashing all the foundations of the army, inspiring the polivanov commission, and tying the hands of two war ministers? the following is the personnel elected in the beginning of april from the soldiers' section of the soviet to the executive committee:-- war-time officers clerks cadets soldiers from the rear scribes and men on special duty i will leave their description to stankevitch, who said: "at first hysterical, noisy, and unbalanced men were elected, who were utterly useless to the committee...." new elements were subsequently added. "the latter tried consciously, and in the measure of their ability, to cope with the ocean of military matters. two of them, however, seemed to have been inoffensive scribes in reserve battalions, who had never taken the slightest interest in the war, the army, or the political revolution." the duplicity and the insincerity of the soviet were clearly manifested in regard to the war. the intellectual circles of the left and of the revolutionary democracy mostly espoused the idea of zimmerwald and of internationalism. it was natural, therefore, that the first word which the soviet addressed on march , , "to the peoples of the whole world," was: "peace." the world problems, infinitely complex, owing to the national, political, and economic interests of the peoples who differed in their understanding of the eternal truth, could not be solved in such an elementary fashion. bethmann-holweg was contemptuously silent. on march th, , the reichstag, by a majority against the votes of both social democratic parties, declined the offer of peace without annexations. noske voiced the views of the german democracy in saying: "we are offered from abroad to organise a revolution. if we follow that advice the working classes will come to grief." among the allies and the allied democracies the soviet manifesto provoked anxiety, bewilderment, and discontent, which were vividly expressed in the speeches made by albert thomas, henderson, vandervelde, and even the present-day french bolshevik, cachin, upon their visits to russia. the soviet subsequently added to the word "peace" the definition, "without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples." the theory of this formula promptly clashed with the actual question of western and southern russia occupied by the germans; of poland, of roumania, belgium, and serbia, devastated by the germans; of alsace-lorraine and posen, as well as of the servitude, expropriations, and compulsory labour which had been imposed upon all the countries invaded by the germans. according to the programme of the german social democrats, which was at length published in stockholm, the french in alsace-lorraine, the poles in posen, and the danes in schleswig were only to be granted national autonomy under the sceptre of the german emperor. at the same time, the idea of the independence of finland, russian poland, and ireland was strongly advocated. the demand for the restoration of the german colonies was curiously blended with the promises of independence for india, siam, korea. the sun did not rise at the bidding of chanticleer. the _ballon d'essai_ failed. the soviet was forced to admit that "time is necessary in order that the peoples of all countries should rise, and with an iron hand compel their rulers and capitalists to make peace.... meanwhile, the comrade-soldiers who have sworn to defend russian liberties should not refuse to advance, as this may become a military necessity...." the revolutionary democracy was perplexed, and their attitude was clearly expressed in the words of tchkeidze: "we have been preaching against the war all the time. how can i appeal to the soldiers to continue the war and to stay at the front?" be that as it may, the words "war" and "advance" had been uttered. they divided the soviet socialists into two camps, the "defeatists" and "defensists."[ ] theoretically, only the right groups of the social revolutionaries, the popular socialists, the "unity" ("edistvo") group, and the labour party ("trudoviki") belonged to the latter. all other socialists advocated the immediate cessation of the war and the "deepening" of the revolution by means of internal class war. in practice, when the question of the continuation of the war was put to the vote, the defensists were joined by the majority of the social revolutionaries and of the social democrat mensheviks. the resolutions, however, bore the stamp of ambiguity--neither war nor peace. tzeretelli was advocating "a movement against the war in all countries, allied and enemy." the congress of the soviets at the end of may passed an equally ambiguous resolution, which, after demanding that annexations and indemnities should be renounced by all belligerents, pointed out that, "so long as the war lasts, the collapse of the army, the weakening of its spirit, strength and capacity for _active_ operations would constitute a strong menace to the cause of freedom and to the vital interests of the country." in the beginning of june the second congress passed a new resolution. on the one hand, it emphatically declared that "the question of the advance should be decided solely from the point of view of purely military and strategical considerations"; on the other hand, it expressed an obviously defeatist idea: "should the war end by the complete defeat of one of the belligerent groups, this would be a source of new wars, would increase the enmity between peoples, and would result in their complete exhaustion, in starvation and doom." the revolutionary democracy had obviously confused two ideas: the _strategic victory_ signifying the end of the war and _the terms of the peace treaty_, which might be humane or inhuman, righteous or unjust, far-seeing or short-sighted. in fact, what they wanted was war and an advance, but _without a victory_. curiously enough, the prussian deputy, strebel, the editor of _vorwaerts_, invented the same formula as early as in . he wrote: "i openly profess that a complete victory of the empire would not benefit the social democracy." there was not a single branch of administration with which the soviet and the executive committee did not interfere with the same ambiguity and insincerity, due on the one hand to the fear of any action contrary to the fundamentals of their doctrine, and on the other to the obvious impossibility of putting these doctrines into practice. the soviet did not, and could not, partake in the creative work of rebuilding the state. with regard to economics, agriculture, and labour, the activities of the soviet were reduced to the publication of pompous socialist party programmes, which the socialist ministers themselves clearly understood to be impracticable in the atmosphere of war, anarchy, and economic crisis prevailing in russia. nevertheless, these resolutions and proclamations were interpreted in the factories and in the villages as a kind of "absolution." they roused the passions and provoked the desire, immediately and arbitrarily, to put them into practice. this provocation was followed by restraining appeals. in an appeal addressed to the sailors of kronstadt on may th, , the soviet suggested "that they should demand immediate and implicit compliance with all the orders of the provisional government given in the interests of the revolution and of the security of the country...." all these literary achievements are not, however, the only form of activity in which the soviet indulged. the characteristic feature of the soviet and of the executive committee was the complete absence of discipline in their midst. with reference to the special delegation of the committee, whose object it was to be in contact with the provisional government, stankevitch says: "what could that delegation do? while it was arguing and reaching a complete agreement with the ministers, dozens of members of the committee were sending letters and publishing articles; travelling in the provinces, and at the front in the name of the committee; receiving callers at the taurida palace, everyone of them acting independently and taking no heed of instructions, resolutions, or decisions of the committee." was the central committee of the soviet invested with actual power? a reply to this question can be found in the appeal of the organising committee of the labour socialist democratic party of july th. "the watchword 'all-power to the soviets,' to which many workmen adhere, is a dangerous one. _the following of the soviets represents a minority in the population_, and we must make every effort in order that the bourgeois elements, who are still willing and capable of joining us in preserving the conquests of the revolution, shall share with us the burdens of the inheritance left by the old régime, which we have shouldered, and the enormous responsibility for the outcome of the revolution which we bear in the eyes of the people." the soviet, and later the all-russian central committee, could not, and would not, by reason of its composition and their political ideas, exercise a powerful restraining influence upon the masses of the people, who had thrown off the shackles and were perturbed and mutinous. the movement had been inspired by the members of the soviet, and the influence and authority of the soviet were, therefore, entirely dependent on the extent to which they were able to flatter the instincts of the masses. these masses, as karl kautsky, an observer from the marxist camp, has said, "were concerned merely with their requirements and their desires as soon as they were drawn into the revolution, and they did not care a straw whether their demands were practicable or beneficial to society." had the soviet endeavoured to resist with any firmness or determination whatsoever the pressure of the masses, it would have run the risk of being swept away. also, day after day and step by step, the soviet was coming under the influence of anarchist and bolshevik ideas. chapter xi. the bolshevik struggle for power--the power of the army and the idea of a dictatorship. in the first period--from the beginning of the revolution until the _coup d'état_ of november--the bolsheviks were engaged in struggling to seize power by destroying the bourgeois régime and disorganising the army, thus paving the way for the _avénement_ of bolshevism, as trotsky solemnly expressed it. on the day after his arrival in russia lenin published his programme, of which i will here mention the salient points: ( ) the war waged by the "capitalist government" is an imperialistic, plundering war. no concessions, therefore, should be made to revolutionary "defensism." the representatives of that doctrine and the army in the field should be made clearly to understand that the war cannot end in a truly democratic peace, without coercion, _unless_ capitalism is destroyed. the troops must fraternize with the enemy. ( ) the first stage of the revolution by which the bourgeoisie came into power must be followed by the second stage in which power must pass into the hands of the proletariat and of the poorest peasants. ( ) no support should be given to the provisional government, and the fallacy of its promises should be exposed. ( ) the fact must be acknowledged that, in the majority of the soviets, the bolshevik party is in a minority. the policy must therefore be continued of criticising and exposing mistakes, while at the same time advocating the necessity for the transfer of supreme power to the soviet. ( ) russia is not a parliamentary republic--that would have been a step backwards--but a republic of the soviets of workmen's and peasants' deputies. the police (militia?), the army, and the civil service must be abolished. ( ) with regard to the agrarian question, the soviets of farm-labourers' deputies must come to the fore. all landowners' estates must be confiscated, and all land in russia nationalised and placed at the disposal of local soviets of peasants' deputies. the latter to be elected among the poorest peasants. ( ) all the banks in the country must be united in one national bank, controlled by the soviet. ( ) socialism must not be introduced now, but a step must be taken towards the ultimate control by the soviet of all industries and of the distribution of materials. ( ) the state shall become a commune, and the socialist democratic bolshevik party shall henceforward be called "the communist party." i shall not dwell upon this programme, which was put into practice, with certain reservations, in november, . during the first period the activities of the bolsheviks, which are of great importance, were based upon the following three principles: ( ) the overthrow of the government and the demoralisation of the army. ( ) the promotion of class war in the country and discontent in the villages. ( ) the seizure of power by the minority, which, according to lenin, was to be "well-organised, armed and centralised," _i.e._, the bolshevik party. (this was, of course, a negation of democratic forms of government.) the ideas and aims of the party were, of course, beyond the understanding not only of the ignorant russian peasantry, but even of the bolshevik underlings scattered throughout the land. the masses wanted simple and clear watchwords to be immediately put into practice, which would satisfy their wishes and demands arising from the turmoil of the revolution. that "simplified" bolshevism inherent in all popular movements against the established power in russia was all the easier to institute in that it had freed itself from all restraining moral influences and was aiming primarily at destruction pure and simple, ignoring the consequences of military defeat and of the ruin of the country. the provisional government was the first target. in the bolshevik press, at public meetings, in all the activities of the soviets and congresses, and even in their conversations with the members of the provisional government, the bolshevik leaders stubbornly and arrogantly advocated its removal, describing it as an instrument of counter-revolution and of international reaction. the bolsheviks, however, refrained from decisive action, as they feared the political backwardness of the country as a whole. they began what soldiers call "a reconnaissance," and carried it out with great intensity. they seized several private houses in petrograd, and organised a demonstration on the th and st of april. that was the first "review" of the proletariat, at which an estimate was made of the bolshevik forces. the excuse for this demonstration, in which the workmen and the troops participated, was given by miliukov's note on international policy. i say _excuse_ because the real reason lay in the fundamental divergence of opinion mentioned above. everything else was only a pretext. as a result of the demonstration there were great disturbances and armed conflicts in the capital, and many casualties. the crowds carried placards bearing the inscriptions: "down with the miliukov policy of conquests," and "down with the provisional government." the review was a failure. in the course of the debate in the soviet on this occasion, the bolsheviks demanded that the government be deposed, but there was a note of hesitation in their speeches: "the proletariat should first discuss the existing conditions and form an estimate of its strength." the soviet passed a resolution condemning both the government's policy of conquest and the bolshevik demonstration, while at the same time "congratulating the revolutionary democracy of petrograd, which had proved its intense interest in international politics by meetings, resolutions and demonstrations." lenin was planning another armed demonstration on a large scale on june th during the congress of the soviets; but it was countermanded, as the great majority of the congress was opposed to it. the demonstration was likewise intended as a means of seizing power. this internal struggle between the two wings of the revolutionary democracy, which were bitterly antagonistic to one another, is extremely interesting. the left wing made every endeavour to induce the "defensist" block, which was preponderant, to break with the bourgeoisie and to assume power. the block was also resolutely opposed to such a course. within the soviets new combinations were coming into being. on certain questions the social revolutionaries of the left and the social democrats--internationalists--were leaning towards the bolsheviks. nevertheless, until september the bolsheviks were not in a majority in the petrograd soviet or in many provincial soviets. it was only on september th that bronstein trotsky succeeded tchkeidze as chairman of the petrograd soviet. the motto, "all power to the soviets," sounded from their lips like self-sacrifice or provocation. trotsky explained this contradiction by saying that, owing to constant re-elections, the soviets reflected the true (?) spirit of the masses of workmen and soldiers, who were leaning to the left, whereas, after the break with the bourgeoisie, extremist tendencies were bound to prevail in the soviets. as the true aspect of bolshevism gradually revealed itself these dissensions deepened, and were not limited to the social democratic programme or to party tactics. it was a struggle between democracy and the proletariat, between the majority and a minority, which was intellectually backward, but strong in its mutinous daring and headed by strong and unprincipled men. it was a struggle between the democratic principles of universal suffrage, political liberties, equality, etc., and the dictatorship of a privileged class, madness, and imminent slavery. on the nd july there was a second ministerial crisis, for which the outward cause was the disapproval of the liberal ministers of the act of ukrainian autonomy. on july rd- th the bolsheviks made another riot in the capital, in which workmen, soldiers and sailors participated. it was done this time on a large scale, and was accompanied by plunder and murder. there were many victims, and the government was in great difficulty. kerensky was at that time visiting us on the western front. his conversations with petrograd over the direct wire indicated that prince lvov and the government were deeply depressed. prince lvov summoned kerensky to return to petrograd at once, but warned him that he could not be responsible for his safety. the rebels demanded that the soviet and the central executive committee of the congress should assume power. these wings of the revolutionary democracy returned another categorical refusal. the movement found no support in the provinces, and the mutiny was quelled chiefly by the vladimir military school and the cossack regiments. several companies of the petrograd garrison likewise remained loyal. bronstein trotsky wrote that the movement was premature because there were too many passive and irresolute elements in the garrison; but that it had nevertheless been proved that, "except the cadets, no one wanted to fight against the bolsheviks _for the government and for the leading parties in the soviet_." the tragedy of the government headed by kerensky, and of the soviet, lay in the fact that the masses would not follow abstract watchwords. they proved equally indifferent to the country and to the revolution, as well as to the international, and had no intention of shedding their blood and sacrificing their lives for any of these ideas. the crowd followed those who gave practical promises and flattered its instincts. * * * * * when we speak of "power," with reference to the first period of the russian revolution, we actually mean only its outward forms; for under the exceptional conditions imposed by a world war on a scale unequalled in history, when per cent. of the entire male population was under arms, the power was really concentrated in the hands of the army. that army had been led astray, had been demoralised by false doctrines, had lost all sense of duty, and all fear of authority. last, but not least, it had no leader. the government, kerensky, the commanding corps, the soviet, regimental committees--for many reasons none of these could claim that title. the dissensions between all these contending forces were reflected in the minds of the men, and hastened the ruin of the army. it is useless to make any surmises which cannot be proved by realities, especially in the absence of historical perspective; but there can be no doubt the question, whether or not it would have been possible to erect a dam which would have stemmed the tide and preserved discipline in the army, will continue to arouse attention. personally, i believe that it was possible. at first the supreme command might have done it, as well as the government, had it shown sufficient resolve to squash the soviets or sufficient strength and wisdom to draw them into the orbit of statesmanship and of truly democratic constructive work. there can be no doubt that, in the beginning of the revolution, the government was recognised by all the sane elements of the population. the high command, the officers, many regiments, the bourgeoisie, and those democratic elements which had not been led astray by militant socialism adhered to the government. the press in those days was full of telegrams, addresses and appeals from all parts of russia, from various social, military and class organisations and institutions whose democratic attitude was undoubted. as the government weakened and was driven into two successive coalitions, that confidence correspondingly decreased and could not find compensation in fuller recognition by the revolutionary democracy; because anarchist tendencies, repudiating all authority, were gaining ground within these circles. in the beginning of may, after the armed rising in the streets of petrograd, which took place without the knowledge of the soviet, but with the participation of its members; after the resignation of miliukov and gutchkov, the complete impotence of the provisional government became so clearly apparent that prince lvov appealed to the soviet, with the consent of the duma committee and of the constitutional democratic party. he invited "the active creative forces of the country to participate directly in the government which had hitherto refrained from any such participation." after some hesitation, the soviet deemed it necessary to accept the offer, thereby assuming direct responsibility for the fate of the revolution. (four members of the soviet accepted ministerial posts.) the soviet declined to assume full power "because the transfer of power to the soviets in that period of the revolution would have weakened it and would have prematurely estranged the elements capable of serving it, which would constitute a menace to the revolution." the impression produced by such declarations upon the bourgeoisie and upon the "hostages" in the coalition government can be imagined. although the soviet expressed full confidence in the government and appealed to the democracy to grant it full support, which would guarantee the authority of the government, that government was already irretrievably discredited. the socialist circles which had sent their representatives to join it neither altered nor strengthened its intellectual level. on the contrary, it was weakened, inasmuch as the gulf was widened which separated the two political groups represented in the government. while officially expressing confidence in the government, the soviet continued to undermine its power and became somewhat lukewarm towards the socialist ministers, who had been compelled by circumstances to deviate, to a certain extent, from the programme of the socialist party. the people and the army did not pay much attention to these events, as they were beginning to forget that there was any power at all, owing to the fact that the existence of that power had no bearing upon their everyday life. the blood shed during the petrograd rising organised by the anarchist-bolshevik section of the soviet on july th- th, prince lvov's resignation, and the formation of a new coalition in which the socialists, nominated by the soviet, definitely predominated were but stepping stones towards the complete collapse of the power of the state. as i have already said, the first government crisis was occasioned by events which, however important politically, were only "excuses." in the new coalition the democratic bourgeoisie played but a secondary part, and its "temporary" assistance was only required in order that responsibility might be shared; while everything was decided behind the curtain, in the circles closely connected with the soviet. such a coalition could have no vitality and could not reconcile even the opportunist elements of the bourgeoisie with the revolutionary democracy. apart from political and social considerations, the relative strength of the forces which were brought into play was influenced by the growing discontent of the masses with the activities of the government owing to the general condition of the country. the masses accepted the revolution not as an arduous, transitory period, linked up with the past and present political development of russia and of the world, but as an independent reality of the day, carrying in its trail real calamities such as the war, banditism, lawlessness, stoppage of industry, cold and hunger. the masses were unable to grasp the situation in its complex entirety and could not differentiate between elemental, inevitable phenomena inherent in all revolutions and the will for good or evil of departments of the government, institutions or individuals. they felt that the situation was intolerable and tried to find a remedy. as a result of the universal recognition of the impotence of the existing power, a new idea began to occupy the minds of the people: a dictatorship. i emphatically declare that in the social and military circles with which i was in touch the tendency towards a dictatorship was prompted by a patriotic and clear consciousness of the abyss into which the russian people was rapidly sinking. _it was not in the slightest degree inspired by any reactionary or counter-revolutionary motives._ there can be no doubt that the movement found adherents among the reactionaries and among mere opportunists; but both these elements were accessory and insignificant. kerensky thus interpreted the rise of the movement which he described as "the tide of conspiracy": "the tarnopol defeat created a movement in favour of conspiracies, while the bolshevik rising of july demonstrated to the uninitiated the _depth of the disruption of democracy, the impotence of the revolution_ against anarchy, as well as the strength of the organised minority which acted spontaneously." it would be difficult to find a better excuse for the movement. in the atmosphere of popular discontent, universal disorder and approaching anarchy, endeavours at creating a dictatorship were the natural outcome of the existing conditions. these endeavours had their origin in a search for a _strong national and democratic power, but not a reactionary one_. on the whole the revolutionary democracy lived in an atmosphere poisoned by the fear of a counter-revolution. all its cares, measures, resolutions and appeals, as well as the disruption of the army and the abolition of the police in the villages, tended towards a struggle with this imaginary foe, which was supposed to menace the conquests of the revolution. were the conscious leaders of the soviet really convinced that such a danger existed, or were they fanning this unfounded fear as a tactical move? i am inclined to accept the second solution, because it was quite obvious, not only to myself, but to the soviet as well, that the activities of the democratic bourgeoisie meant not counter-revolution, but merely opposition. and yet in the russian partisan press and in wide circles outside russia it is precisely in the former sense that the pre-november period of the revolution was interpreted. the provisional government proclaimed a broad, democratic programme upon its formation. in the circles of the right this programme was criticised and there was discontent; but no active opposition. in the first four or five months after the beginning of the revolution there was not a single important counter-revolutionary organisation in the country. these organisations became more or less active and other secret circles, especially officers' circles, were formed in july in connection with the plans for a dictatorship. there can be no doubt that many people with pronounced tendencies towards a restoration joined these circles. but their main object was to combat the unofficial government, which was a class government, as well as the personnel of the soviet and the executive committee. had these circles not collapsed prematurely owing to their weakness, numerical insignificance and lack of organisation, some of the members of those institutions might very possibly have been destroyed. while constantly resisting counter-revolution from the right, the soviet gave every opportunity for the preparations for a real counter-revolution emanating from its own midst, from the bolsheviks. i remember that different persons who came to the stavka began to discuss the question of a dictatorship and to throw out feelers, as it were, approximately in the beginning of june. all these conversations were stereotyped to such an extent that i have no difficulty in summarising them. "russia is moving towards inevitable ruin. the government is utterly powerless. we must have a strong power. sooner or later we shall have to come to a dictatorship." nobody mentioned restoration or a change of policy in a reactionary direction. the names were mentioned of kornilov and brussilov. i warned them against hasty decisions. i must confess that we still entertained the illusory hope that the government--by internal evolution, under the influence of a new, armed demonstration on the part of the anti-national extremist elements towards which they were so lenient--would realise the futility and hopelessness of continuing in their present position and would come to the idea of power vested in one man, which might be achieved in a constitutional manner. the future seemed pregnant with disaster in the absence of a truly lawful power. i pointed out that there were no military leaders enjoying sufficient authority with the demoralised soldiery, but that if a military dictatorship should become necessary for the state and practicable, kornilov was already very much respected by the officers, whereas brussilov's reputation had been injured by his opportunism. in his book kerensky says that "cossack circles and certain politicians" had suggested repeatedly to him that the impotent government should be replaced by a personal dictatorship. it was only when society was disappointed in him as the "possible organiser and chief agent for altering the system of government" that "a search began for another individual." there can be no doubt that the men and social circles that appealed to kerensky in the question of a dictatorship were not his apologists and did not belong to the "revolutionary democracy," but the mere fact of their appeal is sufficient proof that their motives could not have been reactionary, and that it reflected the sincere desire of the russian patriotic elements to see a strong man at the helm in days of storm and strife. perhaps there may also have been another motive; there had been a short period, approximately in june, when not only the russian public, but also the officers had succumbed to the charm of the war minister's impassioned oratory and pathos. the russian officers, who were being sacrificed wholesale, had forgotten and forgiven and were desperately hoping that he would save the russian army. and their promise to die in the front line was by no means an empty one. during kerensky's visits to the front, it was a painful sight to see these doomed men, their eyes shining with exaltation, and their hearts beating with hope, a hope that was destined to be so bitterly and mercilessly disappointed. it is to be noted that kerensky, seeking in his book to justify the temporary "concentration of power" which he assumed on august th, says: "in the struggle against the conspiracy conducted by a single will, the state was compelled to set against it a will capable of resolute and quick action. no collective power, much less a coalition, can possess such a single will." i think that the internal condition of the russian state threatened with a monstrous joint conspiracy of the german general staff and the anti-national and anti-constitutional elements of the russian exiles was sufficiently grave to warrant the demand for a strong power "capable of resolute and quick action." chapter xii. the activities of the provisional government--internal politics, civil administration--the town, the village and the agrarian problem. i will deal in this and in the subsequent chapters with the internal condition of russia in the first period of the revolution only in so far as it affected the conduct of the world war. i have already mentioned the duality of the supreme administration of the country and the incessant pressure of the soviet upon the provisional government. a member of the duma, mr. shulgin, wittily remarked: "the old régime is interned in the fortress of peter and paul, and the new one is under domiciliary arrest." the provisional government did not represent the people as a whole; it could not and would not forestall the will of the constituent assembly by introducing reforms which would shake the political and social structure of the state to its very foundations. it proclaimed that "not violence and compulsion, but the voluntary obedience of free citizens to the power which they had themselves created, constituted the foundation of the new administration of the state. not a single drop of blood has been shed by the provisional government which has erected no barrier against the free expression of public opinion...." this non-resistance to evil at the moment when a fierce struggle, unfettered by moral or patriotic considerations, was being conducted by some groups of the population for motives of self-preservation and by others for the attainment by violence of extreme demands, was undoubtedly a confession of impotence. in the subsequent declarations of the second and third coalition governments mention was made "of stringent measures" against the forces of disorganisation in the country. these words, however, were never translated into deeds. the idea of not forestalling the will of the constituent assembly was not carried out by the government, especially in the domain of national self-determination. the government proclaimed the independence of poland, but made "the consent to such alterations of the territory of the russian state as may be necessary for the creation of independent poland" dependent upon the all-russian constituent assembly. that proclamation, the legal validity of which is contestable, was, however, in full accord with the juridical standpoint of society. with regard to finland, the government did not alter her legal status towards russia, but confirmed the rights and privileges of the country, cancelled all the limitations of the finnish constitution and intended to convoke the finnish chamber ("seim") that was to confirm the new constitution of the principality. the government subsequently adhered to their intention to entertain favourably all the just demands of the finns for local reconstruction. nevertheless, both the provisional government and finland were engaged in a protracted struggle for power on account of the universal desire for the immediate satisfaction of the interests of the separate nationalities. on july th the finnish assembly passed a law (by the majority of social-democratic votes) proclaiming the assumption by that body of supreme power after the abdication "of the finnish grand-duke" (the official title of the russian emperor). only foreign affairs, military legislation and administration were left to the provisional government. this decision corresponded to a certain degree with the resolution of the congress of soviets, which demanded that full independence should be granted to finland before the convocation of the constituent assembly, with the above-mentioned restrictions. the russian government answered this declaration of the actual independence of finland by dissolving the assembly, which met, however, once again in september of its own free will. in this struggle, the intensity of which varied according to the rise and fall of the political barometer in petrograd, the finnish politicians, disregarding the interests of the state and having no support whatsoever in the army, counted exclusively upon the loyalty or, to be more correct, the weakness of the provisional government. matters never reached the stage of open rebellion. the conscious elements of the population kept the country within the limits of reasonableness, not out of loyalty, but perhaps because they feared the consequences of civil war and especially of the sabotage in which the licentious soldiers and sailors would have presumably indulged. may and june were spent in a struggle for power between the government and the self-appointed central rada (assembly). the all-ukrainian military congress, also convened arbitrarily on june th, demanded that the government should immediately comply with all the demands of the central rada and the congresses, and suggested that the rada should cease to address the government, but should begin at once to organise the autonomous administration of the ukraine. on june th the autonomous constitution of the ukraine was adopted and a secretariat (council of ministers) formed under the chairmanship of mr. vinnichenko. after the government envoys--the ministers kerensky, tereschenko and tzeretelli--had negotiated with the rada, a proclamation was issued on july nd, which forestalled the decision of the constituent assembly and proclaimed the autonomy of the ukraine with certain restrictions. the central rada and the secretariat were gradually seizing the administration, creating a dual power on the spot and discrediting the all-russian government. they thus provoked civil strife and provided moral excuses for every endeavor to shirk civic and military duties to the common mother country. the central rada, moreover, contained from the outset sympathisers with germany and was undoubtedly connected through the "union for the liberation of the ukraine" with the headquarters of the central powers. bearing in mind the ample material collected by the stavka, vinnichenko's half-hearted confession to a french correspondent (?) with regard to germanophil tendencies in the rada, and finally the report of the procurator of the kiev court of appeal at the end of august, , i cannot doubt that the rada played a criminal part. the procurator complained that the complete destruction of the machinery of intelligence and of criminal investigation deprived the government prosecutors of the possibility of investigating the situation; he said that not only german espionage and propaganda, but the mutinies of the ukrainian troops, as well as the destination of obscure funds of undoubted austro-german origin ... could be traced to the rada. * * * * * the ministry of the interior, which, in the old days, practically controlled the autocracy and provoked universal hatred, now went to the other extreme. it all but abolished itself, and the functions of that branch of the administration were divided among local, self-appointed organisations. the history of the organs of the ministry of the interior is, in many ways, similar to the fate of the supreme command. on march th the minister-president issued an order for the suppression of the offices of governor and of inspector of police ("ispravnik"), which were to be replaced by the presidents of the provincial and district self-governing councils ("oupravas"), and for the police to be replaced by a militia organised by social institutions. this measure, adopted owing to the universal dislike for the agents of the old régime, was, in fact, the only actual manifestation of the government's will; because the status of the commissars was not established by law until the month of september. the instructions and orders of the government were, on the whole, of an academic nature, because life followed its own course, and was regulated, or, to be more correct, muddled up, by local revolutionary changes of the law. the office of government commissars became a sinecure from the very outset. they had no power or authority, and became entirely dependent upon revolutionary organisations. when the latter passed a vote of censure upon the activities of a commissar, he could practically do nothing more. the organisations elected a new one, and his confirmation in office by the provisional government was a mere formality. in the first six weeks seventeen provincial commissars and a great many district commissars were thus removed. later, in july, tzeretelli, during his tenure of the office of minister of the interior, which lasted for a fortnight, gave official sanction to this procedure and sent a circular to the local soviets and committees, inviting them to send in to him the names of desirable candidates, which were to replace the unsuitable ones. thus there remained no representatives of the central power on the spot. in the beginning of the revolution the so-called "social committees" or "soviets of social organisation" really represented a social institution comprising the union of towns and _zemstvos_, of municipal dumas, professional unions, co-operatives, magistrates, etc. things went from bad to worse when these social committees were dissolved into class and party organisations. local power passed into the hands of the soviets of workmen and soldiers and in places before the law had been produced to "democratised" socialistic dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-bolshevik soviets. the regulations issued by the government on april th, on the organisation of municipal self-government, comprised the following main points: ( ) all citizens of both sexes, having attained the age of twenty, were given the suffrage in the town. ( ) no domiciliary qualification was established. ( ) a proportional system of elections was introduced. ( ) the military were given the suffrage in the localities in which the respective garrisons were quartered. i will not examine in detail these regulations, which are probably the most democratic ever known in municipal law, because the experience gained in their application was too short to afford any ground for discussion. i will only note one phenomenon which accompanied the introduction of these regulations in the autumn of . the free vote in many places became a mockery. throughout the length and breadth of russia, all the non-socialist and politically neutral parties were under suspicion and were subjected to persecution. they were not allowed to conduct propaganda, and their meetings were dispersed. electioneering was characterised by blatant abuses. occasionally election agents were subjected to violence and lists of candidates destroyed. at the same time the licentious and demoralised soldiery of many garrisons--chance guests in the town in which, as often as not, they had only appeared a day or two before--rushed to the polls and presented lists drawn up by the extreme anti-national parties. there were cases when military units, arriving after the elections, demanded a re-election and accompanied this demand by threats and sometimes murders. there can be no doubt that, among the circumstances that affected the august elections in petrograd to the municipal duma, to which sixty-seven bolsheviks out of two hundred were elected, the presence in the capital of numerous demoralised garrisons was not the least important. the authorities were silent because they were absent. the _petite bourgeoisie_, the intellectual workers, in a word, the town democracy in the widest sense, was the weakest party and was always defeated in that revolutionary struggle. the mutinies, rebellions, and separations of various republics--the precursors of the bloody soviet régime--had the most painful effect on the life of that portion of the community. the "self-determination" of the soldiers caused uneasiness and even fear of unrestricted violence. even travelling was unsafe and difficult, because the railways fell into the hands of deserters. the "self-determination" of the workmen resulted in the impossibility of obtaining supplies of the most necessary commodities, owing to a tremendous rise in prices. the "self-determination" of the villages produced a stoppage of supplies, and the villages were thus left to starve; not to mention the moral ordeal of the class which was subjected to insults and degradation. the revolution had raised hopes for the betterment of the conditions of life for everyone except the _bourgeois_ democracy, because even the moral conquests proclaimed by the new revolutionary power--liberty of speech, of the press and of meetings, etc.--soon belonged exclusively to the revolutionary democracy. the upper _bourgeoisie_ (intellectually superior) was organised to a certain extent by means of the constitutional democratic party, but the _petite bourgeoisie_ (the _bourgeois_ democracy) had no organisation whatsoever and no means for an organised struggle. the democratic municipalities were losing their true democratic aspect--not as a result of the new municipal law, but of revolutionary practice--and became mere class organs of the proletariat, or the representatives of purely socialistic parties, completely out of touch with the people. self-government in the districts and in the villages in the first period of the revolution was of more or less the same nature. towards the autumn there should have been a democratic system of _zemstvo_ administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. the district (volost) _zemstvo_ was to undertake the administration of local agriculture, education, order and safety. as a matter of fact, the villages were administered--if such a word can be applied to anarchy--by a complex agglomeration of revolutionary organisations, such as peasant congresses, supply and land committees, popular soviets, village councils, etc. very often another peculiar organisation--that of the deserters--dominated them all. at any rate, the all-russian union of peasants agreed with the following declaration made by the left wing: "all our work for the organisation of various committees will be of no avail if these social organisations are to remain under the constant threat of being terrorised by accidental armed bands." the only question that deeply perturbed the minds of the peasantry and overshadowed all other events, was the old, painful, traditional question: the question of the land. it was an exceptionally complex and tangled question. it arose more than once in the shape of fruitless mutinies, which were ruthlessly suppressed. the wave of agrarian troubles which swept over russia in the years of the first revolution ( - ) and left a trail of fire and ruined estates was an indication of the consequences that were bound to follow the revolution of . it is difficult to form an exhaustive idea of the motives which prompted the land-owners to defend their rights so stubbornly and so energetically: was it atavism, a natural yearning for the land, statesmanlike considerations as to the desirability of increasing the productivity of the land by introducing higher methods of agriculture, a desire to maintain a direct influence over the people, or was it merely selfishness?... one thing is certain--the agrarian reforms were overdue. retribution could not fail to overtake the government and the ruling classes for the long years of poverty, oppression, and, what is most important, the incredible moral and intellectual darkness in which the peasant masses were kept, their education being entirely neglected. the peasants demanded that all land should be surrendered to them, and would not wait for the decision of the central land committee or of the constituent assembly. this impatience was undoubtedly due, to a great extent, to the weakness of the government and to outside influences, which will be described later. there was no divergence of opinion as to the fundamental idea of the reforms. the liberal democracy and the _bourgeoisie_, the revolutionary democracy and the provisional government, all spoke quite definitely about "handing the land over to the workers." with the same unanimity these elements favoured the idea of leaving the final decision on the reform of the land and legislation on the subject to the constituent assembly. this irreconcilable divergence of opinion arose by reason of the very essence of land reform. liberal circles in russia stood for the private ownership of the land--an idea which found increasing favour with the peasants--and demanded that the peasants should receive allotments rather than that the land should be entirely redistributed. on the other hand, the revolutionary democracy advocated, at all meetings of every party, class and profession, the adoption of the resolution of the all-russian congress of peasants, which was passed on may th, with the approval of the minister tchernov on "the transfer of all lands ... _to the people as a whole, as their patrimony, on the basis of equal possession without any payment_." the peasants did not or would not understand this social revolutionary resolution, which caused dissensions. the peasants were private owners by nature and could not understand the principle of nationalisation. the principle of equal possession meant that many millions of peasants, whose allotments were larger than the normal, would lose their surplus allotments, and the whole question of the redistribution of the land would lead to endless civil war; because there were innumerable peasants who had no land at all, and only , , dessiatines of arable land which did not belong to the peasants to divide among , , peasant households. the provisional government did not consider itself entitled to solve the land problem. under the pressure of the masses, it transferred its rights partly to the ministry of agriculture, partly to the central land committee, which was organised on the basis of broad, democratic representation. the latter was entrusted with the task of collecting data and of drawing up a scheme of land reform, as well as of regulating the existing conditions with regard to the land. in practice, the use of the land transfer, rent, employment of labour, etc., were dealt with by the local land committees. these bodies contained illiterate elements--the intellectuals as a rule were excluded--which had selfish motives and had no perception either of the extent or of the limits of their powers. the central representative institutions and the ministry of agriculture, under tchernov, issued appeals against arbitrariness and for the preservation of the land, pending the decision of the constituent assembly. at the same time they overtly encouraged "temporary possession of the land," as seizure of the land was then described, on the excuse that the government were obliged to sell as much land as possible. the propaganda that was conducted on a large scale in the villages by irresponsible representatives of socialist and anarchist circles completed tchernov's work. the results of this policy were soon apparent. in one of his circulars to provincial commissars, the minister of the interior, tzeretelli, admitted that complete anarchy reigned in the villages: "land is being seized and sold, agricultural labourers are forced to stop working, and landowners are faced with demands which are economically impossible. breeding stock is being destroyed and implements plundered. model farms are being ruined. forests are being cut down irrespective of ownership, timber and logs are being stolen, and their shipment prevented. no sowing is done on privately-owned farms, and harvests of grain and hay are not reaped." the minister accused the local committees and the peasant congresses of organising arbitrary seizures of the land, and came to the conclusion that the existing conditions of agriculture and forestry "would inevitably bring about endless calamities for the army and the country, and threatened the very existence of the state." if we recall the fires, the murders, the lynchings, the destruction of estates, which were often filled with treasures of great historical and artistic value, we shall have a true picture of the life of the villages in those days. the question of the ownership of the land by the landlords was thus not merely a matter of selfish class interest, all the more as, not only the landlords but the wealthy peasants were subjected to violence by order of the committees, and in spite of them. one village rose against another. it was not a question of the transfer of riches from one class or individual to another, but of the destruction of treasures, of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the state. the instincts of proprietorship inherent in the peasantry irresistibly grew as these seizures and partitions took place. the mental attitude of the peasantry upset all the plans of the revolutionary democracy. by converting the peasants into a _petite bourgeoisie_, it threatened to postpone to an indefinite date the triumph of socialism. the villagers were obsessed by the idea of land distribution and by their own interests, and were not in the least concerned with the war, with politics, or with social questions which did not directly affect them. the workers of the village were being killed and maimed at the front, and the village, therefore, considered the war as a burden. the authorities disallowed seizures of the land and imposed restrictions in the shape of monopolies and fixed prices for corn. the peasantry, therefore, bore a grudge against the government. the towns ceased to supply manufactured goods and the villages were estranged from the towns and ceased to supply them with grain. this was the only real "conquest" made by the revolution, and those who profited by it grew very anxious as to the attitude of future governments towards the arbitrary solution of the land question. they therefore actively encouraged anarchy in the villages, condoned seizures and undermined the authority of the provisional government. by this means they hoped to bring the peasants over to their side as supporters, or, at least, as a neutral element, in the impending decisive struggle for power. * * * * * the abolition of the police by the order issued on april th was one of the acts of the government which seriously complicated the normal course of life. in reality, this act only confirmed the conditions which had arisen almost everywhere in the first days of the revolution, and were directly due to the wrath of the people against the executive of the old regime, and especially of those who had been oppressed and persecuted by the police and had suddenly found themselves on the crest of the wave. it would be a hopeless task to defend the russian police as an institution. it could only be considered good by comparing it with the militia and with the extraordinary bolshevik commission.... in any case it would have been useless to resist the abolition of the police, because it was a psychological necessity. there can be no doubt that the attitude and actions of the old police were due less to their political opinions than to the instructions of their employers and to their own personal interests. no wonder, therefore, that the gendarmes and the policemen, insulted and persecuted, introduced a very bad element into the army, into which they were subsequently forcibly drafted. the revolutionary democracy, in self defence, grossly exaggerated their counter-revolutionary activities in the army; nevertheless, it is absolutely true that a great many ex-officers of the police and of the gendarmerie, partly, perhaps, from motives of self-defence, chose for themselves a most lucrative profession--that of the demagogue and the agitator. the fact is that the abolition of the police in the very midst of the turmoil--when crime was on the increase and the guarantees of public safety and of the safety of individual property were weakened--was a real calamity. the militia, indeed, far from being a substitute for the police, was a caricature of them. in western countries the police is placed as a united force under the orders of a department of the central government. the provisional government placed the militia under the orders of _zemstvo_ and municipal administrations. the government commissars were only entitled to make use of the militia for certain definite purposes. the cadres of the militia were filled by untrained men, devoid of technical experience, and, as often as not, criminals. by virtue of the new law, there were admitted to the militia persons under arrest or who had served a term of imprisonment for comparatively grave offences. the system of recruiting practised by some forcibly "democratised" _zemstvo_ and municipal institutions tended quite as much as the new law towards the deterioration of the personnel of the militia. the chief of the central administration of the militia himself admitted that escaped convicts were sometimes placed in command of the militia. the villages were sometimes without any militia at all, and they administered themselves as best they could. in its proclamation of april th the provisional government gave an accurate description of the condition of the country in stating that "the growth of new social ties was slower than the process of disruption caused by the collapse of the old régime." in every feature of the life of the people this fact was clearly to be observed. chapter xiii. the activities of the provisional government: food supplies, industry, transport and finance. in the early spring of the deficiency in supplies for the army and for the towns was rapidly growing. in one of its appeals to the peasants the soviet said: "the enemies of freedom, the supporters of the deposed czar, are taking advantage of the shortage of food in the towns _for which they are themselves responsible_ in order to undermine your freedom and ours. they say that the revolution has left the country without bread...." this simple explanation, adduced by the revolutionary democracy in every crisis, was, of course, one-sided. there was the inheritance of the old régime as well as the inevitable consequences of three years of war, during which imports of agricultural implements had come to a standstill, labourers were taken from the land, and, as a result, the area under crops was diminished. but these were not the only reasons for the food shortage in a fertile country--a shortage which in the autumn was considered by the government as disastrous. the food policy of the government and the fluctuation of prices, the depreciation of the currency and a rise in the price of commodities entirely out of proportion to the fixed prices for grain also largely contributed to this result. this rise in prices was due to general economic conditions, and especially to a very rapid rise in wages; to the agrarian policy of the government, the inadequacy of the area under crops, to the turmoil in the villages, and to the breakdown of transport. private trade was abolished and the entire matter of food supplies was handed over to food supply committees--undoubtedly democratic in character, but, with the exception of the representatives of the co-operatives, inexperienced and devoid of a creative spirit. there are many more reasons, great and small, which may be included in the formula: the old régime, the war and the revolution. on march th the provisional government introduced the grain monopoly. the entire surplus of grain, excluding normal supplies, seed corn and fodder, reverted to the state. at the same time the government once again raised the fixed price of grain, and promised to introduce fixed prices for all necessary commodities, such as iron, textiles, leather, kerosine oil, etc. this last measure, which was universally recognised as just, and to which the minister of supplies attributed a very great importance, proved impossible of application owing to the confused condition of the country. russia was covered by a huge network of food supply institutions, which cost , , roubles a year, but could not cope with their work. the villages, on the other hand, had ceased to pay taxes and rents, were flooded with paper money, for which they could get no equivalent in manufactured goods, and were by no means anxious to supply grain. propaganda and appeals were of no avail, and, as often as not, force had to be applied. in its proclamation of august th the government admitted that the country was in a desperate position; the government stores were emptying; towns, provinces, and armies at the front were in dire need of bread, _although, in fact, there was sufficient bread in the country_. some had not delivered last year's harvest; some were agitating and preventing others from doing their duty. in order to avert grave danger, the government once more raised the fixed prices and threatened to apply stringent measures against the offenders, and to regulate prices and the distribution of articles required by the villages. but the vicious circle of conflicting political, social and class interests was narrowing, like to a tight noose, round the neck of the government, paralysing its will-power and energy. * * * * * the condition of industry was no less acute, and it was steadily falling into ruin. here, as in the matter of supplies, the calamity cannot be ascribed to one set of causes, as happened when the employers and the workmen levelled accusations against one another. the former were charged with taking excessive profits and having recourse to sabotage in order to upset the revolution, while the latter were blamed for slackness and greed and for deriving selfish gains from the revolution. the causes may be divided into three categories. owing to various political and economic reasons and to the fact that the old government did not devote sufficient attention to the development of the natural resources of the country, our industries were not placed on a solid basis, and were to a great extent dependent upon foreign markets even for such material as might easily have been found in russia. thus in there was a serious shortage of pig-iron, and in of fuel. from to imports of metals from abroad rose from to per cent. before the war we imported per cent. of cotton. we needed , , pouds[ ] of wool from abroad out of a total of the , , pouds produced. the war unquestionably affected industry very deeply. normal imports came to a standstill. the mines of dombrovsk were lost. owing to strategical requirements, transport was weakened, supplies of fuel and of raw materials diminished. most of the factories had to work for the army, and their personnel was curtailed by mobilisations. from an economic point of view, the militarisation of industry was a heavy burden for the population, because, according to the estimates made by one of the ministers, the army absorbed to per cent. of the total of goods produced by the country. finally, the war widened the gulf between the employers and the workmen, as the former made immense profits, whereas the latter were impoverished, and their condition was further aggravated by the suspension of certain professional guarantees on account of the war by the fact that certain categories of workmen were drafted by conscription to definite industrial concerns, and by the general burden of inflated prices and inadequate food supplies. even in these abnormal circumstances russian industries to some extent fulfilled the requirements of the moment, but the revolution dealt them a death blow, which caused their gradual dislocation and ultimate collapse. on the one hand, the provisional government was legislating for the establishment of a strict government control of the industries of the country and for regulating them by heavily taxing profits and excess war profits, as well as by government distribution of fuel, raw materials and food. the latter measure caused the trading class to be practically eliminated and to be replaced by democratic organisations. whether excess profits disappeared as a result of this policy, or were merely transferred to another class, it is not easy to decide. on the other hand, the government were deeply concerned with the protection of labour, and were drafting and passing various laws concerning the freedom of unions, labour exchanges, conciliation boards, social insurance, etc. unfortunately, the impatience and the desire for "law-making" which had seized the villages were also apparent in the factories. heads of industrial concerns were dismissed wholesale, as well as the administrative and technical staffs. these dismissals were accompanied by insults and sometimes by violence, out of revenge for past offences, real or imaginary. some of the members of the staffs resigned of their own accord, because they were unable to endure the humiliating position into which they were forced by the workmen. given our low level of technical and educational standards, such methods were fraught with grave danger. as in the army, so in the factories, committees replaced by elections the dismissed personnel with utterly untrained and ignorant men. sometimes the workmen completely seized the industrial concerns. ignorant and unprovided with capital, they led these concerns to ruin, and were themselves driven to unemployment and misery. labour discipline in the factories completely vanished, and no means was left of exercising moral, material or judicial pressure or compulsion. the "consciousness" alone of the workers proved inadequate. the technical and administrative personnel which remained or was newly elected could no longer direct the industries and enjoyed no authority, as it was thoroughly terrorised by the workmen. naturally, therefore, the working hours were still further curtailed, work became careless, and production fell to its lowest ebb. the metallurgical industries of moscow fell per cent. and the productivity of the petrograd factories to per cent. as early as in the month of april. in june the production of coal and the general production of the donetz basin fell per cent. the production of oil in baku and grozni also suffered. the greatest injury, however, was inflicted upon the industries by the monstrous demands for higher wages, completely out of proportion to the cost of living and to the productivity of labour, as well as to the actual paying capacity of the industries. these demands greatly exceeded all excess profits. the following figures are quoted in a report to the provisional government: in eighteen concerns in the donetz basin, with a total profit of , , roubles per annum, the workmen demanded a wage increase of , , roubles per annum; the total amount of increased wages in all the mining and metallurgical factories of the south was , , roubles per annum. in the urals the total budget was , , , while the wages rose to , , . in the putilov factory alone, in petrograd, before the end of , the increase in wages amounted to , , roubles. the wages rose from to per cent. the increase in the wages of the textile workers of moscow rose per cent., as compared to . the burden of these increases naturally fell on the government, as most of the factories were working for the defence of the country. owing to the condition of industry described above, and to the psychology of the workmen, industrial concerns collapsed, and the country experienced an acute shortage of necessary commodities, with a corresponding increase in prices. hence the rise in the price of bread and the reluctance of the villages to supply the towns. at the same time bolshevism introduced a permanent ferment into the labouring masses. it flattered the lowest instincts, fanned hatred against the wealthy classes, encouraged excessive demands, and paralysed every endeavour of the government and of the moderate democratic organisations to arrest the disruption of industry: "all for the proletariat and through the proletariat...." bolshevism held up to the working class vivid and entrancing vistas of political domination and economic prosperity, through the destruction of the capitalist régime and the transfer to the workmen of political power, of industries, of the means of production, and of the wealth of the country. and all this was to come at once, immediately, and not as a result of a lengthy, social, economic process and organised struggle. the imagination of the masses, unfettered by knowledge or by the authority of leading professional unions, which were morally undermined by the bolsheviks, and were on the verge of collapse, was fired by visions of avenging the hardships and boredom of heavy toil in the past, and of enjoying amenities of a _bourgeois_ existence, which they despised and yet yearned for with equal ardour. it was "now or never: all or nothing!" as life was destroying illusions, and the implacable law of economics was meting out the punishment of high prices, hunger and unemployment, bolshevism was the more convincingly insisting upon the necessity of rebellion and explaining the causes of the calamity and the means of averting it. the causes were: the policy of the provisional government, which was trying to reintroduce enslavement by the bourgeoisie, the sabotage of the employers, and the connivance of the revolutionary democracy, including the mensheviks, which had sold itself to the bourgeoisie. the means was the transfer of power to the proletariat. all these circumstances were gradually killing russian industry. in spite of all these disturbances, the dislocation of industry was not immediately felt in the army to an appreciable degree, because attention was concentrated upon the army at the expense of the vital necessities of the country itself, and also because for several months there had been a lull at the front. in june, , therefore, we were provided adequately, if not amply, for an important offensive. imports of war material through archangel, murmansk, and partly through vladivostok had increased, but had not been sufficiently developed by reason of the natural shortcomings of maritime routes, and of the low carrying capacity of the siberian and of the murmansk railways. only per cent. of the actual needs of the army were satisfied. the military administration, however, clearly saw that we were living on the old stores collected by the patriotic impulse and effort of the country in . by august, , the most important factories for the production of war materials had suffered a check. the production of guns and of shells had fallen per cent., and of aircraft per cent. the possibility of continuing the war under worse material conditions was, however, amply proved later by the soviet government, which had been using the supplies available in and the remnants of russian industrial production for the conduct of civil war for more than three years. this, of course, was only possible through such an unexampled curtailment of the consuming market that we are practically driven back to primitive conditions of life. * * * * * transport was likewise in a state of dislocation. as early as may, , at the regular congress of railway representatives at the stavka, the opinion was expressed, and confirmed by many specialists, that, unless the general conditions of the country changed, our railways would come to a standstill within six months. practice has disproved theory. for over three years, under the impossible conditions of civil war and of the bolshevik régime, the railways have continued to work. it is true that they did not satisfy the needs of the population even in a small measure, but they served the strategical purposes. that this situation cannot last, and that the entire network of the russian railways is approaching its doom, is hardly open to doubt. in the history of the disintegration of the russian railway system the same conditions are traceable which i have mentioned in regard to the army, the villages, and especially the industries: the inheritance of the unwise policy of the past in regard to railways, the excessive demands of the war, the wear and tear of rolling stock, and anarchy on the line, due to the behaviour of a licentious soldiery; the general economic condition of the country, the shortage of rails, of metal and of fuel; the "democratisation" of railway administration, in which the power was seized by various committees; the disorganisation of the administrative and technical personnel, which was subjected to persecution; the low producing power of labour and the steady growth of the economic demands of the railway employees and workmen. in other branches of the administration the government offered a certain resistance to the systematic seizure of power by private organisations, but in the ministry of railways that pernicious system was introduced by the government itself, in the person of the minister nekrassov. he was the friend and the inspirer of kerensky, alternately minister of railways and of finance, assistant and vice-president of the council of ministers, governor-general of finland, octobrist, cadet (constitutional democrat), and radical democrat, holding the scales between the government and the soviet. nekrassov was the darkest and the most fatal figure in the governing circles, and left the stamp of destruction upon everything he touched--the all-russian executive committee of the union of railways, the autonomy of the ukraine, or the kornilov movement. the ministry had no economic or technical plan. as a matter of fact, no such plan could ever be carried out, because nekrassov decided to introduce into the railway organisation, hitherto strongly disciplined, "the new principles of democratic organisation, instead of the old watchwords of compulsion and fear"(?). soviets and committees were implanted upon every branch of the railway administration. enormous sums were spent upon this undertaking, and, by his famous circular of may th, the minister assigned to these organisations a very wide scope of control and management, as well as of the "direction" which they were henceforward entitled to give to the responsible personnel in the administration. executive functions were subsequently promised to these organisations.... "meanwhile the ministry of railways and its subordinate branches will work in strict accordance with the ideas and wishes of the united railway workers." nekrassov thus handed over to a private organisation the most important interests of the state--the direction of the railway policy, the control of the defence, of industries, and of all other branches dependent upon the railway system. as one of our contemporary critics has said, this measure would have been entirely justified had the whole population of russia consisted of railway employees. this reform, carried out by nekrassov on a scale unprecedented in history, was something worse than a mere blunder. the general trend of ministerial policy was well understood. in the beginning of august, at the moscow congress, which was turned into a weapon for the socialist parties of the left, one of the leaders declared that "the railway union must be fully autonomous and no authority except that of the workers themselves should be entitled to interfere with it." in other words, a state within a state. disruption ensued. a new phase of the arbitrariness of ever-changing organisations was introduced into the strict and precise mechanism of the railway services in the centre as well as throughout the country. i understand the democratisation that opens to the popular masses wide access to science, technical knowledge, and art, but i do not understand the democratisation of these achievements of human intellect. there followed anarchy and the collapse of labour discipline. as early as in july the position of the railways was rendered hopeless through the action of the government. after holding the office of minister of railways for four months, nekrassov went to the ministry of finance, of which he was utterly ignorant, and his successor, yurenev, began to struggle against the usurpation of power by the railwaymen, as he considered "the interference of private persons and organisations with the executive functions of the department as a crime against the state." the struggle was conducted by the customary methods of the provisional government, and what was lost could no longer be recovered. at the moscow congress the president of the union of the railwaymen, fully conscious of its power, said that the struggle against democratic organisations was a manifestation of counter-revolution, that the union would use every weapon in order to counteract these endeavours, and "would be strong enough to slay this counter-revolutionary hydra." as is well known, the all-russian executive committee of the union of railways subsequently became a political organisation pure and simple, and betrayed kornilov to kerensky and kerensky to lenin. with a zeal worthy of the secret police of the old régime, it hunted out kornilov's followers, and finally met an inglorious end in the clutches of bolshevik centralisation. * * * * * we now come to another element in the life of the state--finance. every normal financial system is dependent upon a series of conditions: general political conditions, offering a guarantee of the external and internal stability of the state and of the country; strategical conditions, defining the measure of efficiency of the national defence; economic conditions, such as the productivity of the country's industries and the relation of production to consumption; the conditions of labour, of transport, etc. the government, the front, the villages, the factories, and the transport offered no necessary guarantees, and the ministry of finance could but have recourse to palliatives in order to arrest the disruption of the entire system of the currency and the complete collapse of the budget, pending the restoration of comparative order in the country. according to the accepted view, the main defects of our pre-war budget were that it was based upon the revenue of the spirit monopoly ( , , roubles), and that there was scarcely any direct taxation. before the war the budget of russia was about ½ milliards of roubles; the national debt was about ½ milliards, and we paid nearly , , roubles interest per annum; half of that sum went abroad, and was partially covered by ½ milliards of our exports. the war and prohibition completely upset our budget. government expenses during the war reached the following figures: ½ milliards of roubles. " " " " seven months, " " the enormous deficit was partially covered by loans and by paper currency. the expenses of the war were met, however, out of the so-called "war fund." at the stavka, in accordance with the dictates of practical wisdom, expenditure was under the full control of the chief-of-staff of the supreme commander-in-chief, who determined the heads of expenditure in his orders, schedules, and estimates. the revolution dealt the death-blow to our finance. as shingarev, the minister of finance, said, the revolution "induced everyone to claim more rights, and stifled any sense of duty. everybody demanded higher wages, but no one dreamt of paying taxes, and the finances of the country were thus placed in a hopeless position." there was a real orgy; everyone was desperately trying to grab as much as possible from the treasury under the guise of democratisation, taking advantage of the impotence of the government and of powerlessness to resist. even nekrassov had the courage to declare at the moscow congress that "never in history had any czarist government been as generous and prodigal as the government of revolutionary russia," and that "the new revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one." suffice it to quote a few "astronomic" figures in order to gauge the insuperable obstacles in the way of a reasonable budget. the decline of production and the excessive rise in wages resulted in the necessity of enormous expenditure for subsidies to expiring concerns and for overpayments for means of production. these over-payments in the donetz basin alone amounted to , , , roubles; the increase in the soldiers' pay, , , roubles; railwaymen's pay, , , roubles; post office employees, , , roubles. after a month the latter demanded another , , roubles, while the entire revenue of the posts and telegraphs was , , roubles. the soviet demanded milliards (in other words, nearly the total of the budget for ) for allowances to soldiers' wives, whereas only milliards had been spent till under this head. the food supply committees cost , , roubles per annum, and the land committee , , roubles, etc., etc. meanwhile the revenue was falling steadily. thus, for example, the land tax fell per cent. in the first few months of the revolution; the revenue from town property, per cent.; the house tax, per cent., etc. at the same time, our internal troubles caused the depreciation of the rouble and a fall in the price of russian securities abroad. the provisional government based its financial policy upon "reorganisation of the financial system on democratic lines and the direct taxation of the propertied classes" (death duties, excess profits taxes, income taxes, etc.). the government, however, would not adopt the measure recommended by the revolutionary democracy--a compulsory loan or a high capital levy--a measure distinctly tainted with bolshevism. all these just taxes, introduced or planned, did not suffice even partially to satisfy the growing needs of the state. in the month of august the finance ministry was compelled to increase indirect taxation on certain monopolies, such as tea, sugar, and matches. these measures were, of course, extremely burdensome, and therefore highly unpopular. expenditure was growing, revenue was not forthcoming. the liberty loan was not progressing favourably, and there could be no hope for foreign loans on account of the condition of the russian front. internal loans and treasury bonds yielded ½ milliards in the first half of . ordinary revenue was expected to yield , , , roubles. there remained one weapon established by the historical tradition of every revolution--the printing press. paper currency reached colossal proportions: ½ , , , roubles. , , , " , , , " ½ , , , " according to the estimates of july, , the total of paper currency was , , , roubles (the gold reserve was , , , roubles), as against milliards before the war. four successive finance ministers were unable to drag the country out of the financial morass. this might possibly have been achieved by the awakening of the national spirit and an understanding of the interests of the state, or by the growth of a wise and strong power which could have dealt a final blow to the anti-state, selfish motives of the bourgeois elements that based their well-being upon the war and upon the blood of the people, as well as of the democracy, which, in the words of shingarev, "so severely condemned through its representatives in the duma the very same poison (paper currency) which it was now drinking greedily at the moment when that democracy had become its own master." chapter xiv. the strategical position of the russian front. the first and fundamental question with which i was confronted at the stavka was _the objective of our front_. the condition of the enemy did not appear to us as particularly brilliant. but i must confess that the truth as at present revealed exceeds all our surmises, especially according to the picture drawn by hindenburg and ludendorff of the condition of germany and of her allies in . i will not dwell upon the respective numerical strength, armaments, and strategical positions on the western front. i will only recall that in the middle of june hindenburg gave rather a gloomy description of the condition of the country in his telegram to the emperor. he said: "we are very much perturbed by the depression of the spirits of the people. that spirit must be raised, _or we shall lose the war_. our allies also require support, lest they desert us.... economic problems must be solved, which are of paramount importance to our future. the question arises--is the chancellor capable of solving them? a solution must be found _or else we perish_." the germans were anticipating a big offensive of the british and the french on the western front, where they had concentrated their main attention and their main forces, leaving on the eastern front after the russian revolution only such numbers as were scarcely sufficient for defence. and yet the position on the eastern front continued to create a certain nervousness at the german g.h.q. will the russian people remain steadfast, or will the defeatist tendencies prevail? hindenburg wrote: "as the condition of the russian army prevented us from finding a clear answer to that question, our position in regard to russia remained insecure." in spite of all its defects, the russian army in march, , was a formidable force, with which the enemy had seriously to reckon. owing to the mobilisation of industry, to the activities of the war-industries committees, and partly to the fact that the war ministry was showing increased energy, our armaments had reached a level hitherto unknown. also, the allies were supplying us with artillery and war materials through murmansk and archangel on a larger scale. in the spring we had the powerful forty-eighth corps--a name under which heavy artillery of the highest calibre for special purposes, "taon," was concealed. in the beginning of the year the engineering troops were reorganised and amplified. at the same time new infantry divisions were beginning to deploy. this measure, adopted by general gourko during his temporary tenure of office as chief-of-staff of the supreme c.-in-c., consisted in the reduction of regiments from four battalions to three, as well as the reduction of the number of guns to a division. a third division was thus created in every army corps, with artillery. there can be no doubt that, had this scheme been introduced in peace-time, the army corps would have been more pliable and considerably stronger. it was a risky thing to do in war-time. before the spring operations the old divisions were disbanded, whereas the new ones were in a pitiable state in regard to armaments (machine-guns, etc.), as well as technical strength and equipment. many of them had not been sufficiently blended together--a circumstance of particular importance in view of the revolution. the position was so acute that in may the stavka was compelled to sanction the disbanding of those of the third division which should prove feeble, and to distribute the men among units of the line. this idea, however, was hardly ever put into practice, as it encountered strong opposition on the part of units already disaffected by the revolution. another measure which weakened the ranks of the army was the dismissal of the senior men in the ranks. this decision, fraught with incalculable consequences, was taken on the eve of a general offensive. it was due to a statement made at a council at the stavka by the minister of agriculture (who was also in charge of supplies) that the condition of supplies was critical, and that he could not undertake the responsibility of feeding the army unless about a million men were removed from the ration list. in the debate attention was drawn to the presence in the army of an enormous number of non-combatants, quite out of proportion to the numbers of fighting men, and to the inclusion in the army of a quantity of auxiliary bodies, which were hardly necessary, such as of labour organisations, chinese, and other alien labour battalions, etc. mention was also made of the necessity of having a younger army. i very much feared this trend of mind, and gave orders to the staff to draw up accurate lists of all the above-named capitalists. while this work was still in preparation the war minister issued, on april th, an order of the day giving leave, in the internal districts, to soldiers over forty to work in the fields till may th. leave was afterwards extended till june th, but practically hardly anyone returned. on april th the provisional government discharged all men over forty-three. under the pressure of the men it became unavoidable to spread the provisions of the first order to the army, which would not be reconciled to any privileges granted to the rear. the second order gave rise to a very dangerous tendency, as it practically amounted to a _beginning of demobilisation_. the elemental desire of those who had been given leave to return to their homes could not be controlled by any regulations, and the masses of these men, who flooded the railway stations, caused a protracted disorganisation of the means of transport. some regiments formed out of reserve battalions lost most of their men. in the rear of the army transport was likewise in a state of confusion. the men did not wait to be relieved, but left the lorries and the horses to their fate; supplies were plundered and the horses perished. the army was weakened as a result of these circumstances, and the preparations for the defensive were delayed. [map: the russian (european) front in .] [map: the russian caucasian front in march .] the russian army occupied an enormous front, from the baltic to the black sea and from the black sea to hamadan. sixty-eight infantry and nine cavalry corps occupied the line. both the importance of and the conditions obtaining on these fronts varied. our northern front, including finland, the baltic and the line of the western dvina, was of great importance, as it covered the approaches to petrograd. but the importance at that front was limited to defensive purposes, and for that reason it was impossible to keep at that front large forces or considerable numbers of guns. the conditions of that theatre--the strong defensive line of the dvina--a series of natural positions in the rear linked up with the main positions of the western russian front, and the impossibility of any important operations in the direction of petrograd without taking possession of the sea, which was in our hands--all this would have justified us in considering that the front was, to a certain extent, secure, had it not been for two circumstances, which caused the stavka serious concern: the troops of the northern front, owing to the vicinity of revolutionary petrograd, were more demoralised than any other, and the baltic fleet and its bases--helsingfors and kronstadt, of which the latter served as the main base of anarchism and bolshevism--were either "autonomous" or in a state of semi-anarchy. while preserving to a certain degree the outward form of discipline, the baltic fleet was actually in a state of complete insubordination. the admiral in command, maximov, was entirely in the hands of the central committee of sailors. not a single order for naval operations could be carried out without the sanction of that committee, not to speak of naval actions. even the work of laying and repairing minefields--the main defence of the baltic--met with opposition from sailors' organisations and the crews. not only the general decline of discipline, but the well-planned work of the german general staff were quite obvious, and apprehensions were entertained lest naval secrets and codes be revealed to the enemy. at the same time, the troops of the forty-second corps, quartered along the finnish coast and on the monzund islands, had been idle for a long time and their positions scattered. with the beginning of the revolution they were, therefore, rapidly demoralised, and some of them were nothing but physically and morally degenerate crowds. to relieve or to move them was an impossibility. i recall that in may, , i made several unavailing endeavours to send an infantry brigade to the monzund islands. suffice it to say that the army corps commander would not make up his mind to inspect his troops and get into touch with them--a circumstance which is typical of the troops as well as of the personality of their commander. in a word, the position on the northern front in the spring of was the following: we received daily reports of the channel between the islands of the gulf of riga and the mainland being blocked with ice, and this ice appeared to be the chief real obstacle to an invasion of the german fleet and expeditionary forces. the western front extended from the disna to the pripet. on this long line two sectors--minsk-vilna and minsk-baranovitchi--were of the greatest importance to us, as they represented the two directions in which our troops, as well as the germans, might undertake offensive operations, for which there had already been precedents. the other sections of the front, and especially the southern--the pollessie, with its forests and marshes--owing to the conditions of the country and of the railways, were passive. along the river pripet, its tributaries and canals, a kind of half-peaceful intercourse with the germans had long since been established, as well as a secret exchange of goods, which was of some advantage to the "comrades." for example, we received reports that russian soldiers from the line, with bags, appeared daily in the market of pinsk, and that their advent was for many reasons encouraged by the german authorities. there was another vulnerable point--the bridge-head on the stokhod by the station, chrevishe-golenin, occupied by one of the army corps of general lesh. on march st, after strong artillery preparation and a gas attack, the germans fell upon our corps and smashed it to pieces. our troops had heavy casualties, and the remnants of the corps retreated behind the stokhod. the stavka did not get an accurate list of the casualties, because it was impossible to ascertain the numbers of killed or wounded under the head of "missing." the german official communiqué gave a list of prisoners-- officers and about , men. owing to the conditions in that theatre of war, this tactical success was of no strategical importance, and could lead to no dangerous developments. nevertheless, we could not but wonder at the frankness of the cautious _norddeutsche allgemeine zeitung_, the official organ of the german chancellor, which wrote: "the communiqué of the stavka of the russian supreme command of march th is mistaken in interpreting the operations undertaken by the german troops, and dictated by a tactical necessity which had arisen only within the limits of a given sector, was an operation of general importance." the paper knew the facts of which we were not certain and which have now been explained by ludendorff. from the beginning of the russian revolution, germany had a new aim: _unable to conduct operations on both the main fronts, she had decided attentively to follow and to encourage the process of demoralisation in russia, striking at her not by arms, but by developing propaganda_. the battle of the stokhod was fought on the personal initiative of general linsingen, and the german government was frightened because it considered that "at a moment when fraternisation was proceeding at full speed" german attacks might revive the dying flames of patriotism in russia and postpone her collapse. the chancellor asked the german g.h.q. to make as little as possible of that success, and the g.h.q. cancelled all further offensives "in order not to dash the hopes for peace which were about to be realised." our reverse on the stokhod produced a strong impression in the country. it was the first fighting experience of the "freest revolutionary army in the world...." the stavka merely gave the facts in a spirit of impartiality. in the circles of the revolutionary democracy the reverse was explained partly by the treachery of the commanding officers and partly by a conspiracy to emphasise by this example the impracticability of the new army regulations and the danger of the collapse of discipline, partly by the incompetence of the military authorities. the moscow soviet wrote to the stavka accusing one of the assistants of the war minister who had commanded a division on that front of being a traitor. others attributed our defeat solely to the demoralisation of the troops. in reality, the reasons for the defeat were two-fold: the _tactical_ reason--the doubtful practicability of occupying a narrow bridge-head when the river was swollen, the insecurity of the rear and perhaps inadequate use of the troops and of technical means; and the _psychological_ reason, the collapse of the _moral_ and of the discipline of the troops. the last circumstance, apparent in the enormous number of prisoners, gave both the russian stavka and hindenburg's headquarters much food for thought. the south-western front, from the pripet to moldavia, was the most important, and attracted the greatest attention. from that front, operating lines of the highest importance led to the north-west, into the depths of galicia and poland, to cracow, warsaw and brest-litovsk. the advance along these lines was covered from the south by the carpathians, separated the southern austrian group of armies from the northern german, and threatened the rear and the communications of the latter. these operating lines, upon which no serious obstacles were encountered, led us to the front of the austrian troops, whose fighting capacity was lower than the germans. the rear of our south-western front was comparatively well-organised and prosperous. the psychology of the troops, of the command, and of the staffs always differed considerably from the psychology of other fronts. in the glorious, but joyless, campaign only the armies of the south-western front had won splendid victories, had taken hundreds of thousands of prisoners, had made victorious progress hundreds of miles deep into the enemy territory, and had descended into hungary from the carpathians. these troops had formerly always believed in success. brussilov, kornilov, kaledin had made their reputations on that front. owing to all these circumstances the south-western front was regarded as the natural base and the centre of the impending operations. consequently, troops, technical means, the greater part of the heavy artillery ("taon") and munitions were concentrated at that front. the region between the upper seret and the carpathians was, therefore, being prepared for the offensive, _places d'armes_ erected, roads made. further south there was the roumanian front, stretching to the black sea. after the unsuccessful campaign of our troops occupied the line of the danube, the seret and the carpathians, and it was sufficiently fortified. part of general averesco's roumanian troops occupied the front between our fourth and ninth armies, and part were being organised under the direction of the french general, berthelot, assisted by russian gunner instructors. the reorganisation and formation proceeded favourably, the more so as the roumanian soldier is excellent war material. i became acquainted with the roumanian army in november, , when i was sent with the eighth army corps to buseo, into the thick of the retreating roumanian armies. curiously enough, i was ordered to advance in the direction of bucarest until i came into contact with the enemy, and to cover that direction with the assistance of the retreating roumanian troops. for several months i fought by buseo, rymnik and fokshany, having two roumanian corps at times under my command and averesco's army on my flank. i thus gained a thorough knowledge of the roumanian troops. in the beginning of the campaign the roumanian army showed complete disregard of the experience of the world war. in matters of equipment and ammunition their levity was almost criminal. there were several capable generals, the officers were effeminate and inefficient, and the men were splendid. the artillery was adequate, but the infantry was untrained. these are the main characteristics of the roumanian army, which soon afterwards acquired better organisation and improved in training and equipment. the relations between the actual russian commander-in-chief, who was designated as the assistant c.-in-c., and the king of roumania, who was nominally in chief command, were fairly cordial. although the russian troops began to commit excesses, which had a bad effect upon the attitude of the roumanians, the condition of the front did not, however, cause serious apprehension. owing to the general conditions at the theatre of war, only an advance in great strength in the direction of bucarest and an invasion of transylvania could have had a political and strategical effect. but new forces could not be moved to roumania, and the condition of the roumanian railways excluded all hope of the possibility of transport and supplies on a large scale. the theatre, therefore, was of secondary importance, and the troops of the roumanian front were preparing for a local operation, with a view to attracting the austro-german forces. the caucasian front was in an exceptional position. it was far distant. for many years the caucasian administration and command had enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. from august, , the army was commanded by the grand-duke nicholas, a man of commanding personality, who took advantage of his position whenever there was a difference of opinion between himself and the stavka. finally, the natural conditions of the theatre of war and the peculiarities of the enemy rendered that front entirely different from the european. all this led to a kind of remoteness and aloofness of the caucasian army and too abnormal relations with the stavka. general alexeiev repeatedly stated that, in spite of all his efforts, he was unable clearly to discern the situation in the caucasus. the caucasus lived independently, and told the government only as much as it considered necessary; and the reports were coloured in accordance with local interests. in the spring of the caucasian army was in a difficult position, not by reason of the strategical or fighting advantages of the enemy--the turkish army was by no means a serious menace--but of internal disorganisation. the countryside was roadless and bare. there were no supplies or forage, and the difficulties of transport made the life of the troops very arduous. the army corps on the right flank was comparatively well supplied, owing to facilities for transport across the black sea, but the other army corps, and especially those of the left flank, fared very badly. owing to geographical conditions, light transport required an enormous number of horses, while there was no fodder on the spot. railways of all kinds were being built very slowly, partly owing to a lack of railway material and partly because that material had been wasted by the caucasian front upon the trapezund railway, which was of secondary importance, owing to the parallel maritime transport. in the beginning of may general yudenitch reported that, owing to disease and loss of horses, transport was completely disorganised, batteries in position had no horses, half of the transport was non-existent, and , horses were needed. tracks, rolling stock and forage were urgently required. in the first half of april , men ( per cent.) of the infantry of the line had died of typhus and scurvy. yudenitch therefore foreshadowed the necessity of a compulsory retreat to points of supply, the centre towards erzerum and the right flank to the frontier. the solution suggested by general yudenitch could not be accepted, both for moral reasons and because our retreat would have freed turkish troops for action on other asiatic fronts. this circumstance particularly worried the british military representative at the stavka, who repeatedly conveyed to us the desire of the british g.h.q. that the left flank of our troops should advance in the valley of the river diala for a combined operation with general maude's mesopotamian contingent against halil pasha's army. this advance was necessary to the british rather for political considerations than for strategical requirements. the actual condition of our left flank army corps was, moreover, truly desperate, and in may tropical heat set in in the valley of the diala. as a result the caucasian front was unable to advance, and was ordered actively to defend its position. the advance of the army corps of the left flank, in contact with the british, was made conditional upon the latter supplying the troops. as a matter of fact, in the middle of april, a partial retreat took place in the direction of ognot and mush; at the end of april the left flank began its fruitless advance in the valley of the diala, and subsequently a condition arose on the caucasian front which was something between war and peace. in conclusion, mention must be made of another portion of the armed forces of russia in that theatre--the black sea fleet. in may and in the beginning of june serious disturbances had already occurred, which led to the resignation of admiral koltchak. the fleet, however, was still considered strong enough to carry out its task--to hold the black sea and also to blockade the turkish and bulgarian coasts and guard the maritime routes to the caucasian and roumanian fronts. i have given a short summary of the conditions of the russian front without indulging in a detailed examination of strategical possibilities. whatever our strategy during that period may have been, it was upset by the masses of the soldiery, for from petrograd to the danube and the diala demoralisation was spreading and growing. in the beginning of the revolution it was impossible to gauge the extent of its effects upon various fronts and upon future operations. but many were those whose minds were poisoned by a suspicion as to the futility of all our plans, calculations and efforts. chapter xv. the question of the advance of the russian army. we were thus confronted with a crucial question: should the russian army advance? on march th the provisional government issued a proclamation "to the citizens" on the subject of war aims. the stavka could not detect any definite instructions for governing the russian army in the midst of a series of phrases in which the true meaning of the appeal was obscured in deference to the revolutionary democracy. "the defence at all costs of our national patrimony and the liberation of the country from the enemy who has invaded it is the first and vital aim of our soldiers, who are defending the freedom of the people.... free russia does not aim at domination over other peoples, at depriving them of _their_ national patrimony, or at the forcible seizure of foreign territories. she aims at a lasting peace, on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. the russian people do not wish to increase their external power at the expense of other peoples ... but ... will not allow their mother country to come out of the great struggle downtrodden and weakened. these principles will constitute the basis of the foreign policy of the provisional government ... _while all the obligations to our allies will be respected_." in the note of april th, addressed to the allied powers by the foreign minister, miliukov, we find yet another definition: "the universal desire of the people to carry the world war to a victorious conclusion ... has grown owing to the consciousness of the common responsibility of everyone. this desire has become more active, because it is concentrated on the aim which is immediate and clear to everyone--_that of repelling the enemy who has invaded the territory of our mother country_." these, of course, were mere phrases, which described the war aims in cautious, timorous and nebulous words, allowing of any interpretation, and deprived, moreover, any foundation in fact. the will for victory in the people and in the army had not only not grown, but was steadily decreasing, as a result of weariness and waning patriotism, as well as of the intense work of the abnormal coalition between the representatives of the extreme elements of the russian revolutionary democracy and the german general staff. that coalition was formed by ties which were unseen and yet quite perceptible. i will deal with that question later, and will only say here that the destructive work, in accordance with the zimmerwald programme, for ending the war began long before the revolution and was conducted from within as well as from without. the provisional government was trying to pacify the militant element of the revolutionary democracy by expounding meaningless and obscure formulas with regard to the war aims, but it did not interfere with the stavka in regard to the choice of strategical means. we were, therefore, to decide the question of the advance independently from the prevailing currents of political opinion. the only clear and definite object upon which the commanding staffs could not fail to agree was to defeat the enemy in close union with the allies. otherwise our country was doomed to destruction. such a decision implied an advance on a large scale because victory was impossible without it, and a devastating war might otherwise become protracted. the responsible organs of the democracy, the majority of whom had defeatist tendencies, tried correspondingly to influence the masses. even the moderate socialist circles were not altogether free from these tendencies. the masses of the soldiery utterly failed to understand the ideas behind of the zimmerwald programme; but the programme itself offered a certain justification for the elementary feelings of self-preservation. in other words, it was a question with them of saving their skin. the idea of an advance could not, therefore, be particularly popular with the army, as demoralisation was growing. there was no certainty not only that the advance would be successful, but even that the troops would obey the order to go forward. the colossal russian front was still steady ... by the force of inertia. the enemy feared it, as, like ourselves, he was unable to gauge its potential strength. what if the advance were to disclose our impotence? such were the motives adduced against an advance. but there were too many weighty reasons in favour of it, and these reasons were imperative. the central powers had exhausted their strength, moral and material, and their man power. if our advance in the autumn of , which had no decisive strategical results, had placed the enemy forces in a critical position, what might not happen now, when we had become stronger and, technically better equipped, when we had the advantage in numbers, and the allies were planning a decisive blow in the spring of ? the germans were awaiting the blow with feverish anxiety, and in order to avert it they had retreated thirty miles on a front of miles between arras and soissons to the so-called hindenburg line, after causing incredibly ruthless and inexcusable devastation to the relinquished territory. this retreat was significant, as it was an indication of the enemy's weakness, and gave rise to great hopes. _we had to advance._ our intelligence service was completely destroyed by the suspicions of the revolutionary democracy, which had foolishly believed that this service was identical with the old secret police organisation, and had therefore abolished it. many of the delegates of the soviet were in touch with the german agents. the fronts were in close contact, and espionage was rendered very easy. in these circumstances our decision not to advance would have been undoubtedly communicated to the enemy, who would have immediately commenced the transference of his troops to the western front. this would have been tantamount to treason to our allies, and would have inevitably led to a separate peace--with all its consequences--if not officially, at least practically. the attitude of the revolutionary elements in petrograd in this matter was, however, so unstable that the stavka had at first suspected--without any real foundation--the provisional government itself. this caused the following incident: at the end of april, in the temporary absence of the supreme c.-in-c., the chief of the diplomatic chancery reported to me that the allied military attaches were greatly perturbed because a telegram had just been received from the italian ambassador at petrograd, in which he categorically stated that the provisional government had decided to conclude a separate peace with the central powers. when the receipt of a telegram had been ascertained, i sent a telegram to the war minister, because i was then unaware of the fact that the italian embassy, owing to the impulsiveness of its personnel, had more than once been the channel through which false rumours had been spread. my telegram was most emphatic, and ended thus: "posterity will stigmatise with deep contempt the weak-kneed, impotent, irresolute generation which was good enough to destroy the rotten régime, but not good enough to preserve the honour, the dignity, and the very existence of russia." the misunderstanding was painful indeed; the news was false, the government was not thinking of a separate peace. later, at the fateful sitting of the conference at the stavka of commanders-in-chief and members of the government, on july th, i had an opportunity of expressing my views once more. i said: "... there is another way--the way of treason. it would give a respite to our distressed country.... but the curse of treachery will not give us happiness. at the end of that way there is slavery--political, economical, and moral." i am aware that in certain russian circles such a straightforward profession of moral principles in politics was afterwards condemned. it was stated that such idealism is misplaced and pernicious, that the interests of russia must be considered above all "conventional political morality."... a people, however, lives not for years, but for centuries, and i am certain that, had we then altered the course of our external policy, the sufferings of the russian people would not have been materially affected, and the gruesome, blood-stained game with marked cards would have continued ... at the expense of the people. the psychology of the russian military leaders did not allow of such a change, of such a compromise with conscience. alexeiev and kornilov, abandoned by all and unsupported, continued for a long time to follow that path, trusting and relying upon the common-sense, if not the noble spirit, of the allies and preferring to be betrayed rather than betray. was that playing the part of a don quixote? it may be so. but the other policy would have had to be conducted by other hands less clean. as regards myself, three years later, having lost all my illusions and borne the heavy blows of fortune, having knocked against the solid wall of the overt and blind egoism of the "friendly" powers, and being therefore free from all obligations towards the allies, almost on the eve of the final betrayal by these powers of the real russia, i remained the convinced advocate of _honest policy_. now the tables are turned. at the end of april, , i had to try and convince british members of parliament that a healthy national policy cannot be free from all moral principles, and that an obvious crime was being committed because no other name could be given to the abandonment of the armed forces of the crimea to the discontinuance of the struggle against bolshevism, its introduction into the family of civilised nations, and to its indirect recognition; that this would prolong for a short while the days of bolshevism in russia, but would open wide the gates of europe to bolshevism. i am firmly convinced that the nemesis of history will not forgive them, as it would not have then forgiven us. the beginning of was a moment of acute peril for the central powers and a decisive moment for the entente. the question of the russian advance greatly perturbed the allied high command. general barter, the representative of great britain, and general janin, the french representative at russian headquarters, often visited the supreme c.-in-c. and myself, and made inquiries on the subject. but the statements of the german press, with reference to pressure from the allies and to ultimatums to the stavka, are incorrect. these would have simply been useless, because janin and barter understood the situation, and knew that it was the condition of the army that hindered the beginning of the advance. they tried to hurry and to increase technical assistance, while their more impulsive compatriots--thomas, henderson, and vandervelde--were making hopeless endeavours to fan the flame of patriotism by their impassioned appeals to the representatives of the russian revolutionary democracy and to the troops. the stavka also took into consideration the strong probability that the russian army would have rapidly and finally collapsed had it been left in a passive condition and deprived of all impulses for active hostilities, whereas a successful advance might lift and heal the _moral_, if not through sheer patriotism, at least through the intoxication of a great victory. such feelings might have counteracted all international formulas sown by the enemy on the fertile soil of the defeatist tendencies of the socialistic party. victory would have given external peace, and some chance of peace within. defeat opened before the country an abyss. the risk was inevitable, and was justified by the aim of saving russia. the supreme commander-in-chief, the quartermaster-general, and myself fully agreed as to the necessity of an advance. and this view was shared in principle by the senior commanding officers. different views were held on various fronts as to the degree of fighting capacity of the troops and as to their preparedness. i am thoroughly convinced that the decision itself independently of its execution rendered the allies a great service, because the forces, the means, and the attention of the enemy were kept on the russian front, which, although it had lost its former formidable power, still remained a potential danger to the enemy. the same question, curiously enough, was confronting hindenburg's headquarters. ludendorff writes: "the general position in april and in may precluded the possibility of important operations on the eastern front." later, however, "... there were great discussions on the subject at g.h.q. would not a rapid advance on the eastern front with the available troops, reinforced by a few divisions from the west, offer a better chance than mere waiting? it was a most propitious moment, as some people said, for smashing the russian army, when its fighting capacity had deteriorated.... i disagreed, in spite of the fact that our position in the west had improved. i would not do anything that might destroy the real chances of peace." ludendorff means, of course, separate peace. what such a peace was to be we learnt later, at brest-litovsk.... the armies were given directions for a new offensive. the general idea was to break through the enemy positions on sectors specially prepared on all european fronts, to advance on a broad front in great strength on the south-western front, in the direction from kamenetz-podolsk to lvov, and further to the line of the vistula, while the striking force of our western front was to advance from molodetchno to vilna and the niemen, throwing back northwards the german armies of general eichorn. the northern and the roumanian fronts were to co-operate by dealing local blows and attracting the forces of the enemy. the time for the advance was not definitely fixed, and a broad margin was allowed. but the days went by, and the troops, who had hitherto obeyed orders and carried out the most difficult tasks without a murmur, the same troops that had hitherto withstood the onset of the austro-german armies with naked breasts, without cartridges or shells, now stood with their will-power paralysed and their reason obscured. the offensive was still further delayed. meanwhile the allies, who had been preparing a big operation for the spring, as they had counted upon strong reinforcements being brought up by the enemy in the event of the complete collapse of the russian front, began the great battle in france, as had been planned, at the end of march, and _without awaiting_ the final decision on our advance. the allied headquarters, however, did not consider simultaneous action as a necessary condition of the contemplated operations, even before disaffection had begun in the russian army. owing to the natural conditions of our front we were not expected to begin the advance before the month of may. meanwhile, according to the general plan of campaign for , which had been drawn up in november, , at the conference at chantilly, general joffre intended to begin the advance of the anglo-french army at the end of january and the beginning of february. general nivelle, who superseded him, altered the date to the end of march after the conference at calais of february th, . the absence of co-ordination between the western and eastern european fronts was bearing bitter fruit. it is difficult to tell whether the allies would have deferred their spring offensive for two months, and whether the advances of a combined operation with the russian front would have been a compensation for the delay, which gave germany the opportunity of reinforcing and reorganising her armies. one thing is certain--that that lack of co-ordination gave the germans a great respite. ludendorff wrote: "i detest useless discussions, but i cannot fail to think of what would have happened had russia advanced in april and may and had won a few minor victories. we would have been faced, as in the autumn of , with a fierce struggle. our munitions would have reached a very low ebb. after careful consideration, i fail to see how our high command could have remained the master of the situation had the russians obtained in april and may even the same scant successes which crowned their efforts in june. in april and may of , in spite of our victory (?) on the aisne and in champagne, it was only the russian revolution that saved us." * * * * * apart from the general advance on the austro-german front, another question of considerable interest arose in april--that of an _independent operation for the conquest of constantinople_. inspired by young and spirited naval officers, the foreign minister, miliukov, repeatedly negotiated with alexeiev, and tried to persuade him to undertake that operation, which he considered likely to be successful, and which would, in his opinion, confront the revolutionary democracy, which was protesting against annexations, with an accomplished fact. the stavka disapproved of this undertaking, as the condition of our troops would not permit of it. the landing of an expeditionary force--in itself a very delicate task--demanded stringent discipline, preparation, and perfect order. what is more, the expeditionary force, which would lose touch with the main army, should be imbued with a very strong sense of duty. to have the sea in the rear is a circumstance which depresses even troops with a very strong _moral_. these elements had already ceased to exist in the russian army. the minister's requests were becoming, however, so urgent that general alexeiev deemed it necessary to give him an object-lesson, and a small expedition was planned to the turkish coast of asia minor. as far as i can remember, zunguldak was the objective. this insignificant operation required a detachment consisting of one infantry regiment, one armoured car division, and a small cavalry contingent, and was to have been carried out by the troops of the roumanian front. after a while the headquarters of that front had shamefacedly to report that the detachment could not be formed because the troops declined to join the expeditionary force. this episode was due to a foolish interpretation of the idea of peace without annexations, which distorted the very principles of strategy and was also, perhaps, due to the same instinct of self-preservation. it was another ill omen for the impending general advance. that advance was still being prepared, painfully and desperately. the rusty, notched russian sword was still brandished. the question was, when would it stop and upon whose head would it fall? [illustration: foreign military representatives at the stavka. standing on the pathway, from left to right: lieut.-col. marsengo (italy); . general janin (france); . general alexeiev; . general barter (great britain); . general romei longhena (italy).] chapter xvi. military reforms--the generals--the dismissal from the high command. preparations for the advance continued alongside of the so-called "democratisation." these phenomena must be here recorded, as they had a decisive effect upon the issue of the summer offensive and upon the final destinies of the army. military reforms began by the dismissal of vast numbers of commanding generals. in military circles this was described, in tragic jest, as "the slaughter of the innocents." it opened with the conversation between the war minister, gutchkov, and the general on duty at the stavka, komzerovski. at the minister's request the general drew up a list of the senior commanding officers, with short notes (records of service). this list, afterwards completed by various people who enjoyed gutchkov's confidence, served as a basis for the "slaughter." in the course of a few weeks senior officers, including seventy commanders of infantry and cavalry divisions, were placed on the retired list. in his speech to the delegates of the front on april th, , gutchkov gave the following reasons for this measure: "it has been our first task, after the beginning of the revolution, to make room for talent. among our commanding officers there were many honest men; but some of them were unable to grasp the new principles of intercourse, and in a short time more changes have been made in our commanding personnel than have ever been made before in any army.... i realised that there could be no mercy in this case, and i was merciless to those whom i considered incapable. of course, i may have been wrong. there may have been dozens of mistakes, but i consulted knowledgeable people and took decisions only when i felt that they were in keeping with the general opinion. at any rate, we have promoted all those who have proved their capacity among the commanding officers. i disregarded hierarchical considerations. there are men who commanded regiments in the beginning of the war and are now commanding armies.... we have thus attained not only an improvement, but something different and equally important. by proclaiming the watchword 'room for talent' we have instilled joy into the hearts, and have induced the officers to work with impetus and inspiration...." what did the army gain by such drastic changes? did the _cadres_ of the commanding officers really improve? in my opinion that object was not attained. new men appeared on the scene, owing to the newly-introduced right of selecting assistants, not without the interference of our old friends--family ties, friendship and wire-pulling. could the revolution give new birth to men or make them perfect? was a mechanical change of personnel capable of killing a system which for many years had weakened the impulse for work and for self-improvement? it may be that some talented individuals did come to the fore, but there were also dozens, nay, hundreds, of men whose promotion was due to accident and not to knowledge or energy. this accidental character of appointments was further intensified when later kerensky abolished for the duration of the war all the existing qualifications, as well as the correlation of rank and office. the qualification of knowledge and experience was also thereby set aside. i have before me a list of the senior commanding officers of the russian army in the middle of may, , when gutchkov's "slaughter" had been accomplished. the list includes the supreme commander-in-chief, the commanders-in-chief of fronts, armies and fleets, and their chiefs of staff--altogether forty-five men: opportunists. ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ the | approving | non-resisters | opponents | commanding | of | to | of |total. personnel. |democratisation.|democratisation.|democratisation.| ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ the supreme | | | | c.-in-c. | | | | army | | | | commanders| | | | fleet | | | | commanders| | | | chiefs | | | | of staff | | | | ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ | | | | ------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ i have excluded five names, as i have no data about them. these men were the brain, the soul and the will-power of the army. it is difficult to estimate their military capacity according to their last tenures of office, because strategy and military science in had almost entirely ceased to be applied and became slavishly subservient to the soldiery, but i know the activities of these men in regard to the struggle against democratisation--_i.e._, the disruption of the army, and the above table indicates the three groups into which they were divided. subsequently, after , some of these men took part in the struggle or kept aloof from it. opportunists. --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ the | approving | non-resisters | opponents | commanding | of | to | of |total. personnel. |democratisation.|democratisation.|democratisation.| --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ in anti- | | | | bolshevik | | | | organisations| | | | with the | | | | bolsheviks | | -- | | retired from | | | | the struggle | | | | --------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------ such are the results of the changes in the high command, where men were in the public eye and where their activities attracted the critical attention not only of the government, but of military and social circles. i think that in the lower grades things were no better. the question of the justice of this measure may be open to discussion, but, personally, i have no doubt whatsoever about its extreme impracticability. the dismissal _en masse_ of army chiefs definitely undermined the faith in the commanding staffs, and afforded an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence of the committees and of the men towards individual representatives of the commanding staff. constant changes and transfers removed most officers from their units, where they may have enjoyed respect and authority acquired by military prowess. these men were thrown into new circles strange to them, and time was needed, as well as difficult work, in the new and fundamentally changed atmosphere in order to regain that respect and authority. the formation of third infantry divisions was still proceeding, and was also occasioning constant changes in the commanding personnel. that chaos was bound to ensue as a result of all these circumstances is fairly obvious. so delicate a machine as the army was in the days of war and revolution could only be kept going by the force of inertia, and could not withstand new commotions. pernicious elements, of course, should have been removed and the system of appointments altered, and the path opened for those who were worthy; beyond that the matter ought to have been allowed to follow its natural course without laying too much stress upon it and without devising a new system. apart from the commanding officers who were thus removed, several generals resigned of their own accord--such as letchitzki and mistchenko--who could not be reconciled to the new régime, and many commanders who were evicted in a revolutionary fashion by the direct or indirect pressure of the committee or of the soldiery. admiral koltchak was one of them. further changes were made, prompted by varying and sometimes self-contradictory views upon the army administration. these changes were, therefore, very fitful, and prevented a definite type of commanding officer from being introduced. alexeiev dismissed the commander-in-chief, ruzsky, and the army commander, radko-dmitriev, for their weakness and opportunism. he visited the northern front, and, having gained an unfavourable impression of the activities of these generals, he discreetly raised the question of their being "overworked." that is the interpretation given by the army and society to these dismissals. brussilov dismissed yudenitch for the same reasons. i dismissed an army commander (kvietsinski) because his will and authority were subservient to the disorganising activities of the committees who were democratising the army. kerensky dismissed the supreme commander-in-chief and the commanders-in-chief, gourko and dragomirov, because they were strenuously opposed to the democratisation of the army. he also dismissed brussilov for the opposite motives, because brussilov was an opportunist, pure and simple. brussilov dismissed the commander of the eighth army, general kaledin--who later became the ataman of the don and was universally respected--on the plea that he had "lost heart" and did not approve of democratisation. this dismissal of a general with a magnificent war record was effected in a rude and offensive manner. he was at first offered the command of another army, and then offered to retire. kaledin then wrote to me: "my record entitles me to be treated otherwise than as a stop-gap, without taking my own views into consideration." general vannovski, who was relieved of the command of an army corps by the army commander because he refused to acknowledge the priority of the army committee, was immediately appointed by the stavka to a higher command and given an army on the south-western front. general kornilov, who had refused the chief command of the troops of the petrograd district, "because he considered it impossible to be a witness of and a contributor to the disruption of the army by the soviet," was afterwards appointed to the supreme command at the front. kerensky removed me from the office of chief-of-staff of the supreme c.-in-c. because i did not share the views of the government and openly disapproved of its activities, but, at the same time, he allowed me to assume the high office of commander-in-chief of our western front. things also happened of an entirely different nature. the supreme commander-in-chief, general alexeiev, made several unavailing efforts to dismiss admiral maximov, who had been elected to the command of the baltic fleet and was entirely in the hands of the mutinous executive committee of the baltic fleet. it was necessary to remove that officer, who had brought about so much evil, influenced, no doubt, by his surroundings, because the committee refused to release him, and maximov refused all summonses to come to the stavka on the plea that the condition of the fleet was critical. in the beginning of june brussilov managed to remove him from the fleet ... at the price of appointing him chief of the naval staff of the supreme c.-in-c. many other examples might be quoted of incredible contrasts in principles of army administration occasioned by the collision of two opposing forces and two schools of thought. * * * * * i have already said that the entire commanding staff of generals was strictly loyal to the provisional government. general kornilov, the would-be "rebel," addressed the following speech to a meeting of officers: "the old régime has collapsed. the people are building a new structure of liberty, and it is the duty of the people's army wholeheartedly to support the new government in its difficult, creative work." the commanding staff may have taken some interest in questions of general policy and in the socialistic experiments of the coalition governments, but no more than was taken by all cultured russians, and they did not consider themselves entitled or obliged to induce the troops to participate in the solution of social problems. their only concern was to preserve the army and the foreign policy which contributed to the victory. such a connection between the commanding staff and the government, at first "a love match" and later one of convenience, prevailed until the general offensive in june, while there still remained a flicker of hope that the mood of the army would change. that hope was destroyed by events, and, after the advance, the attitude of the commanding staff was somewhat shaken. i may add that the _entire_ senior commanding staff considered as inadmissible the democratisation of the army which the government was enforcing. from the table which i have quoted it can be seen that per cent. of the commanding officers did not raise a sufficiently strong protest against the disruption of the army. the reasons were manifold and entirely different. some did it for tactical considerations, as they thought that the army was poisoned and that it should be healed by such dangerous antidotes. others were prompted by purely selfish motives. i do not speak from hearsay, but because i know the _milieu_ and the individuals, many of whom have discussed the matter with me with perfect frankness. cultured and experienced generals could not frankly and scientifically advocate such "military" views as, for example, klembovski's suggestion that a triumvirate should be placed at the head of the army, consisting of the commander-in-chief, a commissar, and an elected soldier; kvietzinski's suggestion that the army committee should be invested with special plenary power by the war minister and the central committee of the soviet, which would entitle them to act in the name of that committee; or viranovski's suggestion that the entire commanding staff should be converted into "technical advisers" and their power transferred entirely to the commissars and the committee. the loyalty of the high commanding staff can be gauged from the following fact: at the end of april general alexeiev, despairing of the possibility of personally preventing the government from adopting measures which tended to disrupt the army, and before issuing the famous proclamation of the rights of the soldier, wired in cipher to all the commanders-in-chief a draft of a strong and resolute collective appeal from the army to the government. this appeal pointed to the abyss into which the army was being hurled. in the event of the draft being approved, it was to have been signed by all senior ranks, including divisional commanders. the fronts, however, for various reasons, disapproved of such means of influencing the government. general ragosa, the temporary c.-in-c. of the roumanian front, who was afterwards ukrainian war minister under the hetman, replied that the russian people seemed to be ordained by the almighty to perish, and it was therefore useless to struggle against fate. with a sign of the cross, one should patiently await the dictates of fate!... this was literally the sense of his telegram. such was the attitude and the confusion in the higher ranks of the army. as regards the commanders, who fought unremittingly against the disruption of the army, many of them struggled against the tide of democratisation, as they considered it their duty to the people. they did this in disregard of the success or failure of their efforts, of the blows of fate, or of the dark future, of which some already had a premonition, and which was already approaching with disaster in its train. on they went, with heads erect, misunderstood, slandered and savagely hated, as long as life and courage permitted. chapter xvii. "democratisation of the army"--administration, service and routine. in order to carry out the democratisation of the army and the reform of the war ministry in accordance with the new régime, gutchkov established a commission under the chairmanship of the late war minister, polivanov, who died at riga in , where he was the expert of the soviet government in the delegation for making peace with poland. the commission was composed of representatives of the military commission of the duma and of representatives of the soviet. there was a similar commission in the ministry of the navy under the chairmanship of savitch, a prominent member of the duma. i know more about the work of the first commission, and will therefore dwell upon it. the regulations drafted by the commission were not confirmed until they had been approved by the military section of the executive committee of the soviet, which enjoyed great authority and often indulged in independent military law-making. no future historian of the russian army will be able to avoid mention of the polivanov commission--this fatal institution whose stamp is affixed to every one of the measures which destroyed the army. with incredible cynicism, not far removed from treachery, this institution, comprising many generals and officers appointed by the war minister, systematically and daily introduced pernicious ideas and destroyed the rational foundations of military administration. very often drafts of regulations, which appeared to the government as excessively demagogic and were not sanctioned, appeared in the press and came to the knowledge of the masses of the soldiery. they were instilled into the army, and subsequently caused pressure to be brought to bear upon the government by the soldiery. the military members of the commission seemed to be competing with one another in slavish subservience to the new masters, and endorsed by their authority the destructive ideas. men who reported to the committee have told me that civilians occasionally protested during the debates and warned the committee against going too far, but no such protests ever came from the military members. i fail to understand the psychology of the men, who came so rapidly and unreservedly under the heel of the mob. the list of military members of the commission of the month of may indicates that most of them were staff officers and representatives of other departments, mostly of petrograd (twenty-five); only nine were from the army, and these do not seem to have been drawn from the line. petrograd has its own psychology different from that of the army. the most important and detrimental democratic regulations were passed concerning the organisation of committees, disciplinary action, the reform of the military courts, and, finally, the famous "declaration of the rights of the soldier." _military chiefs were deprived of disciplinary power._ it was transferred to regimental and company disciplinary courts, which also had to settle "misunderstandings" between officers and men. there is no need to comment upon the importance of this curtailment of the disciplinary power of the officers; it introduced complete anarchy in the internal life of regimental units, and the officer was discredited _by the law_. the latter circumstance is of paramount importance, and the revolutionary democracy took full advantage of this procedure in all its attempts at law-making. the reform of the courts aimed at weakening the influence of military judges by appointment upon the course of the trial, the introduction of juries and the general weakening of military justice. field courts-martial were abolished, which meted out quick punishment on the spot for obvious and heavy crimes, such as treason, desertion, etc. the democratisation of the military courts might be excused to a certain extent by the fact that confidence in the officers, having been undermined, it was necessary to create judicial courts of a mixed composition on an elective basis, which in theory were supposed to enjoy to a greater extent the confidence of the revolutionary democracy. but that object was not attained, because the military courts--one of the foundations of order in the army--fell entirely into the hands of the mob. the investigating organs were completely destroyed by the revolutionary democracy, and investigation was strongly resisted by the armed men and sometimes by the regimental revolutionary institutions. the armed mob, which included many criminal elements, exercised unrestrained and ignorant pressure upon the conscience of the judges, and passed sentences in advance of the verdicts of the judges. army corps tribunals were destroyed, and members of the jury who had dared to pass a sentence distasteful to the mob were put to flight. these were common occurrences. the case was heard in kiev of the well-known bolshevik, dzevaltovski, a captain of the grenadier regiment of the guards, who was accused, with seventy-eight other men, of having refused to join in the advance and of having dragged his regiment and other units to the rear. the circumstances of the trial were these: in court there was a mob of armed soldiers, who shouted approval of the accused on his way from the prison to the court. dzevaltovski called, together with his escort, at the local soviet, where he received an ovation. finally, while the jury were deliberating, the armed reserve battalions paraded before the court with the band and sang the "international." dzevaltovski and all his companions were, of course, found "not guilty." military courts were thus gradually abolished. it would be a mistake, however, to ascribe this new tendency solely to the influence of the soviets. it may also be explained by kerensky's point of view. he said: "i think that no results can be achieved by violence and by mechanical compulsion in the present conditions of warfare, where huge masses are concerned. the provisional government in the three months of its existence has come to the conclusion that it is necessary to appeal to the common-sense, the conscience and the sense of duty of the citizens, and that it is the only means of achieving the desired results." in the first days of the revolution the provisional government abolished capital punishment by the ukase of march th. the liberal press greeted this measure with great pathos. articles were written expressing strongly humanitarian views, but scant understanding of realities, of the life of the army, and also scant foresight. v. nabokoff, the russian abolitionist, who was general secretary to the provisional government, wrote: "this happy event is a sign of true magnanimity and of wise foresight.... capital punishment is abolished unconditionally and for ever.... it is certain that in no other country has the moral condemnation of this, the worst kind of murder, reached such enormous proportions as in russia.... russia has joined the states that no longer know the shame and degradation of judicial murder." it is interesting to note that the ministry of justice drafted two laws, in one of which capital punishment was maintained for the most serious military offences--espionage and treason. but the department of military justice, headed by general anushkin, emphatically declared in favour of complete abolition of capital punishment. july came. russia had already become used to anarchist outbreaks, but was nevertheless horror-stricken at the events that took place on the battlefields of galicia, near kalush and tarnopol. the telegrams of the government commissars, savinkov and filonenko, and of general kornilov, who demanded the immediate reintroduction of capital punishment, were as a stroke of a whip to the "revolutionary conscience." on july th, kornilov wrote: "the army of maddened, ignorant men, who are not protected by the government from systematic demoralisation and disruption, and who have lost all sense of human dignity, is in full flight. on the fields, which can no longer be called battlefields, shame and horror such as the russian army has never known reign supreme.... the mild government measures have destroyed discipline, and are provoking the fitful cruelty of the unrestrained masses. these elemental feelings find expression in violence, plunder and murders.... capital punishment would save many innocent lives at the price of a few traitors and cowards being eliminated." on july th the government restored capital punishment and revolutionary military tribunals, which replaced the former field courts-martial. the difference was that the judges were elected (three officers and three men) from the list of the juries or from regimental committees. this measure, the restoration of capital punishment, due to pressure having been brought to bear upon the government by the military command, the commissars, and the committees, was, however, foredoomed to failure. kerensky subsequently tried to apologise to the democracy at the "democratic conference": "wait till i have signed a single death sentence, and i will then allow you to curse me...." on the other hand, the very personnel of the courts and their surroundings, described above, made the very creation of these courts impossible: there were hardly any judges capable of passing a death sentence or any commissars willing to endorse such a sentence. on the fronts which i commanded there were, at any rate, no such cases. after the new revolutionary military tribunals had been functioning for two months, the department of military justice was flooded with reports from military chiefs and commissars on the "blatant infringements of judicial procedure, upon the ignorance and lack of experience of the judges." the disbandment of mutinous regiments was one of the punitive measures carried out by the supreme administration or command. this measure had not been carefully thought out, and led to thoroughly unexpected consequences--it provoked mutinies, prompted by a desire to be disbanded. regimental honour and other moral impulses had long since been characterised as ridiculous prejudices. the actual advantages of disbanding, on the other hand, were obvious to the men: regiments were removed from the firing line for a long time, disbanding continued for months, and the men were sent to new units, which were thus filled with vagabond and criminal elements. responsibility for this measure can be equally divided between the war ministry, the commissars, and the stavka. the whole burden of it finally fell once more upon the guiltless officers, who lost their regiments--which were their families--and their appointments, and were compelled to wander about in new places or find themselves in the desolate condition of the reserve. apart from this undesirable element, units were filled with the late inmates of convict prisons, owing to the broad amnesty granted by the government to criminals, who were to expiate their crimes by military service. my efforts to combat this measure were unavailing, and resulted in the formation of a special regiment of convicts--a present from moscow--and in the formation of solid anarchist cadres in the reserve battalions. the _naïf_ and insincere argument of the legislator that crimes were committed because of the czarist régime, and that a free country would convert the criminal into a self-sacrificing hero, did not come true. in the garrisons, where amnestied criminals were for some reason or other more numerous, they became a menace to the population before they ever saw the front. thus, in june, in the units quartered at tomsk, there was an intense propaganda of wholesale plunder and of the suppression of all authority. soldiers formed large robber bands and terrorized the population. the commissar, the chief of the garrison, and all the local revolutionary organisations started a campaign against the plunderers; after much fighting, no less than , amnestied criminals were turned out of the garrison. reforms were intended to affect the entire administration of the army and of the fleet, but the above-mentioned committees of polivanov and savitch failed to carry them out, as they were abolished by kerensky, who recognised at last all the evil they had wrought. the committees merely prepared the democratisation of the war and naval councils by introducing elected soldiers into them. this circumstance is the more curious because, according to the legislator's intention, these councils were to consist of men of experience and knowledge, capable of solving questions of organisation, service, and routine, of military and naval legislation, and of making financial estimates of the cost of the armed forces of russia. this yearning of the uncultured portion of democracy for spheres of activity foreign to it was subsequently developed on an extensive scale. thus, for example, many military colleges were, to a certain extent, managed by committees of servants, most of whom were illiterate. under the bolshevik régime, university councils numbered not only professors and students, but also hall-porters. i will not dwell upon the minor activities of the committees, the reorganisation of the army, and the new regulations, but will describe the most important measure--the committees and the "declaration of the rights of the soldier." chapter xviii. the declaration of the rights of the soldier and committees. elective bodies from the military section of the soviet to committees and soviets of various denominations in regimental units and in the departments of the army, the fleet and the rear, were the most prominent factor of "democratisation." these institutions were partly of a mixed type, and included both officers and men and partly soldiers and workers' institutions pure and simple. committees and soviets were formed everywhere as the common feature of revolutionary organisations, planned before the revolution and sanctioned by the order no. . elections from the troops to the soviet in petrograd were fixed for february th, and the first army committees came into being on march st, in consequence of the above-mentioned order no. . towards the month of april self-appointed soviets and committees, varying in denomination, personnel and ability, existed in the army and in the rear, and introduced incredible confusion into the system of military hierarchy and administration. in the first month of the revolution the government and the military authorities did not endeavour to put an end to or to restrict this dangerous phenomenon. they did not at first realise its possible consequences, and counted upon the moderating influence of the officer element. they occasionally took advantage of the committees for counteracting acute manifestations of discontent among the soldiers, as a doctor applies small doses of poison to a diseased organism. the attitude of the government and of the military authorities towards these organisations was irresolute, but was one of semi-recognition. on april th, addressing the army delegates, gutchkov said at yassy: "a congress will soon be held of the delegates of all army organisations, and general regulations will then be drawn up. meanwhile, you should _organise as best you can_, taking advantage of the existing organisations and working for general unity." in april the position became so complicated that the authorities could no longer shirk the solution of the question of committees. at the end of march there was a conference at the stavka, attended by the supreme commander-in-chief, the war minister, gutchkov, his assistants, and officers of the general staff. i was also present in my capacity as future chief-of-staff to the supreme c.-in-c. a draft was presented to the conference, brought from sevastopol by the staff-colonel verkhovski (afterwards war minister). the draft was modelled upon the regulations already in force in the black sea fleet. the discussion amounted to the expression of two extreme views--mine and those of colonel verkhovski. the latter had already commenced those slightly demagogic activities by which he had at first gained the sympathies of the soldiers and of the sailors. he had had a short experience in organising these masses. he was persuasive because he used many illustrations--i do not know whether the facts he mentioned were real or imaginary--his views were pliable, and his eloquence was imposing. he idealised the committees, and argued that they were very useful, even necessary and statesmanlike, inasmuch as they were capable of bringing order into the chaotic movements of the soldiery. he emphatically insisted upon the competence and the rights of these committees being broadened. i argued that the introduction of committees was a measure which the army organisation would be unable to understand, and that it amounted to disruption of the army. if the government was unable to cope with the movement, it should endeavour to paralyse its dangerous consequences. with that end in view, i advocated that the activities of the committees should be limited to matters of internal organisation (food supplies, distribution of equipment, etc.), that the officer element should be strengthened, and that the committees should remain within the sphere of the lower grades of the army, in order to prevent them from spreading and acquiring a preponderating influence upon larger formations such as divisions, armies, and fronts. unfortunately, i only succeeded in compelling the conference to accept my views to an insignificant degree, and on march th the supreme c.-in-c. issued an order of the day on the "transition to the new forms of life," and appealing to the officers, men, and sailors wholeheartedly to unite in the work of introducing strict order and solid discipline within the units of the army and navy. the main principles of the regulations were the following: ( ) the _fundamental objects_ of the organisation were (_a_) to increase the fighting power of the army and of the navy in order to win the war; (_b_) to devise new rules for the life of the soldier-citizen of free russia; and (_c_) to contribute to the education of the army and of the fleet. ( ) the _structure_ of the organisation: permanent sections--company, regimental, divisional, and army committees. temporary sections--conferences, attached to the stavka, of army corps, of the fronts, and of the centre. the latter to form permanent soviet. ( ) the conferences to be called by the respective commanding officers or on the initiative of the army committees. all the resolutions of the conferences and committees to be confirmed by the respective military authorities prior to publication. ( ) the _competence_ of the committees was limited to enforcing order and fighting power (discipline, resistance to desertion, etc.), routine (leave, barrack life, etc.), internal organisation (control of food supplies and equipment), and education. ( ) _questions of training_ were unreservedly excluded from discussion. ( ) the _personnel of the committees_ was determined in proportion to elected representatives--one officer to two men. in order to give an idea of the slackening of discipline in the higher ranks i may mention that, immediately after receiving these regulations, and obviously under the influence of army organisations, general brussilov issued the following order: "officers to be excluded from company committees, and in higher committees the proportion lowered from one-third to one-sixth...." in less than a fortnight, however, the war ministry, in disregard of the stavka, published its own regulations, drafted by the famous polivanov committee, with the assistance of soviet representatives. in these new regulations substantial alterations were made: the percentage of officers in committees was reduced; divisional committees abolished; "the taking of rightful measures against abuses by commanding officers in the respective units" were added to the powers of the committees; the company committees were not permitted to discuss the matter of military preparedness and other purely military matters affecting the unit, but no such reservation was made with regard to regimental committees; the regimental commanding officer was entitled to appeal against but not to suspend the decisions of the committee; finally, the committees were given the task of negotiating with political parties of every description in the matter of sending delegates, speakers, and pamphlets explaining the political programme before the elections to the constituent assembly. these regulations, which were tantamount to converting the army in war-time into an arena of political strife and depriving the commanding officer of all control over his unit, constituted, in fact, one of the main turning points on the path of destruction of the army. the following appreciation of these regulations by the anarchist, makhno (the order of the day of one of his subordinate commanders of november th, ), is worthy of note: "as any party propaganda at the present moment strongly handicaps the purely military activities of the rebel armies, i emphatically declare to the population that all party propaganda is strictly prohibited pending the complete victory over the white armies...." several days later, in view of a protest from the stavka, the war ministry issued orders for the immediate suspension of the regulations concerning the committees. where the committees had already been formed, they were allowed to carry on in order to avoid misunderstandings. the ministry decided to alter the section of the regulations concerning the committees, in accordance with the orders of the supreme commander-in-chief, in which fuller consideration was given to the interests of the troops. thus, in the middle of april there was an infinite variety in the organisation of the army. some institutions were illegal, others were sanctioned by the stavka, and others still by the war ministry. all these contradictions, changes, and re-elections might have led to ridiculous confusion had not the committees simplified matters: they simply cast off all restrictions and acted arbitrarily. wherever troops or army departments were quartered among the population local soldiers' soviets or soviets of soldiers and workmen were formed, which recognised no regulations, and were particularly intent upon covering deserters and mercilessly exploiting municipalities, zemstvos, and the population. the authorities never opposed them, and it was only at the end of august that the war ministry lost patience with the abuses of these "institutions of the rear," and informed the press that it _intended_ to undertake the drafting of special regulations concerning these institutions. who were the members of the committees? the combatant element, living for and understanding the interests of the army and imbued with its traditions, was scantily represented. valour, courage and a sense of duty were rated very low on the market of soldiers' meetings. the masses of the soldiery, who were, alas! ignorant, illiterate, and already demoralised and distrusted their chiefs, elected mostly men who imposed on them by smooth talking, purely external political knowledge derived from the revelation of party propaganda; chiefly, however, by shamelessly bowing to the instincts of the men. how could a real soldier, appealing to the sense of duty, to obedience and to a struggle for the mother country, compete with such demagogues? the officers did not enjoy the confidence, they did not wish to work in the committees, and their political education was probably inadequate. in the higher committees one met honest and sensible soldiers more often than officers, because a man wearing a soldier's tunic was in a position to address the mob in a manner in which the officer could never dare to indulge. the russian army was henceforward administered by committees formed of elements foreign to the army and representing rather socialist party organs. it was strange and insulting to the army that congresses of the front, representing several million combatants and many magnificent units with a long and glorious record, and comprising officers and men of whom any army might be proud, were held under the chairmanship of such men as civilian jews and georgians, who were bolsheviks, mensheviks, or social revolutionaries--posner on the western front, gegetchkory on the caucasian, and doctor lordkipanitze on the roumanian. * * * * * what, then, were these army organisations doing that were supposed to reconstruct "the freest army in the world"? i will quote a list of questions discussed at conferences of the front and which influenced the front and army committees: ( ) the attitude towards the government, the soviet and the constituent assembly. ( ) the attitude towards war and peace. ( ) the question of a democratic republic as a desirable form of government. ( ) the question of the land. ( ) the labour question. these intricate and burning political and social questions, to which a radical solution was being given and which created partisanship and class strife, were thus introduced into the army that was facing a strong and cruel enemy. the effect was self-evident. but even in strictly military matters certain utterances were made at the conference at minsk, which attracted the particular attention of the military and civil authorities, and caused us gravely to ponder. it was suggested that the rank of officer, individual disciplinary power, etc., should be abolished, and that the committees should be entitled to remove commanding officers of whom they disapproved. from the very first days of their existence the committees fought stubbornly to obtain full power not only with regard to the administration of the army, but even for the formula: "all power to the soviets." at first, however, the attitude of the army committees towards the provisional government was perfectly loyal, and the lower the committee the more loyal it was. the petrograd papers of march th were full of resolutions proclaiming unrestricted obedience to the provisional government, of telegrams greeting and of records of delegations sent by the troops, who were perturbed by rumours of the opposition of the soviet. this attitude later underwent several changes, due to the propaganda of the soviet. a powerful influence was exercised by the resolution of the congress of soviets, which i have already quoted, and which appealed to the russian revolutionary democracy to organise under the guidance of the soviets and to be prepared to resist all the attempts of the government to avoid the control of the democracy or the fulfilment of their pledges. the higher committees indulged chiefly in political activities and in the strengthening of revolutionary tendencies in the army, while the lower committees gradually became absorbed in matters of service and routine, and were weakening and discrediting the authority of the commanding officers. the right to remove these officers was practically established, because the position of those who had received a vote of censure became intolerable. thus, for instance, on the western front, which i commanded, about sixty senior officers resigned--from army corps to regimental commanders. what was, however, infinitely more tragic was the endeavour of the committees, on their own initiative and under pressure from the troops, to interfere with purely military and technical orders, thus rendering military operations difficult or even impossible. the commanding officer who was discredited, fettered and deprived of power, and, therefore, of responsibility, could no longer confidently lead the troops into the field of victory and death.... as there was no authority the commanding officers were compelled to have recourse to the committees, which sometimes did exercise a restraining influence over the licentious soldiery, resisted desertion, smoothed friction between officers and men, appealed to the latter's sense of duty--in a word, tried to arrest the collapse of the crumbling structure. these activities of some of the committees still misled their apologists, including kerensky. it is no use to argue with men who think that a structure may be erected by one laying bricks one day and pulling them to pieces on the next. the work, overt and unseen, of army committees, alternating between patriotic appeals and internationalist watchwords, between giving assistance to commanding officers and dismissing them, between expressions of confidence in, or of distrust of, the provisional government, and ultimatums for new boots or travelling allowances for members of committees.... the historian of the russian army, in studying these phenomena, will be amazed at the ignorance of the elementary rules governing the very existence of an armed force, which was displayed by the committees in their decisions and in their writings. the committees of the rear and of the fleet were imbued with a particularly demagogic spirit. the baltic fleet was in a state approaching anarchy all the time; the black sea fleet was in a better condition, and held out until june. it is difficult to estimate the mischief made by these committees and soviets in the rear, scattered all over the country. their overbearing manner was only comparable with their ignorance. i will mention a few examples illustrating these activities. the regional committee of the army, the fleet and the workmen of finland issued a declaration in may, in which, not content with the autonomy granted to finland by the provisional government, they demanded her complete independence, and declared that "they would give every support to all the revolutionary organisations working for a speedy solution of that question." the central committee of the baltic fleet, in conjunction with the above-mentioned committee, made a declaration, which coincided with the bolshevik outbreak in petrograd in the beginning of june. they demanded "all power to the soviets. we shall unite in the revolutionary struggle of our working democracy for power, and will not allow the ships to be called out by the provisional government for the suppression of the mutiny to leave petrograd." the committee of the minsk military district, shortly before the advance, gave leave to all the reservists to proceed to their farms. i gave orders for the trial of the committee, but the order was of no avail, because, in spite of all my representations, the war ministry had not established any legal responsibility for the committees, whose decisions were recorded by vote and occasionally by secret ballot. i will mention yet another curious episode. the committee of one of the cavalry depôts on my front decided that horses should be watered only once a day, so most of the horses were lost. it would be unjust to deny that the organisations of the rear occasionally did adopt reasonable measures, but these instances are few indeed, and they were drowned in the general wave of anarchy which these organisations had raised. the attitude of the committees towards the war, and in particular towards the proposed advance, was, of course, a momentous matter. in chapter x. i have already described the self-contradictions of the soviets and congresses, as well as the ambiguous and insincere directions which they gave to the army organisations, and which amounted to the acceptance of war and of the advance, but without victory. the same ambiguity prevailed in the high committees, with the exception, however, of the committee of our western front, which passed in june a truly bolshevik resolution to the effect that war has been engendered by the plundering policy of the government; that the only means of ending the war was for the united democracies of all countries to resist their governments; and that a decisive victory of one or the other of the contending groups of powers would only tend to increase militarism at the expense of democracy. as long as the front was quiet the troops accepted all these discourses and resolutions in a spirit of comparative indifference. but when the time came for the advance, many people thought of saving their skins, and the ready formulas of defeatism proved opportune. besides the committees, who were continuing to pass patriotic resolutions, certain organisations reflecting the views of the units of the army, or their own, violently opposed the idea of an advance. entire regiments, divisions, and even army corps, especially on the northern and western russian fronts, refused to conduct preparatory work or to advance to the firing line. on the eve of the advance we had to send large forces for the suppression of units that had treacherously forgotten their duty. i have already mentioned the attitude of many senior commanders towards the committees. the best summary of these views can be found in the appeal of general fedotov, in temporary command of an army, to the army committee: "our army is at present organised as no other army in the world.... elected bodies play an important part. we--_the former leaders_--can only give the army our military knowledge of strategy and tactics. you--the committees--are called upon to organise the army and to create its internal strength. great indeed is the part which you--the committees--are called upon to play in the creation of a new and strong army. history will recognise this...." before the army organisations were sanctioned the commander of the caucasian front issued an order for the decisions of the self-appointed tiflis soldiers' soviet to be published in the orders of the day, and for all regulations appertaining to the organisation and routine of the army to be sanctioned by that soviet. is one to wonder that such an attitude of a certain portion of the commanding staffs gave an excuse and a foundation for the growing demands of the committees? as regards the western and south-western fronts, which i commanded, i definitely refused to have anything to do with the committees, and suppressed, whenever possible, such of their activities as were contrary to the interests of the army. one of the prominent commissars, a late member of the executive committee of the soviet, stankevitch, wrote: "theoretically, it became increasingly apparent that either the army must be abolished or else the committees. in practice, one could do neither one nor the other. the committees were a vivid expression of the incurable sociological disease of the army, and a sign of its certain collapse and paralysis. was it not for the war ministry to hasten the death by a resolute and hopeless surgical operation?" the once great russian army of the first period of the revolution dwindled inevitably to nothing under such conditions as these: there was no mother country. the leader had been crucified. in his stead a group appeared at the front of five defensists and three bolsheviks, and made an appeal to the army: "forward, to battle for liberty and for the revolution, but ... without inflicting a decisive defeat upon the enemy," cried the former. "down with the war and all power to the proletariat!" shouted the others. the army listened and listened, but would not move. and then ... it dispersed! [illustration: the conference of commanders-in-chief. standing on the pathway, from left to right: generals denikin, danilov, hanjin. seated (left): doukhonin, gourko, brussilov. centre: alexeiev. right: dragomirov, scherbatchev.] [illustration: a group of "prisoners" at berdichev. from left to right: captain kletzando, general elsner, general vannovsky, general denikin, general erdeli, general markov, general orlov.] chapter xix. the democratisation of the army: the commissars. the next measure for the democratisation of the army was the introduction of the institution of commissars. the idea was derived from the history of the french revolutionary wars, and was fostered in various circles at different times; it was prompted chiefly by _distrust of the commanding staffs_. pressure was brought to bear from below. the conference of the delegates of the front addressed an emphatic demand to the soviet in the middle of april that commissars should be introduced in the army. the excuse was that it was no longer possible to preserve order in respect of the attitude of the men towards individual commanding officers, and that, if cases of arbitrary dismissal had as yet been avoided, it was only due to the fact that the army expected the soviet and the government to take the necessary steps and did not wish to handicap their work. at the same time, the conference suggested the absurd idea of the simultaneous appointment to the army of three kinds of commissars: ( ) from the provisional government, ( ) from the soviets, and ( ) from the army committees. the conference went very far in their demands, and demanded that the commissariats, as controlling organs, should: discuss _all_ matters appertaining to the competence of the commanders of armies and fronts; counter-sign _all_ army orders; investigate the activities of the commanding staffs, with the right to recommend their dismissal. protracted negotiations on this matter ensued between the soviet and the government, and at the end of april it was agreed that commissars would be appointed to the army--one from the provisional government and one from the soviet. this decision, however, was subsequently altered, probably as the result of the formation of a coalition ministry (may th). one commissar was appointed by agreement between the government and the soviet. he represented both these bodies, and was responsible to them. at the end of june the provisional government introduced the office of commissar of the fronts, and thus defined their function: according to the instructions of the war ministry, they were to see that all political questions arising within the armies of the front should be given a uniform solution, and that the work of the army commissars should be co-ordinated. at the end of july a final touch was given by the appointment of a high commissar attached to the stavka, and the entire official correspondence was concentrated in the political section of the war ministry. no law, however, was passed defining the rights and the duties of the commissars. the commanding staffs, at any rate, were unaware of such laws, and this alone gave rise to all the misunderstandings and conflicts that followed. the commissars had secret instructions to watch the commanding staffs and headquarters in respect of their political reliability. from that point of view the democratic régime went further, perhaps, than the autocratic. of this i became convinced during my command of the western and south-western fronts, in reading the telegrams exchanged between the commissariats and petrograd. these telegrams--may the commissars forgive me!--were handed to me, de-coded, by my staff, immediately after their despatch. this part of the commissars' duty required a certain training in political intelligence, but their overt duties were infinitely more complex: they demanded statesmanship, a clear knowledge of the aims to be pursued, an understanding of the psychology, not merely of the officers and men, but of the senior commanding staff, acquaintance with the fundamental principles of service and routine in the army, great tact, and, finally, the personal qualities of courage, strong will, and energy. only such qualifications were capable of mitigating to a certain degree the disastrous consequences of a measure which deprived (to be more accurate, sanctioned the deprivation of) the commanding officers of the possibility of influencing the troops--that influence being the only means of strengthening the hope and faith in victory. such elements were not to be found, unfortunately, in the circles connected with the government and the soviet and enjoying their confidence. the personnel of the commissars whom i met may be described thus: war-time officers, doctors, solicitors, newspaper men, exiles and _emigrés_ completely out of touch with russian life, members of militant revolutionary organisations, etc. these men had, obviously, inadequate knowledge of the army. all these men belonged to socialist parties, from social-democrat mensheviks to the group "edinstvo" (unity), war party blinkers, and very often did not follow the political lines of the government because they considered themselves tied by soviet and party discipline. owing to political differences of opinion, the attitude of the commissars towards the war also varied. stankevitch, one of the commissars, who carried out his duties in his own way most conscientiously, when proceeding to visit an advancing division was beset with doubts: "the soldiers believe that we do not wish to deceive them; they force themselves, therefore, to forget their doubts, and they go forward to death and murder. but we, are we entitled not only to encourage them, but to take upon ourselves the decision?" according to savinkov (who was commissar of the seventh army of the south-western front, and later war minister), not all the commissars agreed upon the question of bolshevism, and not all of them considered a resolute struggle against the bolsheviks possible or desirable. savinkov was an exception. although not a soldier by profession, he was steeled in struggle and wanderings, in constant danger, and his hands were stained with the blood of political victims. this man, however, understood the laws of the struggle, threw off the yoke of the party, and fought more resolutely than others against the disorganisation of the army. but the personal touch in his attitude towards the events was somewhat too marked. none of the commissars, with the exception of very few men of the savinkov type, displayed personal strength or energy. they were men of words, not of deeds. their lack of training would not have had such negative results had it not been for the fact that, their functions not being clearly defined, they gradually began to interfere with every feature of the life and service of the troops, partly on their own initiative, partly at the instigation of the men and of the army committees, and partly even of commanding officers, who were trying to escape responsibility. questions of appointments, dismissals, and even operative plans attracted the attention of the commissars, not only from the point of view of "covert counter-revolution," but from the point of view of practicability. the confusion in their minds was so great that the weaker elements among the commanding staffs were sometimes completely disheartened. i remember one case during the july retreat on the south-western front. one of the army corps commanders rashly destroyed a well-equipped military railway, thereby placing the army in an exceedingly difficult position. he was dismissed by the army commander, and afterwards expressed to me his sincere astonishment: "why had he been dismissed? he had acted--upon the instructions of the commissar." the commissars carried out the ideas of the soviet and whole-heartedly defended the sacred newly-acquired rights of the soldier, but failed to fulfil their primary duty--direct the political life of the army. very often the most destructive propaganda was permitted. soldiers' meetings and committees were allowed to pass all kinds of anti-national and anti-government resolutions, and the commissars only interfered when the tension of the atmosphere resulted in an armed mutiny. such a policy puzzled the troops, the committees, and the commanding officers. the institution of commissars did not attain its purpose. among the soldiers the commissars could not be popular because they were to a certain extent an instrument of compulsion, and occasionally of suppression. at the same time, the extent of their power was not well defined, and they could not gain proper authority over the most undisciplined units. this was confirmed later after the seizure of power by the bolsheviks, when the commissars were the first to flee from their posts in a great hurry and in secret. there thus appeared in the russian army, instead of one authority, three different authorities, which excluded one another--the commanding officer, the committee, and the commissar. they were shadowy authorities. another authority was overhanging, and was oppressing them morally with all its insensate weight--the power of the mob. * * * * * in examining the question of the new institutions--commissars and committees--and of their bearing upon the destinies of the russian army, i have done so solely from the point of view of the preservation of our armed forces as an important factor in the future of our country. it would, however, be a mistake to overlook the connection between these measures and the entirety of laws which govern the life of the people and the course of the revolution. these measures, moreover, bear the stamp of logic and of inevitability owing to the part which the revolutionary democracy had chosen to play. therein lies the tragedy of the situation. the socialist democracy did not possess any elements sufficiently trained to become the instruments of army administration. at the same time, it did not have the courage or the possibility to quell the resistance of the bourgeois democracy and of the commanding staffs, and to compel them to work for the glorification of socialism, as the bolsheviks afterwards did, who forced the remnants of the russian _intelligencia_ and of the officers to serve communism by applying methods of sanguinary and ruthless extermination. when the revolutionary democracy actually assumed power and set up to fulfil certain aims it was well aware of the fact that those elements in the administration and the command who were called upon to carry out these aims did not share the views of the revolutionary democracy. hence the inevitable distrust of these elements and the desire to weaken their influence and their authority. what methods did the democracy have recourse to? as the central revolutionary organ was utterly devoid of statesmanship and of patriotism, it applied in its struggle against political opponents destructive methods, completely disregarding the fact that by these methods they were destroying the country and the army. another circumstance must be borne in mind--the revolution that had shaken the state to its very foundations and upset the established class relations occurred at the moment when the flower of the nation--over , , men--were under arms. elections to the constituent assembly were impending. in these circumstances it was impossible to avoid politics being introduced into the army, as it is impossible to arrest the course of a river. but it would have been possible to divert it to proper channels. in this matter, however, the two contending forces (that which wished to preserve the state and the demagogic force) also collided, as both endeavoured to influence the attitude of the army, which was a decisive factor in the revolution. these were the propositions which pre-ordained and explained the subsequent course of the democratisation of the army. the socialist democracy, which governed at first behind the scenes and then overtly, was endeavouring to strengthen its position and to bow to the instincts of the crowd, destroyed the military power and connived at the institution of elective military organisations, which were less dangerous and more open to its influence than the commanding staffs, although they did not answer the requirements of the soviet. the necessity of military authority of some sort was clearly realised. the commanding staffs were distrusted, and there was a desire to create a buffer between the two artificially separated elements of the army. these considerations inspired the creation of the office of commissars, who bore the dual responsibility before the soviet and the government. neither the men nor the officers were satisfied with these institutions, which fell together with the provisional government, were revived with certain modifications in the red army, and once again swept away by the tide of events. "peoples cannot choose their institutions, as man cannot choose his age. peoples obey the institutions to which they are tied by their past, their creed, by the economic laws and surroundings in which they live. there are many examples in history when the people have destroyed by violent revolution the institutions which it has taken a dislike for. but there is not a case in history of these new institutions forcibly imposed upon the people becoming permanent and solid. after a while the past comes again into force, because we are created entirely by that past and it is our supreme ruler."[ ] it is obvious that the russian national army will be revived not only on democratic, but on historical foundations. chapter xx. the democratisation of the army--the story of "the declaration of the rights of the soldier." the ill-famed law, emanating from the polivanov committee and known as the "declaration of the rights of the soldier," was confirmed by kerensky on may th. i will give the main points of that law: ( ) "all soldiers of the army enjoy full rights of citizenship." ( ) every soldier is entitled to the membership of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organisation, society or union. ( ) every soldier off duty has the right freely and openly to express in word, writing, or in the press his political, religious, social and other views. ( ) all printed matter (periodicals and other) should be delivered to the addressees. ( ) soldiers are not to be appointed as orderlies. officers are entitled to have one servant, appointed by mutual consent (of the soldier and of the officer); wages also to be settled by mutual consent, but there should be no more than one servant to each officer, army doctor, army clerk, or priest. ( ) saluting is abolished for men as well as for units. ( ) no soldier is to be punished or fined without trial. at the front the commanding officer is entitled, on his own responsibility, to take the necessary steps, including armed force, against disobedient subordinates. such steps are not to be considered as disciplinary punishments. internal administration, punishments, and control in cases defined by army regulations, belong to elective army organisations. this "declaration of rights," of which the above is but a brief summary, gave official sanction to the malady with which the army was stricken, and which spread in varying degrees owing to mutinies, violence, and "by revolutionary methods," as the current expression goes. it dealt a death-blow to the old army. it introduced boundless political discussions and social strife into the unbalanced armed masses which had already become aware of their rough physical power. "the declaration" admitted and sanctioned wide propaganda by speech and pamphlet of anti-national, immoral and anti-social doctrines, and even the doctrines that repudiated the state and the very existence of the army. finally, it deprived commanding officers of disciplinary power, which was handed over to elective bodies, and once again insulted and degraded the commanding staff. in his remarks attached to the text of the "declaration," kerensky says: "let the freest army and navy of the world prove that there is strength and not weakness in liberty, let them forge a new iron discipline of duty and raise the armed power of the country." and the "great silent one," as the french picturesquely describe the army, began to talk and to shout louder and louder still, enforcing its demands by threats, by arms, and by shedding the blood of those who dared to resist its folly. at the end of april the final draft of the "declaration" was sent by gutchkov to the stavka for approval. the supreme commander-in-chief and myself returned an emphatic disapproval, in which we gave vent to all our moral sufferings and our grief for the dark future of the army. our conclusion was that the "declaration" "was the last nail driven into the coffin which has been prepared for the russian army." on may st gutchkov resigned from the war ministry, as he did not wish "to share the responsibility for the heavy sin which was committed against the mother country," and in particular to sign the "declaration." * * * * * the stavka sent copies of the draft "declaration" to the commander-in-chief of the fronts for reference, and they were called by general alexeiev to moghilev, in order to discuss the fateful position. this historical conference took place on may nd. the speeches, in which the collapse of the russian army was described, were restrained and yet moving, as they reflected deep sorrow and apprehension. brussilov, in a low voice expressing sincere and unfeigned pain, ended thus: "all this can yet be borne, and there still remains some hope of saving the army and leading it forward, provided the 'declaration' is not issued. if it is, there is no salvation, and i would not remain in office for a single day." this last sentence provoked a warm protest from general stcherbatchov, who argued that no one should resign, that, however arduous and hopeless the position may be, the leaders cannot abandon the army.... somebody suggested that all the commanders-in-chief should immediately proceed to petrograd, and address to the provisional government a stern warning and definite demands. the general who suggested this thought that such a demonstration would produce a very strong impression and might arrest the progress of destructive legislation. others thought that it was a dangerous expedient and our last trump card, and that, should the step prove ineffective, the high command would be definitely discredited. the suggestion, however, was accepted, and, on the th may, a conference took place of all the commanders-in-chief (with the exception of the caucasian front), the provisional government, and the executive committee of the soviet. i am in possession of the record of that conference, of which i give extensive extracts below. the condition of the army, such as it appeared to its leaders, in the course of events, and without, therefore, any historical perspective, is therein described, as well as the characteristics of the men who were then in power. the trend of the speeches made by the commander-in-chief was the same as in the stavka, but they were less emphatic and less sincere. brussilov smoothed over his accusations, lost his pathos, "warmly greeted the coalition ministry," and did not repeat his threat of resignation. the record. _general alexeiev._--i consider it necessary to speak quite frankly. we are all united in wishing for the good of our country. our paths may differ, but we have a common goal of ending the war in such a manner as to allow russia to come out of it unbroken, albeit tired and suffering. only victory can give us the desired consummation. only then will creative work be possible. but victory must be achieved, and that is only possible if the orders of the commanding officers are obeyed. if not, it is not an army, but a mob. to sit in the trenches does not mean to reach the end of the war. the enemy is transferring, in great haste, division after division from our front to the franco-british front, and we continue to sit still. meanwhile, the conditions are most favourable for our victory, but we must advance in order to win it. our allies are losing faith in us. we must reckon with this in the diplomatic sphere, and i particularly in the military one. it seemed as if the revolution would raise our spirits, would give us impetus, and therefore victory. in that, unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. not only is there no enthusiasm or impetus, but the lowest instincts have come to the fore, such as self-preservation. the interests of the mother country and its future are not being considered.... you will ask what has happened to the authority, to principles, or even to physical compulsion? i am bound to state that the reforms to which the army has as yet failed to adapt itself have shaken it, have undermined order and discipline. discipline is the mainstay of the army. if we follow that path any further there will be a complete collapse.... the commanders-in-chief will give you a series of facts describing the condition of the armies. i will offer a conclusion and will give expression to our desires and demands, which must be complied with. _general brussilov._--i must first of all describe to you the present condition of the officers and men. cavalry, artillery and engineering troops have retained about per cent. of their cadres. but in the infantry, which is the mainstay of the army, the position is entirely different. owing to enormous casualties in killed, wounded and prisoners, as well as many deserters, some regiments have changed their cadres nine or ten times, so that only from three to ten men remain of the original formation. reinforcements are badly trained and their discipline is still worse. of the regular officers from two to four remain and in many cases they are wounded. other officers are youngsters commissioned after a short training and enjoying no authority owing to their lack of experience. it is upon these new cadres that the task has fallen to remodel the army on a new basis, and that task has so far proved beyond their capacity. although we felt that a change was necessary and that it had already come too late, the ground was nevertheless unprepared. the uneducated soldier understood it as a deliverance from the officers' yoke. the officers greeted the change with enthusiasm. had this not been so, the revolution may not have probably passed so smoothly. the result, however, was that freedom was only given to the men, whereas the officers had to be content to play the part of pariahs of liberty. the unconscious masses were intoxicated with liberty. everyone knows that extensive rights have been granted, but they do not know what these rights are, and nobody bothers about duties. the position of the officers is very difficult. from to per cent. have rapidly adapted themselves to the new conditions, because they believed that these conditions were all to the good. those of the officers who were trusted by the men did not lose that trust. some, however, became too familiar with the men, were too lenient and even encouraged internal dissensions amongst the men. but the majority of the officers, about per cent., were unable to adapt themselves. they were offended, retired to the background and do not know what to do now. we are trying to bring them into contact with the soldiers once more, because we need the officers for continued fighting, and we have no other cadres. many of the officers have no political training, do not know how to make speeches--and this, of course, handicaps the work of mutual understanding. it is necessary to explain and to instil into the masses the idea that freedom has been granted to _everyone_. i have known our soldiers for forty-five years, i love them and i will do my best to bring them into close touch with the officers, but the provisional government, the duma and particularly the soviet should also make every effort in order to assist in that work which must be done as soon as possible in the interests of the country. it is also necessary, owing to the peculiar fashion in which the illiterate masses have understood the watchword "without annexations and indemnities." one of the regiments has declared that not only would it refuse to advance, but desired to leave the front and to go home. the committees opposed this tendency, but were told that they would be dismissed. i had a lengthy argument with the regiment, and when i asked the men whether they agreed with me, they begged leave to give me a written answer. a few minutes later they presented to me a poster: "peace at any price and down with the war." in the course of a subsequent talk i had with one of the men, he said to me: "if there are to be no annexations, why do we want that hill top?" my reply was: "i also do not want the hill top, but we must beat the enemy who is occupying it." finally, the men promised to hold on, but refused to advance, arguing that "the enemy is good to us and has informed us that he will not advance provided we do not move. it is important that we should go home to enjoy freedom and the land. why should we allow ourselves to be maimed?" is it to be an offensive or a defensive campaign? success can be only obtained by an offensive. if we conduct a passive defence the front is bound to be broken. if discipline is strong a break-through may yet be remedied. but we must not forget that we have no well-disciplined troops, that they are badly trained and that the officers have no authority. in these circumstances an enemy success may easily become a catastrophe. the masses must, therefore, be persuaded that we must advance instead of remaining on the defensive. we thus have many shortcomings, but numerical superiority is still on our side. if the enemy succeeds in breaking the french and the british, he will throw his entire weight upon us and we will then be lost. we need a strong government upon which we could rely, and we whole-heartedly greet the coalition government. the power of the state can only be strong when it leans upon the army, which represents the armed forces of the nation. _general dragomirov._--the prevailing spirit in the army is the desire of peace. anyone might be popular in the army who would preach peace without annexations and would advocate self-determination. the illiterate masses have understood the idea of "no annexations" in a peculiar fashion. they do not understand the conditions of different peoples, and they repeatedly ask the question: "why do not the allied democracies join in our declarations?" the desire for peace is so strong that reinforcements refuse to accept equipment and arms and say: "they are no good to us as we do not intend to fight." work has come to a standstill and it is even necessary to see to it that trenches are not dismantled and that roads are mended. in one of the best regiments we found, on the sector which it had occupied, a red banner inscribed: "peace at all costs." the officer who tore that banner had to flee for his life. during the night men from that regiment were searching for the officer at dvinsk, as he had been concealed by the headquarters staff. the dreadful expression "adherents of the old régime" caused the best officers to be cast out of the army. we all wanted a change, and yet many excellent officers, the pride of the army, had to join the reserve simply because they tried to prevent the disruption of the army, but failed to adapt themselves to the new conditions. what is much more fatal is the growth of slackness and of a lingering spirit. egoism is reaching terrible proportions, and each unit thinks only of its own welfare; endless deputations come to us daily, demanding to be relieved, to remove commanding officers, to be re-equipped, etc. all these deputations have to be addressed, and this hinders our work. orders that used to be implicitly obeyed now demand lengthy arguments; if a battery is moved to a different sector, there is immediate discontent, and the men say: "you are weakening us--you are traitors." owing to the weakness of the baltic fleet, we found it necessary to send an army corps to the rear to meet the eventual landing of an enemy force, but we were unable to do so, because the men said: "our line is long enough as it is and if we lengthen it still more we will be unable to hold the enemy." formerly we had no difficulty whatsoever in regrouping the troops. in september, , eleven army corps were removed from the western front, and this saved us from a defeat which might have decided the fate of the war. at present such a thing would be impossible, as every unit raises objections to the slightest move. it is very difficult to compel the men to do anything in the interests of the mother country. regiments refuse to relieve their comrades in the firing line under various excuses--such as bad weather, or the fact that not all their men had had their baths. on one occasion a unit refused to go to the front on the plea that it had already been in the firing line at easter time. we are compelled to ask the committees of various regiments to argue the matter out. only a small minority of officers is behaving in an undignified manner, trying to make themselves popular by bowing to the instincts of the men. the system of elections has not been introduced in its entirety, but many unpopular officers have been summarily dismissed as they were accused of being adherents to the old régime; other commanding officers, who had been considered incompetent and liable to dismissal, have been made to stay. it was quite impossible not to grant the demands for their retention. with regard to excesses there have been individual cases of shootings of officers.... things cannot continue on these lines. we want strong power. we have fought for the country. you have taken the ground from under our feet. will you kindly restore it? our obligations are colossal, and we must have the power in order to be able to lead to victory the millions of soldiers who are entrusted to our care. _general stcherbatchov._--the illiteracy of the soldiery is the main reason of all these phenomena. it is not, of course, the fault of our people that it is illiterate. for this the old régime is entirely responsible, as it looked upon education from the point of view of the ministry of the interior. nevertheless, we have to reckon with the fact that the masses do not understand the gravity of our position, and that they misinterpret even such ideas as may be considered reasonable.... if we do not wish russia to collapse, we must continue the struggle and we must advance. otherwise we shall witness a grotesque sight. the representatives of oppressed russia fought heroically; but having overthrown the government that was striving for peace with dishonour, the citizens of free russia are refusing to fight and to safeguard their liberties. this is grotesque, strange, incomprehensible. but it is so. the reason is that discipline has gone and there is no faith in the commanding officers. mother country, to most men, is an empty sound. these conditions are most painful, but they are particularly painful on the roumanian front, where one has to reckon not only with military surroundings of specific difficulty, but also with a very complex political atmosphere. our people are used to plains, and the mountainous nature of the theatre of war has a depressing effect upon the troops. we often hear the complaint: "do not keep us in these cursed mountains." we have only one railway line to rely upon for supplies, and have great difficulty in feeding the troops. this, of course, enhances discontent. the fact that we are fighting on roumanian territory is interpreted as a fight "for roumania," which is also an unpopular idea. the attitude of the local population is not always friendly, and the men come to the conclusion that they are being refused assistance by those on whose behalf they are fighting. friction thus arises and deepens, because some of the roumanians blame us for the defeats which they have themselves suffered and owing to which they have lost most of their territory and of their belongings. the roumanian government and the allied representatives are well aware of the ferment in our army, and their attitude towards us is changing. i personally noticed that a shadow has fallen between us, and that the former respect and faith in the prowess of the russian army have vanished. i still enjoy great authority, but if the disruption of the army continues not only shall we lose our allies but make enemies of them, and there would then be a danger of peace being made at our expense. in we advanced across the whole of galicia. in , in our retreat, we took at the south-western front , prisoners. you may judge what that retreat was like and what was the spirit of the troops. in the summer of we saved italy from disaster. is it possible that we may now abandon the allied cause and be false to our obligations? the army is in a state of disruption, but that can be remedied. should we succeed, within a month and a half our brave officers and men would advance again. history will wonder at the inadequate means with which we achieved brilliant results in . if you wish to raise the russian army and to convert it into a strong organised body which will dictate the terms of peace, you must help us. all is not lost yet, but only on condition that the commanding officers will regain prestige and confidence. we hope that full powers in the army will once again be vested in the supreme commander-in-chief, who alone can manage the troops. we will obey the will of the provisional government, but you must give us strong support. _general gourko._--if you wish to continue the war till the desired end, you must restore the power of the army. we have received the draft of the "declaration" (of the rights of the soldier). gutchkov would not sign it and has resigned. i am bound to say that if a civilian has resigned and refused to sign that declaration--to us, the army chiefs, it is inacceptable. it simply completely destroys everything that is left. i will recount to you an episode which occurred while i was temporarily holding the office of chief-of-staff of the supreme c.-in-c. on february th i had a long talk with the late czar, trying to persuade him to grant a responsible ministry. as a last trump card, i alluded to our international position, to the attitude of our allies and to the probable consequences of this measure. but my card was already beaten. i will now endeavour to describe our international position. we have no direct indication of the attitude of our allies towards our intentions to give up the struggle. we cannot, of course, force them to express their innermost thoughts. as in time of war, one is often compelled to come to a decision "for the enemy," i will now try to argue "for the allies." it was easy to begin the revolution, but we have been submerged by its tidal wave. i trust that common sense will help us to survive this. if not, if the allies realise our impotence, the principles of practical policy will force upon them the only issue--a separate peace. that would not be on their part a breach of obligations, because we had promised to fight together and have now come to a standstill. if one of the parties is fighting and the other is sitting in the trenches, like a chinese dragon, waiting for the result of the fight--you must agree that the fighting side may begin to think of making separate peace. such a peace would, of course, be concluded at our expense. the austrians and the germans can get nothing from our allies: their finance is in a state of collapse and they have no natural riches. our finances are also in a state of collapse, but we have immense untouched natural resources. our allies would, of course, come to such a decision only as a last resort, because it would be not peace, but a lengthy armistice. bred as they are upon the ideals of the nineteenth century, the germans, having enriched themselves at our expense, would once again fall upon us and upon our late allies. you may say that if this is possible why should we not conclude a separate peace first. here i will mention first of all the moral aspect of the question. the obligation was undertaken by russia, not merely by the late autocrat. i was aware--long before you had heard of it--of the duplicity of the czar, who had concluded soon after the russo-japanese war of - an alliance with the emperor william, while the franco-russian alliance was still in existence. the free russian people, responsible for its acts, cannot renounce its obligations. but setting aside the moral aspect, there remains the material problem. if we open negotiations they cannot remain secret, and our allies would hear of it within two or three days. they would also enter into a parley, and a kind of auction sale would begin. the allies are, of course, richer than ourselves, but on their side the struggle has not yet ended; besides, our enemies could get much more at our expense. it is precisely from the international point of view that we must prove our capacity for a continued struggle. i will not continue to revolutionise the army, because if i should we might find ourselves powerless not only to advance but even to remain on the defensive. the latter is infinitely more difficult. in we retreated and orders were obeyed. you were entitled to expect this, because we had trained the army. the position has now been altered; you have created something new and have deprived us of power. you can no longer hold us responsible, and the responsibility must fall heavily upon your heads. you say that the revolution is still proceeding. listen to us. we are better acquainted with the psychology of the troops, we have gone with them through thick and thin. stop the revolution and give us, the military chiefs, a chance to do our duty and to bring russia to such a condition in which you may continue your work. otherwise, we will hand over to you not russia, but a field in which our enemies will sow and reap, and democracy itself will curse you. it will be democracy that will suffer if the germans win. democracy will be starving--while the peasants will always manage to feed themselves on their own land. it was said of the old régime that it "played into the hands of william." will it be possible to level the same accusation against you? william is fortunate indeed, as both monarchs and democracies are playing into his hands. the army is on the eve of disruption. our mother country is in danger and is nearing a collapse. you must help. it is easy to destroy, and if you know how to destroy--you should also know how to rebuild. _general alexeiev._--the main points have been stated, and they are true. the army is on the brink of the abyss. another step and it will fall into the abyss and will drag along russia and all her liberties, and there will be no return. everyone is guilty, and the guilt lies heavily upon all that has been done in that direction for the last two and a half months. we have made every effort and are now devoting all our strength to the task of restoring the army. we trust that mr. kerensky will apply all his qualities of mind and character and all his influence to that consummation, and will help us. but that is not enough. those who have been disrupting the army must also help. those who have issued the order no. must issue a series of orders and comments. if the "declaration" is published, as gutchkov said, the last flimsy foundations will fall into dust and the last hope will be dashed. be patient, there is time still. that which has been granted in the last two and a half months has not as yet taken root. we have regulations defining rights and duties. all the regulations that are issued nowadays only mention rights. you must do away with the idea that peace will come by itself. those who say "down with the war" are traitors, and those who say "there should be no advance" are cowards. we still have men with sincere convictions. let them come to us not as passing stars, but let them live with us and dispel the misunderstandings that have arisen. you have the press. may it encourage patriotism and demand that everyone do his duty. _prince lvov._--we have heard the commanders-in-chief, we understand all they have said and will do our duty to our country till the end. _tzeretelli._--there is no one here who has contributed to the disruption of the army and played into the hands of william. i have heard the accusation that the soviet has contributed to the disruption of the army. and yet everyone agrees that the soviet is the only institution that enjoys authority at present. what would happen were there no soviet? fortunately, democracy has come to the rescue and we still have hope in salvation. what can you do? there are only two paths for you to follow. one is to reject the policy of the soviets. but you would then have no source of power wherewith to hold the army and to lead it for the salvation of russia. your other path is the true path, which we have tried; the path of unity with the desires and expectations of the people. if the commanding officers have failed to make it quite clear that the whole strength of the army for the defence of the country lay in the advance, there is no magic wand capable of doing it. it is alleged that the watchword "without annexations or indemnities" has demoralised the army and the masses. it is quite likely that it has been misunderstood, but it should have been explained that this was the ultimate aim; we cannot renounce that watchword. we are aware that russia is in danger, but her defence is a matter for the people as a whole. the power must be united and must enjoy the confidence of the people, but this can only be achieved if the old policy is completely discarded. unity can only be based on confidence, which cannot be bought. the ideals of the soviet are not those of separate and small groups--they are the ideals of the country. to renounce them is to renounce the country. you might, perhaps, understand order no. if you knew the conditions in which it was issued. we were confronted with an unorganised mob and we had to organise it. the masses of the soldiery do not wish to go on with the war. they are wrong, and i cannot believe that they are prompted by cowardice. it is the result of distrust. discipline should remain. but if the soldiers realise that you are not fighting against democracy, they will trust you. by this means the army may yet be saved. by this means the authority of the soviet will be strengthened. there is only one way of salvation, the way of confidence and of the democratisation of the country and of the army. it is by accepting those principles that the soviet has gained the confidence of the people and is now in a position to carry out its ideas. as long as that is so, not all is lost. you must try to enhance the confidence in the soviet. _skobelev._--we have not come here to listen to reproaches. we know what is going on in the army. the conditions which you have described are undoubtedly ominous. it will depend upon the spirit of the russian people whether the ultimate goal will be reached and whether we shall come out of the present difficulty with honour. i consider it necessary to explain the circumstances in which order no. was issued. in the troops which had overthrown the old régime, the commanding officers had not joined the mutineers; we were compelled to issue that order so as to deprive these officers of authority. we were anxious about the attitude of the front towards the revolution and about the instructions that were being given. we have proved to-day that our misgivings were not unfounded. let us speak the truth: the activities of the commanding staff have prevented the army, in these two and a half months, from understanding the revolution. we quite realise the difficulties of your position. but when you say that the revolution must be stayed, we are bound to reply that the revolution cannot begin or end to order. revolution may take its normal course when the mental process of the revolution spreads all over the country, when it is understood by the per cent. of illiterate people. far be it from us to demand that all commanding officers be elected. we agree with you that we have power and have succeeded in attaining it. when you will understand the aims of the revolution and will help the people to understand our watchword, you will also acquire the necessary power. the people must know what they are fighting for. you are leading the army for the defeat of the enemy, and you must explain that a strategical advance is necessary in order that the watchwords that have been proclaimed may be vindicated. we trust the new war minister and hope that a revolutionary minister will continue our work and will hasten the mental process of the revolution in the heads of those who think too slowly. _the war minister--kerensky._--as minister and member of the government, i must say that we are trying to save the country and to restore the fighting capacity and activities of the russian army. _we assume responsibility, but we also assume the right to lead the army_ and to show it the path of future development. nobody has been uttering reproaches here. everyone has described what he has lived through and has tried to define the causes of events, but our aims and desires are the same. the provisional government recognises that the soviet has played a prominent part and admits its work of organisation--otherwise i would not be war minister. no one can level accusations at the soviet. but no one can accuse the commanding staffs either, because the officers have borne the brunt of the revolution quite as much as the rest of the russian people. everyone understands the position. now that my comrades are joining the government, it will be easier to attain our common aims. there is but one thing for us to do--to save our freedom. i will ask you to proceed to your commands and to remember that the whole of russia stands behind you and behind the army. it is our aim to give our country complete freedom. but this cannot be done unless we show the world at large that we are strong in spirit. _general gourko_ (replying to skobelev and tzeretelli).--we are discussing the matter from different angles. discipline is the fundamental condition of the existence of the army. the percentage of losses which a unit may suffer without losing its fighting capacity is the measure of its endurance. i have spent eight months in the south african republics and have seen regiments of two different kinds: ( ) small, disciplined and ( ) volunteer, undisciplined. the former continued to fight and did not lose their fighting power when their losses amounted to per cent. the latter, although they were volunteers who knew what they were fighting for, left the ranks and fled from the battlefield after losing per cent. no force on earth could induce them to fight. that is the difference between disciplined and undisciplined troops. we demand discipline. we do all we can to persuade. but your authoritative voice must be heard. we must remember that if the enemy advances, we shall fall to pieces like a pack of cards. if you will not cease to revolutionise the army--you must assume power yourselves. _prince lvov._--our ends are the same and everyone will do his duty. i thank you for your visit and for giving us your views. * * * * * the conference came to a close. the commanders-in-chief rejoined their fronts, fully conscious that the last card had been beaten. at the same time, the soviet orators and the press started a campaign of abuse against generals alexeiev, gourko and dragomirov, which rendered their resignations imperative. on the th of may, as i already mentioned, kerensky confirmed the "declaration" while issuing an order of the day on the inadmissibility of senior commanding officers relinquishing their posts "in order to shirk responsibility." what was the impression produced by that fateful order? kerensky _afterwards_ tried to adduce the excuse that the regulation was drafted before he had assumed office and was approved of by the executive committee as well as by "military authorities," and that he had no reason to refuse to confirm it; in a word, that he was compelled to do so. but i recall more than one of kerensky's speeches in which, believing his course to be the right one, he prided himself on his courage in issuing a declaration "which gutchkov had not dared to sign, and which had evoked the protests of all the commanding officers." on may th the executive committee of the soviets responded to the declaration by an enthusiastic proclamation which dwelt mainly upon the question of saluting. poor, indeed, was the mind that inspired this verbiage: "two months we have waited for this day.... now the soldier is by law a citizen.... henceforward the citizen soldier is free from the servile saluting, and will greet anyone he chooses as an equal and free man.... in the revolutionary army discipline will live through popular enthusiasm ... and not by means of compulsory saluting...." such were the men who undertook to reorganise the army. as a matter of fact, the majority of the revolutionary democracy of the soviets were not satisfied with the declaration. they described it as "a new enslavement of the soldier," and a campaign was opened for further widening of these rights. members of the defencist coalition demanded that the regimental committees should be empowered to challenge the appointments of the commanding officers and to give them attestations, as well as that freedom of speech should be granted on service. their chief demand, however, was for the exclusion of paragraph of the declaration entitling the commanding officer to use arms in the firing line against insubordination. i need hardly mention the disapproval of the left, "defeatist" section of the soviet. the liberal press utterly failed to appraise the importance of the declaration and never treated it seriously. the official organ of the constitutional democratic party (_retch_, may th) had an article which expressed great satisfaction that the declaration "afforded every soldier the chance of taking part in the political life of the country, definitely freed him from the shackles of the old régime and led him from the stale atmosphere of the old barracks into the fresh air of liberty." it also said that "throughout the world all other armies are remote from politics, whilst the russian army will be the first to enjoy the fullness of political rights." even the conservative paper (_novoc vremia_) said in a leading article: "it is a memorable day; to-day the great army of mighty russia becomes truly the army of the revolution.... intercourse between warriors of all ranks will henceforward be placed upon the common foundation of a sense of duty binding on every citizen, irrespective of rank. and the revolutionary army of regenerated russia will go forward to the great ordeal of blood with faith in victory and in peace." difficult, indeed, was the task of the commanding officers who were endeavouring to preserve the army when they found that the fundamental principles upon which the very existence of the army depended were misunderstood so grossly, even in circles which had heretofore been considered as the mainstay of russian statesmanship. the commanding officers were still more disheartened, and the army fell into the abyss with ever-increasing rapidity. chapter xxi. the press and propaganda. in the late world war, along with aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases and other marvels of military _technique_, a new and powerful weapon came to the fore, viz: _propaganda_. strictly speaking, it was not altogether new, for as far back as canning said, in the house of commons: "should we ever have to take part in a war we shall gather under our flag all the rebels, all those who, with or without cause, are discontented in the country that goes against us." but now this means of conflict attained an extraordinary development, intensity and organisation, attacking the most morbid and sensitive points of national psychology. organised on a large scale, supplied with vast means, the propaganda organs of great britain, france and america, especially those of great britain, carried on a terrible warfare by word of mouth, in the press, in the films and ... with gold, extending this warfare over the territories of the enemy, the allies and the neutrals, introducing it into all spheres--military, political, moral and economic. the more so, that germany especially gave grounds enough for propaganda to have a plentiful supply of irrefragable, evidential material at its disposal. it is difficult to enumerate, even in their general features alone, that enormous arsenal of ideas which, step by step, drop by drop, deepened class differences, undermined the power of the state, sapped the moral powers of the enemy and their confidence in victory, disintegrated their alliance, roused the neutral powers against them and finally raised the falling spirits of their allied peoples. nevertheless, we should not attach exceptional importance to this external moral pressure, as the leaders of the german people are now doing, to justify themselves: germany has suffered a political, economic, military and moral defeat. it was only the interaction of all these factors that determined the fatal issue of the struggle, which, towards its end, became a lingering death-agony. one could only marvel at the vitality of the german people, which, by its intellectual power and the stability of its political thought, held out so long, until at last, in november, , "a double death-blow, both at the front and in the rear," laid it in the dust. in connection with this, history will undoubtedly note a great analogy between the parts played by the "revolutionary democracies" of russia and of germany in the destinies of these peoples. after the _débâcle_ the leader of the german independent social democrats acquainted the country with the great and systematic work which they had carried on, from the beginning of , for the breaking down of the german army and navy, to the glory of the social revolution. in this work one is struck by the similarity of method and _modus operandi_ with those practised in russia. while unable to resist british and french propaganda, the germans were very successful in applying this means to their eastern antagonist, the more so that: "russia created her own misfortunes," said ludendorff, "and the work which we carried on there was not too hard." the results of the interaction of the skilful hand of germany with the movements which arose, less from the fact itself of the revolution than from the individual character of the russian rebellion, exceeded the highest hopes of the germans. the work was carried on in three directions--political, military and social. in the first we note the idea, quite clearly and definitely formulated and systematically carried out by the german government, _of the dismemberment of russia_. its realisation took shape in the proclamation, on november , , of the kingdom of poland[ ] _with a territory which was to extend eastward "as far as possible"_; in the creation of the states of courland and lithuania--"independent," but in union with germany; in the sharing of the white russian provinces between poland and lithuania, and, finally, in the prolonged and very persistent preparation of the secession of little russia, which took place later, in . while the former facts had a meaning only in principle, concerning, as they did, territories actually occupied by the germans and defined the character of the future "annexations," the attitude assumed by the central powers with respect to little russia exercised a direct influence on the stability of our south-western front, creating political complications in the country and separatist tendencies in the army. i shall return to this question later. the german headquarters included an excellently organised "press-bureau," which, besides influencing and directing the home press, also guided german propaganda, which penetrated mainly into russia and france. miliukov quotes a circular issued by the german foreign office to all its representatives in neutral countries: "you are informed that on the territory of the country to which you are accredited, special offices have been instituted for the organisation of propaganda in the states, now fighting with the german coalition. the propaganda will be engaged in exciting the social movement and, in connection with the latter, strikes, revolutionary outbreaks, separatism, among the constituent parts of these states, and civil war, as well as agitation in favour of disarmament and the cessation of the present sanguinary slaughter. you are instructed to afford all possible protection and support to the directors of the said propaganda offices." it is curious that, in the summer of , the british press took up arms against sir george buchanan and the british propaganda ministry for their inertness in the matter of influencing the democracy of russia and of fighting german propaganda in that country. one of the papers pointed out that the british bureau of russian propaganda had at its head a novelist and literary beginners who had "as much idea of russia as of chinese metaphysics." as for us, neither in our government departments nor at the stavka did we have any organ whatever which was even in some degree reminiscent of the mighty western propaganda institutions. one of the sections of the quartermaster-general's department had charge of technical questions, concerning relations with the press, and was left without importance, influence, or any active task. the russian army, well or badly, fought in primitive ways, without ever having recourse to that "poisoning of the enemy's spirit," which was so widely practised in the west. and it paid for this with superfluous torrents of blood. but if opinions may differ regarding the morality of destructive propaganda, we cannot but note our complete inertness and inactivity in another and perfectly pure sphere. we did absolutely nothing to acquaint foreign public opinion with the exceptionally important part played by russia and the russian army in the world war, with the enormous losses suffered and the sacrifices made by the russian people, with those constant majestic deeds of self-sacrifice, incomprehensible, perhaps, to the cold understanding of our western friends, which the russian army made whenever the allied front was within a hair's-breadth of defeat.... such a want of comprehension of the part played by russia i have met with almost everywhere, in wide social circles, long after the conclusion of peace, in my wanderings over europe. the following small episode is a burlesque, but very characteristic instance of this. on a banner presented to marshal foch "from american friends" are depicted the flags of all countries, lands and colonies, which in one way or another came within the orbit of the entente; the russian flag occupies the forty-sixth place, after hayti and uruguay and immediately after san-marino. is this ignorance or triviality? we did nothing to lay a firm moral foundation for national unity during our occupation of galicia, did not draw public opinion to our side during the occupation of roumania by the russian troops, did nothing to restrain the bulgarian people from betraying the interests of the slavonic races. finally, we took no advantage of the presence on russian soil of an enormous number of prisoners, to give them at least a correct idea of russia. the stavka, firmly barricaded within the sphere of purely military questions connected with the carrying out of the campaign, made no attempt to gain any influence over the general course of political events, which agrees completely with the service idea of a national army. but, at the same time, the stavka distinctly avoided influencing the public spirit of the country so as to lead this powerful factor to moral co-operation in the struggle. there was no connection with the leading organs of the press, which was represented at the stavka by men possessing neither weight nor influence. when the thunderstorm of the revolution broke and the political whirlwind swept up and convulsed the army, the stavka could remain inert no longer. it had to respond. the more so, that suddenly no source of moral power was to be found in russia which might have protected the army. the government, especially the war office, rushed irresistibly down the path of opportunism; the soviets and the socialist press undermined the army; the bourgeois press now cried "videant consules ne quid imperio detrimenti caparet," now naïvely rejoiced at the "democratisation and liberation" which were taking place. even in what might have been considered the competent spheres of the higher military bureaucracy of petrograd there reigned such a variety of views, as plunged the public opinion of the country into perplexity and bewilderment. it turned out, however, that for the conflict the stavka possessed neither organisation nor men, neither technique nor knowledge and experience. and, worst of all, the stavka was in some way or other shoved and thrown aside by the madly-careering chariot of life. its voice grew weaker and sank into silence. [illustration: the old army: a review. general ivanov.] [illustration: the revolutionary army: a review. kerensky.] the second quartermaster-general--general markov--had a serious task before him--he had to create the necessary apparatus, to establish communications with the important papers, to supply the stavka with a "megaphone" and raise the condition of the army press, which was leading a wretched existence and which the army organisations were trying to destroy. markov took up the task warmly, but failed to do anything serious, as he only remained in office two months. every step of the stavka in this direction called forth from the revolutionary democracy a disingenuous accusation of counter-revolutionary action. and liberal bourgeois moscow, to which he turned for aid, in the form of intellectual and technical assistance in his task, replied with eloquent promises, but did absolutely nothing. thus the stavka had no means at all, not only for actively combating the disintegration of the army, but for resisting german propaganda, which was spreading rapidly. * * * * * ludendorff says frankly and with a national egotism rising to a high degree of cynicism: "i did not doubt that the _débâcle_ of the russian army and the russian people was fraught with great danger for germany and austria-hungary.... _in sending lenin to russia_ our government assumed an enormous responsibility! this journey was justified from a military point of view; _it was necessary that russia should fall_. but our government should have taken measures that this should not happen to germany."[ ] even now the boundless sufferings of the russian people, now "out of the ranks," did not call forth a single word of pity or regret from its moral corrupters.... with the beginning of the campaign, the germans altered the direction of their work with respect to russia. without breaking their connections with the well-known reactionary circles at court, in the government and in the duma, using all means for influencing these circles and all their motives--greed, ambition, german atavism, and sometimes a peculiar understanding of patriotism--the germans entered at the same time into close fellowship with the russian revolutionaries in the country, and especially abroad, amongst the multitudinous emigrant colony. directly or indirectly, all were drawn into the service of the german government--great agents in the sphere of spying and recruiting, like parvus (helfand); provocateurs, connected with the russian secret police, like blum; propaganda agents--oulianoff (lenin), bronstein (trotsky), apfelbaum (zinovieff), lunacharsky, ozolin, katz (kamkoff), and many others. and in their wake went a whole group of shallow or unscrupulous people, cast over the frontier and fanatically hating the _régime_ which had rejected them--hating it to the degree of forgetfulness of their native land, or squaring accounts with this _régime_, acting sometimes as blind tools in the hands of the german general staff. what their motives were, what their pay, how far they went--these are details; what is important is that they sold russia, serving those aims which were set before them by our foe. they were all closely interlaced with one another and with the agents of the german secret service, forming with them one unbroken conspiracy. the work began with a widespread revolutionary and separatist (ukrainian) propaganda among the prisoners of war. according to liebknecht, "the german government not only helped this propaganda, but carried it on itself." these aims were served by the committee of revolutionary propaganda, founded in at the hague by the union for the liberation of the ukraine in austria by the copenhagen institute (parvus's organisation), and a whole series of papers of a revolutionary and defeatist character, partly published at the expense of the german staff, partly subsidised by it--the _social democrat_ (geneva--lenin's paper), _nashe slovo_ (paris--trotsky's paper), _na tchoozhbeenie_ (geneva--contributions from tchernoff, katz and others), _russkii viestnik_, _rodnaya retch_, _nedielia_, and so forth. similar to this was the activity--the spread of defeatist and revolutionary literature, side by side with purely charitable work--of the committee of intellectual aid to russian prisoners of war in germany and austria (geneva), which was in connection with official moscow and received subsidies from it. to define the character of these publications it is enough to quote two or three phrases expressing the views of their inspirers. lenin said in the _social democrat_: "the least evil will be the defeat of the czarist monarchy, the most barbarous and reactionary of all governments." tchernoff, the future minister of agriculture, declared in the _mysl_ that he had one fatherland only--the international! along with literature the germans invited lenin's and tchernoff's collaborators, especially from the editorial staff of _na tchoozhbeenie_, to lecture in the camps, while a german spy, consul von pelche, carried on a large campaign for the recruiting of agitators for propaganda in the ranks of the army--among the russian emigrants of conscript age and of left wing politics. all this was but preparatory work. the russian revolution opened boundless vistas for german propaganda. along with honest people, once persecuted, who had struggled for the good of the people, there rushed into russia all that revolutionary riff-raff which absorbed the members of the russian secret police, the international informers and the rebels. the petrograd authorities feared most of all the accusation of want of democratic spirit. miliukov, as minister, stated repeatedly that "the government considers unconditionally possible the return to russia of all emigrants, regardless of their views on the war and independently of their registration in the international control list."[ ] this minister carried on a dispute with the british, demanding the release of the bolsheviks, bronstein (trotsky), zourabov and others, who had been arrested by the british. matters were more complicated in the case of lenin and his supporters. despite the demands of the russian government, the allies would undoubtedly have refused to let them through. therefore, as ludendorff acknowledges, the german government despatched lenin and his companions (the first group consisted of seventeen persons) to russia, allowing them free transit through germany. this undertaking, which promised extraordinarily important results, was richly financed with gold and credit through the stockholm (ganetsky-fuerstenberg) and copenhagen (parvus) centres and through the russian siberian bank. that gold which, as lenin expressed it, "does not smell." in october, , bourtsev published a list of persons brought through germany to russia by order of the german general staff. nearly all of them, according to bourtsev, "were revolutionaries who, during the war, had carried on a defeatist campaign in switzerland and were now william's voluntary or involuntary agents." many of them at once assumed a prominent position in the social democratic party, in the soviet, the committee[ ] and the bolshevik press. the names of lenin, tsederbaum (martov), lunacharsky, natanson, riazanov, apfelbaum (zinoviev) and others soon became the most fateful in russian history. on the day of lenin's arrival in petrograd the german paper _die woche_ devoted an article to this event, in which he was called "a true friend of the russian people and an honourable antagonist." and the cadet semi-official organ, the _retch_, which afterwards boldly and unwaveringly waged war against the lenin party, greeted his arrival with the words: "such a generally acknowledged leader of the socialist party ought now to be in the arena, and his arrival in russia, whatever opinion may be held of his views, should be welcomed." on april rd lenin arrived in petrograd, where he was received with much state, and in a few days declared his theses, part of which formed the fundamental themes of german propaganda: "down with war and all power to the soviet!" lenin's first actions seemed so absurd and so clearly anarchistic that they called forth protests not only in the whole of the liberal press, but also in the greater part of the socialist press. but, little by little, the left wing of the revolutionary democracy, reinforced by german agents, joined overtly and openly in the propaganda of its chief, without meeting any decisive rebuff either from the double-minded soviet or the feeble government. the great wave of german and mutinous propaganda engulfed more and more the soviet, the committee, the revolutionary press, and the ignorant masses, and was reflected, consciously or unconsciously, even among those who stood at the helm of the state. from the very first lenin's organisation, as was said afterwards, in july, in the report of the procurator of the petrograd high court of justice, "aiming at assisting the states warring against russia in their hostile actions against her, entered into an agreement with the agents of the said states to forward the disorganisation of the russian army and the russian rear, for which purpose it used the financial means received from these states to organise a propaganda among the population and the troops ... and also, for the same purpose, organised in petrograd, from july rd to th, an armed insurrection against the supreme power existing in the state." the stavka had long and vainly raised its voice of warning. general alexeiev had, both personally and in writing, called on the government to take measures against the bolsheviks and the spies. several times i myself applied to the war office, sending in, among other things, evidential material concerning rakovsky's spying and documents certifying the treason of lenin, skoropis-yoltoukhovsky and others. the part played by the union for the liberation of the ukraine (of which, besides others, melenevsky and v. doroshenko were members)[ ] as an organisation of the central powers for propaganda, spying and recruiting for "setch ukraine units," was beyond all doubt. in one of my letters (may th), based on the examination of a russian officer, yermolenko, who had been a prisoner of war and had accepted the part of a german agent for the purpose of disclosing the organisation, the following picture was revealed: "yermolenko was transferred to our rear, on the front of the sixth army, to agitate for a speedy conclusion of a separate peace with germany. yermolenko accepted this commission at the insistence of his comrades. two officers of the german general staff, schiditzky and lubar, informed him that a similar agitation was being carried on in russia by the sectional president of the union for the liberation of the ukraine, a. skoropis-yoltoukhovsky, and by lenin, as agents of the german general staff. lenin had been instructed to seek to undermine by all means the confidence of the russian people in the provisional government. the money for this work was received through one svendson, an employee of the german embassy in stockholm. these methods were practised before the revolution also. our command turned its attention to the somewhat too frequent appearance of "escaped prisoners." many of them having surrendered to the enemy, passed through a definite course of intelligence work, and having received substantial pay and "papers," were permitted to pass over to us through the line of trenches. being altogether unable to decide what was a case of courage and what of treachery, we nearly always sent all escaped prisoners from the european to the caucasian front. all the representations of the high command as to the insufferable situation of the army, in the face of such vast treachery, remained without result. kerensky carried on free debates in the soviet with lenin on the subject whether the country and the army should be broken down or not, basing his action on the view that he was the "war minister of the revolution," and that "freedom of opinion was sacred to him, whencesoever it might proceed." tzeretelli warmly defended lenin: "i do not agree with lenin and his agitation. but what has been said by deputy shulgin is a slander against lenin, _never has lenin called for actions which would infringe upon the course of the revolution. lenin is carrying on an idealist propaganda._" this much-talked-of freedom of opinion extremely simplified the work of german propaganda, giving rise to such an unheard-of phenomenon as the open preaching in german, at public meetings and in kronstadt, of a separate peace and of distrust of the government, by an agent of germany, the president of the zimmerwald and kienthal conference, robert grimm!... what a state of moral prostration and loss of all national dignity, consciousness, and patriotism is presented by the picture of tzeretelli and skobelev "vouching" for the _agent provocateur_; of kerensky importuning the government to grant grimm the right of entry into russia; of tereshtchenko permitting it, and of russians listening to grimm's speeches--without indignation, without resentment. during the bolshevik insurrection of july the officials of the ministry of justice, exasperated by the laxity of the leaders of the government, decided, with the knowledge of their minister, pereverzev, to publish my letter to the minister of war and other documents, exposing lenin's treason to his country. the documents being a statement signed by two socialists, alexinsky and pankratov, were given to the printers. the premature disclosure of this fact called forth a passionate protest from tchkheidze and tzeretelli, and terrible anger on the part of the ministers nekrassov and tereshtchenko. the government forbade the publication of information which sullied the good name of comrade lenin, and had recourse to reprisals against the officials of the ministry of justice. however, the statement appeared in the press. in its turn the executive committee of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates exhibited a touching care, not only for the inviolability of the bolsheviks, but even for their honour, by issuing on july th a special appeal calling on people "to refrain from the spreading of accusations reflecting dishonour" on lenin and "other political workers" pending the investigation of the matter by a special commission. this consideration was openly expressed in a resolution passed by the central executive committees (on july th), which, while condemning the attempt of the anarchist-bolshevist elements to overthrow the government, expressed the fear that the "inevitable" measures to which the government and the military authorities must have recourse ... would create a basis for the demagogic agitation of the counter-revolutionaries who, for the time being, gathered round the flag of the revolutionary régime, but who might pave the way for a military dictatorship." however, the exposure of the direct criminal participation of the leaders of bolshevism in acts of mutiny and treason may have obliged the government to begin repressions. lenin and apfelbaum (zinoviev) escaped to finland, while bronstein (trotsky), kozlovsky, raskolnikov, remniov, and many others were arrested. several anarchist-bolshevist newspapers were suspended. these repressions, however, were not of a serious character. many persons known to have been leaders in the mutiny were not charged at all, and their work of destruction was continued with consistency and energy. * * * * * while carrying the war into our country the germans persistently and methodically put into practice another watchword--peace at the front. fraternisation had taken place earlier as well, before the revolution; but it was then due to the hopelessly wearisome life in the trenches, to curiosity, to a simple feeling of humanity even towards the enemy--a feeling exhibited by the russian soldier more than once on the battlefield of borodino, in the bastions of sevastopol, and in the balkan mountains. fraternisation took place rarely, was punished by the commanders, and had no dangerous tendencies in it. but now the german general staff organised it on a large scale, systematically and along the whole front, with the participation of the higher staff organs and the commanders, with a detailed code of instructions, which included the observation of our forces and positions, the demonstration of the impressive armament and strength of their own positions, persuasion as to the aimlessness of the war, the incitement of the russian soldiers against the government and their commanders, in whose interest exclusively this "sanguinary slaughter" was being continued. masses of the defeatist literature manufactured in germany were passed over into our trenches, and at the same time agents of the soviet and the committee travelled quite freely along the front with similar propaganda, with the organisation of "exhibition fraternisation," and with whole piles of _pravda_, _trench pravda_, _social democrat_, and other products of our native socialist intellect and conscience--organs which, in their forceful argumentation, left the jesuitical eloquence of their german brethren far behind. at the same time a general meeting of simple "delegates from the front" in petrograd was passing a resolution in favour of allowing fraternisation for the purpose of revolutionary propaganda among the enemy's ranks! one cannot read without deep emotion of the feelings of kornilov, who, for the first time after the revolution, in the beginning of may, when in command of the eighth army, came into contact with this fatal phenomenon in the life of our front. they were written down by nezhintsev, at that time captain of the general staff and later the gallant commander of the kornilov regiment, who in fell in action against the bolsheviks at the storm of ekaterinodar. "when we had got well into the firing zone of the position," writes nezhintsev, "the general (kornilov) looked very gloomy. his words, 'disgrace, treason,' showed his estimate of the dead silence of the position. then he remarked: "'do you feel all the nightmare horror of this silence? you understand that we are watched by the enemy artillery observers and that we are not fired at. yes, the enemy are mocking us as weaklings. can it be that the russian soldier is capable of informing the enemy of my arrival at the position?' "i was silent, but the sacred tears in the eyes of this hero touched me deeply, and at this moment i vowed in my mind that i would die for him and for our common motherland. general kornilov seemed to feel this. he turned to me suddenly, pressed my hand, and turned away, as if ashamed of his momentary weakness. "the acquaintance of the new commander with the infantry began with the units in the reserve, when formed in rank, holding a meeting and replying to all appeals for the necessity of an advance by pointing out how useless it was to continue a bourgeois war, carried on by 'militarists.' when, after two hours of fruitless discussion, general kornilov, worn out morally and physically, proceeded to the trenches, he found a scene there which could scarcely have been foreseen by any soldier of this age. "we entered into a system of fortifications where the trench-lines of both sides were separated or, more correctly, joined by lines of barbed wire.... the appearance of general kornilov was greeted ... by a group of german officers, who gazed insolently on the commander of the russian army; behind them stood some prussian soldiers. the general took my field-glasses and, ascending the parapet, began to examine the arena of the fights to come. when someone expressed a fear that the prussians might shoot the russian commander, the latter replied: "'i would be immensely glad if they did; perhaps it might sober our befogged soldiers and put an end to this shameful fraternisation.' "at the positions of a neighbouring regiment the commander of the army was greeted by the _bravura_ march of a german jaeger regiment, to whose band our 'fraternising' soldiers were making their way. with the remark, 'this is treason!' the general turned to an officer standing next him, ordering the fraternisers from both sides to be told that if this disgraceful scene did not cease at once he would turn the guns loose on them. the disciplined germans ceased playing and returned to their own trenches, seemingly ashamed of the abominable spectacle. but our soldiers--oh! they held meetings for a long time, complaining of the way their 'counter-revolutionary commanders oppressed their liberty.'" in general i do not cherish feelings of revenge. yet i regret exceedingly that general ludendorff left the german army prematurely, before its break-up, and did not experience directly in its ranks those inexpressibly painful moral torments which we russian officers have suffered. [illustration: before the battle in the revolutionary army: a meeting.] [illustration: types of men in the revolutionary army.] besides fraternisation, the enemy high command practised, on an extensive scale and with provocatory purpose, the dispatch of flags of truce directly to the troops, or rather to the soldiers. thus, about the end of april on the dvinsk front there came with a flag of truce a german officer, who was not received. he managed, however, to address to the crowd of soldiers the words: "i have come to you with offers of peace, and am empowered to speak even with the provisional government, but your commanders do not wish for peace." these words were spread rapidly, and caused agitation among the soldiers and even threats to desert the front. therefore when, a few days later, in the same section, _parliamentaires_ (a brigade commander, two officers, and a bugler) made their appearance again, they were taken to the staff quarters of the fifth army. it turned out, of course, that they had no authorisations, and could not even state more or less definitely the object of their coming, since "the sole object of the pseudo-_parliamentaires_ appearing on our front," says an order of the commander-in-chief, "has been to observe our dispositions and our spirit, and, by a lying exhibition of their pacific feelings, to incline our troops to an inaction profitable to the germans and ruinous to russia and her freedom." similar cases occurred on the fronts of the eighth, ninth, and other armies. it is characteristic that the commander-in-chief of the eastern german front, prince leopold of bavaria, found it possible to take a personal part in this course of provocation. in two radiograms, bearing the systematic character of the customary proclamations and intended for the soldiers and the soviet, he stated that the high command was ready to meet half-way "the repeatedly expressed desire of the russian soldiers' delegates to put an end to bloodshed"; that "military operations between us (the central powers) and russia could be put an end to _without russia breaking with her allies_"; that "if russia wants to know the particulars of our conditions, let her give up her demand for their publication...." and he finishes with a threat: "does the new russian government, instigated by its allies, wish to satisfy itself whether divisions of heavy guns are still to be found on our eastern front?" earlier, when leaders did discreditable things to save their armies and their countries, at least they were ashamed of it and kept silence. nowadays military traditions have undergone a radical change. to the credit of the soviet it must be said that it took a proper view of this provocationary invitation, saying in reply: "the commander-in-chief of the german troops on the eastern front offers us 'a separate truce and secrecy of negotiations.' but russia knows that the _débâcle_ of the allies will be the beginning of the _débâcle_ of her own army, and the _débâcle_ of the revolutionary troops of free russia would mean not only new common graves, but the failure of the revolution, the fall of free russia." * * * * * from the very first days of the revolution a marked change naturally took place in the attitude of the russian press. it expressed itself on the one hand in a certain differentiation of all the bourgeois organs, which assumed a liberal-conservative character, the _tactics_ of which were adopted by an inconsiderable part of the socialist press, of the type of plekhanov's _yedinstvo_; and on the other in the appearance of an immense number of socialist organs. the organs of the right wing underwent a considerable evolution, a characteristic indication of which was the unexpected declaration of a well-known member of the _novoye vremya_ staff, mr. menshikov: "we must be grateful to destiny that the monarchy, which for a thousand years has betrayed the people, has at last betrayed itself and put a cross on its own grave. to dig it up from under that cross and start a great dispute about the candidates for the fallen throne would be, in my opinion, a fatal mistake." in the course of the first few months the right press partly closed down--not without pressure and violence on the part of the soviets--partly it assumed a pacific-liberal attitude. it was only in september, , that its tone grew extremely violent in connection with the final exposure of the weakness of the government, the loss of all hope of a legal way out of the "no thoroughfare" which had arisen, and the echoes of kornilov's venture. the attacks of the extremist organs on the government passed into solid abuse of it. though differing in a greater or lesser degree in its understanding of the social problems which the revolution had to solve, though guilty, perhaps, along with russian society, of many mistakes, yet the russian liberal press showed an exceptional unanimity in the more important questions of a constitutional and national character: full power to the provisional government, democratic reforms in the spirit of the programme of march nd,[ ] war until victory along with the allies, an all-russia constituent assembly as the source of the supreme power and of the constitution of the country. in yet another respect has the liberal press left a good reputation behind it in history: in the days of lofty popular enthusiasm, as in the days of doubt, vacillation and general demoralisation, which distinguished the revolutionary period of , no place was found in it, nor in the right press either, for the distribution of german gold.... the appearance, on a large scale, of the new socialist press was accompanied by a series of unfavourable circumstances. it had no normal past, no traditions. its prolonged life below the surface, the exclusively destructive method of action adopted by it, its suspicious and hostile attitude towards all authority, put a certain stamp on the whole tendency of this press, leaving too little place and attention for creative work. the complete discord in thought, the contradictions and vacillation which reigned both within the soviet and also among the party groups and within the parties, were reflected in the press, just as much as the elemental pressure from below of irresistible, narrowly egotistic class demands; for neglect of these demands gave rise to the threat, which was once expressed by the "beauty and pride of the revolution," the kronstadt sailors to tchernov, the minister: "if you will not give us anything, michael alexandrovitch will." finally, the press was not uninfluenced by the appearance in it of a number of such persons as brought into it an atmosphere of uncleanness and perfidy. the papers were full of names, which had emerged from the sphere of crime, of the secret police and of international espionage. all these gentlemen--tchernomazov (a provocator in the secret police and director of the pre-revolutionary _pravda_), berthold (the same and also editor of the _communist_), dekonsky, malinovsky, matislavsky, those colleagues of lenin and gorky--nahamkes, stoutchka, ouritsky, gimmer (soukhanov), and a vast number of equally notorious names--brought the russian press to a hitherto unknown degree of moral degradation. the difference was only a matter of scope. some papers, akin to the soviet semi-official organ, the _izvestia of the workmen's and soldiers' delegates_, undermined the country and the army, while others of the _pravda_ type (the organ of the bolshevik social democrats) broke them down. at the same time as the _izvestia_ would call on its readers to support the provisional government, while secretly ready to strike a blow at it, the _pravda_ would declare that "the government is counter-revolutionary, and therefore there can be no relations with it. the task of the revolutionary democracy is to attain to the dictatorship of the proletariat." and tchernov's socialist revolutionary organ, the _delo naroda_, would discover a neutral formula: all possible support to the coalition government, but "there is not, and cannot be, any unanimity in this question; more than that, there must not be, in the interests of the double defence." at the same time as the _izvestia_ began to preach an advance, but without a final victory, not abandoning, however, the intention of "deciding over the heads of the government and the ruling classes the conditions on which the war might be stopped," the _pravda_ called for universal fraternisation, and the socialist revolutionary, _zemlia i volia_, alternately grieved that germany still wished for conquest, or demanded a separate peace. tchernov's paper, which in march had considered that, "should the enemy be victorious, there would be an end to russian freedom," now, in may, saw in the preaching of an advance "the limit of unblushing gambling on the fate of the fatherland, the limit of irresponsibility and demagogy." gorky's paper, _novaya zhizn_, speaking through gimmer (soukhanov), rises to cynicism when it says: "when kerensky gives orders for _russian soil to be cleared of enemy troops_, his demands far exceed the limits of military _technique_. he calls for a political act, one which has never been provided for by the coalition government. for clearing the country by an advance signifies 'complete victory'...." altogether the _novaya zhizn_ supported german interests with especial warmth, raising its voice in all cases when german interests were threatened with danger, either on the part of the allies or on ours. and when the advance of the disorganised army ended in failure--in tarnopol and kalush--when riga had fallen, the left press started a bitter campaign against the stavka and the commanding personnel, and tchernov's paper, in connection with the proposed reforms in the army, cried hysterically: "let the proletarians know that it is proposed again to give them up to the iron embrace of beggary, slavery and hunger.... let the soldiers know that it is proposed again to enslave them with the 'discipline' of their commanders and to force them to shed their blood without end, so long as the belief of the allies in russia's 'gallantry' is restored." the most straightforward of all, however, was afterwards the _iskra_, the organ of the menshevist internationalists (martov-zederbaum), which, on the day of the occupation of the island of oesel by a german landing-party, published an article entitled "welcome to the german fleet!" the army had its own military press. the organs of the army staffs and of those at the front, which used to appear before the revolution, were of the nature of purely military bulletins. beginning with the revolution, these organs, with their weak literary forces, began to fight for the existence of the army, conscientiously, honestly, but not cleverly. meeting with indifference or exasperation on the part of the soldiers, who had already turned their backs on the officers, and especially on the part of the committee organs of the "revolutionary" movement, which existed side by side with them, they began to weaken and die out, until at last, in the days of august, an order from kerensky closed them altogether; the exclusive right of publishing army newspapers was transferred to the army committee and the committees of the troops at the front. the same fate befell the _news of the active army_, the stavka organ, started by general markov and left without support from the weighty powers of the press of the capital. the committee press, widely spread among the troops at the expense of the government, reflected those moods of which i have spoken earlier in the chapter on the committees, ranging from constitutionalism to anarchism, from complete victory to an immediate conclusion of peace, without orders. it reflected--but in a worse, more sorry form, as regards literary style and content--that disharmony of thought and those tendencies towards extreme theories which characterised the socialist press of the capital. in this respect, in accordance with the personnel of the committees, and to some extent with their proximity to petrograd, the respective fronts differed somewhat from one another. the most moderate was the south-western front, somewhat worse, the western, while the northern front was pronouncedly bolshevist. besides local talent, the columns of the committee press were in many cases opened wide to the resolutions not only of the extreme national parties, but even of the german parties. it would be incorrect, however, to speak of the immediate action of the press on the masses of the soldiers. it did not exist any more than there were any popular newspapers which these masses could understand. the press exercised an influence principally on the semi-educated elements in the ranks of the army. this sphere turned out to be nearer to the soldiers, and to it passed a certain share of that authority which was enjoyed earlier by the officers. ideas gathered from the papers and refracted through the mental prism of this class passed in a simplified form to the soldiery, the vast majority of which unfortunately consisted of ignorant and illiterate men. and among these masses all these conceptions, stripped of cunningly-woven arguments, premises and grounds, were transformed into wondrously simple and terrifically logical conclusions. in them dominated the straightforward negation: "down!" down with the bourgeois government, down with the counter-revolutionary commanders, down with the "sanguinary slaughter," down with everything of which they were sick, of which they were wearied, all that in one way or another interfered with their animal instincts and hampered "free will"--down with them all! in such an elementary fashion did the army at innumerable soldiers' meetings settle all the political and social questions that were agitating mankind. * * * * * the curtain has fallen. the treaty of versailles has for a time given pause to the armed conflict in central europe. evident to the end that, having regained their strength, the nations may again take up their arms, so as to burst the chains in which defeat has fettered them. the idea of the "world-peace," which the christian churches have been preaching for twenty centuries, is buried for years to come. to us, how childishly naïve now seem the efforts of the humanists of the nineteenth century, who by prolonged, ardent propaganda sought to soften the horrors of war and to introduce the limiting norms of international law! yes, now, when we know that one may not only infringe the neutrality of a peaceful, cultured country, but give it to be ravaged and plundered; when we can sink peaceable ships, with women and children on board, by means of submarines; poison people with suffocating gases and tear their bodies with the fragments of explosive bullets; when a whole country, a whole nation, is quoted by cold, political calculation merely as a "barrier" against the invasion of armed force and pernicious ideas, and is periodically either helped or betrayed in turn. but the most terrible of all weapons ever invented by the mind of man, the most shameful of all the methods permitted in the late world war was _the poisoning of the soul of a people_! germany assigns the priority of this invention to great britain. let them settle this matter between themselves. but i see my native land crushed, dying in the dark night of horror and insanity. and i know her tormentors. two theses have arisen before mankind in all their grim power and all their shameless nakedness: _all is permissible for the advantage of one's country!_ _all is permissible for the triumph of one's party, one's class!_ all, even the moral and physical ruin of an enemy country, even the betrayal of one's native land and the making on its living body of _social experiments_, the failure of which threatens it with paralysis and death. germany and lenin unhesitatingly decided these questions in the affirmative. the world has condemned them; but are all those who speak of the matter so unanimous and sincere in their condemnation? have not these ideas left somewhat too deep traces in the minds, not so much perhaps of the popular masses as of their leaders? i, at least, am led to such a conclusion by all the present soulless world policy of the governments, especially towards russia, by all the present utterly selfish tactics of the class organisations. this is terrible. i believe that every people has the right to defend its existence, sword in hand; i know that for many years to come war will be the customary method of settling international disputes, and that methods of warfare will be both honourable and, alas! dishonourable. but there is a certain limit, beyond which even baseness ceases to be simply baseness and becomes insanity. this limit we have already reached. and if religion, science, literature, philosophers, humanitarians, teachers of mankind do not arouse a broad, idealistic movement against the hottentot morality with which we have been inoculated, the world will witness the decline of its civilisation. [illustration: before the battle in the old army: prayers.] chapter xxii. the condition of the army at the july advance. having outlined a whole series of conditions which exercised an influence on the life, spirit, and military efficiency of the once famous russian army, i shall now pass to the sorrowful tale of its fall. i was born in the family of an officer of the line, and for twenty-two years (including the two years of the russo-japanese war) before the european war served in the ranks of modest line units and in small army staffs. i shared the life, the joys and the sorrows of the officer and the soldier, and devoted many pages in the military press to their life which was my own. from to , almost without interval, i stood at the head of the troops and led them into battle on the fields of white russia, volynia, galicia, in the mountains of hungary, in roumania, and then--then in the bitter internecine war which, with bloody share, ploughed up our native land. i have more grounds and more right to speak of the army and in the name of the army than all those strangers of the socialist camp, who, in their haughty self-conceit, as soon as they touched the army, began breaking down its foundations, judging its leaders and fighters and diagnosing its serious disease, who even now, after grievous experiments and experiences, have not given up the hope of transforming this mighty and terrible weapon of national self-preservation into a means for satisfying party and social appetites. for me, the army is not only an historical, social, national phenomenon, but nearly the whole of my life, in which lie many memories, precious and not to be forgotten, in which all is bound up and interlaced into one general mass of swiftly passing days of sadness and of joy, in which there are hundreds of cherished graves, of buried dreams and unextinguishable faith. the army should be approached cautiously, never forgetting that not only its historical foundations, but even such details of its life as may, perhaps, seem strange and absurd, have their meaning and significance. when the revolution began that old veteran, beloved by both officers and soldiers, general p. i. mishtchenko, being unable to put up with the new régime, retired from the army. he lived at temir-han shoura, never went outside his garden fence, and always wore his general's uniform and his crosses of st. george, even in the days of bolshevik power. one day the bolsheviks came to search his house, and, among other things, wanted to deprive him of his shoulder straps and decorations. the old general retired to a neighbouring room and shot himself. let whoever will laugh at "old-fashioned prejudices." we shall reverence his noble memory. and so the storm-cloud of the revolution broke. there was no doubt whatever that such a cataclysm in the life of the nation could not but have a grave effect. the revolution was _bound_ to convulse the army, greatly weakening and breaking all its historic ties. such a result was normal, natural and unavoidable, independently of the condition of the army at the moment, independently of the mutual relations of commanders and subordinates. we can speak only of the circumstances which arrested or hastened the disintegration of the army. a government appeared. its source might have been one of three elements: the high command (a military dictatorship), the bourgeois state duma (the provisional government), or the revolutionary democracy (the soviet). it was the provisional government that was acknowledged. the attitude of the other two elements towards it was different; the soviet practically robbed the government of its power, while the high command submitted to it implicitly, and was therefore obliged to carry out its plans. the government had two courses open to it; it could combat the disintegrating influences which began to appear in the army by stern and ruthless measures, or it could encourage them. owing to pressure from the soviet and partly through want of firmness and through misunderstanding of the laws of existence of armed forces, the government chose the second course. this circumstance decided the fate of the army. all other circumstances could but influence the duration of the process of disruption and its depth. [illustration: types of soldiers of the old army. this company was sent to the west european front.] the festive days of touching and joyous union between the officers and the soldiers vanished rapidly, being replaced by tiresome, weary week-days. but they had been in the past, those days of joy, and, therefore, no impassable abyss existed between the two ranks, over which the inexorable logic of life had long been casting a bridge. the unnecessary, obsolete methods, which had introduced an element of irritation into the soldiery, fell away at once, as of themselves; the officers became more thoughtful and industrious. then came a torrent of newspapers, appeals, resolutions, orders, from some unknown authority, and with them a whole series of new ideas, which the soldier masses were unable to digest and assimilate. new people appeared, with a new speech, so fascinating and promising, liberating the soldiers from obedience and inspiring hope that they would be saved from deadly danger immediately. when one regimental commander naïvely inquired whether these people might not be tried by field court-martial and shot, his telegram, after passing through all official stages, called forth the reply from petrograd that these people were inviolable, and had been sent by the soviet to the troops for the very purpose of explaining to them the true meaning of current events. when such leaders of the revolutionary democracy, as have not yet lost their feeling of responsibility for crucified russia, now say that the movement, caused by the deep class differences between the officers and the soldiers and by "the enslavement" of the latter, was of an elemental nature, which they could not resist, this is deeply untrue. all the fundamental slogans, all the programmes, tactics, instructions and text-books, forming the foundation of the "democratisation" of the army, had been drawn up by the military sections of the secret socialist parties long before the war, outside of "elemental" pressure, on the grounds of clear, cold calculation, as a product of "socialist reasoning and conscience." true, the officers strove to persuade the men not to believe the "new words" and to do their duty. but from the very beginning the soviets had declared the officers to be foes of the revolution; in many towns they had been subjected to cruel torture and death, and this with impunity. evidently not without some reason, when even the "bourgeois" duma issued such a strange and unexpected "announcement" as the following: "this first day of march, rumours were spread among the soldiers of the garrison of petrograd to the effect that the officers in the regiments were disarming the soldiers. these rumours were investigated and found to be false. as president of the military commission of the provisional committee of the state duma, i declare that the most decided measures _will be_ taken to prevent such action on the part of the officers, up to the shooting of those guilty of it. signed, colonel engelhardt." next came order no. ., the declaration and so forth. perhaps, however, it might have been possible to combat all this verbal ocean of lies and hypocrisy which flowed from petrograd and from the local soviets and was echoed by the local demagogues had it not been for a circumstance which paralysed all the efforts of the commanders, viz., the animal feeling of self-preservation which had flooded the whole mass of the soldiers. this feeling had always existed. but it had been kept under and restrained by examples of duty fulfilled, by flashes of national self-consciousness, by shame, fear and pressure. when all these elements had disappeared, when for the soothing of a drowsy conscience there was a whole arsenal of new conceptions, which justified the care for one's own hide and furnished it with an ideal basis, then the army could exist no longer. this feeling upset all the efforts of the commanders, all moral principles and the whole regiment of the army. * * * * * in a large, open field, as far as the eye can see, run endless lines of trenches, sometimes coming close up to each other, interlacing their barbed wire fences, sometimes running far off and vanishing behind a verdant crest. the sun has risen long ago, but it is still as death in the field. the first to rise are the germans. in one place and another their figures look out from the trenches; a few come out on to the parapet to hang their clothes, damp after the night, in the sun. a sentry in our front trench opens his sleepy eyes, lazily stretches himself, after looking indifferently at the enemy trenches. a soldier in a dirty shirt, bare-footed, with coat slung over his shoulders, cringing under the morning cold, comes out of his trench and plods towards the german positions, where, between the lines, stands a "postbox"; it contains a new number of the german paper, _the russian messenger_, and proposals for barter. all is still. not a single gun is to be heard. last week the regimental committee issued a resolution against firing, even against distance firing; let the necessary distances be estimated by the map. a lieutenant-colonel of the gunners--a member of the committee--gave his full approval to this resolution. when yesterday the commander of a field battery began firing at a new enemy trench, our infantry opened rifle fire on our observation post and wounded the telephone operator. during the night the infantry lit a fire on the position being constructed for a newly arrived heavy battery.[ ] nine a.m. the first company gradually begins to awaken. the trenches are incredibly defiled; in the narrow communication trenches and those of the second line the air is thick and close. the parapet is crumbling away. no one troubles to repair it; no one feels inclined to do so, and there are not enough men in the company. there is a large number of deserters; more than fifty have been allowed to go. old soldiers have been demobilised, others have gone on leave with the arbitrary permission of the committee. others, again, have been elected members of numerous committees, or gone away as delegates; a while ago, for instance, the division sent a numerous delegation to "comrade" kerensky to verify whether he had really given orders for an advance. finally, by threats and violence, the soldiers have so terrorised the regimental surgeons that the latter have been issuing medical certificates even to the "thoroughly fit." in the trenches the hours pass slowly and wearily, in dullness and idleness. in one corner men are playing cards, in another a soldier returned from leave is lazily and listlessly telling a story; the air is full of obscene swearing. someone reads aloud from the _russian messenger_ the following: "the english want the russians to shed the last drop of their blood for the greater glory of england, who seeks her profit in everything.... dear soldiers, you must know that russia would have concluded peace long ago had not england prevented her.... we must turn away from her--the russian people demand it; such is their sacred will." someone or other swears. "don't you wish for peace. _they_ make peace, the ----; we shall die here, without getting our freedom!" along the trenches came lieutenant albov, the company commander. he said to the groups of soldiers, somewhat irresolutely and entreatingly: "comrades, get to work quickly. in three days we have not made a single communication trench to the firing line." the card players did not even look round; someone said in a low voice, "all right." the man reading the newspaper rose and reported, in a free and easy manner: "the company does not want to dig, because that would be preparation for an advance, and the committee has resolved...." "look here, you understand nothing at all about it, and, moreover, why do you speak for the whole company? even if we remain on the defensive we are lost in case of an alarm; the whole company cannot get out to the firing line along a single trench." he said this, and with a gesture of despair went on his way. matters were hopeless. every time he tried to speak with them for a time, and in a friendly way, they would listen to him attentively; they liked to talk to him, and, on the whole, his company looked on him favourably in their own way. but he felt that between him and them a wall had sprung up, against which all his good impulses were shattered. he had lost the path to their soul--lost it in the impassable jungle of darkness, roughness, and that wave of distrust and suspicion which had overwhelmed the soldiers. was it, perhaps, that he used the wrong words, or was not able to say what he meant? scarcely that. but a little while before the war, when he was a student and was carried away by the popular movement, he had visited villages and factories and had found "real words" which were clear and comprehensible to all. but, most of all, with what words can one move men to face death when all their feelings are veiled by one feeling--that of self-preservation? the train of his thoughts was broken by the sudden appearance of the regimental commander. "what the devil does this mean? the man on duty does not come forward. the men are not dressed. filth and stench. what are you about, lieutenant?" the grey-headed colonel cast a stern glance on the soldiers which involuntarily impressed them. they all rose to their feet. he glanced through a loop-hole and, starting back, asked nervously: "what is that?" in the green field, among the barbed wire, a regular bazaar was going on. a group of germans and of our men were bartering vodka, tobacco, lard, bread. some way off a german officer reclined on the grass--red-faced, sturdy, with an arrogant look on his face--and carried on a conversation with a soldier named soloveytchick; and, strange to say, the familiar and insolent soloveytchick stood before the lieutenant respectfully. the colonel pushed the observer aside and, taking his rifle from him, put it through the loop-hole. a murmur was heard among the soldiers. they began to ask him not to shoot. one of them, in a low voice, as if speaking to himself, remarked: "this is provocation." the colonel, crimson with fury, turned to him for a moment and shouted: "silence!" all grew silent and pressed to the loop-hole. a shot was heard, and the german officer convulsively stretched himself out and was still; blood was running from his head. the haggling soldiers scattered. the colonel threw the rifle down and, muttering through his teeth "scoundrels!" strode further along the trenches. the "truce" was infringed. the lieutenant went off to his hut. his heart was sad and empty. he was oppressed by the realisation of his unwantedness and uselessness in these absurd surroundings, which perverted the whole meaning of that service to his country, which alone justified all his grave troubles and the death which might perhaps be near. he threw himself on his bed, where he lay for an hour, for two hours, striving to think of nothing, to forget himself. but from beyond the mud wall, where the shelter lay, there crept someone's muffled voice, which seemed to wrap his brain in a filthy fog: "it is all very well for them, the ----. they receive their hundred and forty roubles a month clear, while we--so generous of them--get seven and a half. wait a bit, our turn will come." silence. "i hear they are sharing the land in our place in the province of kharkov. if i could only get home." there was a knock at the door. the sergeant-major had come. "your honour (so he always addressed his company commander in the absence of witnesses), the company is angry, and threatens to leave the position if it is not relieved at once. the second battalion should have relieved us at five o'clock, and it is not here yet. couldn't they be rung up?" "they will not go away. all right, i shall inquire; but, all the same, it is too late now. after this morning's incident the germans will not allow us to be relieved by day." "they will allow us. the committee members know about it already. i think"--he lowered his voice--"that soloveytchick has managed to slip across and explain matters. it is rumoured that the germans have promised to overlook it, on condition that next time the colonel comes to visit the trenches we should let them know, and they will throw a bomb. you had better report it or else, who knows?" "all right." the sergeant-major was preparing to leave. the lieutenant stopped him. "matters are bad, petrovitch. they do not trust us." "god alone knows whom they trust; only last week the sixth company elected their sergeant-major themselves, and now they are making a mock of him; they won't let him say a word." "what will things be afterwards?" the sergeant-major blushed, and said softly: "then the soloveytchicks will rule over us, and we shall be, so to speak, dumb animals before them--that is how matters will be, your honour." the relief came at last. captain bouravin, the commander of the fifth company, came into the hut. albov offered to show him the section and explain the disposition of the enemy. "very well, though that does not matter, because i am not really in command of the company--i am boycotted." "how?" "just so. they have elected the nd lieutenant, my subaltern, as company commander, and degraded me as a supporter of the old régime, because, you see, i had drill twice a day--you know that the marching contingents come up here absolutely untrained. indeed, the nd lieutenant was the first to vote for my removal. 'we have been slave-driven long enough,' said he. 'now we are free. we must clean out everyone, beginning with the head. a young man can manage the regiment just as well, so long as he is a true democrat and supports the freedom of the soldier.' i would have left, but the colonel flatly refused to allow it, and forbids me to hand over the company. so now, you see, we have two commanders. i have stood the situation for five days. look here, albov, you are not in a hurry, are you? very good, then; let us have a chat. i am feeling depressed. albov, have you not yet thought of suicide?" "not as yet." bouravin rose to his feet. "understand me, they have desecrated my soul, outraged my human dignity, and so every day, every hour, in every word, glance or gesture one sees a constant outrage. what have i done to them? i have been in the service for eight years; i have no family, no house or home. all this i have found in the regiment, my own regiment. twice i have been badly wounded, and before my wounds were healed have rushed back to the regiment--so there you are! and i loved the soldier--i am ashamed to speak of it myself, but they must remember how, more than once, i have crept out under the barbed wire to drag in the wounded. and now! well, yes, i reverence the regimental flag and hate their crimson rags. i accept the revolution. but to me russia is infinitely dearer than the revolution. all these committees and meetings, all this adventitious rubbish which has been sown in the army i am organically unable to swallow and digest. but, after all, i interfere with no one; i say nothing of this to anyone, i strive to convince no one. if only the war could be ended honourably, and then i am ready to break stones on the highway, only not to remain in an army democratised in such a manner. take my subaltern; he discusses everything with them--nationalisation, socialisation, labour control. now i cannot do so--i never had time to study it, and i confess i never took any interest in the matter. you remember how the army commander came here and, amidst a crowd of soldiers, said: 'don't say "general"; call me simply comrade george.' now i cannot do such things; besides, all the same, they would not believe me. so i am silent. but they understand and pay me off. and, you know, with all their ignorance, what subtle psychologists they are! they are able to find the place where the sting hurts most. now, yesterday for instance...." he stooped down to albov's ear, and continued in a whisper: "i returned from our mess. in my tent, at the head of my bed, i have a photograph--well, just a treasured memory. there they had drawn an obscenity!" bouravin rose and wiped his brow with his handkerchief. "well, let us take a look at the positions. god willing, we shall not have to stand it long. no one in the company wants to go scouting. i go myself every night; sometimes there is a volunteer who accompanies me--he has a hunter's strain in him. should anything happen, please, albov, see to it that a little packet--it is in my bag--is sent to its destination." the company, without waiting for the completion of the relief, wandered away in disorder. albov plodded after them. the communication trench ended in a broad hollow. like a great ant-hill the regimental bivouac stretched in rows of huts, tents, smoking camp-kitchens and horse-lines. they had once been carefully masked by artificial plantations, which had now withered, lost their leaves, and were merely leafless poles. on an open green soldiers were drilling here and there--listlessly, lazily, as if to create an impression that they were doing something; after all, it would be awkward to be doing absolutely nothing at all. there were few officers about; the good ones were sick of the trivial farce into which real work was now transformed, while the inferior ones had a moral justification for their laziness and idleness. in the distance something between a mob and a column marched along the road towards the regimental staff quarters, carrying crimson flags. before them went a huge banner bearing the inscription, in white letters, visible in the distance: "down with war!" these were reinforcements coming up. at once, all the soldiers drilling on the green, as if at a signal, broke their ranks and ran towards the column. "hey, countrymen! what province are you from?" an animated conversation began on the usual anxious themes: how did matters stand with the land; would peace be concluded soon? much interest, also, was shown in the question as to whether they had brought any home-brewed spirits, as "their own regimental" home brew, manufactured in fairly large quantities at "the distillery" of the third battalion, was very disgusting, and gave rise to painful symptoms. albov made his way to the mess-room. the officers were gathering for dinner. what had become of the former animation, friendly talk, healthy laughter and torrents of reminiscences of a stormy, hard, but glorious life of war? the reminiscences had faded, the dreams had flown away, and stern reality crushed them all down with its weight. they spoke in low voices, sometimes breaking off or expressing themselves figuratively: the mess servants might denounce them, and also new faces had appeared among themselves. not so long ago the regimental committee, on the report of a servant, had tried an officer of the regiment, who wore the cross of st. george and to whom the regiment owed one of its most famous victories. this lieutenant-colonel had said something about "mutinous slaves." and though it was proved that those were not his own words and that he had only quoted a speech made by comrade kerensky, the committee "expressed its indignation at him"; he had to leave the regiment. the personnel of the officers, too, was much changed. of the original staff, some two or three remained. some had perished, others had been crippled, others again, having earned "distrust," were wandering about the front, importuning staffs, joining shock battalions, entering institutions in the rear, while some of the weaker brethren had simply gone home. the army had ceased to need the bearers of the traditions of its units, of its former glory--of those old bourgeois prejudices, which had been swept into the dust by the revolutionary creative power. everyone in the regiment knows already of that morning's event in albov's company. he is questioned about details. a lieutenant-colonel sitting next him wagged his head. "well done, our old man. there was something in the fifth company, too. but i am afraid it will end badly. have you heard what was done to the commander of the doubov regiment, because he refused to confirm an elected company commander and put three agitators under arrest? _he was crucified._ yes, my boy! they nailed him to a tree and began, in turn, to stick their bayonets into him, to cut off his ears, his nose, his fingers." he seized his head in his hands. "my god! where do these men get so much brutality, so much baseness?" at the other end of the table the ensigns are carrying on a conversation on that ever harassing theme--where to get away to. "have you applied for admission to the revolutionary battalion?" "no, it is not worth while. it seems that it is being formed under the superintendence of the executive committee, with committees, elections and "revolutionary" discipline. it does not suit me." "they say that shock units are being formed in kornilov's army and at minsk also. that would be good...." "i have applied for transfer to our rifle brigade in france. only i do not know what i am to do about the language." "alas! my boy, you are too late," remarked the lieutenant-colonel from the other end of the table. "the government has long ago sent 'emigrant comrades' there to enlighten minds. and now our brigades, somewhere in the south of france, are in the situation of something like either prisoners of war or disciplinary battalions." this talk, however, was realised by all to be of a purely platonic character, in view of the hopelessness of a situation from which there was no escape. it was only a case of dreaming a little, as tchekhov's _three sisters_ once dreamed of moscow. dreaming of such a wondrous place, where human dignity is not trampled into the mud daily, where one can live quietly and die honourably, without violence and without outrage to one's service. such a very little thing. "mitka, bread!" boomed out the mighty bass of nd lieutenant yassny. he is quite a character, this yassny. tall and sturdy, with a thick crop of hair and a copper-coloured beard, he is altogether an embodiment of the strength and courage of the soil. he wears four crosses of st. george, and has been promoted from the rank of sergeant for distinction in action. he does not adapt himself to his new surroundings in the least, said "levorution" for "revolution" and "mettink" for "meeting," and cannot reconcile himself to the new order. yassny's undoubted "democratic" views, his candour and sincerity, have given him an exceptionally privileged position in the regiment. without enjoying any special influence, he can, however, condemn, rudely, harshly, sometimes with an oath, both people and ideas, which are jealously guarded and worshipped by the regimental "revolutionary democracy." the men are angry, but suffer him. "there is no bread, i say." the officers, absorbed in their thoughts and in their conversation, had not even noticed that they had eaten their soup without bread. "there will be no bread to-day," answered the waiter. "what is the meaning of this? call the mess-sergeant." the mess-sergeant came, and began to justify himself in a bewildered manner; he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. the head of the commissariat had endorsed it "to be issued," but the clerk, fedotov, a member of the commissariat committee, had endorsed it in his turn "not to be issued." so the storehouse would not issue any bread. no one made any objection, so painfully ashamed was everyone both of the mess-sergeant and of those depths of inanity which had suddenly broken into their life and swamped it with a grey, filthy slime. only yassny's bass voice rang out distinctly under the arches of the mess-room: "what swine!" albov was just preparing for a nap after dinner when the flap of his tent was lifted, and through the aperture appeared the bald head of the chief of the commissariat--a quiet, elderly colonel, who had joined the army again from the retired list. "may i come in?" "i beg your pardon, colonel." "never mind, my dear fellow, don't get up. i have just come in for a second. you see, to-day at six o'clock there is to be a regimental meeting. it will hear the report of the committee for verifying the commissariat, and apparently they will go for me. i am no speech-maker, but you are a master of it. take my part, should it be necessary." "certainly. i did not intend going, but once it is necessary, i shall be there." "thank you, then, my dear fellow." by six o'clock the square next to the regimental staff quarters was completely covered with men. at least two thousand had turned up. the crowd moved, chattered, laughed--just such a russian crowd as on the khodynka in moscow or the _champs de mars_ in petrograd at a holiday entertainment. the revolution could not transform it all at once, either mentally or spiritually. but, having stunned it with a torrent of new words and opened up before it unbounded possibilities, the revolution had destroyed its equilibrium and made it nervously susceptible and stormily reactive to all methods of external influence. an ocean of words--both morally lofty and basely criminal--flowed through their minds as through a sieve, which passed through the trend of the new ideas and retained only those grains which had a real applied meaning in their daily life, in the surroundings of the soldier, the peasant, the workman. hence the absolute absence of results from the torrents of eloquence which flooded the army at the instance of the minister of war; hence, too, the illogical warm sympathy with both speakers of clearly opposed politics. under such conditions, what practical meaning could the crowd find in such ideas as duty, honour, interests of the state, on the one hand; annexations, indemnities, the self-determination of peoples, conscious discipline, and other dim conceptions on the other. the whole regiment had turned out; the soldiers were attracted by the meeting, as by any other spectacle. delegates had been sent by the second battalion, which was in the trenches--about one-third of the battalion. in the middle of the square stood a platform for the speakers; it was decorated with red flags, faded with time and rain; they have been there since the platform was erected for a review by the commander of the army. reviews are now held not among the ranks, but from a tribune. to-day the agenda of the meeting contain two questions: "( ) the report of the commissariat committee on the anomalies in the supply of officers' rations; and ( ) the report of comrade sklianka, an orator specially invited from the moscow soviet to speak about the formation of a coalition ministry." during the preceding week a stormy meeting, which nearly ended in a riot, had been held in connection with the complaint of one of the companies that the soldiers had to eat lentils, which they hated, and thin soup, simply because all the groats and butter were taken for the officers' mess. this was clearly nonsense. nevertheless, it was resolved to appoint a committee for investigation, which would report to a general meeting of the regiment. the report was drawn up by a member of the committee, lieutenant-colonel petrov, who had been removed the year before from the post of chief of the commissariat and was now settling accounts with his successor. in a petty, cavilling way, with a sort of mean irony, he enumerated slight, irrelevant, inaccuracies in the commissariat department of the regiment--there were no serious ones--and dragged out his report endlessly in his creaking, monotonous voice. the crowd, which at first had kept quiet, now hummed again, having ceased to listen. from different sides voices were heard: "enough!" "that will do!" the chairman of the commission ceased reading and suggested that "those comrades who wished" should express their opinions. a tall, stout soldier ascended the platform, and began speaking in a loud, hysterical voice: "comrades, you have heard? that is where the soldiers' property goes. we suffer, our clothes are worn out, we are covered with lice, we go hungry, while they pull the last piece of food out of our mouths." as he spoke a spirit of nervous excitement kept growing in the crowd, muffled murmurs ran through it, and shouts of approval burst from it here and there. "when will there be an end to all this? we are worn out, weary to death." suddenly nd lieut. yassny's deep voice was heard from the rear ranks, drowning the voices both of the speaker and of the crowd. "what is your company?" some confusion took place. the orator was dumb. shouts of indignation were flung at yassny. "what is your company, i ask you?" "the seventh!" voices were heard in the ranks: "we have no such man in the seventh company." "wait a bit, my friend," boomed yassny, "was it not you that came in to-day with the new lot ... you were carrying a large placard? when have you had time to get worn out, poor fellow?" the spirit of the crowd changed in an instant. it began to hiss, laugh, shout, and crack jokes. the unsuccessful orator disappeared in the crowd. someone shouted: "pass a resolution!" lieutenant-colonel petrov mounted the platform again, and began to read out a ready resolution for transferring the officers' mess to privates' rations. but no one listened to him now. two or three voices shouted "that's right!" petrov hesitated a little, then put the paper in his pocket and left the platform. the second question, concerning the removal of the chief of the commissariat and the immediate election of his successor (the author of the report was the candidate proposed) remained unread. the chairman of the committee then announced: "comrade sklianka, member of the executive committee of the moscow council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, will now address the meeting." they were tired of their own speakers--it was always one and the same thing--and the arrival of a new man, somewhat advertised by the committee, aroused general interest. the crowd closed up round the platform and was still. a small, black-haired man, nervous and short-sighted, who constantly adjusted the eyeglasses which kept slipping off his nose, mounted the platform, or rather quickly ran up on to it. he began speaking rapidly, with much spirit and much gesticulation. "soldier comrades! three months have passed already since the petrograd workers and revolutionary soldiers threw off the yoke of the czar and of all his generals. the bourgeoisie, in the person of tereshtchenko, the well-known sugar refiner; konovalov, the factory owner; the landowners, gutchkov, rodzianko, miliukov, and other traitors to the interests of the people, having seized the supreme power, have tried to deceive the popular masses. "the demand of the people that negotiations be commenced at once for that peace which we are offered by our german worker and soldier brethren--who are just as much bereft of all that makes life worth living as we are--has ended in a fraud--a telegram from miliukov to england and france to say that the russian people are ready to fight until victory is attained. "the unfortunate people understood that the supreme power had fallen into even worse hands, _i.e._, into those of the sworn foes of the workman and the peasant. therefore the people shouted mightily: 'down with you, hands off!' "and the accursed bourgeoisie shook at the mighty cry of the workers and hypocritically invited to a share in their power the so-called democracy--the socialist-revolutionaries and the mensheviks, who always associated with the bourgeoisie for the betrayal of the interests of the working people." having thus outlined the process of the formation of the coalition ministry, comrade sklianka passed in greater detail to the fascinating prospects of rural and factory anarchy, where "the wrath of the people sweeps away the yoke of capital" and where "bourgeois property gradually passes into the hands of its real masters--the workmen and the poorer peasants." "the soldiers and the workmen still have enemies," he continued. "these are the friends of the overthrown czarist government, the hardened admirers of shooting, the knout, and blows. the most bitter foes of freedom, they have now donned crimson rosettes, call you 'comrades' and pretend to be friends, but cherish the blackest intentions in their hearts, preparing to restore the rule of the romanovs. "soldiers, do not trust these wolves in sheep's clothing! they call you to fresh slaughter. well, follow them if you like! let them pave the path for the return of the bloody czar with your corpses. let your orphans, your widows and children, deserted by all, pass again into slavery, hunger, beggary, and disease!" the speech undoubtedly had a great success. the atmosphere grew red-hot, the excitement increased--that excitement of the "molten mass," in the presence of which it is impossible to foresee either the limits or the tension, or the tracks along which the torrent will pour. the crowd was noisy and agitated, accompanying with shouts of approval or curses against "the enemies of the people" those parts of the speech which especially touched its instincts, its naked, cruel egotism. albov, pale, with burning eyes, made his appearance on the platform. he spoke excitedly of something or other to the chairman, who then addressed the crowd. the chairman's words were inaudible amidst the noise; for a long time he waved his hands and the flag which he had pulled down, until at last the noise had subsided somewhat. "comrades, lieutenant albov wishes to address you!" shouts and hisses were heard. "down with him! we do not want him!" but albov was already on the platform, gripping hard, bending downwards towards the sea of heads. and he said: "no, i will speak, and you dare not refuse to listen to one of those officers whom this man has been abusing and dishonouring here before you. who he may be, whence he has come, who pays him for his speeches, so profitable to the germans, not one of you knows. he has come here, befogged you, and will go on his way to sow evil and treason. and you have believed him. and we, who along with you have now carried our heavy cross into the fourth year of the war--we are now to be regarded as your enemies? why? is it because we never sent you into action, but led you, bestrewing with officers' corpses the whole of the path covered by the regiment? is it because that, of the officers who led you in the beginning, there is not one left in the regiment who is not maimed?" he spoke with deep sincerity and pain in his voice. there were moments when it seemed as if his words were breaking through the withered crust of those hardened hearts, as if a break would again take place in the attitude of the crowd. "he, your 'new friend,' is calling you to mutiny, to violence, to robbery. do you understand who will benefit when, in russia, brother rises against brother, so as to turn to ashes, in sack and fire, the last property left not only to the 'capitalists,' but to the poverty-stricken workers and peasants? no, it is not by violence, but by law and right, that you will acquire land and liberty and a tolerable existence. your enemies are not here, among the officers, but there--beyond the barbed wire. and we shall not attain either to freedom or to peace by a dishonourable, cowardly standing in one and the same place, but in the general mighty rush of an _advance_." was it that the impression of sklianka's speech was still too vivid or that the regiment took offence at the word "cowardly"--for the most arrant coward will never forgive such a reminder--or, finally, was it the fault of the magic word "advance," which for some time past had ceased to be tolerated in the army? but anyhow albov was not allowed to continue his speech. the crowd bellowed, belched forth curses, pressed forward more and more, advancing toward the platform, and broke down the railing. an ominous roar, faces distorted with fury, and hands stretched forth towards the platform. the situation was becoming critical. nd lieut. yassny pushed his way through to albov, took him by the arm, and forcibly led him to the exit. the soldiers of the first company had already rushed up to it from all sides, and with their aid albov, with great difficulty, made his way out of the crowd, amidst a shower of choice abuse. someone shouted out after him: "wait a bit, you ----; we will settle accounts with you!" night. the bivouac had grown quiet. clouds had covered the sky. it was dark. albov, sitting on his bed in his narrow tent, illuminated by the stump of a candle, was writing a report to the commander of the regiment: "the officers--powerless, insulted, meeting with distrust and disobedience from their subordinates--can be of no further use. i beg of you to apply for my reduction to the ranks, so that there i might fulfil my duty honestly and to the end." he lay down on his bed. he gripped his head in his hands. a kind of uncanny, incomprehensible emptiness seized him, just as if some unseen hand had drawn out of his head all thought, out of his heart all pain. what was that? a noise was heard, the tent-pole fell down, the light went out. a number of men on the tent. hard, cruel blows were showered on the whole of his body. a sharp, intolerable pain shot through his head and his chest. then his whole face seemed covered with a warm, sticky veil, and soon everything became still and calm again, as if all that was terrible and hard to bear had torn itself away, had remained here, on earth, while his soul was flying away somewhere and was feeling light and joyous. albov awoke to feel something cold touching him: a private of his company, goulkin, an elderly man, was sitting at the foot of his bed and wiping away the blood from his head with a wet towel. he noticed that albov had regained consciousness. "look how they have mangled the man, the scum! it can have been no other than the fifth company--i recognised one of them. does it hurt you much? perhaps you would like me to go for the doctor?" "no, my friend, it does not matter. thank you!" and albov pressed his hand. "and their commander, too, captain bouravin, has met with a misfortune. during the night they carried him past us on a stretcher, wounded in the abdomen; the _sanitar_ said that he would not live. he was returning from reconnoitring, and the bullet took just at our very barbed wire. whether it was a german one or whether our own people did not recognise him--who knows?" he was silent for a while. "what has come to the people one simply can't understand. and all this is just put on. it is not true--that which they say against the officers--we understand that ourselves. of course, there are all sorts among you. but we know them very well. don't we see for ourselves that you, now, are for us with all your heart. or let us say nd lieut. yassny. could such a one sell himself? and yet, try to say a word, to take your part--there would be no living for us. there is a great deal of hooliganism now. it is only hooligans that men listen to. my idea is that all this is taking place because men have forgotten god. men have nothing to be afraid of." albov closed his eyes from weakness. goulkin hastily arranged the blanket, which had slipped to the floor, made the sign of the cross over him, and quietly slipped out of the tent. but sleep would not come. his heart was full of an inexhaustible sadness and an oppressive feeling of loneliness. he yearned so much to have some living being at hand, so that he might silently, wordlessly feel its proximity, and not remain alone with his dreadful thoughts. he regretted that he had not detained goulkin. all was quiet. the whole camp was sleeping. albov leaped from his bed and lit the candle again. he was seized with a dull, hopeless despair. he had no more faith in anything. impenetrable darkness lay before him. to make his exit from life? no, that would be surrender. he must go on, with clenched teeth and hardened heart, until some stray bullet--russian or german--broke the thread of his wearisome days. dawn was coming on. a new day was beginning, new army week-days, horribly like their predecessors. * * * * * afterwards? afterwards the "molten element" overflowed its banks completely. officers were killed, burnt, drowned, torn asunder and had their heads broken through with hammers, slowly, with inexpressible cruelty. afterwards--millions of deserters. like an avalanche the soldiery moved along the railways, water-ways and country roads, trampling down, breaking and destroying the last nerves of poor, roadless russia. afterwards--tarnopol, kalush, kazan. like a whirlwind robbery, murder, violence, incendiarism swept over galicia, volynia, the podolsk and other provinces, leaving behind it everywhere a trail of blood and arousing in the minds of the russian people, crazed with grief and weak in spirit, the monstrous thought: "o lord! if only the germans would come quickly." this was done by the soldier. that soldier of whom a great russian writer, with intuitive conscience and a bold heart, has said:[ ] "... how many hast thou killed during these days, oh soldier? how many orphans hast thou made? how many inconsolable mothers hast thou left? dost thou hear the whisper on their lips, from which thou hast driven the smile of joy for evermore? "murderer! murderer! "but why speak of mothers, of orphaned children? a more terrible moment came, which none had expected--and thou didst betray russia, thou didst cast the whole of the motherland, which had bred thee, under the feet of the foe! "thou, oh soldier, whom we loved so--and whom we still love." chapter xxiii. officers' organisations. in the early days of april the idea arose among the headquarters' officers of organising a "union of the officers of the army and the navy." the initiators of the union[ ] started with the view that it was necessary "to think alike, so as to understand alike the events that were taking place, to work in the same direction," for up to the present time "the voice of the officers--of all the officers--has been heard by none. as yet we have said nothing about the great events amidst which we are living. everyone who chooses says for us whatever he chooses. military questions, and even the questions of our daily life and internal order, are settled for us by anyone who likes and in any way he likes." there were two objections made in principle, one being the objection to the introduction by the officers themselves into their ranks of those principles of collective self-government with which the army had been inoculated from outside, in the form of soviets, committees and congresses, and had brought disintegration into it. the second objection was the fear lest the appearance of an independent officers' organisation should deepen still more those differences which had arisen between the soldiers and the officers. on the basis of these views we, along with the commander-in-chief, at first took up an altogether negative attitude towards this proposal. but life had already broken out of its bounds and laughed at our motives. a draft declaration was published, granting the army full freedom for forming unions and meetings, and it would now have been an injustice to the officers to deprive them of the right of professional organisation, if only as a means of self-preservation. in practice, officers' societies had sprung up in many of the armies, and in kiev, moscow, petrograd and other towns they had done so from the earlier days of the revolution. they all wandered in different directions, groping their way, while some unions in the large centres, under the influence of the disintegrating conditions of the rear, displayed a strong leaning towards the policy of the soviets. the officers of the rear frequently lived a completely different spiritual life from those of the front. thus, for instance, the moscow soviet of officers' delegates passed, in the beginning of april, a resolution to the effect that "the work of the provisional government should proceed ... in the spirit of the socialistic and political demands of the democracy, represented by the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates," and expressed a wish that there should be more representatives of the socialist parties in the provisional government. an adulteration of the officers' views was also developing on a larger scale; the petrograd officers' council summoned an "all-russia congress of officers' delegates, army surgeons and officers" in petrograd for may th. this circumstance was the more undesirable in that the initiator of the congress--the executive committee, with lieutenant-colonel goushchin, of the general staff, at its head--had already disclosed to the full its negative policy by its participation in the drafting of the declaration of soldiers' rights, by its active co-operation in the polivanov commission and its servility before the council of workmen's and soldier's delegates, and by its endeavours to unite with it. a proposal in this sense being made, the council, however, replied that such a union was "as yet impossible on technical grounds." having discounted all these circumstances, the supreme commander-in-chief gave his approval to the summoning of a congress of officers, on condition that no pressure should be exercised either in his name or in that of the chief-of-staff. this scrupulous attitude somewhat complicated matters. some of the staffs, being out of sympathy with the idea, prevented the circulation of the appeal, while some of the high commanders, as, for example, the commander of the troops of the omsk district, forbade the delegation of officers altogether. in some places also this question roused the suspicion of the soldiers and caused some complications, in consequence of which the initiators of the congress invited the units to delegate soldiers as well as officers to be present at the sessions. despite all obstacles, over officer delegates gathered in moghilev, per cent. being from the front, per cent. from fighting units in the rear, and per cent. from the rear. on may th the congress was opened with a speech by the supreme commander-in-chief. on that day, for the first time, the high command said, not in a secret meeting, not in a confidential letter, but openly, before the whole country: "russia is perishing." general alexeiev said: "in appeals, in general orders, in the columns of the daily press, we often meet with the short sentence: 'our country is in danger.' "we have grown too well accustomed to this phrase. we feel as if we were reading an old chronicle of bygone days, and do not ponder over the grim meaning of this curt sentence. but, gentlemen, this is, i regret to say, a serious fact. _russia is perishing. she stands on the brink of an abyss. a few more shocks, and she will crash with all her weight into it._ the enemy has occupied one-eighth part of her territory. he cannot be bribed by the utopian phrase: 'peace without annexations or indemnities.' he says frankly that he will not leave our soil. he is stretching forth his greedy grip to lands where no enemy soldier has ever set foot--to the rich lands of volynia, podolia and kiev--_i.e._, to the whole right bank of our dnieper. "and what are we going to do? will the russian army allow this to happen? will we not thrust this insolent foe out of our country and let the diplomatists conclude peace afterwards, with annexations or without them? "let us be frank. the fighting spirit of the russian army has fallen; but yesterday strong and terrible, it now stands in fatal impotence before the foe. its former traditional loyalty to the motherland has been replaced by a yearning for peace and rest. instead of fortitude, the baser instincts and a thirst for self-preservation are rampant. "at home, where is that strong authority for which the whole country is craving? where is that powerful authority which would force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the motherland? "we are told that it will soon appear, but as yet it does not exist. "where is the love of country, where is patriotism? "the great word 'brotherhood' has been inscribed on our banners, but it has not been inscribed in our hearts and minds. class enmity rages amongst us. whole classes which have honestly fulfilled their duty to their country have fallen under suspicion, and on this foundation a deep gulf has been created between two parts of the army--the officers and the soldiers. "and it is at this very moment that the first congress of officers of the russian army has been summoned. i am of the opinion that a more convenient, a more timely moment, could not have been chosen to attain unity in our family, to form a general united family of the corps of russian officers, to discuss the means of breathing ardour into our hearts, _for without ardour there is no victory, without victory there is no salvation, no russia_. "may your work therefore be inspired with love for your motherland and with heartfelt regard for the soldier; mark the ways for raising the moral and intellectual calibre of the soldiers, so that they may become your sincere and hearty comrades. do away with that estrangement which has been artificially sown in our family. "at the present moment--this is a disease common to all--people would like to set all the citizens of russia on platforms or pedestals and scrutinise how many stand behind each of them. what does it matter that the masses of the army accepted the new order and the new constitution sincerely, honestly and with enthusiasm? "_we must all unite on one great object: russia is in danger. as members of the great army, we must save her. let this object unite us and give us strength to work._" this speech, in which the leader of the army expressed "the anxiety of his heart," served as the prologue to his retirement. the revolutionary democracy had already passed its sentence on general alexeiev at its memorable session with the commanders-in-chief on may th; now, after may th, a bitter campaign was begun against him in the radical press, in which the soviet semi-official organ _isvestia_ competed with lenin's papers in the triviality and impropriety of its remarks. this campaign was the more significant in that the minister of war, kerensky, was clearly on the side of the soviet in this matter. as if to supplement the words of the supreme commander-in-chief, i said in my speech, when touching on the internal situation in the country: "... under pressure of the unavoidable laws of history, autocracy has fallen, and our country has passed under the rule of the people. we stand on the threshold of a new life, long and passionately awaited, for which many thousand idealists have gone to the block, languished in the mines and pined in the _tundras_. "but we look to the future with anxiety and perplexity. "for there is no liberty in the revolutionary torture-chamber. "there is no righteousness in misrepresenting the voice of the people. "there is no equality in the hounding down of classes. "and there is no strength in that insane rout where all around seek to grasp all that they possibly can, at the expense of their suffering country, where thousands of greedy hands are stretched out towards power, breaking down the foundations of that country...." then the sessions of the congress began. whoever was present has carried away, probably for the rest of his life, an indelible impression produced by the story of the sufferings of the officers. it could never be written, as it was told with chilling restraint by these, captain bouravin and lieutenant albov, who touched upon their most intimate and painful experiences. they had suffered till they could suffer no more; in their hearts there were neither tears nor complaints. i looked at the boxes, where the "younger comrades" sat who had been sent to watch for "counter-revolution." i wanted to read in their faces the impression produced by all that they had heard. and it seemed to me that i saw the blush of shame. probably it only seemed so to me, for they soon made a stormy protest, demanded the right of voting at the congress, and--five roubles per day "officer's allowance." at thirteen general meetings the congress passed a series of resolutions. among all the classes, castes, professions and trades which exhibited a general elemental desire to get from the weak government all that was possible, in their own private interests, the officers were the only corporation which never asked anything _for itself personally_. the officers requested and demanded _authority_--over themselves and over the army. a firm, single, national authority--"commanding, not appealing." the authority of a government leaning on the trust of the nation, not on irresponsible organisations. such an authority the officers were prepared wholeheartedly and unreservedly to obey, _quite irrespective of differences of political opinions_. i affirm, moreover, that all the inner social class conflict which was blazing up more and more throughout the country did not affect the officers at the front, who were immersed in their work and in their sorrows; it did not touch them deeply; the conflict attracted the attention of the officers only when its results obviously endangered the very existence of the country, and of the army in particular. of course, i am speaking of the mass of the officers; individual leanings towards reaction undoubtedly existed, but they were in no respect characteristic of the officers' corps in . one of the finest representatives of the officers' class, general markov, a thoroughly educated man, wrote to kerensky, condemning his system of slighting the command: "being a soldier by nature, birth and education, i can judge and speak only of my own military profession. all other reforms and alterations in the constitution of our country interest me only as an ordinary citizen. but i know the army; i have devoted to it the best days of my life; i have paid for its successes with the blood of those who were near to me, and have myself come out of action steeped in blood." this the revolutionary democracy had not understood or taken into consideration. the officers' congress in petrograd, at which about delegates were gathered (may - ), passed off in a totally different manner. it split into two sharply-divided camps: the officers and officials of the rear who had given themselves to politics and a smaller number of real officers of the line who had become delegates through a misunderstanding of the matter. the executive committee drew up their programme in strict agreement with the custom of the soviet congresses: ( ) the attitude of the congress towards the provisional government and the soviet; ( ) the war; ( ) the constituent assembly; ( ) the labour question; ( ) the land question; and ( ) the reorganisation of the army on democratic principles. an exaggerated importance was attached to the congress in petrograd, and at its opening pompous speeches were made by many members of the government and by foreign representatives; the congress was even greeted in the name of the soviet by nahamkes. the very first day revealed the irreconcilable differences between the two groups. these differences were inevitable, if only because, even on such a cardinal question as "order no. .," the vice-chairman of the congress, captain brzozek, expressed the view that "its issue was dictated by historical necessity: the soldier was downtrodden, and it was imperatively necessary to free him." this declaration was greeted with prolonged applause by part of the delegates! after a series of stormy meetings, a resolution was passed by a majority of against , which stated that "the revolutionary power of the country was in the hands of the organised peasants, workmen and soldiers, who form the predominating mass of the population," and that therefore the government must be responsible to the all-russia soviet! even the resolution advocating an advance was passed by a majority of little more than two-thirds of those who cast their votes. the attitude of the petrograd congress is to be explained by the declaration made on may th by that group, which, reflecting the real opinion of the front, took the point of view of "all possible support to the provisional government." "in summoning the congress the executive committee of the petrograd council of officers' delegates did not seek for the solution of the most essential problem of the moment--the regeneration of the army--since the question of the fighting capacity of the army and of the measures for raising its level was not even mentioned in the programme, and was included only at our request. if we are to believe the statement--strange, to say no more--made by the chairman, lieutenant-colonel goushchin, the object of the summoning of the congress was the desire of the executive committee to pass under our flag into the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates." this declaration led to a series of serious incidents; three-quarters of the delegates left the meeting and the congress came to an end. i have mentioned the question of the petrograd officers' council and congress only in order to show the spirit of a certain section of the officers of the rear, which was in frequent contact with the official and unofficial rulers, and represented, in the eyes of the latter, the "voice of the army." the moghilev congress, which attracted the unflagging attention of the supreme commander-in-chief, and was much favoured by him, closed on may nd. at this time general alexeiev had already been relieved of the command of the russian army. so deeply had this episode affected him that he was unable to attend the last meeting. i bade farewell to the congress in the following words: "the supreme commander-in-chief, who is leaving his post, has commissioned me, gentlemen, to convey to you his sincere greetings, and to say that his heart, that of an old soldier, beats in unison with yours, that it aches with the same pain, and lives with the same hope for the regeneration of the disrupted, but ever great, russian army. "let me add a few words from myself. "you have gathered here from the distant blood-bespattered marches of our land, and laid before us your quenchless sorrow and your soul-felt grief. "you have unrolled before us a vivid and painful picture of the life and work of the officers amidst the raging sea of the army. "you, who have stood a countless number of times in the face of death! you, who have intrepidly led your men against the dense rows of the enemy's barbed wire, to the rare boom of your own guns, treacherously deprived of ammunition! you, who, hardening your hearts, but keeping up your spirits, have cast the last handful of earth into the grave of your fallen son, brother, or friend! "will you quail now? "no! "you who are weak, raise your heads. you who are strong, give of your determination, of your aspirations, of your desire to work for the happiness of your motherland--pour them into the thinned ranks of your comrades at the front. you are not alone. with you are all those who are honourable, all who think, all who have paused at the brink of that common sense which is now being abolished. "the soldiers also will go with you, understanding clearly that you are leading them, not backwards, to serfdom and to spiritual poverty, but forwards, to freedom and to light. "and then such a thunderstorm will break over the foe as will put an end both to him and to the war. "these three years of the war i have lived one life with you, thought the same thoughts, shared with you the joy of victory and the burning pain of retreat. i have therefore the right to fling into the faces of those who have outraged our hearts, who from the very first days of the revolution have wrought the work of cain on the corps of officers--i have the right to fling in their faces the words: 'you lie! the russian officer has never been either a mercenary or a pretorian.' "under the old régime you were victimised, down-trodden, and deprived of all that makes life worth living. in no less a degree than yourselves, leading a life of semi-beggary, our officers of the line have managed to carry through their wretched, laborious life like a burning torch, the thirst for achievement for the happiness of his motherland. "then let my call be heard through these walls by the builders of the new life of the state: "take care of the officer! for from the beginning and till now he has stood, faithfully and without relief, on guard over the order of the russian state. he can be relieved by death alone." printed by the committee, the text of my speech was circulated at the front, and i was happy to learn, from many letters and telegrams, that the words spoken in defence of the officer had touched his aching heart. the congress left a permanent institution at the stavka--the "chief committee of the officers' union."[ ] during the first three months of its existence the committee did not succeed in rooting itself deeply in the army. its activities were confined to organising branches of the union in the armies and in military circles, to the examination of the complaints that reached it. in exceptional cases incompetent officers were recommended for dismissal (the "black-board"); to a certain very limited degree officers expelled by the soldiers were granted assistance, and declarations were addressed to the government and to the press in connection with the more important events in public and military life. after the june advance the tone of these declarations became acrimonious, critical, and defiant, which seriously disturbed the prime minister, who persistently sought to have the chief committee transferred from moghilev to moscow, as he considered that its attitude was a danger to the stavka. the committee, which was somewhat passive during the command of general brussilov, did, indeed, take part afterwards in general kornilov's venture. but it was not this circumstance that caused the change in its attitude. _the committee undoubtedly reflected the general spirit with which the command and the russian officers were then imbued, a spirit which had become hostile to the provisional government._ also, no clear idea had been formed among the officers of the political groups within the government of the covert struggle proceeding between them, or of the protective part played by many representatives of the liberal democracy among them. a hostile attitude was thus created towards the government as a whole. having remained hitherto perfectly loyal and in the majority of cases well-disposed, having patiently borne, much against the grain, the experiments which the provisional government made, deliberately or involuntarily, on the country and on the army, these elements lived only in the hope of the regeneration of the army, of an advance and of victory. when all these hopes crashed to the ground, then, not being united in their ideals with the second coalitional government, but, on the contrary, deeply distrusting it, the masses of the officers abandoned the provisional government, which thus lost its last reliable support. this moment is of great historical importance, giving the key to the understanding of many later events. as a whole, deeply democratic in their personnel, views and conditions of life, _rejected by the revolutionary democracy_ with incredible harshness and cynicism, and finding no real support in the liberal circles in close touch with the government, the russian officers found themselves in a state of tragic isolation. this isolation and bewilderment served more than once afterwards as a fertile soil for outside influences, foreign to the traditions of the officer caste and to its former political character--influences which led to dissension, and in the end to fratricide. for there can be no doubt that all the power, all the organisation, both of the red and of the white armies, rested exclusively on the personality of the former russian officer. and if afterwards, in the course of three years of conflict, we have witnessed the rise of two conflicting forces in the russian public life of the anti-bolshevist camp, we must seek for their original source not in political differences only, but also in that work of cain towards the officers' caste, which was wrought by the revolutionary democracy from the first days of the revolution. as everyone realised that the "new order" and the front itself are on the verge of collapse, it was obvious that officers should have attempted some organisation to meet such a contingency. but the advocates of action were lying in prison; the chief council of the officers' union, which was best suited for this task, had been broken up by kerensky in the latter days of august. the majority of the responsible leaders of the army were perturbed by a terrible and not unfounded fear for the fate of the russian officers. in this respect the correspondence between general kornilov and general doukhonin is very characteristic. after the bolshevist _coup d'état_ on november ( ), , general kornilov wrote to doukhonin from his prison in bykhov: "foreseeing the further course of events, i think that it is necessary for you to take such measures as would create a favourable atmosphere, while thoroughly safeguarding headquarters, for a struggle against the coming anarchy." among these measures general kornilov suggested "the concentration in moghilev, or in a point near to it, under a reliable guard, of a store of rifles, cartridges, machine-guns, automatic guns and hand-grenades for distribution among the officer-volunteers, who will undoubtedly gather together in this region." doukhonin made a note against this point: "this might lead to excesses." thus the constant morbid fears of an officers' "counter-revolution" proved to be in vain. events took the officers unawares. they were unorganised, bewildered; they did not think of their own safety, and finally scattered their forces. chapter xxiv. the revolution and the cossacks. a peculiar part was played by the cossacks in the history of the revolution. built up historically, in the course of several centuries, the relations of the cossacks with the central government, common to russia, were of a dual character. the government did all to encourage the development of cossack colonisation on the russian south-eastern borders, where war was unceasing. it made allowances for the peculiarities of the warlike, agricultural life of the cossacks, and allowed them a certain degree of independence and individual forms of democratic rule, with representative organs (the kosh, kroog, rada), an elected "army elder" and hetmans. "in its weakness," says solovyov, "the state did not look too strictly on the activities of the cossacks, so long as they were directed only against foreign lands; the state being weak, it was considered needful to give these restless forces an outlet." but the "activities" of the cossacks were more than once directed against moscow as well. this circumstance led to a prolonged internecine struggle, which lasted until the end of the eighteenth century, when, after a ferocious suppression of the pougatchov rebellion, the free cossacks of the south-east were dealt a final blow; they gradually lost their markedly oppositionary character, and even gained the reputation of the most conservative element in the state, the pillars of the throne and the régime. from that time onward the government incessantly showed favour to the cossacks by emphasising their really great merits, by solemn promises to preserve their "cossack liberties,"[ ] and by the appointment of members of the imperial family to honorary posts among the cossacks. at the same time, the government took all measures to prevent these "liberties" from developing to excess at the expense of that ruthless centralisation, which was a historical necessity in the beginning of the building up of the russian state and a vast historical blunder in its later development. to the number of these measures we must refer the limitation of cossack self-government, and, latterly, the traditional appointment to the post of hetman of persons not belonging to the cossack caste, and often complete strangers to the life of the cossacks. the oldest and most numerous cossack army, that of the don, has had generals of german origin at its head more than once. it seemed as if the czarist government had every reason to depend upon the cossacks. the repeated repression of the local political labour and agrarian disturbances which broke out in russia, the crushing of a more serious rising--the revolution of - , in which a great part was played by the cossack troops--all this seemed to confirm the established opinion of the cossacks. on the other hand, sundry episodes of the "repressions," accompanied by inevitable violence, sometimes cruelty, were widely spread among the people, were exaggerated, and created a hostile attitude towards the cossacks at the factories, in the villages, among the liberal _intelligencia_, and especially among those elements which are known as the revolutionary democracy. throughout the whole of the underground literature--in its appeals, leaflets, and pictures--the idea of a "cossack" became synonymous with "servant" of the reactionary party. this definition was greatly exaggerated. the bard of the don cossacks, mitrophan bogayevsky, says of the political character of the cossacks: "the first and fundamental condition which prevented the cossacks, at least in the beginning, from breaking up was the idea of the state, a lawful order, a deep-seated realisation of the necessity of a life within the bounds of law. this seeking of a lawful order runs, and has run, like a scarlet thread through all the circles of all the cossack armies." but such altruistic motives, by themselves, do not exhaust the question. notwithstanding the grievous weight of universal military service, the cossacks, especially those of the south, enjoyed a certain prosperity which excluded that important stimulus which roused against the government and the régime both the workers' class and the peasantry of central russia. an extraordinarily complicated agrarian question set the caste economic interests of the cossacks against the interests of the "outsider"[ ] settlers. thus, for instance, in the oldest and largest cossack army, that of the don, the amount of land secured to an individual farm was, on the average, in _dessiateens_: for cossacks, . to ; for native peasants, . ; for immigrant peasants, . . finally, owing to historical conditions and a narrow territorial system of recruiting, the cossack units possessed a perfectly homogeneous personnel, a great internal unity, and a discipline which was firm, though somewhat peculiar as to the mutual relations between the officers and the privates, and therefore they conceded complete obedience to their chiefs and to the supreme power. with the support of all these motives, the government made a wide use of cossack troops for suppressing popular agitation, and thus roused against them the mute exasperation of the fermenting, discontented masses of the population. in return for their historical "liberties," the cossack armies, as i have said, give all but universal military service. its burden and the degree of relative importance of these troops among the armed forces of the russian empire are shown in the following table: composition of the cossack troops in the autumn of . ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- armies. | cavalry | sotnias not | infantry | regiments. | included | battalions. | | in regiments. | ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- don | | | -- kouban | | | orenburg | | | -- terek | | | ural | | | -- siberian | | | -- trans-baikal | | -- | -- semiretchensk | | | -- astrakhan | | -- | -- amur | | | -- ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- total[ ] | | | ---------------+------------+---------------+------------- partly as cavalry of the line--in divisions and corps, partly as army corps and divisional cavalry--in regiments, sub-divisions and detached _sotnias_, the cossack units were scattered over all the russian fronts, from the baltic to persia. _among the cossacks, as against all the other component parts of the army, desertion was unknown._ at the outbreak of revolution all the political groups, and even the representatives of the allies, devoted great attention to the cossacks--some building exaggerated hopes on them, others regarding them with unconcealed suspicion. the circles of the right looked to the cossacks for restoration; the liberal bourgeoisie, for active support of law and order; while the parties of the left feared that they were counter-revolutionary, and therefore started a strong propaganda in the cossack units, seeking to disintegrate them. this was to some extent assisted by the spirit of repentance which showed itself at all cossack meetings, congresses, "circles" and "radas" at which the late power was accused of systematically rousing the cossacks against the people. the mutual relations between the cossacks and the local agricultural population were unusually complicated, especially in the cossack territories of european russia.[ ] intermingled with the cossack allotments were peasant lands--those of whilom settlers (the indigenous peasantry)--lands let on long lease, on which large settlements had sprung up, finally lands which had been granted by the emperor to various persons and which had gradually passed into the hands of "outsiders." on the basis of these mutual relations dissension now arose which began to assume the character of violence and forcible seizures. with respect to the don army, which gave the keynote to all others, the provisional government considered it necessary to publish on april th an appeal in which, while affirming that "the rights of the cossacks to the land, as they have grown historically, remain inviolable," also promised the "outsider" population, "whose claim to the land is also based on historical rights," that it would be satisfied, in as great a measure as possible, by the constituent assembly. this agrarian puzzle, which surrounded with uncertainty the most tender point of the cossacks' hopes, was explained unequivocally, in the middle of may, by the minister of agriculture, tchernov (at the all-russia peasant congress), who stated that the cossacks held large tracts of land and that now they would have to surrender a portion of their lands. in the cossack territories meanwhile work was in full swing in the sphere of self-determination and self-government; the information supplied by the press was vague and contradictory; no one had yet heard the voice of the cossacks as a whole. one can understand, therefore, that general attention which was concentrated on the all-russia cossack congress, which gathered in petrograd in the beginning of june. the cossacks paid a tribute to the revolution and to the state, referred to their own needs (after all, the question of their holdings was the most vital one), and ... smiled to the soviet.... the impression thus produced was indefinite; neither were the hopes of the one side fulfilled nor the fears of the other dissipated. meanwhile, at the initiative of the revolutionary democracy, a violent propaganda was set on foot for introducing the idea of doing away with the cossacks as a separate caste. but, on the whole, this idea of self-abolition had no success. on the contrary, a growing aspiration spread among the cossacks for maintaining their internal organisation and for the union of all the cossack armies. cossack governments sprang up everywhere, elected hetmans and representative institutions ("circles" and radas), whose authority increased in accordance with the weakening of the authority and power of the provisional government. such eminent men appeared at the head of the cossacks as kaledin (the don), doutov (orenburg), and karaoulov (the terek). a triple power was formed in the cossack territories; the hetman with his government, the commissary of the provisional government, and the soviet.[ ] the commissaries, however, after a short and unsuccessful struggle, soon subsided and exhibited no activity. far more serious became the struggle of the cossack authority with the local soviets and committees, which sought support in the unruly mob of soldiers who flooded the territories under the name of reserve army battalions and rear army units. this curse of the population positively terrorised the land, creating anarchy in the towns and settlements, instituting sacks, seizing lands and businesses, trampling upon all rights, all authority, and creating intolerable conditions of life. the cossacks had nothing with which to combat this violence--all their units were at the front. only in the don territory, accidentally, in the autumn of , not without the deliberate connivance of the stavka, a division was concentrated, and afterwards three divisions, with the aid of which general kaledin attempted to restore order. but all the measures taken by him, as for instance the occupation by armed forces of railway junctions, of the more important mines, and of large centres, which secured normal communication and supplies for the centre and the fronts, were met not only with violent resistance on the part of the soviets and with accusations of counter-revolutionism, but even with some suspicion on the part of the provisional government. at the same time the cossacks of the kouban and of the terek asked the don to send them if only a few _sotnias_, as it was "becoming impossible to breathe for _comrades_." the friendly relations, instituted in the early days of the revolution, between the general russian and the cossack revolutionary democracies were soon broken off finally. "cossack socialism" turned out to be so self-sufficing, so concentrated in its own castes and corporation limits, that it could find no place in that doctrine. the soviets insisted on the equalising of the holdings of the cossacks and the peasants, while the cossacks vigorously defended their right of property and disposal in the cossack lands, basing it on their historical merits as conquerors, protectors, and colonisers of the former marches of russia's territory. the organisation of a general territorial government failed. an internecine struggle began. the consequences were two-fold: the first was a painful atmosphere of estrangement and hostility between the cossacks and the "outsider" population, which later, in the swiftly changing kaleidoscope of the civil war, sometimes assumed monstrous forms of mutual extermination, as the power passed from the hands of one side into those of the other. along with this, one or the other half of the population of the larger cossack territories were generally deemed as participating in the building up and the economy of the land.[ ] the second was the so-called cossack separatism or self-determination. the cossacks had no reason to expect from the revolutionary democracy a favourable settlement of their destiny, especially in the question most vital to it--the land question. on the other hand, the provisional government had also assumed an ambiguous attitude in this matter, and the government power was openly tending to its fall. the future assumed altogether indefinite outlines. hence, independently of the general healthy aspiration towards decentralisation, there appeared among the cossacks, who for centuries had been seeking "freedom," a tendency themselves to secure the maximum of independence, so as to place the future constituent assembly before an accomplished fact, or as the more outspoken cossack leaders put it, "that there should be something from which to knock off." hence a gradual evolution from territorial self-government to autonomy, federation, and confederation. hence, finally--with the intrusion of individual local self-love, ambition, and interests--a permanent struggle began with every principle of an imperial tendency, a struggle which weakened both sides and greatly prolonged the civil war.[ ] it was these circumstances, too, that gave birth to the idea of an independent cossack army, which first arose among the cossacks of the kouban and was not then supported by kaledin and the more imperialistic elements of the don. all that i have related refers mainly to the three cossack bodies (the don, the kouban, and the terek) which form more than sixty per cent. of cossack-dom. but the general characteristic features belong to the other cossack armies as well. along with the alterations in the composition of the provisional government and with the decline of its authority, changes took place in the attitude toward it of cossack-dom, expressing themselves in the resolutions and appeals of the council of the union of the cossack armies, of the hetmans, circles, and governments. if before july the cossacks voted for all possible support to the government and for complete obedience, later, however, _while acknowledging the authority of the government to the very end_, it comes forward in sharp opposition to it on the questions of the organisation of the cossack administration and _zemstvo_, of the employment of cossacks for the repression of rebellious troops and districts and so forth. in october the kouban rada assumes constituent powers and publishes the constitution of the "kouban territory." it speaks of the government in such a manner as the following: "when will the provisional government shake off these fumes (the bolshevist aggression) and put an end, by resolute measures, to these scandals?" the provisional government, being already without authority and without any real power, surrendered all its positions and agreed to peace with the cossack governments. it is remarkable that, even at the end of october, when, owing to the breach of communications, no correct information had yet been received on the don about the events in petrograd and moscow and about the fate of the provisional government, and when it was supposed that its fragments were functioning somewhere or other, the cossack elders, in the person of the representatives of the south-eastern union, then gathering,[ ] sought to get into touch with the government, offering it aid against the bolsheviks, but conditioning this aid with a whole series of economic demands: a non-interest-bearing loan of , , roubles, the state to pay all the expenses of supporting cossack units outside the territory of the union, the institution of a pension fund for all sufferers, and the right of the cossacks to all "spoils of war"(?) which might be taken in the course of the coming civil war. it is not without interest that for a long time pourishkevitch cherished the idea of the transfer of the state duma to the don, as a counterpoise to the provisional government and for the preservation of the source of authority, in case of the fall of the latter. kaledin's attitude towards this proposal was negative. a characteristic indication of the attitude which the cossacks had succeeded in retaining towards themselves in the most varied circles was that attraction to the don which later, in the winter of , led thitherward rodzianko, miliukov, general alexeiev, the bykhov prisoners, savinkov, and even kerensky, who came to general kaledin, in novotcherkassk, in the latter days of november, but was not received by him. pourishkevitch alone did not come, and that only because he was then in prison in petrograd, in the hands of the bolsheviks. and suddenly it turned out that the whole thing was a mystification, pure and simple, that at that time the cossacks had no power left whatever. in view of the growing disorders on the cossack territory, the hetmans repeatedly appealed for the recall from the front of if only part of the cossack divisions. they were awaited with enormous impatience, and the most radiant hopes were built on them. in october these hopes seemed to be on the eve of fulfilment; the cossack divisions had started for home. overcoming all manner of obstacles on their way, retarded at every step by the vikzhel (all-russia executive railway committee) and the local soviets, subjected more than once to insults, disarmament, resorting in one place to requests, in another to cunning, and in some places to armed threats, the cossack units forced their way into their territories. but no measures could preserve the cossack units from the fate which had befallen the army, for the whole of the psychological atmosphere and all the factors of disruption, internal and external, were absorbed by the cossack masses, perhaps less intensively, but on the whole in the same way. the two unsuccessful and, for the cossacks, incomprehensible marches on petrograd, with krymov[ ] and krasnov,[ ] introduced still greater confusion into their vague political outlook. the return of the cossack troops to their homeland brought complete disenchantment with it: they--at least the cossacks of the don, the kouban, and the terek[ ]--brought with them from the front the most genuine bolshevism, void, of course, of any kind of ideology, but with all the phenomena of complete disintegration which we know so well. this disintegration ripened gradually, showed itself later, but at once exhibiting itself in the denial of the authority of the "elders," the negation of all power, by mutiny, violence, the persecution and surrender of the officers, but principally by complete abandonment of any struggle against the soviet power, which falsely promised the inviolability of the cossack rights and organisation. bolshevism and the cossack organisation! such grotesque contradictions were brought to the surface daily by the reality of russian life, on the basis of that drunken debauch into which its long-desired freedom had degenerated. now began the tragedy of cossack life and the cossack family in which an insurmountable barrier had arisen between the "elders" and the "men of the front," destroying their life and rousing the children against their fathers. chapter xxv. national units. in the old russian army the national question scarcely existed. among the soldiery the representatives of the races inhabiting russia experienced somewhat greater hardships in the service, caused by their ignorance or imperfect knowledge of the russian language, in which their training was carried on. it was only this ground--the technical difficulties of training--and perhaps that of general roughness and barbarism, but in no case that of racial intolerance, that often led to that friction, which made the position of the alien elements difficult, the more so that, according to the system of mixed drafting, they were generally torn from their native lands; the territorial system of filling the ranks of the army was considered to be technically irrational and politically--not void of danger. the little russian question in particular did not exist _at all_. the little russian speech (outside the limits of official training), songs and music received full recognition and did not rouse in anyone any feeling of separateness, being accepted as russian, as one's own. in the army, with the exception of the jews, all the other alien elements were absorbed fairly quickly and permanently; the community of the army was in no way a conductor either for compulsory russification or for national chauvinism. still less were national differences to be noticed in the community of officers. qualities and virtues--corporative, military, pertaining to comradeship or simply human, overshadowed or totally obliterated racial barriers. personally, during my twenty-five years of service before the revolution, it never came into my head to introduce this element into my relations as commander, as colleague, or as comrade. and this was done intuitively, not as the result of certain views and convictions. the national questions which _were raised outside the army_, in the political life of the country, interested me, agitated me, were settled by me in one or the other direction, harshly and irreconcilably at times, but always without trespassing on the boundaries of military life. the jews occupied a somewhat different position. i shall return to this question later. but it may be said that, with respect to the old army, this question was of popular rather than of political significance. it cannot be denied that in the army there was a certain tendency to oppress the jews, but it was not at all a part of any system, was not inspired from above, but sprang up in the lower strata and in virtue of complex causes, which spread far outside of the life, customs, and mutual relations of the military community. in any case, the war overthrew all barriers, while the revolution brought with it the repeal, in legislative order, of all religious and national restrictions. with the beginning of the revolution and the weakening of the government, a violent centrifugal tendency arose in the borderlands of russia, and along with it a tendency towards the nationalisation, _i.e._, the dismemberment, of the army. undoubtedly, the need of such dismemberment did not at that time spring from the consciousness of the masses and had no real foundation (i do not speak of the polish formations). the sole motives for nationalisation then lay in the seeking of the political upper strata of the newly formed groups to create a real support for their demands, and in the feeling of self-preservation which urged the military element to seek in new and prolonged formations a temporary or permanent relief from military operations. endless national military congresses began, without the permission of the government and of the high command. all races suddenly began to speak; the lithuanians, the esthonians, the georgians, the white russians, the little russians, the mohammedans--demanding the "self-determination" proclaimed--from cultural national autonomy to full independence inclusive, and principally the immediate formation of separate bodies of troops. finally, more serious results, undoubtedly negative as regards the integrity of the army, were attained by the ukrainian, polish, and partially by the trans-caucasian formations. the other attempts were nipped in the bud. it was only during the last days of the existence of the russian army, in october, , that general shcherbatov, seeking to preserve the roumanian front, began the classification of the army, on a large scale, according to race--an attempt which ended in complete failure. i must add that one race only made no demand for self-determination with regard to military service--the jewish. and whenever a proposal was made from any source--in reply to the complaints of the jews--to organise special jewish regiments, this proposal roused a storm of indignation among the jews and in the circles of the left, and was stigmatised as deliberate provocation. the government showed itself markedly opposed to the reorganisation of the army according to race. in a letter to the polish congress (june st, ) kerensky expressed the following view: "the great achievement of the liberation of russia and poland can be arrived at only under the condition that the organism of the russian army is not weakened, that no alterations in its organisation infringe its unity.... the extrusion from it of racial troops ... would, at this difficult moment, tear its body, break its power, and spell ruin both for the revolution and for the freedom of russia, poland, and of the other nationalities inhabiting russia." the attitude of the commanding element towards the question of nationalisation was dual. the majority was altogether opposed to it; the minority regarded it with some hope that, by breaking their connection with the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, the newly created national units might escape the errors and infatuations of democratisation and become a healthy nucleus for fortifying the front and building up the army. general alexeiev resolutely opposed all attempts at nationalisation, but encouraged the polish and tchekho-slovak formations. general brussilov allowed the creation of the first ukrainian formation on his own responsibility, after requesting the supreme commander-in-chief "not to repeal it and not to undermine his authority thereby."[ ] the regiment was allowed to exist. general ruzsky, also without permission, began the esthonian formations,[ ] and so forth. from the same motives, probably, which led some commanders to allow formations, but with a reverse action, the whole of the russian revolutionary democracy, in the person of the soviets and the army committees, rose against the nationalisation of the army. a shower of violent resolutions poured in from all sides. among others, the kiev council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates, about the middle of april, characterised ukrainisation in rude and indignant language, as simple desertion and "hide-saving," and by a majority of against demanded the repeal of the formation of ukrainian regiments. it is interesting to note that as great an opponent of nationalisation was found in the polish "left," which had split off from the military congress of the poles in june, because of the resolution for the formation of polish troops. the government did not long adhere to its original firm decision against nationalisation. the declaration of july nd, along with the grant of autonomy to the ukraine, also decided the question of nationalising the troops: "the government considers it possible to continue its assistance to a closer national union of the ukrainians in the ranks of the army itself, or to the drafting into individual units of ukrainians exclusively, in so far as such a measure does not injure the fighting capacity of the army ... and considers it possible to attract to the fulfilment of those tasks the ukrainian soldiers themselves, who are sent by the central rada to the war ministry, the general staff, and the stavka." a great "migration of peoples" began. other ukrainian agents journeyed along the front, organising ukrainian _gromadas_ and committees, getting resolutions passed for transfers to ukrainian units, or concerning reluctance to go to the front under the plea that "the ukraine was being stifled" and so forth. by october the ukrainian committee of the western front was already calling for armed pressure on the government for the immediate conclusion of peace. petlura affirmed that he had , ukrainian troops at his disposal. yet the commander of the kiev military district, colonel oberoutchev,[ ] bears witness as follows: "at the time when heroic exertions were being made to break the foe (the june advance) _i was unable to send a single soldier to reinforce the active army_. as soon as i gave an order to some reserve regiment or other to send detachments to reinforce the front, a meeting would be called by a regiment which had until then lived, peaceably, without thinking of ukrainisation, the yellow and blue ukrainian flag would be unfurled and the cry raised: 'let us march under the ukrainian flag!' "and after that they would not move. weeks would pass, a month, but the detachments would not stir, either under the red, or under the blue and yellow flag." was it possible to combat this unconcealed care for their own safety? the answer is given by oberoutchev again--an answer very characteristic in its lifeless party rigour: "of course, i could have used force to get my orders obeyed. and that force lay in my hands." but "by using force against the disobedient, who are acting under the ukrainian flag, one risks the reproach that one is struggling not against acts of anarchy, but against national freedom and the self-determination of nations. and for me, a socialist-revolutionary, to risk such a reproach, and in the ukraine too, with which i had been connected all my life, was impossible. and so i decided to resign."[ ] and he resigned. true, it was only in october, shortly before the bolshevist _coup d'état_, having occupied the post of commander of the troops in the most important district next the front for nearly five months. as a development of the orders of the government, the stavka appointed special divisions on each front for ukrainisation, and on the south-western front also the th army corps, which was under the command of general skoropadsky. to these units, which were mostly quartered in the deep reserve, the soldiers flocked from the whole front, without leave asked or given. the hopes of the optimists on the one hand and the fears of the left circles on the other that nationalisation would create "firm units" (counter-revolutionary in the terminology of the left) were speedily dispersed. the new ukrainian troops were permeated with the same elements of disintegration as the regulars. meanwhile, among the officers and old soldiers of many famous regiments with a great historical past, now transformed into ukrainian units, this measure roused acute pain and the recognition that the end of the army was near.[ ] in august, when i was in command of the south-western front, bad news began to come to me from the th army corps. the corps seemed to be escaping from direct subordination, receiving both directions and reinforcements from the "general secretary petlura" directly. his commissary was attached to the staff of the corps, over which waved the "yellow-blue flag." the former russian officers and sergeants, left in the regiments because there was no ukrainian command, were treated with contumely by the often ignorant ukrainian ensigns set over them and by the soldiers. an extremely unhealthy atmosphere of mutual hostility and estrangement was gathering in these units. i sent for general skoropadsky and invited him to moderate the violent course of the process of ukrainisation and, in particular, either to restore the rights of the commanders or to release them from service in the corps. the future hetman declared that a mistaken idea had been formed of his activity, probably because of the historical past of the skoropadsky family,[ ] that he was a true russian, an officer of the guards and was altogether free of all seeking for self-determination, that he was only obeying orders, for which he himself had no sympathy. but immediately afterwards skoropadsky went to the stavka, whence my staff received directions to aid the speedy ukrainisation of the th army corps. the question of the polish formations was in a somewhat different position. the provisional government had declared the independence of poland, and the poles now counted themselves "foreigners"; polish formations had long ago existed on the south-western front, though they were breaking up (with the exception of the polish lancers); having given permission to the ukrainians, the government could not refuse it to the poles. finally, the central powers, by creating the appearance of polish independence, also had in view the formation of a polish army, which, however, ended in failure. america also formed a polish army on french territory. in july, , the formation of a polish corps was assigned to the western front, of which i was then commander-in-chief. at the head of the corps i put general dovbor-mousnitsky,[ ] who is now in command of the polish army at poznan. a strong, energetic, resolute man, who fearlessly waged war on the disintegration of the russian troops and on the bolshevism among them, he succeeded in a short time in creating units which, if not altogether firm, were, in any case, strikingly different from the russian troops in their discipline and order. it was the old discipline, rejected by the revolution--without meetings, commissaries or committees. such units roused another attitude towards them in the army, notwithstanding the rejection of nationalisation in principle. being supplied with the property of the disbanded mutinous divisions and treated with complaisance by the chief of supplies, the corps was soon able to organise its own commissariat. by order, the ranks of the officers in the polish corps were filled by the transfer of those who desired it, and the ranks of the soldiers--exclusively by volunteers or from reserve battalions; practically, however, the inevitable current from the front set in, caused by the same motives which influenced the russian soldiers, devastating the thinned ranks of the army. in the end the polish formations turned out to be altogether useless to us. even at the june military congress of the poles, fairly unanimous and unambiguous speeches were heard which defined the aims of these formations. their synthesis was thus expressed by one of the delegates: "it is a secret for no one that the war is coming to an end, and we need the polish army, not for the war, not for fighting; we need it so that at the coming international conference we may be reckoned with, that there should be power at our backs." and indeed the corps did not make its appearance at the front--it is true that it was not yet finally formed; it did not wish to interfere in the "home affairs" of the russians (october and later--the struggle against bolshevism) and soon assumed completely the position of "a foreign army," being taken over and supported by the french command. but neither were the hopes of the polish nationalists fulfilled. in the midst of the general break-down and fall of the front in the beginning of and after the irruption of the germans into russia, part of the corps was captured and disarmed, part of it dispersed and the remnants of the polish troops afterwards found a hospitable asylum in the ranks of the volunteer army. personally, i cannot but say a good word for the st polish corps, to the units of which, quartered in bykhov, we owe much in the protection of the lives of general kornilov and the other bykhov prisoners, in the memorable days of september to november. centrifugal forces were scattering the country and the army. to class and party intolerance was added the embitterment of national dissensions, partly based on the historically-created relations between the races inhabiting russia and the imperial government, and partly altogether baseless, absurd, fed by causes which had nothing in common with healthy national feeling. latent or crushed at an earlier date, these dissensions broke out rudely at just that moment, unfortunately, when the general russian authority was voluntarily and conscientiously taking the path of recognition of the historical rights and the national cultural self-determination of the component elements of the russian state. [illustration: general alexeiev's (centre) farewell.] chapter xxvi. may and the beginning of june in the sphere of military administration--the resignation of gutchkov and general alexeiev--my departure from the stavka--the administration of kerensky and general brussilov. on may st the minister of war, gutchkov, left his post. "we wished," so he explained the meaning of the "democratisation" of the army which he tried to introduce, "to give organised forms and certain channels to follow, to that awakened spirit of independence, self-help and liberty which had swept over all. but there is a line, beyond which lies the beginning of the ruin of that living, mighty organism which is the army." undoubtedly that line was crossed even before the first of may. i am not preparing to characterise gutchkov, whose sincere patriotism i do not doubt. i am speaking only of the system. it is difficult to decide who could have borne the heavy weight of administering the army during the first period of the revolution; but, in any case, gutchkov's ministry had not the slightest grounds to seek the part of guiding the life of the army. it did not lead the army. on the contrary, submitting to a "parallel power" and impelled from below, the ministry, somewhat restively, _followed the army_, until it came right up to the line, beyond which final ruin begins. "to restrain the army from breaking up completely under the influence of that pressure which proceeded from the socialists, and in particular from their citadel--the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates--to gain time, to allow the diseased process to be absorbed, to help the healthy elements to gain strength, such was my aim," wrote gutchkov to kornilov in june, . the whole question is whether the resistance to the destroying powers was resolute enough. the army did not feel this. the officers read the orders, signed by gutchkov, which broke up completely the foundations of military life and custom. that these orders were the result of a painful internal drama, a painful struggle and defeat--this the officers did not know, nor did it interest them. their lack of information was so great that many of them even now, four years later, ascribe to gutchkov the authorship of the celebrated "order no. ." however it may be, the officers felt themselves deceived and deserted. their difficult position they ascribed principally to the reforms of the minister of war, against whom a hostile feeling arose, heated still more by the grumbling of hundreds of generals removed by him and of the ultra-monarchical section of the officers, who could not forgive gutchkov his supposed share in the preparation of the palace _coup d'état_ and of the journey to pskov.[ ] thus the resignation of this minister, even if caused "by those conditions, in which the government power was placed in the country, and in particular the power of the minister of the army and the navy with respect to the army and the fleet,"[ ] had another justification as well--the want of support among the officers and the soldiery. in a special resolution the provisional government condemned gutchkov's action in "resigning responsibility for the fate of russia," and appointed kerensky minister of the army and the navy. i do not know how the army received this appointment in the beginning, but the soviet received it without prejudice. kerensky was a complete stranger to the art of war and to military life, but could have been surrounded by honest men; what was then going on in the army was simple insanity, and this even a civilian might have understood. gutchkov was a representative of the bourgeoisie, a member of the right, and was distrusted; now, perhaps, a socialist minister, the favourite of the democracy, might have succeeded in dissipating the fog in which the soldiers' consciousness was wrapped. nevertheless, to take up such a burden called for enormous boldness or enormous self-confidence, and kerensky emphasised this circumstance more than once when speaking to an army audience: "at a time when many soldiers, who had studied the art of war for decades, declined the post of minister of war, i--a civilian, accepted it." no one, however, had ever heard that the ministry of war had been offered to a soldier that may. the very first steps taken by the new minister dissipated our hopes: the choice of collaborators, who were even greater opportunists than their predecessors, but void of experience in military administration and in active service;[ ] the surrounding of himself with men from "underground"--perhaps having done very great work in the cause of the revolution, but without any comprehension of the life of the army--all this introduced into the actions of the war ministry a new party element, foreign to the military service. a few days after his appointment kerensky issued the declaration of the rights of the soldier, thereby predestining the entire course of his activity. on may th the minister was passing through moghilev to the front. we were surprised by the circumstance that the passage was timed for a.m., and that only the chief-of-staff was invited into the train. the minister of war seemed to avoid meeting the supreme commander-in-chief. his conversation with me was short and touched on details--the suppression of some disturbances or other that had broken out at one of the railway junctions and so forth. the most capital questions of the existence of the army and of the coming advance, the necessity for unity in the views of the government and the command, the absence of which was showing itself with such marked clearness--all this, apparently, did not attract the attention of the minister. among other things, kerensky passed a few cursory remarks on the inappropriateness of generals gourko and dragomirov, commanders-in-chief of fronts, to their posts, which drew a protest from me. all this was very symptomatic and created at the stavka a condition of tense, nervous expectation. kerensky was proceeding to the south-western front, to begin his celebrated verbal campaign which was to rouse the army to achievement. the _word_ created hypnosis and self-hypnosis. brussilov reported to the stavka that throughout the army the minister of war had been received with extraordinary enthusiasm. kerensky spoke with unusual pathos and exaltation, in stirring "revolutionary" images, often with foam on his lips, reaping the applause and delight of the mob. at times, however, the mob would turn to him the face of a wild beast, the sight of which made words to stick in the throat and caused the heart to fail. they sounded a note of menace, these moments, but fresh delight drowned their alarming meaning. and kerensky reported to the provisional government that "the wave of enthusiasm in the army is growing and widening," and that a definite change in favour of discipline and the regeneration of the army was displaying itself. in odessa he became even more irresistibly poetical: "in your welcome i see that great enthusiasm which has overwhelmed the country and feel that great exaltation which the world experiences but once in hundreds of years." let us be just. kerensky called on the army to do its duty. he spoke of duty, honour, discipline, obedience, trust in its commanders; he spoke of the necessity for advancing and for victory. he spoke in the language of the established revolutionary ritual, which ought to have reached the hearts and minds of the "revolutionary people." sometimes, even, feeling his power over his audience, he would throw at it the words, which became household words, of "rebel slaves" and "revolutionary tyrants." in vain! at the conflagration of the temple of russia, he called to the fire: "be quenched!" instead of extinguishing it with brimful pails of water. words could not fight against facts, nor heroic poems against the stern prose of life. the replacement of the motherland by liberty and revolution did not make the aims of the conflict any clearer. the constant scoffing at the old "discipline," at the "czar's generals," the reminders of the knout, the stick, and the "former unprivileged condition of the soldier" or of the soldier's blood "shed in vain" by someone or other--nothing of this could bridge the chasm between the two component parts of the army. the passionate preaching of a "new, conscious, iron revolutionary discipline," _i.e._, a discipline based on the "declaration of the rights of the soldier"--a discipline of meetings, propaganda, political agitation, absence of authority in the commanders, and so forth--this preaching was in irreconcileable opposition to the call to victory. having received his impressions in the artificially exalted, theatrical atmosphere of meetings, surrounded both in the ministry and in his journeyings, by an impenetrable wall of old political friends and of all manner of delegations and deputations from the soviets and the committees, kerensky looked on the army through the prism of their outlook, either unwilling or unable to sink himself in the real life of the army and in its torments, sufferings, searchings, and crimes, and finally to attain a real standing-ground, get at vital themes and real words. these everyday questions of army life and organisation--dry in their form and deeply dramatic in their content--never served as themes for his speeches. they contained only a glorification of the revolution and a condemnation of certain perversions of the idea of national defence, created by that revolution itself. the masses of the soldiery, eager for sentimental scenes, listened to the appeals of the recognised chief for self-sacrifice, and they were inflamed with the "sacred fire"; but as soon as the scene was over, both the chief and the audiences reverted to the daily occupations: the chief--to the "democratisation" of the army, and the masses--to "deepening the revolution." in the same way, probably, djerzinsky's executioners in soviet russia now admire, in the temple of proletarian art, the sufferings of young werther--before proceeding to their customary occupation of hanging and shooting. at any rate, there was much noise. so much, that hindenburg sincerely believes even to this day that in june, , the south-western front was commanded by kerensky. in his book _aus meinem leben_ the german field-marshal relates that kerensky succeeded brussilov, "who was swept away from his post by the rivers of russian blood which he shed in galicia and macedonia (?) in " (the field-marshal has confused the theatres of war), and tells the story of kerensky's "advance" and victories over the austrians near stanislavov. * * * * * meanwhile life at the stavka was gradually waning. the wheels of administration were still revolving, everybody was doing something, issuing orders and giving directions. the work was purely formal, because all the plans and directions of the stavka were upset by unavoidable and incalculable circumstances. petrograd never took the stavka into serious account, but at that time the attitude of the government was somewhat hostile, and the war ministry was conducting the work of reorganisation without ever consulting the stavka. this position was a great burden to general alexeiev, the more so that the attacks of his old disease became more frequent. he was extremely patient and disregarded all personal pin-pricks and all efforts at undermining his prerogatives which emanated from the government. in his discussions with numerous army chiefs, and organisations which took advantage of his accessibility, he was likewise patient, straightforward, and sincere. he worked incessantly, in order to preserve the remnants of the army. seeking to give an example of discipline, he protested but obeyed. he was not sufficiently strong and masterful by nature to compel the provisional government and the civilian reformers of the army to take the demands of the supreme command into account; at the same time, he never did violence to his conscience in order to please the powers that be or the mob. on may th, kerensky stopped for a few hours at moghilev on his way home from the south-western front. he was full of impressions, praised brussilov, and expressed the view that the general spirit at the front and the relations between officers and men were excellent. although in his conversation with alexeiev kerensky made no hint, we noticed that his entourage was somewhat uneasy, and realised that decisions in regard to certain changes had already been taken. i did not consider it necessary to acquaint the supreme commander-in-chief with these rumours, and merely seized the first opportunity for postponing his intended visit to the western front so as not to put him into a false position. in the night of the nd a telegram was received dismissing general alexeiev and appointing general brussilov by order of the provisional government. the quartermaster-general josephovitch woke up alexeiev and handed him the telegram. the supreme commander-in-chief was deeply moved, and tears came down his cheeks. may the members of the provisional government who are still alive forgive the vulgarity of the language: in a subsequent conversation with me the supreme commander-in-chief inadvertently uttered the following words: "the cads! they have dismissed me like a servant without notice." a great statesman and military leader had thus left the stage, whose virtue--one of many--was his implicit loyalty (or was it a defect?) to the provisional government. on the next day kerensky was asked--at a meeting of the soviet--what steps he had taken in view of the supreme commander-in-chief's speech at the officers' conference (see chapter xxiii). he replied that alexeiev had been dismissed, and that he, kerensky, believed that a late french politician was right in saying that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top. the bolshevik rosenfeldt (kamenev) expressed satisfaction, because this decision fully coincided with the repeated demands of the soviet. on the same day the government published an official communiqué to the effect that: "in spite of the fact that general alexeiev was naturally very tired and needed rest from his arduous labours, it was considered impossible to lose the services of this exceptionally experienced and talented leader, and general alexeiev was therefore to remain at the disposal of the provisional government." the supreme commander-in-chief issued the following order of the day as a farewell to the armies. "for nearly three years i have walked with you along the thorny path of the russian army. your glorious deeds have filled me with joyful elation, and i was filled with sorrow in the days of our reverses. but i continued with implicit hope in providence, in the mission of the russian people, and in the prowess of the russian soldier. now that the foundations of our military power are shattered, i still preserve the same faith, as life would not be worth living without it. i reverently salute you, my comrades in arms, all those who have done their duty faithfully, all those whose hearts beat with the love of their country, all those who in the days of the popular turmoil were determined not to allow the mother country to be disrupted. i, the old soldier, and your late supreme commander-in-chief, once more reverently salute you. pray think kindly of me." (signed) general alexeiev. towards the end of our work in common my intercourse with general alexeiev was one of cordial friendship. in parting with me, he said: "all this structure will undoubtedly soon collapse. you will have to resume work once again. would you then agree to work with me again?" i naturally expressed my readiness to collaborate in the future. brussilov's appointment signified definite elimination of the stavka, as a decisive factor, and a change in its direction. brussilov's unrestrained and incomprehensible opportunism, and his endeavour to gain the reputation of a revolutionary, deprived the commanding staffs of the army of the moral support which the former stavka still gave them. the new supreme commander-in-chief was given a very frigid and dry reception at moghilev. instead of the customary enthusiastic ovation to which the "revolutionary general" had been accustomed, whom the mob had carried shoulder high at kamenetz-podolsk, he found a lonely railway station and a strictly conventional parade. faces were sulky and speeches were stereotyped. brussilov's first steps, insignificant but characteristic episodes, had a further disheartening effect. as he was reviewing the guard of honour of men with the cross of st. george, he did not greet their gallant wounded commander, colonel timanovsky, or the officers, but shook hands with the men--the messenger and the orderly. they were so much perturbed by the unexpected inconvenience of such greetings on parade that they dropped their rifles. brussilov handed to me his order of the day intended as a greeting to the armies, which he had written in his own hand, and asked me to send it to kerensky for approval. in his speech to the members of the stavka, who had foregathered to bid farewell to general alexeiev, brussilov tried to make excuses. for excuses they were--his confused explanations of the sin of "deepening the revolution" with kerensky and "democratising" the army with the committees. the closing sentence of his order, addressed to the retiring chief, sounded, therefore, out of tune: "your name will always remain unstained and pure as that of a man who has worked incessantly and has given himself entirely to the service of the army. in the dark days of the past and in the present turmoil you have had the courage, resolutely and loyally, to oppose violence, to combat mendacity, flattery, subservience, to resist anarchy in the country and disruption in the ranks of its defenders." my activities were disapproved by the provisional government as much as those of general alexeiev, and i could not work with brussilov owing to fundamental differences of opinion. i presume that during kerensky's visit to the south-western front, brussilov agreed with his suggestion of appointing general lukomsky chief-of-staff. i was therefore surprised at the conversation which took place on the first day of brussilov's arrival. he said to me: "well, general, i thought i was going to meet a comrade-in-arms and that we were going to work together at the stavka, but you look very surly." "that is not quite true. i cannot stay at the stavka any longer. i also know that general lukomsky is to supersede me." "what? how have they dared to appoint him without my knowledge?" we never touched upon that subject again. i continued to work with brussilov for about ten days pending my successor's arrival, and i must confess that work was unpleasant from the moral point of view. from the very first days of the war brussilov and i had served together. for the first month i was quartermaster-general on the staff of his eighth army, then for two years in command of the th rifle division in that same glorious army, and commander of the th army corps on his front. the "iron division" went from victory to victory, and brussilov particularly favoured it and constantly acknowledged its achievements. his attitude towards the commander of the division was correspondingly cordial. i shared with brussilov many hardships as well as many unforgettable happy days of military triumphs. and i found it difficult to speak to him now, for he was a different man and was so recklessly, from the personal point of view--which, after all, did not matter--as well as from the point of view of the interests of the army, throwing his reputation to the four winds. when i reported to him, every question which might be described as "un-democratic," but was, in reality, an endeavour to maintain the reasonable standard of efficiency, was invariably negatived. argument was useless. brussilov sometimes interrupted me and said with strong feeling: "do you think that i am not disgusted at having constantly to wave the red rag? what can i do? russia is sick, the army is sick. it must be cured, and i know of no other remedy." the question of my appointment interested him more than it interested me. i refused to express any definite desire and said that i would accept any appointment. brussilov was negotiating with kerensky. he once said to me, "_they_ are afraid that if i give you an appointment at the front, you will begin to oust the committees." i smiled. "no, i will not appeal to the committees for help, but will also leave them alone." i attributed no importance to this conversation, which was conducted almost in jest; but on the same day a telegram was sent to kerensky, of which the following was the approximate wording: "i have talked it over with deniken. the obstacles have been removed. i request that he be appointed commander-in-chief of the western front." [illustration] [illustration: kerensky addressing soldiers' meeting.] in the beginning of august i proceeded to minsk and took general markov as chief-of-staff of the front. i had no regrets in leaving the stavka. for two months i had worked like a slave and my outlook had widened, but had i achieved anything for the preservation of the army? positive results were nil. there may have been some negative results; the process of disruption of the army had been to a certain extent stayed. and that is all. one of kerensky's assistants, afterwards high commissar, stankevitch, thus describes my activities: "nearly every week telegrams were sent to petrograd (by deniken) containing provocative and harsh criticisms on the new methods in the army; criticisms they were, not advice. is it possible to advise that the revolution should be cancelled." if that was only stankevitch discussing denikin it would not matter. but these views were shared by the wide circles of the revolutionary democracy and referred not to the individual, but to all those who "impersonated the tragedy of the russian army." the appreciation must therefore be answered. yes, the revolution could not be cancelled, and what is more, i may state that the majority of the russian officers, with whom i agreed, _did not wish to cancel the revolution_. they demanded one thing only--that the army should not be revolutionised from the top. none of us could give any other advice. and if the commanding staffs appeared to be "insufficiently tied to the revolution" they should have been mercilessly dismissed and other people--were they but unskilled artisans in military matters--should have been appointed, and given full power and confidence. personalities do not matter. alexeiev, brussilov, kornilov--represent periods and systems. alexeiev protested. brussilov submitted. kornilov claimed. in dismissing these men one after another did the provisional government have a definite idea, or were they simply distracted to the point of convulsion and completely lost in the morass of their own internal dissensions? would it not appear that had the order been changed in which the links had stood in that chain salvation might have ensued? chapter xxvii. my term as commander-in-chief on the western russian front. i took over the command from general gourko. his removal had already been decided on may th, and an order of the day had been drafted at the war ministry. gourko, however, sent a report in which he stated that it was impossible for him to remain morally responsible for the armies under his command in the present circumstances (after the "declaration of the soldier's rights" had been issued). this report afforded kerensky an excuse for issuing on may th an order relieving gourko of his post and appointing him to the command of a division. the motive was adduced that gourko was "not up to the mark," and that "as the country was in danger, every soldier should do his duty and not be an example of weakness to others." also that "the commander-in-chief enjoys the full confidence of the government, and should apply all his energies to the task of carrying out the intentions of the government; to decline to bear the moral responsibility was on general gourko's part tantamount to dereliction of duty, which he should have continued to perform according to his strength and judgment." not to speak of the fact that gourko's dismissal had already been decided, suffice it to recall similar instances, such as the resignations of gutchkov and miliukov, in order to realise the hypocrisy of these excuses. and what is more--kerensky himself, during one of the government crises caused by the uncompromising attitude of the "revolutionary democracy," had threatened to resign, and had stated in writing to his would-be successor, nekrassov, that: "owing to the impossibility of introducing into the government such elements as were required in the present exceptional circumstances, he could no longer bear the responsibility before the country according to his conscience and judgment, and requested therefore to be relieved of all his duties." the papers said that he had "departed from petrograd." on october th, as we know, kerensky fled, abandoning the post of supreme commander-in-chief. the old commanding staffs were in a difficult position. i refer not to men of definite political convictions, but of the average honest soldier. they could not follow kerensky (the system, not the man) and destroy with their own hands the edifice which they had themselves spent their lives in building. they could not resign because the enemy was on russian soil and they would be deserters according to their own conscience. it was a vicious circle. upon my arrival at minsk i addressed two large gatherings of members of the staff and departments of the front, and later the army commanders, and expounded my fundamental views. i did not say much, but stated clearly that i accepted the revolution without any reservations. i considered, however, that to "revolutionise" the army was a fatal procedure, and that to introduce demagogy into the army would mean the ruin of the country. i declared that i would oppose it with all my might and invited my collaborators to do the same. i received a letter from general alexeiev, who wrote: "congratulations on your appointment. rouse them! make your demands calmly but persistently. i trust that the revival will come without coaxing, without red ribbons, without sonorous and empty phrases. the army cannot continue as it is now, for russia is being transformed into a multitude of idlers who have an exaggerated idea of their own importance (value their movements in gold). i am in heart and in thought with you, with your work and with your wishes. god help you." the committee of the front impersonated at minsk "military politics." on the eve of my arrival that semi-bolshevik organisation had passed a resolution protesting against an advance and in favour of the struggle of united democracies against their governments; this naturally helped to define my attitude towards that body. i had no direct intercourse with the committee, which "stewed in its own juice," argued the matter of preponderant influences of the social democratic and social revolutionary factions, passed resolutions which puzzled even the army committees by their demagogic contents, distributed defeatist pamphlets, and incensed the men against their chiefs. according to the law, the committees were not responsible and could not be tried. the committee was educating in the same sense the pupils of the "school for agitators," who were afterwards to spread these doctrines along the front. i will quote one instance showing the real meaning of these manifestations "of civic indignation and sorrow." pupils of the school often appealed to the chief-of-staff and sent in "demands." on one occasion the demand for an extra pair of boots was couched in offensive terms. general markov refused it. on the next day a resolution was published (in the paper _the front_, no. ) of the conference of pupils of the school of agitators to the effect that they had personally tested the reluctance of headquarters to take elective organisations into account. the pupils declared that the committee of the front will find in them and in those who sent them full support against "counter-revolution," and even armed assistance. was work in common possible in these circumstances? the idea of the advance was finally, however, accepted by the committee of the front, which demanded that from itself and from army committees "fighting committees of contact" be established which would be entitled to partake in the drafting of plans of operations to control the commanding officers and headquarters of the advancing troops, etc. i naturally refused the request, and a conflict ensued. the war minister was very much perturbed, and sent to minsk the chief of his chancery, colonel baronovsky, a young staff officer who prompted kerensky in all military matters, and the commissar stankevitch, who remained at the western front for two days, was removed to the northern front and replaced by kalinin. baronovsky's friends afterwards told me that the question of my dismissal had been raised in view of "friction with the committee of the front." stankevitch appeased the committee and "fighting committees of contact" were allowed to take part in the advance, but were denied the right of control over the operations and of assisting in drawing up plans. * * * * * of the three army commanders at that front, two were entirely in the hands of the committees. as their sectors were inactive, their presence could be temporarily tolerated. the advance was to begin on the front of the th army, commanded by general kisselevsky, in the region of molodetchno. i inspected the troops and the position, interviewed the commanding officers and addressed the troops. in the preceding chapters i have recounted impressions, facts, and episodes of the life of the western front. i will, therefore, mention here only a few details. i saw the troops on parade. some units had preserved the appearance and the routine of the normal pre-revolutionary times. these, however, were exceptions, and were to be found chiefly in the army corps of general dovbor-mussnitzki, who was persistently and sternly maintaining the old discipline. most of the units, however, were more akin to a devastated ants-nest than to an organised unit, although they had retained a semblance of discipline and drill. after the review i walked down the ranks and spoke to the soldiers. i was deeply depressed by their new mental attitude. their speeches were nought but endless complaints, suspicions and grievances against everyone and everything. they complained of all the officers, from the platoon commander to the army corps commander, complained of the lentil soup, of having to stand at the front for ever, of the next regiment of the line, and of the provisional government for being implacably hostile to the germans. i witnessed scenes which i shall not forget till my last hour. in one of the army corps i asked to be shown the worst unit. i was taken to the rd suram regiment. we drove up to a huge crowd of unarmed men who were standing, sitting, wandering about the plain behind the village. having sold their clothes for cash or for drink, they were dressed in rags, bare-footed, ragged, unkempt, and seemed to have reached the utmost limit of physical degradation. i was met by the divisional commander, whose lower lip trembled, and by a regimental commander who had the face of a condemned man. nobody gave the order "attention!" and none of the soldiers rose. the nearest ranks moved towards our motor cars. my first impulse was to curse the regiment and turn back. but that might have been interpreted as cowardice, so i went into the thick of the crowd. i stayed there for about an hour. good heavens, what was the matter with these men, with the reasonable creature of god, with the russian field-labourer? they were like men possessed, their brain dimmed, their speech stubborn and completely lacking logic or common-sense; their shrieks were hysterical, full of abuse and foul swearing. we tried to speak, but the replies were angry and stupid. i remember that my feelings of indignation as an old soldier receded to the background and i merely felt infinitely sorry for these uncouth, illiterate russians to whom little was given and of whom little will, therefore, be asked. one wished that the leaders of the revolutionary democracy had been on that plain and had seen and heard everything. one wished one could have said to them: "it is not the time to find out who is guilty, it doesn't matter whether the guilt is ours, yours, of the bourgeoisie or of autocracy. give the people education and an 'image of man' first, and then socialise, nationalise, communise, if the people will then follow you." the same suram regiment, a few days later, gave a sound thrashing to sokolov, the man who drafted order no. , the creator of the new régime for the army, because he demanded, in the name of the soviet, that the regiment should do its duty and join in the advance. after visiting the regiment, in compliance with persistent invitations from a special delegation, i went to a conference of the nd caucasian army corps. the members of that conference had been elected; their discussions were more reasonable and their aims more practical. among the various groups of delegates whom our _aides-de-camp_ had joined, the argument was put forward that, as the commander-in-chief and all the senior commanding officers were present, would it not be expedient to finish them off at once? that would put an end to the advance. to meet the senior commanding officer was by no means a consolation. one of the army corps commanders led his troops with a firm hand, but experienced strong pressure from the army organisations; another was afraid to visit his troops. i found the third in a state of complete collapse and in tears because someone had passed a vote of censure upon him: "and this after forty years' service! i loved the men and they loved me, but now they have dishonoured me, and i cannot serve any longer!" i had to allow him to retire. in the next room a young divisional commander was already in secret consultation with members of the committee, who immediately requested me, in a most peremptory fashion, to appoint the young general to the command of the army corps. the visit left me with a painful impression. disruption was growing and my hopes were waning; and yet one had to continue the work, of which there was plenty for all of us. the western front lived by theory and by the experience of others. it had won no striking victories, which alone can inspire confidence in the methods of warfare, and had no real experience in breaking through the defensive line of the enemy. one was very often compelled to discuss the general plan, the plan of artillery attack, and to establish the points of initiative with those who were to carry out the general plan. we found the greatest difficulty in preparing the plans for storming a position. owing to demoralisation, every movement of troops, every relief, trench digging, bringing batteries into position, either were not carried out at all, or else attended by delays, tremendous efforts or persuasion, and meetings. every slightest excuse was made use of in order to avoid preparations for the advance. owing to the technical unpreparedness of the positions, the chiefs had to perform the arduous and unnatural task of making tactical considerations subservient to the qualities of the commanding officers, instead of giving directions to the troops in accordance with tactical considerations. the degree of the demoralisation of different units and the condition of different sectors of a given firing line, purely accidental, had also to be taken into account. and yet the statement that our technical backwardness was one of the reasons of our collapse in should be accepted with reservations. of course, our army was backward, but in it was infinitely better equipped, had more guns and ammunition and wider experience of her own and of other fronts than in . our technical backwardness was a relative factor which was present at all times in the great war before the revolution, but was remedied in , and cannot, therefore, be taken into account as a decisive feature in estimating the russian revolutionary army and its work in the field. it was the work of sisyphus. the commanding officers gave their heart and soul to the work because in its success they saw the last ray of hope for the salvation of the army and of the country. technical difficulties could be overcome, as long as the moral could be raised. brussilov arrived and addressed the regiment. as a result, the officer commanding the th army was relieved against my will ten days before the decisive advance. and it was not without difficulty that i secured the appointment of general lomnovsky, the gallant commander of the th army corps, who had arrived at the front ten days before the action. there was an unpleasant misunderstanding about brussilov's visit. headquarters had mistakenly informed the troops that kerensky was coming. this substitution provoked strong discontent among the troops. many units declared that they were being deceived, and that unless comrade kerensky himself orders them to advance they would not advance. the nd caucasian division sent delegates to petrograd to make inquiries. and efforts had to be made to appease them by promising that comrade kerensky was due to arrive in a few days. the war minister had to be invited. kerensky came reluctantly, because he was already disillusioned by the failure of his oratorical campaign on the south-western front. for several days he reviewed the troops, delivered speeches, was enthusiastically received and sometimes unexpectedly rebuked. he interrupted his tour, as he was invited to hurry to petrograd on july th, but he returned with renewed energy and with a new up-to-date theme, making full use of the "knife with which the revolution had been stabbed in the back" (the petrograd rising of july rd- th). having, however, completed his tour and returned to the stavka, he emphatically declared to brussilov: "i have no faith whatsoever in the success of the advance." kerensky was equally pessimistic in those days with regard to another matter, the future destinies of the country. he discussed in conversation with myself and two or three of his followers, the stages of the russian revolution, and expressed the conviction that whatever happened we should not escape the reign of terror. the days went by and the advance was further delayed. as early as on june th, i issued the following order of the day to the armies of my front: "the russian army of the south-western front have this day defeated the enemy and broken through his lines. a decisive battle has begun on which depends the fate of the russian people and of its liberties. our brethren on the south-western front are victoriously advancing, sacrificing their lives and expecting us to render them speedy assistance. we shall not be traitors. the enemy shall soon hear the roaring of our guns. i appeal to the troops of the western front to make every effort and to prepare as soon as possible for an advance, otherwise we shall be cursed by the russian people who have entrusted to us the defence of their liberty, honour, and property." i do not know whether those who read this order, published in the papers in complete contravention of all the conditions of secrecy of operation, understood all the inner tragedy of the russian army. all strategy was turned topsy-turvy. the russian commander-in-chief, powerless to advance his troops and thus alleviate the position of the neighbouring front, wanted (even at the cost of exposing his intentions) to hold the german divisions which were being moved from his front and sent to the south-western and the allied front. the germans responded immediately by sending the following proclamation to the front: "russian soldiers! your commander-in-chief of the western front is again calling on you to fight. we know of his order, and also know of the false report that our line to the south-east of lvov has been broken. do not believe it. in reality thousands of russian corpses are lying before our trenches. an advance will never lead to peace. if, nevertheless, you obey the call of your commanders, who are bribed by england, then we shall continue the struggle until you are overthrown." finally, on july th, the thunder of our guns was heard. on july th the storming began, and three days after i was on my way from the th army to minsk, with despair in my heart, and clearly recognising that the last hope of a miracle was gone. chapter xxviii. the russian advance in the summer of --the dÉbÂcle. the russian offensive which had been planned for the month of may was being delayed. at first a simultaneous advance on all fronts had been contemplated; later, however, owing to the psychological impossibility of a forward movement on all fronts, it was decided to advance gradually. the western front was of secondary importance, and the northern was intended only for demonstration. they should have moved first in order to divert the attention and the forces of the enemy from the main front--the south-western. the first two of the above-named fronts were not, however, ready for the advance. the supreme command finally decided to abandon the strategical plan and to give the commanders of various fronts a free hand in starting operations as the armies would be ready, provided these operations were not delayed too long and the enemy was not given the opportunity of carrying out re-groupings on a large scale. even such a strategy, simplified as it had been owing to the revolution, might have yielded great results, considering the world-wide scope of the war; if the german armies on the eastern front could not have been utterly defeated, that front might at least have been restored to its former importance. the central powers might have been compelled to send to that front large forces, war material and munitions, thus severely handicapping hindenburg's strategy and causing him constant anxiety. the operations were finally fixed for the following dates: they were to begin on the south-western front on june th, on the western on july th, on the northern on july th, and on the roumanian on july th. the last three dates almost coincide with the beginning of the collapse (july th- th) of the south-western front. as mentioned above, in june, , the revolutionary democracy had already acquiesced in the idea that an advance was necessary, although this acquiescence was qualified. the offensive thus had the moral support of the provisional government, the commanding staffs, all the officers, the liberal democracy, the defencist coalition of the soviet, the commissars, of nearly all army committees, and of many regimental committees. against the offensive the minority of the revolutionary democracy was ranged--the bolsheviks, the social-revolutionaries of tchernov's and of martov's (zederbaum) group. there was a small appendix to this minority--the democratisation of the army. at the moment of writing i do not possess a complete list of the russian armies, but i may confidently assert that on all sectors upon which the advance had been planned we had a numerical and a technical superiority over the enemy, more especially in guns, of which we had larger quantities than ever. it fell to the lot of the south-western front to test the fighting capacity of the revolutionary army. the group of armies under general bohm-ermolli (the th and nd austrian armies and the southern german armies) stood between the upper sereth and the carpathians (brody-nadvorna) on the position north of the dniester which we had captured after brussilov's victorious advance in the autumn of . south of the dniester stood the rd austrian army of general kirchbach, which formed the left wing of the archduke joseph's carpathian front. our best army corps, which were intended as shock troops, were opposed to the last three armies mentioned above. these austro-german troops had already been dealt many heavy blows by the russian armies in the summer and in the autumn of . since then, the southern german divisions of general botmer, which had been hard hit, had been replaced by fresh troops from the north. although the austrian armies had been to a certain extent reorganised by the german high command and reinforced by german divisions, they did not represent a formidable force and, according to the german headquarters, were not fit for active operations. since the germans had occupied the cherviche "place d'armes" on the stokhod, hindenburg's headquarters had given orders that no operations should be conducted, as it was hoped that the disruption of the russian army and of the country would follow its natural course, assisted by german propaganda. the germans estimated the fighting capacity of our army very low. nevertheless, when hindenburg realised in the beginning of june that a russian advance was a contingency to be reckoned with, he moved six divisions from the western-european front and sent them to reinforce the group of armies of bohm-ermolli. the enemy was perfectly well aware of the directions in which we intended to advance.... the russian armies of the south-western front, commanded by general gutor, were to strike in the main direction of kamenetz-podolsk-lvov. the armies were to move along both banks of the dniester: general erdely's th army in the direction of zlochev, general selivatchev's th army towards brjeczany, and general kornilov's th army towards galitch. in the event of victory we would reach lvov, break through between the fronts of bohm-ermolli and the archduke joseph, and would drive the latter's left wing to the carpathians, cutting it off from all available natural means of communication. the remainder of our armies on the south-western front were stretched along a broad front from the river pripet to brody for active defence and demonstration. on june th the guns of the shock troops of the th and th army opened a fire of such intensity as had never been heard before. after two days of continuous fire, which destroyed the enemy's strong position, the russian regiments attacked. the enemy line was broken between zvorov and brjeczany on a front of several miles; we took two or three fortified lines. on june th the attack was renewed on a front of forty miles, between the upper strypa and the narauvka. in this heavy and glorious battle the russian troops took three hundred officers and eighteen thousand men prisoners in two days, twenty-nine guns, and other booty. the enemy positions were captured on many sectors, and we penetrated the enemy lines to an average depth of over two miles, driving him back to the strypa in the direction of zlochev. the news of our victory spread all over russia, evoked universal rejoicings, and raised the hopes for the revival of the former strength of the russian army. kerensky reported to the provisional government as follows: "this day is the day of a great triumph for the revolution. on june th the russian revolutionary army, in very high spirits, began the advance and has proved before russia and before the world its ardent devotion to the cause of the revolution and its love of country and liberty.... the russian warriors are inaugurating a new discipline based upon feelings of a citizen's duty.... an end has been made to-day of all the vicious calumnies and slander about the organisation of the russian army, which has been rebuilt on democratic lines...." the man who wrote these words had afterwards the courage to claim that it was not he who had destroyed the army, because he had taken over the organisation as a fatal inheritance! after three days' respite, a violent battle was resumed on the front of the th army on both sides of the railway line on the front batkuv-koniuchi. by that time the threatened german regiments were reinforced, and stubborn fighting ensued. the th army captured several lines, but suffered heavy losses. the trenches changed hands several times after a hand-to-hand battle, and great efforts had to be made in order to break the resistance of the enemy, who had been reinforced and had recovered. this action practically signified the end of the advance of the th and th armies. the impetus was spent and the troops began once more to sit in the trenches, the monotony of this pastime being only broken in places by local skirmishes, austro-german counter-attacks, and intermittent gunfire. meanwhile preparations for the advance began on june rd in kornilov's army. on june th his troops broke through general kirchbach's positions west of stanislavov and reached the line of jesupol-lyssetz. after a stubborn and sanguinary battle kirchbach's troops, utterly defeated, ran and dragged along in their headlong flight the german division which had been sent to reinforce them. on the th general cheremissov's right column captured galitch, some of his troops crossed the dniester. on the th the left column overcame the stubborn resistance of the austro-germans and captured kalush. in the next two or three days, the th army was in action on the river lomnitza and finally established itself on the banks of the river and in front of it. in the course of this brilliant operation kornilov's army broke through the rd austrian army on a front of over twenty miles and captured officers, , men, and about guns. the capture of lomnitza opened to kornilov the road to dolina-stryi and to the communications of botmer's army. german headquarters described the position of the commander-in-chief of the western front as _critical_. general bohm-ermolli meanwhile was concentrating all his reserves in the direction of zlochev, the point to which the german divisions were likewise sent which had been taken from the western european front. some of the reserves had to be sent, however, across the dniester against the th russian army. they arrived on july nd, reinforced the shattered ranks of the rd austrian army, and from that day positional battles began on the lomnitza, with varying success, and occasionally stubborn fighting. the concentration of the german shock troops between the upper sereth and the railway line tarnopol-zlochev was completed on july th. on the next day, after strong artillery preparations, this group attacked our th army, broke our front and moved swiftly towards kamenetz-podolsk, pursuing the army corps of the th army who were fleeing in panic. the army headquarters, the stavka and the press, losing all perspective, blamed the th mlynov regiment as the chief cause of the catastrophe. the demoralised, worthless regiment had left the trenches of their own accord and opened the front. it was, of course, a very sad occurrence, but it would be naïve to describe it even as an excuse. for as early as on the th of july the committees and commissars of the th army were telegraphing to the provisional government: "the truth and nothing but the truth about the events." "the german offensive on the front of the th army, which began on july th, is growing into an immeasurable calamity which threatens perhaps the very existence of revolutionary russia. the spirit of the troops, that were prompted to advance by the heroic efforts of the minority, has undergone a decisive and fatal change. the impetus of the advance was soon spent. most of the units are in a condition of increasing disruption. there is not a shadow of discipline or obedience; persuasion is likewise powerless and is answered by threats and sometimes by shootings. cases have occurred when orders to advance immediately to reinforce the line were debated for hours at meetings, and reinforcements were twenty-four hours late. some units arbitrarily leave the trenches without even waiting for the enemy to advance.... for hundreds of miles strings of deserters--healthy, strong men who thoroughly realise their impunity--are to be seen moving along with rifles or without.... the country should know the whole truth. it will shudder and will find the strength to fall with all its might upon all those whose cowardice is ruining and bartering russia and the revolution." the stavka wrote: "in spite of its enormous numerical and technical superiority, the th army was retreating uninterruptedly. on the th of july it had already reached the serenth, never halting at the very strong fortified position to the west of the river, which had been our starting point in the glorious advance of . bohm-ermolli had detached some of his forces for the pursuit of the russian troops in the direction of tarnapol and had moved his main forces southwards between the serenth and the strypa, threatening to cut off the communication of the th army, to throw them into the dniester and, perhaps, cut off the retreat of the th army. on july th the austro-germans had already reached mikulinze, a distance of one march south of tarnapol.... the armies of general selivatchev and cheremissov (who had succeeded general kornilov upon the latter's appointment on july th to the high command of the south-western front) were in great difficulty. they could not hope to resist the enemy by manoeuvring, and all that was left to them was to escape the enemy's blows by forced marches. the th army was in particularly dire straits, as it was retreating under the double pressure of the army corps of general botmer, who was conducting a frontal attack, and of the troops of bohm-ermolli, striking from the north against the denuded right flank. the th army had to march over one hundred miles under pressure from the enemy. on july th the austro-germans advanced to the line mikulinze-podgaitze-stanilavov. on the th the germans occupied tarnapol, abandoned without fighting by the st guards army corps. on the next day they broke through our position on the rivers gniezno and sereth, south of trembovlia, and developed their advance in the eastern and south-eastern directions. on the same day, pursuing the th and th armies, the enemy occupied the line from the sereth to monsaterjisko-tlumatch. on the th july, seeing that the position was desperate, the commander-in-chief issued orders for a retreat from the sereth, and by the st the armies of the south-western front, having cleared galicia and bukovina, reached the russian frontier. their retreat was marked by fires, violence, murders and plunder. a few units, however, fought the enemy stubbornly and covered the retreat of the maddened mob of deserters by sacrificing their lives. among them were russian officers, whose bodies covered the battlefields. the armies were retreating in disorder; the same armies that, only a year ago, had captured lutsk, brody-stanislavov, chernovetz in their triumphal progress ... were retreating before the same austro-german troops that only a year ago had been completely defeated and had strewn with fugitives the plains of volynia, galicia and bukovina, leaving hundreds of thousands of prisoners in our hands. we shall never forget that in brussilov's advance of , the th, th, th and th armies took , prisoners, guns, , , machine guns, etc. our allies are not likely to forget this either; they know full well that the loud echo of the galician battle sounded on the somme and at goritza. the commissars savinkov and filonenko telegraphed to the provisional government: "there is no choice; the traitors must be executed.... capital punishment must be meted out to all those who refuse to sacrifice their lives for their country...." in the beginning of july, after the russian advance had ostensibly failed, it was decided at hindenburg's headquarters to undertake a new extensive operation against the roumanian front by a simultaneous advance of the rd and th austrian armies across bukovina into moldavia and of the right group of general mackensen on the lower sereth. the objective was to seize moldavia and bessarabia. but on july th the russian army of general ragosa and the roumanian army of general averesco took the offensive between the rivers susitsa and putna against the th austrian army. the attack was successful, the enemy positions were captured, the armies moved forward several miles, took , prisoners and over guns, but the operation was not developed. owing to the natural conditions of the theatre of war and to the direction in which the operation was undertaken, it was more akin to a demonstration in order to relieve the south-western front. also the troops of the th russian army soon lost all impetus for the advance. in july and until august th, the troops of the archduke joseph and of mackensen attacked in several directions and gained local successes, but without any appreciable result. although the russian divisions repeatedly disobeyed orders and occasionally left the trenches during the battle, yet the condition of the roumanian front was somewhat better than that of the other front, owing to its distance from petrograd, to the presence of disciplined roumanian troops and to the natural conditions of the country. for these reasons we were able to keep that front somewhat longer. this circumstance, together with the apparent weakness of the austrian armies, especially the rd and the th, and the complete dislocation of the communications of bohm-ermolli's group and of the archduke joseph's left wing--caused hindenburg's headquarters indefinitely to postpone the operation, and a period of calm ensued along the entire south-western front. on the roumanian front local actions were fought until the end of august. at the same time, german divisions began to move from the sbrucz northwards in the direction of riga. hindenburg's plan was to deal the russian army local blows, without straining his own resources or spending large reserves, so urgently needed, on the western-european front. by these tactics he intended to contribute to the natural course of the collapse of the russian front, for it was upon this collapse that the central powers based all their calculations in regard to operations and even in regard to the possibility of continuing the campaign in . our efforts at advancing on other fronts also ended in complete failure. on the th of july operations began on the western front, which i commanded. the details will be given in the next chapter. of this operation ludendorf wrote: "of all the attacks directed against the former eastern front of general eichhorn, the attacks of july th, south of smorgom, and at krevo were particularly fierce.... for several days the position was extremely difficult until our reserves and our gunfire restored the front. the russians left our trenches; they were no longer the russians of the old days." on the northern front, in the th army, everything was over in one day. the stavka wrote: "south-west of the dvinsk our troops, after strong artillery preparation, captured the german position across the railway dvinsk-vilna. subsequently, entire divisions, without pressure from the enemy, deliberately retreated to their own trenches." the stavka noted the heroic behaviour of several units, the prowess of the officers and the tremendous losses which the latter had suffered. this fact, however unimportant from the strategical point of view, deserves to be specially noted. as a matter of fact, the th army was commanded by general danilov (afterwards a member of the bolshevik delegation at brest-litovsk. he served in in the russian army in the crimea). he enjoyed exceptional prestige with the revolutionary democracy. according to stankevitch, the commissar of the northern front, danilov "was the only general who had remained, in spite of the revolution, full master in the army and had succeeded in so dealing with the new institutions--the commissars and the committees--that they strengthened his authority instead of weakening it.... he knew how to make use of these elements, and he overcame all obstacles in a spirit of complete self-control and firmness. in the th army everyone was working, learning and being educated.... as the best and the most cultured elements of the army were working to that end." this is a striking proof of the fact that even when the commanding officer becomes thoroughly familiar with revolutionary institutions, this does not serve as a guarantee of the fighting capacity of his troops. * * * * * on july th kornilov, upon his appointment to the chief command of the south-western front, sent to the provisional government his well-known telegram, of which he forwarded a copy to the supreme commander-in-chief. in that telegram, already quoted above, kornilov demanded the reintroduction of capital punishment, and wrote: "... i declare that the country is on the verge of collapse and that, although i have not been consulted, i _demand_ that the offensive be stopped on all fronts in order that the army may be saved, preserved and re-organised on the basis of strict discipline, and in order that the lives may not be sacrificed of a few heroes who are entitled to see better days." in spite of the peculiar wording of this appeal, the idea of stopping the advance was immediately accepted by the supreme command, the more so that the operations had practically come to a standstill irrespective of orders as a result of the reluctance of the russian army to fight and to advance, as well as of the schemes of the german headquarters. capital punishment and revolutionary courts-martial were introduced at the front. kornilov gave an order to shoot deserters and robbers and to expose their bodies with corresponding notices on the roads and in other prominent places. special shock battalions were formed of cadets and volunteers to fight against desertion, plunder and violence. kornilov forbade meetings at the front and gave an order to stop them by the force of arms. these measures--which were introduced by kornilov at his own risk and peril, his manly, straightforward utterances, and the firm tone in which, disregarding discipline, he began to address the provisional government, and last, but not least, his resolute action--considerably enhanced his authority with the wide circles of liberal democracy and with the officers. even the revolutionary democracy within the army, stunned and depressed as it was by the tragic turn of events, saw in kornilov, for some time after the _débâcle_, the last resource and the only possible remedy in the desperate position. it may be stated that the date of july th, on which kornilov took command of the south-western front and addressed his first demand to the provisional government, sealed his fate: in the eyes of many people he became a national hero and great hopes were centred upon him--he was expected to save the country. during my stay at minsk i was not very well informed of the unofficial tidings prevailing in military circles, yet i felt that the centre of moral influence had moved to berditchev (headquarters of the south-western front). kerensky and brussilov had somehow suddenly receded to the background. a new method of administration was put into practice: we received from kornilov's headquarters copies of his "demands" or notices of some strong and striking decision he had adopted, and in a few days these were repeated from petrograd or from the stavka, but in the shape of an order or of a regulation. the tragedy of july undoubtedly had a sobering effect upon the men. in the first place, they were ashamed because things had happened that were so shameful and so disgraceful that even the dormant conscience and the deadened spirit of the men could not find excuses for these happenings. several months later, in november, after fleeing from the captivity of bykhov, i spent several days under an assumed name and in civilian clothes among the soldiers who had flooded all the railways. they were discussing the past. i never heard a single man confessing openly or cynically his participation in the treachery of july. they all tried to explain away the matter and chiefly attributed it to somebody's treason, especially, of course, the treason of the officers. none spoke of his own treachery. in the second place, the men were frightened. they felt that a kind of power, a kind of authority had arisen, and they were quietly waiting for developments. lastly, operations had ended and nervous tension had been relieved--which caused a certain reaction, apathy and indifference. _this was the second occasion (the first took place in march) on which, had the moment been immediately and properly taken advantage of--it might have been the turning point in the history of the russian revolution._ as the sounds were dying out of the last shots fired at the front, the men who had been stunned by the disaster began to recover their senses. kerensky was the first to return to sanity. the horror had passed away, the nerve-wrecking, maddening fear which had prompted the issue of the first stringent order. kerensky's will-power was dominated by his fear of the soviet, of the danger of definitely losing all prestige with the revolutionary democracy by resentment against kornilov for the resolute tone of the latter's messages and by the shadow of the potential dictator. the drafts of military regulations by which it was intended to restore the power of the commanding officers and of the army were drowned in red tape and in the turmoil of personal conflicts, suspicions and hatreds. the revolutionary democracy once again sternly opposed the new course, as it interpreted this course as an infringement upon the liberties and as a menace to its own existence. the same attitude was adopted by the army committees, whose powers were to be curtailed as a first step in the proposed changes. in these circles the new course was described as counter-revolutionary. the masses of the soldiery, on the other hand, soon appraised the new situation. they saw that stern words were mere words, that capital punishment was only a bogy, because there was no real force capable of mastering their arbitrariness. so fear vanished again. the hurricane did not clear the close and tense atmosphere. new clouds were overhanging and peals of a new deafening thunder were to be heard in the distance. [illustration: general kornilov's arrival at petrograd.] [illustration: general kornilov in the trenches.] chapter xxix. the conference at the stavka of ministers and commanders-in-chief on july th. upon my return from the front to minsk i was summoned to the stavka at moghilev, where a conference was to be held on july th. kerensky suggested that brussilov should invite, of his own accord, the prominent military chiefs, in order to discuss the actual condition of the front, the consequences on the july disaster, and to determine the course of future military policy. it transpired that general gourko, who had been invited by brussilov, had not been admitted to the conference by kerensky. a telegram was sent to kornilov from the stavka saying that, in view of the difficult position of the south-western front, his attendance was impossible, and that he was requested to present in writing his views on the questions under discussion. it should be noted that, at that time, on july th and th, the th army was in full retreat from the sereth to the zbrucz, and that everyone was anxious to hear whether the th army had succeeded in crossing the lower sereth and the th the line of zalestchiki, thus avoiding the blows of the german armies that were trying to cut their retreat. so sad was the plight of the country and the army that i decided to disclose to the conference the full truth on the condition of the army in all its hideous nakedness, and in disregard of all conventionalities. i reported myself to the supreme commander-in-chief. brussilov surprised me. he said: "i have come to the conclusion that this is the limit and we must put the question squarely. all these commissars, committees and democratisations are driving the army and russia to ruin. i have decided categorically to demand that they should cease to disorganise the army. i hope that you will back me?" i answered that this was in full accord with my intentions and that the object of my visit was to put the question squarely of the future destinies of the army. i must confess that brussilov's words reconciled me with him and i therefore decided to eliminate from my speech all the bitter things which i had intended to say against the supreme command. we waited about an hour and a half for the conference to meet. we afterwards learnt that a small incident had occurred. the prime minister had not been met at the station either by brussilov or by his chief-of-staff (general lukomsky), who had been detained by urgent military business. kerensky waited for some time and grew nervous. he finally sent his _aide-de-camp_ to brussilov with the order to come to the station at once and to report. the incident was not commented upon, but all those who have been in touch with politics know that the actors on that stage are mere men, with all their weaknesses, and that the game is often continued behind the curtain. the conference was attended by the prime minister kerensky, the foreign minister terestchenko, the supreme c.-in-c. brussilov, his chief-of-staff general lukomsky, generals alexeiev and ruzsky, the c.-in-c. of the northern front general klembovsky, by myself as c.-in-c. of the western front, and by my chief-of-staff general markov, admiral maximov, generals velitchko and romanovsky, the commissar of the western front savinkov, and two or three young men of kerensky's suite. general brussilov addressed the conference in a short speech, which struck me as being very vague and commonplace. in fact, he said nothing at all. i had hoped that brussilov would keep his word and would sum up the situation and draw conclusions. i was mistaken. brussilov did not speak again. i opened the discussion. i said: "it is with deep emotion and in full consciousness of a grave responsibility that i am delivering my report to the conference. i beg to be excused if i speak as openly and frankly as i have always done. i was outspoken with the old autocracy, and intend to be just as outspoken with the new--the revolutionary autocracy. "when i took command of the front, i found the armies in a state of complete disruption. this seemed the more strange that neither in the reports received at the stavka or in those i received upon taking over the command had the situation been described in such gloomy colours. the explanation is obvious: as long as the army corps were not conducting active operations, excesses were comparatively few; but no sooner was the order given for doing the duty of a soldier, for taking up positions or for the advance, than the instinct of self-preservation asserted itself and the picture of disruption was unveiled. some ten divisions refused to take up positions. all commanding officers of all grades had to work very hard, to argue, to persuade.... in order to be able to carry out the slightest measure of any importance, it became imperative to reduce the numbers of mutinous troops. a whole month was thus lost, although some divisions obeyed orders. disruption was rampant in the nd caucasian corps and in the th infantry division. several units had lost human appearance, not only morally but physically. i shall never forget the hour which i spent in the rd suram regiment. there were up to ten private stills in each regiment; drunkenness, cardplaying, rioting, plunder and even murder. i took a drastic step. i sent the nd caucasian corps (except the st infantry division and the th infantry division) to the rear and ordered them to be disbanded. before the operation had developed, i thus lost about , bayonets without firing a shot. the th and th infantry divisions, which were considered the best, were sent to occupy the sector of the caucasians. what happened? the th division, after a forced march to its destination, returned on the next day almost in its entirety (two and a half regiments). the th division sent one regiment to the trenches, and that regiment passed a resolution against advancing. every possible measure was taken in order to raise the spirit of the troops. the supreme commander-in-chief visited the front. from his conversations with the members of committee and with the men elected from two army corps he gathered the impression that 'the soldiers were all right, but the commanding officers had lost heart.' that is not so. the commanding officers did all they could in extremely difficult and painful surroundings, but the supreme commander-in-chief is unaware of the fact that the meeting of the st siberian corps, where his speech was most enthusiastically received, continued after his departure. new speakers came forward and appealed to the men not to listen to the 'old bourgeois' (forgive me, that is so.... brussilov interjected: "i do not mind") and they heaped vile abuse upon his head. these appeals were also enthusiastically greeted. the war minister, who visited the troops and by his fiery eloquence incited them to deeds of valour, was enthusiastically received by the th division. upon his return to the train he was met by a regimental deputation which announced that half an hour after the minister had gone the regiment, as well as another one, had decided not to advance. the picture was particularly moving and evoked great enthusiasm when, in the th division, the commanding officer of the poti infantry regiment knelt to receive the red banner. the men swore--there were three speakers and passionate cheering--to die for the country. on the first day of the advance the regiment did not reach our trenches, but turned round in a disgraceful manner and retreated six miles behind the battlefield. "the commissars and the committee were among the factors which were meant to give moral support to the troops, but practically contributed to their demoralisation. among the commissars there may have been favourable exceptions of men who did a certain amount of good without interfering with other people's business. but the institution itself cannot fail to contribute to the disruption of the army because it implies a dual power, friction and interference uncalled for and criminal. i am compelled to describe the commissars of the western front. one of them, for all i know, may be a good and honest man, but he is an utopian and not only ignorant of army life, but of life in general. he has a great idea of his own importance. in demanding that the chief-of-staff should obey his orders, he declares that he is entitled to dismiss commanding officers, including the general officer commanding the army. in explaining to the troops the extent of his authority, he thus describes it: 'as the fronts are subordinate to the war minister, i am the war minister for the western front.' another commissar, who knows about as much of army life as the first one, is a social democrat standing somewhere on the verge between bolshevism and menchevism. he is the noted reporter of the military section of the all-russian congress of soviets who has expressed the view that the army has not been sufficiently disorganised by the 'declaration' and demanded further 'democratisation.' he claimed the right for the men to veto appointments of commanding officers, insisted upon part of paragraph of the declaration which empowered the commanding officers to use arms against cowards and traitors being cancelled, and upon freedom of speech being granted not only off parade, but on duty. the rd commissar, who was not a russian, and who appeared to treat the russian soldier with contempt, in addressing the regiment used such foul language as had never fallen from the commanding officers under the czar's régime. curiously enough the conscious and free revolutionary warriors accept such treatment as their due and obey him. that commissar, according to the commanding officers, is undoubtedly useful. "the committees are another disintegrating force. i do not deny that some of the committees have done excellent work, and have done their best to fulfil their duty. in particular some of their members have been exceedingly useful, and have rendered their country the supreme service of dying the death of heroes. but i affirm that the good they have done will not compensate for the tremendous mischief done to the army by the introduction of all these new authorities, by friction, by interference, and by discrediting the commands. i might quote hundreds of resolutions bearing that stamp, but will confine myself merely to the most blatant cases. the struggle for seizing power in the army is carried on openly and systematically. the chairman of the committee of the front has published in his paper an article advocating that governmental powers be granted to the committee. the army committee of the rd army has passed the resolution, which to my intense surprise was endorsed by the commanding officer, requesting 'that the army committees be invested with the plenary powers of the war minister and of the central committee of the soviets which would entitle them to act in the name of that committee.' when the famous 'declaration' was discussed opinions varied in the committee of the front in regard to paragraph . some members wanted the second part to be eliminated; others demanded that a proviso be added empowering the members of the committee of the front to take the same measures including armed force against the same persons, and even against the commanding officers themselves. is that not the limit? in the report of the all-russian congress a demand is formulated for the soldiers' committees to be allowed to cancel appointments of commanding officers, and to partake in the administration of the army. you must not think that this is merely theory. far from it. the committees endeavour to get hold of everything, to interfere with purely military questions, with the routine and the administration. and this is being done in an atmosphere of complete anarchy caused by wholesale insubordination. "moral preparations for the advance were proceeding apace. on june th the committee of the front passed a resolution against the advance, but changed its mind on the th. the committee of the nd army decided against the offensive on june st, but cancelled its decision on june th. in the minsk soviet votes against decided against the advance. all the committees of the th infantry division passed a vote of censure on the provisional government, and described the offensive as "treason to the revolution." the campaign against the authorities manifested itself in a series of dismissals of senior commanders, in which the committees almost invariably participated. shortly before the opening of the operations an army corps commander, the chief-of-staff, and a divisional commander of the most important sector occupied by the shock troops, had to resign, and the same fate was shared by about commanding officers, from army corps commander to regimental commander. it is impossible to estimate the amount of harm done by the committee. they have no proper discipline of their own. if the majority passes a reasonable resolution, that does not suffice. it is put into practice by individual members of the committee. taking advantage of their position as members of army committees, the bolsheviks have more than once spread mutiny and rebellion with impunity. as a result, authority is undermined instead of being strengthened, because so many different individuals and institutions are supposed to exercise that authority. and the commander in the field, who is being discredited, dismissed, controlled and watched from all sides, is nevertheless expected to lead the troops into action with a strong hand. such was the moral preparation. the troops have not yet been deployed. but the south-western front required immediate assistance. the enemy had already removed from my front to the south-west three or four divisions. i decided to attack with the troops which presented at least a semblance of loyalty. in three days our guns had smashed the enemy trenches and wrought havoc among them, had inflicted heavy losses among the germans, and had opened the way for our infantry. the first line had been almost entirely broken, and our men had already visited the enemy batteries. that breach of the front promised to develop into a great victory, for which we had been hoping for so long.... i now revert to descriptions of the battle. 'the units of the th infantry division took up their positions only four hours before the attack; of the th regiment only two and a half companies, with four machine-guns and officers, reached the appointed line; only one-half of the th came up. two battalions of the th regiment, who had occupied the defiles, refused to advance; men of the th regiment retired to the rear in batches. units of the th division were met by a strong artillery fire, machine-gun and rifle fire, and remained behind their barbed wire, as they were incapable of advancing. only a few shock troops and volunteers of the volga regiment, with a company of officers, succeeded in capturing the first line, but the fire was so strong that they failed to keep the position, and towards the afternoon units of the th division returned to their original lines after suffering heavy losses, especially in officers. on the sector of the st division the attack began at five minutes past seven. the nd gori regiment and the th ardagan-michailovsky regiment, as well as two companies of the sukhum regiment, with a shock company of the poti regiment, made a dash across two lines of trenches, bayoneted the enemy, and began to storm the third line at half-past seven. the break was so rapid and so unexpected that the enemy failed to establish a barrage. the st poti regiment, which was following the advance troops, approached our first line of trenches, but refused to go any further, so that our troops who had broken through were not reinforced in time. the units of the th division, which followed, could not carry out their orders because the men of the poti regiment had crowded in the trenches, while the enemy had opened a very strong gun fire. these units, therefore, partly dispersed and partly lay in our trenches. seeing that no reinforcements were forthcoming from the rear and from the flanks, the men of the gori and ardagan regiments lost heart, and some of the companies, in which all the officers had been killed, began to retire. they were followed by the remainder of the troops without, however, any pressure from the germans, who did not put their batteries and machine-guns into action until the retreat had begun.... the units of the th division were late in going into position, because the men advanced reluctantly, as their mood had changed. a quarter of an hour before the appointed time the th regiment on the right flank refused to advance, and the erivan regiment had to be drawn up from the army corps reserves. for some unknown reason the th and th regiments also failed to move.... after this failure desertion began to grow, and at dawn became general. the men were tired, nervous; they had lost the habit of fighting, and were unaccustomed to the roar of the guns owing to long months of inactivity, of fraternisation, and of meetings. they left the trenches _en masse_, they abandoned the machine-guns and retired to the rear.... _the headquarters of the th army corps sent the following report of the battle: 'the cowardice and lack of discipline in certain units reached such a pitch that the commanding officers were compelled to ask our artillery to cease firing, because the fire of our own guns caused a panic among our soldiers.'_ "i will quote another description of the battle made by an army corps commander who took command on the eve of battle, and whose impressions are therefore totally unbiassed: '... everything was ready for the advance: the plan had been worked out in detail; we had a powerful and efficient artillery; the weather was favourable because it did not allow the germans to take advantage of their superiority in aircraft; we had superior numbers, our reserves were drawn up in time, we had plenty of ammunition, and the sector was well chosen for the advance, because we were in a position to conceal strong artillery forces in the close neighbourhood of our trenches. the undulations of ground also afforded many hidden approaches to the front; the distance between ourselves and the enemy was small, and there were no natural obstacles between us which would have had to have been forced under fire. finally, the troops had been prepared by the committees, the commanding officers and the war minister, kerensky, and their efforts induced the troops to take the first, the most arduous steps. we attained considerable success without suffering appreciable losses. three fortified lines had been broken through and occupied, and there remained only separate defensive positions. the fighting might soon have reached the phase of bayonet fighting; the enemy artillery was silenced, over , germans, many machine-guns and other booty had been captured. also, our guns had inflicted heavy casualties in killed and wounded upon the enemy, and it may be confidently stated that the forces that were opposing our corps had been temporarily knocked out. along the entire front of our corps only three or four enemy batteries and occasionally three or four machine-guns were firing, and there were isolated rifle shots. but--night came. immediately i began to receive anxious reports from officers commanding sectors at the front to the effect that the men were abandoning the unattacked front line _en masse_, entire companies deserting. it was stated in some of the reports that the firing line in places was only occupied by the commanding officer, his staff, and a few men. the operations ended in an irretrievable and hopeless failure. in one day we had lived through the joy of victory, which had been won in spite of the low spirits of the men, as well as the horror of seeing the fruits of victory deliberately cast away by the soldiery. and yet the country needed that victory for its very life. i realised that we, the commanding officers, are powerless to alter the elemental psychology of the men, and i wept long and bitterly.' "this inglorious operation, however, resulted in serious losses, which it is now difficult to estimate, as crowds of fugitives returned daily. over , wounded men have already passed through sorting stations in the rear. i will refrain at present from drawing any conclusion, but the percentage of various kinds of wounds is symptomatic: per cent. heavily wounded, per cent. finger and wrist wounds, per cent. light wounds from which bandages were not removed at the dressing stations (many wounds were probably simulated), and per cent. bruised and sick. such was the end of the operation. i have never yet gone into battle with such superiority in numbers and technical means. never had the conditions been more full of such brilliant promise. on a front of about miles i had battalions against enemy battalions; guns against german: of my battalions came into action against german battalions of the st line. all that was wasted. reports from various commanders indicate that the temper of the troops immediately after the operation was just as indefinite as before. three days ago i summoned the army commanders and addressed to them the question: 'could their armies resist a strong enemy attack, provided reserves were forthcoming?' the answer was in the negative. 'could the armies resist an organised german offensive in their present condition, numerical and technical?' two of the army commanders gave indefinite replies, and the commanding officer of the th army answered in the affirmative. they all said: 'we have no infantry.' i will go further, and i will say: "_we have no army. it is necessary immediately, and at all costs to create that army._ the new government regulations, which are supposed to raise the spirit of the army, have not yet penetrated into its depths, and the impression they have produced cannot yet be defined. one thing is certain--that repression alone cannot drag the army out of the morass into which it has fallen. it is repeated every day that the bolsheviks have caused the disruption of the army, but i disagree. it is not so. the army has been disrupted by others, and the bolsheviks are like worms which have bred in the wounds of the army. the army has been disrupted by the regulations of the last four months, and it is the bitter irony of fate that this has been done by men who, however honest and idealistic, are unaware of the historical laws governing the existence of the army, of its life and routine. at first this was done under pressure from the soviet, which was primarily an anarchist institution. later it developed into a fatal, mistaken policy. soon after the war minister had taken up his duties he said to me: 'the process of revolutionising the country and the army has been completed. now we must proceed with creative work....' i ventured to reply: 'the process is completed, but it is too late.'" general brussilov here interrupted me, and asked me to curtail my report, as the conference would otherwise be too protracted. i realised that the length of the report was not what mattered, but it was its risky substance, and i replied: "i consider that this question is of paramount importance, and request that i be allowed to complete my statement, otherwise i shall have to cease speaking." a silence ensued, which i interpreted as a permission to continue. i then proceeded: "the declaration of the soldiers' rights has been issued. every one of the commanding officers has stated that it would bring about the ruin of the army. the late supreme c.-in-c., general alexeiev, telegraphed that the declaration was the last nail which was being driven into the coffin prepared for the russian army. the present supreme c.-in-c., when in command of the south-western front, declared here, at moghilev, at the conference of commanders-in-chief, that the army may yet be saved and may advance, but on one condition--if the declaration is not issued. our advice, however, was unheeded. paragraph of the declaration authorises free and open expressions of political, religious, social, and other views. the army was thus flooded by politics. when the men of the nd caucasian grenadier division were disbanded they were quite sincerely puzzled. 'what is the reason? we were allowed to speak whenever and whatever we wished, and now we are being disbanded....' you must not think that such a broad interpretation of the 'liberties' is confined to the illiterate masses. when the th infantry division was morally disrupted, and all the committees of that division passed a vote of censure upon the provisional government and categorically refused to advance, i disbanded the division. but there arose an unexpected complication: the commissars came to the conclusion that no crime had been committed, because the spoken and the written word were unrestricted. the only thing that could be incriminated was direct disobedience of army orders.... paragraph stipulates that all literature should be delivered to the addressees, and the army was flooded with criminal bolshevik and defeatist literature. the stuff upon which our army was fed--and apparently at the expense of government funds and of the people's treasure--can be gauged from the report of the moscow military bureau, which alone supplied to the front the following publications: from march th to may st-- , copies of the _pravda_ , " " _soldiers' pravda_ , " " _social democrat_ from may st to june th-- , copies of the _soldiers' pravda_ , " " _social democrat_ , " " _pravda_ and so on. the same kind of literature was sent to the villages by the soldiers. "paragraph stipulates that no soldier can be punished without a trial. of course, this liberty applied only to the men, because the officers continued to suffer the heaviest penalty of dismissal. what was the result? the central military justice administration, without reference to the stavka and in view of the impending democratisation of the courts, suggested that the latter should suspend their activities, except for cases of special importance, such, for example, as treason. the commanding officers were deprived of disciplinary powers. disciplinary courts were partly inactive, partly were boycotted. justice completely disappeared from the army. this boycott of disciplinary court and reports on the reluctance of certain units to elect juries are symptomatic. the legislator may come across the same phenomenon in respect of the new revolutionary military courts, in which juries may also have to be replaced by appointed judges. as a result of a series of legislative measures, authority and discipline have been eliminated, the officers are dishonoured, distrusted, and openly scorned. generals in high command, not excluding commanders-in-chief, are being dismissed like domestic servants. in one of his speeches at the northern front the war minister inadvertently uttered the following significant words: 'it lies within my power to dismiss the entire personnel of the high command in twenty-four hours, and the army would not object.' in the speeches addressed to the western front it was said that 'in the czarist army we were driven into battle with whips and machine-guns ... that czarist commanders led us to slaughter, but now every drop of our blood is precious....' i, the commander-in-chief, stood by the platform erected for the war minister, and i was heart-broken. my conscience whispered to me: 'that is a lie. my "iron" rifles, only eight battalions and then twelve, took over , prisoners and guns.... i have never driven them into battle with machine-guns. i have never led my troops to slaughter at mezolaborch, lutovisko, lutsk, chartoriisk.' to the late commander-in-chief of the south-western front these names are indeed familiar.... "everything may be forgiven and we can stand a great deal if it is necessary for victory, if the troops can regain their spirit and can be induced to advance.... i will venture to draw a comparison. sokolov and other petrograd delegates came to our front, to the rd suram regiment. he came with the noble object of combating dark ignorance and moral decrepitude, which were particularly apparent in that regiment. he was mercilessly flogged. we were, of course, revolted against that crowd of savage scoundrels, and everyone was perturbed. all kinds of committees passed votes of censure. the war minister condemned the behaviour of the suram regiment in fiery speeches and army orders, and sent a telegram of sympathy to sokolov. "and here is another story. i well remember january, , near lutovisko. there was a heavy frost. colonel noskov, the gallant one-armed hero, up to the waist in snow, was leading his regiment to the attack under a heavy fire against the steep and impregnable slopes of height .... death spared him then. and now two companies came, asked for general noskov, surrounded him, killed him and went away. i ask the war minister, did he condemn these foul murderers with the whole might of his fiery eloquence, of his wrath and of his power, and did he send a telegram of sympathy to the hapless family of the fallen hero? "when we were deprived of power and authority, when the term 'commanding officer' was sterilised, we have once again been insulted by a telegram from the stavka to the effect that: 'commanding officers who will now hesitate to apply armed force will be dismissed and tried.' no, gentlemen, you will not intimidate those who are ready to lose their lives in the service of their country. "the senior commanding officers may now be divided into three categories: some of them disregarding the hardships of life and service with a broken heart, are doing their duty devotedly to the end; others have lost heart and are following the tide; the third are curiously brandishing the red flag, and mindful of the traditions of the tartar captivity, are crawling before new gods of the revolution as they crawled before the czars. it causes me infinite pain to mention the question of the officers.... it is a nightmare, and i will be brief. when sokolov became familiar with the army, he said: 'i could not imagine that your officers could be such martyrs. i take off my hat to them.' yes, in the darkest days of czarist autocracy, the police and the gendarmerie never subjected the would-be criminal to such moral torture and derision as the officers have to endure at present from the illiterate masses, led by the scum of the revolution. officers who are giving their lives for the country. they are insulted at every turn. they are beaten. yes, beaten. but they will not come and complain to you. they are ashamed, dreadfully ashamed. alone, in their dug-outs, many of them are silently weeping over their dismal fate. no wonder many officers consider that the best solution is to be killed in action. listen to the subdued and placid tragedy of the following words which occur in a field report: 'in vain did the officers marching in front try to lead the men into action. at that a moment a white flag was raised on redoubt no. . fifteen officers and a small batch of soldiers then went forward. their fate is unknown--they did not return.' ( th corps). may these heroes rest in peace and their blood be upon the heads of their conscious and unconscious executioners. "the army is falling to pieces. heroic measures are needed for its salvation: ( ) the provisional government should recognise its mistakes and its guilt, as it has not understood and estimated the noble and sincere impulse of the officers who had greeted the news of the revolution with joy, and had sacrificed innumerable lives for their country. ( ) petrograd, entirely detached from the army, and ignorant of its life and of the historical foundations of its existence, should cease to enact military regulations. full power must be given to the supreme commander-in-chief, who should be responsible only to the provisional government. ( ) politics must disappear from the army. ( ) the 'declaration' must be rescinded in its fundamentals. commissars and committees must be abolished, and the functions of the latter must gradually be altered. ( ) commanding officers must be restored to power. discipline and the outward form of order and good conduct must likewise be restored. ( ) appointments to prominent posts must be made not only according to the standard of youth and strength, but also of experience in the field and in administration. ( ) special law-abiding units of all arms must be placed at the disposal of commanding officers as a bulwark against mutiny, and against the horrors of possible demobilisation. ( ) military revolutionary courts must be established and capital punishment introduced in the rear for the troops and for civilians guilty of the same crimes. "if you ask me whether these measures are likely to produce good results, i will answer frankly: yes, but not at once. it is easy to destroy the army, but time is needed for its reconstruction. the measures i suggest would at least lay the foundations for the creation of a strong army. in spite of the disruption of the army, we must continue the struggle, however arduous it may be, and we must even be prepared to retreat into the depths of the country. our allies should not count upon immediate relief through our advance. even in retreating and remaining on the defensive, we are drawing upon us enormous enemy forces, which, were they relieved, would be sent to the western front and would crush the allies and then turn against us. upon this new calvary the russian people and the russian army may yet shed rivers of blood and endure privations and misfortunes. but at the end of the calvary a bright future is in store. "there is another way. the way of treason. it would give a respite to our martyred country.... but the curse of treachery cannot give us happiness. at the end of that path there is political, moral and economic slavery. the destinies of the country are in the hands of the army. i now appeal to the provisional government represented here by two ministers: "you must lead russia towards truth and enlightenment under the banner of liberty, but you must give us a real chance of leading the troops in the name of that same liberty under our old banners. you need have no fear. the name of the autocrat has been removed from these banners as well as from our hearts. it is no longer there. but there is a mother country; there is a sea of blood; and there is the glory of our former victories. you have trampled that banner into the dust. the time has now come. raise the banners and bow to them if your conscience is still within you." * * * * * i had finished. kerensky rose, shook hands with me, and said: "thank you, general, for your outspoken and sincere speech." in the evidence which kerensky subsequently gave to the high commission for the investigation of kornilov's movement, the prime minister explained this gesture by the fact that he approved, not of the contents of my speech, but of my courage, and that he wished to emphasise his respect for every independent opinion, albeit entirely divergent from the views of the provisional government. in substance, according to kerensky, "general deniken had for the first time drawn a plan for the revanche--that music of the future military reaction." there is in these words a deep misinterpretation. we had not forgotten the galician retreat of or its causes, but, at the same time, we could not forgive kalush and tarnopol in . it was our duty, our right, and our moral obligation not to wish for either of these contingencies. i was followed by general klembovsky. i had left the assembly, and only heard the end of his speech. he described the condition of his front in terms almost identical to mine, with great restraint, and came to a conclusion that could only have been prompted by deep despair: he suggested that power should be vested at the front in a kind of peculiar triumvirate consisting of the commander-in-chief, a commissar, and an elected soldier.... general alexeiev was unwell, spoke briefly, described the condition of the rear, of the reserves and garrison troops, and endorsed the suggestions i had made. general ruzsky, who had been undergoing a protracted cure in the caucasus, and was therefore out of touch with the army, analysed the situation such as it appeared to him from the speeches that had been made. he quoted a series of historical comparisons between the old army and the new revolutionary one with such emphasis and bluntness that kerensky, in replying, accused ruzsky of advocating the return to czarist autocracy. the new men were unable to understand the passionate grief of an old soldier for the army. kerensky was probably unaware of the fact that ruzsky had been repudiated, and also passionately accused by the reactionary circles of the opposite crime, for the part which he had played in the emperor's abdication. a telegram was read from general kornilov, urging that capital punishment should be introduced in the rear, chiefly in order to cope with the licentious bands of reservists; that disciplinary powers should be vested in the commanding officers; that the competence of the army committees should be restricted and their responsibilities fixed; that meetings should be prohibited as well as anti-national propaganda, and visits to the front prohibited to various delegations and agitators. all this was practically implied in my programme, but under another shape, and was described as "military reaction." but kornilov had other suggestions. he advocated that commissars should be introduced into the army corps and given the right to confirm the verdicts of the military revolutionary tribunals, as well as to effect a "cleansing" of the commanding staffs. this last proposal impressed kerensky by its "breadth and depth of vision"--greater than those which emanated from the "old wiseacres," whom he considered intoxicated "with the wine of hate...." there was an obvious misunderstanding, because kornilov's "cleansing" was not intended against the men of solid military traditions (mistakenly identified with monarchist reaction), but against the hirelings of the revolution--unprincipled men, deprived of will-power and of the capacity of taking the responsibility upon their own shoulders. savinkov, the commissar of the south-western front, also spoke, expressing his own views only. he agreed with the general description of the front which we had given, and pointed out that it is not the fault of the revolutionary democracy that the soldiery of the old régime is still distrustful of their commanding officers; that all is not well with the latter from the military and political points of view, and that the main object of the new revolutionary institutions was to restore normal relations between these two elements of the army. kerensky made the closing speech of the conference. he tried to justify himself--spoke of the elemental character of the inevitable "democratisation" of the army. he blamed us for seeing in the revolution, and in its influence upon the russian soldier, the only cause of the _débâcle_ of july, and he severely condemned the old régime. finally, he gave us no definite directions for future work. the members of the conference dispersed with a heavy feeling of mutual misunderstanding. i was also discouraged, but at the bottom of my heart i was pleased to think--alas! i was mistaken--that our voices had been heeded. my hopes were confirmed by a letter from kornilov which i received soon after his appointment to the supreme command: "i have read the report you made at the stavka on july th with deep and sincere satisfaction. i would sign such a report with both hands; i take off my hat to you, and i am lost in admiration before your firmness and courage. i firmly believe that, with the help of the almighty, we will succeed in accomplishing the task of reconstructing our beloved army and of restoring its fighting power." fate has, indeed, cruelly derided our hopes! chapter xxx. general kornilov. two days after the moghilev conference general brussilov was relieved of the supreme command. the attempt to give the leadership of the russian armies to a person who had not only given proof of the most complete loyalty to the provisional government, but had evinced sympathy with its reforms, had failed. a leader had been superseded, who, on assuming the supreme command, gave utterance to the following: "i am the leader of the revolutionary army, appointed to this responsible post by the people in revolution and the provisional government, in agreement with the petrograd soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. i was the first to go over to the people, serve the people. i will continue to serve them, will never desert them."[ ] kerensky, in his evidence before the commission of inquiry, explained brussilov's dismissal by the catastrophal condition of the front, by the possible development of the german offensive, the absence of a firm hand at the front, and of a definite plan; by brussilov's inability to evaluate and forestall the complications of the military situation, and lastly, by his lack of influence over both officers and men. be it as it may, general brussilov's retirement from the pages of military history can in no wise be regarded as a simple episode of an administrative character. _it marks a clear recognition by the government of the wreck of its entire military policy._ on july th, by an order of the provisional government, lavr georgievich kornilov, general of infantry, was appointed to the post of supreme commander-in-chief. [map: the russian front in june and july, ] in chapter vii. i spoke of my meeting with kornilov, then commander-in-chief of the petrograd district. the whole meaning of his occupation of this post lay in the chance of bringing the petrograd garrison to a sense of duty and subordination. this kornilov failed to accomplish. a fighting general who carried fighting men with him by his courage, coolness, and contempt of death, had nothing in common with that mob of idlers and hucksters into which the petrograd garrison had been transformed. his sombre figure, his dry speech, only at times softened by sincere feeling, and above all, its tenour so far removed from the bewildering slogans of the revolution, so simple in its profession of a soldier's faith--could neither fire nor inspire the petrograd soldiery. inexperienced in political chicanery, by profession alien to those methods of political warfare which had been developed by the joint efforts of the bureaucracy, party sectarianism, and the revolutionary underworld, kornilov, as commander-in-chief of the petrograd district, could neither influence the government nor impress the soviet, which, without any cause, distrusted him from the very beginning. kornilov would have managed to suppress the petrograd praetorians, even if he had perished in doing so, but he could not attract them to himself. he felt that the petrograd atmosphere did not suit him, and when on april st, the executive committee of the soviet, after the first bolshevist attacks, passed a resolution that no military unit could leave barracks in arms without the permission of the committee, it was totally impossible for kornilov to remain at a post which gave no rights and imposed enormous responsibilities. there was yet another reason: the commander-in-chief of the petrograd district was subordinated, not to the stavka, but to the minister of war. gutchkov had left that post on april th, and kornilov did not wish to remain under kerensky, the vice-president of the petrograd soviet. [map: the russian front till august th and after] the position of the petrograd garrison and command was so incongruous that this painful problem had to be solved by artificial measures. on kornilov's initiative, and with general alexeiev's full approval, the stavka, in conjunction with the headquarters of the petrograd district, drew up a scheme for the organisation of the petrograd front, covering the approaches to the capital through finland and the finnish gulf. this front was to include the troops in finland and kronstadt, on the coast, of the reval fortified region and the petrograd garrison, the depôt battalions of which it was proposed to expand into active regiments and form into brigades; the inclusion of the baltic fleet was likewise probable. such an organisation--logical from a strategical point of view, especially in connection with the information received of the reinforcement of the german front on the line of advance on petrograd--gave the commander-in-chief the legal right to alter the dispositions to relieve the troops at the front and behind, etc. i do not know whether this would have really made it possible to free petrograd from the garrison which had become a veritable scourge to the capital, the provisional government, and even (in september) to the non-bolshevist sections of the soviet. the government most thoughtlessly bound itself by a promise, given in its first declaration, that "the troops which had taken part in the revolutionary movement should not be either disarmed or moved from petrograd." this plan, however, naturally failed on kornilov's departure, as his successors, appointed one after another by kerensky, were of such an indefinite political character, and so deficient in military experience, that it was impossible to place them at the head of so large a military force. at the end of april, just before his retirement, gutchkov wished to make kornilov commander-in-chief of the northern front, a post which had become vacant after general ruzsky's dismissal. general alexeiev and i were at the conference with thomas and the french military representatives, when i was called up to the telegraph instrument to talk with the minister of war. as general alexeiev remained at the meeting, and gutchkov was ill in bed, the negotiations, in which i acted as an intermediary, were exceedingly difficult to carry on, both technically and because, in view of the indirect transmission, it was necessary to speak somewhat guardedly. gutchkov insisted, alexeiev refused. no less than six times did i transmit their replies, which were at first reserved and then more heated. gutchkov spoke of the difficulty of managing the northern front, which was the most unruly, and of the need of a firm hand there. he said that it was desirable to retain kornilov in the immediate vicinity of petrograd, in view of future political possibilities. alexeiev refused flatly. he said nothing about "political possibilities," basing his refusal on the grounds of kornilov's inadequate service qualifications for command, and the awkwardness of passing over senior commanders more experienced and acquainted with the front, such as general abram dragomirov, for instance. nevertheless, when the next day an official telegram arrived from the ministry in connection with kornilov's appointment, alexeiev replied that he was uncompromisingly against it, and that if the appointment were made in spite of this, he would immediately send in his resignation. never had the supreme commander-in-chief been so inflexible in his communications with petrograd. some persons, including kornilov himself (as he confessed to me afterwards), involuntarily gained the impression that the question was a somewhat wider basis one than that of the appointment of the commander-in-chief ... that the fear of a future dictator played a certain part. however, this supposition is flatly contradicted by placing this episode in conjunction with the fact that the petrograd front was created for kornilov--a fact that was of no less importance and fraught with possibilities. in the beginning of may kornilov took over the th army on the south-western front. general dragomirov was appointed commander-in-chief of the northern front. this is the second event which gives the key to the understanding of the subsequent relations between alexeiev and kornilov. according to kornilov, the th army was in a state of complete disintegration when he assumed command. "for two months," says he, "i had to visit the units nearly every day and personally explain to the soldiers the necessity for discipline, encourage the officers, and urge upon the troops the necessity of an advance.... here i became convinced that firm language from the commander and definite action were necessary in order to arrest the disintegration of our army. i understood that such language was expected both by the officers and the men, the more reasonable of whom were already tired of the complete anarchy...." under what conditions kornilov made his rounds we have already shown in chapter xxiii. i hardly think that he managed to arouse the mass of soldiers to consciousness. the kalush of june th and the kalush of july th show the th army equally as heroes and as beasts. the officers and a small part of the real soldiers, however, were more than ever under the spell of kornilov's personality. its power increased among the non-socialistic sections of the russian public likewise. when, after the rout of july th, general gutor--who had been appointed to the highly responsible post of commander-in-chief of the south-western front, merely not to resist the democratisation of the army--yielded to despair and collapsed, there was no one to replace him except kornilov (on the night of july th).... the spectre of the "general on a white horse" was already looming in sight and disturbing the spiritual peace of many. brussilov was strongly opposed to this appointment. kerensky hesitated for a moment. the position, however, was catastrophical. kornilov was bold, courageous, stern, resolute and independent, and would never hesitate to show initiative or to undertake any responsibility if circumstances required it. kerensky was of the opinion[ ] that kornilov's downright qualities, though dangerous in case of success, would be only too useful in case of a panic-stricken retreat. and "when the moor has done his work, let the moor go...." so kerensky insisted on kornilov's appointment as commander-in-chief of the south-western front. on the third day after taking over his duties, kornilov wired to the provisional government: "i declare that if the government does not confirm the measures proposed by me, and deprives me of the only means of saving the army and of using it for its real purpose of defending the motherland and liberty, then i, general kornilov, will of my own accord lay down my authority as commander-in-chief...." a series of political telegrams from kornilov produced a profound impression on the country, and inspired some with fear, some with hate, and others with hope. kerensky hesitated, but what about the support of the commissars and committees? the tranquilisation and reduction to order of the south-western front attained, among other means, by kornilov's bold, resolute struggle against the army bolsheviks? the oppressive isolation felt by the minister of war after the conference of july th? the uselessness of retaining brussilov as supreme commander-in-chief and the hopelessness of placing at the head of the army generals of the new type, as shown by the experiment of appointing brussilov and gutor? savinkov's persistent advice? such were the reasons which forced kerensky--who fully recognised the inevitability of the coming collision with the man who repudiated his military policy with every fibre of his soul--to decide on the appointment of kornilov to the post of supreme commander-in-chief. there is not the slightest doubt that kerensky did this in a fit of despair. probably it was the same feeling of fatality that induced him to appoint savinkov acting minister of war. the collisions occurred sooner than might have been expected. on receiving the order for his appointment, kornilov at once sent the provisional government a telegram "reporting" that he could accept command and "lead the nation to victory and to the prospect of a just and honourable peace only on the following conditions: "( ) responsibility to his own conscience and to the whole nation. "( ) complete non-interference with his orders relating to military operations and, therefore, with the appointment of the higher command. "( ) the application of the measures recently introduced at the front to all places in the rear where drafts for the army were quartered. "( ) acceptance of his proposals telegraphed to the conference at the stavka on july th." when in due course i read this telegram in the newspapers, i was not a little surprised at the first condition, which established a highly original form of suzerainty on the part of the supreme command until the convocation of the constituent assembly. i waited impatiently for the official reply. there was none. as it turned out, on receiving kornilov's ultimatum, the council of the government hotly debated the matter, and kerensky demanded that the prestige of the high command should be upheld by the immediate removal of the new supreme commander-in-chief. the government did not agree to this, and kerensky, ignoring the other points mentioned in the telegram, replied only to the second, by recognising the right of the supreme commander-in-chief to select his own direct assistants. diverging from the established procedure of appointments, the government, simultaneously with kornilov's appointment and without his knowledge, issued an order appointing general cheremissov commander-in-chief of the south-western front. kornilov regarded this as a complete violation of his rights, and sent another ultimatum, declaring that he could continue to hold supreme command only on condition of cheremissov's immediate removal. he declined to go to moghilev before this question was settled. cheremissov, on his part, was very "nervy," and threatened to "bomb his way" into front headquarters and to establish his rights as commander-in-chief. this complicated matters still further, and kornilov reported by wire[ ] to petrograd that, in his opinion, it would be more regular to dismiss cheremissov. "for the purpose of strengthening discipline in the army, we decided to take severe measures with the soldiers; the same measures must likewise apply to the higher military commanders." the revolution had upset all mutual relations and the very essence of discipline. as a soldier, i was bound to see in all this the undermining of the authority of the provisional government (if such existed), and i could not but recognise that it was both the right and the duty of the government to make everyone respect its authority. as a chronicler, however, i must add that the military leaders had no other means of stopping this disintegration of the army, proceeding from above. and had the government actually possessed the power, and in full panoply of right and might had been able to assert itself, there would have been no ultimatums either from the soviet or from the military leaders. furthermore, there would have been no need for the events of the th of august, and those of the th of october would have been impossible. the matter finally resolved itself into the arrival of commissar filonenko at front headquarters. he informed kornilov that all his recommendations had been accepted by the government, in principle, while cheremissov was placed at the disposal of the provisional government. general balnev was hastily, at random, selected to command the south-western front, and kornilov assumed the supreme command on the th of july. the spectre of the "general on the white horse" became more and more clearly visible. and the eyes of many, suffering at the sight of the madness and the shame now engulfing russia, were again and again turned to this spectre. honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicians, soldiers and adventurers, all turned to it. and all with one voice cried out, "save us!" he, the stern and straightforward soldier, deeply patriotic, untried in politics, knowing little of men, hypnotised both by truth and flattery, and by the general longing expectation of someone's coming, moved by a fervent desire for deeds of sacrifice--he truly believed in the predestined nature of his appointment. he lived and fought with this belief, and died for it on the banks of the kuban. kornilov became a sign and rallying point. to some, of counter-revolution; to others, of the salvation of their native land. around this point a struggle for influence and power was commenced by people who, unaided, without him could not have attained to such power. a characteristic episode had already taken place on the th of july, at kamenetz-podolsk. here, in kornilov's entourage, there occurred the first conflict between savinkov and zavoiko, the former being the most prominent russian revolutionary, leader of the terrorist fighting group of the social-revolutionary party, organiser of the most notorious political assassinations--those of plehve, minister of the interior, of the grand duke serge, etc. strong-willed and cruel by nature, completely lacking in the controlling influences of "conventional morality," despising both the provisional government and kerensky, supporting the provisional government from motives of expediency, as he understood it, ready at any moment to sweep them aside--he saw in kornilov merely a weapon in the fight for revolutionary power, in which _he_ must have a dominant interest. zavoiko was one of those peculiar personages who afterwards clustered closely round kornilov and played such a prominent part in the august days. he was not very well known even to kornilov. the latter stated, in his evidence before the supreme commission of inquiry, that he became acquainted with zavoiko in april, ; that zavoiko had been "marechal de noblesse" of the haisin district of podolia, had been employed on the nobel oilfields in baku, and, by his own statements, had been employed in prospecting for minerals in turkestan and western siberia. he arrived in czernowitz, enrolled as a volunteer in the daghestan mounted regiment, and was retained at army headquarters as personal aide to kornilov. that is all that is known of zavoiko's past. kornilov's first telegram to the provisional government was edited by zavoiko, who "gave it the form of an ultimatum with a concealed threat, in case of non-compliance with the demands presented to the provisional government, to proclaim a military dictatorship on the south-western front."[ ] i discovered all this subsequently. during all these events i continued working at minsk, completely engrossed now, not by the offensive, but by the organisation of any sort of skeleton defence of the half-collapsed front. there was no information, no rumours even, of what was going on at the head of affairs. only an increased tension was noticeable in all official relations. * * * * * quite unexpectedly, in the end of july the stavka offered me the post of commander-in-chief of the south-western front. i communicated by wire with general lukomsky, the chief-of-staff of the supreme commander-in-chief, and told him that i should obey orders and go wherever i was sent, but would like to know the reason for this exchange. if the reasons were political i should ask to be left at my old post. lukomsky assured me that what kornilov had in view was only the military importance of the south-western front and the proposed strategical operations in that quarter. i accepted the post. i parted from my assistants with regret, and, having transferred my friend, general markov, to the new front, left for my new place of service together with him. on my way i stopped at moghilev. the stavka was in a very optimistic mood; everyone was animated and hopeful, but there were no signs of any "underground" conspiratory working. it should be mentioned that in this respect the military were so naïvely inexperienced, that when they really began to "conspire" their work took such _obvious_ forms that the deaf could not help hearing, nor the blind seeing, what was going on. on the day of our arrival kornilov held a council of the chiefs of departments of the stavka, at which the so-called "kornilov programme" for the restoration of the army was discussed. i was invited to attend. i shall not repeat all the fundamental propositions, which have already been mentioned both by me and in kornilov's telegrams--such demands, for instance, as the introduction of revolutionary courts-martial and capital punishment in the rear, the restoration of disciplinary authority to commanders and raising their prestige, the limitation of the activity of the committees and their responsibility, etc. i remember that side by side with clear and irrefutable propositions--the draft memorandum drawn up by the departments of the stavka--there were bureaucratic lucubrations hardly applicable in actual life. for instance, with the object of making disciplinary authority more palatable to revolutionary democracy, the authors of the memorandum had drawn up a curiously detailed list of disciplinary misdemeanour with a corresponding scale of penalties. and this was meant for the seething whirlpool of life, where all relations were trampled underfoot, all standards violated, where every fresh day brought forward an endless variety of departures from the regulations! at any rate, the supreme command was finding the proper path, and apparently kornilov's personality was a guarantee that the government would be obliged to follow that path. undoubtedly a long struggle with the soviets, committees, and soldiery was still to be waged, but, at least, the definiteness of the policy gave moral support and a tangible basis for this heavy task in the future. on the other hand, the support given to kornilov's measures by savinkov's war ministry gave reason to hope that kerensky's vacillations and indecision would finally be overcome. the attitude to this question of the provisional government as a whole was of no practical importance, and could not even be officially expressed. at that time it seemed as if kerensky had, in some degree, freed himself from the yoke of the soviet, but, just as formerly all the most important questions of state had been settled by him apart from the government, in conjunction with the leading soviet circles, now, in august, the direction of state affairs passed into the hands of a triumvirate composed of kerensky, nekrassov, and tereschenko, leaving both the socialist and liberal groups of the government out of the running. after the meeting was over kornilov asked me to stay, and, when all had left, said to me, almost in a whisper: "it is necessary to struggle, otherwise the country will perish. n. came to see me at the front. he is nursing his scheme of a _coup d'état_ and of placing the grand-duke dmitri on the throne. he is organising something or other, and has suggested collaboration. i told him flatly that i would take no part in any romanov adventures. the government itself understands that it can do nothing. they have offered my joining in the government.... no, thank you! these gentlemen are far too much entangled with the soviets, and cannot decide on anything. i have told them that if authority is given me i shall carry on a decisive struggle. we must lead russia to a constituent assembly, and then let them do what they like. i shall stand aside and not interfere in any way. now, general, may i rely on your support?" "to the fullest extent." this was my second meeting and my second conversation with kornilov. we embraced heartily and parted ... only to meet again in the bykhov prison. chapter xxxi. my service as commander-in-chief of the south-western front--the moscow conference--the fall of riga. i was touched by general alexeiev's letter: "my thoughts are with you in your new appointment. i consider that you have been sent to perform a superhuman task. much has been said, but apparently little has been done there. nothing has been done even after the th july by russia's chief babbler.... the authority of the commanders is being steadily curtailed. should you want my help in anything i am ready to go to berdichev, to go to the front, to one command or another.... god preserve you!" here was a man, indeed, whom neither an exalted position nor misfortunes could change. he was full of his modest, disinterested work for the good of his native land. a new front, new men. the south-western front, shaken by the events in july, was gradually recovering. not, however, in the sense of real convalescence, as the optimists thought, but of a return approximately to its condition prior to the offensive. there were the same strained relations between officers and men, the same slip-shod service, the desertion, and open unwillingness to fight, which was only less actively expressed owing to the lull in operations; finally there was the same bolshevist propaganda, only more active, and not infrequently disguised under the form of committee "fractions" and preparations for the constituent assembly. i have a document referring to the nd army of the western front. it is highly characteristic as an indication of the unparalleled toleration and, indeed, encouragement of the disintegration of the army on the part of the representatives of the government and commanders, under the guise of liberty and conscious voting at the elections. here is a copy of the telegram sent to all the senior officers of the nd army: the army commander, in agreement with the commissar, and at the request of the army fraction of the bolshevist social-democrats, has permitted the organisation, from the th to th october, of preparatory courses for instructors of the aforesaid fraction for the elections to the constituent assembly, one representative of the bolshevist organisation of each separate unit being sent to the said courses. no. . suvorov.[ ] the same toleration had been exercised in many cases previously, and was founded on the exact meaning of the regulations for army committees and of the "declaration of soldiers' rights." carried away by the struggle against counter-revolution, the revolutionary institutions had paid no attention to such facts as public meetings with extreme bolshevist watchwords being held at the very place where the front headquarters were situated, or that the local paper, _svobodnaia mysl_,[ ] most undisguisedly threatened the officers with a st. bartholomew's eve. the front was _holding out_. that is all that could be said of the situation. at times there would be disturbances ending tragically, such as the brutal murder of generals girshfeld, hirschfeld, and stefanovich, commissar linde. the preliminary arrangements and the concentration of the troops for the coming partial offensive were made, but there was no possibility of launching the actual attack until the "kornilov programme" had been put into practice and the results known. i waited very impatiently. the revolutionary organisations (the commissariat and committee) of the south-western front were in a position; they had not yet seized power, but some of it had already been yielded to them voluntarily by a series of commanders-in-chief--brussilov, gutor, baluev. therefore, my coming at once roused their antagonism. the committee of the western front lost no time in sending a scathing report on me to berdichev on the basis of which the next issue of the committee's organ published an impressive warning to the "enemies of democracy." as usual, i totally omitted to invoke the aid of the commissariat, and sent a message to the committee saying that i could have nothing to do with it unless it kept rigidly within the limits of the law. the commissar of the front was a certain gobechio. i saw him once only, on my arrival. in a few days he got transferred to the caucasus, and his post was taken by iordansky.[ ] as soon as he arrived he issued an "order to the troops at the front." afterwards he was unable to understand that two persons could not command the front at one and the same time. iordansky and his assistants, kostitsin and grigorier--a literary man, zoologist, and doctor respectively--were probably rather prominent men in their own profession, but utterly ignorant of military life. the committee of the front was no better and no worse than others.[ ] it took the "defencist" point of view, and even supported the repressive measures taken by kornilov in july, but at that time the committee was not in the least degree a _military_ institution organically connected--for good or evil--with the true army life. it was merely a mixed party organ. divided into "fractions" of all the socialist parties, the committee positively revelled in politics, and introduced them at the front likewise. the committee carried on propaganda on a large scale, convened congresses of representatives in order to have them converted by socialist fractions, including such as were openly antagonistic to the policy of the government. i made an attempt to stop this work in view of the impending strategical operations and the difficult period of transition, but met with determined opposition on the part of commissar iordansky. at the same time, the committee was perpetually interfering in all questions of military authority, spreading sedition and distrust to the commanders. * * * * * meanwhile, both in petrograd and moghilev, events were taking their course, and we could grasp their meaning only in so far as they were reflected by newspaper reports, rumours and gossip. there was still no "programme." the moscow state conference[ ] raised great hopes, but it met without making any changes in either state or military policy. on the contrary, it even outwardly emphasises the irreconcilable enmity between the revolutionary democracy and the liberal bourgeoisie, between the commanders and the soldiers' representatives. if the moscow conference yielded no positive results, nevertheless, it fully exposed the mood of the opponents, the leaders and the rulers. all unanimously recognised that the country was in deadly peril. everyone understood that the social relations had suffered an upheaval, that all branches of the nation's economy had been uprooted. each party reproached the other with supporting the selfish interests of their class. this, however, was not the most important matter, for, strange as it may seem, the primary causes of social class war, even the agrarian and labour questions, merely led to disagreement, without rousing any irreconcilable dissentions. even when plekhanov, the old leader of the social-democrats, amid universal approval, turned to the right demanding sacrifice, and to the left demanding moderation, it seemed as if the chasm between the two opposing social camps was not so very great. all the attention of the conference was taken up by other questions, those of _authority and of the army_. miliukov enumerated all the sins of the government, vanquished by the soviets, its "capitulation" to the ideology of the socialist parties and zimmerwaldists, capitulation in the army, in foreign policy, to the utopian demands of the working classes, to the extreme demands of nationalities. "the usurpation of the authority of the state by central and local committees and soviets," said general kaledin distinctly, "must be stopped at once and decisively." maklakov smoothed the way for his attack: "i demand nothing, but i cannot help drawing attention to the alarm felt by the social conscience when it sees that the 'defeatists' of yesterday have been invited to join the government." shulgin (right) is agitated. he says: "i want your (the provisional government's) authority to be really strong, really unlimited. i want this, though i know that a strong government easily turns to despotism, which is more likely to crush me than you, the friends of that government." on the left, jehkheidze sings the praises of the soviets: "it is only owing to the revolutionary organisations that the creative spirit of the revolution has been preserved, for the salvation of the country from the disintegration of authority and from anarchy...." "there is no power higher than that of the provisional governments," says tzeretelli, "because the source of this power the sovereign people has, through all the organs at its disposal, directly delegated this power to the provisional government." of course, in so far as that government submits to the will of the soviets?... and over all one hears the dominating voice of the president of the congress, who is seeking for "heavenly words" in order to "express his shuddering horror" at coming events, "and at the same time brandishing a wooden sword and threatening his hidden enemies thus: 'be it known to everyone who has once tried to offer armed resistance to the authority of the people that the attempt will be smothered in blood and iron. let those beware who think that the time has come for them to overthrow the revolutionary government with the help of bayonets.'" the contradiction was still more striking in military matters. in a dry but powerful speech, the supreme commander-in-chief drew a picture of the destruction of the army, involving the whole country in its ruin, and with great reserve explained the gist of his programme. general alexeiev related, with genuine bitterness, the sad story of the sins, sufferings and gallantry of the former army. "weak in technical resources and morally strong in spirit and discipline," he related how the army had lived to see the bright days of the revolution, and how later on, "when it was thought to be a danger to the conquests of the revolution, it was inoculated with deadly poison." kaledin, the don cossack attaman, representing thirteen cossack armies and unhampered by any official position, spoke sharply and distinctly: "the army must keep out of politics. there must be no political meetings with their party struggles and disputes. all the (army) soviets and committees must be abolished. the declaration of soldiers' rights must be revised. discipline must be raised both at the front and in the rear. the disciplinary authority of the commanders must be restored. all power to the leaders of the army!" kuchin, the representative of the army and front committees, rose to reply to these trite military axioms. "the committees were a manifestation of the instinct of self-defence.... they had to be formed as organs for the protection of the privates, as hitherto there had been nothing but oppression ... the committees had brought light and knowledge to the soldiers.... then came the second period--one of decay and disorganisation ... 'rearguard consciousness' made its appearance, but failed to digest all the mass of questions which the revolutions had raised in the minds of the soldiery...." now the speaker did not deny the necessity for repressive measures, but they "must be compatible with the definite work of army organisations...." how this was to be done had been shown by the united front of revolutionary democracy, namely, the army must be animated, not by the desire of victory over the enemy, but by "a repudiation of imperialistic aims, and a desire for the speedy attainment of universal peace on democratic principles.... the commanders should possess complete independence in the conduct of military operations, and have a decisive voice in questions of discipline and service training." the object of the organisations, on the other hand, was to introduce their policy wholesale among troops, and "the commissars must be the introducers of (this) single revolutionary policy of the provisional government, the army committees must direct the social and political life of the soldiers. the restoration of the disciplinary authority of the commanders is not to be thought of," etc. what is the government going to do? will it find enough strength and boldness to burst the fetters placed on it by the bolshevistic soviet?[ ] kornilov said firmly, repeating his words twice: "i do not doubt for a moment that the (my) measures will be carried out without delay." and if not--was it to be war? he also said: "it is impossible to admit that the determination to carry out these measures should in every case be aroused merely by the pressure of defeats and loss of territory. if the rout at tarnopol and the loss of galicia and bukovina did indeed result in restoration of discipline at the front, it cannot be admitted that order in the rear should be restored at the cost of the loss of riga, and that order on the railways should be restored by the cession of moldavia and bessarabia to the enemy." on the th riga fell. both strategically and tactically the front of the lower dvina was in complete preparedness. taking into consideration the strength of the defensive positions, the forces were also sufficient. the officers in command were general parsky, army commander, and general boldyrev, corps commander; both experienced generals, and certainly not inclined to counter-revolution in the opinion of the democrats.[ ] finally, from deserters' reports, our headquarters knew not only the direction but even the day and the hour of the contemplated attack. nevertheless, on the th august the germans (von hutier's th army), after heavy artillery preparation, occupied the uxküll bridgehead in the face of feeble opposition on our part, and crossed the dvina. on th august the germans assumed the offensive also along the mitau road; towards evening of the same day the enemy's uxküll group, having pierced our lines on the egel, began deploying in a northerly direction, threatening the retreat of the russian troops towards wenden. the th army, abandoning riga, retired some - versts, losing touch with the enemy, and on the th occupied the so-called wenden position. the army lost in prisoners alone some , men, besides guns, machine-guns, etc. a further advance did not enter into the german plans, and they commenced to establish themselves on the extensive terrain of the right bank of the dvina, immediately sending off two divisions to the western front. we lost the rich industrial town of riga, with all its military structures and supplies; more important still, we lost a safe defensive line, the abandonment of which placed both the dvina front and the way to petrograd under a constant threat. the fall of riga made a great impression in the country. quite unexpectedly, however, it called forth from the revolutionary democracy, not repentance, not patriotic fervour, but, instead, a still greater bitterness towards the leaders and officers. the stavka in one _communiqué_[ ] inserted the following sentence: "the disorganised masses of the soldiery are flocking in uncontrollable masses along the pskov high road and the road to bieder-limburg." this statement, undoubtedly true, and neither mentioning nor relating to the causes of the above, raised a storm amongst the revolutionary democracy. the commissars and committees of the northern front sent a series of telegrams refuting the "provocative attacks of the stavka" and assuring that "there was no shame in this reverse"; that "the troops honestly obey all demands of their leaders ... there have been no cases of flight or treachery on the part of the troops." the commissar for the front, stankevitch, while demurring against there being no shame in such a causeless and inglorious retreat, pointed out, amongst other things, a series of errors and delinquencies on the part of the commanders. it is extremely possible that there were errors, both personal and of leadership, as well as purely objective deficiencies, caused by mutual mistrust, slackening of obedience, and the _débâcle_ of the technical services. at the same time, it is undoubtedly a fact that the troops of the northern front, and especially the th army, were the most disorganised of all, and, logically, could not offer the necessary resistance. even the apologist of the th army, commissar voitinsky, who always considerably exaggerated the fighting value of these troops, telegraphed on the nd to the petrograd soviet: "the troops show want of confidence in their powers, absence of training for battle, and, consequently, insufficient steadiness in open warfare.... many units fight bravely, as in the early days; others show signs of weariness and panic." actually, the debauched northern front had lost all power of resistance. the troops rolled back to the limit of pursuit by the german advanced detachments, and only moved forward subsequently on losing touch with hutier's main body, which had no intention of passing, beyond a definite line. meanwhile, all the papers of the left commenced a fierce campaign against the stavka and the commands. the word "treachery" was heard.... tchernov's _delo naroda_, a defeatist paper, complained: "a torturing fear creeps into the mind: are not the mistakes of the commanders, the deficiencies in artillery, and the incapacity of the leaders being unloaded on to the soldiers--courageous, heroic, perishing in thousands." the _izvestia_ announced also the motives for the "provocation": "the stavka, by putting forth the bogy of menacing events, is trying to terrorise the provisional government and make it adopt a series of measures, directly and indirectly aimed at the revolutionary democracy and their organisations...." in conjunction with all these events, the feeling against the supreme commander-in-chief, general kornilov, was increasing in the soviets, and rumours of his approaching dismissal appeared in the press. in answer to these, a series of angry resolutions addressed to the government, and supporting kornilov, made their appearance.[ ] the resolution of the council of the union of cossack troops contained even the following passage: "the supersession of kornilov will inevitably imbue the cossacks with the fatal impression of the futility of further cossack sacrifices"; and, further, that the council "declines all responsibility for the cossack troops at and behind the front should kornilov be removed." such was, then, the situation. instead of pacification, passions burned fiercer, contradictions increased, the atmosphere of mutual mistrust and morbid suspicion was thickened. * * * * * i still postponed my tour of the troops, not abandoning hope of a satisfactory issue to the struggle and of the publication of the "kornilov programme."[ ] what could i bring the men? a deep, painful feeling, words appealing to "common-sense and conscience," concealing my helplessness, and like the voice of one crying in the wilderness? all had been and gone, leaving bitter memories behind. it will always be so: thoughts, ideas, words, moral persuasion will never cease to rouse men to deeds of merit; but what if overgrown, virgin soil must be torn up with an iron plough?... what should i say to the officers, sorrowfully and patiently awaiting the end of the regular and merciless lingering death of the army? for i could only say to them: if the government does not radically alter its policy the end of the army has come. on the th august orders were received to move the caucasian native ("wild") division from under my command northwards; on the th the same order was received for the rd cavalry corps, then in reserve, and later for the kornilov "shock" regiment. as always, their destination was not indicated. the direction prescribed, on the other hand, equally pointed to the northern front, at that time greatly threatened, and to ... petrograd. i recommended general krymov, commanding the rd cavalry corps, for the command of the th army. the stavka agreed, but demanded his immediate departure for moghilev on a special mission. on his way there krymov reported to me. apparently he had not yet received definite instructions--at any rate, he spoke of none; however, neither he nor i doubted that the mission was in connection with the expected change in military policy. krymov was at this time cheerful and confident, and had faith in the future; as formerly, he considered that only a crushing blow to the soviets could save the situation. following on this, official information was received of the formation of the detached petrograd army, and the appointment of an officer of the general staff to be quartermaster-general of this army was desired. finally, about the th, the situation became somewhat clearer. an officer reported to me at berdichev, and handed me a personal letter from kornilov, wherein the latter suggested i should hear this officer's verbal report. he stated as follows: "according to reliable information, a rising of the bolsheviks will take place at the end of august. by this time the rd cavalry corps,[ ] commanded by krymov, would reach petrograd, would crush the rising, and simultaneously put an end to the soviets."[ ] simultaneously, petrograd would be proclaimed in a state of war, and the laws resulting from the "kornilov programme" would be published. the supreme commander-in-chief requested me to despatch to the stavka a score or more of reliable officers--officially "for trench mortar instruction"; actually they would be sent to petrograd, and incorporated in the officers' detachment. in the course of the conversation he communicated the news from the stavka, painting all in glowing colours. he told me, among other things, of rumours concerning new appointments to the kiev, odessa and moscow commands, and of the proposed new government, mentioning some existing ministers, and some names entirely unknown to me. the part played in this matter by the provisional government, in particular by kerensky, was not clear. had he decided on an abrupt change of military policy, would he resign, or would he be swept away by developments impossible of prediction by pure logic, or the most prophetic common sense? _in this volume i described the entire course of events during august in that sequence and in that light, in which these tragic days were experienced on the south-western front, not giving them the perspective of the stage and the actors acquired subsequently._ the seconding of the officers--with all precautions to prevent either them or their superiors being placed in a false position--was commenced, but it is hardly likely that it could have been accomplished by the th. not one army commander was supplied by me with the information i had received; in fact, not one of the senior officers at the front knew anything of the events brewing. it was clear that the history of the russian revolution had entered on a new phase. what would the future bring? general markov and i spent many hours discussing this subject. he--nervous, hot-headed and impetuous--constantly wavered between the extremes of hope and fear. i also felt much the same; and both of us quite clearly saw and felt the _fatal inevitability_ of a crisis. the soviets--bolshevists or semi-bolshevists, no matter which--would unfailingly bring russia to her doom. a conflict was unavoidable. but _over there_, was there an actual chance, or was everything being done in heroic desperation? [illustration: general kornilov's welcome in moscow.] chapter xxxii. general kornilov's movement and its repercussion on the south-west front. on august th i was thunderstruck by receiving from the stavka news of the dismissal of general kornilov from the post of supreme commander-in-chief. a telegram, unnumbered, and signed "kerensky," requested general kornilov to transfer the supreme command temporarily to general lukomsky, and, without awaiting the latter's arrival to proceed to petrograd. such an order was quite illegal, and not binding, as the supreme commander-in-chief was in no way under the orders either of the war minister or of the minister-president, certainly not of comrade kerensky. general lukomsky, chief-of-staff, answered the minister-president in telegram no. , which i give below. its contents were transmitted to us, the commanders-in-chief by telegram no. . which i have not preserved. its tenor, however, is clear from the deposition of kornilov, in which he says: "i ordered that my decision (not to surrender my command, and first to elucidate the situation), and that of general lukomsky, be communicated to the commanders-in-chief on all fronts." lukomsky's telegram, no. , ran as follows: all persons in touch with military affairs were perfectly aware that, in view of the existing state of affairs, when the actual direction of internal policy was in the hands of irresponsible public organisations, having an enormously deleterious effect on the army, it would be impossible to resurrect the latter; on the contrary, the army, properly speaking, would cease to exist in two or three months. russia would then be obliged to conclude a shameful separate peace, whose consequences to the country would be terrible. the government took half measures, which, changing nothing, merely prolonged the agony, and, in saving the revolution, did not save russia. at the same time, the preservation of the benefits of the revolution depended solely on the salvation of russia, for which purpose the first step must be the establishment of a really strong government and the reform of the home front. general kornilov drew up a series of demands, the execution of which has been delayed. in these circumstances, general kornilov, actuated by no motives of personal gain or aggrandisement, and supported by the clearly-expressed will of the entire right-thinking sections of the army and the civil community, who demanded the speedy establishment of a strong government for the saving of their native land, and of the benefits of the revolution, considered more severe measures requisite which would secure the re-establishment of order in the country. the arrival of savinkov and lvov, who in your name made general kornilov similar proposals,[ ] only brought general kornilov to a speedy decision. in accordance with your suggestions, he issued his final orders, which it is now too late to repeal. your telegram of to-day shows that you have now altered your previous decision, communicated in your name by savinkov and lvov. conscience demands from me, desiring only the good of the motherland, to declare to you absolutely that it is now impossible to stop what was commenced with your approval; this will lead but to civil war, the final dissolution of the army, and a shameful separate peace, as a consequence of which the conquests of the revolution will certainly not be secured to us. in the interests of the salvation of russia you must work with general kornilov, and not dismiss him. the dismissal of general kornilov will bring upon russia as yet unheard-of horrors. personally, i decline to accept any responsibility for the army, even though it be for a short period, and do not consider it possible to take over the command from general kornilov, as this would occasion an outburst in the army which would cause russia to perish. lukomsky. all the hopes which had been entertained of the salvation of the country and the regeneration of the army by peaceful means had now failed. i had no illusions as to the consequences of such a conflict between general kornilov and kerensky, and had no hopes of a favourable termination if only general krymov's corps did not manage to save the situation. at the same time, not for one moment did i consider it possible to identify myself with the provisional government, which i considered criminally incapable, and therefore immediately despatched the following telegram: i am a soldier and am not accustomed to play hide and seek. on the th of july, in a conference with members of the provisional government, i stated that, by a series of military reforms, they had destroyed and debauched the army, and had trampled our battle honours in the mud. my retention as commander-in-chief i explained as being a confession by the provisional government of their deadly sins before the motherland, and of their wish to remedy the evil they had wrought. to-day i receive information that general kornilov, who had put forward certain demands capable yet of saving the country and the army,[ ] has been removed from the supreme command. seeing herein a return to the planned destruction of the army, having as its consequence the downfall of our country, i feel it my duty to inform the provisional government that i cannot follow their lead in this. denikin. simultaneously markov sent a telegram to the government stating his concurrence in the views expressed by me.[ ] at the same time i ordered the stavka to be asked in what way i could assist general kornilov. he knew that, besides moral support, i had no actual resources at my disposal, and, therefore, thanking me for this support, demanded no more. i ordered copies of my telegrams to be sent to all commanders-in-chief, the army commanders of the south-western front, and the inspector-general of lines of communication. i also ordered the adoption of measures which would isolate the front against the penetration of any news of events, without the knowledge of the staff, until the conflict had been decided. i received similar instructions from the stavka. i think it hardly necessary to state that the entire staff warmly supported kornilov, and all impatiently awaited news from moghilev, still hoping for a favourable termination. absolutely no measures for the detention of any persons were taken: this would have been of no use, and did not enter into our plans. meanwhile, the revolutionary democracy at the front were in great agitation. the members of the front committee on this night left their quarters and lodged in private houses on the outskirts of the town. the assistants of the commissar were at the time away on duty, and iordansky himself in zhitomir. an invitation from markov to him to come to berdichev had no result, either that night or on the th. iordansky expected a "treacherous ambush." night fell, a long, sleepless night, full of anxious waiting and oppressive thoughts. never had the future of the country seemed so dark, never had our powerlessness been so galling and oppressive. a historic tragedy, played out far from us, lay like a thundercloud over russia. and we waited, waited. i shall never forget that night. those hours still live in mental pictures. successive telegrams by direct wire: agreement apparently possible. no hopes of a peaceful issue. supreme command offered to klembovsky. klembovsky likely to refuse. one after another copies of telegrams to the provisional government from all army commanders of my front, from general oelssner and several other senior officers, voicing their adherence to the opinion expressed in my telegram. a touching fulfilment of their _civic duty_ in an atmosphere saturated with hate and suspicion. their _soldier's oath_ they could no longer keep. finally, the voice of despair from the stavka. for that is the only name for the general orders issued by kornilov on the night of the th: the telegram of the minister-president, no. [ ] in its entire first part is a downright lie: it was not i who sent vv. n. lvov, a member of the state duma, to the provisional government. he came to me as a messenger from the minister-president. my witness to this is alexei aladyin, member of the state duma. the great provocation, placing the motherland on the turn of fate, is thus accomplished. people of russia. our great motherland is dying. her end is near. forced to speak openly, i, general kornilov, declare that the provisional government, under pressure from the bolshevik majority in the soviets, is acting in complete accordance with the plans of the german general staff and simultaneously with the landing of enemy troops near riga, is killing the army, and convulsing the country internally. the solemn certainty of the doom of our country drives me in these terrible times to call upon all russians to save their dying native land. all in whose breasts a russian heart still beats, all who believe in god, go into the churches, pray our lord for the greatest miracle, the salvation of our dear country. i, general kornilov, son of a peasant cossack, announce to all and everyone that i personally desire nothing save the preservation of our great russia, and vow to lead the people, through victory over our enemies, to a constituent assembly, when they themselves will settle their fate and select the form of our new national life. i cannot betray russia into the hands of her ancient enemy--the german race!--and make the russian people german slaves. and i prefer to die honourably on the field of battle, that i may not see the shame and degradation of our russian land. people of russia, in your hands lies the life of your native land! this order was despatched to the army commanders for their information. the next day one telegram from kerensky was received at the commissariat, and from then all our communications with the outside world were interrupted.[ ] well, the die was cast. a gulf had opened between the government and the stavka, to bridge which was now impossible. on the following day, the th, the revolutionary institutions, seeing that absolutely nothing threatened them, exhibited a feverish activity. iordansky assumed the "military authority," made a series of unnecessary arrests in zhitomir among the senior officials of the chief board of supplies, and issued, under his signature and in his own name, that of the revolutionary organisations and that of the commissary of the province, an appeal, telling, in much detail and in the usual language of proclamations, how general denikin was planning "to restore the old régime and deprive the russian people of land and freedom." at the same time similar energetic work was being carried on in berdichev under the guidance of the frontal committee. meetings of all the organisations went on incessantly, along with the "education" of the typical rear units of the garrison. here the accusation brought forward by the committee was different: "the counter-revolutionary attempt of the commander-in-chief, general denikin, to overthrow the provisional government and restore nicholas ii. to the throne." proclamations to this effect were circulated in numbers among the units, pasted on walls, and scattered from motor-cars careering through the town. the nervous tension increased, the streets were full of noise. the members of the committee became more and more peremptory and exigent in their relations with markov. information was received of disorders which had arisen on the lyssaya gora (bald hill). the staff sent officers thither to clear up the matter and determine the possibility of pacification. one of them--a tchekh officer, lieutenant kletsando--who was to have spoken with the austrian prisoners, was attacked by russian soldiers, one of whom he wounded slightly. this circumstance increased the disturbance still more. from my window i watched the crowds of soldiers gathering on the lyssaya gora, then forming in column, holding a prolonged meeting, which lasted about two hours, and apparently coming to no conclusion. finally the column, which consisted of a troop of orderlies (formerly field military police), a reserve _sotnia_, and sundry other armed units, marched on the town with a number of red flags and headed by two armoured cars. on the appearance of an armoured car, which threatened to open fire, the orenburg cossack _sotnia_, which was on guard next the staff quarters and the house of the commander-in-chief, scattered and galloped away. we found ourselves completely in the power of the revolutionary democracy. "revolutionary sentries" were posted round the house. the vice-president of the committee, koltchinsky, led four armed "comrades" into the house for the purpose of arresting general markov, but then began to hesitate, and confined himself to leaving in the reception-room of the chief-of-staff two "experts" from the frontal committee to control his work. the following wireless was sent to the government: "general denikin and all his staff have been subjected to personal detention at his stavka. in the interests of the defence the guidance of the activity of the troops has been left in their hands, but is strictly controlled by the delegates of the committee." now began a series of long, endless, wearisome hours. they will never be forgotten. nor can words express the depth of the pain which now enveloped our hearts. at p.m. on the th markov asked me into the reception-room, where assistant-commissary kostitsin came with ten to fifteen armed committee members and read me an "order from the commissary of the south-western front, iordansky," according to which i, markov, and quartermaster-general orlov were to be subjected to preliminary arrest for an attempt at an armed rising against the provisional government. as a man of letters iordansky seemed to have become ashamed of the arguments about "land," "freedom," and "nicholas ii.," designed exclusively for inflaming the passions of the mob. i replied that a commander-in-chief could be removed from his post only by the supreme commander-in-chief or by the provisional government; that commissary iordansky was acting altogether illegally, but that i was obliged to submit to force. motor-cars drove up, accompanied by armoured cars, and markov and i took our seats. then came the long waiting for orlov, who was handing over the files; then the tormenting curiosity of the passers-by. then we drove on to lyssaya gora. the car wandered about for a long time, halting at one building after another, until at last we drove up to the guard-house; we passed through a crowd of about a hundred men who were awaiting our arrival, and were greeted with looks full of hatred and with coarse abuse. we were taken into separate cells; kostitsin very civilly offered to send me any of my things i might require, but i brusquely declined any services from him; the door was slammed to, the key turned noisily in the lock, and i was alone. in a few days the stavka was liquidated. kornilov, lukomsky, romanovsky, and others were taken off to the bykhov prison. the revolutionary democracy was celebrating its victory. yet at that very time the government was opening wide the doors of the prisons in petrograd and liberating many influential bolsheviks--to enable them to continue, publicly and openly, their work of destroying the russian empire. on september the provisional government arrested general kornilov; on september the provisional government liberated bronstein trotsky. these two dates should be memorable for russia. * * * * * cell no. . the floor is some seven feet square. the window is closed with an iron grating. the door has a small peep-hole in it. the cell is furnished with a sleeping bench, a table, and a stool. the air is close--an evil-smelling place lies next door. on the other side is cell no. , with markov in it; he walks up and down with large, nervous strides. somehow or other i still remember that he makes three steps along his cell, while i manage, on a curve, to make five. the prison is full of vague sounds. the strained ear begins to distinguish them, and gradually to make out the course of prison life, and even its moods. the guards--i guess them to be soldiers of the prison guard company--are rough and revengeful men. it is early morning. someone's voice is booming. whence? outside of the window, clinging to the grating, hang two soldiers. they look at me with cruel, savage eyes, and hysterically utter terrible curses. they throw in something abominable through the open window. there is no escape from their gaze. i turn to the door--there another pair of eyes, full of hatred, peers through the peep-hole; thence choice abuse pours in also. i lie down on the sleeping-bench and cover my head with my cloak. i lie for hours. the whole day, one after another, the "public accusers" replace each other at the window and at the door--the guards allow all to come freely. and into the narrow, close kennel pours, in an unceasing torrent, a foul stream of words, shouts, and curses, born of immense ignorance, blind hate, and bottomless coarseness. one's whole soul seems to be drenched with that abuse, and there is no deliverance, no escape from this moral torture chamber. what is it all about? "wanted to open the front" ... "sold himself to the germans"--the sum, too, was mentioned--"for twenty thousand roubles" ... "wanted to deprive us of land and freedom." this was not their own, this was borrowed from the committee. but commander-in-chief, general, gentleman--this, indeed, was their own! "you have drunk our blood, ordered us about, kept us stewing in prison; now we are free and you can sit behind the bars yourself. you pampered yourself, drove about in motor-cars; now you can try what lying on a wooden bench is, you ----. you have not much time left. we shan't wait till you run away--we will strangle you with our own hands." these warriors of the rear scarcely knew me at all. but all that had been gathering for years, for centuries, in their exasperated hearts against the power they did not love, against the inequality of classes, because of personal grievances and of their shattered lives--for which someone or other was to blame--all this now came to the surface in the form of unmitigated cruelty. and the higher the standing of him who was reckoned the enemy of the people, and the deeper his fall, the more violent was the hostility of the mob and the greater the satisfaction of seeing him in its hands. meanwhile, behind the wings of the popular stage stood the managers, who inflamed both the wrath and the delight of the populace; who did not believe in the villainy of the actors, but permitted them even to perish for the sake of greater realism in the performance and to the greater glory of their sectarian dogmatism. these motives of party policy, however, were called "tactical considerations." i lay, covered head and all by my cloak and, under a shower of oaths, tried to see things clearly: "what have i done to deserve this?" i went through the stages of my life.... my father was a stern soldier with a most kindly heart. up to thirty years of age he had been a peasant serf and was drafted into the army, where, after twenty-two years of hard service in the ranks, under the severe discipline of the times of nicholas i, he was promoted to the rank of nd lieutenant. he retired with the rank of major. my childhood was hard and joyless, amidst the poverty of a pension of roubles a month. then my father died. life became still harder. my mother's pension was roubles a month. my youth was passed in study and in working for my daily bread. i became a volunteer in the army, messing in barracks with the privates. then came my officer's commission, then the staff college. the unfairness of my promotion, my complaint to the emperor against the all-powerful minister of war, and my return to the nd artillery brigade. my conflict with a moribund group of old adherents of serfdom; their accusation of demagogy. the general staff. my practice command of a company in the rd pultussk regiment. here i put an end to the system of striking the soldiers and made an unsuccessful experiment in "conscious discipline." yes, mr. kerensky, i did this also in my younger days. i privately abolished disciplinary punishment--"watch one another, restrain the weak-spirited--after all, you are decent men--show that you can do your duty without the stick." i finished my command: during the year the behaviour of the company had not been above the average, it drilled poorly and lazily. after my departure the old sergeant-major, stsepoura, gathered the company together, raised his fist significantly in the air and said distinctly, separating his words: "now it is not captain denikin whom you will have. do you understand?" "yes, sergeant-major." it was said, afterwards, that the company soon showed improvement. then came the war in manchuria; active service; hopes for the regeneration of the army. then an open struggle, in a stifled press, with the higher command of the army, against stagnation, ignorance, privileges and licence--a struggle for the welfare of the officer and the soldier. the times were stern--all my service, all my military career was at stake. then came my command of a regiment, constant care for the improvement of the condition of the soldiers, after my pultussk experience--strict service demands, but also respect for the human dignity of the soldier. at that time we seemed to understand one another and were not strangers. then came war again, the "iron" division, nearer relations with the rifleman and work with him in common. the staff was always near the positions, so as to share mud, want of space, and dangers with the men. then a long, laborious path, full of glorious battles, in which a common life, common sufferings and common fame brought us still closer together, and created a mutual faith and a touching proximity. no, i have never been an enemy to the soldier. i threw off my cloak, and, jumping from the wooden bed, went up to the window, where the figure of a soldier clung to the grating, belching forth curses. "you lie, soldier! it is not your own words that you are speaking. if you are not a coward, hiding in the rear, if you have been in action, you have seen how your officers could die. you have seen that they...." his hands loosened their grip and the figure disappeared. i think it was simply because of my stern address, which, despite the impotence of a prisoner, produced its usual effect. fresh faces appeared at the window and at the peep-hole in the door. it was not always, however, that we met with insolence alone. sometimes, through the assumed rudeness of our gaolers we could see a feeling of awkwardness, confusion and even commiseration. but of these feelings they were ashamed. on the first cold night, when we had none of our things, a guard brought markov, who had forgotten his overcoat, a soldier's overcoat, but half an hour later--whether he had grown ashamed of his good action, or whether his comrades had shamed him--he took it back. in markov's cursory notes we find: "we are looked after by two austrian prisoners.... besides them, we have as our caterer a soldier, formerly of the finland rifles (a russian), a very kind and thoughtful man. during our first days he, too, had a hard time of it--his comrades gave him no peace; now, however, matters are all right; they have quieted down. his care for our food is simply touching, while the news he brings is delightful in its simplicity. yesterday, he told me that he would miss us when we are taken away. "i soothed him by saying that our places would soon be filled by new generals--that all had not yet been destroyed." my heart is heavy. my feelings seem to be split in two: i hate and despise the savage, cruel, senseless mob, but still i feel the old pity for the soldier: an ignorant, illiterate man, who has been led astray, and is capable both of abominable crimes and of lofty sacrifices! soon the duty of guarding us was given to the cadets of the nd zhitomir school of nd lieutenants. our condition became much easier from the moral point of view. they not only watched over the prisoners, but also guarded them from the mob. and the mob, more than once, on various occasions, gathered near the guard-room and roared wildly, threatening to lynch us. in such cases the company on guard gathered hastily in a house nearly opposite us and the cadets on guard made ready their machine-guns. i recall that, calmly and clearly realising my danger, when the mob was especially stormy, i planned out my method of self-defence: a heavy water-bottle stood upon my table; with it i might hit the first man to break into my cell; his blood would infuriate and intoxicate the "comrades," and they would kill me at once, without torturing me.... with the exception, however, of such unpleasant moments, our life in prison went on in a measured, methodical way; it was quiet and restful; after the strain of our campaigning, and in comparison with the moral suffering we had undergone, the physical inconveniences of the prison régime were mere trifles. our life was varied by little incidents. sometimes a bolshevist cadet standing at the door would tell the sentry loudly, so that his words might be heard in the cell, that at their last meeting the comrades of lyssaya gora, having lost all patience, had finally decided to lynch us, and added that this was what we deserved. another time, markov, passing along the corridor, saw a cadet sentry leaning on his rifle, with the tears streaming from his eyes--he felt sorry for us. what a strange, unusual exhibition of sentiment in our savage days. for a fortnight i did not leave my cell for exercise, not wishing to be an object of curiosity for the "comrades," who surrounded the square before the guard-room and examined the arrested generals as if they were beasts in a menagerie. i had no communication with my neighbours, but much time for meditation and thought. and every day as i open my window i hear from the house opposite a high, tenor voice--whether of friend or foe i know not--singing: "this is the last day that i ramble with you, my friends." chapter xxxiii. in berdichev gaol--the transfer of the "berdichev group" of prisoners to bykhov. besides markov and me, whose share in events has been depicted in the preceding chapters, the following were cast into prison: . general erdeli, commander of the special army. . lieutenant-general varnovsky, commander of the st army. . lieutenant-general selivatchev, commander of the th army. . lieutenant-general eisner, chief of supplies to the south-western front. the guilt of these men lay in their expression of solidarity with my telegram no. , and of the last, moreover, in his fulfilment of my orders for the isolation of the frontal region with respect to kiev and zhitomir. and . general eisner's assistants--general parsky and general sergievsky--men who had absolutely no connection with events. . major-general orlov, quartermaster-general of the staff of the front--a wounded man with a withered arm, timid, and merely carrying out the orders of the chief-of-staff. . lieutenant kletsando, of the tchekh troops, who had wounded a soldier of lyssaya gora on august th. . captain prince krapotkin, a man over sixty years of age, a volunteer, and the commandant of the commander-in-chief's train. he was not initiated into events at all. general selivatchev, general parsky and general sergievsky were soon released. prince krapotkin was informed on september th that his actions had not been criminal, but was set free only on september rd, when it appeared that we were not to be tried at berdichev. for a charge of rebellion to hold good against us an association of eight men at the very least had to be discovered. our antagonists were much interested in this figure, being desirous of observing the rules of decorum.... there was another prisoner, however, kept in reserve and separate from us, at the commandant's office, and even afterwards transferred to bykhov--a military official named boudilovitch--a youth weak in body, but strong in spirit, who on one occasion dared to tell a wrathful mob that it was not worth the little finger of those whom it was maltreating.[ ] no other crime was imputed to him. on the second or third day of my imprisonment i read in a newspaper, which had accidentally or purposely found its way into my cell, an order from the provisional government to the senate, dated august th, which ran as follows: "lieutenant-general denikin, commander-in-chief of the armies of the south-western front, to be removed from the post of commander-in-chief and brought to trial for rebellion.--signed: minister-president a. kerensky and b. savinkov--in charge of the war ministry." on the same date similar orders were issued concerning generals kornilov, lukomsky, markov and kisliakov. later an order was issued for the removal of general romanovsky. on the second or the third day of my arrest the guard-room was visited, for our examination, by a committee of investigation, under the superintendence of the chief field prosecutor of the front, general batog, and under the presidency of assistant-commissar kostitsin, consisting of: lieutenant-colonel shestoperov, in charge of the juridical section of the commissariat; lieutenant-colonel frank, of the kiev military court; nd lieut. oudaltsov and junior sergeant of artillery levenberg, members of the committee of the front. my evidence, in view of the facts of the case, was very short, and consisted of the following statements: ( ) none of the persons arrested with me had taken part in any active proceedings against the government; ( ) all orders given to and through the staff during my last days, in connection with general kornilov's venture, proceeded from me; ( ) i considered, and still consider, that the activity of the provisional government is criminal and ruinous for russia, but that nevertheless i had not instituted a rebellion against it, but having sent my telegram no. , i had left it to the provisional government to take such action towards me as it might see fit. later the chief military prosecutor, shablovsky, having acquainted himself with the material of the investigation and with the circumstances which had arisen around it in berdichev, was horrified at the "uncautious formulation" of my evidence. by september st iordansky was already reporting to the war ministry that the committee of investigation had discovered documents establishing the existence of a conspiracy which had long been preparing.... at the same time, iordansky, man of letters, inquired of the government whether, in the matter of the direction of the cases of the generals arrested, he could act within the limits of the law, _in conformity with local circumstances_, or whether he was bound to be guided by any _political considerations_ of the central authority. in reply he was informed that he must act reckoning with the law alone and ... _taking into consideration local circumstances_.[ ] in view of this explanation, iordansky decided to commit us for trial by a revolutionary court-martial, to which end a court was formed of members of one of the divisions formerly subordinated to me at the front, while captain pavlov, member of the executive committee of the south-western front, was marked down for public prosecutor. thus the interests of competency, impartiality and fair play were observed. iordansky was so anxious to obtain a speedy verdict for myself and for the generals imprisoned with me that on september rd he proposed that the commission, without waiting for the elucidation of the circumstances, should present the cases to the revolutionary court-martial in groups, as the guilt of one or other of the accused was established. we were much depressed by our complete ignorance of what was taking place in the outer world. on rare occasions kostitsin acquainted us with the more important current events, but in the commissar's comments on the events only depressed us still more. it was clear, however, that the government was breaking up altogether, that bolshevism was raising its head higher and higher, and that the country must inevitably perish. about september th or th, when the investigation was over, our prison surroundings underwent, to some extent, a change. newspapers began to appear in our cells almost daily; at first secretly, afterwards, from september nd, officially. at the same time, after the relief of one of the companies of guards, we decided to try an experiment: during our exercise in the corridor i approached markov and started talking with him; the sentries did not interfere. from that time we began talking with one another every day; sometimes the sentries demanded that we should stop, and then we were silent at once, but more frequently they did not interfere. in the second half of september visitors also were allowed; the curiosity of the "comrades" of lyssaya gora was now apparently satisfied; fewer of them gathered about the square, and i used to go out to walk every day, was able to see all the prisoners and exchange a few words with them now and again. now, at least, we knew what was doing in the world, while the possibility of meeting one another removed the depression caused by isolation. from the papers we learned that the investigation of the kornilov case was committed to the supreme investigation committee, presided over by the chief military and naval prosecutor, shablovsky.[ ] about september th, in the evening, a great noise and the furious shouts of a large crowd were heard near the prison. in a little while four strangers entered my cell--confused and much agitated by something or other. they said they were the president and members of the supreme committee of investigation for the kornilov case.[ ] shablovsky, in a still somewhat broken voice, began to explain that the purpose of their arrival was to take us off to bykhov, and that, judging by the temper which had developed in berdichev, and by the fury of the mob which now surrounded the prison, they could see that there were no guarantees for justice here, but only savage revenge. he added that the committee had no doubt as to the inadmissibility of any segregation of our cases, and as to the necessity of a common trial for all the participators in the kornilov venture, but that the commissariat and the committees were using all means against this. the committee, therefore, asked me whether i would not wish to supplement my evidence by any facts which might yet more clearly establish the connection between our case and kornilov's. in view of the impossibility of holding the examination amidst the roar of the crowd which had gathered, they decided to postpone it to the following day. the committee departed; soon after the crowd dispersed. what more could i tell them? only, perhaps, something of the advice which kornilov had given me at moghilev, and through a messenger. but this was done as a matter of exceptional confidence on the part of the supreme commander-in-chief, which i could in no case permit myself to break. therefore, the few details which i added next day to my original evidence did not console the commission and did not, apparently, satisfy the volunteer, a member of the committee of the front, who was present at the examination. nevertheless, we waited with impatience for our liberation from the berdichev chamber of torture. but our hopes were clouded more and more. the newspaper of the committee of the front methodically fomented the passions of the garrison; it was reported that at all the meetings of all the committees resolutions were passed against letting us out of berdichev; the committee members were agitating mightily among the rear units of the garrison, and meetings were held which passed off in a spirit of great exaltation. the aim of the shablovsky commission was not attained. as it turned out in the beginning of september, to shablovsky's demand that a separate trial of the "berdichev group" should not be allowed, iordansky replied that "to say nothing of the transfer of the generals to any place whatsoever, even the least postponement of their trial would threaten russia with incalculable calamities--complications at the front, and a new civil war in the rear," and that both on political and on tactical grounds it was necessary to have us tried in berdichev, in the shortest possible time, and by revolutionary court-martial.[ ] the committee of the front and the kiev soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates would not agree to our transfer, despite all the arguments and persuasions brought forward at their meeting by shablovsky and the members of his commission. on the way back, at moghilev, a consultation took place on this question between kerensky, shablovsky, iordansky and batog. all, excepting shablovsky, came to the altogether unequivocal conclusion that the front was shaken, that the soldiery was restless and demanding a victim, and that it was necessary to enable the tense atmosphere to discharge itself, even at the cost of injustice.... shablovsky rose and declared that he would not permit such a cynical attitude toward law and justice. i remember that this tale perplexed me. it is not worth while disputing about points of view. but if the minister-president is convinced that in the matter of protecting the state it is admissible to let oneself be guided by expediency, in what way, then, was kornilov to blame? on september th a debate took place in petrograd, in the last "court of appeal"--in the military section of the executive committee of the council of workmen's and soldiers' delegates--between shablovsky and the representative of the committee of the south-western front, fully supported by iordansky. the last two declared that if the revolutionary court-martial was not held on the spot, in berdichev, in the course of the next five days the lynching of the prisoners was to be feared. however, the central committee agreed with shablovsky's arguments, and sent its resolution to that effect to berdichev. so an organised lynching was prevented. but the revolutionary institutions of berdichev had at their service another method for liquidating the "berdichev group," an easy and irresponsible one--the method of popular wrath.... a rumour spread that we were to be taken away on the rd, then it was stated that our departure would take place on the th at p.m. from the passenger station. to take the prisoners away without making the fact public was in no way difficult: in a motor-car, on foot in a column of cadets, or, again, in a railway carriage--a narrow gauge-line came close up to the guard-house and joined on to the broad gauge-line outside the town and the railway station.[ ] but such a method of transferring us did not agree with the intentions of the commissariat and the committees. general doukhonin inquired from the stavka, of the staff of the front, whether there were any reliable units in berdichev, and offered to send a detachment to assist in our move. the staff of the front declined assistance. the commander-in-chief, general volodchenko, had left on the eve, the th, for the front.... much talk and an unhealthy atmosphere of expectation and curiosity were being artificially created around this question.... kerensky sent a telegram to the commissariat: "i am sure of the prudence of the garrison, which may elect, from among its numbers, two representatives to accompany." in the morning the commissariat began visiting all the units in the garrison, to obtain their consent to our transfer. the committee had appointed a meeting of the whole garrison for p.m., _i.e._, three hours before our departure, and in the field, moreover, immediately beside our prison. this mass meeting did indeed take place; at it the representatives of the commissariat and of the committee of the front announced the orders for our transfer to bykhov, thoughtfully announced the hour of our departure and appealed to the garrison ... to be prudent; the meeting continued for a long time and, of course, did not disperse. by o'clock an excited crowd of thousands of men had surrounded the guard-room, and its dull murmur made its way into the building. among the officers of the cadet battalion of the nd zhitomir school of nd lieutenants, which was on guard this day, was captain betling, wounded in many battles, who before the war had served in the th archangelogorod infantry regiment, which i commanded.[ ] betling asked the superior officer of the school to replace by his half-company the detachment appointed to accompany the prisoners to the railway station. we all dressed and came out into the corridor. we waited. an hour, two hours passed.... the meeting continued. numerous speakers called for an immediate lynching.... the soldier who had been wounded by lieutenant kletsando was shouting hysterically and demanding his head.... standing in the porch of the guard-room, assistant commissaries kostitsin and grigoriev were trying persuasion with the mob. that dear betling, too, spoke several times, hotly and passionately. we could not hear his words. at last, pale and agitated, betling and kostitsin came up to me. "how will you decide? the crowd has promised not to touch anyone, only it demands that you should be taken to the station on foot. but we cannot answer for anything." i replied: "let us go." i took off my cap and crossed myself: "lord, bless us!" * * * * * the crowd raged. we, the seven of us, surrounded by a group of cadets, headed by betling, who marched by my side with drawn sword, entered the narrow passage through this living human sea, which pressed on us from all sides. in front were kostitsin and the delegates (twelve to fifteen) chosen by the garrison to escort us. night was coming on, and in its eerie gloom, with the rays of the searchlight on the armoured car cutting through it now and then, moved the raving mob, growing and rolling on like a flaming avalanche. the air was full of a deafening roar, hysterical shouts, and mephitic curses. at times they were covered by betling's loud, anxious voice: "comrades, you have given your word!... comrades, you have given your word!..." the cadets, those splendid youths, crushed together on all sides, push aside with their bodies the pressing crowd, which disorders their thin ranks. passing the pools left by yesterday's rain, the soldiers fill their hands with mud and pelt us with it. our faces, eyes, ears, are covered with its fetid, viscid slime. stones come flying at us. poor, crippled general orlov has his face severely bruised; erdeli and i, as well, were struck--in the back and on the head. on our way we exchanged monosyllabic remarks. i turned to markov: "what, my dear professor, is this the end?" "apparently...." the mob would not let us come up to the station by the straight path. we were taken by a roundabout way, some three miles altogether, through the main streets of the town. the crowd is growing. the balconies of the berdichev houses are full of curious spectators; the women wave their handkerchiefs. gay, guttural voices come from above: "long live freedom!" the railway station is flooded with light. there we find a new, vast crowd of several thousand people. and all this has merged in the general sea which rages and roars. with enormous difficulty we are brought through it under a hail of curses and of glances full of hatred. the railway carriage. an officer--elsner's son--sobbing hysterically and addressing impotent threats to the mob, and his soldier servant, lovingly soothing him, as he takes away his revolver; two women, dumb with horror--kletsando's wife and sister, who had thought to see him off.... we wait for an hour, for another. the train is not allowed to leave--a prisoner's car is demanded. there were none at the station. the mob threatens to do for the commissaries. kostitsin is slightly buffeted. a goods car is brought, all defiled with horse-dung--what a trifle! we enter it without the assistance of a platform; poor orlov is lifted in with difficulty; hundreds of hands are stretched towards us through the firm and steady ranks of the cadets.... it is already p.m. the engine gives a jerk. the crowd booms out still louder. two shots are heard. the train starts. the noise dies away, the lights grow dimmer. farewell berdichev! kerensky shed a tear of delight over the self-abnegation of "our saviours"--as he called--not the cadets, but the commissaries and the committee members. "what irony of fate! general denikin, arrested as kornilov's accomplice, was saved from the rage of the frenzied soldiers by the members of the executive committee of the south-western front and by the commissaries of the provisional government." "i remember with what agitation i and the never-to-be-forgotten doukhonin read the account of how a handful of these brave men escorted the arrested generals through a crowd of thousands of soldiers who were thirsting for their blood...."[ ] why slander the dead? certainly, doukhonin was no less anxious for the fate of the prisoners than for ... the fate of their revolutionary escort.... that roman citizen, pontius pilate, smiled mockingly through the gloom of the ages.... chapter xxxiv. some conclusions as to the first period of the revolution. history will not soon give us a picture of the revolution in a broad, impartial light. those prospects which are now opening out to our view are sufficient only to enable us to grasp certain particular phenomena in it and, perhaps, to reject the prejudices and misconceptions which have sprung up around them. the revolution was inevitable. it is called a revolution of the whole people. this is correct only in so far as the revolution was the result of the discontent of literally all classes of the population with the old power. but upon the question of its achievements opinions were divided, and deep breaches were bound to appear between classes on the very next day after the downfall of the old power. the revolution was many-faced. for the peasants--the ownership of the land; for the workmen--the ownership of profits; for the liberal bourgeoisie--changed political conditions of life in the land and moderate social reforms; for the revolutionary democracy--power and the maximum of social achievement; for the army--absence of authority and the cessation of the war. with the downfall of the power of the czar, there was left in the country, until the summoning of a constituent assembly, no lawful power, no power that had a juridical basis. this is perfectly natural and follows from the very nature of a revolution. but whether through genuine misconception or deliberately perverting the truth, men have fabricated theories, known to be false, about the "general popular origin of the provisional government" or about the "full powers of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates," as an organ supposed to represent the "whole of the russian democracy." what an elastic conscience one must have, if, while professing democratic principles and protesting violently against the slightest deviation from orthodox conditions of the lawfulness of elections, one can still ascribe full powers, as the organ of democracy, to the petrograd soviet or to the congress of soviets, the election of which is of an extraordinary simplified and one-sided character. it was not without reason that for a long time the petrograd soviet hesitated to publish lists of its members. as to the supreme power, to say nothing of its "popular origin" from a "private meeting of the state duma," the technique of its construction was so imperfect that repeated crises might have put an end to its very existence and to every trace of its continuity. finally, a really "popular" government could not have remained isolated, left by all to the will of a group of usurpers of authority. that same government which, in the days of march, so easily obtained general recognition. recognition, yes, but not practical support. after march rd, and up to the constituent assembly, _every_ supreme authority bore the marks of self-assumed power, and _no_ power could satisfy all classes of the population, in view of the irreconciliableness of their interests and the intemperance of their desires. neither of the ruling powers (the provisional government and the soviet) enjoyed the due support of the _majority_. for this majority ( per cent.) said, through its representatives in the constituent assembly of : "we peasants make no difference between parties; parties fight for power, while our peasant business is the land alone." but even if, forestalling the will of the constituent assembly, the provisional government had satisfied these desires of the majority in full, it could not have reckoned on this majority's immediate submission to the general interests of the state, nor on its _active_ support: engaged in the redistribution of the land, which also had a strong attraction for the elements at the front, the peasantry would scarcely have given the state, voluntarily, the forces and the means for putting it in order, _i.e._ plenty of corn and plenty of soldiers--brave, faithful and obedient to the law. even then the government would have been faced with insoluble problems: an army which did not fight, an unproductive industry, a transport system which was being broken down and ... the civil war of parties. let us, therefore, set aside the popular and democratic origin of the provisional authority. let it be self-assumed, as it has been in the history of all revolutions and of all peoples. but the very fact of the wide recognition of the provisional government gave it a vast advantage over all the other forces which disputed its authority. it was necessary, however, that this power should become so strong, so absolute in its nature, so autocratic, as, having crushed all opposition by force, perhaps by arms, to have led the country to a constituent assembly, elected in surroundings which did not admit of the falsification of the popular vote, and to have protected this assembly. we are apt to abuse the words "elemental force," as an excuse for many phenomena of the revolution. that "molten element" which swept kerensky away with the greatest ease, has it not fallen into the iron grip of lenin-bronstein and, for more than three years, been unable to escape from bolshevist duress? if such a power, harsh, but inspired by reason and by a true desire for popular rule, had assumed authority and, having crushed the _licence_ into which _freedom_ had been transmuted, had led this authority to a constituent assembly, the russian people would have blessed, not condemned it. in such a position will every provisional authority find itself which accepts the heritage of bolshevism; and russia will judge it, not by the juridical marks of its origin, but by its works. why is the overthrow of the incompetent authority of the old government to be an achievement, to the memory of which the provisional government proposed erecting a monument in the capital, while the attempt to overthrow the incompetent authority of kerensky, made by kornilov, after exhausting all lawful means and after provocation on the part of the minister-president, is to be counted rebellion? but the need for a powerful authority is far from being exhausted by the period preceding the constituent assembly. did not the assembly of call in vain on the country, not for submission, but simply for protection from physical outrage on the part of the turbulent sailor horde? yet not a hand was raised in its defence. let us grant that _that_ assembly, born in an atmosphere of mutiny and violence, did not express the will of the russian people and that the future assembly will reflect that will more perfectly. i think, however, that even those who have the most exalted faith in the infallibility of the democratic principle do not close their eyes to the unbounded possibilities of the future which will be the heritage of such a physical and psychological transformation in the people as is unknown to history and has never yet been investigated by anyone. who knows whether it may not be necessary to confirm the democratic principle, the authority itself of the constituent assembly, and its commands, by iron and fresh bloodshed.... be that as it may, the _outward_ recognition of the provisional government took place. it would be difficult and useless to separate, in the work of the government, that which proceeded from its free will and sincere convictions from what bears the stamp of the forcible influence of the soviet. if tzeretelli was entitled to declare that "there has never yet been a case when, in important questions, the provisional government has not been ready to come to an agreement," so have we the right to identify their work and their responsibility. all this activity, _volens nolens_, bore the character of destruction, not creation. the government repealed, abolished, disbanded, permitted.... in this lay the centre of gravity of its work. i picture to myself the russia of that period as a very old house, in need of capital reconstruction. in the absence of means and while waiting for the building season (the constituent assembly), the builders began extracting the decayed girders, some of which they did not replace at all, others they replaced with light, temporary props, and others again they reinforced with new baulks without fastenings--the latter means turning out to be the worst. and the house crashed down. the causes of such a method of building were first: the absence of a complete and symmetrical plan among the russian political parties, the whole energy, mental and will tension of which were directed mainly towards the destruction of the former order. for we cannot give the name of practical plans to the abstract outlines of the party programmes; they are rather lawful or unlawful diplomas for the right of building. secondly--that the new ruling classes did not possess the most elementary technical knowledge of the art of ruling, as the result of a systematic, age-long setting them aside from these functions. thirdly--the non-forestalling of the will of the constituent assembly, which, in any case, called for heroic measures for its summoning, and therewith no less heroic measures for securing real freedom of election. fourthly--the odiousness of all that bore the stamp of the old order, even though it were sound at bottom. fifthly--the self-conceit of the political parties, each of which individually represented the "will of the whole people" and was distinguished by extreme irreconciliableness towards its antagonists. i might probably continue this list for a long time, but i shall pause on one fact which has a significance which is far from being confined to the past. the revolution was expected, it was prepared, but _no one_, not a single one of the political groups _had prepared itself for it_. and the revolution came by night, finding everyone, like the foolish virgins in the gospel, with lamps unlit. one cannot explain and excuse everything by elemental forces alone. no one had troubled to construct beforehand a general plan of the canals and sluices necessary to prevent the inundation from becoming a flood. not one of the leading parties possessed a programme for the interregnum in the life of the country, a programme which, in its character and scale, could not correspond with normal plans of construction, either in the system of administration or in the sphere of economic and social relations. it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the only assets in the possession of the progressive and socialist blocks on march th, , were: for the former--the choice for the post of minister-president of prince lvov, for the latter--the soviets and order no. . after this began the convulsive, unsystematic vacillation of the government and of the soviet. it is to be regretted that this difference, which constitutes a marked distinction between two periods--the provisional and the constructive--two systems, two programmes, has not yet become sufficiently clear in public consciousness. the whole period of the active struggle with bolshevism passed under the sign of the mingling of these two systems, of divergent views and of incapacity to construct a provisional form of authority. it would seem that now, too, the anti-bolshevist forces, while increasing the divergence of their views and building plans for the future, are not preparing for the process of assuming the power after the downfall of bolshevism, and will again approach the task with naked hands and wavering mind. only now the process will be immeasurably more difficult. for the second excuse--after "elemental forces"--for the failure of the revolution, or rather of its leading men--"the heritage of the czarist régime"--has paled very much on the background of the sanguinary bolshevist mist which has enveloped the land of russia. * * * * * the new power (the provisional government) was faced by a question of the first importance--the war. on its decision rested the fate of the country. the decision in favour of continuing the alliance and the war rested on ethical motives, which at that time did not rouse any doubts, and on practical motives, which were in some degree disputable. now, even the former have been shaken, since both the allies and the enemy have treated the fate of russia with cruel, cynical egotism. nevertheless, i have no doubt of the correctness of the decision then taken to continue the war. many suppositions might be made as to the possibilities of a separate peace--whether that of brest-litovsk or one less grievous for the state and for our national self-love. but it is to be thought that such a peace in the spring of would have led either to the dismemberment of russia and her economic _débâcle_ (a general peace at the expense of russia), or to the complete victory of the central powers over our allies, which would have produced incomparably deeper convulsions in their countries than those which the german people are now experiencing. both in the one case and in the other, no objective data would be present for any change for the better in the political, social and economic conditions of russian life and any turning of the russian revolution into other channels. only, besides bolshevism, russia would have added to her liabilities the hatred of the defeated for many years. having decided to fight, it was necessary to preserve the army by admitting a certain conservatism into it. such a conservatism serves as a guarantee for the stability of the army and of that authority which seeks support in it. if the participation of the army in historical cataclysms cannot be avoided, neither can it be turned into an arena for political struggle, creating, instead of the principle of service--_pretorians or opritchniks_, whether of the czar, of the revolutionary democracy, or of any party is a matter of indifference. the army was broken up. on those principles which the revolutionary democracy took as a basis for the existence of the army, the latter could neither build nor live. it was no mere chance that all the later attempts at armed conflict with bolshevism began with the organisation of an army on the normal principles of military administration, to which the soviet command as well sought to pass gradually. no elemental circumstances, no errors on the part of military dictatorships and of the powers co-operating with or opposing them which led to the failure of the struggle (of this some truths will be spoken later) are able to cast this undeniable fact into the shade. nor is it a mere chance that the leading circles of the revolutionary democracy could create no armed forces, except that pitiful parody on them--the "national army" on the so-called "front of the constituent assembly." it was just this circumstance that led the russian socialist emigrants to the theory of non-resistance, of the negation of armed struggle, to the concentration of all their hopes on the inner degeneration of bolshevism and its overthrow by some immaterial "forces of the people themselves," which, however, could not express themselves otherwise than by blood and iron: "the great, bloodless" revolution is drowned in blood from its beginning to its end. to refuse to consider that vast question--the re-creation of a national army on firm principles--is not to solve it. what then? on the day that bolshevism falls will peace and good-will immediately show forth in a land corrupted by a slavery worse than that of the tartar yoke, saturated with dissension, revenge, hatred, and ... an enormous quantity of arms? or, from that day forward, will the self-interested desires of many foreign governments disappear, or will they grow stronger when the menace of the moral infection of the soviet has vanished? finally, even should the whole of old europe, morally regenerated, beat out its swords into ploughshares, is it impossible for a new tchingiz-khan to come out of the depths of that asia which has accounts age-long and huge beyond measure, against europe? the army will be regenerated. of that there can be no doubt. shaken in its historical foundations and traditions, like the heroes of the russian legends, it will stand for no short time at the cross-roads, gazing anxiously into the misty distances, still wrapped in the gloom before the dawn, and listening intently to the vague sounds of the voices calling to it. and among the delusive calls it will seek, straining its hearing to the utmost, for the real voice ... the voice of its own people. printed by the field press ltd., windsor house, bream's buildings, london, e.c. . footnotes: [ ] _barin_ is the russian word for master. it also means gentleman, and was used by the peasants and by servants in addressing their superiors. [ ] the french deputy, louis martin, estimates the losses of the armies in killed alone as follows:--(in millions) russia ½, germany , austria ½, france . , great britain . , italy . , etc. russia's share of the martyrdom of all the allied forces is per cent. [ ] president of the duma. [ ] the grand duke here refers to the manifesto drafted by witte, granting various liberties and decreeing the convocation of the duma. [ ] miliukov: _history of the second russian revolution_. [ ] minister of war. [ ] chessin: _la révolution russe_. [ ] quartermaster-general of the commander-in-chief of all fronts. [ ] chief of staff of the northern front (com.-in-ch., general ruzsky). [ ] count fredericks, narishkine, ruzsky, gutchkov, shulgin. [ ] shulgin's narrative. [ ] prince lvov, miliukov, kerensky, nekrassov, teresvtchenko, godnev, lvov, gutchkov, and rodzianko. [ ] miliukov: _history of the second russian revolution_. [ ] the murder took place on the night of july th, . [ ] much time, pains and labour were devoted to the task of collecting information about the murdered imperial family by general dietrichs. [ ] the term _soviet_ for brevity will be used in the course of the narrative instead of _soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates_. [ ] the word _defensists_ is used as a translation of the newly-coined russian word _oboronetz_, which means "he who is in favour of a defensive war." [ ] a "poud" is equal to pounds. [ ] gustave le-bon, _the psychology of socialism_. [ ] the restoration of poland in her _ethnographic_ frontiers was intended by russia also. [ ] _mes souvenirs de guerre._ [ ] these lists contained the names of those suspected of relations with the enemy governments. [ ] among the members of the committee were, for instance, zourabov and perzitch, who had served under parvus. [ ] it is curious that bronstein (trotsky)--a person sufficiently competent in the matter of secret communications with the staffs of our antagonists--said in the _izvestia_ for july th, : "in the paper _nashe slovo_ i have exposed and pilloried skoropis-yoltoukhovsky, potok and melenevsky as agents of the austrian general staff." [ ] v. chap. iv.--of course articles and did not meet with the approval of public opinion. [ ] generally speaking, the special services, and especially the artillery, retained their likeness to human beings, as well as a certain amount of discipline, much longer than the infantry. [ ] leonid andreiev's article: "_to thee, oh soldier!_" [ ] the greatest part was played by lieutenant-colonels of the general staff, lebedev (afterwards chief-of-staff to admiral koltchak) and pronin. [ ] the president was colonel novosiltsev, a member of the fourth state douma, a cadet (constitutional democrat). [ ] the last charter to the cossacks of the don was granted on january , , by the emperor nicholas ii., and contained the following words: "... we confirm all the rights and privileges granted to it (the cossack army), affirming by our imperial word both the indefeasibility of its present form of service, which has earned the army of the don historic glory and the inviolability of all its estates and lands, gained by the labours, merits and blood of its ancestors...." [ ] such was the name given to the non-cossack immigrant element in the territory. [ ] with artillery to correspond. [ ] in the territory of the don the peasants formed per cent. of the population and the cossacks per cent. [ ] in places, the territorial council of "outsiders." [ ] in the principal territories--on the don and on the kouban--the cossacks formed about one-half of the population. [ ] of these phenomena i shall speak later in more detail. [ ] the don, the kouban, the terek, astrakhan, and the mountaineers of the northern caucasus. i shall speak of this later. [ ] the third cavalry corps, in kornilov's advance against kerensky. [ ] the third cavalry corps with kerensky against the bolsheviks. [ ] the ural cossacks, until their tragic fall in the end of , knew not bolshevism. [ ] general alexeiev ordered its disbandment, but kerensky permitted it to remain. [ ] they were disbanded. [ ] a socialist-revolutionary emigrant and an active worker in his party. he was appointed to this post by kerensky, at the desire of the kiev council of soldiers' delegates. [ ] oberoutchev. _in the days of the revolution._ [ ] among others, my former th rifle division was subjected to ukrainisation. [ ] the ukrainian hetman skoropadsky was one of his ancestors. [ ] formerly commander of the th army corps. [ ] the proposal of abdication made to the emperor nicholas ii. [ ] gutchkov's official letter to the president of the government. [ ] colonels: baranovsky, yakoubovitch, prince toumanov, and later verkhovsky. [ ] th july--reply to the greeting of the moghilev soviet. [ ] see his evidence before the commission of inquiry. [ ] conversation by telegraph with colonel bazanovsky. [ ] savinkov: _the kornilov affair_. savinkov's expostulations prevailed. kornilov even consented to remove zavoiko from the limits of the front, but soon recalled him. [ ] chief of staff of the army. [ ] free thought. (transl. note). [ ] former editor of the _sovremenny mir_ (contemporary world), and social-democrat of the _yedinstvo_ group. in he edited the bolshevist newspaper in helsingfors. [ ] undoubtedly better than the committee of the western front. [ ] held on august th, . [ ] in august the balance of forces in the soviet altered rapidly in favour of the bolsheviks, giving them a majority. [ ] general parsky now occupies an important post in the soviet army, while general boldyrev was subsequently commander-in-chief of the anti-bolshevist "front of the constituent assembly" on the volga. [ ] st august. [ ] from the chief committee of the union of officers, the military league, the council of the union of cossack troops, the union of the knights of st. george, the conference of public men, etc. [ ] until august th, _i.e._, until the rupture with kornilov, kerensky could not bring himself to sign the draft laws embodying the "programme." [ ] the rd cavalry corps was summoned to petrograd by the provisional government. [ ] from the report of the inquiry it is seen that savinkov, in charge of the ministry of war, and the head of kerensky's secretariat, colonel baranovsky, despatched to the stavka, themselves admitted the possibility of simultaneous action by the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates and the bolsheviks, the former under the influence of the publication of the "kornilov programme," and the necessity for ruthlessly suppressing this. (protocol appendix xiii. to kornilov's deposition.) [ ] as we shall see later, savinkov stated in his evidence that he "suggested no political combinations in the name of the minister-president." [ ] the "kornilov programme" is meant here. [ ] the commanders-in-chief of the other fronts sent the provisional government telegrams of a completely loyal nature on august th. their tenor is seen from the following extracts: "northern front--general klembovsky: consider change in supreme command extremely dangerous when the threat of an external enemy to the integrity of our native land and our freedom demands the speedy adoption of measures for the strengthening of the discipline and fighting value of our army." "western front--general baluev: the present situation of russia demands the immediate adoption of exceptional measures, and the retention of general kornilov at the head of the army is an imperative necessity, no matter what the political situation." "roumanian front--general scherbachev: the dismissal of general kornilov will infallibly have a fatal effect on the army and the defence of the motherland. i appeal to your patriotism in the name of the salvation of our native land." all the commanders-in-chief mentioned the necessity for the introduction of the measures demanded by kornilov. [ ] this telegram was not received at headquarters. kerensky gives the episode with lvov thus: "on august th general kornilov sent to me vv. n. lvov, member of the state duma, with a demand that the provisional government should cede all its military and civil authority, leaving him to form a government for the country in accordance with his own personal views." [ ] on the morning of the th a telegram from the quartermaster-general at the stavka somehow reached us, in which again hopes of a peaceful settlement were held out. [ ] he went through the kouban campaigns with the volunteer army and served in it to the day of his death, from spotted typhus, in . [ ] official communication. [ ] the members of the commission were: col. raupach and col. oukraintsev, military jurists; kolokolov, examining magistrate; and lieber and krochmal, members of the executive committee of the soviet of workmen's and soldiers' delegates. [ ] shablovsky, kolokolov, raupach and oukraintsev. [ ] shablovsky's interview in the "retch." [ ] on that same morning we had been taken without any escort, with only one guard accompanying us, to the bath, about two-thirds of a mile from the guard-house, without attracting any attention. [ ] this gallant officer was afterwards one of the first volunteers, was wounded again in kornilov's first kouban campaign in , and died in the spring of of spotted typhus. [ ] the kornilov case. * * * * * * transcriber's note: every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible. soviet order number is referred to as "order no. ." and "order no. i." in the printed text: this has been standardised to "order no. ." the original contained several unmatched double quotation marks. it was not possible to determine where the matching double quotation marks belonged, and none were added. the reference to the footnote "miliukov: _history of the second russian revolution_" on page was missing in the original. the following is a list of changes made to the original. the first line is the original line, the second the corrected one. shulguin and miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was shulgin and miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was upon which the czarist government could reply. everybody considered upon which the czarist government could rely. everybody considered the villages. government servants of all kinds were impoverishd the villages. government servants of all kinds were impoverished the proletariat, the troops, the bourgoisie, even the nobility ... the proletariat, the troops, the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ... terrorist crimes, military mutinies and aggrarian offences, etc. terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc. at pskov, on the evening of march st, the czar saw general rusky, at pskov, on the evening of march st, the czar saw general ruzsky, on the south-western front ukranian units were being formed. on the south-western front ukrainian units were being formed. socialistic dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-boshevik soviets. socialistic dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-bolshevik soviets. administration, on the same basis as that in the munipalities. administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities. of agriculture, and of the economic stablity of the state. of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the state. as life was destroying allusions, and the implacable law as life was destroying illusions, and the implacable law new revolutionary régime is much more expensive that the old one. new revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one. the baltic fleet was actally in a state of complete insubordination. the baltic fleet was actually in a state of complete insubordination. and avaresco's army on my flank. i thus gained a and averesco's army on my flank. i thus gained a south-western front, in the direction from kamemetz-podolsk to lvov, south-western front, in the direction from kamenetz-podolsk to lvov, and afforded an excuse for the abitrariness and violence and afforded an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence senior commanding staff considered as inadmissable the democratisation senior commanding staff considered as inadmissible the democratisation gutchov, his assistants, and officers of the general staff. gutchkov, his assistants, and officers of the general staff. demanded that the regimetal committees should be empowered demanded that the regimental committees should be empowered of their registration in the international control list. of their registration in the international control list." in the secret police and director of the pre-revolutionary _pravdo_ in the secret police and director of the pre-revolutionary _pravda_ (the organ of the bolshevik social domocrats) broke them down. (the organ of the bolshevik social democrats) broke them down. issuing medical certicates even to the "thoroughly fit." issuing medical certificates even to the "thoroughly fit." he had sent in a request that morning for two poods of bread. he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread. force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the motherland?" force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the motherland? factories, in the villages, among the liberal _intelligentcia_, factories, in the villages, among the liberal _intelligencia_, the don, the kouban, the terex, astrakhan, and the mountaineers the don, the kouban, the terek, astrakhan, and the mountaineers as soon as i give an order to some reserve regiment or other as soon as i gave an order to some reserve regiment or other that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top." that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top. broke our front and moved swiftly towards kaminetz-podolsk, broke our front and moved swiftly towards kamenetz-podolsk, on july th the austro-germans had aready reached mikulinze, on july th the austro-germans had already reached mikulinze, in the eyes of many people he bacame a national hero in the eyes of many people he became a national hero his chief-of-staff general lukomsky, generals alexeiev and russky, his chief-of-staff general lukomsky, generals alexeiev and ruzsky, manifested itself in a series of dismissal of senior commanders, manifested itself in a series of dismissals of senior commanders, a silence ensued, which i intrepreted as a permission to continue. a silence ensued, which i interpreted as a permission to continue. had already taken place on the th of july, at kamenets-podolsk. had already taken place on the th of july, at kamenetz-podolsk. was subordinated, not to the stavka, but to the minister of war, was subordinated, not to the stavka, but to the minister of war. the petrograd garrison, the depôt ballations of which it was proposed the petrograd garrison, the depôt battalions of which it was proposed honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicans, soldiers honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicians, soldiers even when the plekhanov, the old leader of the social-democrats, even when plekhanov, the old leader of the social-democrats, kornilov, loukomsky, romanovsky, and others were taken off kornilov, lukomsky, romanovsky, and others were taken off isolation of the frontal region wtih respect to kiev and zhitomir. isolation of the frontal region with respect to kiev and zhitomir. in the shortest possible time, and by revolutionary court-martial." in the shortest possible time, and by revolutionary court-martial. through its representatives in the consituent assembly of : through its representatives in the constituent assembly of : [ ] prince lvov, miliukov, kerensky, nekrasso, teresvtchenko, [ ] prince lvov, miliukov, kerensky, nekrassov, teresvtchenko, [ ] former editor of the _souvremenny mir_ (contemporary world), [ ] former editor of the _sovremenny mir_ (contemporary world), [transcriber's notes] here are the definitions of several unfamiliar (to me) words. batmen soldier assigned to an officer as a servant. batushka village priest. drosky cart felcher second-rate medical student or anyone with some medical knowledge. hors de combat out of the fight; disabled; not able to fight. junker aristocratic prussian landholder devoted to militarism and authoritarianism, providing the german military forces with many of its officers. knout whip with a lash of leather thongs, formerly used in russia for flogging criminals. to flog with the knout. mashie nib mashie-niblick (mah-she nib-lik)--wood shafted golf club with about the same loft and length as today's seven iron. poilus french common soldier, especially in world war i. verst russian measure of distance; feet, . mile, . km. viand choice or delicate food. volplane glide in an airplane without power. i (don kostuch) am the son of john kostuch, then from detroit, who was a mechanic in the th, company m. he saw some action in the fall of but due to flu, exposure and a dislocated joint, was evacuated to england on december , before the gruesome winter described in the book. {sources: "m" company th records and golden c. bahr papers, - .} the following text is copied from a newspaper clipping in the book. the declaration of war is on one side and an incomplete local news item is on the other side. from the indianapolis news, monday, april , u. s. declaration of war sixty-fifth congress of the united states of america at the first session begun and held at the city of washington on monday, the second day of april, one thousand nine hundred and seventeen joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists between the imperial german government and the government of the people of the united states and making provision to the same. whereas the imperial german government has committed repeated acts of war against the government and the people of the united states of america, therefore be it resolved by the senate and house of representatives of the united states of america in congress assembled, that the state of war between the united states and the imperial german government which has thus been thrust upon the united states is hereby formally declared; and that the president be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the united states and the resources of the government to carry on war against the imperial german government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the congress of the united states. ?? speaker of the house of representatives thomas r. marshall vice president of the united states and president of the senate approved april, woodrow wilson from the indianapolis news, monday, april , county pledges aid for food movement resolutions adopted, at courthouse meeting. appeal made to people the movement to make the state of indiana economically and agriculturally prepared for war, as recommended by governor james p, goodrich, had its beginning in marion county at a meeting of farmers and those interested in soil cultivation held saturday afternoon in the criminal courtroom. the necessity for the efficient utilization of all the soil resources of indiana were emphasized in addresses at the meeting, which was the beginning of a plan to create a county-wide interest in the movement. another meeting monday. the general idea of the need for greater food production, as outlined at the meeting, will be crystallized into definite plans for meeting the situation at a meeting called for monday night, to be held in the criminal court room. representatives of commercial, labor and civic bodies and organizations of all kinds are invited and requested to attend the meeting monday night and assist in the work. stirring appeals to the people of indianapolis and the county to respond to the agricultural need which this country faces in the present war period were made by speakers, including: charles v. fairbanks, formerly vice-president of the united states; the rev. frank l. loveland, pastor of the meridian street m. e. church; h. orme, president of the better farming association, and ralph m. gilbert, county agricultural agent. resolutions adopted. resolutions were adopted at the meeting pledging the support of the citizens of marion county in all measures taken for the defense of the nation and urging the people to respond to the resolutions prepared for greater and efficient food production. the resolutions prepared by a committee composed of mord gardner, ralph c. avery, fred l., smock, john e. shearer, c. c. osborn, grace may stutsman, charles p. wright and leo fesler were as follows: "whereas, by joint resolution of congress and the proclamation of the president, war has been declared on germany, and "'whereas, the president has earnestly appealed to all citizens to support the government in every possible way, and our governor has called, for meetings in each county to plan preparedness in every occupation. "resolved, that we, the citizens of marion county, assembled in meetings at the courthouse do loyally pledge the support... [torn] the following map was provide by mike grobbel (http://grobbel.org) who photographed it from the frederick c. o'dell map collection, folder number , map number , bentley historical library, university of michigan. mr. grobbel is the grandson of "corp. c. a. grobbell, "i" co." mentioned on page as a recipient of the french croix de guerre. the correct spelling is "grobbel". corp. grobbel received the distinguished service cross, not mentioned in this book. [illustration: map titled "sketch showing location of fortified areas"] [end of transcriber's notes] [illustration: primitive road through snow covered forest.] hundreds of miles through solid forests of pine and spruce the history of the american expedition fighting the bolsheviki campaigning in north russia - compiled and edited by capt. joel r. moore, th u. s. infantry lieut. harry h. mead, th u. s. infantry lieut. lewis e. jahns, th u. s. infantry published by the polar bear publishing co. detroit, mich. copyright by joel r. moore press of topping-sanders company detroit to the men who in north russia died in battle and of wounds, or of sickness due directly to hardship and exposure, this book is reverently dedicated. to our comrades and friends to our comrades and friends we address these prefatory words. the book is about to go to the printers and binders. constantly while writing the historical account of the american expedition, which fought the bolsheviki in north russia, we have had our comrades in mind. you are the ones most interested in getting a complete historical account. it is a wonderful story of your own fighting and hardships, of your own fortitude and valor. it is a story that will make the eyes of the home folks shine with pride. probably you never could have known how remarkably good is the record of your outfits in that strange campaign if you had not commissioned three of your comrades to write the book for you. in the national army, we happened to be officers; in civil life we are respectively, college professor, lawyer, and public accountant, in the order in which our names appear on the title page. but we prefer to come to you now with the finished product merely as comrades who request you to take the book at its actual value to you--a faithful description of our part in the great world war. we are proud of the record the americans made in the expedition. we think that nothing of importance has been omitted. some sources of information were not open to us--will be to no one for years. but from some copies of official reports, from company and individual diaries, and from special contributions written for us, we have been able to write a complete narrative of the expedition. in all cases except a few where the modesty of the writer impelled him to ask us not to mention his name, we have referred to individuals who have contributed to the book. to these contributors all, we here make acknowledgment of our debt to them for their cordial co-operation. for the wealth of photo-engravures which the book carries, we have given acknowledgment along with each individual engraving, for furnishing us with the photographic views of the war scenes and folk scenes of north russia. most of them are, of course, from the official united states signal corps war pictures. when we started the book, we had no idea that it would develop into the big book it is, a de luxe edition, of fine materials and fine workmanship. we have not been able to risk a large edition. only two thousand copies are being printed. they are made especially for the boys who were up there under the arctic circle, made as nice as we could get them made. of many of the comrades we have lost track, but we trust that somehow they will hear of this book and become one of the proud possessors of a copy. to our comrades and friends, we offer this volume with the expectation that you will be pleased with it and that after you have read it, you will glow with pride when you pass it over to a relative or friend to read. detroit, michigan, september, joel r. moore harry h. mead lewis e. jahns table of contents index to photo-engravures introduction u. s. a. medical units on the arctic ocean fall offensive on the railroad river push for kotlas doughboys on guard in archangel why american troops were sent to russia on the famous kodish front in the fall penetrating to ust padenga peasantry of the archangel province "h" company pushes up the onega valley "g" company far up the pinega river with wounded and sick armistice day with americans in north russia winter defense of toulgas great white reaches mournful kodish ust padenga the retreat from shenkursk defense of pinega the land and the people holding the onega valley ice-bound archangel winter on the railroad bolsheozerki letting go the tail-holt the th engineers "come get your pills" signal platoon wins commendation the doughboy's money in archangel propaganda and propaganda and-- real facts about alleged mutiny our allies, french, british and russian felchers, priests and icons bolshevism y. m. c. a. and y. w. c. a. with troops "dobra" convalescent hospital american red cross in north russia captive doughboys in bolshevikdom military decorations homeward bound in russia's fields (poem) our roll of honored dead map of the archangel fighting area index of photo-engravures hundreds of miles through solid forests surgical operation, receiving hospital, archangel old glory protects our hospital used as rd stationary hospital "olympia" sailors fought reds after -hour march in forest loading a drosky at obozerskaya wireless operators-signal platoon a shell screeched over this burial scene vickers machine gun helping hold lines our armored train first battalion hurries up river lonely post in dense forest statue of peter the great and public buildings, archangel drawing rations, verst list honors to a soldier olga barracks street car strike in archangel american hospitals "supply" co. canteen "accommodates" boys red cross ambulances, archangel "cootie mill" operating at smolny annex single flat strip of iron on plow point thankful for what at home we feed pigs artillery "o. p." kodish mill for grinding grain pioneer platoon clearing fire lane testing vickers machine gun doughboy observing bolo in pagosta, near ust padenga cossack receiving first aid ready for day's work flax hung up to dry th engineers at beresnik joe chinzi and russian bride watching her weave cloth doughboy attends spinning bee doughboy in best bed--on stove defiance to bolo advance th hospital at beresnik onega y. m. c. a., obozerskaya trench mortar crew, chekuevo--hand artillery wounded and sick--over a thousand in all bolo killed in action--for russia or trotsky? monastery at pinega russian 's bound for pinega "g" men near pinega lewis gun protects mess hall something like selective draft canadian artillery, kurgomin watch tower, verst toulgas outpost one of a bolo patrol patrolling by reindeer jitney to bakaritza russian eskimos at home near pinega fortified house, toulgas to bolsheozerki colonel morris, at right russian eskimo idol ambulance men practising rifle and pistol fire, on onega front french machine gun men at kodish allied plane carrying bombs dance at convalescent hospital--nurses and "y" girls subornya cathedral building a blockhouse market scene, yemetskoe old russian prison--annex to british hospital wash day--rinsing in river archangel cab-men minstrels of "i" company repeat program in y. m. c. a archangel girls filling christmas stockings y. m. c. a. rest room, archangel russian masonry stove--american convalescent hospital comrade allikas finds his mother in archangel printing "the american sentinel" flashlight of a doughboy outpost at verst bolo commander's sword taken in battle of bolsheozerki eight days without a shave, near bolsheozerki woodpile strong-point, verst verst --"fort nichols" back from patrol our shell bursts near the bolo skirmish line blockhouse at shred makrenga hot summer day at pinega before the world war dvina river ice jam in april bare mejinovsky--near kodish bolo general under flag truce at , april, after prisoner exchange parley pioneer platoon has fire th engineers under canvas near bolsheozerki with "m" co hospital "k. p.'s" red cross nurses bartering mascots colonel dupont (french) at bestows many croix de guerre medals on americans polish artillery and mascot russian artillery, verst canadian artillery--americans were strong for them making khleba--black bread stout defense of kitsa christmas dinner, convalescent hospital, archangel "come and get it" at orderly room, convalescent hospital, archangel american hospital scene doughboys entertained by "y" girls in hostess house doughboys drubbed sailors yank and scot guarding bolo prisoners, beresnik view of archangel in summer general ironside inspecting doughboys burial of lt. clifford phillips, american cemetery, archangel major j. brooks nichols in his railway detachment field hq ready to head memorial day parade, archangel, american cemetery, archangel soldiers and sailors of six nations reverence dead graves of first three americans killed, obozerskaya, russia sailors parade on memorial day through ice floes in arctic homeward bound out of white sea into arctic, under midnight sun introduction the troopships "somali," "tydeus," and "nagoya" rubbed the bakaritza and smolny quays sullenly and listed heavily to port. the american doughboys grimly marched down the gangplanks and set their feet on the soil of russia, september th, . the dark waters of the dvina river were beaten into fury by the opposing north wind and ocean tide. and the lowering clouds of the arctic sky added their dismal bit to this introduction to the dreadful conflict which these american sons of liberty were to wage with the bolsheviki during the year's campaign. in the rainy fall season by their dash and valor they were to expel the red guards from the cities and villages of the state of archangel, pursuing the enemy vigorously up the dvina, the vaga, the onega and the pinega rivers, and up the archangel-vologda railway and the kodish-plesetskaya-petrograd state highway. they were to plant their entrenched outposts in a great irregular horseshoe line, one cork at chekuevo, the toe at ust-padenga, the other cork of the shoe at karpagorskaya. they were to run out from the city of archangel long, long lines of communication, spread wide like the fingers of a great hand that sought seemingly to cover as much of north russia as possible with allied military protection. in the winter, in the long, long nights and black, howling forests and frozen trenches, with ever-deepening snows and sinking thermometer, with the rivers and the white sea and the arctic ocean solid ice fifteen feet thick, these same soldiers now seen disembarking from the troopships, were to find their enemy greatly increasing his forces every month at all points on the allied line. stern defense everywhere on that far-flung trench and blockhouse and fortified-village battle line. they were to feel the overwhelming pressure of superior artillery and superior equipment and transportation controlled by the enemy and especially the crushing odds of four to ten times the number of men on the battle lines. and with it they were to feel the dogged sense of the grim necessity of fighting for every verst of frozen ground. their very lives were to depend upon the stubbornness of their holding retreat. there could be no retreating beyond archangel, for the ships were frozen in the harbor. indeed a retreat to the city of archangel itself was dangerous. it might lead to revulsion of temper among the populace and enable the red guards to secure aid from within the lines so as to carry out trotsky's threat of pushing the foreign bayonets all under the ice of the white sea. and in that remarkable winter defense these american soldiers were to make history for american arms, exhibiting courage and fortitude and heroism, the stories of which are to embellish the annals of american martial exploits. they were destined, a handful of them here, a handful there, to successfully baffle the bolshevik hordes in their savage drives. in the spring the great ice crunching up in the rivers and the sea was to behold those same veteran yanks still fighting the red guard armies and doing their bit to keep the state of archangel, the north russian republic, safe, and their own skins whole. the warming sun and bursting green were to see the olive-drab uniform, tattered and torn as it was, covering a wearied and hungry and homesick but nevertheless fearless and valiant american soldier. with deadly effect they were to meet the onrushing swarms of bolos on all fronts and slaughter them on their wire with rifle and machine gun fire and smash up their reserves with artillery fire. with desperation they were to dispute the overwhelming columns of infantry who were hurled by no less a renowned old russian general than kuropatkin, and at malo bereznik and bolsheozerki, in particular, to send them reeling back in bloody disaster. they were to fight the bolshevik to a standstill so that they could make their guarded getaway. summer was to see these americans at last handing over the defenses to russian northern republic soldiers who had been trained during the winter at archangel and gradually during the spring broken in for duty alongside the american and british troops and later were to hold the lines in some places by themselves and in others to share the lines with the new british troops coming in twenty thousand strong "to finish the bloody show." gaily decorated archangel was to bid the americanski dasvedanhnia and god-speed in june. blue rippling waters were to meet the ocean-bound prows. music from the cruiser "des moines" (come to see us out) was to blow fainter and fainter in the distance as they cheered us out of the dvina river for home. now the troops are hurrying off the transport. they are just facing the strange, terrible campaign faintly outlined. it is now our duty to faithfully tell the detailed story of it--"the history of the american north russian expedition," to try to do justice in this short volume to the gripping story of the american soldiers "campaigning in north russia, - ." the american north russian expeditionary force consisted of the th infantry, which had been known at camp custer as "detroit's own," one battalion of the th engineers, the th ambulance company, and the th field hospital company. the force was under the command of col. george e. stewart, th infantry, who was a veteran of the philippines and of alaska. the force numbered in all, with the replacements who came later, about five thousand five hundred men. these units had been detached from the th division, the custer division, while it was enroute to france, and had been assembled in southern england, there re-outfitted for the climate and warfare of the north of russia. on august the th, the american forces embarked at newcastle-on-tyne in three british troopships, the "somali," the "tydeus" and the "nagoya" and set sail for archangel, russia. a fourth transport, the "czar," carried italian troops who travelled as far as the murmansk with our convoy. the voyage up the north sea and across the arctic ocean, zig-zagging day and night for fear of the submarines, rounding the north cape far toward the pole where the summer sun at midnight scarcely set below the northwestern horizon, was uneventful save for the occasional alarm of a floating mine and for the dreadful outbreak of spanish "flu" on board the ships. on board one of the ships the supply of yeast ran out and breadless days stared the soldiers in the face till a resourceful army cook cudgelled up recollections of seeing his mother use drainings from the potato kettle in making her bread. then he put the lightening once more into the dough. and the boys will remember also the frigid breezes of the arctic that made them wish for their overcoats which by order had been packed in their barrack bags, stowed deep down in the hold of the ships. and this suffering from the cold as they crossed the arctic circle was a foretaste of what they were to be up against in the long months to come in north russia. we had thought to touch the murmansk coast on our way to archangel, but as we zig-zagged through the white-capped arctic waves we picked up a wireless from the authorities in command at archangel which ordered the american troopships to hasten on at full speed. the handful of american sailors from the "olympia," the crippled category men from england and the little battalion of french troops, which had boldly driven the red guards from archangel and pursued them up the dvina and up the archangel-vologda railway, were threatened with extermination. the reds had gathered forces and turned savagely upon them. so we sped up into the white sea and into the winding channels of the broad dvina. for miles and miles we passed along the shores dotted with fishing villages and with great lumber camps. the distant domes of the cathedrals in archangel came nearer and nearer. at last the water front of that great lumber port of old peter the great lay before us strange and picturesque. we dropped anchor at : a. m. on the fourth day of september, . the anchor chains ran out with a cautious rattle. we swung on the swift current of the dvina, studied the shoreline and the skyline of the city of archangel, saw the allied cruisers, bulldogs of the sea, and turned our eyes southward toward the boundless pine forest where our american and allied forces were somewhere beset by the bolsheviki, or we turned our eyes northward and westward whence we had come and wondered what the folks back home would say to hear of our fighting in north russia. i u. s. a. medical units on the arctic ocean someone blunders about medicine stores--spanish influenza at sea and no medicine--improvised hospitals at time of landing--getting results in spite of red tape--raising stars and stripes to hold the hospital--aid of american red cross--doughboys dislike british hospital--starting american receiving hospital--blessings on the medical men. at stoney castle camp in england, inquiry by the americans had elicited statement from the british authorities that each ship would be well supplied with medicines and hospital equipment for the long voyage into the frigid arctic. but it happened that none were put on the boat and all that the medical officers had to use were three or four boxes of medical supplies that they had clung to all the way from camp custer. before half the perilous and tedious voyage was completed, the dreaded spanish influenza broke out on three of the ships. on the "somali," which is typical of the three ships, every available bed was full on the fifth day out at sea. congestion was so bad that men with a temperature of only or degrees were not put into the hospital but lay in their hammocks or on the decks. to make matters worse, on the eighth day out all the "flu" medicines were exhausted. it was a frantic medical detachment that paced the decks of those three ships for two days and nights after the ships arrived in the harbor of archangel while preparations were being made for the improvisation of hospitals. on the th of september they debarked in the rain at bakaritza. about thirty men could be accommodated in the old russian red cross hospital, such as it was, dirt and all. the remainder were temporarily put into old barracks. what "flu"-weakened soldier will ever forget those double decked pine board beds, sans mattress, sans linen, sans pillows? if lucky, a man had two blankets. he could not take off his clothes. death stalked gauntly through and many a man died with his boots on in bed. the glory of dying in france to lie under a field of poppies had come to this drear mystery of dying in russia under a dread disease in a strange and unlovely place. nearly a hundred of them died and the wonder is that more men did not die. what stamina and courage the american soldier showed, to recover in those first dreadful weeks! no attempt is made to fasten blame for this upon the american medical officers, nor upon the british for that matter. many a soldier, though, was wont to wish that major longley had not himself been nearly dead of the disease when the ships arrived. to the credit of adjutant kiley, captains hall, kinyon, martin and greenleaf and lieutenants lowenstein and danzinger and the enlisted medical men, let it be said that they performed prodigies of labor trying to serve the sick men who were crowded into the five hastily improvised hospitals. the big american red cross hospital, receiving hospital at the base, was started at archangel november nd by captain pyle under orders of major longley. the latter had been striving for quite a while to start a separate receiving hospital for american wounded, but had been blocked by the british medical authorities in archangel. they declared that it was not feasible as the americans had no equipment, supplies or medical personnel. however, the officer in charge of the american red cross force in archangel offered to supply the needed things, either by purchasing them from the stores of british medical supplies in archangel or by sending back to england for them. it is said that the repeated letters of major longley to sos in england somehow were always tangled in the british and american red tape, in going through military channels. at last major longley took the bull by the horns and accepted the aid of the red cross and selected and trained a personnel to run the hospital from among the officers and men who had been wounded and were recovered or partially recovered and were not fit for further heavy duty on the fighting line. he had the valuable assistance also of the two american red cross nurses, miss foerster and miss gosling, the former later being one of five american women who, for services in the world war, were awarded the florence nightingale medal. on september th, we opened the first red cross hospital which was also used in connection with the russian red cross hospital and was served by russian red cross nurses. captain hall and lieutenant kiley were in charge of the hospital. a few days later an infirmary was opened for the machine gunners and company "c" of the engineers at solombola. a good story goes in connection with this piece of history of the little red cross hospital on troitsky near olga barracks. there had been rumor and more or less open declaration of the british medical authorities that the americans would not be permitted to start a hospital of their own in archangel. the russian sisters who owned the building were interested observers as to the outcome of this clash in authority. it was settled one morning about ten o'clock in a spectacular manner much to the satisfaction of the americans and russians. captain wynn of the american red cross came to the assistance of captain hall, supplying the american flag and helping raise it over the building and dared the british to take it down. then he supplied the hospital with beds and linen and other supplies and comfort bags for the men, dishes, etc. this little hospital is a haven of rest that appears in the dreams today of many a doughboy who went through those dismal days of the first month in archangel. there they got american treatment and as far as possible food cooked in american style. in october the number of sick and wounded men was so large that another hospital for the exclusive use of convalescents was opened in an old russian sailor's home in the near vicinity of american headquarters. [illustration: surgeons operating on a soldier.] red cross photo surgical operation american receiving hospital, archangel, [illustration: several nurses watching the american flag being raised.] u. s. official photo old glory protects our hospital [illustration: exterior of a building, with several people in the street.] u. s. official photo used as rd stationary hospital [illustration: group of sailors holding rifles.] u. s official photo sailors from "olympia" fought reds [illustration: soldiers drying clothing over a fire.] u. s. official photo after -hour march in forest [illustration: horse drawn cart being loaded from a rail car.] u.s. official photo loading a drosky at obozerskaya [illustration: two soldiers operating radio equiptment.] u.s. official photo wireless operators--signal platoon during this controversy with the british medical authorities, the head american medical officer was always handicapped, as indeed was many a fighting line officer, by the fact that the british medical officer outranked him. let it be understood right here that many a british officer was decorated with insignia of high rank but drew pay of low rank. it was actually done over and over again to give the british officer ranking authority over the american officers. what american doughboy who ever went through the old rd stationary hospital will ever forget his homesickness and feeling of outrage at the treatment by the perhaps well-meaning but nevertheless callous and coarse british personnel. think of tea, jam and bread for sick and wounded men. an american medical sergeant who has often eaten with the british sergeants at that hospital, sergeant glenn winslow, who made out the medical record for every wounded and sick man of the americans who went through the various hospitals at archangel, and who was frequently present at the british sergeant's mess at the hospital, relates that there were plenty of fine foods and delicacies and drink for the sergeant's messes, corroborated by mess sgt. vincent of. "f" company. and a similar story was told by an american medical officer who was invalided home in charge of over fifty wounded americans. he had often heard that the comforts and delicacies among the british hospital supplies went to the british officers' messes. captain pyle was in command on the icebreaker "canada" and saw to it that the limited supply of delicacies went to the wounded men most in need of it. there were several british officers on the icebreaker enroute to murmansk who set up a pitiful cry that they had seen none of the extras to which they were accustomed, thinking doubtless that the american officer was holding back on them. captain pyle on the big ship out of murmansk took occasion to request of the british skipper that the american wounded on board the ship be given more food and more palatable food. he was asked if he expected more for the doughboy than was given to the tommie. the american officer's reply was characteristic of the difference between the attitude of british and american officers toward the enlisted man: "no, sir, it is not a question of different treatment as between tommie and doughboy. it is difference in the feeding of the wounded and sick american officers and the feeding of wounded and sick american enlisted men. my government makes no such great difference. i demand that my american wounded men be fed more like the way in which the officers on this ship are fed." lest we forget, this same medical officer in charge at one time of a temporary hospital at a key point in the field, was over-ranked and put under a british medical officer who brought about the american officer's recall to the base because he refused to put the limited american medical personnel of enlisted men to digging latrines for the british officers' quarters. many a man discharged from the british rd stationary hospital as fit for duty, was examined by american medical officers and put either into our own red cross hospital or into the american convalescent hospital for proper treatment and nourishment back to fighting condition. it was openly charged by the americans that several americans in the british hospital were neglected till they were bedsore and their lives endangered. sick and wounded men were required to do orderly work. when a sturdy american corporal refused to do work or to supervise work of that nature in the hospital, he was court-martialed by order of the american colonel commanding the american forces in north russia. of course it must needs be said that there were many fine men among the british medical officers and enlisted personnel. but what they did to serve the american doughboys was overborne by the mistreatment of the others. finally no more wounded americans were sent to the british hospital and no sick except those sick under g. o. . these latter found themselves cooped up in an old russian prison, partially cleaned up for a hospital ward. this was a real chamber of horrors to many an unfortunate soldier who was buffetted from hospital to major young's summary court to hospital or back to the guardhouse, all the while worrying about the ineffectiveness of his treatment. so the american soldiers at last got their own receiving hospital and their own convalescent hospital. of course at the fighting fronts they were nearly always in the hands of their own american medical officers and enlisted men. the bright story of the convalescent hospital appears in another place. this receiving hospital was a fine old building which one time had been a meteorological institute, a russian imperial educational institution. its great stone exterior had gathered a venerable look in its two hundred years. the americans were to give its interior a sanitary improvement by way of a set of modern plumbing. but the thing that pleased the wounded doughboy most was to find himself, when in dreadful need of the probe or knife, under the familiar and understanding and sympathetic eyes of majors henry or longley or some other american officer, to find his wants answered by an enlisted man who knew the slang of broadway and hamtramck and the small town slang of "back home in michigan, down on the farm," and to find his food cooked and served as near as possible like it was "back home" to a sick man. blessings on the medical men! ii fall offensive on the railroad third battalion hurries from troopship to troop-train bound for obozerskaya--we relieve wearied french battalion--"we are fighting an offensive war"--first engagement--memorable night march ends at edge of lake--our enemy compels respect at verst --american major hangs on--successful flank march takes verst --front line is set at by dashing attack--we hold it despite severe bombardments and heavy assaults. on the afternoon of september the fifth the rd battalion of the th infantry debarked hurriedly at bakaritza. doughboys marched down the gangplank with their full field equipment ready for movement to the fighting front. somewhere deep in the forest beyond that skyline of pine tree tops a handful of french and scots and american sailors were battling the bolos for their lives. the anxiety of the british staff officer--we know it was one of general poole's staff, for we remember the red band on his cap, was evidenced by his impatience to get the americans aboard the string of tiny freight cars. doughboys stretched their sea legs comfortably and formed in column of squads under the empty supply shed on the quay, to escape the cold drizzle of rain, while major young explained in detail how captain donoghue was to conduct the second train. all night long the two troop trains rattled along the russki railway or stood interminably at strange-looking stations. the bare box cars were corded deep with sitting and curled up soldiers fitfully sleeping and starting to consciousness at the jerking and swaying of the train. once at a weird log station by the flaring torchlights they had stood for a few minutes beside a northbound train loaded with bolshevik prisoners and deserters gathered in that day after the successful allied engagement. morning found them at a big bridge that had been destroyed by artillery fire of the red guards the afternoon before, not far from the important village of obozerskaya, a vital keypoint which just now we were to endeavor to organize the defense of, and use as a depot and junction point for other forces. no one who was there will forget the initial scene at obozerskaya when two companies of americans, "i" and "l", proceeded' up the railroad track in column of twos and halted in ranks before the tall station building, with their battalion commander holding officers call at command of the bugle. an excited little french officer popped out of his dugout and pointed at the shell holes in the ground and in the station and spoke a terse phrase in french to the british field staff officer who was gnawing his mustache. the latter overcame his embarrassment enough to tell major young that the french officer feared the bolo any minute would reopen artillery fire. then we realized we were in the fighting zone. the major shouted orders out and shooed the platoons off into the woods. later into the woods the french officers led the americans who relieved them of their circle of fortified outposts. some few in the vicinity of the scattered village made use of buildings, but most of the men stood guard in the drizzly rain in water up to their knees and between listening post tricks labored to cut branches enough to build up a dry platform for rest. the veteran french soldier had built him a fire at each post to dry his socks and breeches legs, but "the strict old disciplinarian," major young, ordered "no fires on the outpost." and this was war. far up the railroad track "at the military crest" an outpost trench was dug in strict accordance with army book plans. the first night we had a casualty, a painful wound in a doughboy's leg from the rifle of a sentry who cried halt and fired at the same time. an officer and party on a handcar had been rattling in from a visit to the front outguard. all the surrounding roads and trails were patrolled. armed escorts went with british intelligence officers to outlying villages to assemble the peasants and tell them why the soldiers were coming into north russia and enlist their civil co-operation and inspire them to enlist their young men in the slavo-british allied legion, that is to put on brass buttoned khaki, eat british army rations, and drill for the day when they should go with the allies to clear the country of the detested bolsheviki. to the american doughboys it did not seem as though the peasants' wearied-of-war countenances showed much elation nor much inclination to join up. the inhabitants of obozerskaya had fled for the most part before the reds. some of the men and women had been forced to go with the red guards. they now crept back into their villages, stolidly accepted the occupancy of their homes by the americans, hunted up their horses which they had driven into the wilderness to save them from the plundering bolo, greased up their funny looking little droskies, or carts, and began hauling supplies for the allied command and begging tobacco from the american soldiers. captain donoghue with two platoons of "k" company, the other two having been dropped temporarily at issaka gorka to guard that railroad repair shop and wireless station, now moved right out by order of colonel guard, on september seventh, on a trail leading off toward tiogra and seletskoe. somewhere in the wilds he would find traces of or might succor the handful of american sailors and scots who, under col. hazelden, a british officer, had been cornered by the red guards. "reece, reece," said the excited drosky driver as he greedily accepted his handful of driver's rations. he had not seen rice for three years. thankfully he took the food. his family left at home would also learn how to barter with the generous doughboy for his tobacco and bully beef and crackers, which at times, very rarely of course, in the advanced sectors, he was lucky enough to exchange for handfuls of vegetables that the old women plucked out of their caches in the rich black mould of the small garden, or from a cellar-like hole under a loose board in the log house. "guard duty at archangel" was aiming now to be a real war, on a small scale but intensive. obozerskaya, about one hundred miles south of archangel, in a few days took on the appearance of an active field base for aggressive advance on the enemy. here were the rapid assembling of fighting units; of transport and supply units; of railroad repairing crews, russian, under british officers; of signals; of armored automobile, our nearest approach to a tank, which stuck in the mud and broke through the frail russki bridges and was useless; of the feverish clearing and smoothing of a landing field near the station for our supply of spavined air-planes that had already done their bit on the western front; of the improvement of our ferocious-looking armored train, with its coal-car mounted naval guns, buttressed with sand bags and preceded by a similar car bristling with machine guns and lewis automatics in the hands of a motley crew of polish gunners and russki gunners and a british sergeant or two. this armored train was under the command of the blue-coated, one-armed old commander young, hero of the zeebrugge raid, who parked his train every night on the switch track next to the british headquarters car, the blue car with the union jack flying over it and the whole allied force. secretly, he itched to get his armored train into point-blank engagement with the bolshevik armored train. "all patrols must be aggressive," directed a secret order of col. guard, the british officer commanding this "a" force on the railroad, "and it must be impressed on all ranks that we are fighting an offensive war, and not a defensive one, although for the time being it is the duty of everybody to get the present area in a sound state of defense. all posts must be held to the last as we do not intend to give up any ground which we have made good." and within a week after landing in russia the american soldier was indeed making head on an offensive campaign, for on september th two platoons of "m" company reconnoitering in force met a heavy force of bolos on similar mission and fought the first engagement with the red guards, driving the reds from the station at verst and taking possession of the bridge at verst . we had ridden out past the outguard on the armored train, left it and proceeded along the railway. remember that first bolo shell? well, yes. that thing far down the straight track three miles away col. guard, before going to the rear, derisively told lieut. danley could not be a bolo armored train but was a sawmill smoke stack. suddenly it flashed. then came the distant boom. came then the whining, twist-whistling shell that passed over us and showered shrapnel near the trenches where lay our reserves. he shortened his range but we hurried on and closed with his infantry with the decision in the american doughboy's favor in his first fight. he had learned that it takes many shrapnel shells and bullets to hit one man, that to be hit is not necessarily to be killed. a few days later "l" company supported in the nick of time by two platoons of "i" company repulsed a savage counter-attack staged by the red guards, september th, on a morning that followed the capture of a crashing red bombing plane in the evening and the midnight conflagration in "l" company's fortified camp that might have been misinterpreted as an evacuation by the bolo. in this engagement lieut. gordon b. reese and his platoon of "i" company marked themselves with distinction by charging the reds as a last resort when ammunition had been exhausted in a vain attempt to gain fire superiority against the overwhelming and enveloping red line, and gave the bolshevik soldiers a sample of the fighting spirit of the americans. and the reds broke and ran. also our little graveyard of brave american soldiers at obozerskaya began to grow. it was the evening before when the bolo airman, who had dropped two small bombs at the americans at obozerskaya, was obliged to volplane to earth on the railroad near the outguard. major young was there at the time. he declared the approaching bomb-plane by its markings was certainly an allied plane, ordered the men not to discharge their lewis gun which they had trained upon it, and as the bolos hit the dirt two hundred yards away, he rushed out shouting his command, which afterwards became famous, "don't fire! we are americans." but the bolo did not "pahneemahya" and answered with his own lewis gun sending the impetuous american officer to cover where he lay even after the bolo had darted into the woods and the doughboys ran up and pulled the moss off their battalion commander whom they thought had been killed by the short burst of the bolo's automatic fire, as the major had not arisen to reply with his trusty six shooter. meanwhile "k" company had met the enemy on the seletskoe-kodish front as will be related later, and plans were being laid for a converging attack by the kodish, onega and railroad columns upon plesetskaya. "l" company was sent to support "k" company and the railroad force marked time till the other two columns could get into position for the joint drive. machine gun men and medical men coming to us from archangel brought unverified stories of fighting far up the dvina and onega rivers where the bolshevik was gathering forces for a determined stand and had caused the digging of american graves and the sending back to archangel of wounded men. this is told elsewhere. our patrols daily kept in contact with red guard outposts on the railroad, occasionally bringing in wounded bolos or deserters, who informed us of intrenchments and armored trains and augmenting bolshevik regiments. our allied force of cossacks proved unreliable and officer's patrols of americans served better but owing to lack of maps or guides were able to gain but little information of the forest trails of the area. british intelligence officers depending on old forester's maps and on deserters and prisoners and neutral natives allowed the time for "pat rooney's work," personal reconnaissance, to go by till one day, september th, general finlayson arrived at obozerskaya in person at noon and peremptorily ordered an advance to be started that afternoon on the enemy's works at versts and . col. sutherland was caught unprepared but had to obey. calling up one company of the resting french troops under the veteran african fighter, captain alliez, for support, col. sutherland asked major young to divide his two american companies into two detachments for making the flank marches and attacks upon the red positions. the marches to be made to position in the afternoon and night and the attacks to were be put on at dawn. the armored train and other guns manned by the poles were to give a barrage on the frontal positions as soon as the american soldiers had opened their surprise flank and rear attacks. then the bolos were supposed to run away and a french company supported by a section of american machine guns and a "hq." section that had been trained hastily into a stokes mortar section, were to rush in and assist in consolidating the positions gained. but this hurriedly contrived advance was doomed to failure before it started. there had not been proper preparations. the main force consisting of "m" company and two platoons of "i" company and a small detachment of engineers to blow the track in rear of the bolo position at was to march many miles by the flank in the afternoon and night but were not provided with even a map that showed anything but the merest outlines. the other detachment consisting of two remaining platoons of "i" company were little better off only they had no such great distance to go. both detachments after long hours were unable to reach the objective. this was so memorable a night march and so typical of the fall operations everywhere that space has been allowed to describe it. no one had been over the proposed route of march ordered by col. sutherland. no russian guide could be provided. we must follow the blazed trail of an east-and-west forest line till we came to a certain broad north-and-south cutting laid out in the days of peter the great. down this cutting we were to march so many versts, told by the decaying old notched posts, till we passed the enemy's flank at , then turn in toward the railroad, camp for the night in the woods and attack him in the rear at : a. m. at five o'clock in the afternoon the detachment struck into the woods. lieut. chantrill, the pleasant british intelligence officer who acted as interpreter, volunteered to go as guide although he had no familiarity with the swamp-infested forest area. it was dark long before we reached the broad cutting. no one will forget the ordeal of that night march. could not see the man ahead of you. ears told you he was tripping over fallen timber or sloshing in knee-deep bog hole. hard breathing told the story of exertion. only above and forward was there a faint streak of starlight that uncertainly led us on and on south toward the vicinity of the bolo positions. hours later we emerge from the woods cutting into a great marsh. far in the dark on the other side we must hit the cutting in the heavy pine woods. for two hours we struggle on. we lose our direction. the marsh is a bog. to the right, to the left, in front the tantalizing optical illusion lures us on toward an apparently firmer footing. but ever the same, or worse, treacherous mire. we cannot stand a moment in a spot. we must flounder on. the column has to spread. distress comes from every side. men are down and groggy. some one who is responsible for that body of men sweats blood and swears hatred to the muddler who is to blame. how clearly sounds the exhaust of the locomotives in the bolo camp on the nearby railroad. will their outguards hear us? courage, men, we must get on. this is a fine end. d-- that unverified old map the colonel has. it did not show this lake that baffles our further struggles to advance. detour of the unknown lake without a guide, especially in our present exhausted condition, is impossible. (two weeks later with two russian guides and american officers who had explored the way, we thought it a wonderful feat to thread our way around with a column). judgment now dictates that it is best to retrace our steps and cut in at to be in position to be of use in the reserve or in the consolidation. we have failed to reach our objective but it is not our fault. we followed orders and directions but they were faulty. it is a story that was to be duplicated over and over by one american force after another on the various fronts in the rainy fall season, operating under british officers who took desperate chances and acted on the theory that "you americans," as col. sutherland said, "can do it somehow, you know." and as to numbers, why, "ten americans are as good as a hundred bolos, aren't they?" but how shall we extricate ourselves? who knows where the cutting may be found? can staggering men again survive the treacherous morass? it is lighter now. we will pick our way better. but where is the cutting? chantrill and the captain despair. have we missed it in, the dark? then we are done for. where is the "i" co. detachment again? lost? here corporal grahek, and you, sgt. getzloff, you old woodsmen from north michigan pines, scout around here and find the cutting and that rear party. who is it that you men are carrying? no trace of the rear part of the column nor of the cutting! one thing remains to do. we must risk a shout, though the reds may hear. "danley! eeyohoh!" "yes, h-e-e-e-r-r-e on the c-u-t-t-i-n-g!" did ever the straight and narrow way seem so good. the column is soon united again and the back trail despondingly begun. daylight of a sunday morning aids our footsteps. we cross again the stream we had waded waist deep in the pitch dark and wondered that no one had been drowned. zero hour arrives and we listen to the artillery of both sides and for the rat-tat-tat of the bolo machine guns when our forces move on the bridgehead. we hurry on. the battle is joined. pine woods roar and reverberate with roar. by taking a nearer blazed trail we may come out to the railway somewhere near the battle line. at : a. m. we emerge from the woods near our armored train. at field headquarters, major nichols, who in the thick of the battle has arrived to relieve major young, orders every man at once to be made as comfortable as possible. men build fires and warm and dry their clammy water-soaked feet, picture of which is shown in this volume. bully and tea and hard tack revive a good many. it is well they do, for the fight is going against us and two detachments of volunteers from these men are soon, to be asked for to go forward to the battle line. considerable detail has been given about this march of "i" and "m" because writer was familiar with it, but a similar story might be told of "h" in the swamps on the onega, or of "k" or "l" and "m. g." at kodish, or of "a," "b," "c" or "d" on the river fronts, and with equal praise for the hardihood of the american doughboy hopelessly mired in swamps and lost in the dense forests, baffled in his attempts because of no fault of his own, but ready after an hour's rest to go at it again, as in this case when a volunteer platoon went forward to support the badly suffering line. the red guards composed of the letts and sailors were fiercely counter-attacking and threatening to sweep back the line and capture field-headquarters. during the preceding hours the french company had pressed in gallantly after the artillery and machine gun barrage and captured the bridgehead, and, supported by the american machine gun men and the trench mortar men, had taken the bolo's first trench line, seeking to consolidate the position. lieut. keith of "hq." company with twenty-one men and three stokes mortars had gone through the woods and taking a lucky direction, avoided the swamp and cut in to the railroad, arriving in the morning just after the barrage and the french infantry attack had driven the reds from their first line. they took possession of three bolshevik shacks and a german machine gun, using hand grenades in driving the reds out. then they placed their trench mortars in position to meet the bolo counter-attack. the bolos came in on the left flank under cover of the woods, the french infantry at that time being on the right flank in the woods, and two platoons of americans being lost somewhere on the left in the swamp. this counterattack of the reds was repulsed by the trench mortar boys who, however, found themselves at the end of the attack with no more ammunition for their mortars, col. sutherland not having provided for the sending of reserve ammunition to the mortars from obozerskaya. consequently the second attack of the reds was waited with anxiety. the reds were in great force and well led. they came in at a new angle and divided the americans and french, completely overwhelming the trench mortar men's rifle fire and putting costello's valiant machine guns out of action, too. lieut keith was severely wounded, one man was killed, four wounded and three missing. sgt. kolbe and pvt. driscoll after prodigies of valor with their machine guns were obliged to fall back with the french. kolbe was severely wounded. so the bolo yells that day sounded in triumph as they won back their positions from the americans and french. the writer knows, for he heard those hellish yells. under cover of the single "m" company platoon rushed up to the bridge, the americans and french whose gallant efforts had gone for naught because col. sutherland's battle plan was a "dud," retired to field headquarters at . a half platoon of "i" men hurried up to support. the veteran alliez encouraged the american officer captain moore, to hang on to the bridge. lieut. spitler came on with a machine gun and the position was consolidated and held in spite of heavy shelling by the bolo armored trains and his desperate raids at night and in the morning, for the purpose of destroying the bridge. his high explosive tore up the track but did no damage to the bridge. his infantry recoiled from the lewis gun and machine gun fire of the americans that covered the bridge and its approaches. the day's operations had been costly. the french had lost eight, killed and wounded and missing. the americans had lost four killed, fourteen wounded, among whom were lieuts. lawrence keith and james r. donovan, and five missing. many of these casualties were suffered by the resolute platoon at the bridge. there lieut. donovan was caught by machine gun fire and a private by shrapnel from a searching barrage of the bolos, as was also a sergeant of "f" company who was attached for observation. but the eight others who were wounded, two of them mortally, owed their unfortunate condition to the altogether unnecessary and ill-advised attempt by col. sutherland to shell the bridge which was being held by his own troops. he had the panicky idea that the red guards were coming or going to come across that bridge and ordered the shrapnel which cut up the platoon of "m" company with its hail of lead instead of the reds who had halted yards away and themselves were shelling the bridge but to no effect. not only that but when col. sutherland was informed that his artillery was getting his own troops, he first asked on one telephone for another quart of whisky and later called up his artillery officer and ordered the deadly fire to lengthen range. this was observed by an american soldier, ernest roleau, at verst , who acted as interpreter and orderly in sutherland's headquarters that day. the british officer sadly retired to his blue car headquarters at verst , thinking the reds would surely recapture the bridge. but major nichols in command at field headquarters at verst thought differently. when the order came over the wire for him to withdraw his americans from the bridge, this infantry reserve officer whose previously most desperate battle, outside of a melee between the bulls and bears on wall street, had been to mashie nib out of a double bunkered trap on the detroit country club golf course, as usual with him, took "plenty of sand." he shoved the order to one side till he heard from the officer at the front and then requested a countermanding order. he made use of the veteran alliez's counsel. and for two dubious nights and days with "m" and "i" companies he held on to the scant three miles of advance which had been paid for so dearly. and the reds never did get back the important bridge. now it was evident that the bolshevik rear-guard action was not to be scared out. it was bent on regaining its ground. during these last september days of supposed converging drive in three columns on plesetskaya our widely separated forces had all met with stiff resistance and been worsted in action. the bolshevik had earned our respect as a fighter. more fighting units were hurried up. our "a" force command began careful reconnaissance and plans of advance. american officers and doughboys had their first experiences, of the many experiences to follow, of taking out russian guides and from their own observations and the crude old maps and from doubtful hearsay to piece together a workable military sketch of the densely forested area. artillery actions and patrol actions were almost daily diet till, with the advance two weeks later on october thirteenth, the offensive movement started again. this time french and americans closely co-operated. the reds evidently had some inkling of it, for on the morning when the amalgamated "m"-"boyer" force entered the woods, inside fifteen minutes the long, thin column of horizon blue and olive drab was under shrapnel fire of the bolo. with careful march this force gained the flank and rear of the enemy at verst , and camped in a hollow square, munched on hardtack and slept on their arms in the cold rain. lieut. stoner, capt. boyer, the irrepressible french fun-maker, capt. moore and lieut. giffels slept on the same patch of wet moss with the same log for a pillow, unregardful of the tnt in the engineer officer's pocket, which was for use the next morning in blowing the enemy's armored train. at last : a. m. comes but it is still dark and foggy. men stretch their cold and cramped limbs after the interminable night. no smokes. no eats. in ten minutes of whispering the columns are under way. the leading platoon gets out of our reach. delay while we get a new guide lets them get on ahead of the other platoons. too bad. it spoils the plan. the main part of the attacking forces can not press forward fast enough to catch up. the engineers will be too late to blow the track in rear of the bolo train. the red guard listening posts and his big tower on the flank now stand him in good stead. he sees the little platoon of franco-americans approaching in line, and sends out a superior force to meet the attack. ten minutes of stiff fire fight ensues during which the other attacking platoons strive to get up to their positions in rear and rear flank. but our comrades are evidently out-numbered and being worsted. we must spring our attack to save them. oh, those bugles! who ever heard of a half mile charge? and such a melee. firing and yelling and tooting like ten thousand the main party goes in. what would the first "old man" of the th, our beloved colonel john w. craig, have said at sight of that confused swarm of soldiers heading straight for the bolo positions. lucky for us the bolo does not hold his fire till we swarm out of the woods. as it is in his panic he blazes away into the woods pointblank with his artillery mounted on the trains and with his machine guns, two of which only are on ground positions. and his excited aim is characteristically high, slavo bogga. we surge in. he jumps to his troop trains, tries to cover his withdrawal by the two machine guns, and gets away, but with hundreds of casualties from our fire that we pour into the moving trains. marvellous luck, we have monkeyed with a buzz saw and suffered only slight casualties, one american killed and four wounded. two french wounded. the surprise at threw "the wind" up the bolo's back at his forward positions, and - / , and lieuts. primm and soyer's amalgamated french-american attacking party won a quick victory. the armored train came on through over the precious bridge at verst , the track was repaired and our artillery came up to and answered the red armored train that was shelling us while we consolidated the position. lieut. anselmi's resolute american signal men unmindful of the straggling bolos who were working south in the woods along the railroad, "ran" the railway telephone lines back to field headquarters at and established communications with major nichols. as soon as transportation was open "i" company and apsche's company of french moved up and went on through to battle the reds in the same afternoon out of their position at verst where they had rallied and to advance on the fifteenth to a position at , where the americans dug in. trouble with the french battalion was brewing for the british command. the poilus had heard of the proposed armistice on the western front. "la guerre finis," they declared, and refused to remain with "i" company on the line. so on october sixteenth this company found itself single-handed holding the advanced position against the counter-attack of the reinforced reds. after a severe artillery barrage of the reds, captain winslow pushed forward to meet the attack of the bolos and fought a drawn battle with them in the woods in the afternoon. both sides dug in. "i" company lost one killed and four wounded. meanwhile "m" company, after one day to reorganize and rest, hurried up during the afternoon fight and prepared to relieve "i" company. sleeping on their arms around the dull-burning fires at between noisy periods of night exchanges of fire by the americans and red guards, this company next morning at : a. m. went through under a rolling barrage of major lee's artillery, which had been able to improve its position during the night, thanks to the resolute work of lieut. giffels and his american engineers on the railroad track. stoner's platoon destroyed the heavy outpost of bolos with a sharp fire fight and a charge and swept on, only halting when he reached a large stream. beyond this was a half-mile square clearing with characteristic woodpiles and station and woodmen's houses, occupied by a heavy force of six hundred red guards, themselves preparing for attack on the americans. here captain moore timed his three platoons and lieut. spitler's machine guns for a rush on three sides with intent to gain a foothold at least within the clearing. the very impetuosity of the doughboy's noisy attack struck panic into the poorly led bolsheviks and they won an easy victory, having possession of the position inside half an hour. the reds were routed and pursued beyond the objectives set by col. sutherland. and the old company horse shoe again worked. though many men had their clothes riddled not a man was scratched. the position was consolidated. an hour after the engagement two sections of the french company that had sulked the preceding day came smilingly up and helped fortify the flanks. their beloved old battalion commander, major alabernarde, had shamed them out of their mutinous conduct and they were satisfied again to help their much admired american comrades in this strange, faraway side show of the great world war. one or two interesting reminiscences here crowd in. it was during the charge on that lieut. stoner missed a dugout door by a foot with his hand grenade and his tender heart near froze with horror an hour afterward when he came back from pursuit of the reds to find that with the one bolo soldier in the dugout were cowering twenty-seven women and children, one eight days old. the red-whiskered old bolo soldier had a hand grenade in his pocket and sergeant dundon nearly shook his yellow teeth loose trying to make him reply to questions in english. and the poor varlet nearly expired with terror later in the day when lieut. riis of the american embassy stood him up with his back against a shack. "comrades, have mercy on me! my wife and my children," he begged as he fell on his knees before the click of the camera. another good story was often told about the alleged "bolo spy dog patrols" first discovered when the british officer led his royal scots, most of them raw russian recruits, to the front posts at to reinforce "m" co. "old ruble" had been a familiar sight to the americans. at this time he had picked up a couple of cur buddies, and was staying with the americans at the front, having perpetual pass good at any part of the four-square outpost. but the british officer reported him to the american officer as a sure-enough trained bolshevik patrol dog and threatened to shoot him. and at four o'clock the next morning they did fire at the dogs and started up the nervous red guards into machine gun fire from their not distant trench line and brought everyone out to man our lines for defense. and the heavy enemy shelling cut up scots (russians) as well as americans. here the fall advance on the archangel-vologda railway ended. we were a few versts north of emtsa, but "mnoga, mnoga versts," many versts, distant from vologda, the objective picked by general poole for this handful of men. emtsa was a railroad repair shop village. we wanted it. general ironside who relieved poole, however, had issued a general order to hold up further advances on all the fronts. so we dug in. winter would soon be on, anyway. the red guards, however, meant to punish us for the capture of this position. he thoroughly and savagely shelled the position repeatedly and the british artillery moved up as the yankee engineers restored the destroyed railroad track and duelled daily with the very efficient red artillery. we have to admit that with his knowledge of the area the red artillery officer had the best of the strategy and the shooting. he had the most guns too. major nichols was heard to remark the day after he had been through the severe six gun barrage of the reds who poured their wrath on the americans at before they could but more than get slight shrapnel shelters made, and had suffered four casualties, and the royal scots had lost a fine scotch lieutenant and two russian soldiers. "this shelling of course would be small peanuts to the french and british soldiers who were on the western front, but to us americans fresh from the fields and city offices and shops of michigan it is a little hell." and so the digging was good at during the last of october and the first of november while major nichols with "m" and "i" and french and american machine gun sections held this front. on the fourth of november "i" company supported by the french machine gunners sustained a terrific attack by the reds in powerful force, repulsed them finally after several hours, with great losses, and gained from general ironside a telegram of congratulations. "i" co. lost one killed, one missing, two wounded, one of which was lieut. reese. after that big attack the enemy left us in possession and we began to fear winter as much as we did the enemy. the only event that broke the routine of patrols and artillery duels was the accidental bombing by our allied airplane of our position instead of the half-mile distant enemy trenches, one of the two -lb. bombs taking the life of floyd sickles, "m" company's barber and wounding another soldier. amusing things also are recalled. the american medical officer at the front line one morning looked at a french soldier who seemed to be coming down with a heavy cold and generously doped him up with hot water and whiskey. next morning the whole machine gun section of french were on sick call. but collins was wise, and perhaps his bottle was empty. one day a big, husky yank in "i" company was brokenly "parlevooing" with a little french gunner, who was seen to leap excitedly into the air and drape himself about the doughboy's neck exclaiming with joy, "my son, my son, my dear sister's son." this is the truth. and he took the yank over to his dugout for a celebration of this strange family meeting, filled him up with sour wine, and his pockets with pictures of dancing girls. of course we were to learn to our discomfort and peril that winter was the time chosen by trotsky for his counter-offensive against the allied forces in the north. of that winter campaign we shall tell in later chapters. we leave the americans now on the railroad associated with their french comrades and th engineers building blockhouses for defense and quarters to keep warm. iii river push for kotlas first battalion hurries up the river--we take chamova--the lay of the river land--battling for seltso--retire to yakovlevskoe--that most wonderful smoke--incidents of the march--sudden shift to shenkursk area--the battalion splits--again at seltso--bolos attack--edvyinson a hero. that dismal, gloomy day--september , --the first battalion, under lt.-col. james corbley, spent on board transport, watching the third battalion disembark and getting on board the freight cars that were to carry them down to the railroad front. each man on board was aching to set foot on dry land once more and would gladly have marched to any front in order to avoid the dull monotony aboard ship, with nothing of interest to view but the gleaming spires of the cathedrals or the cold, gray northern sky, but there is an end to all such trials, and late that evening we received word that our battalion was to embark on several river barges to proceed up the dvina river. the following day all hands turned to bright and early and from early dawn until late that afternoon every man that was able to stand, and some that were not, were busily engaged in making up packs, issuing ammunition and loading up the barges. by six o'clock that evening they had marched on board the barges--some of the men in the first stages of "flu" had to be assisted on board with their packs. these barges, as we afterward learned, were a good example of the russian idea of sanitation and cleanliness. they had been previously used for hauling coal, cattle, produce, flax, and a thousand-and-one other things, and in their years of usage had accumulated an unbelievable amount of filth and dirt. in addition to all this, they were leaky, and the lower holds, where hundreds of men had to sleep that week, were cold, dismal and damp. small wonder that our little force was daily decreased by sickness and death. after five days of this slow, monotonous means of travel, we finally arrived at the town of beresnik, which afterward became the base for the river column troops. the following day "a" company, th infantry, under capt. otto odjard, took over the defense of the village in order to relieve a detachment of royal scots who were occupying the town. all that day we saw and heard the dull roar of the artillery further up the river, where the royal scots, accompanied by a gunboat, were attempting to drive the enemy before them. meeting with considerable opposition in the vicinity of chamova, a village about fifty versts from beresnik, a rush call was sent in for american reinforcements. the first battalion of the th infantry left beresnik about september th under command of major corbley, and started up the dvina. the first incident worthy of record occurred at chamova. as advance company we arrived about : a. m. at chamova, which was garrisoned by a small force of scots. we put out our outposts in the brush which surrounded the town, and shortly afterward, about : a. m., we were alarmed by the sound of musketry near the river bank. we deployed and advanced to what seemed to be a small party from a gunboat. they had killed two scots who had mistaken them for a supply boat from beresnik and gone to meet them empty-handed. the bolo had regained his boat after a little firing between him and the second platoon which was at the upper end of the village. we were trying to locate oars for the clumsy russian barzhaks on the bank, intending to cross to the island where the gunboat was moored and do a little navy work, when the british monitor hove into sight around a bend about three miles down stream, and opened fire on the gunboat. the first shot was a little long, the second a little short, and the third was a clean hit amid ship which set the gunboat on fire. john bolo in the meantime took a hasty departure by way of the island. we were immensely disappointed by the advent of the monitor, as the gunboat would have been very handy in navigating the russian roads. this monitor, by the way, was much feared by the russians, but was very temperamental, and if it was sadly needed, as it was later at toulgas when we were badly outranged, it reposed calmly at beresnik. when the monitor first made its advent on the dvina she steamed into beresnik, and her commander inquired loftily, "where are the bloody bolsheviks, and which is the way to kotlas?" upon being informed she steamed boldly up the dvina on the road to kotlas, found the bolo, who promptly slapped a shell into their internal workings, killing several men and putting the monitor temporarily hors de combat. after that the monitor was very prudent and displayed no especial longing to visit kotlas. in order to better comprehend the situation and terrain of the river forces, a few words regarding the two rivers and their surroundings will not be without interest. this region is composed of vast tundras or marshes and the balance of the entire province is covered with almost impenetrable forests of pine and evergreen of different varieties. the tundras or marshes are very treacherous, for the traveler marching along on what appears to be a rough strip of solid ground, suddenly may feel the same give way and he is precipitated into a bath of ice cold muddy water. great areas of these tundras are nothing more than a thickly woven matting of grasses and weeds overgrowing creeks or ponds and many a lonely traveler has been known to disappear in one of these marshes never to be seen again. this condition is especially typical of the dvina river. the dvina is a much larger river than the vaga and compares favorably to the lower mississippi in our own country. it meanders and spreads about over the surrounding country by a thousand different routes, inasmuch as there are practically no banks and nothing to hold it within its course. the vaga, on the other hand, is a narrower and swifter river and much more attractive and interesting. it has very few islands and is lined on either side by comparatively steep bluffs, varying from fifty to one hundred feet in height. the villages which line the banks are larger and comparatively more prosperous, but regarding the villages more will be said later. [illustration: group of soldier surrounding a grave.] u. s. official photo a shell screeched over this burial scene [illustration: soldier operating a machine gun.] u. s. official photo vickers machine gun helping hold lines [illustration: train moving through the forest.] u s official photo our armored train [illustration: several boats tied on the shore of a river. towers of the town are in the background.] renicke first battalion hurries up river [illustration: soldiers huddled around a fire at night.] red cross photo lonely post in dense forest [illustration: buildings in the foreground, the ocean in the background.] morris statue of peter the great and state buildings in archangel [illustration: soldiers receiving rations from a train.] u. s. official photo drawing rations, verst [illustration: soldiers surrounding a grave in the forest.] red cross photo last honors to a soldier we continued our march up the dvina, about two days behind the fleeing bolo, hoping that he would decide to make a stand. this he did at seltso. on the morning of september th, through mud and water, at times waist deep and too precarious for hauling artillery, the advance began on seltso. at : p. m. the advance party, "d" company, under captain coleman, reached yakovlevskaya, a village just north of seltso and separated from it by a mile of wide open marsh which is crossed by a meandering arm of the nearby dvina. a single road and bridge lead across to seltso. "d" company gallantly deployed and wading the swamp approached within one thousand five hundred yards of the enemy, who suddenly opened up with machine guns, rifles, and russian pom pom. this latter gun is a rapid fire artillery piece, firing a clip of five shells weighing about one pound apiece, in rapid succession. we later discovered that they, as well as most of the flimsy rifles, were made by several of the prominent gun manufacturers of the united states. "d" company found further advance impossible without support and dug in. "c" company under capt. fitz simmons hurried up and took position in a tongue of woods at the right of "d" and were joined after dark by "b" company. none of the officers in command of this movement knew anything of the geography nor much of anything else regarding this position, so the men were compelled to dig in as best they could in the mud and water to await orders from colonel corbley, who had not come up. at eleven o'clock that night a drizzling rain set in, and huddled and crouched together in this vile morass, unprotected by even an overcoat, without rations, tired and exhausted from the day's march and fighting, the battalion bivouacked. all night the enemy kept searching the woods and marshes with his artillery, but with little effect. during the night we learned that the bolo had a land battery of three-inch guns and five gunboats in the river at their flank with six and nine-inch guns aboard rafts. this was none too pleasing a situation for an infantry attack with no artillery preparation, coupled with the miserable condition of the troops. as daylight approached the shelling became more and more violent. the bolo was sending over everything at his command and it was decided to continue the attack lest we be exterminated by the enemy artillery. at daybreak lt. dressing of "b" company took out a reconnaissance patrol to feel out the enemy lines of defense, but owing to the nature of the ground he had little success. his patrol ran into a bolo outpost and was scattered by machine gun fire. it was here that corporal shroeder was lost, no trace ever being found of his body or equipment. about noon two platoons of company "b" went out to occupy a certain objective. this they found was a well constructed trench system filled with bolos, and flanked by machine gun positions. in the ensuing action we had three men killed and eight men wounded, including lt. a. m. smith, who received a severe wound in the side, but continued handling his platoon effectively, showing exceptional fortitude. the battle continued during the afternoon all along the line. "c" and "d" were supporting "b" with as much fire as possible. but troops could not stay where they were under the enemy fire, and col. corbley, who had at last arrived, ordered a frontal attack to come off after a preparatory barrage by our russian artillery which had at last toiled up to a position. here fortune favored the americans. the russian artillery officer placed a beautiful barrage upon the village and the enemy gunboats, which continued from : to : p.m. at : o'clock, the zero hour, the infantry made the attack and in less than an hour's time they had gained the village. the bolsheviks had been preparing to evacuate anyway, as the persistence of our attack and effectiveness of our rifle fire had nearly broken their morale. americans with white, strained faces, in contrast with their muck-daubed uniforms, shook hands prayerfully as they discussed how a determined defense could have murdered them all in making that frontal attack across a swamp in face of well-set machine gun positions. however, the americans were scarcely better off when they had taken seltso, for their artillery now could not get up to them. so the enemy gunboats could shell seltso at will. hence it appeared wise to retire for a few days to yakovlevskaya. in the early hours of the morning following the battle the americans retired from seltso. they were exceedingly hungry, dog-tired, sore in spirit, but they had undergone their baptism of fire. after a few days spent in yakovlevskoe we set out again, and advanced as far as a village called pouchuga. here we expected another encounter with the bolo, but he had just left when we arrived. we were fallen out temporarily on a muddy russian hillside in the middle of the afternoon, the rain was falling steadily, we had been marching for a week through the muddiest mud that ever was, the rations were hard tack and bully, and tobacco had been out for several weeks. a more miserable looking and feeling outfit can scarce be imagined. a bedraggled looking convoy of russian carts under lt. warner came up, and he informed us that he could let us have one package of cigarettes per man. we accepted his offer without any reluctance, and passed them out. to paraphrase gunga din, says capt. boyd: "they were british and they stunk as anyone who smoked british issue cigarettes with forty-two medals can tell you, but of all the smokes i've (i should say 'smunk' to continue the paraphrase) i'm gratefulest to those from lt. warner. you could see man after man light his cigarette, take a long draw, and relax in unadulterated enjoyment. ten minutes later they were a different outfit, and nowhere as wet, cold, tired or hungry. lucy page gaston and the anti-cigarette league please note." after a long day's march we finally arrived in a "suburb" of pouchuga about : p.m. with orders to place our outposts and remain there that night. by nine o'clock this was done, and the rest of the company was scattered in billets all over the village, being so tired that they flopped in the first place where there was floor space to spread a blanket. then came an order to march to the main village and join major corbley. at least a dozen of the men could not get their shoes on by reason of their feet being swollen, but we finally set out on a pitch black night through the thick mud. we staggered on, every man falling full length in the mud innumerable times, and finally reached our destination. captain boyd writes: "i shall never forget poor wilson on that march, cheery and good-spirited in spite of everything. his loss later at toulgas was a personal one as well as the loss of a good soldier. "i also remember babcock on that march--babcock, who was one of our best machine gunners, never complaining and always dependable. we were ploughing along through the mud when from my place at the head of the column i heard a splash. i went back to investigate and there was babcock floundering in a ditch with sides too slippery to crawl up. the column was marching stolidly past, each man with but one thought, to pull his foot out of the mud and put it in a little farther on. we finally got babcock up to terra firma, he explained that it had looked like good walking, nice and smooth, and he had gone down to try it. i cautioned him that he should never try to take a bath while in military formation, and he seemed to think the advice was sound." now the battalion was needed over on the vaga river front, the story of whose advance there is told in another chapter. by barge the americans went down the dvina to its junction with the vaga and then proceeded up that river as far as shenkursk. to the doughboys this upper vaga area seemed a veritable land of milk and honey when compared with the miserable upper dvina area. fresh meat and eggs were obtainable. there were even women there who wore hats and stockings, in place of boots and shawls. we had comfortable billets. but it was too good to be true. in less than a week the bolo's renewed activities on the upper dvina made it necessary for one company of the first battalion to go again to that area. colonel corbley saw "b" company depart on the tug "retvizan" and so far as field activities were concerned it was to be part of the british forces on the dvina from october till april rather than part of the first battalion force. the company commander was to be drafted as "left bank" commander of a mixed force and hold toulgas those long, long months. the only help he remembers from colonel corbley or colonel stewart in the field operations was a single visit from each, the one to examine his company fund book, the other to visit the troops on the line in obedience to orders from washington and general ironside. of this visit captain boyd writes: "when col. stewart made his trip to toulgas his advent was marked principally by his losing one of his mittens, which were the ordinary issue variety. he searched everywhere, and half insinuated that capt. dean, my adjutant, a british officer, had taken it. i could see dean getting hot under the collar. then he told me that my orderly must have taken it. i knew adamson was more honest than either myself or the colonel, and that made me hot. then he finally found the mitten where he had dropped it, on the porch, and everything was serene again. "col. stewart went with me up to one of the forward blockhouses, which at that time was manned by the scots. after the stock questions of 'where are you from' and 'what did you do in civil life' he launched into a dissertation on the disadvantages of serving in an allied command. the scot looked at him in surprise and said, 'why, sir, we've been very glad to serve with the americans, sir, and especially under lt. dennis. there's an officer any man would be proud to serve under.' that ended the discussion." after this slight digression from the narrative, we may take up the thread of the story of this push for kotlas. royal scots and russians had been left in quiet possession of the upper dvina near seltso after the struggle already related. but hard pressed again, they were waiting the arrival of the company of americans, who arrived one morning about : a. m. a few miles below our old friend, the village of yakovlevskoe. we marched to the village, reported to the british officer in command at seltso, and received the order, "come over here as quick as you possibly can." the situation there was as follows: the bolos had come back down the river in force with gunboats and artillery, and were making it exceedingly uncomfortable for the small british garrisons at seltso and borok across the river. we marched around the town, through swamps at times almost waist deep, and attacked the bolo trenches from the flank at dusk. we were successful, driving them back, and capturing a good bit of supplies, including machine guns and a pom pom. the bolos lost two officers and twenty-seven men killed, while we had two men slightly wounded, both of whom were later able to rejoin the company. "we expected a counter attack from the bolo, as our force was much smaller than his, and spent the first part of the night making trenches. an excavation deeper than eighteen inches would have water in the bottom. we were very cold, as it was october in russia, and every man wet to the skin, with no blankets or overcoats. about midnight the british sent up two jugs of rum, which was immediately issued, contrary to military regulations. it made about two swallows per man, but was a lifesaver. at least a dozen men told me that they could not sleep before that because they were so cold, but that this started their circulation enough so they were able to sleep later. in the morning we advanced to lipovit and attacked there, but ran into a jam, had both flanks turned by a much larger force, and were very fortunate to get out with only one casualty. corporal downs lost his eye, and showed extreme grit in the hard march back through the swamp, never complaining. i saw, after returning to the states, an interview with col. josselyn, at that time in command of the dvina force, in which he mentioned downs, and commended him very highly." the ensuing week we spent in seltso, the bolos occupying trenches around the upper part of our defenses. they had gunboats and naval guns on rafts, and made it quite uncomfortable for us with their shelling, although the only american casualties were in the detachment of th engineers. our victory was short lived, however, for in a few days our river monitor was forced to return to archangel on account of the rapidly receding river, which gave the enemy the opportunity of moving up their . inch naval guns, with double the range of our land batteries, making our further occupation of seltso impossible. on the afternoon of october , the second and third platoons of company "b" were occupying the blockhouses when the bolos made an attack, which was easily repelled. as we were under artillery fire with no means of replying, the british commander decided to evacuate that night. it was impossible to get supplies out owing to the lack of transportation facilities. that part of company "b" in the village left at midnight, followed by the force in the blockhouses at : a. m. after a very hard march we reached toulgas and established a position there. our position at toulgas in the beginning was very unfavorable, being a long narrow string of villages along the dvina which was bordered with thick underbrush extending a few hundred yards to the woods. we had a string of machine gun posts scattered through the brush, and when our line of defense was occupied there was less than two platoons left as a reserve. with us at this time we had company "a" of the nd tenth royal scots (british) under captain shute, and a section of canadian artillery. the bolos followed us here and after several days shelling, to which because of being outranged we were unable to reply, they attacked late in the afternoon of october rd. our outposts held, and we immediately counter attacked. the enemy was repulsed in disorder, losing some machine guns, and having about one hundred casualties, while we came out scot free. it was during the shelling incidental to this that edvinson, the viking, did his stunt. he was in a machine gun emplacement which was hit by a small h. e. shell. the others were considerably shaken up, and pulled back, reporting edvinson killed, that he had gone up in the air one way, and the lewis gun the other. we established the post a little farther back and went out at dusk to get edvinson's body. much was the surprise of the party when he hailed them with, "well, i think she's all right." he had collected himself, retrieved the lewis gun, taken it apart and cleaned it and stuck to his post. the shelling and sniping here had been quite heavy. his action was recognized by the british, who awarded him a military medal, just as they did corporal morrow who was instrumental in reoccupying and holding an important post which had been driven in early in the engagement. corporal dreskey and private lintula also distinguished themselves at this point. here we may leave "b" company and the scots and russians making a fortress of toulgas on the left bank of the dvina. the reds were busy defending plesetskaya from a converging attack and not till snow clouds gathered in the northern skies were they to gather up a heavy force to attack toulgas. we will now turn to the story of the first battalion penetrating with bayonets far up the vaga river. iv doughboys on guard in archangel second battalion lands to protect diplomatic corps--colonel tschaplin's coup d'etat is undone by ambassador francis--doughboys parade and practice new weapons--scowling solombola sailors--description of archangel--american headquarters. with the arrival of the american expeditionary force, the diplomatic corps of the various allied nations which had been compelled to flee north before the red radicals that had overthrown the kerensky provisional government, asked for troops in the city of archangel itself to stabilize the situation. the second battalion of the th under command of major j. brooks nichols disembarked at smolny quay at four o'clock of the afternoon of september th, the same day the ships dropped anchor in the harbor. a patrol was at once put out under lieut. collins of "h" company. it was well that american troops were landed at once as will prove evident from the following story. the new government of archangel was headed by the venerable tchaikowsky, a man who had been a revolutionary leader of the highest and saneest type for many years. he had lived for a period of years in america, on a farm in kansas, and had been a writer of note in russia and england for many years. he was a democratic leader and his government was readily accepted by the people. but as with all newly constructed governments it moved very slowly and with characteristic russian deliberation and interminable talk and red tape. this was too much for the impatient ones among the russians who had invited the allied expedition. one colonel tschaplin (later to be dubbed "charley chaplin" by american officers who took him humorously) who had served under the old czar and had had, according to his yarns--told by the way in the most engaging english--a very remarkable experience with the bolsheviks getting out of petrograd. he was, it is said, influenced by some of the subordinate english officers to make a daring try to hasten matters. on the evening of the th of september, while the american soldiers were patrolling the smolny area, near archangel proper, this col. tschaplin executed his coup d'etat. he quietly surrounded the homes of tchaikowsky and other members of the archangel state government and kidnapped them, hiding them away on an island in the dvina river. great excitement prevailed for several days. the people declared tschaplin was moving to restore monarchy under aid of the foreign arms and declared a strike on the street railroads and threatened to take the pumping station and the electric power station located at smolny. american troops manned the cars and by their good nature and patience won the respect and confidence of the populace, excited as it was. the american ambassador, the hon. david r. francis, with characteristic american directness and fairness called the impetuous tschaplin before him and gave him so many hours in which to restore the rightful government to power. and tchaikowsky came back into the state house on september th much to the rejoicing of the people and to the harmony of the allied expedition. the diplomatic and military authorities of the american part of the expedition had handled the situation in a way that prevented riot and gained esteem for americans in the eyes of all the russians. archangel, smolny and bakaritza now were busy scenes of military activity. down the streets of archangel marched part of a battalion of doughboys past the state house and the imposing foreign embassy building. curious eyes looked upon the o. d. uniform and admired the husky stalwarts from over the seas. bright-eyed women crowded to the edge of the boardwalks amongst the long-booted and heavily bewhiskered men. well-dressed men with shaven faces and marks of culture studied the americans speculatively. russian children began making acquaintance and offering their flattering americanski dobra. at solombola, smolny, bakaritza, sounds of firing were heard daily, but the populace were quieted when told that it was not riot or bolo attack but the americans practising up with their ordnance. in fact the americans, hearing of actions at the fronts, were desperately striving to learn how to use the lewis guns and the vickers machine guns. at camp custer they had perfected themselves in handling the colt and the brownings but in england had been obliged to relinquish them with the dubious prospect of re-equipping with the russian automatic rifles and machine gun equipment at archangel. now they were feverishly at work on the new guns for reports were coming back from the front that the enemy was well equipped with such weapons and held the americans at great disadvantage. here let it be said that the american doughboy in the north russian campaign mastered every kind of weapon that was placed in his hands or came by fortune of war to his hand. he learned to use the lewis gun and the vickers machine gun of the british and russian armies, also the one-pounder, or pom pom. he became proficient in the use of the french chauchat automatic rifle and the french machine gun, and their rifle grenade guns. he learned to use the stokes mortars with deadly effect on many a hard-fought line. and during the winter two platoons of "hq." company prided themselves on the mastery of a battery of russian artillery patterned after the famous, in fact, the same famous french gun. while the nd battalion under major nichols was establishing itself in quarters at smolny, where was a great compound of freshly unloaded supplies of food, herring and whiskey (do not forget the hard stuff) and, becoming responsible for the safety of the pumping station and the electric power station and the ships in the harbor, captain taylor established the big headquarters company at olga barracks at the other end of the city on september seventh where he could train his men for the handling of new weapons and could co-operate with captain kenyon's machine gun men. they on the same day took up quarters in solombola barracks and were charged with the duty of not only learning how to use the new machine guns but to keep guard over the quays and prevent rioting by the turbulent russian sailors. their undying enmity had been earned by the well-meant but untactful, yes, to the sailors apparently treacherous, conduct of general poole toward them on the russian ships in the murmansk when he got them off on a pretext and then seized the ships to prevent their falling into the hands of the red guards. and while the doughboys on the railroad and kodish fronts in the fall were occasionally to run up against the hard-fighting russian sailors who had fled south to petrograd and volunteered their services to trotsky to go north and fight the allied expeditionary forces, these doughboys doing guard duty in archangel over the remnants of stores and supplies which the bolo had not already stolen or sunk in the dvina river, were constantly menaced by these surly, scowling sailors at solombola and in archangel. really it is no wonder that the several allied troop barracks were always guarded by machine guns and automatics. rumor at the base always magnified the action at the front and always fancied riot and uprising in every group of gesticulating russkis seen at a dusky corner of the city. the supply company of the regiment became the supply unit for all the american forces under captain wade and was quartered at bakaritza, being protected by various units of allied forces. "finish" the package of russki horse skin and bones which the boys "skookled" from the natives, that is, bought from the natives, became the most familiar sight on the quays, drawing the strange-looking but cleverly constructed drosky, or cart, bucking into his collar under the yoke and pulling with all his sturdy will, not minding the american "whoa" but obedient enough when the doughboy learned to sputter the russki "br-r-r br-r-r." archangel is situated on one of the arms of the dvina river which deltas into the white sea. out of the enormous interior of north russia, gathering up the melted snows of a million square miles of seven-foot snow and the steady june rains and the weeks of fall rains, the great mississippi of north russia moves down to the sea, sweeping with deep wide current great volumes of reddish sediment and secretions which give it the name dvina. and the arm of the arctic ocean into which it carries its loads of silt and leachings, and upon which it floats the fishermen's bottoms or the merchantmen's steamers, is called the white sea. rightly named is that sea, the michigan or wisconsin soldier will tell you, for it is white more than half the year with ice and snow, the sporting ground for polar bears. while we were fighting the bolsheviki in archangel, the national geographic society, in a bulletin, published to our people certain facts about the country. it is so good that extracts are in this chapter included: "the city of archangel, russia, where allied and american troops have their headquarters in the fight with the bolshevik forces, was the capital of the archangel province, or government, under the czar's regime--a vast, barren and sparsely populated region, cut through by the arctic circle. "west and east, the distance across the archangel district is about that from london to rome, from new york to st. louis, or from boston to charleston, s. c. its area, exclusive of interior waters, is greater than that of france, italy, belgium and holland combined. yet there are not many more people in these great stretches than are to be found in detroit, mich., or san francisco or washington. "arable land in all this territory is less than , square miles, and three-fourths of that is given over to pasturage. the richer grazing land supports holmagor cattle, a breed said to date back to the time of peter the great, who crossed native herds with cattle imported from holland. "about fifteen miles from the mouth of the dvina river, which affords an outlet to the white sea, lies the city of archangel. norsemen came to that port in the tenth century for trading. one expedition was described by alfred the great. but first contact with the outside world was established in the sixteenth century when sir richard chancellor, an english sailor, stopped at the bleak haven while attempting a northeast passage to india. ivan the terrible summoned him to moscow and made his visit the occasion for furthering commercial relations with england. thirty years after the englishman's visit a town was established and for the next hundred years it was the muscovite kingdom's only seaport, chief doorway for trade with england and holland. "when peter the great established st. petersburg as his new capital much trade was diverted to the baltic, but archangel was compensated by designation as the capital of the archangel government. "boris godunov threw open to all nations, and in the seventeenth century tartar prisoners were set to work building a large bazaar and trading hall. despite its isolation the city thus became a cosmopolitan center and up to the time of the world war norwegian, german, british, swedish and danish cargo vessels came in large numbers. "every june thousand of pilgrims would pass through archangel on their way to the famous far north shrine, solovetsky monastery, situated on an island a little more than half a day's boat journey from archangel. "the city acquired its name from the convent of archangel michael. in the troitski cathedral, with its five domes, is a wooden cross, fourteen feet high, carved by the versatile peter the great, who learned the use of mallet and chisel while working as a shipwright in holland after he ascended the throne." to the sailor looking from the deck of his vessel or to the soldier approaching from bakaritza on tug or ferry, the city of archangel affords an interesting view. hulks of boats and masts and cordage and docks and warehouses in the front, with muddy streets. behind, many buildings, grey-weathered ones and white-painted ones topped with many chimneys, and towering here and there a smoke stack or graceful spire or dome with minarets. between are seen spreading tree tops, too. all these in strange confused order fill all the horizon there with the exception of one space, through which in june can be seen the : p. m. setting sun. and in this open space on clear evenings, which by the way, in june-july never get even dusky, at various hours can be seen a wondrous mirage of waters and shores that lie on the other side of the city below the direct line of sight. prominently rises the impressive magnitudinous structure of the reverenced cathedral there, its dome of the hue of heaven's blue and set with stars of solid gold. and when all else in the landscape is bathed in morning purple or evening gloaming-grey, the levelled rays of the coming or departing sun with a brilliantly striking effect glisten these white and gold structures. miles and miles away they catch the eye of the sailor or the soldier. built on a low promontory jutting into the dvina river, the city appears to be mostly water-front. in fact, it is only a few blocks wide, but it is crescent shaped with one horn in smolny--a southern suburb having dock and warehouse areas--and the other in solombola on the north, a city half as large as archangel and possessing saw-mills, shipyards, hospitals, seminary and a hard reputation, archangel is convex westward, so that one must go out for some distance to view the whole expanse of the city from that direction. a mass of trees, a few houses, some large buildings and churches mainly near the river, with a foreground of shipping, is the summer view. the winter view is better, the bare trees and the smaller amount of shipping at the docks permitting a better view of the general layout of the city, the buildings and the type of houses used by the population as homes. along the main street, troitsky prospect, runs a two-track trolley line connecting the north and south suburbs mentioned in the preceding paragraph. the cars are light and run very smoothly. they are operated chiefly by women. between the main street and the river-front near the center of the city is the market-place. this covers several blocks and is full of dingy stalls and alleys occupied by almost hopeless traders and stocks in trade. as new wooden ware, home-made trinkets, second-hand clothing and fresh fish can be obtained there the year around, and in summer the offerings of vegetables are plentiful and tempting, the market-place never lacks shoppers who carry their paper money down in the same basket they use to carry back their purchases. public buildings are of brick or stone and are colored white, pink, grey or bright red to give a light or warm effect. down-town stores are built some of brick and some of logs. homes are square in type, with few exceptions, built of logs, usually of very plain architecture, set directly against the sidewalks, the yards and gardens being at the side or rear. for privacy, each man's holdings are surrounded by a seven-foot fence. thus the streets present long vistas of wooden ware, partly house and partly fence, with sometimes over-hanging trees, and with an inevitable set of doorsteps projecting from each house over part of the sidewalk. this set of steps is seldom used, for the real entrance to the home is at the side of the house reached through a gateway in the fence. the houses in archangel are usually of two stories, with double windows packed with cotton or flax to resist the cold. when painted at all, the houses have been afflicted by their owners with one or more coats of yellowish-brown stuff familiar to every american farmer who has ever "primed" a big barn. a few houses have been clap-boarded on the outside and some of these have been painted white. the rest of the street view is snow, or, lacking that, a cobbled pavement very rough and uneven, and lined on each side--sometimes on one side only, or in the centre--with a narrow sidewalk of heavy planks laid lengthwise over the otherwise open public sewer, a ditch about three feet wide and from three to six feet deep. woe be to him who goes through rotten plank! it has been done. so much for general scenic effects at archangel. the technical institute, used as headquarters by the american forces, is worth a glance. it is a four-story solid-looking building about one hundred and fifty feet square and eighty feet high, with a small court in the centre. the outside walls of brick and stone are nearly four feet thick, and their external surface is covered by pink-tinted plaster which catches the thin light of the low-lying winter sun and causes the building to seem to glow. on the front of the building there are huge pillars rising from the second story balcony to the great grecian gable facing the river. inside, this great building is simple and severe, but rather pleasing. windows open into the court from a corridor running around the building on each floor, and on the other side of the corridor are the doors of the rooms once used as recitation and lecture halls, laboratories, manual training shops, offices, etc. outside, it was one of the city's imposing buildings; inside, it was well-appointed. to the people of the city it was a building of great importance. it was worthy to offer the commander of the american troops. here colonel stewart set up his headquarters. the british commanding general had his headquarters, the g. h. q., n. r. e. f., in another school building in the centre of the city, within close reach of the archangel state capitol building. colonel stewart's headquarters were conveniently near the two buildings which afterward were occupied and fitted up for a receiving hospital and for a convalescent hospital respectively, as related elsewhere, and not far either from the protection of the regimental headquarters company quartered in olga barracks. here the commanding officer of this expeditionary force of americans off up here near the north pole on the strangest fighting mission ever undertaken by an american force, tried vainly to keep track of his widely dispersed forces. up the railroad he had seen his third battalion, under command of major c. g. young, go with general finlayson whom general poole had ordered to take vologda, four hundred miles to the south. his first battalion, under lieutenant colonel corbley he had seen hurried off up the dvina river under another british brigadier-general to take kotlas hundreds of miles up the river. his second battalion under major j. brooks nichols was on duty in archangel and the nearby suburbs. these forces, and his th engineer battalion and his ambulance and hospital units were shifted about by the british generals and colonels and majors often without any information whatever to colonel stewart, the american commanding officer. he lost touch with his battalion and company commanders. he had a discouraging time even in getting his few general orders distributed to the american troops. no wonder that often an american officer or soldier reporting in from a front by order or permission of a british field officer, did not feel that american headquarters was his real headquarters and in pure ignorance was guilty of omitting some duty or of failure to comply with some archangel restriction that had been ordered by american headquarters. as to general orders from american headquarters dealing with the action of troops in the field, those were so few and of so little impressiveness that they have been forgotten. we must say candidly that the doughboy came to look upon american headquarters in archangel as of very trifling importance in the strange game he was up against. he knew that the strategy was all planned at british g. h. q., that the battle orders were written in the british field officer's headquarters, that the transportation and supplies of food were under control of the british that altogether too much of the hospital service was under control of the british. somehow the doughboy felt that the very limited and much complained about service of his own american supply unit, that lived for the most part on the fat of the land in bakaritza, should have been corrected by his commanding officer who sat in american headquarters. and they felt, whether correctly or not, that the court-martial sentences of major c. g. young, who acted as summary court officer at smolny after he was relieved of his command in the field, were unnecessarily harsh. and they blamed their commanding officer, colonel stewart, for not taking note of that fact when he reviewed and approved them. the writers of this history of the expedition think the doughboy had much to justify his feeling. v why american troops were sent to russia this was a much mooted question among soldiers--partisan politicians attacked with vitriol--partisan explanations did not explain--red propaganda helped confuse the case--russians of archangel, too, were concerned--we who were there think of those pitiable folk and their hopeless military and political situation that tried our patience and that of the directors of the expedition who undoubtedly knew no better than we did. to many people in america and england and france the north russian expedition appears to have been an unwarrantable invasion of the land of an ally, an ally whose land was torn by internal upheavals. it has been charged that commercial cupidity conceived the campaign. men declare that certain members of the cabinet of lloyd george and of president wilson were desirous of protecting their industrial holdings in north russia. the editors of this work can not prove or disprove these allegations nor prove or disprove the replies made to the allegations. we have not the time or means to do so even if our interests, political or otherwise, should prompt us to try it. from discussion of the partisan attacks on and defense of the administration's course of action toward russia in - , both of which are erratic and acrimonious, we plead to be excused. we shall tell the story of the genesis of the expedition as well as we can. we do not profess to know all about it. it will be some time before the calm historian can possess himself of all the facts. till such time we hope that this brief statement will stand. we offer it hesitatingly with keen consciousness of the danger that it will probably suit neither of the two parties in controversy over the sending of troops to north russia. but we offer this straightforward story confidently to our late comrades. they have entrusted us with the duty of writing the history of what they did in north russia as their bit in the great world war. and we know our comrades, at least, and we hope the general reader, too, will credit us with writing in sincerity and good faith. early in , for the allied forces, it looked dark. the germans were able to neglect the crumbled-in eastern front and concentrate a tornado drive on the western front. it was at last realized that the controlling bolshevik faction in russia was bent on preventing the resumption of the war on the eastern front and possibly might play its feeble remnants of military forces on the side of the germans. the allied supreme council at versailles decided that the other allies must go to the aid of their old ally russia who had done such great service in the earlier years of the war. on the russian war front germany must be made again to feel pressure of arms. organization of that front would have to be made by efforts of the allied supreme war council. they had some forces to build on. several thousand czecho-slovak troops formerly on the eastern front had been held together after the dissolution of the last russian offensive in . their commander had led them into siberia. some at that time even went as far as vladivostok. these troops had desired to go back to their own country or to france and take part in the final campaign against the germans. there was no transportation by way of the united states. negotiations with the bolshevist rulers of russia, the story runs, brought promises of safe passage westward across central russia and then northward to archangel, thence by ship to france. this situation in mind the allied supreme war council urged a plan whereby an allied expedition of respectable size would be sent to archangel with many extra officers for staff and instruction work, to meet the czechs and reorganize and re-equip them, rally about them a large northern russian army, and proceed rapidly southward to reorganize the eastern front and thus draw off german troops from the hard pressed western front. this plan was presented to the allied supreme war council by a british officer and politician fresh from moscow and petrograd and archangel, enthusiastic in his belief in the project. the expedition was to be large enough to proceed southward without the czechs, sending them back to the west by the returning ships if their morale should prove to be too low for the stern task to be essayed on the restored eastern front. general poole, the aforementioned british officer in command, seems to have been very sure that the bolsheviks who had so blandly agreed to the passage of the czechs through the country would not object to the passage of the expedition southward from archangel, via vologda, petrograd and riga to fight the germans with whom they, the bolsheviki, had compacted the infamous brest-litovsk treaty. all this while, remember, the old allies of russia had preserved a studied neutrality toward the factional fight in russia. they steadily refused to recognize the bolshevik government of lenine and trotsky. while this plan was still in the whispering stages, the activities of the germans in finland where they menaced petrograd and where their extension of three divisions to the northward and eastward seemed to forecast the establishment of submarine bases on the murmansk and perhaps even at archangel where lay enormous stores of munitions destined earlier in the war to be used by the russians and rumanians against the huns. at any rate, the port of archangel would be one other inlet for food supplies to reach the tightly blockaded germans. since the autumn of military supplies of all kinds, chiefly made in america and england, had been sent to archangel for the use of the russian armies. at the time of the revolution against the old czar nicholas, in , there were immense stores in the warehouses of the archangel district and the archangel-vologda railway had been widened to standard gauge and many big american freight cars supplied to carry those supplies southward. and these stores had been greatly augmented during the kerensky regime, the enthusiastic time immediately subsequent to the fall of the czar, when anti-german russians were exulting "now the arch traitor is gone, we can really equip our armies," and when the allies believed that after a few months of confusion the revolutionary government would become a more trustworthy ally than the old imperial government had been. [illustration: several soldiers eating at a table.] u.s. official photo olga barracks [illustration: several people standing around a streetcar.] u.s. official photo street car strike in archangel [illustration: several building, including two towers.] u.s. official photo american hospitals and headquarters [illustration: several soldiers waiting at a window.] u.s. official photo "supply" c. canteen "accommodates" boys [illustration: several soldiers and two small sheds on sleigh runners, pulled by horses.] u.s. official photo red cross ambulances, archangel [illustration: a small room with several soldiers holding their shirts.] u.s. official photo "cootie mill" operating at smolny annex of convalescent hospital [illustration: two men with a horse pulling a plow.] wisckot single flat strip of iron on plow point [illustration: soldier sharing his rations with a group of children.] wagner thankful for what at home we feed pigs now, although archangel was the chief port of entry for military supplies to the new russian government, the geographical situation of the northern province, or rather state, of archangel had left it rather high and dry in the hands of a local government, which, so distantly affiliated with moscow and petrograd, did not reflect fully either the strength or weaknesses of the several regimes which succeeded one another at the capital between the removal of the czar and the machine gun assumption of control by the bloody pair of zealots and tricksters, lenine and trotzky. consequently, when kerensky disappeared the government at archangel did not greatly change in character. to be sure, it had no army or military force of its own. the central government sent north certain armed red guards, and agents of government called "commissars," who were to organize and control additions to the red guards and to supervise also the civil government of archangel state, as much as possible. these people of the northern state were indeed jealous of their rights of local government. and the work of the red agents in levying on the property and the man-power of the north was passively resisted by these intelligent north russians. all this was of great interest to the allied supreme war council because of the danger that the war supplies would be seized by the rapidly emboldened bolshevik government and be delivered into the hands of the germans for use against the allies. for since the brest-litovsk treaty it had appeared from many things that the crafty hand of germany was inside the russian bolshevik glove. moreover, there were in north russia, as in every other part, many russians who could not resign themselves to bolshevik control, even of the milder sort, nor to any german influence. those in the archangel district banded themselves together secretly and sent repeated calls to the allies for help in ridding their territory of the bolshevik red guards and german agents, using as chief arguments the factors above mentioned. while the anti-bolshevists were unwilling to unmask in their own state, for obvious reason, their call for help was made clear to the outside world and furnished the allied supreme war council just the pretext for the expedition which it was planning for a purely military purpose, namely, to reconstruct the old eastern fighting front. in fact, when a survey of the military resources of the european allies had disclosed their utter lack of men for such an expedition and it was found that the only hope lay in drawing the bulk of the needed troops from the united states forces, and when the statement of the cases in the usual polite arguments brought from president wilson a positive refusal to allow american troops to go into russia, it was only by the emphasis, it is said, of the pathetic appeal of the north russian anti-bolshevists, coupled with the stirring appeals of such famous characters as the one-time leader of the russian women's battalion of death and the direct request of general foch himself for the use of the american troops there in russia as a military necessity to win the war, that the will of president wilson was moved and he dubiously consented to the use of american troops in the expedition. even this concession of president wilson was limited to the one regiment of infantry with the needed accompaniments of engineer and medical troops. the bitter irony of this limitation is apparent in the fact that while it allowed the supreme war council to carry out its scheme of an allied expedition with the publicly announced purposes before outlined, committing america and the other allies to the guarding of supplies at murmansk and archangel and frustrating the plans of germany in north russia, it did not permit the allied war council sufficient forces to carry out its ultimate and of course secret purpose of reorganizing the eastern front, which naturally was not to be advertised in advance either to russians or to anyone. the vital aim was thus thwarted and the expedition destined to weakness and to future political and diplomatic troubles both in north russia and in europe and america. during the months spent in winning the participation of the united states in an allied expedition to north russia, england took some preliminary steps which safeguarded the murmansk railway as far south toward petrograd as kandalaksha. royal engineers and marines, together with a few officers and men from french and american military missions, who had worked north with the diplomatic corps, were thus for a dangerously long period the sole bulwark of the allies against complete pro-german domination of the north of russia. some interesting stories could be told of the clever secret work of the american officers in ferreting out the evidences in black and white, of the co-operation of the german war office with lenine and trotsky. and stories of daring and pluck that saved men's lives and kept the north russians from a despairing surrender to the bolsheviki. meanwhile england was taking measures herself to support these men so as to form a nucleus for the larger expedition when it should be inaugurated by the allied supreme war council. but the total number of british officers and men who could be spared for the purpose, in view of the critical situation on the western front, was less than , . and these had to be divided between the widely separated areas of murmansk and archangel. and the officers and men sent were nearly all, to a man, those who had already suffered wounds or physical exhaustion on the western front. this was late in june. about this time the plan of the allied supreme war council as already stated was, under strict limitations, acceded to by president wilson, and the doughboys of the th infantry in july found themselves in england hearing about archangel and disgustedly exchanging their enfields for the russian rifles. for various reasons the command of the expedition was assigned by general foch to general poole, the british officer who had been so enthusiastic about rolling up a big volunteer army of north russians to go south to petrograd and wipe out the red dictatorate and re-establish the old hard-fighting russian front on the east. naturally, american soldiers who fought that desperate campaign in north russia now feel free to criticize the judgment of general foch in putting general poole in command. it appears from the experiences of the soldiers up there that for military, for diplomatic and for political reasons it would have been better to put an american general in command of the expedition. and while we are at it we might as well have our little say about president wilson. we think he erred badly in judgment. he either should have sent a large force of americans into north russia--as we did into cuba--a force capable of doing up the job quickly and thoroughly, or sent none at all. he should have known that the american doughboy fights well for a cause, but that a british general would have a hard time convincing the americans of the justice of a mixed cause. this is confession of a somewhat blind prejudice which the american citizen has against the aggressive action of british arms wherever on the globe they may be seen in action, no matter how justifiable the ultimate turn of events may prove the british military action to have been. we say that this prejudice should have been taken into account when the american doughboy was sent to russia to fight under british command. it might not be out of order to point out that the north russian shared with his american allies in that campaign the same prejudice, unreasonable at times without doubt, but none the less painful prejudice against the british command of the expedition. and all this in spite of the fact that most of the british officers were personally above reproach, and general ironside, who soon succeeded the failing poole, was every inch of his six foot-four a man and a soldier, par excellence. the french were able to send only part of a regiment, one battalion of colonial troops and a machine gun company, who reached the murmansk late in july about the time the americans were sailing from england. they were soon sent on to archangel, where political things were now come to a head. the serbian battalion which had left odessa at the time of the summer collapse of the russian armies in had gradually worked its way northward from petrograd on the petrograd-kola railroad with the intention of shipping for the western fighting front by way of england. they had been of potential aid to the allied military missions during the summer and now were permitted by the serbian government to be joined to the allied expedition. they were accordingly put into position along the kola railroad. these troops, of course, as well as thousands of british troops which were stationed in the murmansk and by the british war office were numbered in the north russian expeditionary forces, were of no account whatever in the military activities of that long fall and winter and spring campaign in the far away archangel area where the american doughboys for months, supported here and there by a few british and french and russians, stood at bay before the swarming bolos and battled for their lives in snow and ice. the battalion of italian troops with its company of skii troops which sailed from england with the american convoy also went to the murmansk and all the american doughboy saw of italians in the fighting area of archangel, north russia, was the little handful of well dressed italian officers and batmen in the city of archangel. of course, we had plenty of representation of italian fighting blood right in our own ranks. they were in the o. d. uniform and were american citizens. and of course the same thing could be said of many another nationality that was represented in the ranks of american doughboys and whose bravery in battle and fortitude in hardships of cold and hunger gave evidence that no one nationality has a corner on courage and "guts" and manhood. to call the roll of one of those heroic fighting companies of doughboys or engineers or medical or hospital companies in the olive drab would evidence by the names of the men and officers that the best bloods of europe and of asia were all pulsing in the american ranks. the presence of british, french and american war vessels and the first small bodies of troops encouraged the murmansk russian authorities to declare their independence of the red moscow crowd and to throw in their lot with the allies in the work of combatting the agents of the german war office in the north. in return the allies were to furnish money, food and supplies. early in july written agreement to this effect had been signed by the murmansk russian authorities and all the allies represented, including the united states. it will be recalled that ambassador francis had been obliged to leave petrograd by the bolshevik rulers, and he had gone north into murmansk. the result of this agreement with the murmansk and the arrival of further troops at the murmansk coast, together with the promise of more to follow immediately, was to influence the russian local government of the state of archangel to break with the hated reds. and so, on august st, a quiet coup d'etat was effected. the anti-bolshevists came out into the open. the provisional north russian government was organized. the people were promised an election and they accepted the situation agreeably for they had detested the red government. two cargoes of food had no little also to do with the heartiness of their acceptance of the allied military forces and the overturn of the bolshevik government. within forty-eight hours came the military forces already mentioned, the advance forces of the british that preceded the allied expedition, consisting of a huge british staff, a few british soldiers, a few french and a detachment of fifty american sailors from the "olympia." in a few days the battalion of french colonials sailed in from murmansk. the coming of the troops prevented the counter coup of the reds. they could only make feeble resistance. the passage up the delta of the dvina river and the actual landing while exciting to the jackies met with little opposition. truth to tell, the wily bolsheviks had for many weeks seen the trend of affairs, and, expecting a very much larger expedition, had sent or prepared for hasty sending south by rail toward vologda or by river to kotlas of all the military supplies and munitions and movable equipment as well as large stores of loot and plunder from the city of archangel and suburbs. count von mirbach, the german ambassador at moscow, threatened lenine and trotsky that the german army then glowering in finland, across the way, would march on petrograd unless the military stores were brought out of archangel. the rearguard of the bolshevik armed forces was disappearing over the horizon when the american jackies seized engines and cars at archangel preestin and bakaritza, which had been saved by the hindering activities of anti-bolshevik trainmen, and dashed south in pursuit. there is a heroic little tale of an american naval reserve lieutenant who with a few sailors took a lame locomotive and two cars with a few rifles and two machine guns, mounted on a flat car, and hotly gave chase to the retreating red guards, routing them in their stand at issaka gorka where they were trying to destroy or run off locomotives and cars, and then keeping their rear train moving southward at such a rate that the reds never had time to blow the rails or burn a bridge till he had chased them seventy-five miles. there a hot box on his improvised armored train stopped his pursuit. he tore loose his machine guns and on foot reached the bridge in time to see the reds burn it and exchange fire with them, receiving at the end a wound in the leg for his great gallantry. the red guards were able to throw up defenses and to bring up supporting troops. a few days later the french battalion fought a spirited, but indecisive, engagement with the reds. it was seen that he intended to fight the allies. he retreated southward a few miles at a time, and during the latter part of august succeeded in severely punishing a force of british and french and american sailors, who had sought to attack the reds in flank. and it was this episode in the early fighting that caused the frantic radiogram to reach us on the arctic ocean urging the american ships to speed on to archangel to save the handful of allied men threatened with annihilation on the railroad and up the dvina river. and we were to go into it wholehearted to save them, and later find ourselves split up into many detachments and cornered up in many another just such perilous position but with no forces coming to support us. the inability of the allied supreme war council to furnish sufficient troops for the north russian expedition, and the delay of the united states to furnish the part of troops asked of her, very nearly condemned the undertaking to failure before it was fairly under way. however, as the ultimate success of the expedition depended in any event on the success of the allied operations in far off siberia in getting the czecho-slovak veterans and siberian russian allies through to kotlas, toward which they were apparently fighting their way under their gallant leader and with the aid of admiral kolchak, and because there was a strong hope that general poole's prediction of a hearty rallying of north russians to the standards of the allies to fight the germans and bolsheviki at one and the same time, the decision of the supreme war council was, in spite of president wilson's opposition to the plan, to continue the expedition and strengthen it as fast as possible. to the american soldier at this distance it looks as though the french and british, perhaps in all good faith, planned to muddle along till the american authorities could be shown the fitness or the necessity of supporting the expedition with proper forces. but this was playing with a handful of americans and other allied troops a great game of hazard. only those who went through it can appreciate the peril and the hazard. to the credit of the american doughboys and tommies and poilus and others who went into north russia in the fall of let it be said that they smashed in with vim and gallant action, thinking that they were going to do a small bit away up there in the north to frustrate the military and political plans of the germans. and although they were not all interested in the russian civil war at the beginning, they did learn that the north russian people's ideal of government was the representative government of the americans, while the red guards whom they were fighting stood for a government which on paper at its own face value represented only one class and offered hatred to all other classes. when it tried to put into effect its so-called constitution that had been dreamed out of a nightmare of oppression and hate, it failed completely. machine gun beginning begot cruel offspring of provisional courts of justice and sword-revised soviets of the people so that packed soviets and lenine-picked delegates and trotsky-ridden ministers made the actual soviet government as much resemble the ideal soviet government as a wild-cat mining stock board of directors resembles a municipal board of public works. and the world knows now, if it did not in - , that the russian socialist federated soviet republic was, and is, a highly centralized tyranny, frankly called by its own leaders "the dictatorship of the proletariat." the russian people prayed for "a fish and received a serpent." vi on the famous kodish front in the fall "k" company hurries to save force "b"--importance of kodish front--hazelden's force destroyed--first fight at seletskoe--both sides burn bridges--desperate fighting at emtsa river--capture of kodish--digging in--we lose village after days of hard fighting--trenches and blockhouses. nowhere did the yanks in north russia find the fighting fiercer than did those who were battling their way toward plesetskaya on the famous kodish front. woven into their story is that of the most picturesque american fighter and doughtiest soldier of the many dauntless officers and men who struggled and bled in that strange campaign. this man was captain michael donoghue, commanding officer of "k" company, th infantry. he afterward was promoted in the field to rank of major and his old outfit of detroit boys proudly remember that "k" stands for kodish where they and their commander earned the plaudits of the regiment. it will be remembered that the third battalion was hurried from troopship to troop train and steamed south as fast as the rickety russki locomotives of the type could wobble, and it will be remembered that captain donoghue, the senior captain of that battalion, was chosen to go with half of his "k" company to the relief of a mixed force of american sailors and british royal scots and french infantry who had been surrounded, it was rumored, and were in imminent danger of annihilation. with his little force of one hundred and twenty men, including a medical officer with eight enlisted medical men, transporting his rations and extra munitions on the dumpy little russki droskie, the american officer led out of obozerskaya at three o'clock in the afternoon, bivouacked for the night somewhere on the trail in a cold drizzle, and reached volshenitsa, the juncture of the trails from seletskoe and emtsa, about noon of the th of september. four versts beyond volshenitsa the column passed the scene of the battle between the bolos and "b" force. gear and carts scattered around and two or three fresh graves told that this was serious business. a diary of an american sailor and the memoranda of a british officer, broken off suddenly on the th of august, that were picked up told of the adventures of the handful of men we were going to hunt. more explanations of the genesis of this kodish front is now in order. consideration of the map will show that kodish was of great strategic importance. truth to tell it was of more importance than our high command at first estimated. the bolshevik strategists were always aware of its value and never permitted themselves to be neglectful of it. trotsky knew that the strategy and tactics of the winter campaign would make good use of the kodish road. indeed it was seen in the fall by general poole that a red column from plesetskaya up the kodish road was a wedge between the railroad forces and the river forces, always imperiling the vaga and dvina forces with being cut off if the reds came strong enough. the first movement on kodish by the allied troops had been made by "b" force under the command of col. hazelden of the british army. with about two hundred men composed of french soldiers, a few english soldiers, american sailors from the olympic, and some local russian volunteers, he had pushed up the dvina and vaga to seletskoe and operating from there had sent a party of french even as far as emtsa river, a few miles north of kodish. but before he could attack kodish, hazelden was ordered to strike across the forest area and attack the reds in the rear near obozerskaya where the bolshevik rear guard with its excellent artillery strategist was stubbornly holding the allied force "a." passing through seletskoe he left the russian volunteers to oppose the reds in kodish, and guard his rear. but these uncertain troops fled upon approach of the bolos and about the first of september col. hazelden instead of being in a position to demoralize the reds on the railroad by a swift blow from behind, found himself in desperate defense, both front and rear, and beleagured in the woods and swamps some twenty-seven versts east of obozerskaya. he managed to get a message through to sisskoe just before the reds closed in on him from behind. about a hundred english marines, a section of machine gunners, a platoon of royal scots, and some russian artillery, all enroute to archangel from their chase of the reds up the dvina, were ordered off their barges at sisskoe, were christened "d" force, and, under the command of captain scott, british officer, were given the task of preventing the reds from kodish from cutting off the river communications. this force was also to help col. hazelden out. but as we have seen, his force had been destroyed, and americans hurriedly sent out. at volshenitsa captain donoghue received a message by aeroplane from col. guard at obozerskaya that "d" force was held up at tiogra by the reds. after patrolling the forest five days and finding the trail to emtsa impassable during the wet season, "k" company received both the welcome reinforcements of lieut. gardner and the twenty men who had been left at lewis gun school at bakaritza, and orders to proceed on to seletskoe. the red guards hearing of the american successes on the railway and hearing of the approach of this force from the railroad in their rear went back to kodish, and on the morning of september th "k" company became a full-fledged member of "d" force to be better known the world over in the bitterest part of this campaign as the kodish force. here the doughboys got their baptism of fire when they took over under fire the outposts of the village of seletskoe. for the bolos who had retreated the week before had told the inhabitants they would be back and they were making their threat, or promise, as you will have it, good. for two days and nights the americans beat off the attacks, principally through the good work of sgt. michael kinney, the gallant soldier who fell at kodish on new year's day. aided by the accurate fire of the french machine gun section, the "k" men inflicted such heavy penalties that the reds quit in panic, assassinated their commander and skurried south thirty miles. however, this victory was not exploited by the allied force. it seems that the commander of the force had sent out a russian patrol on the east bank of the emtsa river which brought back information that a heavy force of the enemy was operating in the rear of "d" force. accordingly captain scott ordered a retreat from seletskoe to tiogra, taking up a position on the north bank of the emtsa river after burning the bridge to prevent pursuit by the reds who it was afterwards found were fleeing in the opposite direction, after having burned another bridge on the emtsa further to the south to prevent the americans from pursuing them. an interesting story was often repeated about this funny episode which was due to the credence given by the british officer to the report of the highly imaginative russian patrol. an english corporal on one of the outposts of seletskoe was not informed by captain scott of the retreat during the night. next morning he went forward and discovered that the reds had burned their bridge. but when he went to report that fact he found the village of seletskoe evacuated by his own forces, natives also having fled with everything of value from the samovar to the cow. a few hours later the old corporal appeared on the other bridgeless bank of the emtsa across from the "k" men who were digging in and said in a puzzled way, "i saiy, old chap, wots the bloody gaime?" of course as soon as an improvised pontoon could be rigged up "k" company and the rest of the happily informed force were in pursuit again of the reds. the bridge was constructed by a detachment of the th american engineers, who had come up with col. henderson, of the famous "black watch," the new commander. the french machine gunners by this time were badly needed on the railroad force. in their place came a company of the russian officers' training corps. on september rd seletskoe was again occupied and the yanks began improving its defenses, taking much satisfaction in the arrival from archangel of lieut. ballard's american machine gun platoon. within two days also their ranks were greatly strengthened by the arrival of lieut. chappel from issaka gorka with the other two platoons of "k" company closely followed by captain cherry with "l" company from the railroad force. general finlayson, whose job it was to take plesetskaya, now sought to shove the kodish force ahead rapidly so as to trap the reds on the railroad between the two forces. accordingly the next morning, september th, "k" company and two platoons of "l" and the machine gun section moved south toward kodish to achieve the mission that had been assigned to col. hazelden. the bolshevik was found the next morning strongly entrenched on the other side of the river emtsa near the burned bridge and after severe losses suffered in the gaining of a foothold on the north side of the river by crossing on a raft, the americans had to dig in. in fact they lay for over a week in the swamp hanging tenaciously to their position but unable to advance. men's feet swelled in their wet boots till the shoes burst. but still they hung on under the example of their game old captain, at this time lieut. chappel was victim of a bolo machine gun while trying to lead a raiding squad up to its capture. six others were killed and twenty-four were wounded. droskies needed for transportation of supplies and ammunition had to be used to take back the wounded and sick from exposure to seletskoe. no "k" or "l" or "m. g." man who was there will ever forget those days. it was obvious that the kodish force must be augmented. english marines and a section of canadian artillery came up. headquarters was established in the four-house village of mejnovsky, eight miles back. steady sniping and patrol action was carried on actively by both forces. col. henderson's further attempt to throw a force across the river by means of a raft was frustrated by the reds. october th lieut.-col. gavin came up to assume command. this energetic and keen british officer soon worked out plans for effecting an advance. using the american engineers, he soon had a ferry in use three versts--about two miles--below mejnovsky. and on october the th "k" and "l" companies crossed on that ferry and marched up the left bank of the emtsa till within one thousand yards of the flank of the strong bolo position, and bivouacked in the swamp for the night. in the morning captain cherry took his company and two platoons of "k" and struck south to pass by the flank and fall upon kodish in rear of the enemy who was holding the position in great force at the river. the remainder of "k" company moved upon the right of the enemy front line at the river crossing. at the time donoghue struck, a frontal demonstration was made upon the reds by the english marines and american machine guns firing across the river and by the canadian artillery shelling the woods where the red reserves were thought to be. the plan failed because of the inability of captain cherry to reach his objective, on account of the bottomless swamps that he encountered. captain donoghue gained a foot-hold and then was forced to dig in and during the afternoon repulsed two counter attacks of the bolos, having paid for the capture of the two bolo machine guns by severe losses. during the night under cover of these two platoons, "l" and the english marines crossed the river, where the reds had held them so many days. and during the following day the right of the bolo position was turned by a movement through the woods. but at four o'clock in the afternoon the enemy's second, position, a mile north of the village, developed surprising strength. in fact, the reds counterattacked just at dark and once more the doughboys lay down, on their arms, in the rain-flooded swamp, where the dark, frosty morning would find them stiff and ugly customers for the reds to tackle. in fact they did rise up and smite the bolshevik so swiftly that he fled from his works and left kodish in such a hurry that he gave no forwarding address for his mail. captain donoghue set up his headquarters in kodish and sent detachments out to follow the reds and to threaten the red shred makhrenga and taresevo forces. during this fight, or rather after it, the canadians taught our boys their first lesson in looting the persons of the dead. our men had been rather respectful and gentle with the bolo dead who were quite numerous on the emtsa river battlefield. can you call a tangle of woods a field? but the canadians, veterans of four years fighting, immediately went through the pockets of the dead for roubles and knives and so forth and even took the boots off the dead, as they were pretty fair boots. the officer who reports this says he has often heard of dead men's boots but had to go to war to actually see them worn. in passing let it be stated that many a footsore doughboy helped himself to a dry pair of boots from a dead red guard or in winter to a pair of valenkas, or warm felt boots. one of "captain mike's" nervy sergeants protested against being sent back to seletskoe to get him a new pair of shoes, for he hated the ill-fitting british army shoe, as all americans did, and prevailed upon donoghue to let him wait a few days till after a battle when he sure enough helped himself to a fine pair of boots. one thing the american never did take from the dead bolo was his russian tobacco, for it was worse even than the british issue tobacco. a good story is told on one of donoghue's lieutenants. during the excitement of burning the bridge over the emtsa at tiogra, time when the two forces fled from one another, the officer, greatly fatigued, sat down on the bridge during the preparations by the men. he was missed later on the march and the man whom the captain sent back to find the lieutenant arrived just in time to keep what little hair the popular bald-headed little officer had from being singed off by the leaping flames. lieut. ryan does not like to be kidded about it. the morning of the seventeenth of october saw the american forces again on the advance. good news had come of the successes on the railroad. the kodish force was in the strategic position now to force the reds to give up emtsa and plesetskaya. but trotsky's northern army commander evidently well understood that situation, for he gave strict attention to this kodish force of americans and at the fifteenth verst pole on the main road his red guards held the americans all day. again the next day he made donoghue's yanks strive all day. just at night successful flanking movements caused the enemy to evacuate his formidable position. it was here that sgt. cromberger, one of ballard's machine gun men, distinguished himself by going single-handed into the bolo lines to reconnoiter. the converging advances upon plesetskaya by the three columns, up the onega valley, on the railroad and on the kodish-plesetskaya-petrograd highway now seemed about to succeed. hard fighting by all three columns had broken the bolshevik's confidence somewhat. of course at this time of writing it can be seen better than it could then. he did not make a stand at avda. he was found by our patrols way back at kochmas, only a few miles from the railroad. meanwhile the russian officers' training corps which was armed with forty lewis guns and acted rather independently, together with the royal scot platoon and a large number of "partisans," anti-bolshevik volunteers of the area, effected the capture of shred makhrenga, taresevo and other villages, which added to the threat of the kodish force on plesetskaya. plesetskaya at that moment was indeed of immense value to the reds. it was the railroad base of their four columns that were holding up the left front of their northern army. but they were discouraged. our patrols and spies sent into plesetskaya vicinity reported and stories of deserters and wounded men all indicated that the reds were getting ready to evacuate plesetskaya. a determined smash of the three allied columns would have won the coveted position. but the kodish force now received the same strange order from far-off archangel that was received on the other fronts: "to hold on and dig in." no further advances were to be made. thinking of their eleven comrades killed in this advance and of the thirty-one wounded and of the many sick from exposure, the americans on the kodish force as well as the english marines and scots who also had lost severely, were loath to stop with so easy a victory in sight. of course general ironside's main idea was right, but its application at that time and place seemed to work hardship on the kodish force. and the sequel proves it. to add to their discomfort, the very size of this force which had struggled so valiantly this little distance, was now reduced by the withdrawal of the english marines and of "l" company, and by the ordering of the canadian artillery guns to the dvina front. the remaining force with captain donoghue totalled one hundred and eighty men, which seemed very small to them, in view of the fact that a mere reconnoitering patrol from the bolos now returning to activity always showed anywhere from seventy-five to one hundred rifles and a machine gun or two. however, they made the best of their remaining days in october to fortify the kodish-avda front sector of the road. the yanks were to be prepared for the worst. and they got it. let us take a look at the position held by these americans. it is typical of the positions in which many of the far-flung detachments found themselves. at the seventeenth verst pole was a four-man outpost. at the sixteenth verst pole lieut. ballard had two of his machine guns, a lewis gun crew and some forty-six men from "k" company. four versts behind him on the densely wooded road lieut. gardner with forty men and a vickers gun was occupying the old bolo dugouts. one verst further back in the big clearing was kodish village, a place which by all the rules of field strategy was absolutely untenable. here with four vickers guns were the remainder of "k" company along with the sick and the lame and the halt, scarce forty men really able to do active duty, but obliged to stay on to support their comrades. the nearest friendly troops, including their artillery, were back at seletskoe, thirty versts away. on october th the reds returned to avda. the noise from that village and reports brought by patrols indicated that this enemy who erstwhile was on the run, and whom our high command now held lightly, was determined to regain kodish. and while striking heavily at their enemy on the railroad as we have seen, the red guards now fell upon this single company of americans strung out along the kodish-avda road. in the afternoon of november st the enemy drove in our cossack post of "k" men at verst seventeen, began shelling us with his artillery and for several days kept raiding ballard heavier and heavier. meanwhile captain donoghue sent out from kodish every available man to strengthen the line. night and day the men labored to erect additional defenses, with scarcely time to close an eye in sleep, patrolling all the trails on their flanks. on the fourth of november, the day the reds were massed in such numbers on the railroad, they succeeded in forcing ballard from his trenches at the sixteenth verst pole. he fell back to the new defenses at the fifteenth verst. it is related by his men that he passed between bolo forces who lined the road but permitted the americans to escape. lieut. gardner was now reinforced at the twelfth verst pole, for a patrol had lost a man somewhere on the river flank and it was thought that the enemy was preparing to pass by the flank and bag this body of american fighters by taking the newly constructed bridge on the emtsa in the rear of donoghue's small force. this bridge was their "only way home." their worst fears came true. on the morning of the fifth of november these yanks way out at front of kodish, holding the enemy off desperately from the frontal attack, and endeavoring vainly to frustrate the flank attacks of their enemy in greatly superior numbers, suddenly heard great bursts of machine gun fire way towards the rear in the vicinity of kodish. instantly they knew that reds had worked down the river by the flank from avda or even from emtsa on the railroad and were attacking in force three miles to their rear. that made the situation desperate. but the yanks who had in the beginning of the campaign been looked down upon by the red capped british high command because of their greenness, now showed their fineness of fighting stuff by fighting on with undiminished vigor and effectiveness. nowhere did they give way. day and night they were on the alert. attacks from the front, sly raids from the woods on each side of the road, heart chilling assaults upon the cluster of houses in kodish way in their rear, and steady progress of the red guards toward the bridge on the emtsa, their only way out of the bag in which the worn and depleted company was being trapped, brought the prolonged struggle to a crisis in the middle of the afternoon of the eighth of november. it came as follows: colonel hazelden, survivor of the disaster earlier in the fall, as already related, had returned to command the kodish-shred makhrenga fronts, when col. gavin was sent to command the railroad front where colonel sutherland had fizzled. this gallant officer was on his way to the perilous front to see ballard. just as he passed gardner at the twelfth verst pole, he found himself and the two detachments of americans at last completely cut off by a whole battalion of red guards fresh from the south of russia, sent up by trotsky to brace his northern army. for half an hour there raged a fight as intense as was the bitter reality of the emergency to the forty americans with gardner in those dugouts. by almost miraculous luck in directing their fire through the screen of trees that shielded the reds from view, sgt. cromberger's vickers gun and cpl. wilkie's lewis gun inflicted terrible losses upon this fresh battalion just getting into action against the americanskis. it was massed preparatory to the final dispositions of its commander to overwhelm the americans. but with the hail of bullets tearing through their heavy ranks, the bolos were unable long to stand it, and at last broke from control, yelling and screaming, to suffer still more from the well-handled guns when they left their cover and ran for the woods. and so the little force was saved. but so loud and prolonged were the yells of the frightened and wounded reds that captain donoghue, a verst in the rear at his field headquarters, he related afterwards, paced the floor of the log shack in an agony of certainty that his brave men were all gone. he had been sure that the howling of the scattered pack had been the fervent yells of a last bayonet charge wiping out the yankees. the reds could not get themselves together for another attack at this point before dark but did drive ballard back verst after verst that afternoon. it was a grim handful of "m. g." and "k" men who looked at their own losses and counted the huge enemy losses of that desperate day and wondered how many such days would whittle them off to the point of annihilation. col. hazelden had gone back to headquarters. captain donoghue now acted with his usual decisiveness. the americanskis had slipped out of the bag before the red string was tied. and in the morning of the th of november the good old vickers guns and lewis guns were peeking from their old concealed strongholds on the american side of the emtsa. artillery support was reported on the way to argue with the bolo artillery. a platoon of "l" company which had come up during the last of the fighting, together with a platoon of replacement men from the old division in france, who had just come across the trail from the railroad, now took over the active defense of the bridge. both sides began digging in. american engineers came up to build block houses. and the fagged warriors of machine gun and "k" infantry men now retired a short distance to the rear to make themselves as comfortable as possible in the woods, and try to forget their recent harrowing experiences and the sight of the seven bleeding stretchers that were part of the cost of trying to hold a place that was a veritable death trap. here it was that major nichols on a look-see from the railroad detachments found them. he had been sent across by the french colonel commanding vologda force, under which this kodish force had recently been brought. he was the first american field officer that had come to inspect this hard-battered outfit. and his report on their miserable plight had no little influence in bringing them relief. shortly afterward "k" company was relieved by "e" company which had come down from archangel guard duty, and "k" company went to reserve position in seletskoe and later marched across the trail to obozerskaya, took troop train to archangel for a much needed and highly deserved two weeks' change of scenery and rest, arriving one evening in november in an early winter's snow storm at smolny quay where the "m" company men captured them and their luggage and carried them off to a big feed, first one they had had in russia. lieut. ballard's heroic machine gun platoon a few days later was also relieved, by lieut. o'callaghan's platoon. so ended the fall campaign on the famous kodish front. vii penetrating to ust padenga taking of shenkursk on vaga--"horse marines"--battling at puia--bad position for troops--retirement to ust padenga--critical situation--"c" company stands heavy losses--lieutenant cuff and men killed in hand to hand fighting--bolshevik patrols--cossack forces weak on defense. while the old first battalion was, as we have seen, fighting up to seltso on the dvina river, numerous reports were coming in daily that a strong force of the bolsheviki were operating on the vaga river. this river is a tributary of the dvina and empties into it at a village called ust vaga, about thirty versts below beresnik and on which is located the second largest town or city in the province of archangel. this river was strategically of more value than the upper dvina, because, as a glance at the map will show, its possession threatened the rear of both the dvina and the kodish columns. accordingly, on the fifteenth day of september, accompanied by a river gunboat, the remaining handful of company "a", comprising two platoons, under capt. odjard and lieut. mead, went on board a so-called fast river steamer en route to shenkursk. on the seventeenth day of september this detachment took possession of shenkursk without firing a single shot, the bolsheviki having fled in disorder upon word of our arrival. the citizens of this village turned out en masse to welcome us as their deliverers, and the slavo-british allied legion soon gained a considerable number of new recruits. shenkursk is a village about one hundred and twenty-five versts up the vaga river from its junction with the dvina river. it is by far one of the most substantial and prosperous in the province of archangel. it differs very materially from all the surrounding country in that it is located on good sandy soil on a high bluff overlooking the river and is comparatively dry, even in wet weather. it is quite a summer resort town, has a number of well constructed brick buildings, half a dozen or more schools, a seminary, monastery, saw mill, and in many others respects is far above the average russian village. upon their arrival our troops were quartered in an old cossack garrison, reminiscent of the days of the czar. we prepared to settle down very comfortably for the winter. our dream of rest and quiet was rudely shattered, however, for two days later we were notified that the british command for the vaga river troops was on its way to shenkursk, and that we were to push further on down the river to stir up the enemy. without question we were quite willing to leave the enemy rest in peace as long as he did not molest us, but such was not the fortune nor luck of war, and therefore, on september st, the small detachment of american troops, reinforced by some thirty or forty s. b. a. l. troops, went steaming up the vaga river on the good ship "tolstoy," a decrepit old river steamer on which we had mounted a pom pom and converted it into a "battle cruiser." the troops immediately christened themselves the horse "marines" and the name was quite an appropriate one as later events proved. about noon that day capt. odjard and lieut. mead with two platoons arrived opposite a village named gorka when suddenly without any warning the enemy, concealed in the woods on both sides of the river, opened up a heavy machine gun and rifle fire. our fragile boat was no protection from this fire. to attempt to run around and withdraw in the shallow stream was next to impossible, so after a hasty consultation the commander grasped the horns of the dilemma by running the boat as close to the shore as possible, where the troops immediately swarmed overboard in water up to their waists, quickly gained the protection of the shore and spreading out in perfect skirmish order, poured a hot fire into the enemy, who was soon on the run. this advance continued for some several days until under the severe marching conditions, lack of food, clothing, etc., a halt was made at rovdinskaya, a village about ninety versts from shenkursk, and a few days later more reinforcements arrived under lieuts. mcphail and saari. a number of incidents on this advance clearly indicated that we were operating in hostile and very dangerous country. our only line of communication with our headquarters was the single local telegraph line, which was constantly being cut by the enemy. at one time a large force of the enemy got in our rear and we were faced with the unpleasant situation of having the enemy completely surrounding us. capt. odjard determined upon a bold stroke. figuring that by continuing the advance and striking a quick blow at the enemy ahead of us, those in the rear would anticipate the possibility of heavy reinforcements bringing up our rear. on october th we engaged the enemy at the village of puiya. we inflicted heavy casualties upon him. he suffered no less than fifty killed and several hundred wounded. as anticipated, the enemy in our rear quickly withdrew and thus cleared the way for our retreat. we retired to rovdinskaya, which position we held for several weeks. the situation was growing more desperate day by day. our rations were at the lowest ebb; cold weather had set in and the men were poorly and lightly clad, in addition to which our tobacco ration had long since been completely exhausted, which added much to the general dissatisfaction and lowering of the morale of the troops. with the approach of the russian winter a new and dangerous problem presented itself. at the outset of the expedition it had been planned that the troops on the railroad front were to push well down the railroad to or beyond plesetskaya. the vaga column was to go as far as velsk and there establish a line of communication across to the railroad front. unfortunately, their well-laid plans fell through and perhaps fortunately so. the forces of the railroad had been checked near emtsa, far above plesetskaya. the other troops on the dvina had by this time retired to toulgas and as a consequence the smallest force in the expedition, the vaga column, was now in the most advanced position of these three fronts, a very dangerous and poorly chosen military position. [illustration: soldier standing next a ft. observation tower.] wagner artillery "o. p.," kodish [illustration: windmill.] lanman mill for grinding grain [illustration: soldiers cutting down trees.] u. s. official photo pioneer platoon clearing fire lane [illustration: several soldiers watching the operation of a machine gun.] u. s official photo testing a vickers machine gun [illustration: soldier on sentry duty.] u. s. official photo doughboy observing bolo in pagosta--near ust padenga [illustration: russian cossack being bandaged.] u s official photo cossack receiving first aid, vistavka [illustration: two russian women with a horse and wagon.] lanman ready for day's work [illustration: flax hanging from a fence.] doud flax hung up to dry [illustration: several soldiers with horses and ropes attached to a barge.] wagner th engineers at beresnik to make matters still worse, from the village of nyandoma on the vologda railroad, there is a well defined winter trail, running straight across country to the village of ust padenga, located on the vaga river, about half way between shenkursk and rovdinskaya. rumors were constantly coming in that the bolo was occupying the villages all along this trail in order to launch a big drive on shenkursk as soon as winter set in. on these frozen, packed trails, troops, artillery, etc., could be moved as easily and readily as by rail. in order then to withdraw our lines and to add greater safety to the columns, it was finally decided to withdraw from rovdinskaya to ust padenga. at one o'clock on the morning of october th, as we lay shivering and shaking in the cold and dismal marshes, which we chose to call our front line, orders came through for us to hold ourselves in readiness for a quick and rapid retreat the following morning. all that night we had russian peasants, interpreters, etc., scouring the villages about us for horses and carts to assist in our withdrawal. at : a. m. that morning the withdrawal began. the god of war, had he witnessed this strange sight that morning, must have recalled a similar sight a hundred years and more prior to that, at moscow, when the army of the great napoleon was scattered to the winds by the cavalry and infantry of the russian hordes. three hundred and more of the ludicrous two-wheeled russian carts preceded us with the artillery, floundering, miring, and slipping in the sticky, muddy roads. following at their rear, came the tired, worn and exhausted troops--unshaven, unkempt and with tattered clothing. they were indeed a pitiful sight. all that day they marched steadily on toward ust padenga. to add to the difficulty of the march, a light snow had fallen which made the roads a mere quagmire. late that night we arrived at the position of ust padenga, which was to become our winter quarters and where later so many of our brave men were to lay down their lives in the snow and cold of the russian forests. with small delay for rest or recuperation we at once began preparation for the defense of this position. our main position and the artillery were stationed in a small village called netsvetyavskaya, situated on a high bluff by the side of which meandered the vaga river. in front of this bluff flowed the padenga river, a small tributary of the vaga, and at our right, all too close for safety, was located the forest. about one thousand yards directly ahead of us was located the village of ust padenga proper, which was garrisoned by a company of russian soldiers. to our right and about seventeen hundred yards ahead of us on another bluff was located the village of nijni gora, to be the scene of fierce fighting in the snow. on the last day of october company "a", which had been on this front for some forty days without a relief, were relieved by company "c" and a battery of canadian artillery was also brought up to reinforce this position. all was now rather quiet on this front, but rumors more and more definite were coming in daily that the bolo was getting ready to launch a big drive on this front. from the location of our troops here, several hundred miles and more from our base on the dvina and with long drawn out lines of communication, some of the stations forty miles or so apart, it was apparent that if attacked by a large force, we would have to give way. it was also plainly apparent that in case the vaga river force was driven back to the dvina it would necessitate the withdrawal of the forces on the dvina from their strongly fortified position at toulgas--consequently, we received orders that this position at ust padenga must be held at all cost. such was the critical position of the americans sent up the river by order of general poole on a veritable fool's errand. the folly of his so-called "active defense" of archangel was to be exposed most plainly at ust padenga and shenkursk in winter. by the middle of november the enemy was becoming more and more active in this vicinity. on the seventeenth day of november a small patrol of americans and canadians were ambushed and only one man, a canadian, escaped. the ambush occurred in the vicinity of trogimovskaya, a village about eight versts below ust padenga, where it was known that the bolo was concentrating troops. on the morning of november th, acting under orders from british headquarters, a strong patrol, numbering about one hundred men, was sent out at daybreak, under lieut. cuff of "c" company, to drive the enemy out of this position. the only road or trail leading into this town ran through a dense forest. the snow, of course, was so deep in the forest that it was impossible to proceed by any other route than this roadway or trail. as this patrol was approaching one of the most dense portions of the forest they were suddenly met by an overwhelming attacking party, which had been concealed in the forest. the woods were literally swarming with them and after a sharp fight lieut. francis cuff, one of the bravest and most fearless officers in the expedition, in command of the patrol, succeeded in withdrawing his platoon. a detachment of the patrol on the edge of the woods skirting the vaga river was having considerable difficulty extricating itself, however, and without faltering lieut. cuff immediately deployed his men and opened fire again upon the enemy. during this engagement, he, with several other daring men, became separated from their fellows and it was at this time that he was severely wounded. he and his men, several of whom were also wounded, although cut off and completely surrounded, fought like demons and sold their lives dearly, as was evidenced by the enemy dead strewn about in the snow near them. the remains of these heroic men were later recovered and removed to shenkursk, where they were buried almost under the shadows of the cathedral located there. during this period the thermometer was daily descending lower and lower; snow was falling continually and the days were so short and dark that one could hardly distinguish day from night. these long nights of bitter cold, with death stalking at our sides, was a terrible strain upon the troops. sentries standing watch in the lonely snow and cold were constantly having feet, hands, and other parts of their anatomy frozen. their nerves were on edge and they were constantly firing upon white objects that could be seen now and then prowling around in the snow. these objects as we later found were enemy troops clad in white clothing which made it almost impossible to detect them. about this time an epidemic of "flu" broke out in some of the villages. in view of the russian custom of keeping the doors and windows of their houses practically sealed during the winter and with their utter disregard for the most simple sanitary precautions, small wonder it was that in a short time the epidemic was raging in practically every village within our lines. the american red cross and medical officers of the expedition at once set to work to combat the epidemic as far as the means at their disposal would permit. the russian peasant, of course, in true fatalist fashion calmly accepted this situation as an inevitable act of providence, which made the task of the red cross workers and others more difficult. the workers, however, devoted themselves to their errand of mercy night and day and gradually the epidemic was checked. this voluntary act of mercy and kindness had a great effect upon the peasantry of the region and doubtless gave them a better and more kindly opinion of the strangers in their midst than all the efforts of our artillery and machine guns ever could have done. and when in the winter horses and sleighs meant life or death to the doughboys, the peasants were true to their american soldier friends. after the fatal ambush of lieutenant cuff's patrol at ust padenga, "c" company, was relieved about the first of december by company "a." during the remainder of the month there was more or less activity on both sides of the line. about the fifth or sixth of the month, the enemy brought up several batteries of light field artillery in the dense forests and begun an artillery bombardment of our entire line. fortunately, however, we soon located the position of their guns and our artillery horses were immediately hitched to the guns, and supported by two platoons of "a" company under captain odjard and lieut. collar, swung into a position from which they obtained direct fire upon the enemy guns with the result that four guns were shortly thereafter put out of commission. from this time on, there were continual skirmishes between the outposts and patrols. the bolo's favorite time for patrolling was at night and during the early hours of the morning when everything was pitch dark. they all wore white smocks over their uniforms and they could easily advance within fifteen or twenty feet of our sentries and outposts without being seen. they were not always so fortunate, however, in this reconnoitering, as a picture on a following page proves which shows one of their scouts clad in the white uniform and cap, who was shot down by one of our sentries when he was less than fifteen feet away from the sentry. outside of the terrific cold and the natural hardships of the expedition, the month of december was comparatively quiet on the padenga front. however, in the neighborhood of shenkursk there was a growing feeling that a number of the enemy troops were in nearby villages and that the enemy was constantly occupying more and more of them daily. in order to break up this growing movement and to assure the natives of the shenkursk region that we would brook no such interference or happenings within our lines, on the fifth of december, a strong detachment, consisting of company "c" under lieut. weeks, and russian infantry, mounted cossacks, and a pom pom detachment, set out for kodima about fifty versts north and east of shenkursk toward the dvina river. it was reported that there were about one hundred and fifty or two hundred of the enemy located in this village, who were breaking a trail through from the dvina river in order that they could send across supporting troops from the dvina for the attack on shenkursk. our detachment, after a day and a half's march, arrived in the vicinity of kodima and prepared to take the position. at about the moment when the attack was to begin, it was found that the pom poms and the vickers guns were not working. the thermometer at this time stood at fifty below zero and the intense cold had frozen the oil in the buffers of the pom poms and machine guns, rendering them worse than useless. fortunately, this was discovered in time to prevent any casualties, for it was later found that there were between five hundred and one thousand of the enemy located in this position and that they were intrenched in prepared positions and well equipped with rifles, machine guns and artillery. our forces, of course, were compelled to retreat, but this maneuver naturally gave the enemy greater courage and the following week it was reported that they were advancing from kodima on shenkursk. we at once dispatched a large force of infantry, artillery, and mounted cossacks to delay this advance. this maneuver was also a miserable failure, and it is not difficult to understand the reason for same when one considers that this detachment was composed of americans, canadians, and russians, of every conceivable, type and description, and orders issued to one body might be and usually were entirely misunderstood by the others. shortly after this, however, the cossack colonel desired to vindicate his troops and a new attack was planned in which the cossacks, supported by their own artillery, were to launch a drive against the enemy at kodima. after a big night's pow-wow and a typical cossack demonstration of swearing eternal allegiance to their leader and boasting of the dire punishment they were going to inflict upon the enemy, they sallied forth from shenkursk with their banners gaily flying. no word was heard from them until the following evening when just at dusk across the river came, galloping like mad, the first news-bearers of our valiant cohorts. on gaining the shelter of shenkursk, most of them were completely exhausted and many of their horses dropped dead from over-exertion on the way, while others died in shenkursk. our first informants described at great detail a thrilling engagement in which they had participated and how they had fought until their ammunition became exhausted, when they were forced to retreat. others described in detail how prince aristoff and his adjutant, captain robins, of the british army, had fought bravely to the last and when about to be taken prisoners, used the last bullets remaining in their pistols to end their lives, thus preventing capture. more and more of the scattered legion were constantly arriving, and each one had such a remarkably different story to tell from that of his predecessor, that by the following morning, we were all inclined to doubt all of the stories. however, it is true that colonel aristoff and robins failed to return, and we were compelled for the time being to assume that at least part of the stories were true. the cossacks immediately went into deep mourning for the loss of their valiant leader and affected great grief and sorrow. this, however, did not prevent them from ransacking the colonel's headquarters and carrying off all his money and jewelry and, in fact, about everything that he owned. four days later, however, in the midst of all this mourning and demonstrations, we were again treated to a still greater surprise, for that afternoon who should come riding into the village but the colonel himself along with his adjutant. it can be readily imagined what scrambling and endeavor there was on the part of the sorrowing ones to return undetected to the colonel's headquarters his stolen property and belongings. for days thereafter, the garrison resounded to the cracking of the colonel's knout, and this time the wailing and shedding of tears was undoubtedly more real than any that had been shed previously to that time. these various unfortunate affairs, while harmful enough in themselves, did far greater harm than such incidents would ordinarily warrant, in this respect, that they gave the enemy greater and greater confidence all along, meanwhile lowering the morale of our russian cohorts as well as our own troops. and here we leave these hardy yanks, far, far to the south of archangel. when their story is picked up again in the narrative, it will be found to be one of the most thrilling stories in american military exploits. viii peasantry of the archangel province russian peasant born linguist--soldiers see village life--communal strips of land tilled by grandfather's methods--ash manure--rapid growth during days of perpetual daylight--sprinkling cattle with holy water--"sow in mud and you will be a prince"--cabbage pie at festival--home-brewed "braga" more villainous than vodka--winter occupations and sports--north russian peasants less illiterate than commonly supposed. the province of archangel is in the far north or forest region of russia. it is a land of forest and morass, plentifully supplied with water in the form of rivers, lakes and marshes, along the banks of which are scant patches of cultivated land, which is invariably the location of a village. throughout the whole of this province the climate is very severe. for more than half of the year the ground is covered by deep snow and the rivers are completely frozen. the arable land all told forms little more than two per cent of the vast area. the population is scarce and averages little more at the most than two to the square mile, according to the latest figures, about . during the late fall and early winter, shortly after company "a" had been relieved at ust padenga, we were stationed in the village of shegovari. here we had considerable leisure at our disposal and consequently the writer began devoting more time to his linguistic studies. difficult as the language seems to be upon one's first introduction to it, it was not long before i was able to understand much of what was said to me, and to express myself in a vague roundabout way. in the latter operation i was much assisted by a peculiar faculty of divination which the russian peasant possesses to a remarkably high degree. if a foreigner succeeds in expressing about one-fourth of an idea, the russian peasant can generally fill up the remaining three-fourths from his own intuition. this may perhaps be readily understood when one considers that a great majority of the upper classes speak french or german fluently and a great number english as well. then, too, the many and varied races that have united and intermingled to form the russian race may offer an equally satisfactory explanation. shegovari may be taken as a fair example of the villages throughout the northern half of russia, and a brief description of its inhabitants will convey a correct notion of the northern peasantry in general. the village itself is located about forty versts above shenkursk on the banks of the vaga river, which meanders and winds about the village so that the river is really on both sides. on account of this location there is more arable land surrounding the village than is found in the average community and dozens of villages are clustered about this particular location, the villages devoting most of their time to agricultural pursuits. i believe it may safely be said that nearly the whole of the female population and about one-half the male inhabitants are habitually engaged in cultivating the communal land, which comprises perhaps five hundred acres of light, sandy soil. as is typical throughout the province this land is divided into three large fields, each of which is again subdivided into strips. the first field is reserved for one of the most important grains, i.e., rye, which in the form of black bread, is the principal food of the population. in the second are raised oats for the horses and here and there some buckwheat which is also used for food. the third field lies fallow and is used in the summer for pasturing the cattle. this method of dividing the land is so devised in order to suit the triennial rotation of crops, a very simple system, but quite practical nevertheless. the field which is used this year for raising winter grain, will be used next summer for raising summer grain and in the following year will lie fallow. every family possesses in each of the two fields under cultivation one or more of the subdivided strips, which he is accountable for and which he must cultivate and attend to. the arable lands are of course carefully manured because the soil at its best is none too good and would soon exhaust it. in addition to manuring the soil the peasant has another method of enriching the soil. though knowing nothing of modern agronomical chemistry, he, as well as his forefathers, have learned that if wood be burnt on a field and the ashes be mixed with the soil, a good harvest may be expected. this simple method accounts for the many patches of burned forest area, which we at first believed to be the result of forest fires. when spring comes round and the leaves begin to appear, a band of peasants, armed with their short hand axes, with which they are most dextrous, proceed to some spot previously decided upon and fell all trees, great and small within the area. if it is decided to use the soil in that immediate vicinity, the fallen trees are allowed to remain until fall, when the logs for building or firewood are dragged away as soon as the first snow falls. the rest of the piles, branches, etc., are allowed to remain until the following spring, at which time fires may be seen spreading in all directions. if the fire does its work properly, the whole of the space is covered with a layer of ashes, and when they have been mixed with the soil the seed is sown, and the harvest, nearly always good, sometimes borders on the miraculous. barley or rye may be expected to produce about six fold in ordinary years and they may produce as much as thirty fold under exceptional circumstances! in most countries this method of treating the soil would be an absurdly expensive one, for wood is entirely too valuable a commodity to be used for such a purpose, but in this northern region the forests are so boundless and the inhabitants so few that the latter do not make any great inroad upon the former. the agricultural year in this region begins in april, with the melting snows. nature which has been lying dormant for some six months, now awakes and endeavors to make up for lost time. no sooner does the snow disappear than the grass immediately sprouts forth and the shrubs and trees begin to bud. the rapidity of this transition from winter to spring certainly astonished the majority of us, accustomed as we were to more temperate climes. on the russian st. george's day, april rd, according to the old russian calendar, or two weeks later according to our calendar, the cattle are brought forth from their winter hibernation and sprinkled with holy water by the priest. they are never very fat at any time of the year but at this particular period of the year their appearance is almost pitiful. during the winter they are kept cooped up in a shed, usually one adjoining the house or under the porch of same with very little, if any, light or ventilation, and fed almostly exclusively on straw. it is quite remarkable that there is one iota of life left in them for when they are thus turned out in the spring they look like mere ghosts of their former selves. with the horses it is a different matter for it is during the winter months in this region that the peasants do most of their traveling and the horse is constantly exposed to the opposite extreme of exposure and the bleak wind and cold, but is well fed. meanwhile the peasants are impatient to begin the field labor--it is an old russian proverb known to all which says: "sow in mud and you will be a prince," and true to this wisdom they always act accordingly. as soon as it is possible to plough they begin to prepare the land for the summer grain and this labor occupies them probably till the end of may. then comes the work of carting out manure, etc., and preparing the fallow field for the winter grain which will last until about the latter part of june when the early hay making generally begins. after the hay making comes the harvest which is by far the busiest time of the year. from the middle of july--especially from st. elijah's day about the middle of july, when the saint according to the russian superstition, may be heard rumbling along the heavens in his chariot of fire--until the end of august or early september the peasant may work day and night and yet find that he has barely time to get all his work done. during the summer months the sun in this region scarcely ever sets below the horizon and the peasant may often be found in the fields as late as twelve o'clock at night trying to complete the day's work. in a little more than a month from this time he has to reap and stack his grain, oats, rye and whatever else he may have sown, and to sow his winter grain for the next, year. to add to the difficulty both grains often ripen about the same time and then it requires almost superhuman efforts on his part to complete his task before the first snow flies. when one considers that all this work is done by hand--the planting, plowing, reaping, threshing, etc., in the majority of cases by home made instruments, it is really a more remarkable thing that the russian peasant accomplishes so much in such a short space of time. about the end of september, however, the field labor is finished and on the first day of october the harvest festival begins. at this particular season of the year our troops on the vaga river were operating far below shenkursk in the vicinity of rovdinskaya and it was our good fortune to witness a typical parish fete--celebrated in true russian style. while it is true during the winter months that the peasant lives a very, frugal and simple life, it is not in my opinion on account of his desire so to do but more a matter of necessity. during the harvest festivals the principal occupation of the peasant seems to be that of eating and drinking. in each household large quantities of braga or home brewed beer is prepared and a plentiful supply of meat pies are constantly on hand. there is also another delectable dish, which i am sure did not appeal to our troops to the fullest extent. it was a kind of pie composed of cabbage and salt fish, but unless one was quite accustomed to the odor, he could not summon up sufficient courage to attack this viand. it, however, was a very popular dish among the peasants. after a week or so of this preparation the fete day finally arrives and the morning finds the entire village attending a long service in the village church. all are dressed in their very best and the finest linens and brightest colors are very much in evidence. after the service they repair to their different homes--of course many of the poorer ones go to the homes of the more well to do where they are very hospitably received and entertained. all sit down to a common table and the eating begins. i attended a dinner in a well-to-do peasant's house that day and before the meal was one-third through i was ready to desist. the landlord was very much displeased and i was informed confidentially by one of the russian officers who had invited me that the landlord would take great offense at the first to give up the contest--and that as a matter of fact instead of being a sign of poor breeding, on the contrary it was considered quite the thing to stuff one's self until he could eat no more. as the meal progressed great bowls of braga and now and then a glass of vodka were brought in to help along the repast. after an almost interminable time the guests all rose in a body and facing the icon crossed themselves--then bowing to the host--made certain remarks which i afterward found out meant, "thanks for your bread and salt"--to which the host replied, "do not be displeased, sit down once more for goodluck," whereupon all hands fell to again and had it not been for a mounted messenger galloping in with important messages, i am of the opinion that we would probably have spent the balance of the day trying not to displease our host. if the russian peasant's food were always as good and plentiful as at this season of the year, he would have little reason to complain, but this is by no means the case. beef, mutton, pork and the like are entirely too expensive to be considered as a common article of food and consequently the average peasant is more or less of a vegetarian, living on cabbage, cabbage soup, potatoes, turnips and black bread the entire winter--varied now and then with a portion of salt fish. from the festival time until the following spring there is no possibility of doing any agricultural work for the ground is as hard as iron and covered with snow. the male peasants do very little work during these winter months and spend most of their time lying idly upon the huge brick stoves. some of them, it is true, have some handicraft that occupies their winter hours; others will take their guns and a little parcel of provisions and wander about in the trackless forests for days at a time. if successful, he may bring home a number of valuable skins--such as ermine, fox and the like. sometimes a number of them associate for the purpose of deep sea fishing, in which case they usually start out on foot for kem on the shores of the white sea or for the far away kola on the murmansk coast. here they must charter a boat and often times after a month or two of this fishing they will be in debt to the boat owner and are forced to return with an empty pocket. while we were there we gave them all plenty to do--village after village being occupied in the grim task of making barb wire entanglements, etc., building block houses, hauling logs, and driving convoys. this was of course quite outside their usual occupation and i am of the impression that they were none to favorably impressed--perhaps some of them are explaining to the bolo commissars just how they happened to be engaged in these particular pursuits. for the female part of the population, however, the winter is a very busy and well occupied time. for it is during these long months that the spinning and weaving is done and cloth manufactured for clothing and other purposes. many of them are otherwise engaged in plaiting a kind of rude shoe--called lapty, which is worn throughout the summer by a great number of the peasants--and i have seen some of them worn in extremely cold weather with heavy stockings and rags wrapped around the feet. this was probably due to the fact, however, that leather shoes and boots were almost a thing of the past at that time, for it must be remembered that russia had been practically shut off from the rest of the world for almost four years during the period of the war. the evenings are often devoted to besedys--a kind of ladies' guild meeting, where all assemble and engage in talking over village gossip, playing games and other innocent amusements, or spinning thread from flax. before closing this chapter, i wish to comment upon an article that i read some months ago regarding what the writer thought to be a surprising abundance of evidence disproving the common idea of illiteracy among the russian peasants. it is admitted that the peasants of this region are above the average in the way of education and ability, but as i have later learned they are not an average type of the millions of peasants located in the interior and the south of russia, whose fathers and forefathers and many of themselves spent the greater part of their lives as serfs. while the peasants of this region nominally may have come under the heading of serfs, yet when they were first driven into this country for the purpose of colonization and settlement by peter the great, they were given far greater liberties than any of the peasants of the south enjoyed. they were settled on state domains and those that lived on the land of landlords scarcely ever realized the fact, inasmuch as few of the landed aristocracy ever spent any portion of their time in the province of archangel unless compelled to do so. in addition to this liberty and freedom, there was also the stimulating effect of the cold, rigorous climate and therefore it is more readily understood why the peasants of this region are more energetic, more intelligent, more independent and better educated than the inhabitants of the interior to the south. after becoming somewhat acquainted with the family life of the peasantry, and no one living with them as intimately as we did, could have failed to have become more than ordinarily acquainted, we turned our attention to the local village government or so-called mir. we had early learned that the chief personage in a russian village was the starosta, or village elder, and that all important communal affairs were regulated by the selski skhod or village assembly. we were also well acquainted with the fact that the land in the vicinity of the village belonged to the commune, and was distributed periodically among the members in such a way that every able bodied man possessed a share sufficient for his maintenance, or nearly so. beyond this, however, few of us knew little or nothing more. we were fortunate in having with us a great number of russian born men, who of course were our interpreters, one of whom, by the way, private cwenk, was killed on january th, , in the attack of nijni gora when he refused to quit his post, though mortally injured, until it was too late for him to make his escape. through continual conversations and various transactions with the peasants (carried on of course through our interpreters) the writer gradually learned much of the village communal life. while at first glance there are many points of similarity between the family life and the village life, yet there are also many points of difference which will be more apparent as we continue. in both, there is a chief or ruler, one called the khozain or head of the house and the other as above indicated, the starosta or village elder. in both cases too there is a certain amount of common property and a common responsibility. on the other hand, the mutual relations are far from being so closely interwoven as in the case of the household. from these brief remarks it will be readily apparent that a russian village is quite a different thing from a provincial town or village in america. while it is true in a sense that in our villages the citizens are bound together in certain interests of the community, yet each family, outside of a few individual friends, is more or less isolated from the rest of the community--each family having little to interest it in the affairs of the other. in a russian village, however, such a state of indifference and isolation is quite impossible. the heads of households must often meet together and consult in the village assembly and their daily duties and occupations are controlled by the communal decrees. the individual cannot begin to mow the hay or plough the fields until the assembly has decided the time for all to begin. if one becomes a shirker or drunkard everyone in the village has a right to complain and see that the matter is at once taken care of, not so much out of interest for the welfare of the shirker, but from the plain selfish motive that all the families are collectively responsible for his taxes and also the fact that he is entitled to a share in the communal harvest, which unless he does his share of the work, is taken from the common property of the whole. as heretofore stated on another page of this book, the land belonging to each village is distributed among the individual families and for which each is responsible. it might be of interest to know how this distribution is made. in certain communities the old-fashioned method of simply taking a census and distributing the property according to same is still in use. this in a great many instances is quite unfair and works a great hardship--where often the head of the household is a widow with perhaps four or five girls on her hands and possibly one boy. obviously, she cannot hope to do as much as her neighbor, who, perhaps, in addition to the father, may have three or four well-grown boys to assist him. it might be logically suggested, then, that the widow could rent the balance of her share of the land and thus take care of same. if land were in demand in russia, especially in the archangel region, as it is in the farming communities of this country, it might be a simple matter--but in russia often the possession of a share of land is quite often not a privilege but a decided hardship. often the land is so poor that it cannot be rented at any price, and in the old days it was quite often the case that even though it could be rented, the rent would not be sufficient to pay the taxes on same. therefore, each family is quite well satisfied with his share of the land and is not looking for more trouble and labor if they can avoid it, and at the assembly meetings, when the land is distributed each year, it is amusing to hear the thousand-and-one excuses for not taking more land, as the following brief description will illustrate. it is assembly day, we will imagine, and all the villagers are assembled to do their best from having more land and its consequent responsibilities thrust upon them. nicholas is being asked how many shares of the communal land he will take, and after due deliberation and much scratching of the head to stir up the cerebral processes (at least we will assume that is the function of this last movement) he slowly replies that inasmuch as he has two sons he will take three shares for his family to farm, or perhaps a little less as his health is none too good, though as a matter of fact he may be one of the most ruddy-faced and healthiest individuals present. this last remark is the signal for an outburst of laughter and ridicule by the others present and the arguments pro and con wax furious. of a sudden, a voice in the crowd cries out: "he is a rich moujik, and he should have five shares of the land as his burden at the least." nicholas, seeing that the wave is about to overwhelm him, then resorts to entreaty and makes every possible explanation now why it will be utterly impossible for him to take five shares, his point now being to cut down this allotment if within his power. after considerable more discussion the leader of the crowd then puts the question to the assembly and inquires if it be their will that nicholas take four shares. there is an immediate storm of assent from all quarters and this settles the question beyond further argument. this native shrewdness and spirit of barter is quite typical of the russian peasant in all matters--large or small--and he greets the outcome of every such combat with stoical indifference, in typical fatalist fashion. the writer recalls one experience in the village of shegovari on the occasion of our first occupation of this place. it was before the rivers had frozen over and headquarters at shenkursk was getting ready to install the sledge convoy system which was our only means of transportation during the long winter months. shegovari being a large and prosperous community and there being a plentiful supply of horses there, we were accordingly dispatched to this place to take over the town and buy up as many horses as could be commandeered in this section. in company with a villainous looking detachment of cossacks we set out from shenkursk on board an enormous barge being towed by the river steamer "tolstoy." on our way we became pretty well acquainted with colonel aristov, the commander of the cossacks, who, through his interpreter, filled our ears with the various deeds of valor of himself and picked cohorts. he further informed us that the village where we were going was hostile to the allied troops, and that there was some question just at that time as to whether it was not in fact occupied by the enemy. consequently he had devised a very clever scheme, so he thought, for getting what we were after and incidentally putting horses on the market at bargain rates. we were to bivouac for the night some ten miles or so above the town and at early dawn we would steam down the river on our gunboat. if there were any signs of hostility we were at once to open up on the village with the pom pom mounted on board our cruiser, and the infantry were to follow up with an attack on land. the colonel's idea was that a little demonstration of arms would thoroughly cow the native villagers and therefore they would be willing to meet any terms offered by him for the purchase of their horses. fortunately or unfortunately (which side one considers) the plan failed to materialize, for when we anchored alongside the village the peasants were busily occupied in getting their supply of salt fish for the winter and merely took our arrival as one of the usual unfortunate visitations of providence. the colonel at once sent for the starosta (the village elder as heretofore explained) who immediately presented himself with much bowing and scraping, probably wondering what further ill-luck was to befall him. the colonel with a great display of pomp and gesticulating firmly impressed the starosta that on the following day all the peasants were to bring to this village their horses, prepared to sell them for the good of the cause. ... the following morning the streets were lined up with horses and owners, and they could be seen corning from all directions. at about ten o'clock the parade began. each peasant would lead his horse by the colonel, who would look them over carefully and then ask what the owner would take for his horse. usually he would be met with a bow and downcast eyes as the owner replied: "as your excellency decides." "very well, then, you will receive nine hundred roubles or some such amount." instantly the air of submissiveness and meekness disappears and a torrent of words pours forth, eulogizing the virtues of this steed and the enormous sacrifice it would be to allow his horse to go at that price. after the usual haggling the bargain would be closed--sometimes at a greater figure and sometimes at a lesser. now the amusing part of this transaction to me was that with my interpreter we moved around amongst the crowd and got their own values as to some of these horses. what was our amazement some moments later to see them pass before the colonel who in a number of cases offered them more than their estimates previously given to myself, whereupon they immediately went through the maneuvers above described and in some cases actually obtained increases over the colonel's first hazard. this lesson later stood us in good stead, for some weeks later it devolved upon us to purchase harnesses and sleds for these very horses and the reader may be sure that such haggling and bargaining (all through an interpreter) was never seen before in this part of the country. somehow the word got around that the amerikanskis who were buying the sleds and harness had gotten acquainted with the horse dealing method of some weeks past and therefore it was an especial event to witness the sale and purchase of these various articles, and, needless to say, there was always an enthusiastic crowd of spectators present to cheer and jibe at the various contestants. all these various transactions must have resulted with the balance decidedly in favor of the villagers, for they were extremely pleasant and hospitable to us during our entire stay here and instead of being hostile were exactly the opposite, actually putting themselves to a great amount of trouble time after time to meet with our many demands for logs and laborers, although they were in no way bound to do these things. in our dealings with the community here, as elsewhere, all transactions were carried on with the starosta or village head. we naturally figured that this officer was one of the highest and most honored men of the village, probably corresponding to the mayor of one of our own cities, but we were later disillusioned in this particular. it seems that each male member of the community must "do time" some time during his career as village elder, and each one tried to postpone the task just as long as it was in his power to do so. true it is that the starosta is the leader of his community during his regime, but therein is the difficulty, for coupled with this power is the further detail of keeping a strict and accurate account of all the business transactions of the year, all the moneys, wages, etc., due the various members for labors performed and services rendered. this, of course, is due to the fact that everything is owned in common by the community: land, food products, wood, in short, practically all tangible property. imagine, then, the starosta who, we will say, at eight or nine o'clock on a cold winter's night is called upon to have a dozen or more drivers ready the next morning at six o'clock to conduct a sledge convoy through to the next town, another group of fifty or a hundred workmen to go into the forests and cut and haul logs for fortifications, and still others for as many different duties as one could imagine during time of war. he must furthermore see, for example, that the same drivers are properly called in turn, for it is the occasion of another prolonged verbal battle in case one is called out of his turn. during the day he is probably busily occupied in commandeering oats and hay for the convoy horses and when night comes he certainly has earned his day's repose, but his day does not end at nightfall as in the case of the other members of the commune. during our stay here, practically every night he would call upon the commanding officer to get orders for the coming day, to check over various claims and accounts and each week to receive pay for the entire community engaged in these labors. one occasion we distinctly recall as a striking example of this particular starosta's honesty and integrity. he had spent the greater part of the evening in our headquarters, checking over accounts involving some three or four thousand roubles for the pay roll the following day. finally the matter was settled and the money turned over to him, after which we all retired to our bunks. at about one o'clock that morning the sentry on post near headquarters awakened us and said the starosta was outside and wished to see the commander, whereupon the c. o. sent word for him to come up to our quarters. after the usual ceremony of crossing himself before the icon the starosta announced that he had been overpaid about ninety roubles, which mistake he found after reaching his home and checking over the account again. we were too dumfounded to believe our ears. here was this poor hard-working moujik who doubtless knew that the error would never have been discovered by ourselves, and, even if it had, the loss would have been trifling, yet he tramped back through the snow to get this matter straightened out before he retired to the top of the stove for the night. needless to say, our c. o. turned the money back to him as a reward for his honesty, in addition to which he was given several hearty draughts of rum to warm him up for his return journey, along with a small sack of sugar to appease his wife who, he said, always made things warmer for him when he returned home with the odor of rum about him. [illustration: a soldier and his bride surrounded by the wedding party.] u. s. official photo joe chinzi and russian bride [illustration: a man watching a woman weave cloth.] doud watching her weave cloth [illustration: soldier watching several women seated around a table.] u.s. official photo doughboy attends spinning-bee [illustration: soldier on a bed on a large fireplace.] doud doughboy in the best bed--on stove [illustration: several soldiers seated on a barricade.] morris defiance to bolo advance [illustration: building behind a grove of trees.] doud th hospital at beresnik [illustration: several houses clustered together.] red cross photo onega [illustration: several soldiers writing and reading in a room.] u s official photo y m. c. a., obozerskaya ix "h" company pushes up the onega valley two platoons of "h" company by steamer to onega--occupation of chekuevo--bolsheviki give battle--big order to little force--kaska too strongly defended--doughboys' attack fails--cossacks spread false report--successful advance up valley--digging in for winter. meanwhile "h" company was pushing up the onega valley. stories had leaked out in archangel of engagements up the dvina and up the railroad where american soldiers had tasted first sweets of victory, and "h" men now piled excitedly into a steamer at archangel on the th of september and after a -hour ride down the dvina, across the dvina bay up an arm of the white sea called onega bay and into the mouth of the onega river, landed without any opposition and took possession. the enemy had been expelled a few days previously by a small detachment of american sailors from the "olympia." the "h" force consisted of two platoons commanded by lieuts. phillips and pellegrom, who reported to an english officer, col. clark. the coming of americans was none too soon. the british officer had not made much headway in organizing an effective force of the anti-bolshevik russians. the red guards were massing forces in the upper part of the valley and, german-like, had sent notice of their impending advance to recapture the city of onega. on september th lieut. pellegrom received verbal orders from col. clark to move his platoon of fifty-eight men with lieut. nugent, m. r. c., and one man at once to chekuevo, about fifty miles up the river. partly by boat and partly by marching the americans reached the village of chekuevo and began organizing the defenses, on the th. three days later lieut. phillips was hurried up with his platoon to reinforce and take command of the hundred and fifteen americans and ninety-three russian volunteers. at dawn on the twenty-fourth the enemy attacked our positions from three sides with a force of three hundred and fifty men and several machine guns. the engagement lasted for five hours. the main attack coming down the left bank of the onega river was held by the americans till after the enemy had driven back the allies, russians, on the right bank and placed a machine gun on our flank. then the americans had to give ground on the main position and the reds placed another machine gun advantageously. meanwhile smaller parties of the enemy were working in the rear. finally the enemy machine guns were spotted and put out of action by the superior fire of our lewis automatics, and the bolshevik leader, shiskin, was killed at the gun. this success inspirited the americans who dashed forward and the reds broke and fled. a strong american combat patrol followed the retreating reds for five miles and picked up much clothing, ammunition, rifles, and equipment, and two of his dead, ten of his wounded and one prisoner and two machine guns. losses on our side consisted of two wounded. our russian allies lost two killed and seven wounded. the action had been carried on in the rain under very trying conditions for the americans who were in their first fire fight and reflected great credit upon lieut. phillips and his handful of doughboys who were outnumbered more than three to one and forced to give battle in a place well known to the enemy but strange to the americans and severely disadvantageous. outside of a few patrol combats and the capture of a few bolshevik prisoners the remainder of the month of september was uneventful. the onega valley force, like the railway and kodish forces, was sparring for an opening and plans were made for a general push on plesetskaya. on september th lieut. phillips received an order as follows: "the enemy on the railway line is being attacked today (the th) and some cossacks are coming to you from obozerskaya. on their arrival you will move south with them and prevent enemy from retiring across the river in a westerly direction. "open the wire to obozerskaya and ascertain how far down the line our troops have reached and then try to keep abreast of them but do not go too far without orders from the o/ca force (col. sutherland at obozerskaya). i mean by this that you must not run your head against a strong force which may be retiring unless you are sure of holding your ground. there is a strong force at plesetskaya on the railway and it is possible that they may retire across your front in the direction of the line running from murmansk to petrograd. the commandant of chekuevo must supply you with carts for rations and, as soon as you can, make arrangements for food to be sent to you from the railway. the s. s. service can run up to you with supplies and can keep with you until you reach the rapids, if you go so far. don't forget that the enemy has a force at turchesova, south of you. keep the transports in the middle of your column so that no carts get cut off, and it would be a good thing if you could get transport from village to village. "captain burton, r. m. l. i., will remain in command at chekuevo." w. j. clark, lieut.-col. the americans knew that this was a big contract, but let us now look at the map and see what the plan really called for. forty miles of old imperial telegraph and telephone line to the eastward to restore to use between chekuevo and obozerskaya. no signal corps men and no telling where the wires needed repair. and sixty miles more or less to the south and eastward on another road to make speed with slow cart transport with orders to intercept an enemy supposed to be preparing to flee westward from the railway. not forgetting that was to be done in spite of the opposition of a strong force of red guards somewhere in the vicinity of turchesova thirty-five miles up the valley. "a little job, you know," for those one hundred and fifteen americans, veterans of two weeks in the wilds of north russia. the american officer from his reconnaissance patrols and from friendly natives learned that the enemy instead of seeking escape was massing forces for another attack on the americans. about seven hundred of the red guards were heavily entrenched in and around kaska and were recruiting forces. in compliance with his orders, lieut. phillips moved out the next morning, october st, with the eighteen mounted cossacks, joined in the night from obozerskaya, and his other anti-bolshevik russian volunteer troops. movement began at : a. m. with about eight miles to march in the dark and zero hour was set for five o'clock daybreak. two squads of the americans and russian volunteers had been detached by lieut. phillips and given to the command of capt. burton to make a diversion attack on wazientia, a village across the river from kaska. lieut. pellegrom was to attack the enemy in flank from the west while lieut. phillips and the cossacks made the frontal assault. phillip's platoon was early deserted by the cossacks and, after advancing along the side of a sandy ridge to within one hundred yards of the enemy, found it necessary to dig in. lieut. pellegrom on the flank on account of the nature of the ground brought his men only to within three hundred yards of the enemy lines and was unable to make any communication with his leader. captain burton was deserted by the volunteers at first fire and had to retreat with his two squads of americans. the fire fight raged all the long day. phillips was unable to extricate his men till darkness but held his position and punished the enemy's counter attacks severely. the enemy commanded the lines with heavy machine guns and the doughboys who volunteered to carry messages from one platoon to the other paid for their bravery with their lives. believing himself to be greatly outnumbered the american officer withdrew his men at : p. m. to chekuevo, with losses of six men killed and three wounded. enemy losses reported later by deserters were thirty killed and fifty wounded. again the opposing sides resorted to delay and sparring for openings. at chekuevo the americans strengthened the defenses of that important road junction and kept in contact with the enemy by daily combat patrols up the valley in the direction of kaska, scene of the encounter. it was during this period that one day the "h" men at chekuevo were surprised by the appearance of lieut. johnson with a squad of "m" company men who had patrolled the forty miles of obozerskaya road to chekuevo looking for signs of the enemy whom a mounted patrol of cossacks sent from obozerskaya had declared were in possession of the road and of chekuevo. they learned from these men that on the railway, too, the enemy had disclosed astonishing strength of numbers and showed as good quality of fighting courage as at kaska and had administered to the american troops their first defeat. they learned, too, that the french battalion was coming back onto the fighting line with the americans for a heavy united smash at the enemy. a new party of some fifteen cossacks relieved the eighteen cossacks who returned to archangel. the force was augmented materially by the coming of a french officer and twenty-five men from archangel. the same boat brought out the remainder of "h" company under command of capt. carl gevers, who set up his headquarters at onega, october th, under the new british o/c onega det., col. ("tin eye") edwards, and sent lieut. carlson and his platoon to karelskoe, a village ten miles to the rear of chekuevo, to support phillips. success on the railroad front, together with information gathered from patrols led col. edwards to believe the enemy was retiring up the valley. an armed reconnaissance by the whole force at chekuevo moving forward on both sides of the onega river on october th, which was two days after the americans on the railroad had carried four hundred and forty-five by storm and the bolo had "got up his wind" and retired to emtsa. phillips found that the enemy had indeed retired from kaska and retreated to turchesova, some thirty-five miles up the valley. phillips occupied all the villages along the river kachela in force, sending his combat patrols south of priluk daily to make contact. winter showed signs of early approach and, in compliance with verbal orders of col. edwards at onega, phillips withdrew his forces to chekuevo on october th. this seems to have been in accordance with the wise plan of the new british commanding general to extend no further the dangerously extended lines, but to prepare for active defense just where snow and frost were finding the various widely scattered forces of the expedition. on the way back through kaska it was learned that two of the "h" men who had been reported missing in the fight at kaska, but who were in fact killed, had been buried by the villagers. they were disinterred and given a regular military funeral, and graves marked. outside of daily patrols and the reliefs of platoons changing about for rest at onega there was little of excitement during the remainder of october and the month of november. occasionally there would be a flurry, a "windy time" at british headquarters in onega and patrols and occupying detachments sent out to various widely separated villages up the valley. there seems to have been an idea finally that the village of kyvalanda should be fortified so as to prevent the red guards from having access to the valley of the chulyuga, a tributary of the onega river, up which in the winter ran a good road to bolsheozerke where it joined the chekuevo road to oborzerskaya. wire was brought up and the village of kyvalanda was strongly entrenched, sometimes two platoons being stationed there. captain gevers had to go to hospital for operation. this was a loss to the men. here old boreas came down upon this devoted company of doughboys. they got into their winter clothing, gave attention to making themselves as comfortable shelters as possible on their advanced outposts, organized their sleigh transport system that had to take the place of the steamer service on the onega which was now a frozen barrier to boats but a highway for sleds. they had long winter nights ahead of them with frequent snow storms and many days of severe zero weather. and though they did not suspect it they were to encounter hard fighting during and at the end of the winter. x "g" company far up the pinega river reds had looted villages of pinega valley--winter sees bolsheviks returning to attack--mission of american column--pinega--pinkish-white political color--yank soldiers well received--take distant karpogora--greatly outnumbered americans retire--"just where is pinega front?" in making their getaway from archangel and vicinity at the time the allies landed in archangel, the reds looted and robbed and carried off by rail and by steamer much stores of furs, and clothing and food, as well as the munitions and military equipment. what they did not carry by rail to vologda they took by river to kotlas. we have seen how they have been pursued and battled on the onega, on the railroad, on the vaga, on the dvina. now we turn to the short narrative of their activities on the pinega river. as the reds at last learned that the expedition was too small to really overpower them and had returned to dispute the allies on the other rivers, so, far up the pinega valley, they began gathering forces. the people of the lower pinega valley appealed to the archangel government and the allied military command for protection and for assistance in pursuing the reds to recover the stores of flour that had been taken from the co-operative store associations at various points along the river. these co-operatives had bought flour from the american red cross. accordingly on october th captain conway with "g" company set off on a fast steamer and barge for pinega, arriving after three days and two nights with a force of two platoons, the other two having been left behind on detached service, guarding the ships in the harbor of bakaritza. here the american officer was to command the area, organize its defense and cooperate with the russian civil authorities in raising local volunteers for the defense of the city of pinega, which, situated at the apex of a great inverted "v" in the river, appeared to be the key point to the military and political situation. pinega was a fine city of three thousand inhabitants with six or seven thousand in the nearby villages that thickly dot the banks of this broad expansion of the old fur-trading and lumber river port. its people were progressive and fairly well educated. the city had been endowed by its millionaire old trader with a fine technical high school. it had a large cathedral, of course. not far from it two hours ride by horseback, an object of interest to the doughboy, was the three hundred-year-old monastery, white walls with domes and spires, perched upon the grey bluffs, in the hazy distance looking over the broad pinega valley and soyla lake, where the monks carried on their fishing. in pinega was a fine community hall, a good hospital and the government buildings of the area. its people had held a great celebration when they renounced allegiance to the czar, but they had very sensibly retained some of his old trained local representatives to help carry on their government. self government they cherished. when the red guards had been in power at archangel they had of course extended their sway partially to this far-off area. but the people had only submitted for the time. some of their able men had had to accept tenure of authority under the nominal overlordship of the red commissars. and when the reds fled at the approach of the allies, the people of pinega had punished a few of the cruel bolshevik rulers that they caught but had not made any great effort to change all the officers of civil government even though they had been red officials for a time. in fact it was a somewhat confused color scheme of red and white civil government that the americans found in the pinega valley. the writer commanded this area in the winter and speaks from actual experience in dealing with this pinega local government, half red as it was. the americans were well received and took up garrison duty in the fall, raising a force of three hundred volunteers chiefly from the valley above pinega, whose people were in fear of a return of the reds and begged for a military column up the valley to deliver it from the red agitators and recover their flour that had been stolen. november th captain conway, acting under british g. h. q., archangel, acceded to these requests and sent lieut. higgins with thirty-five americans and two hundred and ten russian volunteers to clear the valley and occupy karpogora. for ten days the force advanced without opposition. at marynagora an enemy patrol was encountered and the next day the yanks drove back an enemy combat patrol. daily combat patrol action did not interfere with their advance and on thanksgiving day the "g" company boys after a little engagement went into karpogora. they were one hundred and twenty versts from pinega, which was two hundred and seven versts from archangel, a mere matter of being two hundred miles from archangel in the heart of a country which was politically about fifty-fifty between red and white. but the reds did not intend to have the americans up there. on december th they came on in a much superior force and attacked. the americans lost two killed and four wounded out of their little thirty-five americans and several white guards, and on order from captain conway, who hurried up the river to take charge, the flying column relinquished its hold on karpogora and retired down the valley followed by the reds. a force of white guards was left at visakagorka, and one at trufanagora, and priluk and the main white guard outer defense of pinega established at pelegorskaya. like the whole expedition into russia of which the pinega valley force was only one minor part, the coming of the allied troops had quieted the areas occupied but, in the hinterland beyond, the propaganda of the wily bolshevik agents of trotsky and lenine succeeded quite naturally in inflaming the russians against what they called the foreign bayonets. and here at the beginning of winter we leave this handful of americans holding the left sector of the great horseshoe line against a gathering force, the mutterings of whose red mobs was already being heard and which was preparing a series of dreadful surprises for the allied forces on the pinega as well as on other winter fronts. indeed their activities in this peace-loving valley were to rise early in the winter to major importance to the whole expedition's fate and stories of this flank threat to archangel and especially to the dvina and vaga lines of communication, where the pinega valley merges with the dvina valley, was to bring from our american great headquarters in france the terse telegram: "just where is the pinega front?" it was out there in the solid pine forests one hundred fifty miles to the east and north of archangel. out where the russian peasant had rigged up his strange-looking but ingeniously constructed sahnia, or sledge. where on the river he was planting in the ice long thick-set rows of pines or branches in double rows twice a sled length apart. these frozen-in lines of green were to guide the traveller in the long winter of short days and dark nights safely past the occasional open holes and at such times as he made his trip over the road in the blinding blizzards of snow. out there where the peasant was changing from leather boots to felt boots and was hunting up his scarfs and his great parki, or bearskin overcoat. that is where "g" company, one hundred strong, was holding the little, but important, pinega front at the end of the fall campaign. xi with wounded and sick lest we forget s. o. l. doughboy--column in battle and no medical supplies--jack-knife amputation--sewed up with needle and thread from red cross comfort kit--diary of american medical officer--account is choppy but full of interest. some things the doughboy and officer from america will never have grace enough in his forgiving heart to ever forgive. those were the outrageous things that happened to the wounded and sick in that north russian campaign. of course much was done and in fact everything was meant to be done possible for the comfort of the luckless wounded and the men who, from exposure and malnutrition, fell sick. but there were altogether too many things that might have been avoided. lest we forget and go off again on some such strange campaign let us chronicle the story of the grief that came to the s. o. l. doughboy. one american medical officer who went up with the first column of americans in the onega river valley in the fall never got through cussing the british medical officer who sent him off with merely the handful of medical supplies that he, as a medical man, always carried for emergencies of camp. story has already been told of the lack of medical supplies on the two "flu"-infected ships that took the soldiers to russia. never will the american doughboy forget how melancholy he felt when he saw the leaded shrouds go over the side of the sister ship where the poor italians were suffering and dying. and the same ill-luck with medical supplies seemed to follow us to north russia. dr. nugent, of milwaukee, writes after the first engagement on the onega front he was obliged to use needle and thread from a doughboys' red cross comfort kit to take stitches in six wounded men. lieut. lennon of "l" company reports that during the first action of his company on the kodish front in the fall, there was no medical officer with the unit in action. the american medical officer was miles in rear. wounded men were bandaged on the field with first aid and carried back twenty-six versts. and he relates further that one man on the field suffered the amputation of his leg that day with a pocket knife. the officer further states that the american medical officer at seletskoe was neglectful and severe with the doughboys. at one time there was no iodine, no bandages, no number 's at kodish front. the medical officer under discussion was never on the front and gained the hearty dislike of the american doughboys for his conduct. this matter of medical and surgical treatment is of such great importance that space is here accorded to the letter and diary notes of an american officer, major j. carl hall, our gallant and efficient medical officer of the th infantry, who from his home in centralia, illinois, august th, , sends us a contribution as follows: "take what you can use from this diary. thought i would avoid the english antagonism throughout but later have decided to add the following incident at shenkursk, december , . i was ordered by the british general, finlayson, to take the duties of s. m. o. and sanitary officer of vaga column, that all medical and sanitary questions, including distribution of american personnel would be under the british s. m. o. dvina forces--right at the time the american soldiers were needing medical attention most. this order absolutely contradicted my order from the american headquarters at archangel, making me powerless to care for the american soldiers. i wired the british i could not obey it, unless sent from american headquarters. col. graham, british officer in charge of shenkursk column, informed me that i was disobeying an order on an active front, for which the maximum punishment was death. i immediately told him i was ready to take any punishment they might administer and sooner or later the news would travel back to u. s. a. and the general public would awaken to the outrageous treatment given the american soldiers by the hands of the british. this affair was hushed and i received no punishment, for he knew that there would have to be too many american lives accounted for. i returned to the base at archangel and was then placed in charge of the surgery of the american red cross hospital. "the russian-english nurse story you know and also add that % of all medical stores obtained from the british on the river front, if not stolen by myself and men, were signed over to us with greatest reluctance, red tape, and delay. it was a question of fight, quarrel, steal and even threaten to kill in order to obtain those supplies justly due us. "would like very much to have given you a more satisfactory report--but right now am rushed for time--anyway, probably you can obtain most of the essential points. "yours very truly, (signed) john c. hall." this faithful and illuminating diary account of major hall's is typical of the story on the other four fronts, except that british medical officers dominated on the railroad front and on the onega front and at kodish. upon arrival of th infantry in russia on sept. th, , as regimental surgeon, established an infirmary in olga barracks, archangel. after taking over civilian hospital by american red cross, i then established a twenty bed military hospital and an infirmary at solombola. on sept. th i was ordered to report to major rook, r. a. m. c, at issakagorka, on railroad front, four miles south of bakaritza, for instructions regarding medical arrangements on river and railroad fronts. on sept. th i reported to col. mcdermott, r. a. m. c., a. d. m. s., north russian expeditionary force, and there received instructions that i should leave immediately for issakagorka. accompanied by my interpreter, private anton russel, and sgt. paul clark, boarded russian launch for bakaritza six miles up the dvina and on the opposite bank of the river, where we transferred to train and proceeded to issakagorka. upon arrival there and reporting to major rook, r. a. m. c., i was informed that i should go armed night and day for they were having trouble with local bolsheviks and expected an attack any time. issakagorka is a village located in a swamp with about , population, and every available room occupied. the overcrowded condition due to the presence of many refugees from petrograd and moscow and other bolshevik territories. the streets deep. an odor of decaying animal matter, stagnant water and feces is to be had on the streets and in all the homes. at the house in which i was billeted, a fair example of practically all russian homes, the toilet was inside. on sept. th i was ordered to railroad front to inspect medical arrangements. arrived at obozerskaya and found that lieut. ralph powers had taken over the railroad station and had almost completed arrangements for a detention hospital of forty beds. he had just evacuated thirty sick and wounded. the first aid station being in a log hut, one-quarter mile west of station, in charge of capt. wymand pyle, m. c. in this there were ten stretchers which they had used for temporary beds until cases could be evacuated to the rear. pits had been dug for latrines daily because the ground was so swampy the pit would fill with water by night. the americans had been instructed to boil water before drinking, but after investigating i found it had been almost impossible for they had no way to boil it only by mess cup, and the officers found it difficult to get the men to strictly observe this order. the return trip from the front to issakagorka was made on the ambulance train. this train consisted of five coaches, which had been used in the war against germany, and all badly in need of repair. two were nothing more than box cars fitted with stretchers. two were a slight improvement over these, having double-decked framework for beds, which were fitted with mattresses and blankets. the other coach was divided into compartments. one an operating room, which was built on modern plans, and the other compartment was built on the style of the american pullman, and occupied by the russian doctor in charge of train, one felcher or assistant doctor (a sanitar), which is a russian medical orderly, and two russian female nurses. our sick and wounded were being evacuated by this train from the front to bakaritza; there kept at the field hospital th or taken by boat to archangel. i reported to general finlayson on sept. and was given , roubles to be delivered to col. joselyn, then in charge of river forces, and informed to leave for river front to make medical arrangements for the winter drive. at noon sept. th, with lieut. chappel and two platoons of infantrymen, boarded a box car, travelled to bakaritza, where we transferred to a small, dirty russian tug. the day was spent going south on dvina river, toward beresnik. at the same time lieut. chappel with the platoons of infantrymen boarded a small boat and proceeded up the river. the tug on which we were had no sleeping accommodations and on account of the number aboard we had to sleep the first night sitting erect. the cockroaches ran around in such large numbers that when we ate it was necessary to keep a very close watch, or one would get into the food. the following day the infantrymen were left at siskoe and we went on to beresnik. lieut. chappel was killed two days after leaving us. arrived at beresnik, which is about one hundred and fifty miles from archangel, after a thirty-eight-hour trip; reported to major coker, and then visited british detention hospital in charge of capt. watson, r. a. m. c. the hospital being a five-room log building with the toilet built adjoining the kitchen. in this hospital there were twenty sick and wounded americans and royal scots. the beds were stretchers placed on the floor about one and one-half feet apart. the food consisted of bully beef, m and v, hard tack, tea and sugar, as reported by the patients stationed there. the pneumonia patients, spanish influenza and wounded were all fed alike. it was here that i met capt. fortescue, r. a. m. c. a general improvement in sanitation was ordered and capt. watson instructed to give more attention to the feeding of patients. with capt. fortescue i visited civilian hospital two miles northwest of beresnik; found russian female doctor in charge, and, looking over buildings, decided to take same over for military hospital. conditions of buildings fair; five in number, and would accommodate one hundred patients in an emergency. the equipment of the hospital was eight iron beds. vermin of all kinds, and cockroaches so thick that they had to be scraped from the wall and shovelled into a container. the latrines were built in the buildings, as is russian custom, and were full to overflowing. the four patients who were there were retained and cared for by the civilian doctor. while at beresnik we stayed at the detention hospital. the following morning, sept. st, with capt. fortescue, boarded british motor launch. after travelling for about thirty versts we transferred on to several tugs and barges, and on sept. rd boarded hospital boat "vologjohnin," and left for front after hearing that there were eight or ten casualties, several having been killed, but unable to ascertain name of village where the wounded were. after an hour slowly moving up stream, because of sand bars and mines, the tug was suddenly stranded in mid-stream. after trying for two hours the captain gave up in despair. we then arranged with engineers (a squad on board same tug) to make a raft with two barrels. when this was about completed two boats approached from opposite directions. we then transferred to the "viatka" and proceeded to troitza and there succeeded in commandeering twenty horses. the following day with capt. mccardle, american engineer, capt. fortescue and pvt. russel, with our horses, we crossed the river by ferry and then proceeded to the front. traveling very difficult on account of the swampy territory and lack of information from natives who seemed afraid of us. the horses sank in the mud and water above their knees. the bolos had told natives that the allies would burn their homes and take what little food they had. arrived at zastrovia and saw american troops who informed us that the hospital was located in the next village. lower seltso about three miles farther. upon arrival there we located the hospital, which was in a log hut, considered the best the village afforded, in charge of capt. van home and lieut. katz with eight enlisted medical detachment men. lieut. goodnight with twenty or thirty ambulance men had just arrived at this place. eight sick and wounded americans were being treated in hospital. arranged for two more rooms so capacity of hospital might be increased. it was vitally important that these cases be evacuated at once, but there was no possible way except by river, which was heavily mined. decided it best to attempt evacuation by rowboat. sgt. clair petit volunteered to conduct convoy to hospital boat at troitza. convoy was arranged and patients safely placed on board hospital boat, where they were hurriedly carried to archangel. returned to headquarters boat the following morning and all seemed to be suffering from enteritis, due to the water not being boiled. sanitation in these villages almost an impossibility. barn built in one end of home, with possibly a hallway between it and the kitchen. the hay loft is usually on a level with the kitchen floor, a hole in many houses is cut through this floor and used as a toilet. or it quite often is nothing more than a two-inch board nailed over the sills. in the very best southern villagers' homes there may be a closed toilet in the hallway between the barn and kitchen. these are the billets used by the allied troops on the river front in north russia. the native seldom drinks raw water, but nearly always quenches his thirst by drinking tea. wired major longley at base sept. nd for one-half of th field hospital to be sent to beresnik, to take over civilian hospital. communication with the base was very poor. unable to get any definite answer to my telegrams. another trip was made from troitza to beresnik with hospital boat "currier." sick and wounded royal scots taken to field hospital at beresnik. after arrival they were loaded on two-wheeled carts and hauled two miles to the hospital. upon arrival at beresnik found capt. martin, with one-half of field hospital th, had taken over civilian hospital. on sept. th it was decided to establish a detention hospital at shenkursk, so capt. watson and twelve r. a. m. c. men with medical supplies for a twenty-bed hospital were placed on board hospital boat "currier." after posting two guards with machine guns on the boat we started on the trip to shenkursk. a distance of about ninety-five versts from beresnik on the vaga river. all along the way the boat stopped to pick up wood and at each stop natives would come down to the river banks with vegetables and eggs, willing to trade most anything for a few cigarettes or a little tobacco. arrived at shenkursk at : p. m., sept. th, and about one-half hour later the american headquarters boat docked next to the hospital boat. when the various boats docked at shenkursk all the natives of the town came down to the banks of the river and were very curious as well as friendly. the village of shenkursk is situated on a hill and surrounded by forest. one company of americans and a detachment of russians in control of town. it had been taken only a few days before. capt. fortescue and i looked over civilian hospital and found it to be very filthy. owing to the fact that it was so small and occupied to its full capacity, decided to look further. directing our steps to the school, we found a very clean, desirable building, large enough to accommodate at least one hundred patients. after consulting the town commandant, were given permission to take over building for military hospital. capt. watson and capt. daw, with equipment for thirty beds, were placed in charge. stretchers were used as beds, until it was possible to make an improvement or procure some from base. employed two russian female nurses. wired to major longley for one-half of field hospital th to take over this hospital, and in addition more medical officers and personnel, for ambulance work. on oct. nd capt. fortescue returned to beresnik, which left me as a. d. a. d. m. s. river forces. the same day we took quarters with russian professor and established an office in same building. upon investigation we found that the american troops had not been issued any tobacco or cigarettes for several weeks and were smoking tea leaves, straw or anything that would smoke. the paper used for these cigarettes was mostly news and toilet paper. on oct. rd, with russian medical officer and six american enlisted medical men, we proceeded to rovidentia, the advance front, about thirty-five miles from shenkursk on vaga river. established a small detention hospital here of ten beds, leaving the russian medical officer and six american enlisted medical men in charge. this village was occupied by two platoons of americans and about one hundred russians. in comparison to previous villages i visited in russia, shenkursk was an improvement over most of them. mainly because of its location, there being a natural drainage, and the water was much better, containing very little animal and vegetable matter. on oct. th with pvts. russel and stihler again embarked on hospital boat "vologjohnin," and the following morning at : a.m. proceeded to beresnik with a few russian wounded, arriving at : p.m. made inspection of hospital. capt. martin with one-half of field hospital working overtime, making beds, cleaning wards and hospital grounds, and at the same time caring for thirty sick and wounded patients. marked improvement over previous condition. left beresnik oct. th on hospital boat "vologjohnin" with headquarters boat and small gunboat. downpour of rain. gunboat landed on sand bar and headquarters boat turned back, but the "vologjohnin" kept on going until dark. anchored opposite an island and at daybreak proceeded further, finally reaching the only boat, the "yarrents," left on the river front. before leaving beresnik three more men were placed on board the boat. the personnel aboard at this time consisted of capt. hall in charge, two russian female nurses, five american medical men and two british. upon arrival at toulgas i received word from major whittaker that sixteen wounded and six sick royal scots were located in the hospital at seltso, but that seltso had been under shell fire that day and would be too dangerous to bring hospital boat up. that night, under the cover of darkness with all lights extinguished, i ordered hospital boat to seltso. we arrived at seltso but the british troops who were stationed there stated they knew nothing of the sick and wounded royal scots, but that royal scots were stationed across the river. they stated that it would be very dangerous to attempt to go across the river, and no one on the hospital boat knew the exact location of the royal scots. after a while a british sergeant stated that he would go along and direct the way, but when the boat pulled out the sergeant was not to be found. but we went across the river. the barge directly opposite was empty, so we went to the next barge about two versts farther up. that one had been sunk, so we went a few more versts to the third barge which had been used by the royal scots but which had been evacuated by them that day. i decided that we had gone far enough, and we returned to toulgas. on the way back we picked up two wounded officers of the polish legion, who had just come from the borak front, in a small rowboat, and stated it was at that place that they had the sick and wounded scots. it would be impossible to reach this place by boat, because they had quite a time in getting through with a small boat. they would not believe that we had come up the river so far, and made the remark that we had been within a few yards of the bolshevik lines. on oct. th, after getting in touch with major whittaker, who stated that the royal scots would be placed on the left bank of the river opposite seltso, i ordered the boat to seltso to make another attempt to get the royal scots. although we had the window well covered, the bolsheviks must have seen the light from a candle which was used to light the cabin. they began firing, but could not get the range of the boat. we then returned without success. on the afternoon of oct. th, while seltso was under shell fire, the "vologjohnin" was docked about twenty-nine yards behind the allied barge with the big naval gun, and did not leave until the shell fire became heavy. about : p.m., after transferring the sick troops and female nurses from the "vologjohnin," another attempt was made, although the russian crew refused to make another trip, and would not start until i insisted that the trip had to be made and placed several armed guards, american medical men, on the boat. on this night the medical supplies were handed over to capt. griffiths, r. a. m. c, and casualties were safely placed on board. after returning to toulgas the female nurses and sick troops who had been left there were again placed on board. the "vologjohnin" proceeded to beresnik where all casualties, totaling forty-three, were handed over to the th field hospital. (the major modestly omits to tell that he with his pistol compelled the crew to run the boat up to get the wounded men. general pershing remembered major hall later with a citation. he repeated the deed two days later, that time for americans instead of scots.) left beresnik oct. th with hospital boat for seltso and upon arrival there, the town was again under shell fire. all afternoon and evening the hospital boat was docked within twenty-five yards of the big gun. received reports that several americans had been wounded so i ordered the russian crew and medical personnel of boat, with stretchers, to upper seltso to get the wounded. the seriously wounded had to be carried on stretchers through mud almost knee deep, while the others were placed on two-wheeled carts and brought to the boat, a distance of two miles. after two hours they succeeded in getting six wounded americans on board, one dying, another almost dead, and a third in a state of shock from a shrapnel wound in thigh. necessary to ligate heavy bleeders. bolo patrol followed along after bearers. that night the allies retreated on both sides of the river. british commanding officer taken aboard hospital boat. remained over night anchored in mid-stream. nothing could have prevented the bolo boats from coming down stream and either sink our boat or take us prisoners, for our guns were left in the retreat. several wounded on opposite bank but it was necessary for them to be evacuated overland for several versts under most extreme difficulties on two-wheeled carts through mud in many places to the horses' bellies. by moving up and down stream next day the wounded were found. it was necessary to have the boat personnel serve what extra tea and hard tack they had to the weary, mud-spattered royal scots. americans retreated to toulgas on right bank of river where lieut. katz, m. c., with medical detachment men established a detention hospital. on oct. th thirty-five sick and wounded patients were transferred to field hospital th, beresnik. capt. kinyon, m. c.., lieut. danziger, m. c., lieut. simmons, d. c., and one-half of field hospital th arrived at beresnik from base, and placed on board hospital boat "currier." arranged to take personnel and supplies to shenkursk and establish hospital there, at this time occupied by capt. watson and fourteen r. a. m. c. men. pvt. stihler transferred to british hospital barge "michigan" to work in office of d. a. d. m. s. in addition to being used for the office of the d. a. d. m. s., the barge was also used for a convalescent hospital of forty beds, in charge of capt. walls, r. a. m. c. left beresnik oct. th with complete equipment and personnel for hospital of one hundred beds, also medical and red cross supplies. many refugees and several prisoners on board. placed guards from medical personnel over stores and prisoners. one prisoner tried to escape through window of boat but was caught before he could get away. [illustration: several soldier standing in the snow with weapons.] red cross photo trench mortar crew, chekuevo--hand artillery [illustration: several soldier standing in the snow, two with crutches.] u. s. official photo wounded and sick--over a thousand in all [illustration: dead soldier laying in the snow.] u s official photo bolo killed in action--for russia or trotsky? [illustration: three buildings with towers reflected in foreground water.] rouleau monastery at pinega [illustration: several soldier and horses with an artillery piece.] u. s. official photo russian 's bound for pinega [illustration: several soldiers with a horse and sleigh.] hill "g" men near pinega [illustration: several soldier with a machine gun in front of a building protected by a log barricade.] hill lewis gun protects mess hall, pinega he was reported later as bolshevik spy, another as a lett officer. travel by night is against the rules of russian river boat crew. had to use force to get them to continue moving. arrived at shenkursk oct. th and delivered prisoners. relieved capt. watson, r. a. m. c., and personnel from duty at detention hospital, and started field hospital . returned to beresnik and found that hospital now working about full capacity. after placing all seriously sick and wounded on board hospital ship "currier" we proceeded to archangel, and arrived there oct. nd. boat greatly in need of repairs. arranged with major longley to get red cross and medical supplies, and had them placed aboard. among the red cross supplies were ten bags of sugar to be divided between the hospitals and used for the purpose of bartering natives for vegetables, eggs and chickens. oct. th, , weather growing colder. departed for beresnik on hospital boat. the russian crew did not want to travel at night but i insisted and we kept on going. awakened by cooties. after lighting my candle found quite a number. oct. th, , stopped for a short time to pick up wood. awakened by rumbling and cracking noise against boat and upon looking out saw we were running through floating ice. this condition persisted for thirty-five versts until we reached beresnik. crew stopped boat and refused to go any farther. necessary to use some moral "suasion." when we arrived at beresnik found that one paddle was out of order and bow of boat dented in many places and almost punctured in one place. reported to general finlayson, who ordered me to proceed with boat after unloading medical and red cross supplies, to pianda, which is about twelve versts back up river on a tributary of the dvina river, and report on the situation at charastrovia for billets or building for convalescent hospital. left bereznik for pianda oct. th and had to run boat through two miles of almost solid ice, four inches thick. at the mouth of this tributary had to make three attempts before successfully penetrating ice enough to get into channel of stream. the following day after leaving a few medical supplies with canadian artillery headquarters and arranging transportation for myself and personnel, with a few cooking utensils and blankets, we started for beresnik. stopped at charastrovia and looked over several buildings but nothing available worth while. natives very unfriendly and suspicious. arrived at beresnik, reported to the general and spent the night at field hospital . oct. th left on tug "archangel" for kurgomin with dentist. received report that several casualties were there to be evacuated. reached pless but found the river full of ice again. captain of boat stated that he could not get to kurgomin, but within about three miles of the place. docked boat and walked through mud and water to my knees to kurgomin. found there had been a small detention hospital of fifteen beds established by capt. fortescue in charge of capt. watson, r. a. m. c. good building at pless for a hospital of fifty or seventy-five beds, which was necessary to be taken over and used as advance base evacuating hospital after dvina froze. sent dentist with equipment over to opposite bank to take care of men's teeth of co. "b", then holding the front on the left bank. getting his field equipment together and using cabin as his office, he was able to care for twenty men. all to be evacuated were walking cases. very dark and mud twelve inches deep. officially reported that bolos were coming around the rear that night. we arrived tired, but safely, where the boat was waiting and returned eight miles through ice. waited until morning before going farther and at daybreak started for chamova. stopped there while dentist cared for several co. "d" men. finally reached beresnik after being stuck on sand bars many times, as river was very shallow at that time of the year and channel variable. handed patients over and spent night at field hospital . following day found it necessary to be deloused. we had nothing but serbian barrels for clothing disinfectors at that time. reported that a thresh delouser had been started for beresnik. sanitation greatly improved. after a few days' rest and arranging with engineers to make ambulance sled, started again on tug "archangel" for dvina front. on the way only one hour when boat ran aground, and after two hours' work (pushing with poles by all on board) we succeeded getting into channel and anchored for the night. started again at daybreak and stopped at chamova. "d" company th infantry at that place with one medical enlisted man, who had taken three years in medicine. the only man with medical knowledge available. he had established an aid station with two stretchers for beds. place comfortable and clean. general sanitation and billeting the same as in all other russian villages. reached pless and left some medical stores with capt. watson, then proceeded to toulgas with medical and red cross supplies. on way to headquarters a few stray shots were fired by snipers, but no harm done. left medical and red cross supplies at lower toulgas and took aboard eight sick and wounded troops. started for beresnik. stopped at chamova to pick up one sick and one wounded american. arrived at beresnik nov. th. with medical and red cross supplies left for shenkursk on hospital ship "currier." natives very friendly along the vaga river and anxious to barter. arrived at shenkursk nov. th. over one hundred patients in hospital. officers had taken over an additional building for contagious ward which was full of "flu" and pneumonia cases. with every caution against the spread of the disease, the epidemic was growing. russian soldier seems to have no resistance, probably due to the lack of proper kind of food for the last four years. seven at hospital morgue at one time, before we could get coffins made. people were dying by hundreds in the neighboring villages. found it necessary to try and organize medical assistance in order to combat the epidemic. funerals of three or four passed wailing through the streets every few hours. the russian funeral at shenkursk was as follows: corpse is carried out in the open on the lid of the coffin, face exposed, and a yellow robe (used for every funeral) is thrown over the body. the body is then carried to the church where there is little or no ventilation except when the doors are opened. here during the chants every member of the funeral party, at different times during the service, proceeds to kiss the same spot on an image, held by the priest. it is their belief that during a religious service it is impossible to contract disease. visited civilian hospitals nov. th, which were in a most horrible state. no ventilation and practically all with spanish influenza and, in addition, many with gangrenous wounds. tried to enlighten the russian doctor in charge with the fact that fresh air would be beneficial to his cases. but he seemed to think i was entirely out of my sphere and ignored what i said. i reported the situation to british headquarters and thereafter he reluctantly did as i suggested. then arranged with headquarters to send russian medical officer and felchers with american medical officers out to villages where assistance was needed most, instructing each to impress on the natives the necessity of fresh air and proper hygiene. they found there was such a shortage of the proper kind of food that the people had no resistance against disease, and were dying by the hundreds. in the meantime established annex to civilian hospital in a school building. had wooden beds made and placed felchers in charge. tried to segregate cases in shenkursk and immediate vicinity as much as possible. after getting everything in working order i found a shortage of doctors. so i proceeded to villages not yet reached by others. report from ust padenga that lieut. cuff and fourteen enlisted men killed or missing on patrol nov. th; some of the bodies recovered. weather growing colder. twenty degrees below zero, with snow four inches deep. evacuated sick and wounded from ust padenga eighteen versts beyond shenkursk in sleds filled with hay and blankets necessary for warmth. shakleton shoes had not arrived at that time. most cases coming back in good condition, but pneumonia cases would not stand the exposure. condition at ust padenga very uncertain. lieut. powers and lieut. taufanoff in charge of ten-bed detention hospital. advised them to keep their hospital clear for an emergency. action reported on dvina and hospital captured; later retaken. slight action every day or so at ust padenga. lieut. powers caring for all civilians in and around that place. visited one home where i found the father sick and in adjoining room the corpse of his wife and two children. in another village i found twenty-four sick in four families; eight of which were pneumonia cases. in one peasant home, six in family, all sick with a child of eight years running a fever, but trying to care for others. all sleeping in the same room; three on the floor and balance together in a loft made by laying boards between the sills. they informed me that no food had been cooked for them for three days. the child eight years old was then trying to make some tea. this same room was used as a dining room and kitchen. it had double windows, all sealed air-tight. russian troops very difficult to discipline along sanitary or hygienic lines and have no idea of cleanliness. a guard on the latrine was an absolute necessity. i adopted this plan in hospital, but impossible to get their officers to follow this rule at their barracks latrines. reported it to british headquarters but they stated that they could not do anything. dec. th, . left by sled for ust padenga to inspect hospital. arrived at : a.m. very cold day. general conditions very good considering circumstances. using pits out in open for latrines. men living in double-decker beds, and as comfortable as possible in the available billets. hospital consisted of two rooms in a log hut, but light, dry and comfortable. beds improvised with stretchers laid across wooden horses. had three casualties which they were evacuating that day. started for shenkursk at : p.m. began snowing and my driver proceeded in circles leaving the horse go as he chose. a russian custom when they lose their bearings. i got somewhat anxious and had been trying to inquire with the few russian terms i had been forced to learn. driver stated that he did not know the way, and we ran into snow drifts, into gullies, over bluffs, through bushes, and after floundering around in the snow for six hours i heard the bugle from shenkursk which was just across the river. i then started the direction which i thought was up the river and by good luck, ran into the road that led across the vaga to shenkursk. december th, . hospital inspected by major fitzpatrick of american red cross. december th, . left shenkursk for shegovari where lieut. goodnight and th ambulance men were running a detention hospital of eight beds and infirmary for american platoon, stationed at that place which is forty versts down vaga river from shenkursk toward beresnik, where we arrived at : p.m. looked over his hospital and continued on to kitsa. remained over night and left at daylight december th, going across vaga through woods to chamova, arriving at noon. very cold day. here given a team of horses and proceeded to toulgas, the farthest dvina front. found small hospital with several sick at lower toulgas in charge of british medical officer. stayed over night at headquarters two versts further up the river. the following day some artillery firing. proceeded to front line dressing station in charge of lieut. christie and ten th ambulance men. one from advance headquarters on left bank, british holding front. one company of americans and one of scots on right bank. stopped at shushuga on return, eight versts from toulgas. across the river from this place is pless where an evacuation hospital was conducted by capt. watson, r. a. m. c., with fourteen british and one american ambulance man, used as a cook and interpreter. stretchers used for beds. casualties held here for two or three days and evacuated by sled to beresnik about fifty versts to the rear. at shushuga there were two ambulance men conducting a first aid station. village held by one platoon of americans. returned to beresnik making a change of horses at chamova and ust vaga. the latter place held by twenty-eight american engineers and about one hundred russians. first aid given by a russian felcher. inspected wards, kitchen, food, etc. found there was no complaint as to treatment received. december th, . with rations for five days left for archangel by sleigh, making a change of horses about every twenty versts. arrived at archangel at : p.m., december , . xii armistice day with americans in north russia "b" and "d" busy with attacking bolos--"l" vigilantly holding front near kodish--quiet on other fronts--engineers building blockhouses with willing assistance of doughboys--how was our little war affected--"we're here because we're here"--no share in victory shouting--"f" on lines of communication. armistice day, november th, , with american soldiers in north russia, was a day of stern activity for continued war. a great thrill of pride possessed the entire force because the yanks on the western front had been in at the death of hun militarism. the wonderful drives of our armies under pershing which crushed in the hindenberg lines, one after another, had been briefly wirelessed and cabled up to russia. we got the joyful news in archangel on the very day the fighting ceased on the western front. but the "b" and "d" company men were too busy on armistice day to listen to rumors of world peace. the reds had staged that awful four-day battle, told next in this story, and the american medical and hospital men were sadly busy with thirty bleeding and dead comrades who had fallen in defending toulgas. "c" was far out at ust padenga earnestly building blockhouses. "a" was at shenkursk with colonel corbley, resting after two months stiff fighting and with american engineers of the th building blockhouses. for they correctly suspected that the reds would not quit just because of the collapse of the germans. "l" company and ballard's machine gun platoon were hourly prepared to fight for their position at the emtsa river against the red force flushed with the victorious recapture of kodish. th engineers were skillfully and heartily at work on the blockhouses and gun emplacements and log shelters for this kodish force, doomed to a desperate winter, armistice or no armistice. old "k" company, breathless yet from its terrific struggle to hold kodish, was back at base headquarters at seletskoe waiting patiently for "e" company to relieve them. captain heil's company had left archangel by railroad and was somewhere on the cold forest trail between obozerskaya and seletskoe. "f" company, as we have seen, was now on the precious lines of communication, now more subject to attack because of the numerous winter trails across the hitherto broad, impassable expanses of forest and swamp, which were now beginning to freeze up. far out on their left flank and to their rear was the little force of "g" company who were holding pinega and a long sector of road which was daily becoming more difficult to safeguard. and hundreds of miles across this state of archangel in the onega valley our "h" company comrades felt the responsibility of wiring in themselves for a last ditch stand against the reds who might try to drive them back and flank their american and allied comrades on the railroad. on the railroad the l th engineers were busy as beavers building, with the assistance of the infantrymen, blockhouses and barracks and gun emplacements and so forth. for, while the advanced positions on the railroad were of no value in themselves, it was necessary to hold them for the sake of the other columns. obozerskaya was to be the depot and sleigh transportation point of most consequence next to seletskoe, which itself in winter was greatly dependent on obozerskaya. "i" and "m" companies were resting from the hard fall offensive movement, the former unit at obozerskaya, the latter just setting foot for the first time in archangel for a ten day rest, the company having gone directly from troopship to troop train and having been "shock troops" in everyone of the successive drives at the red army positions. in archangel "hq." company units were assisting machine gun units in guarding important public works and marching in strength occasionally on the streets to glare down the scowling sailors and other red sympathizers who, it was rumored persistently, were plotting a riot and overthrow of the tchaikowsky government and throat-cutting for the allied embassies and military missions. oh, armistice day in archangel made peace in our strange war no nearer. it was dark foreboding of the winter campaign that filled the thoughts of the doughboy on duty or lying in the hospital in archangel that day. out on the various fronts the american soldiers grimly understood that they must hold on where they were for the sake of their comrades on other distant but nevertheless cotangent fronts on the circular line that guard archangel. in archangel the bitter realization was at last accepted that no more american troops were to come to our assistance. of course every place where two american soldiers or officers exchanged words on armistice day, or the immediate days following, the chief topic of conversation was the possible effect of the armistice upon our little war. vainly the scant telegraphic news was studied for any reference to the russian situation in the archangel area. was our unofficial war on russia's red government to go on? how could armistice terms be extended to it without a tacit recognition of the lenine-trotsky government? as one of the boys who was upon the dvina front writes: "we would have given anything we owned and mortgaged our every expectation to have been one of that great delirious, riotous mob that surged over paris on armistice day; and we thought we had something of a title to have been there for we claimed the army of pershing for our own, even though we had been sent to the arctic circle; and now that the whole show was over we wanted to have our share in the shouting." but the days, deadly and monotonous, followed one another with ever gloomy regularity, and there was no promise of relief, no word, no news of any kind, except the stories of troops returning home from france. doubtless in the general hilarity over peace, we were forgotten. after all, who had time in these world stirring days to think of an insignificant regiment performing in a fantastic arctic side show. truth to tell, the red propagandists on trotsky's northern army staff quickly seized the opportunity to tell the allied troops in north russia that the war was over and asked us what we were fighting for. they did it cleverly, as will be told elsewhere. yet the doughboy only swore softly and shined his rifle barrel. he could not get information straight from home. he was sore. but why fret? his best answer was the philosophic "we're here because we're here" and he went on building blockhouses and preparing to do his best to save his life in the inevitable winter campaign which began (we may say) about the time of the great world war armistice day, which in north russia did not mean cease firing. before passing to the story of the dark winter's fighting we must notice one remaining unit of the american forces, hitherto only mentioned. it is the unit that after doing tedious guard duty in archangel and its suburbs for a couple of months, all the while listening impatiently to stories of adventure and hardship and heroism filtering in from the fronts and the highly imaginative stories of impending enemy smashes and atrocities rumoring in from those same fronts and gaining color and tragic proportions in the mouth-to-mouth transit, that unit "f" company, the prize drill company of camp custer in its young life, now on october th found itself on a slow-going barge en route to yemetskoe, one hundred and twenty-five versts, as the side wheeler wheezed up the meandering old dvina river. there in the last days of the fall season this company of americans took over the duty of patrolling constantly the line of communications and all trails leading into it so that no wandering force of red guards should capture any of the numerous supply trains bound south with food, powder and comforts--such as they were--for the americans and allied forces far south on the dvina and vaga fronts. it was highly important work admirably done by this outfit commanded by captain ralph ramsay. any slackening of alertness might have resulted disastrously to their regimental comrades away south, and while this outfit was the last of the th to go into active field service it may be said in passing that in the spring it was the last unit to come away from the fighting front in june, and came with a gallant record, story of which will appear later. winter blizzards found the outfit broken into trusty detachments scattered all the way from kholmogori, ninety versts north of yemetskoe, to morjegorskaya, fifty-five versts south of company headquarters in yemetskoe. and it was common occurrence for a sergeant of "f" company with a "handful of doughboys" to escort a mob of bolshevik prisoners of war to distant archangel. xiii winter defense of toulgas general ironside makes expedition aim defensive--bolsheviki help give it character--toulgas--surprise attack nov. th by reds--canadian artillery escapes capture--we win back our positions--"lady olga" saves wounded men--heroic wallace--cudahy and derham carry upper toulgas by assault--foukes--a jubilant bonfire--many prisoners--ivan puzzled by our war--bolo attack in january fails--dresing nearly takes prisoner--winter patrolling--corporal prince's patrol ambushed--we hold toulgas. general ironside had now taken over command of the expedition and changed its character more to accord with the stated purpose of it. we were on the defensive. the bolshevik whose frantic rear-guard actions during the fall campaign had often been given up, even when he was really having the best of it, merely because he always interpreted the persistence of american attack or stubbornness of defense to mean superior force. he had learned that the north russian expeditionary force was really a pitifully small force, and that there was so much fussing at home in england and france and america about the justice and the methods of the expedition, that no large reinforcements need be expected. so the bolsheviks on armistice day, november , began their counter offensive movement which was to merge with their heavy winter campaign. so the battle of november th is included in the narrative of the winter defense of toulgas. toulgas was the duplicate of thousands of similar villages throughout this province. it consisted of a group of low, dirty log houses huddled together on a hill, sloping down to a broad plain, where was located another group of houses, known as upper toulgas. a small stream flowed between the two villages and nearly a mile to the rear was another group of buildings which was used for a hospital and where first aid was given to the wounded before evacuating them to bereznik, forty or fifty miles down the river. the forces engaged in the defense of this position consisted of several batteries of canadian artillery, posted midway between the hospital and the main village. in addition to this "b" company, american troops, and another company of royal scots were scattered in and about these positions. from the upper village back to the hospital stretched a good three miles, which of course meant that the troops in this position, numbering not more than five hundred were considerably scattered and separated. this detailed description of our position here is set forth so specifically in order that the reader may appreciate the attack which occurred during the early part of november. on the morning of november th, while some of the men were still engaged in eating their breakfasts and while the positions were only about half manned, suddenly from the forests surrounding the upper village, the enemy emerged in attack formation. lieut. dennis engaged them for a short time and withdrew to our main line of defense. all hands were immediately mustered into position to repel this advancing wave of infantry. in the meantime the bolo attacked with about five hundred men from our rear, having made a three day march through what had been reported as impassable swamp. he occupied our rearmost village, which was undefended, and attacked our hospital. this forward attack was merely a ruse to divert the attention of our troops in that direction, while the enemy directed his main assault at our rear and undefended positions for the purpose of gaining our artillery. hundreds of the enemy appeared as if by magic from the forests, swarmed in upon the hospital village and immediately took possession. immediately the hospital village was in their hands, the bolo then commenced a desperate advance upon our guns. at the moment that this advance began, there were some sixty canadian artillery men and one company "b" sergeant with seven men and a lewis gun. due to the heroism and coolness of this handful of men, who at once opened fire with their lewis guns, forcing the advancing infantry to pause momentarily. this brief halt gave the canadians a chance to reverse their gun positions, swing them around and open up with muzzle bursts upon the first wave of the assault, scarcely fifty yards away. it was but a moment until the hurricane of shrapnel was bursting among solid masses of advancing infantry, and under such murderous fire, the best disciplined troops and the most foolhardly could not long withstand. certain it was that the advancing bolo could not continue his advance. the bolos were on our front, our right flank and our rear, we were entirely cut off from communication, and there were no reinforcements available. about : p. m. we launched a small counter attack under lt. dennis, which rolled up a line of snipers which had given us considerable annoyance. we then shelled the rear villages occupied by the bolos, and they decamped. meanwhile the royal scots, who had been formed for the counter attack, went forward also under the cover of the artillery, and the bolo, or at least those few remaining, were driven back into the forests. the enemy losses during this attack were enormous. his estimated dead and wounded were approximately four hundred, but it will never be known as to how many of them later died in the surrounding forests from wounds and exposure. this engagement was not [only] disastrous from the loss of men, but was even more disastrous from the fact that some of the leading bolshevik leaders on this front were killed during this engagement. one of the leading commanders was an extremely powerful giant of a man, named melochofski, who first led his troops into the village hospital in the rear of the gun positions. he strode into the hospital, wearing a huge black fur hat, which accentuated his extraordinary height, and singled out all the wounded american and english troops for immediate execution, and this would undoubtedly have been their fate, had it not been for the interference of a most remarkable woman, who was christened by the soldiers "lady olga." this woman, a striking and intelligent appearing person, had formerly been a member of the famous battalion of death, and afterwards informed one of our interpreters that she had joined the soviets out of pure love of adventure, wholly indifferent to the cause for which she exposed her life. she had fallen in love with melochofski and had accompanied him with his troops through the trackless woods, sharing the lot of the common soldiers and enduring hardships that would have shaken the most vigorous man. with all her hardihood, however, there was still a touch of the eternal feminine, and when melochofski issued orders for the slaughter of the invalided soldiers, she rushed forward and in no uncertain tones demanded that the order be countermanded and threatened to shoot the first bolo who entered the hospital. she herself remained in the hospital while melochofski with the balance of his troops went forward with the attack and where he himself was so mortally wounded that he lived only a few minutes after reaching her side. she eventually was sent to the hospital at the base and nursed there. capt. boyd states that he saw a letter which she wrote, unsolicited, to her former comrades, telling them that they should not believe the lies which their commissars told them, and that the allies were fighting for the good of russia. at daybreak the following day, five gun boats appeared around the bend of the river, just out of range of our three inch artillery, and all day long their ten long ranged guns pounded away at our positions, crashing great explosives upon our blockhouse, which guarded the bridge connecting the upper and middle village, while in the forests surrounding this position the bolo infantry were lying in wait awaiting for a direct hit upon this strong point in order that they could rush the bridge and overwhelm us. time after time exploding shells threw huge mounds of earth and debris into the loop holes of this blockhouse and all but demolished it. here sergeant wallace performed a particularly brave act. the blockhouse of which he was in command was near a large straw pile. a shell hit near the straw and threw it in front of the loop holes. wallace went out under machine gun fire from close range, about seventy-five yards, and under heavy shelling, and removed the straw. the same thing happened a little later, and this time he was severely wounded. he was awarded the distinguished conduct medal by the british. private bell was in this blockhouse when it was hit and all the occupants killed or badly wounded. bell was badly gashed in the face, but stuck with his lewis gun until dark when he could be relieved, being the only one in the shattered blockhouse which held the bridge across the small stream separating us from the bolos. for three days the gun boats pounded away and all night long there was the rattle and crack of the machine guns. no one slept. the little garrison was fast becoming exhausted. men were hollow-eyed from weariness and so utterly tired that they were indifferent to the shrieking shells and all else. at this point of the siege, it was decided that our only salvation was a counter attack. in the forests near the upper village were a number of log huts, which the natives had used for charcoal kilns, but which had been converted by the enemy into observation posts and storehouses for machine guns and ammunition. his troops were lying in and about the woods surrounding these buildings. we decided to surprise this detachment in the woods, capture it if possible and make a great demonstration of an attack so as to give the enemy in the upper village the impression that we were receiving reinforcements and still fresh and ready for fighting. this maneuver succeeded far beyond our wildest expectations. company "b," under command of lt. john cudahy, and one platoon of company "d" under lt. derham, made the counter attack on the bolo trenches. just before dawn that morning the americans filed through the forests and crept upon the enemy's observation posts before they were aware of any movement on our part. we then proceeded without any warning upon their main position. taken as they were, completely by surprise, it was but a moment before they were in full rout, running panic-stricken in all directions, thinking that a regiment or division had followed upon them. we immediately set fire to these huts containing their ammunition, cartridges, etc., and the subsequent explosion that followed probably gave the enemy the impression that a terrific attack was pending. as we emerged from the woods and commenced the attack upon upper toulgas we were fully expecting stiff resistance, for we knew that many of these houses concealed enemy guns. our plans had succeeded so well, however, that no supporting fire from the upper village came and the snipers in the forward part of the village seeing themselves abandoned, threw their guns and came rushing forward shouting "tovarish, tovarish," meaning the same as the german "kamerad." as a matter of fact, in this motley crew of prisoners were a number of germans and austrians, who could scarcely speak a word of german and who were probably more than thankful to be taken prisoners and thus be relieved from active warfare. during this maneuver one of their bravest and ablest commanders, by the name of foukes, was killed, which was an irreparable loss to the enemy. foukes was without question one of the most competent and aggressive of the bolo leaders. he was a very powerful man physically and had long years of service as a private in the old russian army, and was without question a most able leader of men. during this four days' attack and counter attack he had led his men by a circuitous route through the forests, wading in swamps waist deep, carrying machine guns and rations. the nights were of course miserably cold and considerable snow had fallen, but foukes would risk no fire of any kind for fear of discovery. it was not due to any lack of ability or strategy on his part that this well planned attack failed of accomplishment. on his body we found a dramatic message, written on the second day of the battle after the assault on the guns had failed. he was with the rear forces at that time and dispatched or had intended to dispatch the following to the command in charge of the forward forces: "we are in the two lowest villages--one steamer coming up river--perhaps reinforcements. attack more vigorously--melochofski and murafski are killed. if you do not attack, i cannot hold on and retreat is impossible. (signed) foukes." out of our force of about six hundred scots and americans we had about a hundred casualties, the scots suffering worse than we. our casualties were mostly sustained in the blockhouses, from the shelling. it was here that we lost corporal sabada and sergeant marriott, both of whom were fine soldiers and their loss was very keenly felt. sabada's dying words were instructions to his squad to hold their position in the rear of their blockhouse which had been destroyed. it was reported that trotsky, the idol of the red crowd, was present at the battle of toulgas, but if he was there, he had little influence in checking the riotous retreat of his followers when they thought themselves flanked from the woods. they fled in wild disorder from the upper village of toulgas and for days thereafter in villages far to our rear, various members of this force straggled in, half crazed by starvation and exposure and more than willing to abandon the soviet cause. for weeks the enemy left the americans severely alone. toulgas was held. but it was decided to burn upper toulgas, which was a constant menace to our security, as we had no men to occupy it with sufficient numbers to make a defense and the small outposts there were tempting morsels for the enemy to devour. many were reluctant to stay there, and it was nervous work on the black nights when the wind, dismal and weird, moaned through the encompassing forest, every shadow a crouching bolshevik. often the order came through to the main village to "stand to," because some fidgety sentinel in upper toulgas had seen battalions, conjured by the black night. so it was determined to burn the upper village and a guard was thrown around it, for we feared word would be passed and the bolos would try to prevent us from accomplishing our purpose. the inhabitants were given three hours to vacate. it was a pitiful sight to see them turned out of the dwellings where most of them had spent their whole simple, not unhappy lives, their meagre possessions scattered awry upon the ground. the first snow floated down from a dark foreboding sky, dread announcer of a cruel arctic winter. soon the houses were roaring flames. the women sat upon hand-fashioned crates wherein were all their most prized household goods, and abandoned themselves to a paroxysm of weeping despair, while the children shrieked stridently, victim of all the realistic horrors that only childhood can conjure. most of the men looked on in silence, uncomprehending resignation on their faces, mute, pathetic figures. poor moujiks! they didn't understand, but they took all uncomplainingly. nitchevoo, fate had decreed that they should suffer this burden, and so they accepted it without question. but when we thought of the brave chaps whose lives had been taken from those flaming homes, for our casualties had been very heavy, nearly one hundred men killed and wounded, we stifled our compassion and looked on the blazing scene as a jubilant bonfire. all night long the burning village was red against the black sky, and in the morning where had stood upper toulgas was now a smoking, dirty smudge upon the plain. we took many prisoners in this second fight of toulgas. it was a trick of the bolos to sham death until a searching party, bent on examining the bodies for information, would approach them, when suddenly they would spring to life and deliver themselves up. these said that only by this method could they escape the tyranny of the bolsheviki. they declared that never had they any sympathy with the soviet cause. they didn't understand it. they had been forced into the red army at the point of a gun, and were kept in it by the same persuasive argument. others said they had joined the bolshevik military forces to escape starvation. there was only one of the thirty prisoners who admitted being an ardent follower of the cause, and a believer in the soviet articles of political doctrine, and this was an admission that took a great deal of courage, for it was instilled universally in the bolos that we showed no mercy, and if they fell into the hands of the cruel angliskis and americanskis there was nothing but a hideous death for them. of course our high command had tried to feed our troops the same kind of propaganda. lenine, himself, said that of every one hundred bolsheviks fifty were knaves, forty were fools, and probably one in the hundred a sincere believer. once a bolshevik commander who gave himself up to us said that the great majority of officers in the soviet forces had been conscripted from the imperial army and were kept in order by threats to massacre their families if they showed the slightest tendency towards desertion. the same officer told me the bolshevik party was hopelessly in the minority, that its adherents numbered only about three and a half in every hundred russians, that it had gained ascendancy and held power only because lenine and trotsky inaugurated their revolution by seizing every machine gun in russia and steadfastly holding on to them. he said that every respectable person looked upon the bolsheviks as a gang of cutthroats and ruffians, but all were bullied into passive submission. we heard him wonderingly. we tried to fancy america ever being brow-beaten and cowed by an insignificant minority, her commercial life prostrated, her industries ravished, and we gave the speculation up as an unworthy reflection upon our country. but this was russia, russia who inspired the world by her courage and fortitude in the great war, and while it was at its most critical stage, fresh with the memories of millions slain on gallician fields, concluded the shameful treaty of brest litovsk, betraying everything for which those millions had died. russia, following the visionary kerensky from disorder to chaos, and eventually wallowing in the mire of bolshevism. yes, one can expect anything in russia. they were a hardboiled looking lot, those bolo prisoners. they wore no regulation uniform, but were clad in much the same attire as an ordinary moujik--knee leather boots and high hats of gray and black curled fur. no one could distinguish them from a distance, and every peasant could be bolshevik. who knew? in fact, we had reason to believe that many of them were bolshevik in sympathy. the bolos had an uncanny knowledge of our strength and the state of our defenses, and although no one except soldiers were allowed beyond the village we knew that despite the closest vigilance there was working unceasingly a system of enemy espionage with which we could never hope to cope. some of the prisoners were mere boys seventeen and eighteen years old. others men of advanced years. nearly all of them were hopelessly ignorant, likely material for a fiery tongued orator and plausible propagandist. they thought the americans were supporting the british in an invasion of russia to suppress all democratic government, and to return a romanoff to the throne. that was the story that was given out to the moujiks, and, of course, they firmly believed it, and after all why should they not, judging by appearances? we quote here from an american officer who fought at toulgas: "if we had not come to restore the tsar, why had we come, invading russia, and burning russian homes? we spoke conciliatingly of 'friendly intervention,' of bringing peace and order to this distracted country, to the poor moujik, when what he saw were his villages a torn battle ground of two contending armies, while the one had forced itself upon him, requisitioned his shaggy pony, burned the roof over his head, and did whatever military necessity dictated. it was small concern to ivan whether the allies or the bolsheviks won this strange war. he did not know what it was all about, and in that he was like the rest of us. but he asked only to be left alone, in peace to lead his simple life, gathering his scanty crops in the hot brief months of summer and dreaming away the long dreary winter on top of his great oven-like stove, an unworrying fatalistic disciple of the philosophy of nitchevoo." after the fierce battle to hold toulgas, the only contact with the enemy was by patrols. "d" company came up from chamova and relieved "b" company for a month. work was constantly expended upon the winter defenses. the detachment of th engineers was to our men an invaluable aid. and when "b" went up to toulgas again late in january, they found the fortifications in fine shape. but meanwhile rumors were coming in persistently of an impending attack. the bolo made his long expected night attack january , in conjunction with his drive on the vaga, and was easily repulsed. another similar attack was made a little later in february, which met with a similar result. it was reported to us that the bolo soldiers held a meeting in which they declared that it was impossible to take toulgas, and that they would shoot any officer who ordered another attack there. it was during one of the fracases that lt. dressing captured his prisoner. with a sergeant he was inspecting the wire, shortly after the bolo had been driven back, and came upon a bolo who threw up his hands. dressing drew his revolver, and the sergeant brought his rifle down to a threatening position, the bolo became frightened and seized the bayonet. dressing wishing to take the prisoner alive grabbed his revolver by the barrel and aimed a mighty swing. unfortunately he forgot that the british revolver is fastened to a lanyard, and that the lanyard was around his shoulder. as a result his swing was stopped in midair, nearly breaking his arm, the bolo dropped the bayonet and took it on the run, getting away safely, leaving dressing with nothing to bring in but a report. march st we met with a disaster, one of our patrols being ambushed, and a platoon sent out to recover the wounded meeting a largely superior force, which was finally dispersed by artillery. we lost eight killed and more wounded. sergeant bowman, one of the finest men it has been my privilege to know, was killed in this action and his death was a blow personally to every man in the company. corporal prince was in command of the first patrol, which was ambushed. in trying to assist the point, who was wounded, prince was hit. when we finally reached the place of this encounter the snow showed that prince had crawled about forty yards after he was wounded and fired his rifle several times. he had been taken prisoner. from this time on the fighting in the upper dvina was limited to the mere patrol activities. there to be sure was always a strain on the men. remembering their comrades who had been ambushed before, it took the sturdiest brand of courage for small parties to go out day and night on the hard packed trails, to pass like deer along a marked runway with hunter ready with cocked rifle. the odds were hopelessly against them. the vigilance of their patrols, however, may account for the fact that even after his great success on the vaga, the commander of bolshevik northern army did not send his forces against the formidably guarded toulgas. one day we were ordered by british headquarters to patrol many miles across the river where it had been reported small parties of bolos were raiding a village. we had seventeen sleighs drawn by little shaggy ponies, which we left standing in their harnesses and attached to the sleighs while we slept among the trees beside a great roaring blaze that our russian drivers piled high with big logs the whole night through; and the next morning, in the phantom gloom we were off again, gliding noiselessly through the forest, charged with the unutterable stillness of infinite ethereal space; but, as the shadows paled, there was unfolded a fairyland of enchanted wonders that i shall always remember. invisible hands of artistry had draped the countless pines with garlands and wreaths of white with filmy aigrettes and huge, ponderous globes and festoons woven by the frost in an exquisite and fantastic handiwork; and when the sun came out, as it did for a few moments, every ornament on those decorated christmas trees glittered and twinkled with the magic of ten thousand candles. it was enchanted toyland spread before us and we were held spell bound by a profusion of airy wonders that unfolded without end as we threaded our way through the forest flanked by the straight, towering trunks. after a few miles the ponies could go no further through the high drifts, so we left them and made our way on snowshoes a long distance to a group of log houses the reported rendezvous of the bolsheviks, but there were no bolos there, nor any signs of recent occupancy, so we burned the huts and very wearily dragged our snow shoes the long way back to the ponies. they were wet with sweat when we left them belly deep in the snow; but there they were, waiting with an attitude of patient resignation truly russian and they made the journey homeward with more speed and in higher spirits than when they came. there is only one thing tougher than the russian pony and that is his driver, for the worthies who conducted us on this lengthy journey walked most of the way through the snow and in the intense cold, eating a little black bread, washed down with hot tea, and sleeping not at all. [illustration: hundreds of men standing in front of a towering white building.] wagner something like a selective draft [illustration: several soldiers under a log shelter, tending an artillery piece.] wagner canadian artillery, kurgomin [illustration: small tower of logs in a snow covered forest.] u. s. official watch-tower, verst [illustration: three soldiers on sentry duty.] u. s. official toulgas outpost [illustration: wounded (dead?) soldier propped against a wall.] u. s. official one of a bolo patrol [illustration: soldiers marching through a snow covered forest.] u. s. official patrolling those long weeks of patrol and sentry duty were wearing on the men. sentinels were continually seeing things at night that were not. once we were hurried out into the cold darkness by the report of a great multitude of muttering voices approaching from the forest, but not a shot answered our challenge and the next morning there in the snow were the fresh tracks of timber wolves--a pack had come to the end of the woods--no wonder the detroit fruit salesman on guard thought the bolos were upon us. but not long afterwards the bolos did come and more cunningly and stealthily than the wolf pack, for in the black night they crept up and were engaged in the act of cutting the barbed wire between the blockhouses, when a sentinel felt--there was no sound--something suspicious, and sped a series of machine gun bullets in the direction he suspected. there was a fight lasting for hours, and in the morning many dead bolos were lying in the deep snow beyond the wire defenses. they wore white smocks which, at any distance, in the dim daylight, blended distinctly with the snow and at night were perfectly invisible. we were grateful to the sentinel with the intuitive sense of impending danger. some soldiers have this intuition. it is beyond explanation but it exists. you have only to ask a soldier who has been in battle combat to verify the truth of this assertion. still we decided not to rely entirely upon this remarkable faculty of intuition, some man might be on watch not so gifted; and so we tramped down a path inside the wire encompassing the center village. during the long periods between the light we kept up an ever vigilant patrol. the bolos came again at a time when the night was blackest, but they could not surprise us, and they lost a great many men, trying to wade through waist deep snow, across barbed wire, with machine guns working from behind blockhouses two hundred yards apart. it took courage to run up against such obstacles and still keep going on. when we opened fire there was always a great deal of yelling from the bolos--commands from the officers to go forward, so our interpreters said, protests from the devils, even as they protested, many were hit; but it is to be noted that the officers stayed in the background of the picture. there was no soviet leader who said "follow me" through the floundering snow against those death scattering machine guns--it did not take a great deal of intelligence to see what the chances were. so weeks passed and we held on, wondering what the end would be. we did not fear that we should lose toulgas. with barbed wire and our surrounding blockhouses we were confident that we could withstand a regiment trying to advance over that long field of snow; but the danger lay along our tenuous line of communication. the plight of the yankee soldier in north russia fighting the bolsheviki in the winter of - was often made the subject of newspaper cartoon. below is reproduced one of thomas' cartoons from the detroit news, which shows the doughboy sitting in a toulgas trench--or a kodish, or shred makrenga, or pinega, or chekuevo, or railroad trench. of course this dire position was at one of those places and at one of those times before the resourceful yanks had had time to consolidate their gains or fortify their newly accepted position in rear of their former position. in a few hours--or few days at most, the american soldier would have dug in securely and made himself rudely comfortable. that rude comfort would last till some british officer decided to "put on a bit of a show," or till the reds in overwhelming numbers or with tremendous artillery pounding or both combined, compelled the yanks to fight themselves into a new position and go through the arctic rigors of trench work again in zero weather for a few days. the cartoonist knows the unconquerable spirit of humor with which the american meets his desperate situations; for he puts into the soldier's mouth words that show that although he may have more of a job than he bargained for, he can joke with his buddie about it. as reserve officers of that remarkable north russian expeditionary force the writers take off their hats in respect to the citizen soldiers who campaigned with us under conditions that were, truth to say, usually better but sometimes much worse than the trench situation pictured by the cartoon below. with grit and gumption and good humor those citizen soldiers "endured hardness as good soldiers." [illustration: cartoon; two soldiers in a trench surrounded by snow, with shells exploding all around. one is reading a newspaper with the headline "peace conference news: after war labor problem". he remarks to the other soldier "well, bill, we certainly got a job after the war."] xiv great white reaches lines of communication guarded well--fast travelling pony sleighs--major williams describes sled trip--a long winter march--visiting three hundred year old monastery--snowshoe rabbit story--driving through fairyland--lonely, thoughtful rides under white north star--wonderful aurora borealis. we left "f" company in the winter, swirling snows guarding the many points of danger on the long lines of communication. they were in december scattered all the way from archangel to morjegorskaya. for a few weeks in january, lieut. sheridan with his platoon sat on the bolo lidtilters in leunova in the lower pinega valley and then was hurried down the dvina to another threatened area. the red success in pushing our forces out of shenkursk and down the vaga made the upper dvina and vaga roads constantly subject to raiding parties of the bolsheviki. early in february "k" company came up from archangel and took station at yemetskoe, one platoon being left at kholmogori. "f" company had been needed further to the front to support the first battalion companies hard pressed by the enemy. nervous and suspected villages alike were vigilantly visited by strong patrols. on february th captain ramsay hurried up with two platoons to reinforce shred mekhrenga, traveling a distance of forty versts in one day. but the enemy retired mysteriously as he had oft before just when it seemed that he would overpower the british-russian force that had been calling for help. so the americans were free to go back to the more ticklish vaga-dvina area. from here on the story of "f" company on the lines of communication merges into the story of the stern rear guard actions and the final holding up of the advance of the reds, and their gallant part will be read in the narrative related elsewhere. mention has already been made of the work of "g" and "m" company platoons on the isolated pinega valley lines and of "h" company guarding the very important onega-obozerskaya road, over which passed the mails and reinforcements from the outside world. the cluster of villages called bolsheozerki was on this road. late in march it was overpowered by a strong force of the reds and before aid could come the bolshevik northern army commander had wedged a heavy force in there, threatening the key-point obozerskaya. this point on the line of communication had been guarded by detachments from the railroad force at obozerskaya, americans alternating with french soldiers, and both making use of russian allied troops. at the time of its capture it was occupied by a section of french supported by russian troops. the story of its recapture is told elsewhere. the trail junction point volshenitsa, between seletskoe and obozerskaya, was fitted up with quarters for soldiers and vigilantly guarded against surprise attacks by the reds from , or emtsa. sometimes it was held by british and russians from seletskoe and sometimes by americans from obozerskaya. it sounds easy to say "guarding lines of communication." but any veteran of the north russian expedition will tell you that the days and nights he spent at that duty were often severe tests. when that russki thermometer was way below forty and the canteen on the hip was solid ice within twenty minutes of leaving the house, and the sleigh drivers' whiskers were a frozen niagara, and your little party had fifteen versts to go before seeing another village, you wondered how long you would be able to handle your rifle if you should be ambushed by a party of bolos. with the settling down of winter the transportation along the great winter reaches of road became a matter of fast traveling pony sleighs with frequent exchange of horses. officers and civil officials found this travel not unpleasant. the following story, taken from the red cross magazine and adapted to this volume, will give the doughboy a pleasing recollection and the casual reader a vivid picture of the winter travel. this might be the story of captain ramsay driving to pinega in january to visit that front. or it might be old "three-hair" doc laird sledging to soyla to see "military pete" primm's sturdy platoon. or it might be colonel stewart on his remarkable trip to the river winter fronts. however, it is the story of the active american red cross major williams, who hit the long trails early and showed the rest the way. "i have just returned from a trip by sled up the pinega river, to the farthest point on that section where american troops are located. the trip consumed six days and this, with the trip to the dvina front, makes a total of twenty days journeying by sled and about eight hundred miles covered. horses and not reindeer are used for transport. the russian horse, like the peasant, must be a stout breed to stand the strain and stress of existence. they are never curried, are left standing in the open for hours, and usually in spots exposed to cruel winds when there is a semblance of shelter available within a few feet. the peasants do not believe in 'mollycoddling' their animals, nor themselves. "on the return trip from dvina i had a fine animal killed almost instantly by his breaking his neck. it was about five o'clock in the afternoon, pitch dark of course, and our russian driver who, clad in reindeer skin and hood, resembled for all the world a polar bear on the front of the sled shouted meaningless and unnecessary words to our two horses to speed them on their way. "all sexes and ages look alike in these reindeer parkis. we were in a semi-covered sled with narrow runner, but with safety skids to prevent it from completely capsizing. at the foot of every russian hill the road makes a sharp turn. for a solid week we had been holding on at these turns, but finally had become accustomed, or perhaps i should say resigned, to them. going down a long hill the horse holds back as long as he can, the driver assisting in retarding the movement of the sled. but on steep hills, where this is not possible, it is a case of a run for life. "our horse shied sharply at a sleeping bag which had been thrown from baggage sled ahead. the safety skids could not save us, but made the angle of our overturn more complete. kirkpatrick, several pieces of his luggage, and an abnormal quantity of hay added to my discomfort. his heavy blanket roll, which he had been using as a back rest, was thrown twenty feet. the top of the sled acted as an ideal snow scoop and my head was rubbed in the snow thoroughly before our little driver, who was hanging on to the reins (b-r-r b-r-r b-r-r) could hold down the horse. it was not until an hour later, when our driver was bringing in our baggage, that i discovered that our lives had been in the hands of a thirteen-year-old girl. "after a trip of this sort one becomes more and more enthusiastic about his blanket roll. sleeping at all times upon the floor, and occasionally packed in like sardines with members of peasant families all in the same room, separated only by an improvised curtain, we kept our health, appetites and humor. "a small village of probably two hundred houses. the american soldiers have been in every house. at first the villagers distrusted them. now they are the popular men of the community with the elders as well as children. their attitude toward the russian peasant is helpful, conciliatory, and sympathetic. one of these men told me that on the previous day he had seen a woman crying on the street, saying that their rations would not hold out and they would be forced to eat straw. the woman showed me a piece of bread, hardly a square meal for three persons, which she produced carefully wrapped as if worth its weight in gold from a box in the corner. they had been improvident in the use of their monthly ration of fifteen pounds of flour per person and the end of the month, with yet three days to go, found them in a serious dilemma. when the hard tack and sugar were produced they were speechless with astonishment. and the satisfaction of the american soldier was great to see. "up on the pinega river, many miles from any place, we passed a considerable body of american soldiers headed to the front. every man was the picture of health, cheeks aglow, head up, and on the job. these same men were on the railroad front--four hundred miles in another direction--when i had seen them last. there they were just coming out of the front line trenches and block houses, wearing on their heads their steel hats and carrying on their backs everything but the kitchen stove. "now they were rigged more for long marching, in fur caps, khaki coats of new issue with woollen lining, and many carried alpine poles, for in some places the going was hard. "from our sled supply every man was given a package of red cross cigarettes, and every man was asked if he had received his christmas stocking. they all had. i dined, by the way, with general ironside last night, and he was very strong in his praise for this particular body of men who have seen strenuous service and are in for more." one of the most memorable events in the history of a company of americans in russia was the march from archangel to pinega, one hundred and fifty miles in dead of winter. the first and fourth platoons made the forced march december th to th inclusive, hurrying to the relief of two platoons of another company with its back to the wall. two weeks later the second and third platoons came through the same march even faster, although it was forty degrees below zero on three days, for it was told at archangel that the other half of "m" company was in imminent danger of extermination. the last instructions for the march, given in the old smolny barracks, are typical of march orders to american soldiers: "we march tomorrow on pinega. many versts but not all in one day. we shall quarter at night in villages, some friendly, some hostile. we may meet enemy troops. we march one platoon ahead, one behind the -sleigh convoy. alert advance and rear parties to protect the column from surprise. "ours is a two-fold mission: first, to reinforce a half of another company which is now outnumbered ten to one; second, to raise a regiment of loyal russian troops in the great pinega valley where half the people are loyal and half are bolo sympathizers. we hold the balance of power. hold up your chins and push out your chests and bear your arms proudly when passing among the russian people. you represent the nation that was slow to wrath but irresistible in might when its soldiers hit the hindenburg line. make russians respect your military bearing. the loyal will breathe more freely because you have come. the treacherous bolo sympathizers will be compelled to wipe off their scowls and will fear to try any dirty work. "and further, just as important, remember not only to bear yourselves as soldiers of a powerful people, but bear yourselves as men of a courteous, generous, sympathetic, chivalrous people. treat these simple people right and you win their devoted friendship. respect their oddities. do not laugh at them as do untactful soldiers of another nation. molest no man's property except of military necessity. you will discover likable traits in the character of these russians. here, as everywhere in the world, in spite of differences of language and customs, of dress and work and play and eating and housing, strangers among foreign people will find that in the essentials of life folks is folks. "you will wear your american field shoes and arctics in preference to the clumsy and slippery bottomed shackleton boot. overcoats will be piled loosely on top of sleighs so as to be available when delay is long. canteens will be filled each evening at company "g-i" can. drink no water in villager's home. you may buy milk. everyone must protect his health. we have no medical man and only a limited supply of number nines. "tomorrow at noon we march. prepare carefully and cheerfully." the following account of the march is copied from the daily story written in an officer's diary: to ouima--first day, december th after the usual delay with sleigh drivers, with shoutings and "brrs" and shoving and pullings, the convoy was off at : a. m. december . the trail was an improved government road. the sun was on our right hand but very low. the fire station of smolny at last dropped out of the rearward view. the road ran crooked, like the dvina along whose hilly banks it wound. a treat to our boys to see rolling, cleared country. fish towns and lumber towns on the right. hay stacks and fields on the left, backed by forests. here the trail is bareswept by the wind from across the river. again it is snow blown and men and ponies slacken speed in the drifts. early sets the sun, but the white snow affords us light enough. the point out of sight in front, the rear party is lost behind the curve. tiny specks on the ice below and distant are interpreted to be sledges bound for some river port. nets are exposed to the air and wait now for june suns to move out the fetters of ice. decent looking houses and people face the strange cavalcade as it passes village after village. it is a new aspect of russia to the americans who for many weeks have been in the woods along the vologda railroad. well, halting is a wonderful performance. the headman--starosta--must be hunted up to quarter officers and men. he is not sure about the drivers. perhaps he fears for the great haystacks in his yard. we cannot wait. in we go and buffalo bill's men never had anything on these russki drivers. but it all works out, slava bogga for army sergeants. american soldiers are quick to pull things through anyway. without friction we get all in order. guard is mounted over the sleighs. now we find out that mr. poole was right in talking about "friendly russians." our lowly hosts treat us royally. tea from the samovar steams us a welcome. it is clean homes, mostly, soldiers find themselves in,--clean clothing, clean floors, oil lamps, pictures on the walls. to liablskaya--second day, december th crawled out of our sheepskin sleeping bags about : o'clock well rested. breakfasted on bacon and bread and coffee. gave headman ten roubles. every soldier reported very hospitable treatment. tea for all. milk for many. some delay caused by the sledge drivers who joined us late at night from bakaritza with oats. left at : . billeting party given an hour's start, travelling ahead of the point to get billets and dinner arranged. marching hard. cold sleet from southeast with drifting snow. the shackelton boot tricky. men find it hard to navigate. road very hilly. cross this inlet here. down the long hill and up a winding hill to the crest again which overhangs the stream that soon empties into the big dvina. to the left on the ice-locked beach are two scows. it is warmer now for the road winds between the pines on both sides. the snow ceases gradually but we do not see the least brightness in the sky to show location of old sol. we are making four versts an hour in spite of the hills and the cumbrous boots. the drivers are keeping up well. only once is the advance party able to look back to the rear guard, the caravan being extended more than a verst. here is another steep hill. see the crazy russki driver give his pony his head to dash down the incline. disaster hangs in a dizzy balance as he whirls round and round and the heavily loaded sled pulls horse backwards down the hill. now we meet a larger party of dressed-up folks going to church. it is holy day for saint nicholas. the long hill leading into liablskaya is a good tester for courage. some of the men are playing out--eight versts more will be tough marching. here is the billeting officer to tell us that the eight versts is a mistake--it is nineteen instead. we must halt for the night. no one is sorry. there is the blazing cook's fire and dinner will be ready soon. it is only : , but it seems nearly night. men are quickly assigned to quarters by the one-eyed old headman, kardacnkov, who marks the building and then goes in to announce to the householder that so many amerikanski soldats will sleep there. twenty-five minutes later the rear guard is in. our host comes quickly with samovar of hot water and a pot of tea. he is a clerical man from archangel, a soldier from the caucasus. with our m. & v. we have fresh milk. it is dark before : p.m. we need a lamp. all the men are well quartered and are trying to dry their shoes. we find the sergeants in a fine home. a bos'n of a russian vessel is home on leave. we must sit in their party and drink a hop-ferment substitute for beer. their coffee and cakes are delicious and we hold converse on the political situation. "american soldiers are here to stop the war and give russia peace" is our message. in another home we find a war prisoner from germany, back less than a week from petrograd front. he had to come around the bolsheviki lines on the vologda r. r. he says the b. government is on its last legs at petrograd. to koskogor--third day, december th oh, you silvery moon, are you interested in that bugle call? it is telling our men to come to breakfast at once-- : , for we start for koskogor at : a. m. or before. the start is made at : . road is fine--well-beaten yesterday by marketing convoys and by russians bound for church to celebrate saint nick's day. between the pines our road winds. not a breath of air has stirred since the fine snow came in the night and "ridged each twig inch deep with pearl." what a sight it would have been if the sun had come up. wisconsin, we think of you as we traverse these bluffs. you tenth verst, you break a beautiful scene on us with your trail across the valley. you courageous little pony, you deserve to eat all that hay you are lugging up that hill. your load is not any worse than that of the pony behind who hauls a giant log on two sleds. you deserve better treatment, loshad. when russia grows up to an educated nation animal power will be conserved. here we see the primitive saw mill. perched high on a pair of horses is a great log. up and down cuts the long-toothed saw. up pulls the man on top. down draws the man on the ground. something is lacking--it is the snap-ring that we so remember from boyhood wood-cutting days in michigan. here we are back to the river again and another picturesque scene with its formidable hill--verst . but we get on fast for the end is in sight. the windmill for grinding grain tells us a considerable village is near. we arrive and stop on the top of the hill in the home of a merchant-peasant, lopatkin: a fine home--house plants and a big clock and a gramophone. it is cold, for the russian stove has not been fired since morning--great economy of fuel in a land of wood. to kholmogora--fourth day, december st harbinger of hope! oh you red sky line! shall we see the sun today? it is : a. m. and from our hill top the wide red horizon in the south affords a wonderful scene. in the distance, headlands on the dvina cut bold figures into the red. far, far away stretches the flat river. now we are safely down the long, steep hill and assembled on the river. sergeant getzloff narrowly escapes death from a reckless civilian's pony and sleigh. we crawl along the east shore for a verst and then cross squarely to the other side, facing a cold, harsh wind. what a wonderful subject for a picture. tall pines--tallest we have yet seen in russia, on the island lift their huge trunks against the red, the broad red band on the skyline. and now, too, the upland joins itself to the scene. the going is drifty and sternly cold. broad areas allow the biting wind full sweep. ears are covered and hands are thrashed. that "stolen horse" pole there may be a verst post. sure enough, and " ," it says, " to go." look now for the barber poles. we are too late to get a glimpse of the sun. red is the horizon yet but the sun has risen behind a low cloud screen. the advance guard has outwalked the convoy and while ponies toil up the hill, we seek shelter in the lee of a house to rest, to smoke. the convoy at last comes up. one animal has a ball of ice on his foot. we make the drivers rest their ponies and look after their feet. ten minutes and then on. it is a desperate cold. a driver's ears are tipped with white. the bugler's nose is frozen on the windward side. everyone with yarn mittens only is busy keeping fingers from freezing. here it is good going for the long straight road is flanked by woods that protect road from drifts and traveller from icy blasts. this road ends in a half mile of drifts before a town on the bank of a tributary to the dvina. we descend to the river. so there you are, steamboat, till the spring break-up frees you and then you will steam up and down the river with logs and lumber and hemp and iron and glass and soldiers perhaps--but no americans, i hope. what is this train that has come through our point? bolshevik? those uniforms of the russki m. p.'s are alarmingly like those we have been shooting at. go on with your prisoners. now it is noon. the sun is only a hand high in the sky. the day has grown grey and colder. or is it lack of food that makes us more susceptible to winter's blasts? a bit of hard tack now during this rest while we admire the enduring red of the sky. we are nearing our objective. for several versts we have skirted the edge of the river and watched the spires and domes of the city come nearer to us. we wind into the old river town and pass on for a verst and a half to an old monastery where we find quarters in a subsidiary building which once was an orphan's home. the old women are very kind and hospitable. the rooms are clean and airy and warm. at monastery--fifth day, december nd we spend the day at rest. men are contented to lie on the warm floors and ease their feet and ankles. we draw our rations of food, forage and cigarettes. it is bitterly cold and we dread the morrow. the madam botchkoreva, leader of the famous women's battalion of death, comes to call on us. she excites only mild interest among the soldiers. to ust pinega--sixth day, december rd zero is here on the edge of a cutting wind. but we dash around and reorganize our convoy. five sleds and company property are left at the monastery in charge of two privates who are not fit to march further. five horses are unfit to go. billeting party leaves about : a. m. the convoy starts at : . along the river's edge we move. a big twelve-verst horseshoe takes us till noon. men suffer from cold but do not complain. we put up in village. people are friendly. officers are quartered with a good-natured peasant. call up pinega on long distance phone. we are needed badly. officer will try to get sleighs to come to meet us forty versts out of pinega. maj. williams, red cross, came in to see us after we had gone to bed, on his way to pinega. to verkhne palenga--seventh day, december th at breakfast telegram came from pinega promising one hundred horses and red cross christmas dinners. get away at : a. m. the lane is full of snow but the winding road through the pines is a wonderfully fine road. for thirteen versts there is hardly a drift. the hills are very moderate. wood haulers are dotting the river. stores are evidently collecting for scow transport in the summer. no, do not take to the ice. keep on to the left, along the river. this hill is not so bad. we lost our point on a tortuous road, but find that we have avoided a ravine. the fourteenth verst takes us across the river--follow the telephone wires there. come back, you point, and take the road to the left that climbs that steep bluff yonder. what a sight from the top! the whole convoy lies extended from advance guard on the hill to rear guard on the river. up and down our winding pine-flanked road takes us. it is hard going but the goal is only a few versts away. now we are in sight of the village and see many little fields. oh boy! see that ravine. this town is in two parts. hospitable is the true word. men turn out and cut notches in the ice to help the ponies draw the sleds up the hill. it is some show. several of the ponies are barely able to make the grade. the big man of the village is cukov. we stay in his home--fine home. headman zelenian comes to see us. opened our red cross christmas stockings and doughboys share their meagre sweets with russki children. to leunovo--eighth day, december th up at : for a merry christmas march. away at : . good road for thirteen versts, to uzinga. here we stop and call for the headman who gets his men to help us down the hill to the river. not cold. holes in the river for washing clothes. officer reported seeing women actually washing clothes. found out what the high fences are for. hang their flax up to dry. the twenty-fourth verst into leunovo is a hard drag. quarters are soon found. people sullen. forester, polish man who lives in house apart at north end of village, tells me there are many bolsheviki sympathizers in the town. also that ostrov and kuzomen are affected similarly. this place will have to be garrisoned by american soldiers to protect our rear from treachery. to gbach--ninth day, december th delay in starting due to necessity for telephoning to pinega in regard to rations and sleighs. some error in calculations. they had sleighs waiting us at gbach this morning instead of tomorrow morning. snow falling as we start on the river road at : . we find it glada (level) nearly all the way but drifty and hard walking. nevertheless we arrive at end of our twenty-one verst march at : . met by friendly villagers and well quartered. these people need phone and a guard the same as at verkne palenga. find that people here view the villages of ostrov and kuzomen with distrust. kulikoff, a prominent leader in the bolo northern army, hails from one of these villages. spent an hour with the village schoolmaster. had a big audience of men and boys. sgt. young and interpreter came through from pinega to untangle the sleigh situation. we find that it is again all set here for an early start with one hundred sleighs. a spoiled can of m. & v. makes headquarters party desperately sick. to pinega--tenth day, december th hard to get up this morning. horses and sleighs came early as promised. put one man and his barrack bag and equipment into each sleigh and in many sleighs added a light piece of freight to lighten our regular convoy sleds. got away at : a. m. nice day for driving. the russian sleigh runs smoothly and takes the bumps gracefully. it is the first time these solders have ridden in sleighs. urgency impels us. light ball snow falls. much hay cut along this valley. we meet the genial red cross man who passes out cigarettes and good cheer to all the men. arrive at soyla at noon. some mistake made. the hundred horses left yesterday and the headman goes out to get them again for us to go on this evening. seventeen sleighs got away at : p. m. twenty-five more at : p. m. at : we got away with the remainder of company. have a good sleigh and can sleep. here is yural and i must awake and telephone to pinega to see how situation stands. loafer in telegraph office informs us of the battle today resulting in defeat of white guards, the volunteers of pinega who were supporting the hundred americans. bad news. it is desperately cold. no more sleeping. the river road is bleak. we arrive at last-- : a. m. in the frosty night the hulks of boats and the bluffs of pinega loom large. so endeth diary of the remarkable march. no group of healthy men anywhere in the world, no matter what the danger and hardships, will long forego play. it is the safety valve. it may be expressed in outdoor sports, or indoor games, or in hunting, fishing or in some simple diversion. it may be in a tramp or a ride into some new scenery to drink in beauty, or what not, even to getting the view-points of strange peoples. what soldier will ever forget the ride up to the old three-hundred-year-old monastery and the simple feed that the monks set out for them. or who will forget the dark night at kodish when the orator called out to the americans and they joshed him back with great merriment. often the soldier on the great line of communication duty whiled away an hour helping some native with her chores. "her" is the right word, for in that area nearly every able-bodied man was either in the army, driving transport, working in warehouses, or working on construction, or old and disabled. practically never was a strong man found at home except on furlough or connected with the common job of the peasants, keeping the bolo out of the district. for a matter of several weeks in weather averaging twenty-four degrees below zero three american soldiers were responsible for the patrol of seven versts of trail leading out from a village on the line of communication toward a bolo position which was threatening it. one or all of them made this patrol by sleigh every six or eight hours, inspecting a cross-trail and a rest shack which bolo patrols might use. their plan was never to disturb the snow except on the path taken by themselves, so that any other tracks could be easily detected. one day there were suspicious signs and one of the men tramped a circle around the shack inspecting it from all sides before entering it. next morning, before daylight, another one of the trio made the patrol and being informed of the circle about the shack, saw what he took to be additional tracks leading out and into the shack and proceeded to burn the shack as his orders were, if the shack were ever visited and promised to be of use to the enemy. later by daylight a comrade making the patrol came back with the joke on his buddie who in the darkness had mistaken a huge snowshoe rabbit's tracks, made out of curiosity smelling out the man's tracks. often the patrol sled would travel for hours through a fairy land. the snow-laden trees would be interlaced over the trail, so that the sled travelled in a wonderful crystal, grey, green and golden tunnel. filtering beams of sunlight ahead of it. a mist of disturbed snow behind it. no sound save from the lightly galloping pony, the ooh-chee-chee of the driver or the bump of the sleigh against a tree or a root, or the occasional thunder of a rabchik or wild turkey in partridge-like flight. beside the trail or crossing might be seen the tracks of fox and wolf and in rare instances of reindeer. or on the open road in the night: solemn again the mood of the doughboy as he recollects some of those lonely night rides. here on his back in the hay of the little sled he reclines muffled in blankets and robes, his driver hidden in his great bearskin parki, or greatcoat, hidden all but his two piercing eyes, his nose and whiskers that turned up to shield his face. with a jerk the fiery little pony pulls out, sending the two gleaming sled tracks to running rearward in distant meeting points, the woods to flying past the sleigh and the snow to squealing faintly under the runners; sending the great starry heavens to sweep through the tops of the pine forest and sending the doughboy to long thoughts and solemn as he looks up at the north star right above him and thinks of what his father said when he left home: "son, you look at the north star and i'll look at it and every time we will think of one another while you are away, and if you never come back, i'll look at the north star and know that it is looking down at your grave where you went with a purpose as fixed as the great star and a motive as pure as its white light." oh, those wonderful night heavens to the thoughtful man! every veteran at this point in the narrative thinks now of the wonderful nights when the northern lights held him in their spell. always the sentry called to his mates to come and see. it cannot be pictured by brush or pen, this aurora borealis. it has action, it has color, sheets of light, spires, shafts, beams and broad finger-like spreadings, that come and go, filmy veils of light winding and drifting in, weaving in and out among the beams and shafts, now glowing, now fading. it may be low in the north or spread over more than half the heavens. it may shift from east to western quarter of the northern heaven. never twice the same, never repeating the delicate pattern, nor staying a minute for the admirer, it brightens or glimmers, advances or retreats, dies out gradually or vanishes quickly. always a phenomenon of wonder to the soldier who never found a zero night too cold for him to go and see, was the aurora borealis. xv mournful kodish donoghue brings valuable reinforcements--bolshevik orator on emtsa bridge--conditions detrimental to morale--preparations for attack on kodish--savage fighting blade to blade--bolsheviks would not give way--desperately bitter struggle--we hold kodish at awful cost--under constant and severe barrage--half-burned shell-gashed houses mark scene of struggle--we retire from kodish--again we capture kodish but can not advance--death of ballard--counter attack of reds is barely stemmed--both sides see futility of fighting for kodish--"k" means kodish where heroic blood of two continents stained snows richly. we left "k" company and ballard's platoon of machine gun men, heroes of the fall fighting at kodish, resting in archangel. we have seen that the early winter was devoted to building defenses against the reds who showed a disposition to mass up forces for an attack. "k" company had come back to the force in december and with "l" company gone to reserve in seletskoe. captain donoghue had become "major mike" for all time and lt. jahns commanded the old company. donoghue had taken back to the kodish force valuable reinforcements in the shape of smith's and tessin's trench mortar sections of "hq" company. it had been in the early weeks of winter during the time that captain heil with "e" company and the first platoon machine gunners were holding the emtsa bridge line, that the bolsheviki almost daily tried out their post-armistice propaganda. the bolo commander sent his pamphlets in great profusion; he raised a great bulletin board where the american troops and the canadian artillery forward observers could read from their side of the river his messages in good old i. w. w. style and content; he sent an orator to stand on the bridge at midnight and harangue the americans by the light of the aurora borealis. he even went so far as to bring out to the bridge two prisoners whom the bolos had had for many weeks. one was a royal scot lad, the other was pvt. george albers of "i" company who had been taken prisoner one day on the railroad front. these two prisoners were permitted to stand near enough their comrades to tell them they were well treated. captain heil was just about to complete negotiations for the exchange of prisoners one day when a patrol from another allied force raided the bolos in the rear and interrupted the close of the deal. the bolos were occupied with their arms. and shortly afterward donoghue heard of the negotiations and the wily propaganda of the reds and put a stop to it. on another page is told the story of similar artifices resorted to by the reds on the toulgas front to break into the morale of the american troops. it was well that the american officer adopted firm measures. to be sure the great rank and file of american soldiers like their people back home could not be fooled by propaganda. they could see through red propaganda as well as they could see through the old german propaganda and british propaganda and american for that matter. of course not always clearly. but it was wise to avoid the stuff if possible, and to discount it good-humoredly when it did contact with us. the black night and short, hazy days, the monotonous food, the great white, wolf-howling distances, and the endless succession of one d--- hardship after another was quite enough. add to that the really pathetic letters from home telling of sickness and loneliness of those in the home circle so far away, and the uselessly sobful letters that carried clippings from the partisan papers that grossly exaggerated and distorted stories of the arctic campaign and also carried suggestions of resistance to the military authorities, and you have a situation that makes us proud at this time of writing that our american men showed a real stamina and morale that needs no apology. the story of this new year's day battle with the bolos proves the point. for six weeks "e" company had been on the line. part of "l" company had been sent to reinforce shred makrenga and the remainder was at seletskoe and split up into various side detachments. now they came for the preparations for their part in the united push on plesetskaya, mentioned before. "k" company came up fresh from its rest in archangel keen to knock the bolo out of kodish and square the november account. major donoghue was to command the attacking forces, which besides "e" and "k" consisted of one section of canadian artillery, one platoon of the "m. g." company, one trench mortar section, a medical detachment and a detachment of th engineers who could handle a rifle if necessary with right good will. each unit caught a gleam of fire from the old irishman's eye as he looked them over on december th and th, while "l" company came up to take over the front so as to relieve the men for their preparations for the shock of the battle. the enemy was holding kodish with two thousand seven hundred men, supported by four pieces of artillery and a reserve of seven hundred men. donoghue had four hundred fifty men. at : a. m. "e" and "k" companies were on the east bank of the emtsa moving toward the right flank of the bolos and firing red flares at intervals with very pistol to inform donoghue of their progress. meanwhile the seven stokes mortars were putting a fifteen-minute barrage of shells, a great -shell burst, on the bolo trenches, which added to the -gun machine and lewis gun barrage, demoralized the red front line and gave the two infantry companies fifteen minutes later an easy victory as they swung in and on either side of the road advanced rapidly toward kodish village. meanwhile the canadian artillery pounded the bolo reserves in kodish. [illustration: sleigh pulled by reindeer.] u. s. official photo by reindeer jitney to bakaritza [illustration: several people outside three large teepee-like structures.] primm russian eskimos at home, near pinega [illustration: three soldiers near a reinforced log cabin, covered with snow.] wagner fortified house, toulgas [illustration: column of sleds moving through a forest.] u. s. official to bolskeozerki [illustration: two men in heavy coats standing in the snow,] wagner colonel morris--at right [illustration: rough carving of a log, reminiscent of easter island stone faces.] red cross russian eskimo idol [illustration: men standing in snow in front of a horse and sleigh.] doud ambulance men [illustration: soldiers with rifles lying in a trench behind a wooden fence. several buildings in the background] red cross photo practising rifle and pistol fire oil onega front [illustration: three soldiers standing front of a log blockhouse.] wagner french machine gun men at kodish [illustration: several soldiers standing around a biplane. buildings (hangars?) in the background; about a foot of snow on the ground.] u.s. official photo allied plane carrying bombs the reds tried to rally at a ridge of ground a verst in front of kodish but the dreadful trench mortars again showered them at eight hundred yards with this new kind of hell and they were easily dislodged by the infantry and machine gun fire. at : p. m. after seven hours hard fighting the americans were again in possession of kodish. an interesting side incident of this recapture of kodish was the defeat of a company of reds occupying a kodish flank position at the church on the river two versts away. the reds disputed but sergeant masterson and fifteen men of "e" company dislodged them. but time was valuable. donoghue's battle order that day called for his force to take kodish and its defenses, avda and its defenses and to occupy kochmas. only a matter of twenty miles of deep snow and hard fighting. so the enemy was attacked again vigorously at one of the old fighting spots of the fall campaign, at verst . as in the previous fighting the red guards, realizing the strategic value of this road fought tenaciously for every verst of it. they had been prepared for the loss of kodish village itself; it was untenable. but they refused to budge from verst . the trench mortars could not reach their dugout line. and the red machine guns poured a hot fire into the village of kodish as well as into the two platoons that forced their way a half a verst from the village toward this stubborn stronghold of the reds. darkness fell on the combatants locked in desperate fight. all the american forces were brought up into kodish for they had expected to get on to avda as their order directed. out in front the night was made lurid by flares and shell fire and gun fire where the two devoted platoons of "k" and "e" companies with two machine guns of the first platoon of "m. g." company hung on. lts. jahns, shillson and berger were everywhere among their men and met nothing but looks of resolution from them, for if this little force of less than a hundred men gave way the whole american force would be routed from kodish. there could be no orderly retreat from the village under such desperate conditions in the face of such numbers. they had to stick on. half their number were killed and wounded, among whom was the gallant lt. berger of "e" company who had charged across the bridge in the morning in face of machine gun fire. sergeants kenney and grewe of "k" company gave their lives that night in moving courageously among their men. frost bites cruelly added to the miseries of those long night hours after the fighting lulled at eleven o'clock. morning discovered the force digging in. the odds were all against them. again they were standing in kodish where after personal reconnaisance col. lucas, their nominal superior officer, commanding vologda force, had said no troops should be stationed as it was strategically untenable. but a new british officer had come into command of the seletskoe detachment, and perhaps that accounts for the foolhardy order that the doughty old donoghue received; "hold what you have got and advance no further south; prepare defenses of kodish." what an irony of fate. his force had been the only one of the various forces that had actually put any jab into the push on plesetskaya. now they were to be penalized for their very desperately won success. the casualties had been costly and had been aggravated by the rapid attacks of the frost upon hands and feet. in temperature way below zero the men lay in the snow on the outskirts and in that lowly village under machine gun fire and shrapnel. they undermined the houses to get warmth and protection in the dugouts thus constructed under them. barricades they built; and chipped out shallow trenches in the frozen ground. again the trench mortar came into good use. a platoon of "k" and a platoon of "e" found themselves partly encircled by a strong force of reds, with a single mortar near them to support. this mortar although clogged repeatedly with snow and ice worked off two hundred fifty shells on the reds and finally spotted the enemy machine gun positions and silenced them, contributing greatly to the silencing of the enemy fire and to his discouragement. the firer of this mortar, pvt. barone of "hq" company, who worked constantly, a standing target for the bolos, near the end of the fight fell with a bullet in his leg. and so the americans scrapped on. and they did hold kodish. seven were killed and thirty-five wounded, two mortally, in this useless fight. lt. o'brien of "e" company was severely wounded and at this writing is still in hospital. "the memories of these brave fellows," says lt. jack commons, "who went as the price exacted, lt. berger of "e" company, sgts. kenney and grewe and many other steady and courageous and loyal pals through the months of hardship that had preceded, made kodish a place horrible, detested, and unnerving to the small detachment that held it." meanwhile their fellows at the river bank with the engineers were slashing down the trees on the bolo side clearing the bank to prevent surprise of the allied position over the seven foot ice that now made the river into a winding roadway. more blockhouses and gun positions were put in. it was only a matter of time till they would have to retreat to the old position on the river. on january th donoghue sent "e" company back to occupy and help strengthen the old position at the river, from where they sent detachments forward to help "k" and "m.g." and trench mortar hold the shell-shattered village of kodish. the enemy confined himself chiefly to artillery shelling, always replied to vigorously by our gallant canadian section who, though outgunned, sought to draw part of the enemy fire their way to lighten the barrage on their american comrades caught like rats in the exposed village. from their three hills about the doomed village of kodish the reds kept up a continuous sharpshooting which fortunately was too long range to be effective. and the enormous losses which the reds had suffered on their side that bloody new year's day made them hesitate to move on the village with infantry to be mowed down by those dreadful amerikanski fighters, when a few days of steady battering with artillery would perhaps do just as well. flesh and blood can stand only so much. terrible was the strain. no wonder that on the seventh day of this hell a lieutenant with a single platoon holding the village after receiving magnified reports from his patrols of strong bolo flanking forces, imagined a general attack on kodish. the french colonel, v. o. c. o., had said kodish should not be held. and in the night he set fire to the ill-fated village and retreated to the river. swift came the command from the fiery old donoghue: "back to that village with me, the reds shall not have it." and his men reoccupied it before dawn. but no one but they can ever know how they suffered. the cold twenty below zero stung them in the village half burned. their beloved old commander's words stung them. hateful to them was the certainty that he was grimly carrying out a written order superior indeed to the french colonel's v. o. but which was not based on a true knowledge of the situation by the far-distant british officer who went over col. lucas' head and ordered kodish held. could they hold on? they did, with a display of fortitude that became known to the world and which makes every soldier who was in the expedition thrill with honest pride and admiration for them. the americans held it till they were relieved by a company of veteran fighters, the king's liverpools, supported by a half company of "dyer's battalion" of russians. in passing let it be remarked that the english officer, captain smerdon, soon succeeded in convincing the british o. c. seletskoe that kodish was no place for any body of soldiers to hold. he gallantly held it but only temporarily, for soon he and the canadians and trench mortar and machine gun men and the dyer's battalion men were back under major donoghue holding the old emtsa river line and its two supporting blockhouse lines. our badly shattered "e" company and "k" company went to reserve in seletskoe. the former company in the middle of january went to archangel for a ten day rest, and will be heard of later in the winter on another desperate front. old "k" company was glad to just find warm bunks in seletskoe and regain their old fighting pep that had been exhausted in the new year's period of protracted fighting under desperate odds. here let us insert the story of a two-man detachment of those redoubtable trench mortar men who rivaled their comrades' exploits with rifle and bayonet or machine gun. corp. andriks and pvt. forthe of "hq" company trench mortar platoon were loaned for a few days to the british officer at shred makrenga to instruct his russian troops in the use of the stokes mortars. but the two yanks in the two months they were on that hard-beset front spent most of their time in actually fighting their guns rather than in teaching the russians. this is only one of many cases of the sort, where small detachments of american soldiers sent off temporarily on a mission, were kept by the british officers on active duty. they did such sterling service. ever hear of the "lost platoon of "d" company?" like vagabonds they looked when finally their platoon leader, lt. wallace, cut loose from the british officer and reported back to lieut.-col. corbley on the vaga. but the erratic reds would not settle down to winter quarters. they had frustrated the great push on plesetskaya with apparent ease. they had the allied warriors now ill at ease and nervous. the trench mortar men and the machine gun men can tell many an interesting story of those january days on the kodish front serving there with the mixed command of canadians and king's liverpools and dyer's battalion of russians. these latter were an uncertain lot of change-of heart bolshevik prisoners and deserters and accused spies and so forth, together with russian youths from the streets of archangel, who for the uniform with its brass buttons and the near-british rations of food and tobacco had volunteered to "help save russia." by the rugged old veteran, dyer, they had been licked into a semblance of fighting trim. this was the force which major donoghue had at command when again came the order to take kodish. this time it was not a great offensive push to jab at the red army vitals, but it was a defensive thrust, a desperate operation to divert attention of the reds from their successful winter operations against the shred makrenga front. two platoons of couriers du bois, the well trained russian white guards under french tutelage, and those same royal marines that had been with him the first time kodish was taken in the bloody fight in the fall. and lt. ballard's gallant platoon of machine gun men came to relieve the first "m. g." platoon and to join the drive. they had an old score to settle with the bolos, too. again the american officer led the attack on kodish and this time easily took the village, for the reds were wise enough not to try to hold it. their first lines beyond the village yielded to his forces after stiff fighting, but the old th verst pole position held three times against the assaults of the allied troops. meanwhile the courageous "french-russians" had marched fourteen miles through the woods, encircling the bolo flank, and fell upon his artillery position, captured the guns and turned them upon the red reserves at avda. but the other forces could not budge the reds from verst and so the couriers du bois, after holding their position against counter attack all the afternoon, blew up the red field pieces and retreated in the face of a fresh bolo battalion from avda. and during the afternoon the americans who were engaged in this fight lost an officer whose consummate courage and wonderful cheerfulness had won him the adoration of his men and the respect and love of the officers who worked with him. brave, energetic, cheerful old ballard's death filled the machine gun company and the whole regiment with mingled feelings of sorrow and pride. over and beyond the call of duty he went to his death while striving to save the fortune of the day that was going against his doughty old leader donoghue. he did not know that the liverpool company had left a hole in the line by finding a trail to the rear after their second gallant but fruitless assault, and he went forward of his own initiative, with a russian lewis gun squad to find position where he could plant one of his machine guns to help the s. b. a. l. platoons and liverpools whom old donoghue was coming up to lead in another charge on the bolo position. lt. ballard ran into the exposed hole in the line and pushed forward to a place where his whole squad was ambushed and the russian lewis gunner was the only one to get out. he returned with his gun and dropped among the americanski machine gunners, telling of the death of ballard and the russian soldiers at the point of the bolshevik bayonets. lt. commons of "k" company declares that ballard met his death at that place by getting into the hole in the line which he supposed was held by english and russians and by being caught in a cross fire of bolo colt machine guns. whichever way it was, his body was never seen nor recovered. hope that he might have been taken as a wounded prisoner by the reds still lived in the hearts of his comrades. and all officers and men of the american forces who came into detroit the following july vainly wished to believe with the girl who piteously scanned every group that landed, that ballard might yet be heard from as a prisoner in russia. no doubt he was killed. the battle continued. finally the withdrawal of the couriers du bois and the coming through of the avda battalion of the reds, together with red reinforcements from kodlozerskaya-pustin, reduced donoghue's force to a stern defensive and he retreated at five o'clock in good order to the old lines on the river. the half-burned and scarred buildings of kodish mournfully reminded the soldier of the losses that had decimated the ranks of the forces that fought and refought over the village. into their old strongholds they retired, keeping a sharp lookout for the expected retaliation of the reds. it came two days later. and it nearly accounted for the entire force, although that was not so remarkable, lt. commons, the major's adjutant, says, because so many even of the shorter engagements on this and other fronts had been equally narrow squeaks for the americans and their allies. the reds in this fight reached the second line of defense with their flanking forces, and bombarded it with new guns brought up from plesetskaya. meanwhile, all along the front they attacked in great force and succeeded in taking one blockhouse, killing the seven gallant liverpool lads who fought up all their ammunition and defied the bolo steel to steel. but the remainder of the front held, largely through the effective work of the american trench mortar and the deadly machine gunners shooting for revenge of the death of ballard, their nervy leader, held fast their strongholds. at last the reds found their losses too severe to continue the attack. and they had been constantly worried by the gallant russian couriers du bois, who fearlessly stayed out in the woods and nipped the bolo forces in flank or rear. and so they withdrew. there was little more fighting on this front. the reds were content to let well enough alone. kodish in ruins was theirs. plesetskaya was safe from threats on that hard fought road. this was the last fight for the americans on the kodish front. "k" company had already looked for the last time on the old battle scenes and at the wooden crosses which marked the graves of their heroic dead, and had gone to archangel to rest, later to duty on the lines of communication at kholmogori and yemetskoe. now the trench mortar platoon and "m. g." platoon went to the railroad front, and major donoghue was the last one to leave the famous kodish front, where he had won distinction. it was now an entirely british-russian front and the american officer who had remained voluntarily to lead in the last big fight because of his complete knowledge of the battle area now went to well-earned rest in archangel. in closing the story of the americans on the kodish front we turn to the words written us by lt. john a. commons: "thus the kodish front was really home to the men of "k" company, for most of their stay in the northern land. to "e" and "l" and machine gun and trench mortar "hq" platoon it was also, but for a shorter period, their only shelter from the rains of the fall and the bite of the winter. "k", however, meant kodish. there they had their first fight, there their dead were buried. there they had their last battle. and there their memories long will return, mostly disagreeable to be sure, but still representing very definitely their part, performed with honesty, courage and distinction, in the big work that was given the yankee doughboys to do 'on the other side.' "the scraps mentioned here were the tougher part of the actions at the front. in between the line should be read first the cold as it was felt only out in the arctic woods, away from the villages and their warm houses. then, too, everything was one ceaseless and endless repetition of patrolling and scouting. many were the miles covered by these lads from detroit and other cities and towns of america among the soft snow and the evergreens. many a time did these small parties have their own little battles way out in the woods. much has been said here and there of the influence of bolshevik propaganda upon the american forces. it is true that these soldiers got a lot of it, and it is true that these soldiers read nearly all that they got. but it is true also that there was not a single incident of the whole campaign which could with honesty be attributed to this propaganda. on the kodish front it is quite safe to say that there was more of this ludicrous literature--not ludicrous to the russian peasant, but very much so to the average american--taken in than on any other. scarce a patrol went out which did not bring back something with which to while away a free hour or so, or with which to start a fire. it was always welcome. "but it was seriously treated in the same spirit that moved a corporal of ballard's machine gun platoon who felt strongly the discrepancy between the remarks of the bolshevik speaker on the bridge to the effect that his fellows were moved by brotherly love for the yanks and the fact that nine out of every ten bolshevik cartridges captured had the bullets clipped. the corporal reciprocated later with a machine gun, not for the love but for the bullets. "so they stuck and fought, suffering through the bitter months of winter just below the arctic circle, where the winter day is in minutes and the night seems a week. and there is not one who is not proud that he was once a "side kicker" and a "buddy" to some of those fine fellows of the various units who unselfishly and gladly gave the last that a man has to give for any cause at all." xvi ust padenga positions near ust padenga in january--bolo patrols--overwhelming assault by bolos january nineteenth--through valley of death--canadian artillery and machine gun fire punishes enemy frightfully when he takes ust padenga--death of powers--enemy artillery makes american position untenable--escaping from trap--retreating with constant rear-guard actions--we lose our last gun--"a" company has miraculous escape but suffers heavy losses. outside of routine patrolling, outpost duties and intermittent shelling and sniping, the early part of the month of january, , was comparatively quiet on the ust padenga front. the troops now engaged in the defense of this sector were company "a," th infantry, a platoon of "a" company, th engineers, canadian artillery, english signal detachment and several companies of russians and cossacks. it will be recalled that the main positions of our troops was in netsvetiafskaya, on a high bluff overlooking ust padenga and nijni gora--the former about a thousand yards to our left front on the bank of the vaga, and the latter about a mile to our right front located on another hill entirely surrounded by a deep ravine and valleys. in other words our troops were in a v-shaped position with netsvetiafskaya as the base of the v, ust padenga as the left fork, and nijni gora as the right fork of same. the cossack troops refused to occupy the position of nijni gora, claiming that it was too dangerous a position and almost impossible to withdraw from in case they were hard pressed. consequently, orders were issued from british headquarters at shenkursk, ordering an american platoon to occupy nijni gora and the cossacks to occupy ust padenga. on the afternoon of january , the fourth platoon of company "a," with forty-six men under command of lieut. mead, relieved the second platoon and took over the defense of nijni gora. the weather at this time was fearfully cold, the thermometer standing about forty-five degrees below zero. rumors after rumors were constantly coming in to our intelligence section that the enemy was preparing to make a desperate drive on our positions at this front. his patrols were getting bolder and bolder. a few nights before, one of the members of such a patrol had been shot down within a few feet of pvt. george moses, one of our sentinels, who, single handed, stood his post and held off the patrol until assistance arrived. we had orders to hold this front at all cost. by the use of field glasses we could see considerable activity in the villages in front of us and on our flanks, and during the night the inky blackness was constantly being illuminated by flares and rockets from many different points. it is the writer's opinion that these flares were used for the purpose of guiding and directing the movements of the troops that on the following day annihilated the platoon in nijni gora. on the morning of that fatal nineteenth day of january, just at dawn the enemy's artillery, which had been silent now for several weeks, opened up a terrific bombardment on our position in nijni gora. this artillery was concealed in the dense forest on the opposite bank of the vaga far beyond the range of our own artillery. far in the distance at ranges of a thousand to fifteen hundred yards, we could see long skirmish lines of the enemy clad in ordinary dark uniforms. whenever they got within range we would open fire with rifles and machine guns which succeeded in repelling any concerted movement from this direction. at this time there were twenty-two men in the forward position in command of lt. mead and about twenty-two men in command of the platoon sergeant in the rear position, after about an hour's violent shelling the barrage suddenly lifted, instantly, from the deep snow and ravines entirely surrounding us, in perfect attack formation, arose hundreds of the enemy clad in white uniforms, and the attack was on. time after time well directed bursts of machine gun fire momentarily held up group on group of the attacking party, but others were steadily and surely pressing forward, their automatic rifles and muskets pouring a veritable hail of bullets into the thin line of the village defenders. our men fought desperately against overwhelming odds. corporal victor stier, seeing a russian machine gun abandoned by the panic-stricken russians in charge of same, rushed forward and manning this gun single-handed opened up a terrific fire on the advancing line. while performing this heroic task he was shot through the jaw by an enemy bullet. still clinging to his gun he refused to leave it until ordered to the rear by his commanding officer. on his way back through the village he picked up the rifle of a dead comrade and joined his comrades in the rear of the village determined to stick to the end. it was while in this position that he was again hit by a bullet which later proved fatal--his death occurring that night. he was an example of the same heroic devotion to duty that marked each member of this gallant company throughout the expedition. being thus completely surrounded, the enemy now advancing with fixed bayonets, and many of our brave comrades lying dead in the snow, there was nothing left for those of us in the forward position to do but to cut our way through to the rear position in order to rejoin our comrades there. the enemy had just gained the street of the village as we began our fatal withdrawal--fighting from house to house in snow up to our waists, each new dash leaving more of our comrades lying in the cold and snow, never to be seen again. how the miserable few did succeed in eventually rejoining their comrades no one will ever know. we held on to the crest of the hill for a few moments to give our artillery opportunity to open up on the village and thus cover our withdrawal. again another misfortune arose to add more to the danger and peril of our withdrawal. a few days previously our gallant and effective canadian artillery had been relieved by a unit of russian artillery and during the early shelling this fateful morning, the russian artillerymen deserted their guns--something that no canadian ever would have done in such a situation. by the time the russians were forced back to their guns at the point of a pistol in the hands of captain odjard, our little remaining band had been compelled to give way in the face of the terrific fire from the forests on our flanks and the oncoming advance of the newly formed enemy line. to withdraw we were compelled to march straight down the side of this hill, across an open valley some eight hundred yards or more in the terrible snow, and under the direct fire of the enemy. there was no such thing as cover, for this valley of death was a perfectly open plain, waist deep with snow. to run was impossible, to halt was worse yet and so nothing remained but to plunge and flounder through the snow in mad desperation, with a prayer on our lips to gain the edge of our fortified positions. one by one, man after man fell wounded or dead in the snow, either to die from the grievous wounds or terrible exposure. the thermometer still stood about forty-five degrees below zero and some of the wounded were so terribly frozen that their death was as much due to such exposure as enemy bullets. of this entire platoon of forty-seven men, seven finally succeeded in gaining the shelter of the main position uninjured. during the day a voluntary rescue party under command of lieut. mcphail, "sgt." rapp, and others of company "a" with morley judd of the ambulance corps, went out into the snow under continuous fire and brought in some of the wounded and dead, but there were twelve or more brave men left behind in that fatal village whose fate was never known and still remains unknown to the present day, though long since reported by the united states war department as killed in action. many others were picked up dead in that valley of death later in the day and others died on their way back to hospitals. these brave lads made the supreme sacrifice, fighting bravely to the last against hopeless odds. through prisoners later captured by us, we learned that the attacking party that morning numbered about nine hundred picked troops--so the reader will readily appreciate what chance our small force had. all that day and far into the night the enemy's guns continued hammering away at our positions. under cover of darkness the russians and cossacks in the village of ust padenga withdrew to our lines--a move which the enemy least suspected. the following days were just a repetition of this day's action. the enemy shelled and shelled our position and then sent forward wave after wave of infantry. the canadian artillery under command of lieut. douglas winslow rejoined us and, running their guns out in the open sight, simply poured muzzle burst of shrapnel into the enemy ranks, thus breaking up attack after attack. two days later after a violent artillery preparation, the enemy, still believing our russian comrades located in the village of ust padenga, started an open attack upon this deserted position over part of the same ground where so many of our brave comrades had lost their lives on the nineteenth. they advanced in open order squarely in the face of our artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire, but by the time they had gained this useless and undefended village, hundreds of their number lay wounded and dying in the snow. the carnage and slaughter this day in the enemy's ranks was terrific, resulting from a most stupid military blunder, but it atoned slightly for our losses previous thereto. the valley below us was dotted with pile after pile of enemy dead, the carnage here being almost equal to the terrific fighting later at vistavka. when he discovered his mistake and useless sacrifice of men, and seeing it was hopeless to drive our troops from this position by his infantry, the enemy then resorted to more violent use of his artillery. shells were raining into our position now by the thousands, but our artillery could not respond as it was completely outranged. by the process of attrition our little body of men was growing smaller day by day, when to cap the climax late that day a stray shell plunged into our little hospital just as the medical officer, ralph c. powers, who had been heroically working with the dead and dying for days without relief and who refused to quit his post, was about to perform an operation on one of our mortally wounded comrades. this shell went through the walls of the building and through the operating room, passing outside where it exploded and flared back into the room. four men were killed outright, including sgt. yates k. rodgers and corp. milton gottschalk, two of the staunchest and most heroic men of company "a." lieutenant powers was mortally wounded and later died in the hospital at shenkursk, where he and many of his brave comrades now lie buried in the shadow of a great cathedral. this was the beginning of the end for us in this position. the enemy was slowly but surely closing in on shenkursk as evidenced by the following notation, made by one of our intelligence officers in shenkursk, set forth verbatim: "january , canadian artillery and platoon of infantry left of nikolofskia at : a.m., spent the day there establishing helio communication between church towers, here and there. all quiet there. at : a. m. one of the mounted cossack troopers came madly galloping from sergisfskia saying that the bolos were approaching from there and that he had been fired upon. he was terrified to death; other arrivals verify this report. the defenses are not all manned and a patrol sent in that direction. they are sure out there in force right enough. the clans are rapidly gathering for the big drive for the prize, shenkursk. later--orders from british headquarters for troops at ust padenga to withdraw tonight. : p. m.--there is a red glare in the sky in the direction of ust padenga and the flames of burning buildings are plain to be seen. there is ---- a popping down there and the roar of artillery is clearly heard." that night, january nd, we withdrew from this shell-torn and flaming village, leaving behind one of our guns which the exhausted horses could not move. we did not abandon this position a moment too soon, for just as we had finished preparations for withdrawal an incendiary shell struck one of the main buildings of the village, and instantly the surrounding country was as bright as day. all that night, tired, exhausted and half-starved, we plodded along the frozen trails of the pitch black forest. the following morning we halted for the day at shelosha, but late that day we received word to again withdraw to spasskoe, a village about six versts from shenkursk. again we marched all night long, floundering through the snow and cold, reaching spasskoe early that morning. on our march that night it was only by means of a bold and dangerous stroke that we succeeded in reaching spasskoe. the enemy had already gotten between us and our objective and in fact was occupying villages on both sides of the vaga river, through one or the other of which we were compelled to pass. we finally decided that under the cover of darkness and in the confusion and many movements then on foot, we could possibly march straight up the river right between the villages, and those on one side would mistake us for others on the opposite bank. our plan worked to perfection and we got through safely with only one shot being fired by some suspicious enemy sentry, but which did us no harm, and we continued silently on our way. for days now we had been fighting and marching, scarcely pausing for food and then only to force down a ration of frozen bully beef or piece of hard tack, and we expected here at least to gain a short breathing spell, but such was not fate's decree. about : a.m. we finally "turned in," but within a couple of hours we were again busily occupied in surveying our positions and making our plans. about : a. m. lieut. mead and capt. ollie mowatt, in command of the artillery, climbed into a church tower for observation, when to our surprise we could plainly see a long line of artillery moving along the shenkursk road, and the surrounding villages alive with troops forming for the attack. scarcely had we gotten our outposts into position when a shell crashed squarely over the village, and again the battle was on. all that day the battle raged, the artillery was now shelling shenkursk as well as our own position. the plains in front of us were swarming with artillery and cavalry, while overhead hummed a lone airplane which had travelled about a hundred and twenty-five miles to aid us in our hopeless encounter, but all in vain. at : p. m. an enemy shell burst squarely on our single piece of artillery, putting it completely out of action, killing several men, seriously wounding capt. otto odjard, as well as capt. mowatt, who later died from his wounds. while talking by telephone to our headquarters at shenkursk, just as we were being notified to withdraw, a shell burst near headquarters, demolishing our telephone connections. again assembling our men we once more took up our weary retreat, arriving that evening in shenkursk, where, worn and completely exhausted, we flung ourselves on floors and every available place to rest for the coming siege, about to begin. xvii the retreat from shenkursk shenkursk surrounded by bolsheviki--enemy artillery outranged ours--british general at beresnik orders retreat--taking hidden trail we escape--shenkursk battalion of russians fails us--description of terrible march--casting away their shackletons--resting at yemska gora--making stand at shegovari--night sees retreat resumed--cossacks cover rear--holding ill-selected vistavka--toil, vigilance and valor hold village many days--red heavy artillery blows vistavka to splinters in march--grand assault is beaten off for two days--lucky cossacks smash in and save us--heroic deeds performed--vistavka is abandoned. after five days and nights of ceaseless fighting and marching, it is necessary to say that we were soon sleeping the sleep of utterly exhausted and worn out soldiers, but alas, our rest was soon to be disturbed and we were to take up the weary march once more. immediately after our arrival within the gates of shenkursk, the british high command at once called a council of war to hastily decide what our next step should be. the situation briefly stated was this: within this position we had a large store of munitions, food, clothing, and other necessaries sufficient to last the garrison, including our russian allies, a period of sixty days. on the other hand, every available approach and trail leading into shenkursk was held by the enemy, who could move about at will inasmuch as they were protected by the trackless forests on all sides, and thus would soon render it impossible for our far distant comrades in archangel and elsewhere on the lines to bring through any relief or assistance. furthermore, it was now the dead of the arctic winter and three to four months must yet elapse before the block ice of the vaga-dvina would give way for our river gunboats and supply ships to reach us. between our positions and beresnik, our river base, more than a hundred miles distant, were but two occupied positions, the closest being shegovari, forty-four miles in rear of us, with but two russian platoons, and kitsa, twenty miles further with but one platoon and a few russian troops. there were hundreds of trails leading through the forests from town to town and it would be but a matter of days or even hours for the enemy to occupy these positions and then strike at beresnik, thus cutting off not only our forces at shenkursk but those at toulgas far down the dvina as well. already he had begun destroying the lines of communication behind us. that afternoon at : p. m. the last message from beresnik arrived ordering us to withdraw if possible. while this message was coming over the wire and before our signal men had a chance to acknowledge it, the wires suddenly "went dead," shutting off our last hope of communication with the outside world. we later learned from a prisoner who was captured some days later that a strong raiding party had been dispatched to raid the town of yemska gora on the line and to cut the wires. fortunately for us they started from their bivouac on a wrong trail which brought them to their objective several hours later, during which time the battle of spasskoe had been fought and we had been forced to retire, all of which information reached beresnik in time for the general in command there to wire back his order of withdrawal, just as the wires were being cut away. with this hopeless situation before us, and the certain possibility of a starvation siege eventually forcing us to surrender, the council decided that retreat we must if possible and without further delay. all the principal roads or trails were already in the hands of the enemy. however, there was a single, little used, winter trail leading straight back into the forest in rear of us which, with devious turns and windings, would finally bring us back to the river trail leading to shegovari, about twenty miles further down the river. mounted cossacks were instantly dispatched along this trail and after several hours of hard riding returned with word that, due to the difficulty of travel and heavy snows, the enemy had not yet given serious consideration to this trail, and as a consequence was unoccupied by them. without further delay english headquarters immediately decided upon total evacuation of shenkursk. orders were at once issued that all equipment, supplies, rations, horses, and all else should be left just as it stood and each man to take on that perilous march only what he could carry. to attempt the destruction of shenkursk by burning or other means would at once indicate to the enemy the movement on foot; therefore, all was to be left behind untouched and unharmed. soon the messengers were rapidly moving to and fro through the streets of the village hastily rousing the slumbering troops, informing them of our latest orders. when we received the order we were too stunned to fully realize and appreciate all the circumstances and significance of it. countless numbers of us openly cursed the order, for was it not a cowardly act and a breach of trust with our fallen comrades lying beneath the snow in the great cathedral yard who had fought so valiantly and well from ust padenga to shenkursk in order to hold this all important position? however, cooler heads and reason soon prevailed and each quickly responded to the task of equipping himself for the coming march. human greed often manifests itself under strange and unexpected circumstances, and this black night of january , , proved no exception to the rule. here and there some comrade would throwaway a prized possession to make more room for necessary food or clothing in his pack or pocket. some other comrade would instantly grab it up and feverishly struggle to get it tied onto his pack or person, little realizing that long before the next thirty hours had passed he, too, would be gladly and willingly throwing away prize after prize into the snow and darkness of the forest. at midnight the artillery, preceded by mounted cossacks, passed through the lane of barbed wire into the forests. the shenkursk battalion, which had been mobilized from the surrounding villages, was dispatched along the kodima trail to keep the enemy from following too closely upon our heels. this latter maneuver was also a test of the loyalty of this battalion for there was a well defined suspicion that a large portion of them were at heart sympathizers of the bolo cause. our suspicions were shortly confirmed; very soon after leaving the city they encountered the enemy and after an exchange of a few shots two entire companies went over to the bolo side, leaving nothing for the others to do but flee for their lives. fortune was kind to us that night, however, and by : a. m. the infantry was under way. company "a", which had borne the brunt of the fighting so many long, weary days, was again called upon with company "c" to take up the rear guard, and so we set off into the blackness of the never ending forest. as we marched out of the city hundreds of the natives who had somehow gotten wind of this movement were also scurrying here and there in order to follow the retreating column. others who were going to remain and face the entrance of the bolos were equally delighted in hiding and disposing of their valuables and making away with the abandoned rations and supplies. hour after hour we floundered and struggled through the snow and bitter cold. the artillery and horses ahead of us had cut the trail into a network of holes, slides and dangerous pitfalls rendering our footing so uncertain and treacherous that the wonder is that we ever succeeded in regaining the river trail alive. time after time that night one could hear some poor unfortunate with his heavy pack on his back fall with a sickening thud upon the packed trail, in many cases being so stunned and exhausted that it was only by violent shaking and often by striking some of the others in the face that they could be sufficiently aroused and forced to continue the march. at this time we were all wearing the shackleton boot, a boot designed by sir ernest shackleton of antarctic fame, and who was one of the advisory staff in archangel. this boot, which was warm and comfortable for one remaining stationary as when on sentry duty, was very impracticable and well nigh useless for marching, as the soles were of leather with the smooth side outermost, which added further to the difficulties of that awful night. some of the men unable to longer continue the march cast away their boots and kept going in their stocking feet; soon others were following the example, with the result that on the following day many were suffering from severely frostbitten feet. the following morning, just as the dull daylight was beginning to appear through the snow-covered branches overhead, and when we were about fifteen versts well away from shenkursk, the roar of cannon commenced far behind us. the enemy had not as yet discovered that we had abandoned shenkursk and he was beginning bright and early the siege of shenkursk. though we were well out of range of his guns the boom of the artillery acted as an added incentive to each tired and weary soldier and with anxious eyes searching the impenetrable forests we quickened our step. at : a. m. we arrived at yemska gora on the main road from shenkursk, where an hour's halt was made. all the samovars in the village were at once put into commission and soon we were drinking strong draughts of boiling hot tea. some were successful in getting chunks of black bread which they ravenously devoured. the writer was fortunate in locating an old villager who earlier in the winter had been attached to the company sledge transport and the old fellow brought forth some fishcakes to add to the meagre fare. these cakes were made by boiling or soaking the vile salt herring until it becomes a semi-pasty mass, after which it is mixed with the black bread dough and then baked, resulting in one of the most odoriferous viands ever devised by human hands and which therefore few, if any, of us had summoned up courage enough to consume. on this particular morning, however, it required no courage at all and we devoured the pasty mass as though it were one of the choicest of viands. the entire period of the halt was consumed in eating and getting ready to continue the march. at : a. m. we again fell in and the weary march was resumed. the balance of the day was simply a repetition of the previous night with the exception that it was now daylight and the footing was more secure. at five o'clock that afternoon we arrived at shegovari, where the little garrison of company "c" and company "d", under command of lieut. derham, was anxiously awaiting us, for after the attack of the preceding day, which is described in the following paragraph, they were fearful of the consequences in case they were compelled to continue holding the position through the night without reinforcements. shortly after the drive had begun at ust padenga marauding parties of the enemy were reported far in our rear in the vicinity of shegovari. on the night of january st some of the enemy, disguised as peasants, approached one of the sentries on guard at a lonely spot near the village and coldly butchered him with axes; another had been taken prisoner, and with the daily reports of our casualties at ust padenga, the little garrison was justly apprehensive. on the morning of january rd a band of the enemy numbering some two hundred men emerged from the forest and had gained possession of the town before they were detected. fortunately the garrison was quickly assembled, and by judicious use of machine guns and grenades quickly succeeded in repelling the attack and retaining possession of the position, which thus kept the road clear for the troops retreating from shenkursk. such was the condition here upon our arrival. immediately we at once set up our outposts and fortunately got our artillery into position, which was none too soon, for while we were still so engaged our cossack patrols came galloping in to report that a great body of the enemy was advancing along the main road. soon the advance patrols of the enemy appeared and our artillery immediately opened upon them. seeing that we were thus prepared and probably assuming that we were going to make a stand in this position, the enemy retired to await reinforcements. all through the night we could see the flames of rockets and signal lights in surrounding villages showing them the enemy was losing no time in getting ready for an attack. hour after hour our guns boomed away until daylight again broke to consolidate our various positions. [illustration: three couples dancing, and about soldiers seated around wall. soldier of left side has crutch and cast on leg. room is decorated with evergreen boughs and the american flag.] red cross photo holiday dance at convalescent hospital--nurses and "y" girls [illustration: several people and sleighs in front of church with three steeples.] rozanskey subornya cathedral [illustration: several soldiers working on log blockhouse, surrounded by snow-covered forest.] u. s. official photo building a blockhouse our position here was a very undesirable one from a military standpoint, due to the fact that the enemy could approach from most any direction under cover of the forest and river trails. our next position was kitsa, which was situated about twenty miles further down the river toward beresnik, the single trail to which ran straight through the forests without a single house or dwelling the entire way. this would have been almost impossible to patrol, due to the scarcity of our numbers, consequently, it was decided to continue our retreat to this position. at : p. m., under cover of darkness, we began assembling and once more plunged into the never-ending forest in full retreat, leaving shegovari far behind. we left a small body of mounted cossacks in the village to cover our retreat, but later that night we discovered a further reason for this delay here. at about eleven that night, as we were silently pushing along through the inky blackness of the forest, suddenly far to the south of us a brilliant flame commenced glowing against the sky, which rapidly increased in volume and intensity. we afterward learned that our cossack friends had fired the village before departing in order that the enemy could not obtain further stores and supplies which we were compelled to abandon. at midnight of january th the exhausted column arrived in vistavka, a position about six versts in advance from kitsa, and we again made ready to defend this new position. the next day we made a hasty reconnaissance of the place and soon realized that of all the positions we had chosen, as later events conclusively proved, this was the most hopeless of all. vistavka, itself, stood on a high bluff on the right bank of the vaga. immediately in front of us was the forest, to our left was the forest, and on the opposite bank of the river more forest. the river wound in and around at this point and at the larger bends were several villages--one about five versts straight across the river called yeveevskaya--and another further in a direct line called ust suma. about six or seven versts to our rear was kitsa and ignatevskaya lying on opposite sides of the river--kitsa being the only one of all these villages with any kind of prepared defenses at all. however, we at once set to work stringing up barbed wire and trying to dig into the frozen snow and ground, which, however, proved adamant to our shovels and picks. to add further to the difficulty of this task the enemy snipers lying in wait in the woods would pick off our men, so that we finally contented ourselves with snow trenches, and thus began the defense of vistavka, which lasted for about two months, during which time thousands upon thousands of shells were poured into the little village, and attack after attack was repulsed. within two days after our occupation of this place the enemy had gotten his light artillery in place and with his observers posted in the trees of the surrounding forest he soon had our range, and all through the following month of february he continued his intermittent shelling and sniping. night after night we could hear the ring of axes in the surrounding woods informing us that the bolo was establishing his defenses, but our numbers were so small that we could not send out patrols enough to prevent this. our casualties during this period were comparatively light and with various reliefs by the royal scots, kings liverpools, "c" and "d" companies, american infantry, we held this place with success until the month of march. by constant shelling during the month of february the enemy had practically reduced vistavka to a mass of ruins. with no stoves or fire and a constant fare of frozen corned beef and hard tack, the morale of the troops was daily getting lower and lower, but still we grimly stuck to our guns. on the evening of march rd the russian troops holding yeveevskaya got possession of a supply of english rum, with the result that the entire garrison was soon engaged in a big celebration. the bolo, quick to take advantage of any opportunity, staged a well-planned attack and within an hour they had possession of the town. ust suma had been abandoned almost a month prior to this time, which left vistavka standing alone with the enemy practically occupying every available position surrounding us. as forward positions we now held maximovskaya on the left bank and vistavka on the right. the following day the enemy artillery, which had now been reinforced by six and nine-inch guns, opened up with renewed violence and for two days this continued, battering away every vestige of shelter remaining to us. on the afternoon of the fifth the barrage suddenly lifted to our artillery about two versts to our rear, and simultaneously therewith the woods and frozen river were swarming with wave after wave of the enemy coming forward to the attack. to the heroic defenders of the little garrison it looked as though at last the end had come, but with grim determination they quickly began pouring their hail of lead into the advancing waves. attack after attack was repulsed, but nevertheless the enemy had succeeded in completely surrounding us. once more he had cut away our wires leading to kitsa and also held possession of the trails leading to that position. for forty-eight hours this awful situation continued--our rations were practically exhausted and our ammunition was running low. headquarters at kitsa had given us up for lost and were preparing a new line there to defend. during the night, however, one of our runners succeeded in getting through with word of our dire plight. the following day the kings liverpools with other troops marched forth from kitsa in an endeavor to cut their way through to our relief. the bolo, however, had the trails and roads too well covered with machine guns and troops and quickly repulsed this attempt. late that afternoon those in command at kitsa decided to make another attempt to bring assistance to our hopeless position and at last ordered a mixed company of russians and cossacks to go forward in the attempt. after issuing an overdose of rum to all, the commander made a stirring address, calling upon them to do or die in behalf of their comrades in such great danger. the comrades in question consisted of a platoon of russian machine gunners who were bravely fighting with the americans in vistavka. eventually they became sufficiently enthusiastic and with a great display of ceremony they left kitsa. as was to be expected, they at once started on the wrong trail, but as good fortune would have it this afterward proved the turning point of the day. this trail, unknown to them, led into a position in rear of the enemy and before they realized it they walked squarely into view of a battalion of the enemy located in a ravine on one of our flanks, who either did not see them approaching or mistakenly took them for more of their own number advancing. quickly sensing the situation, our cossack allies at once got their machine guns into position and before the bolos realized it these machine guns were in action, mowing down file after file of their battalion. to counter attack was impossible for they would have to climb the ravine in the face of this hail of lead, and the only other way of escape was in the opposite direction across the river under direct fire from our artillery and machine guns. suddenly, several of the enemy started running and inside of a minute the remainder of the battalion was fleeing in wild disorder, but it was like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, for as they retreated across the river our artillery and machine guns practically annihilated them. shortly thereafter the cossacks came marching through our lines where they were welcomed with open arms and again vistavka was saved. that night fresh supplies and ammunition were brought up and the little garrison was promised speedy relief. our total numbers during this attack did not amount to more than four hundred men, including the cossack machine gunners and canadian artillery-men. we afterward learned that from four to five thousand of the enemy took part in this attack. the next day all was quiet and we began to breathe more easily, thinking that perhaps the enemy at last had enough. our hopes were soon to be rudely shattered, for during this lull the bolo was busily occupied in bringing up more ammunition and fresh troops, and on the morning of the seventh he again began a terrific artillery preparation. as stated elsewhere on these pages, our guns did not have sufficient range to reach the enemy guns even had we been successful in locating them, so all we could do was to lie shivering in the snow behind logs, snow trenches and barbed wire, hoping against hope that the artillery would not annihilate us. the artillery bombardment continued for two days, continuing up to noon of march th, when the enemy again launched another attack. this time we were better prepared and, having gotten wind of the plan of attack, we again caught a great body of the infantry in a ravine waist deep in snow. we could plainly see and hear the bolo commissars urging and driving their men forward to the attack, but there is a limit to all endurance and once again one or two men bolted and ran, and it was but a matter of minutes until all were fleeing in wild disorder. space does not permit the enumeration of the splendid individual feats of valor performed by such men as lieuts. mcphail of company "a", and burns of the engineers, with their handful of men--nor the grim tenacity and devotion to duty of sgts. yarger, rapp, garbinski, moore and kenny, the last two of whom gave up their lives during the last days of their attacks. even the cooks were called upon to do double duty and, led by "red" swadener, they would work all night long trying to prepare at least one warm meal for the exhausted men, the next day taking their places in the snow trenches with their rifles on their shoulders fighting bravely to the end. then, too, there were the countless numbers of such men as richey, hutchinson, kurowski, retherford, peyton, russel, de amicis, cheney, and others who laid down their lives in this hopeless cause. the attack was not alone directed against the position of vistavka, for on the opposite bank of the river the garrison at maximovskaya was subjected to an attack of almost equal ferocity. the position there was surrounded by forests and the enemy could advance within several hundred yards without being observed. the defenders here, comprising companies "f" and "a", bravely held on and inflicted terrific losses upon the enemy. it was during these terrible days that lt. dan steel of company "f" executed a daring and important patrol maneuver. this officer, who had long held the staff position of battalion adjutant, feeling that he could render more effective service to his comrades by being at the front, demanded a transfer from his staff position to duty with a line company, which transfer was finally reluctantly given--reluctantly because of the fact that he had virtually been the power behind the throne, or colonel's chair, of the vaga river column. a few days later found him in the thick of the fighting at maximovskaya, and when a volunteer was needed for the above mentioned patrol he was the first to respond. the day in question he set forth in the direction of yeveevskaya with a handful of men. the forests were fairly alive with enemy patrols, but in the face of all these odds he pushed steadily forward and all but reached the outskirts of the village itself where he obtained highly valuable information, mapped the road and trails through the forests, thus enabling the artillery to cover the same during the violent attacks of these first ten days of march. by five o'clock of that day the attack was finally repulsed and we still held our positions at vistavka and maximovskaya--but in vistavka we were holding a mere shell of what had once been a prosperous and contented little village. the constant shelling coupled with attacks and counter attacks for months over the same ground had razed the village to the ground, leaving nothing but a shell-torn field and a few blackened ruins. it was useless to hold the place longer and consequently that night it was decided to abandon the position here and withdraw to a new line about three versts in advance of kitsa. under cover of darkness on the night of march th we abandoned the position at vistavka, and as stated in the previous chapter, established a new line of defense along a trail and in the forests about three versts in advance of kitsa. while our position at vistavka was practically without protection, this position here was even worse. we were bivouacked in the open snow and woods where we could only dig down into the snow and pray that the bolo artillery observers would be unable to locate us. our prayers in this respect were answered, for this position was not squarely in the open as vistavka was, and therefore not under the direct fire of his artillery. the platoons of "f" company at maximovskaya were brought up here to join the balance of their company in holding this position, "a" company being relieved by "d" company and sent across the river to ignatovskaya. "f" company alternated with platoons of the royal scots in this position in the woods for the balance of the month, during which there was constant shelling and sniping but with few casualties among our ranks. the latter part of march "f" company was relieved for a short time, but the first week in april were again sent back to the kitsa position. by this time the spring thaws were setting in and the snow began disappearing. our plans now were to hold these positions at kitsa and maximovskaya until the river ice began to move out and then burn all behind us and make a speedy getaway, but how to do this and not reveal our plans to the enemy a few hundred yards across no man's land was the problem. xviii defense of pinega kulikoff and smelkoff lead heavy force against pinega--reinforcements hastened up to pinega--reds win early victories against small force of defenders--value of pinega area--desperate game of bluffing--captain akutin reorganizes white guards--russians fought well in many engagements--defensive positions hold against heavy red attack--voluntary draft of russians of pinega area--american troops "g" and "m" made shining page--military-political relations eminently successful. the flying column of americans up the pinega river in late fall we remember retired to pinega in face of a surprisingly large force. the commander of the bolshevik northern army had determined to make use of the winter roads across the forests to send guns and ammunition and food and supplies to the area in the upper valley of the pinega. he would jolt the allies in january with five pieces of artillery, two 's and three pom poms, brought up from kotlas where their stores had been taken in the fall retreat before the allies. one of his prominent commanders, smelkoff, who had fought on the railroad in the fall, went over to the distant pinega front to assist a rising young local commander, kulikoff. these two ambitious soldiers of fortune had both been natives and bad actors of the pinega valley, one being a noted horse thief of the old czar's day. with food, new uniforms and rifles and common and lots of nice crisp bolshevik money and with boastful stories of how they had whipped the invading foreigners on other fields in the fall and with invective against the invaders these leaders soon excited quite a large following of fighting men from the numerous villages. with growing power they rounded up unwilling men and drafted them into the red army just as they had done so often before in other parts of russia if we may believe the statements of wounded men and prisoners and deserters. down the valley with the handful of americans and russian white guards there came an ever increasing tide of anti-bolshevists looking to pinega for safety. the russian local government of pinega, though somewhat pinkish, did not want war in the area and appealed to the archangel state government for military aid to hold the reds off. captain conway reported to archangel g. h. q. that the population was very nervous and that with his small force of one hundred men and the three hundred undisciplined volunteer white guards he was in a tight place. consequently, it was decided to send a company of americans to relieve the half company there and at the same time to send an experienced ex-staff officer of the old russian army to pinega with a staff of newly trained russian officers to serve with the american officer commanding the area and raise and discipline all the local white guards possible. accordingly, capt. moore with "m" company was ordered to relieve the americans at pinega, and capt. akutin by the russian general commanding the north russian army was ordered to pinega for the mission already explained. two pieces of field artillery with newly trained russian personnel were to go up and supplies and ammunition were to be rushed up the valley. on december th the half company of american troops set off for the march to the city of pinega. the story of that -verst march of christmas week, when the days were shortest and the weather severe, will be told elsewhere. before they reached the city, which was desperately threatened, the fears of the defenders of pinega had been all but realized. the reds in great strength moved on the flank of the white guards, surrounded them at visakagorka and dispersed them into the woods. if they had only known it they might have immediately besieged the city of pinega. but they respected the american force and proceeded carefully as far as trufanagora. on the very day of this disaster to the white guards the americans on the road were travelling the last forty-six versts rapidly by sleigh. news of this reinforcing column reached the reds and no doubt slowed up their advance. they began fortifying the important trufanagora, which was the point where the old government roads and telegraph lines from mezen and karpogora united for the pinega-archangel line. reference to the war map will show that this pinega area gave all the advantages of strategy to the red commander, whose rapid advance down the valley with the approach of winter had taken the archangel strategists by surprise. his position at trufanagora not only gave him control of the mezen road and cut off the meats from mezen and the sending of flour and medical supplies to mezen and petchura, in which area an officer of the russian northern army was opposing the local red guards, but it also gave him a position that made of the line of communication to our rear a veritable eighty-mile front. in our rear on the line of communication were the villages of leunova, ostrov and kuzomen, which were scowlingly pro-bolshevik. one of the commanders, kulikoff, the bandit, hailed from kuzomen. he was in constant touch with this area. when the winter trails were frozen more solidly he would try to lead a column through the forest to cut the line. now began a struggle to keep the lower valley from going over to the bolsheviki while we were fighting the red guards above the city. it was a desperate game. we must beat them at bluffing till our russian forces were raised and we must get the confidence of the local governments. half the new american force was sent under lt. stoner to occupy the soyla area on the line of communication, which seemed most in danger of being attacked. the men of this area, and the women and children, too, for that matter, were soon won to the cordial support of the americans. treacherous yural was kept under surveillance and later subsided and fell into line with pinega, which was considerably more than fifty per cent white, in spite of the fact that her mayor was a former red. the rout of the white guards at visakagorka had not been as bad as appeared at first. the white guards had fought up their ammunition and then under the instructions of their fiery polish leader, mozalevski, had melted into the forest and reassembled many versts to the rear and gone into the half-fortified village of peligorskaya. here the white guards were taken in hand by their new commander, capt. akutin, and reorganized into fighting units, taking name from the villages whence they came. thus the trufanagora company of white guards rallied about a leader who stimulated them to drill for the fight to regain their own village from the reds who at that very moment were compelling their trufanagora women to draw water and bake bread and dig trenches for the triumphant and boastful red guards. this was an intense little civil war. no mercy and no quarter. the reds inflamed their volunteers and conscripts against the invading americans and the whites. the white guards gritted their teeth at the looting reds and proudly accepted their new commander's motto: white guards for the front; americans for the city and the lines of communication. and this was good. during the nine weeks of this successful defense of the city the russian white guards stood all the casualties, and they were heavy. not an american soldier was hit. yankee doughboys supported the artillery and stood in reserves and manned blockhouses but not one was wounded. three hospitals were filled with the wounded white guards. american soldiers in platoon strength or less were seen constantly on the move from one threatened spot to another, but always, by fate it seemed, it was the russian ally who was attacked or took the assaulting line in making our advances on the enemy. on january th and again on january th and th we tried the enemy's works at ust pocha. both times we took priluk and zapocha but were held with great losses before ust pocha. at the first attempt pochezero was taken in a flank attack by the soyla lake two-company outguard of soyla. but this emboldened the reds to try the winter trail also. on january th they nearly took our position. news of the red successes at shenkursk reached the pinega valley. we knew the reds were now about to strike directly at the city. capt. akutin's volunteer force, although but one-third the size of the enemy, was ready to beat the reds to the attack. with two platoons of americans and seven hundred white guards the american commander moved against the advancing reds. two other platoons of americans were on the line of communications and one at soyla lake ready for counter-attack. only one platoon remained in pinega. it was a ticklish situation, for the red agitators had raised their heads again and an officer had been assassinated in a nearby village. the mayor was boarding in the american guardhouse and stern retaliation had been meted out to the red spies. the reds stopped our force after we had pushed them back into their fortifications and we had to retire to peligora, where barbed wire, barricades, trenches and fortified log houses had been prepared for this rather expected last stand before the city of pinega. for weeks it had looked dubious for the city. enemy artillery would empty the city of inhabitants, although his infantry would find it difficult to penetrate the wire and other fortifications erected by the americans and russians under the able direction of a british officer, lieut. augustine of a canadian engineer unit. think of chopping holes in the ice and frozen ground, pouring in water and freezing posts in for wire supports! then came the unexpected. after six days of steady fighting which added many occupants to our hospital and heavy losses to the enemy, he suddenly retreated one night, burning the village of priluk which we had twice used as field base for our attack on him. from pinega we looked at the faint smoke column across the forest deep with snow and breathed easier than we had for many anxious weeks. our pursuing forces came back with forty loads of enemy supplies they left behind in the various villages we had captured from his forces. why? was it operations in his rear of our forces from soyla, or the american platoon that worried his flank near his artillery, or shaponsnikoff in the mezen area threatening his flank, or was it a false story of the arrival of the forces of kolchak at kotlas in his rear? americans here at pinega, like the vastly more desperate and shattered american forces on the vaga and at kodish at the same time, had seen their fate impending and then seen the reds unaccountably withhold the final blow. the withdrawal of the reds to their stronghold at trufanagora in the second week in february disappointed their sympathizers in pinega and the red leunova area, and from that time on the occupation of the pinega valley by the americans was marked by the cordial co-operation of the whole area. during the critical time when the reds stood almost at the gates of the city, the pinega government had yielded to the demands of the volunteer troops that all citizens be drafted for military service. this was done even before the archangel authorities put its decree forth. every male citizen between ages of eighteen and forty-five was drafted, called for examination and assigned to recruit drill or to service of supply or transportation. there was enthusiastic response of the people. the square opposite the cathedral resounded daily to the russki recruit sergeant's commands and american platoons drilling, too, for effect on the russians, saw the strange new way of turning from line to column and heard with mingled respect and amusement the weird marching song of the russian soldier. and one day six hundred of those recruits, in obedience to order from archangel, went off by sleigh to kholmogora to be outfitted and assigned to units of the new army of the archangel republic. among these recruits was a young man, heir-apparent to the million roubles of the old merchant prince of pinega, whose mansion was occupied by the americans for command headquarters and billets for all the american officers engaged in the defense of the city. this young man had tried in the old russian way to evade the local government official's draft. he had tried again at capt. akutin's headquarters to be exempted but that democratic officer, who understood the real meaning of the revolution to the russian people and who had their confidence, would not forfeit it by favoring the rich man's son. and when he came to american headquarters to argue that he was needed more in the officers' training camp at archangel than in the ranks of recruits, he was told that revolutionary russia would surely recognize his merit and give him a chance if he displayed marked ability along military lines, and wished good luck. he drilled in the ranks. and pinega saw it. the americans had finished their mission in pinega. in place of the three hundred dispirited white guards was a well trained regiment of local russian troops which, together with recruits, numbered over two thousand. under the instruction of lieut. wright of "m" company, who had been trained as an american machine gun officer, the at first half-hearted russians had developed an eight-gun machine gun unit of fine spirit, which later distinguished itself in action, standing between the city and the bolsheviks in march when the americans had left to fight on another front. also under the instruction of a veteran russian artillery officer the two field-pieces, russian 's, had been manned largely by peasant volunteers who had served in the old russian artillery units. in addition, a scouting unit had been developed by a former soldier who had been a regimental scout under the old russian government. pinega was quiet and able to defend itself. compared with the winter story of wonderful stamina in enduring hardships at shenkursk and kodish and the sanguine fighting of those fronts, this defense of pinega looks tame. between the lines of the story must be read the things that made this a shining page that shows the marked ability of americans to secure the co-operation of the russian local government in service of supply and transportation and billeting and even in taking up arms and assuming the burdens of fighting their own battles. those local companies of well-trained troops were not semi-british but truly russian. they never failed their dobra amerikanski soldats, whose close order drill on the streets of pinega was a source of inspiration to the russian recruits. furthermore, let it be said that the faithful representation of american ideals of manhood and square deal and democratic courtesy, here as on other fronts, but here in particular, won the confidence of the at first suspicious and pinkish-white government. our american soldiers' conduct never brought a complaint to the command headquarters. they secured the affectionate support of the people of the pinega valley. never was any danger of an enemy raiding force surprising the american lieutenant, sergeant or corporal whose detachment was miles and miles from help. the natives would ride a pony miles in the dark to give information to the americans and be gratified with his thanks and cigarettes. freely the pinega russians for weeks and weeks provided sleighs and billets and trench-building details and so forth without expecting pay. an arrogant british officer travelling with a pocket full of imprest money could not command the service that was freely offered an american soldier. the doughboy early learned to respect their rude homes and customs. he did not laugh at their oddities but spared their sensitive feelings. he shook hands a dozen times heartily if necessary in saying dasvedania, and left the russian secure in his own self-respect and fast friend of the american officer or soldier. for his remarkable success in handling the ticklish political situation in face of overwhelming military disadvantages, and also in rallying and putting morale into the white guard units of the pinega area, during those nine desperate weeks, the american officer commanding the pinega forces, captain joel r. moore, was thanked in person by general maroushevsky, russian g. h. q., who awarded him and several officers and men of "m" and "g" russian military decorations. and general ironside sent a personal note, prized almost as highly as an official citation, which the editors beg the indulgence here of presenting merely for the information of the readers: archangel, march , . my dear moore: i want to thank you for all the hard work you did when in command of the pinega area. you had many dealings with the russians, and organized their defense with great care and success. all the reports i have received from the russian authorities express the fact that you dealt with them sympathetically under many difficult circumstances. as you probably found, responsibility at such a distance from headquarters is difficult to bear, even for an experienced soldier, and i think you carried out your duties as commander with great credit. i am especially pleased with the manner in which you have looked after your men, which is often forgotten by the non-professional soldier. in such conditions as those prevailing in russia, unless the greatest care is taken of the men, they lose health and heart and are consequently no good for the job for which they are here. believe me yours very sincerely, (signed) edmond ironside, major-general. when the americans left the pinega sector of defense in march, they carried with them the good wishes of the citizens and the russian soldiers of that area. the writer travelled alone the full length of the lower pinega valley after his troops had passed through, finding everywhere the only word necessary to gain accommodations and service was the simple sentence uttered in broken russian, yah amerikanski kapitan, kammandant pinega. the american soldiers, hastening archangel-ward so as to be ready for stern service on another hard-beset front, found themselves aided and assisted cheerfully by the pinega valley peasants who were grateful for the defense of their area in the desperate winter campaign. during those ticklish weeks of bolshevik pressure of greatly superior numbers constantly threatening to besiege pinega, and of a political propaganda which was hard to offset, the americans held on optimistically. if they had made a single false step politically or if their white guards had lost their morale they would have had a more exciting and desperate time than they did have in the defense of pinega. xix the land and the people archangel area--occupations of people--schools--church--dress--in peasant homes--great masonry stove--best bed in house on stove--washing clothes in river below zero--steaming bath house--festivals--honesty of peasants. to the doughboy penetrating rapidly into the interior of north russia, whether by railroad or by barge or by more slow-going cart transport, his first impression was that of an endless expanse of forest and swamp with here and there an area of higher land. one of them said that the state of archangel was miles long by wide and as tall as the -foot pine trees that cover it. winding up the broad deep rivers he passed numerous villages with patches of clearings surrounding the villages, and where fishing nets, or piles of wood, numerous hay stacks and cows, and occasionally a richer area where high drying-racks held the flax, told him that the people were occupied chiefly in fishing, trapping, wood-cutting, flax raising, small dairying, and raising of limited amounts of grain and vegetables. he was to learn later that this north country raised all kinds of garden and field products during the short but hot and perpetually daylight summer. between villages the forest was broken only by the hunter or the woodchopper or the haymaker's trails. the barge might pass along beside towering bluffs or pass by long sandy flats. never a lone peasant's house on the trail was seen. they lived in villages. few were the improved roads. the seletskoe-kodish-plesetskaya-petrograd highway on which our troops fought so long was not much of a road. these roads ran from village to village through the pine woods, crossing streams and wide rivers by wooden bridges and crossing swamps, where it was too much to circuit them, by corduroy. north russia's rich soil areas, her rich ores, her timber, her dairying possibilities have been held back by the lack of roads. the soldier saw a people struggling with nature as he had heard of his grandfathers struggling in pioneer days in america. to many people, the mention of north russia brings vision of wonderful furs in great quantity. in normal times such visions would not be far wrong. but under the conditions following the assumption of central control by the bolsheviks and the over-running of large sections of the north country by their ravenous troops, few furs have been brought to market in the ordinary places. in order to find the fur-catches of the winters of , and before the peaceful security of the settled sections of russia has been restored, it will be necessary to travel by unusual routes into the country far to the northeast of archangel--into the mezen and pechura districts. there will be found fur-clad and half-starved tribes cut off from their usual avenues of trade and hoarding their catches of three seasons while they wonder how long it will be until someone opens the way for the alleviation of their misery. information travels with amazing speed among these simple people, and they will run knowingly no risk of having their only wealth seized without recompense while en route to the distant markets. the bolshevik forces have been holding a section of the usual road to pinega and archangel, and these fur-gathering tribes are wise and stubborn even while slowly dying. they absolutely lack medicine and surgical assistance, and certain food ingredients and small conveniences to which they had become accustomed through their contact with more settled peoples during the last half-century. for those americans in whose minds russia is represented largely by a red blank it would mean an education of a sort to see the passage of the four seasons, the customs and life of the people, and the scenery and buildings in any considerable section of russia. in the north, the division of the year into seasons is rather uncertain from year to year. roughly, the summertime may be considered to last from may th to september st, the rainy season until the freeze-up in late november, the steady winter from early december until early april, and the thaw-season or spring to fill out the cycle until late may. the summer may break into the rainy season in august, and the big freeze may come very early or very late. the winter may be extreme, variable or steady, the latter mood being most comfortable; and the thaw season may be short and decisive or a lingering discouraging clasp on the garments of winter. summers have been known to be very hot and free from rain, and they have been known to be very cloudy and chilly. indeed, twelve hours of cloud in that northern latitude will reduce the temperature very uncomfortably. the woodsmen and peasants can foretell quite accurately some weeks ahead when the main changes are due, which is of great help to the stranger as well as to themselves. a little inquiry by american officers and soldiers brought out the information that the great area lying east, south and west of archangel city has been gradually settled during four hundred years by several types of people, most of them russians in the sense in which americans use the word, but most of them lacking a sense of national responsibility. throughout this long time, people have settled along the rivers and lakes as natural avenues of transportation. they sought a measure of independence and undisturbed and primitive comfort. such they found in this rather isolated country because it offered good hunting and fishing, fertile land with plenty of wood, little possibility of direct supervision or control by the government, refuge from political or civil punishment, few or no taxes, escape from feudalism or from hard industrial conditions, and--more recently--grants by the government of free land with forestry privileges to settlers. notwithstanding all this, the government of archangel state, with its hundreds of thousands of square miles, has never been self-supporting, but has had to draw on natural resources in various ways for its support. this has been done so that there is as yet not noticeable depletion, and the people have remained so nearly satisfied--until recently aroused by other inflammatory events--that it is safe to say that no other larger section of the russian empire has been so free from violence, oppression and revolution as has the north. it has been so difficult to visit this northern region in detail that knowledge of it has been scant and meagre. although many reports have been forwarded by united states agents to various departments of their government ever since russia began to disintegrate, such was the lack of liaison between departments, and so great the disinclination to take advantage of the information thus accumulated, that when the small body of american troops was surprised by orders to proceed to north russia there was no compilation of information concerning their theatre of operations available for them. an amusing error was actually made in the war department's ordering a high american officer to proceed to archangel via vladivostok, which as a cursory glance at the map of the world would discover, is at the far eastern, vostok means eastern, edge of siberia, thousands of miles from archangel. and similar stories were told by british officers who were ordered by their war office to report to archangel by strange routes. england, who has lived almost next door to north russia throughout her history, and who established in the th century the first trading post known in that country, seems to have been in similar difficulties. the detailed information regarding the roads, trails and villages of the north country which filtered down as far as the english officers who controlled the various field operations of the expedition turned out to be nil or erroneous. thereby hang many tales which will be told over and over wherever veterans of that campaign are to be found. the lack of transportation within this great hinterland of archangel, as can be verified by any doughboy who marched and rassled his supplies into the interior, is an immediate reason for the comparative non-development of this region. it has not been so many years since the first railroad was run from central russia to archangel. at first a narrow-gauge line, it was widened to the full five-foot standard russian gauge after the beginning of the great war. it is a single-track road with half-mile sidings at intervals of about seven miles. at these sidings are great piles of wood for the locomotives, and at some of them are water-tanks. while this railroad is used during the entire year, it suffers the disadvantage of having its northern terminal port closed by ice during the winter. after the opening of the great war a parallel line was built from petrograd north to murmansk, a much longer line through more unsettled region but having the advantage of a northern port terminal open the year around. these two lines are so far apart as to have no present relation to each other except through the problem of getting supplies into central russia from the north. they are unconnected throughout their entire length. similarly, there is a paucity of wagon-roads in the archangel district, and those that are passable in the summer are many miles apart, with infrequent cross-roads. roads which are good for "narrow-gauge" russian sleds in the winter when frozen and packed with several feet of snow, are often impassable even on foot in the summer. and dirt or corduroy roads which are good in dry summer or frozen winter are impassable or hub-deep in mud in the spring and in the fall rainy season. for verification ask any "h" company man who pulled his army field shoes out of the sticky soil of the onega valley mile after mile in the fall of while pressing the bolsheviki southward. good roads are possible in north russia, but no one will ever build them until industrial development demands them or the area becomes thickly populated; that is, disregarding the possibility of future road-building for military operations. military roads have, as we know, been built many times in advance of any economic demand, and have later become valuable aids in developing the adjacent country. another reason for the non-development of the north country in the past is the lack of available labor-supply. people are widely scattered. the majority of the industrious ones are on their own farms, and of the remainder the number available for the industries of any locality is small. added to this condition is a very noticeable disinclination on the part of everybody toward over-exertion at the behest of others; coupled with a responsiveness to holidays that is incomprehensible to americans who believe in making time into money. while the excessive proportion of holidays in the russian calendar is deprecated by the more far-sighted and educated among the russians, there is no hesitation on that score noticeable among the bulk of the people. holidays are holy days and not to be neglected. consequently the supply of labor for hire is not satisfactory from the employer's standpoint, because it is not only small but unsteady. the russian workman is faithful enough when treated understandingly. but if allowance is not made beforehand for his limitations and his customs, those who deal with him will be sorely disappointed. it is said that there are upwards of seventy regular holidays, most of them of church origin, aside from sundays; and in addition, holidays by proclamation are not infrequent. some holidays last three days and some holiday seasons--notably the week before lent--are celebrated in a different village of a group each day. the villagers in all perform only the necessary work each day and flock in the afternoon and evenings to the particular village which is acting as host and entertainment center for that day. it is all very pleasant, but it is no life for the solid business man or the industrious laborer. fortunately the agricultural and forestry areas of the north, of which this passage is written, yield a comfortable, primitive living to these hardy people without constant work. the needs of modern industry as we understand it, have not entered to cause confusion in their social structure. the sole result has been to delay the development of resources and industry by deterring the application of capital and entrepreneurship on any large scale. before the war the english had active interest in flax and timber and some general trading, and the germans flooded the north with merchandise, but these activities were more in the nature of utilizing the opportunities created by the needs of the scattered population than of developing rapidly a great country. soldiers in archangel saw american flour being unloaded from british ships in archangel and sliding down the planks from the unloading quay into the russian boats. and at the other side they saw russian bales of flax being hoisted up into the ship for transport to england. england was energetically supplying flour and food and other supplies for an army of , anti-bolsheviki and aid to a civil population of several hundred thousand inhabitants and refugees in the north russian area. this taking of the little stores of flax and lumber and furs that were left in the country by the english seemed to the suspicious anti-british of russia and america to be corroboration of the allegations of commercial purpose of the expedition, though to the pinched population of england to let those supplies of flour and fat and sugar leave england for russia meant hardship. in all fairness we can only say that russia was getting more than england in the exchange. [illustration: several people in heavy clothing gathered around a scale.] u. s. official photo market scene, yemetskoe--note primitive balances weighing beef [illustration: large build surrounded by a high wall.] lanman old russian prison, annex to british hospital [illustration: woman rinsing clothes through a hole in the ice. in the foreground, her sled.] wagner wash day--rinsing clothes in river [illustration: three one-horse wagons.] lanman archangel cab-men [illustration: audience of soldier watching musicians, also soldiers, on stage.] u. s. official photo minstrels of "i" company repeat program in y. m. c. a. [illustration: several women around a table full of presents. the presents are spilling to the floor in a large pile.] u. s official photo archangel girls filling xmas stockings [illustration: about soldiers seated at tables, reading and writing.] u. s. official photo y. m. c. a. rest room, archangel outside of the cities in the life and customs of the people exists a broad simplicity which is unlike the social atmosphere of most of the districts of rural america. persons, however, who are acquainted with the rural districts of norway and sweden feel quite at home in the atmosphere of the north russian village life. the villages are composed of the houses of the small farmers who till the surrounding land, together with church, school, store, and grain and flax barns. except for a few new villages along the railways, all are to be found along some watercourse navigable at least for small barges. for the waterways are the first, and for a long time the only avenues of communication and trade. in the winter they make the very best roadways for sleds. wherever there was a great deal of open farm land along a river several of these village farm centers grew up in close proximity. the villages in such a group often combine for convenience, in local government, trading, and support of churches and schools. the majority of the villagers belong to a few large family groups which have grown in that community for generations and give it an enviable permanence and stability. family groups are represented in the councils of the community by their recognized heads, usually active old men. in these later troublous times, when so many of the men have disappeared in the maelstrom of the european war or are engaged in the present civil strife, women are quite naturally the acting heads of many families; and the result has led some observers to conclude that the women have better heads for business and better muscles for farming than have the men. it is certain that in some communities the women outshine in those respects the men who still remain. the same council of family heads which guides the local affairs of each village, or group of villages, also attends through a committee to the affairs of the local cooperative store society which exists for trading purposes and acts in conjunction with the central society of archangel. each little local store has a vigilant keeper now frequently some capable young widow, who has no children old enough to help her to till some of the strips of land. the election and the duties of the headman have been dealt with heretofore. his word is law and the soldiers came to know that the proper way to get things was to go through the starosta. in every village is a teacher, more or less trained. each child is compelled to attend three years. if desirous he may go to high schools of liberal arts and science and technical scope, seminaries and monastic schools. of course, some children escape school, but not many, and the number of absolute illiterates under middle age who have been raised in north russia is comparatively small. the writer well recalls that peasants seldom failed to promptly sign their names to receipts. around our bulletin boards men in russian camp constantly stood reading. one of the requests from the white guards was for archangel newspapers. one of the pleasantest winter evenings spent in north russia was at the time of a teachers' association meeting in the pinega valley. and one of the cleanest and busiest school-rooms ever visited was one of those little village schools. to be sure the people were limited in their education and way behind the times in their schools but they were eager to get on. also, in every small center of population there is a russian state church. in america we have been accustomed to call these greek catholic churches, but they are not. the ritual and creed are admittedly rather similar, but the church government, the architecture, the sacred pictures and symbols, and the cross, are all thoroughly russian. until the revolution, the czar was the state head of the church, and the ecclesiastical head was appointed by him. in the north at present whatever aid was extended in times past from the government to the churches--and to the schools as well--is looked for from the provisional government at archangel; and under the circumstances is very meagre if not lacking altogether for long periods. the villagers do not close the churches or schools for such a minor reason as that, however. they feed and clothe the teacher and heat the church and the school. the priest works his small farm like the rest of them--that is, if he is a "good" priest. if he is not a "good" priest he charges heavily for special services, christenings, weddings or funerals, and begs or demands more for himself than the villagers think they can afford (and they afford a great deal, for the villagers are very devout and by training very long suffering), and the next year finds himself politely kicked upstairs to another charge in a larger community which the villagers quite logically believe will better be able to support his demands. such an affair is managed with the utmost finesse. within the family all share in the work--and the play. the grown men do the hunting, fishing, felling of timber, building, hauling, and part of the planting and harvesting. the women, boys and girls do a great deal toward caring for the live-stock, and much of the work in the field. they also do some of the hauling and much of the sawing and splitting of wood for the stoves of the house, besides all of the housework and the spinning, knitting, weaving and making of clothing. the boys' specialty during the winter evenings often is the construction of fishnets of various sized meshes, and the making of baskets, which they do beautifully. on sundays and holidays, even in these times of hardship, the native dress of the northern people is seen in much of its former interesting beauty. the women and girls in full skirts, white, red or yellow waists with laced bodices of darker color, fancy head-cloths and startling shawls, tempt the stares of the foreigner as they pass him on their way to church or to a dance. the men usually content themselves with their cleanest breeches, a pair of high boots of beautiful leather, an embroidered blouse buttoning over the heart, a broad belt, and a woolly angora cap without a visor. suspenders and corsets are quite absent. on week-days and at work the dress of the north russian peasant is, after five years of wartime, rather a nondescript collection of garments, often pitiful. in the winter the clothing problem is somewhat simplified because the four items of apparel which are customary and common to all for out-of-doors wear are made so durably that they last for years, and when worn out are replaced by others made right in the home. they are the padded over-coat of coarse cloth or light skins, the valinka of felt or the long boot of fur, the parki--a fur great coat without front opening and with head-covering attached, and the heavy knitted or fur mitten. in several of the views shown in this volume these different articles of dress may be seen, some of them on the heads, backs, hands and feet of the american soldiers. what american soldier who spent days and days in those russian log houses does not remember that in the average house there is little furniture. the walls, floors, benches and tables are as a rule kept very clean, being frequently scrubbed with sand and water. in the house, women and children are habitually bare-footed, and the men usually in stocking-feet. the valinka would scald his feet if he wore them inside, as many a soldier found to his dismay. sometimes chairs are found, but seldom bed-steads except in the larger homes. each member of the family has a pallet of coarse cloth stuffed with fluffy flax, which is placed at night on the floor, on benches, on part of the top of the huge stone or brick stove, or on a platform laid close up under the ceiling on beams extending from the stove to the opposite wall of the living-room. the place on the stove is reserved for the aged and the babies. it was the best bed in the house and was often proffered to the american with true hospitality to the stranger. the bed-clothes consist of blankets, quilts and sometimes robes of skins. some of the patch-work quilts are examples of wonderful needle-work. in the day-time it is usual to see the pallets and rolls of bedding stored on the platform just mentioned, which is almost always just over the low, heavy door leading in from the outer hall to the main living-room. in north russia the one-room house is decidedly the exception, and because of the influence of the deep snows on the customs of the people probably half the houses have two stories. one large roof covers both the home and the barn. the second story of the barn part can be used for stock, but is usually the mow or store-room for hay, grains, cured meat and fish, nets and implements, and is approached by an inclined runway of logs up which the stocky little horses draw loaded wagons or sleds. when the snow is real deep the runway is sometimes unnecessary. the mow is entered through a door direct from the second story of the home part of the building, and the stable similarly from the ground floor. the central object, and the most curious to an american, in the whole house is the huge russian stove. in the larger houses there are several. these stoves are constructed of masonry and are built before the partitions of the house are put in and before the walls are completed. in the main stove there are three fire-boxes and a maze of surrounding air-spaces and smoke-passages, and surmounting all a great chimney which in two-story houses is itself made into a heating-stove with one fire-box for the upper rooms. when the house is to be heated a little door is opened near the base of the chimney and a damper-plate is removed, so that the draft will be direct and the smoke escape freely into the chimney after quite a circuitous passage through the body of the stove. a certain bunch of sergeants nearly asphyxiated themselves before they discovered the secret of the damper in the stove. they were nearly pickled in pine smoke. and a whole company of soldiers nearly lost their billet in kholmogori when they started up the sisters' stoves without pulling the plates off the chimney. then the heating fire-box is furnished with blazing pine splinters and an armful of pine stove-wood and left alone for about an hour or until all the wood is burnt to a smokeless and gasless mass of hot coals and fine ash. the damper plate is then replaced, which stops all escape of heat up the chimney, and the whole structure of the stove soon begins to radiate a gentle heat. except in the coldest of weather it is not necessary to renew the fire in such a stove more than once daily, and one armful of wood is the standard fuel consumption at each firing. another of the fire-boxes in the main stove is a large smooth-floored and vaulted opening with a little front porch roofed by a hood leading into the chimney. this is the oven, and here on baking days is built a fire which is raked out when the walls and floor are heated and is followed by the loaves and pastry put in place with a flat wooden paddle with a long handle. see the picture of the stove and the pie coming out of the oven in the american convalescent hospital in archangel. the third fire-box is often in a low section of the stove covered by an iron plate, and is used only for boiling, broiling and frying. as there is not much food broiled or fried, and as soup and other boiled food is often allowed to simmer in stone jars in the oven, the iron-covered fire-box is not infrequently left cold except in summer. the stove-structure itself is variously contrived as to outward architecture so as to leave one or more alcoves, the warm floors of which form comfortable bed-spaces. the outer surface of the stove is smoothly cemented or enameled. so large are these stoves that partition-logs are set in grooves left in the outer stove-wall, and a portion of the wall of each of four or five rooms is often formed by a side or corner of the same stove. and radiation from the warm bricks heats the rooms. washing of clothes is done by two processes, soaping and rubbing in hot water at home and rinsing and rubbing in cold water at the river-bank or through a hole cut in the ice in the winter. although the result may please the eye, it frequently offends the nose because of the common use of "fish-oil soap." not only was there dead fish in the soap but also a mixture of petroleum residue. no wonder the soldier-poet doggereled "it's the horns of the cootie and beg-bug, the herring and mud-colored crows, my strongest impression of russia, gets into my head through my nose." bathing is a strenuous sport pursued by almost every individual with avidity. it is carried on in special bath-houses of two or more rooms, found in the yard of almost every peasant family. the outer door leads to the entry, the next door to a hot undressing-room, and the inner door to a steaming inferno in which is a small masonry stove, a cauldron of hot water, a barrel of ice-water, a bench, several platforms of various altitudes, several beaten copper or brass basins, a dipper and a lot of aromatic twigs bound in small bunches. with these he flails the dead cuticle much to the same effect as our scouring it off with a rough towel. such is the grandfather of the "russian bath" found in some of our own cities. after scrubbing thoroughly, and steaming almost to the point of dissolution on one of the higher platforms, a russian will dash on cold water from the barrel and dry himself and put on his clothes and feel tip-top. an american would make his will and call the undertaker before following suit. in the summer there is considerable open-air river bathing, and the absence of bathing-suits other than nature's own is never given a thought. the people of this north country are shorter and stockier than the average american. the prevailing color of hair is dark brown. their faces and hands are weather-beaten and wrinkle early. despite their general cleanliness, they often look greasy and smell to high heaven because of their habit of anointing hair and skin with fats and oils, especially fish-oil. not all do this, but the practice is prevalent enough so that the fish-oil and old-fur odors are inescapable in any peasant community and cling for a long time to the clothing of any traveler who sojourns there, be it ever so briefly. american soldiers in - became so accustomed to it that they felt something intangible was missing when they left the country and it was some time before a clever yank thought of the reason. before the great world war, a young peasant who was unmarried at twenty-two was a teacher, a nun, or an old maid. the birth-rate is high, and the death-rate among babies not what it is in our proud america. young families often remain under the grandfather's rooftree until another house or two becomes absolutely necessary to accommodate the overflow. if through some natural series of events a young woman has a child without having been married by the priest, no great stir is made over it. the fact that she is not thrown out of her family home is not consciously ascribed to charity of spirit, nor are the villagers conscious of anything broad or praiseworthy in their kindly attitude. the result is that the baby is loved and the mother is usually happily wed to the father of her child. the north russian villager is an assiduous gossip, but an incident of this kind receives no more attention as an item of news that if its chronology had been thoroughly conventional by american standards. marriages are occasions of great feasting and rejoicing; funerals likewise stir the whole community, but the noise of the occasion is far more terrifying and nerve-wracking. births are quiet affairs; but the christening is quite a function, attended with a musical service, and the "name-day" anniversary is often celebrated in preference to the birthday anniversary by the adult russian peasant. everybody was born, but not everybody received such a fine name from such a fine family at such a fine service under the leadership of such a fine priest; and not everybody has such fine god-parents. the larger religious festivals are also occasions for enjoyable community gatherings, and especially during the winter the little dances held in a large room of some patient man's house until the wee small hours are something not to be missed by young or old. yes, the north russian peasant plays as well as works, and so keen is his enjoyment that he puts far more energy into the play. because of his simple mode of existence it is not necessary to overwork in normal times to obtain all the food, clothing, houses and utensils he cares to use. ordinarily he is a quiet easy-going human. perhaps there is more of sense of humor in the apparently phlegmatic passivity of the russian nitchevo than is suspected by those not acquainted with him. there is also a great timidity in it; for the russian moujik or christianik (peasant farmer) has scarcely been sure his soul is his own, since time immemorable. but his sense of humor has been his salvation, for it has enabled him to be patient and pleasant under conditions beyond his power to change. courtesy to an extent unknown in america marks his daily life. he is intelligent, and is resourceful to a degree, although not well educated. the average north russian is not dishonest in a personal way. that is, he has no personal animus in his deviousness unless someone has directly offended him. he will haul a load of small articles unguarded for many versts and deliver every piece safely, in spite of his own great hunger, because he is in charge of the shipment. but he will charge a commission at both ends of a business deal, and will accept a "gift" almost any time for any purpose and then mayhap not "deliver." only a certain small class, however, and that practically confined to archangel and environs, will admit even most privately that any gift or advantage is payment for a given favor which would not be extended in the ordinary course of business. this class is not the national back-bone, but rather the tinsel trimmings in the national show-window. one time a passing british convoy commandeered some hay at bolsheozerki. upon advice of the american officer the starosta accepted a paper due bill from the british officer for the hay. weeks afterward the american officer found that the russian had been up to that time unable to get cash on his due bill. naturally he looked to the american for aid. the officer took it up with the british and was assured that the due bill would be honored. but to quiet the feeling of the starosta he advanced him the roubles, giving the headman his address so that he could return the roubles to the american officer when the british due bill came cash. brother officers ridiculed the yank officer for trusting the russian peasant, who was himself waiting doubtfully on the british. but his judgment was vindicated later and the honesty of the starosta demonstrated when a letter travelled hundreds of miles to pinega with roubles for the american officer. xx holding the onega valley december fighting--drawn struggle near turchesova--fighting near khala in february--corporal collins and men are ambushed near bolsheozerki--"h" company in two savage battles--lieuts. collins and phillips both mortally wounded. the enemy, who was massing up forces in the upper pinega valley and, as we have seen, caused british g. h. q. to send one company of americans hurrying up the valley for a -mile march christmas week, was also fixing up a surprise for the g. h. q. on the other end of the great line of defense. that same christmas week "h" company found itself again up against greatly superior forces who, as they boasted, were commencing their winter campaign to drive the invaders of russia to the depths of the white sea. on december th one squad of "h" men were in a patrol fight with the enemy which drove the reds from the village of kleshevo. on the following day lt. ketcham with twenty americans and a platoon of r. a. n. b., russian allied naval brigade, proceeded south for reconnaissance in force and engaged a strong enemy patrol in priluk, driving the reds out, killing one, wounding one, and taking one prisoner. on december nd lt. carlson's platoon occupied kleshevo and lt. ketcham's platoon occupied the village on the opposite side of the river. the next day at a village near priluk lt. carlson's men on patrol encountered a bolo combat patrol and inflicted severe losses and took five prisoners. christmas day and several other days were occupied with these patrol combats by the two opposing forces, each of which thought the other had gone into winter quarters. in conformity with the general advance planned on all fronts by the british command to beat the enemy to the attack and to reach a position which would nullify the enemy's tremendous advantage of position with his base at plesetskaya, the british officer in command of the onega valley detachment, planned an attack on turchesova. lt. e. r. collins with the second fourth platoons left pogashitche at : a. m. december , proceeding up the schmokee river in an attempt to get around turchesova and strike the enemy in the flank. it was found, however, that the woods on this side were impassable and so the force left the river by a winter trail for pertema, proceeding thence to goglova, to reinforce the polish company of allies who had captured that village on the same morning. this was wise. the next morning the enemy counter-attacked goglova in great force, but, fortunately, was repulsed without any casualties on our side. he had, however, a threatening position in the village of zelyese, about a mile to the left flank and rear of our position and was discovered to be preparing to renew the battle the next day. lt. collins was obliged to divide his force just as again and again the american officers all along that great russian winter front again and again were compelled to divide in the face of greatly superior and encircling forces. taking lt. ketcham's platoon early the next morning, he boldly struck at the enemy force in his rear and after an hour's fighting the "h" men had possession of the village. but the enemy was at once reinforced from turchesova and delivered a counter-attack that the "h" men repulsed with severe losses. our wounded in the action were two; none killed. horseshoes again. the enemy dead and wounded were over fifty. the enemy continued firing at long range next day, new years of , and wounded one "h." indications pointed toward an inclination of the enemy to evacuate turchesova. therefore, a message received by lt. collins at : p. m., january , from british o. c. onega det., ordering a withdrawal within two hours to kleshevo, came as a surprise to the american soldiers. in this hasty retreat much confusion arose among the excited russian drivers of sleighs. some horses and drivers were injured; much ammunition, equipment, and supplies were lost. the enemy did not follow and for the remainder of january and up to february th the "h" company men performed the routine duties of patrol and garrison duties in the onega valley in the vicinity of kleshevo without any engagement with the enemy who seemed content to rest in quarters and keep out of the way of the americans and allies. on february th lt. ketcham with a combat patrol drove the enemy from khala whom he encountered with a pair of machine guns on patrol. he defeated the reds without any casualties, inflicting a loss on the enemy of one killed and two wounded. for more than a month the sector of defense was quiet except for an occasional rise of the "wind." active patrols were kept out. captain ballensinger assumed command of the company and moved his headquarters from onega to chekuevo. as the mail from and to archangel from the outside world as well as supplies and reinforcements of men were now obliged to use the road from obozerskaya to bolsheozerki to chekuevo to onega to kem and so on to kola and return, it became part of the duty of "h" company to patrol the road from chekuevo to obozerskaya; taking two days coming and two days going with night stops at chinova or bolsheozerki. the last of these patrols left chekuevo on sunday, march , fell into the hands of the advance patrols of the bolo general who had executed a long flank march, annihilated the franco-russian force at bolsheozerki, and occupied the area with a great force of infantry, mounted men, skii troops, and both light and heavy artillery, as related elsewhere in connection with the story of the defense of the railroad. the next day lt. collins with thirty men and a lewis gun started toward bolsheozerki to discover the situation with orders to report at chinova to col. lucas, the french officer in command of the vologda force. travelling all night, he reached col. lucas in the morning and the latter determined to push on under escort of the americans and attempt to reach bolsheozerki and oborzerskaya, being at that time ignorant of the real strength of the force of reds that had interrupted the communications. about noon, march th, the detachment in escort formation left chinova and proceeded without signs of enemy till within four versts of bolsheozerki, where they were met by sudden burst of a battery of machine guns. luckily the range was wrong. the horses bolted upsetting the sleighs and throwing col. lucas into the neck-deep snow. the americans returned the fire and slowly retired with the loss of but one man killed. crawling in the snow for a great distance gave many of them severe frost bites, one of the most acute sufferers being the french col. lucas. the detachment returned to chinova to report by telephone to chekuevo and to organize a defensive position in case the enemy should advance toward chekuevo. the enemy did not pursue. he was crafty. that would have indicated his great strength. by order of col. lawrie, british o. c. onega det., lt. phillips was sent with about forty "h" company men to reinforce lt. collins. it was the british colonel's idea that only a large raiding party of bolos were at bolsheozerki for the purpose of raiding the supply trains of food that were coming from archangel to chekuevo. phillips reached chinova before daybreak of the twentieth. lt. collins was joined at the little village of chinova by three companies of yorks, enroute from murmansk to obozerskaya, a u. s. medical corps officer, lt. springer, and four men joined the force and an attack was ordered on bolsheozerki by these seventy americans and three hundred yorks. they did not know that they were going up against ten times their number. at : a. m. the movement started and at nine in the morning the american advance guard drew fire from the enemy. deploying as planned on the left of the road the "h" men moved forward in line of battle. one company of yorks moved off to the right to attack from the woods and one on the left of the americans. one york company was in reserve. after advancing over five hundred yards in face of the enemy machine gun fire, the americans were exhausted by the deep snow and held on to a line within one hundred yards of the enemy. the yorks on the right and left advanced just as gallantly and were also held back by the deep snow and the severity of the enemy machine gun fire. the fight continued for five hours. lovable old lt. collins fell mortally wounded by a bolo bullet while cheering his men on the desperate line of battle. at last lt. phillips was obliged to report his ammunition exhausted and appealed for reinforcements and ammunition. major monday passed on the appeal to col. lawrie who gave up the attack and ordered the forces to withdraw under cover of darkness, which they all did in good order. losses had not been as heavy as the fury of the fight promised. one american enlisted man was killed and lt. collins died of hemorrhage on the way to chekuevo. eight american enlisted men were severely wounded. the yorks lost two officers and two enlisted men killed, and ten enlisted men wounded. many of the american and british soldiers were frostbitten. during the next week the enemy, we learned later, greatly augmented his forces and strengthened his defenses of bolsheozerki with german wire, machine guns, and artillery. he was evidently bent on exploiting his patrol action success and aimed to cut the railroad at obozerskaya and later deal with the onega detachment at leisure. our troops made use of the lull in the activities to make thorough patrols to discover enemy positions and to send all wounded and sick to onega for safety, bringing up every available man for the next drive to knock the bolo out of bolsheozerki. this was under the command of lt.-col. morrison (british army). meanwhile the bolo general had launched a vicious drive at the americans and russians who stood between him and his railway objective, encircling them with three regiments, and on april , after two days of continuous assault was threatening to overpower them. in this extremity col. lawrie answered the appeal of the british officer commanding at obozerskaya by ordering another attack on the west by his forces. captain ballensinger reports in substance as follows: in compliance with orders he detailed april , one n. c. o. and ten privates to man two stokes mortars, also one n. c. o. and seven privates for a vickers gun. both these details reported to a russian trench mortar officer and remained under his command during the engagement. the balance of the available men at the advance base usolia was divided into two platoons, the first under lt. phillips and the other under the first sergeant. these platoons under capt. ballensinger's command, as part of the reserve, joined the column on the road at the appointed time. they arrived at their position on the road about four versts from bolsheozerki about : a. m. april . zero hour was set at daybreak, : a. m. the first firing began about thirty minutes later, "a" company of the yorks drawing fire from the northern or right flank of the enemy. they reported afterward that the bolos had tied dogs in the woods whose barking had given the alarm. that company advanced in the face of strong machine gun fire and capt. bailey, a british officer went to his death gallantly leading his men in a rush at the guns on a ridge. but floundering in the snow, with their second officer wounded, they were repulsed and forced to retire. at : a. m. lt. pellegrom, having hurried out from archangel, reported for duty and was put in command of a platoon. at : a. m. "a" company yorks was in desperate straits and by verbal order of col. lund one platoon of americans was sent to support their retirement. lt. phillips soon found himself hotly engaged. the original plan had been to send the polish company in to attack the southern villages or the extreme left of the bolo line, but owing to their lateness of arrival they were not able to go in there and were held for a frontal attack, supported by the american trench mortars. they were met by a severe machine gun fire and after twenty minutes of hot fire and heavy losses retired from action. meanwhile "c" company yorks which had been sent around to attack on the north of bolsheozerki got lost in the woods in the dark, trying to follow an old trail made by a russian officer and a few men who had come around the north end of the bolsheozerki area a few days previously with messages from obozerskaya. the company did not get into action and had to return. thus the attack had failed, and the force found itself on a desperate defensive. the "a" yorks, who had suffered severely, retired from action immediately after the first counter-attack of the bolo had been repulsed. then the whole defense of this messed-up attacking force fell upon the american platoon and a dozen yorks with a doughty british officer. phillips, through the superb control of his men, kept them all in line and his lewis guns going with great effectiveness and gave ground slowly and grudgingly, in spite of casualties and great severity of cold. when phillips fell with the wound which was later to prove fatal, pellegrom came up with his platoon to relieve the exhausted platoon, and "c" company yorks arrived on the line from their futile flank march just in time to join the americans at : a. m. in checking the redoubled counterattack of the hordes of bolos. meanwhile the polish troops refused to go back into the fighting line to help stem the bolo attack. peremptory order brought two of their colt automatics up to the line where for forty-five minutes they engaged the enemy, but again retired to the rear and assisted only by firing their machine gun over the heads of the americans and british battling for their very lives all that afternoon in the long thin line of american o. d. and british khaki. the bolo was held in check and at dusk the americans and british and poles withdrew in good order. this ill-fated attack had met with a savage repulse but no doubt it had a great effect upon the bolshevik general at bolsheozerki. on his right he had himself met bloody disaster from a company of americans who had fought his attacking battalions to a standstill for sixty hours and here on his left flank was another company of americans who had twice attacked him and seemed never to stay defeated. april sun was likely to soften his winter road to mush very soon and then these americans and their allies would have him at their mercy. the losses of the enemy were not known but later accounts from prisoners and from natives of the village, who were there, placed them very high. in this last attack "h" lost one officer, who died of wounds later, also one man killed, one mortally wounded and seven others wounded. the british lost one officer killed, one wounded, two privates killed, two missing and ten wounded. the polish company lost five killed, eight missing and ten wounded. of the gallant phillips who fell at bolsheozerki we are pleased to include the following from his company commander: "but when he went forward something made me look him over again, and the look i saw on his face and especially in his eyes, i shall never forget. "i have never seen a look like it before or since. it was by no means the look of a man being afraid (i have seen those looks) nor was it a look of 'i don't care what happens.' it was a look that made me watch him all the way out. it made me hunt him up with my glasses, while i was watching the enemy. the latter was pressing us awfully hard that day, and when i observed our troops slowly giving ground, i went out in person to see if the look on phillip's face had something to do with it. but i soon changed my mind. he was all along the line encouraging his men to hold on, he helped to put new lewis guns in position. in short, he was everywhere without apparent thought of the bullets flying all around him. he pulled back wounded men to be carried back behind the lines. i know that his men would have held every bit of ground, had the british who were holding the flanks not fallen way back behind them. "when the fateful bullet struck him, it knocked him down as if a ton of brick had fallen on him. he said to me, 'my god, i got it. captain, don't bother with me, i am done for, just look after the boys'." let us here relate the story of his plucky fight for life after a bolo bullet tore through his breast. borne tenderly in the arms of his own men to a sleigh which was gently drawn to chanova and thence to chekuevo, he rallied from his great loss of blood. apparently his chances for recovery were good. he sat up in bed, ate with relish and exchanged greetings with his devoted "h" company men who to a man would gladly have changed places with him--what a fine comradeship there was between citizen-officer and citizen-soldier. contrary to expectations phillips was soon moved from chekuevo to onega for safety and for better care. but very soon after reaching onega hemmorhage began again. then followed weeks of struggle for life. everything possible was done for him with the means at hand. although the hospital afforded no x-ray to discern the location of the fatal arterial lesion through which his life was secretly spurting away, the post mortem revealed the fact that the bolshevik rifle bullet had severed a tiny artery in his lung. care-worn american medical men wept in despair. wireless messages throbbed disheartening reports on his condition to anxious regimental comrades on other fronts and at archangel. at last the heroic struggle ended. on the tenth of may phillips bled to death of his wound. the valiant company had done its best in the fall and winter fighting. the company retired to chekuevo and onega, doing guard duty and patrols during the spring. the only event of note was the midnight game of baseball between the medics and doughboys. the medics could not hit the pills as hard as the doughboys. they left onega june th, by steamboat for economia island and left russia june th. xxi ice-bound archangel ferry boat fights ice--archangel cosmopolitan--bartering for eats--strange wood famine--entertainment at american headquarters--doughboy minstrelsy--reindeer teams--russian eskimo--bolshevik prisoners--s. b. a. l. mutiny--major young's scare at smolny--shakleton boots--british rations for yank soldiers--corporal knight writes humorous sketch of ice-bound archangel. on the ferry boat the troops speculated whether or not we would get stuck in the ice before we could cross the river to archangel preestin. it was november nd, . the dvina ran under glass. on the streets of archangel sleighs were slipping. winter was on and archangel in a few days would be ice-bound. for a few days more the ice-breakers would keep the ferry going across the dvina and would cut for the steamships a way out to sea. then the white sea would freeze solid for six months. in a few days the archangel-economia winter railroad would be running. icebreakers would for a while brave the arctic gales that swept the north coast. then they would surrender and the great white silence would begin. varied and interesting are the tales that are told of that winter in archangel. they are descriptive as well as narrative but there is not much coherence to the chapter. however, to the soldiers who were there, or who were out and in archangel during the winter of - this chapter will be pleasing. in from a far-off front for a few days rest, or in on some mission such as the bringing of bolshevik prisoners or to get some of the company property which had been left behind when in the fall the troops left troopships so hurriedly, these groups of american soldiers from the fighting fronts always found archangel of interest. they found that it was a half-modern, half-oriental city, half-simple, half-wicked, with the gay along with the drab, with bright lights along with the gloom. in archangel were all kinds of people--whiskered moujiks beating their ponies along the snow-covered streets, sleek-looking people of the official class, well-dressed men and women of cultured appearance, young women whose faces were pretty and who did not wear boots and shawls but dressed attractively and seemed to enjoy the attention of doughboys, and soldiers of several nations, veterans of war and adventure in many climes. what a cosmopolitan crowd it was in that frozen-in city of the north! the doughboy from the front soon learned that the city had its several national centers--the british quarters, french, italian, and so forth, where their flags denoted their headquarters and in vicinity of which would be found their barracks and quarters and clubs. the yank found himself welcome in every quarter of the city but hailed with most camaraderie in the french quarter. with the russian night patrols he soon came to an amicable understanding and russian cafes soon found out that the yanks were the freest spenders and treated them accordingly. woe to the luckless "limmey" who tried to edge in on a yank party in a russian place. when the doughboy returned to his company at the front he had a few great tales to tell of the eats he had found at some places. some companies had done well. on the market-place and elsewhere the resourceful amerikanski looking for food, especially vegetables, to supplement his mess, learned his first word of russian--skulka rouble. in spite of the watchful british m. p.'s, ruby queens and scissors cigarettes were soon bringing in small driblets of cabbage and onions and potatoes. happy the old mess sergeant who got his buddies expert at this game. and much more contented were the men with the mess. in another chapter read the wonderful menu of the convalescent hospital. in the city the doughboy found the steaming bahnya or bathhouse, and at the "cootie mill" turned in his shirt to rid himself of the "seam squirrels." all cleaned up, with little gifts and cheery words he sought his buddies who were in hospital sick or wounded. he got books and records and gramaphones and other things at the red cross and "y" to take back to the company. he accumulated a thousand rumors about the expedition and about happenings back home. he tired of the gloom and magnified fears of archangel's being overpowered by the bolos and usually returned to the front twice glad--once that he had seen archangel and second that he was back among his comrades at the front. during those weary ice-bound months it was a problem to keep warm. poor management by high american and british officers at one time, to the writer's knowledge, suffered american soldiers at smolny to be actually endangered in health. as far as proper heating of quarters was concerned men at the front provided better for themselves than did the commander at smolny, major young, provide for those fighters in from the fighting front for rest. and that might be said too for his battalion mess. no wonder the doughboy set out to help himself in these things. strange to the american soldiers was the fact that at archangel, a city of saw-mills, sitting in a nick of a great forest that extended for hundreds of miles south, east and west, there was such difficulty in getting supplies of fuel. a desperate sergeant took a detail of men and salvaged a lot of logs lying near the river's edge, borrowed some russki saws with a few cigarettes, commandeered some carts and brought to the cook's kitchen and to the big stoves in the barracks a fine supply of wood. but the joke of it was that the watchful russian owner of the logs sent in his bill for the wood to the british g. h. q. and a ream of correspondence was started between major young and g. h. q., the typewriter controversy continuing long, like katy-did and katy-didn't, long after the sergeant with diplomacy, partial restoration, and sugar had appeased the complaining russian. at american headquarters in the technical institute was held many a pleasant entertainment to while away the winter hours. the auditorium possessed a stage and a good dance floor. the moving picture machine and the band were there. seated on the backless wooden benches soldiers looked at the pictures or listened to the orchestra or to their own doughboy talent showing his art at vaudeville or minstrelsy. or on officers' entertainment night they and their guests chosen from charming russian families, joyfully danced or watched the antics of douglas fairbanks, fatty arbuckle, charlie chaplin, and even our dear deceased old john bunnie. not a silver lining but has its cloudy surface, and many were the uncomfortable moments when the american officer found himself wishing he could explain to his fair guest the meaning of the scene. more than rumor spread through that north country, attributing wonderful powers to the americans based on some douglas fairbanks exploit. can it be that the enemy heard some of these rumors and were unwilling at times to go against the americans? enlisted men's entertainments by the "y" and their own efforts to battle ennui with minstrel show and burlesque and dances have already been mentioned. the great high gorka built by the american engineers in the heart of the city afforded a half-verst slide, a rush of clinging men and women as their toboggan coursed laughing and screaming in merriment down to the river where it pitched swiftly again down to the ice. here at the gorka as at "the merry-go-round," the promenade near sabornya, the doughboy learned how to put the right persuasion into his voice as he said mozhna, barishna, meaning: will you take a slide or walk with me, little girl? at christmas, new year's and st. patrick's day, they had special entertainments. late in march "i" company three times repeated its grand minstrel show. many a doughboy in archangel, kholmogora, yemetskoe, onega or pinega, at one time or another during the long winter, got a chance to ride with the russian eskimo and his reindeer. doughboys who were supporting the artillery the day that the enemy moved on chertkva and threatened peligorskaya, can recall seeing the double sled teams of reindeer that came flashing up through the lines with the american commanding officer who had been urgently called for by the russian officer at peligorskaya. sergeant kant will never forget that wild ride. he sat on the rear sled, or rather he clung to the top of it during that hour's ride of twelve miles. the wise old buck reindeer who was hitched as a rudder to the rear of his sled would brace and pull back to keep the sergeant's sled from snapping the whip at the turns, and that would lift the sled clear from the surface. and when the old buck was not steering the sled but trotting with leaping strides behind the sled then the bumps in the road bounced the sled high. out in front the reindeer team of three strained against their simple harness and supplied the rapid succession of jerks that flew the sleds along toward the embattled artillery. the reindeer travelled with tongues hanging out as if in distress; they panted; they steamed and coated with frost; they thrust their muzzles into the cooling snow to slake their thirst; but they were enjoying the wild run; they fairly skimmed over the snow trail. the eskimo driver called his peculiar moaning cry to urge them on, slapped his lead reindeer with the single rein that was fastened to his left antler, or prodded his team on the haunches with the long pole which he carried for that purpose and for steering his light sled, and with surprising nimbleness leaped on and off his sled as he guided the sled past or over obstructions. a snow-covered log across the trail caused no delay. a leap of three antlered forms, twelve grey legs flashing in the air, a bump of the light sled that volplanes an instant in a shower of snow, a quick leap and a grab for position back on the sled, the thrilling act is over, and the eskimo has not shown a sign of excitement in his indian-like stoic face. on we skim at unbroken pace. we soon reach the place. one of the views shown in this volume is that of a characteristic reindeer team and sled. another shows the home of the north russian branch of the eskimo family. the writer vividly recalls the sight of a semi-wild herd of reindeer feeding in the dense pine and spruce woods. they were digging down through the deep snow to get the succulent reindeer moss. we approached on our russian ponies with our, to them, strange-looking dress. what a thrill it gave us to see them, as if at signal of some sentry, raise their heads in one concerted, obedient look for signal of some leader, and then with great bounds go leaping away to safety, flashing through the dark stems of the trees like a flight of grey arrows discharged from a single bow. further on we came upon the tented domiciles of the owners of this herd. our red-headed russian guide appeased the clamors of the innumerable dogs who bow-wowed out from all sides of the wigwam-like tents of these north russian nomad homes, while we americans looked on in wonder. here was the very counterpart of the american indian buck and squaw home that our grandads had seen in michigan. the women at last appeared and rebuked the ragged half-dressed children for their precipitate rushing out to see the strangers. for a little tobacco they became somewhat talkative and willingly enough gave our guide information about the location of the hidden still we were going to visit, where pine pitch was baked out and barrelled for use in repairing the steamboats and many fishing boats of the area. we studied this aborigine woman and questioned our guide later about these people. like our indians they are. pagans they are and in this volume is a picture of one of their totem poles. untouched by the progress of civilization, they live in the great slavic ocean of people that has rolled over them in wave after wave, but has not changed them a bit. space can not be afforded for the numerous interesting anecdotes that are now in the mind of the writer and the doughboy reader who so many times saw the reindeer and their russian eskimo owners in their wilds or in archangel or other cities and villages where they appear in their annual winter migrations. probably the one most interesting spot in the frozen port city was the american expeditionary post-office. here at irregular intervals, at first via ice-breaker, which battled its way up to the edge of the ice crusted coast north of economia, came our mail bags from home. later those bags came in hundreds of miles over the winter snow roads, hauled by shaggy ponies driven by hairy, weather-beaten moujiks. mail-letters, papers, little things from home, the word still connotes pleasure to us. mail days were boon days, and at the mail-place a detail always arrived early and cheerful. [illustration: two men baking bread at a large fireplace-like oven.] u. s. official photo russian masonry stove--american convalescent hospital [illustration: woman ironing clothes.] u. s. official photo pvt. allikas finds his mother in archangel [illustration: four men setting type and two observing.] u. s official photo printing "the american sentinel" familiar sights in the streets of winter archangel were the working parties composed of bolshevik prisoners of war. except for the doughboy guard it might have been difficult to tell them from a free working party. they all looked alike. in fact, many a scowling face on a passing sled would have matched the bolo clothes better than some of those boyish faces under guard. and how the prisoners came to depend on the doughboy. several times it was known and laughingly told about that bolo prisoners individually managed to escape, sneak home or to a confederate's home, get food, money and clean clothes, and then report back to the american guards. they preferred to be prisoners rather than to remain at large. once a worried corporal of a prisoner guard detail at the convalescent hospital was inventing a story to account to the sergeant for his a. w. o. l. prisoner when to his mingled feeling of relief and disgust, in walked the lost prisoner, nitchevo, khorashaw. the corporal felt about as sheepish as a sergeant and corporal of another company had felt one night when they had spent an hour and a half outmaneuvering the sentries, carrying off a big heavy case to a dark spot, and quietly opening the case found that instead of scotch "influenza cure" it was a box of horseshoes. in that case horseshoes meant no luck. is war cruel? in that city of archangel with nowhere to retreat, nervous times were bound to come. "the wind up their back," that is, cold shivers, made kind-hearted, level-headed men do harsh things. comrade danny anderson of "hq" company could tell a blood-curdling story of the execution he witnessed. six alleged agents of the german war office, russian bolo spies, in one "windy" moment were brutally put away by british officers. their brains spattered on the stone wall. sherman said it. we are glad to say that such incidents were remarkably rare in north russia. the allied officers and troops have a record of which they may be justly proud. here we may as well tell of the s. b. a. l. mutiny in archangel in early winter. it is the story of an occurrence both pitiful and aggravating. after weeks of feeding and pampering and drilling and equipping and shining of brass buttons and showing off, when the order came for them to prepare to march off to the fighting front, the s. b. a. l. held a soviet in their big grey-stone barracks and refused to get ready to go out because they had grievances against their british officers. this was aggravatingly unreasonable and utterly unmilitary. severe measures would have to be used. they were given till : p. m. to reconsider their soviet resolution. meanwhile g. h. q. had ordered out the american "hq" company trench mortar section and a section of the american machine gun company to try bomb and bullet argument on the s. b. a. l.'s who were barricading their barracks and pointing machine guns from their windows. promptly on the minute, according to orders, the nasty, and to the americans pitifully disagreeable job, was begun. in a short time a white flag fluttered a sign of submission. but several had been killed and the populace that swarmed weeping about the american soldiers reproachfully cried: "amerikanski nit dobra." and they did not feel at all glorious. a few minutes later to the immense disgust of the doughboys, a company of english tommies who by all rules of right and reason should have been the ones to clean up the mutinous mess into which the british officers had gotten the s. b. a. l.'s, now hove into sight, coming up the recently bullet-whistling but now deadly quiet street, with rifles slung on their shoulders, crawling along slowly at sixty to the minute pace--instead of a riot-call double time, and singing their insulting version of "over there the yanks are running, running, everywhere, etc." and their old fishmonger reserve officer--he wore colonel's insignia, wiped off his whiskey sweat in unconcealed relief. his battle of archangel had been cut short by the americans who had eagerly watched for the first sign of surrender by the foolish russian soldiers. the finishing touch was added to the short-lived s. b. a. l. mutiny when the tender-hearted but severe old general maroushevsky punished the thirteen ring-leaders of the s. b. a. l. soviet with death before a russian firing squad. this mutiny was described in various ways and use was made of it by agitators in archangel. the writer has followed the account given to him by a machine gun sergeant who was handling one of the guns that day. his story seemed to contain the facts and feelings most commonly expressed by american officers and enlisted men who were in archangel when the unfortunate incident took place. we are bound to comment that we believe it never would have occurred if a tactful, honest american officer had been in charge of the s. b. a. l. americans know how tactless and bull-dozing some british orders--not many to be sure--could be. we fortunately had bluffs enough to offset the bull-dozings. a stormy threat by a sneering, drunken officer to turn his canadian artillery on the bloomin' yanks could be met by a cold-as-steel rejoiner that the british officer would please realize his drunken condition, and take back the sneering threat and come across with a reasonable order or suffer the immediate consequences. and then usually the two could cooperate. such is a partnership war incident. late in winter, after the success of the enemy in the shenkursk area had given the secret sympathizers in archangel renewed hope that trotsky's army would at last crush the allies before archangel, rumor persistently followed rumor that archangel was being honeycombed with spies. the sailors at solombola wore darker scowls and strange faces began to appear at smolny where the city's power station lay. in the allied intelligence staff, that is secret information service, there was redoubled effort. we smile as we think of it. about the time of the bolo general's brilliant smash through our line and capture of bolsheozerki, menacing obozerskaya, a few little outbursts were put down in archangel. a few dozen rusty rifles were confiscated. major young laid elaborate plans for the, to him, imminent riot at smolny. soldiers who had learned from experience how difficult it was for their enemy to keep a skirmish line even when his officers were behind with pistol and machine gun persuasion, now grew sick of this imaginary war in archangel. one company going out to the front on march th, was actually singing in very jubilation because they were getting away from battalion mess and "stand-to" for riot-scare. a distinguished citizen of the world, sir ernest shakleton, visited the city of archangel in the winter. but no one ever saw him try to navigate troitsky prospect in his own invention, the shakleton boot. how dear to his heart are the thoughts of that boot, as the doughboy recalls his first attempts to walk in them. the writer's one and only experience with them resulted in his taking all the road for steering his course and calling for the assistance of two brother officers--and "chi" was the strongest he had drunk, too. of course the doughboy mastered the art of navigating in them. for downright laughableness and ludicrity the charlie chaplin walk has nothing on the shakleton gliding-wabble. the shimmy and the cheek dance would not draw a second look while a stranger could grin audibly at the doughboy shuffle-hip-screwing along in shakleton's. many a fair barishna on troitsky prospect held her furs up to conceal her irrepressible mirth at the sight. aw, shakletons. allusion has been made to the battalion mess of bully and "m. and v." another part of the british issue ration was dried vegetables, which the soldiers nicknamed "grass stew," much to the annoyance of one lt. blease, our american censor who read all our letters in england to see that we did not criticise our allies. one day at soyla grass stew was on the menu, says a corporal. one of the men offered his russian hostess a taste of it. she spat it out on the hay before the cow. the cow was insulted and refused either stew or hay. much was done to improve the ration by general ironside who accepted with sympathy the suggestions of major nichols. coffee finally took the place of tea. more bread and less hard tack was issued. occasionally fresh meat was provided. but on the whole the british ration did not satisfy the american soldier. this leads to a good story. one day during the smolny riot-scare the writer with a group of non-commissioned officers in going all over the area to discover its possibilities for tactics and strategy, visited the russian veterinarian school. here we saw the poor russki pony in all stages of dissection, from spurting throat to disembowelment and horse-steaks. "me for the good old bully," muttered a corporal devoutly, as he turned his head away. here we remember the query of a corporal of headquarters company who said: "where is that half million dogs that were in archangel when we landed last september?" the russians had no meat market windows offering wieners and bologny but it sure was a tough winter for food in that city congested with a large refugee population. and dogs disappeared. of the purely military life in archangel in the long winter little can be said. the real work was done far out at the fronts anyway. no commander of a company of troops fighting for his sector of the line ever got any real assistance from archangel except of the routine kind. many a commendatory message and many a cheering visit was paid the troops by general ironside but we can not record the same for colonel stewart. he was not a success as a commanding officer. he fell down weakly under his great responsibility. before the long winter was over general richardson was sent up to archangel to take command. during the early winter a doughboy in archangel in this spirit of good humor wrote a letter published later in the stars and stripes in france. it is so good that we include it here. "sometimes, about once or twice every now and then, copies of the stars and stripes find their way up here to no woman's land and are instantly devoured by the news-hungry gang, searching for information regarding their comrades and general conditions in france, where we belong, but through fate were sent up to this part of the world to quell bolshevism and guard the northern lights. "we are so far north that the doggone sun works only when it feels inclined to do so, and in that way it is like everything else in russia. the moon isn't so particular, and comes up, usually backwards, at any time of the day or night, in any part of the sky, it having no set schedule, and often it will get lost and still be on the job at noon. yes, we are so far north that degrees below will soon be tropical weather to us, and they will have to build fires around both cows before they can milk them. probably about next month at this time some one will come around and say we will be pulling out of here in a day or so, but then, the days will be six months long. "in our issue of your very popular paper we noticed a cartoon, "pity the boys in siberia," but what about us, ed? now, up here in this tough town there are , l. inhabitants, of which , are human beings and , are dogs. dogs of every description from the poodle to the st. bernard and from the wolfhound to the half-breed dachshund, which is half german and half bolshevik and looks the part. "the wind whistles across the dvina river like the twentieth century limited passing podunk, and snowflakes are as numerous as retreating germans were in france a few weeks ago. we have good quarters when we are here, thank fortune for that, and good food, when it comes up. if we can stand the winter we will be all jake, for a yank can accustom himself to anything if he wants to. but just the same, we would like to see your artists busy on "the boys in northern russia" and tell them not to leave out the word "northern." "we also read in the stars and stripes that the boys in italy had some tongue twisters and brain worriers, but listen to this: centimes and sous and francs may be hard to count, but did you ever hear of a rouble or a kopec? a kopec is worth a tenth of a cent and there are a hundred of them in a rouble. as you will see, that makes a rouble worth a dime, and to make matters worse all the money is paper, coins having gone out of circulation since the beginning of the mix-up. a kopec is the size of a postage stamp, a rouble looks like a united cigar store's certificate, a -rouble note resembles a porous plaster and a -rouble note the declaration of independence. "when a soldier in search of a meal enters a restaurant, he says to the waitress, 'barishna, kakajectyeh bifstek, pozhalysta,' which means 'an order of beefsteak, lady, please: you see, you always say to a woman 'barishna' and she is always addressed in that manner. she will answer the hungry customer with, 'yah ochen sojalaylu, shto unaus nyet yestnik prepasov siechas' (a simple home cure for lockjaw), meaning, "i am very sorry, but we are right out of food today.' he will try several other places, and if he is lucky he is apt to stumble across a place where he can get something to eat, but when he looks at the bill of fare and learns that it cost him about $ . for a sandwich and a cup of coffee, he beats it back to the barracks. "every time you get on a street car ('dramvay') you have to count out kopecs for your fare, and most of us would rather walk than be jammed in the two-by-four buses and fish for the money. before boarding a car each passenger usually hunts up a couple of five gallon milk cans, a market basket or two and a bag of smoked herring, so they will get their kopec's worth out of the ride, besides making the atmosphere nice and pleasant for the rest of the passengers. if you should see a soldier walking down the street with his nose turned up and his mouth puckered in apparent contempt, you would be wrong in thinking he was conceited, for if the truth be known he has probably just got his shirt back from the washwoman, and she has used fish-oil instead of soap and he is trying to escape the fumes. when you take your clothes to have them laundered and tell the woman to please omit the odor, she'll tell you that she has no soap and if you want them washed to your satisfaction please send in a cake. anything in the world to keep your clothes from smelling of fish-oil, so you double-time back and get her the soap, and then she gives the kids a bath, and that's the end of your soap. "when a russian meets another man he knows on the street, both lift hats and flirt with each other. if they stop to talk, they always shake hands, even if they haven't seen each other for fully twenty minutes. then they simply must shake hands again when they leave. when a man meets a lady friend he usually kisses her hand and shows her how far he can bend over without breaking his suspenders. 'ah,' he will say, 'yah ochen rrad vasveedyat, kak vui pazhavaetye?' which in the united states means 'how do you do?' to which she will reply, 'blogadaru vas, yah ochen korosho,' or 'very well, thank you.' it is the knockout. a fellow has to shake hands so much that some of them are getting the habit around the company. "and another thing, ed, are they really holding a separate war up here for our benefit? just because we weren't in on the big doings in france is no reason why they should run a post-season series especially for us. we appreciate the kindness and honor and all that, but what we want to know is where everybody gets that stuff. believe me, after all the dope we got on the trenches, about pianos and wooden floors, steam heat, and other conveniences, when we see ourselves on outpost duty with one blanket and a poncho, sleeping (not on duty, of course) in twenty-eight inches of pure ooooozy mud, which before we awaken turns into thin, fine ice, it makes us want to cry out and ask the universe what we have done to deserve this exile. "now don't think, dear old ed. that we are kicking. american soldiers never do. we just wanted to have something to write you about, to remind you that we are a part of the american e. f., although 'isolated.' "with best wishes to your paper and a merry christmas and a happy new year to all the boys, i'll close with the consoling assurance in my heart that we'll meet you back on broadway, anyway. c. b. knight, corp. "hq" co., th inf., american e. f., archangel, russia." xxii winter on the railroad we come under french flag--thanksgiving day at verst --exploration and blockhouse building--first occupation of bolsheozerki--airplane bombs our own front line troops--year's end push on plesetskaya fiasco--nichols makes railroad sector impregnable--bolo patrol blows up our big six--heavy drive by reds at winter's end--"i" company relieves french-russian force--valorous conduct of men gives lie to charges of loss of morale. in the narrative telling of the fighting on the vaga and dvina, we have already seen that the red guards had disillusioned us in regard to the quiet winter campaign we hoped and expected. now we shall resume the story of the railroad, or vologda force, as it had become known, and tell of the attempted allied push on plesetskaya to relieve the pressure on the river fronts. after our digging in at verst in early november, a company of liverpools came from economia to aid the french infantry and american and french machine gunners, supported by french artillery, to hold that winter front. the american units who had fought on the railroad in the fall were all given ten days rest in archangel. soon the americans were once more back on the front. and it started off uneventful. a french officer, colonel lucas, had come into command of the vologda force. american units were generously supplied with the french chauchat automatic rifles, and ammunition for them, and with french rifles and tromblons to throw the rifle grenades. earnest business of learning to use them. those who were stationed at field headquarters of the front sector of the vologda force, which was at verst , will recollect with great pleasure the thanksgiving day half-holiday and program arranged by major nichols, commanding the american forces. he gave us miss ogden, the y. w. c. a. woman from d. o. u. s. a. to read president wilson's proclamation. how strange it seemed to us soldiers standing there under arms. and major moodie the old veteran of many a british campaign, and friend of kitchener, the good old story teller praised the boys and prayed with them. major nichols and major alabernarde spoke cheering and bracing words to the assembled american and french soldiers. it was an occasion that raised fighting morale. the president's thanksgiving proclamation was transmitted to the american troops in russia through the office of the american embassy. the soldiers listened intently to the words of mr. de witt c. poole, jr., the american charge d'affaires who since the departure of ambassador francis, was the american diplomatic representative in european russia. his message was as follows: "the military command has been asked to make this day a holiday for the troops, so far as military requirements permit, and to communicate to them upon an occasion fraught with tradition and historical memories, the hearty greetings of all americans who are working with them in northern russia. "the american embassy desires the troops to know that both here and at washington there is a full understanding of the difficulties of the work which they are being called upon to do and a desire no less ardent than their own that they should realize as soon as possible the blessings of the peace which is foreshadowed by the armistice on the western front." the chief note in the president's proclamation which lingered on the doughboy's ear was as follows: "our gallant armies have participated in a triumph which is not marred or stained by any purpose of selfish aggression. in a righteous cause they have won immortal glory and have nobly served their nation in serving mankind." work of building blockhouses went rapidly forward under the steady work of the th engineers and the cheerful labor of the infantrymen who found the occupation of swinging axes and hauling logs through the snow to be not unpleasant exercise in the stinging winter weather that was closing down. a commodious building began to go up at for the y. m. c. a. french-russian force under a terrific bombardment and barrage of machine to use for winter entertainments for the men stationed in that stronghold. exploration of the now more available winter swamp trails went on carefully. the chain of lakes and swamps several miles to the west ran north from sheleksa concentration camp of the bolos to bolsheozerki, parallel to the railroad line of operations. this bolsheozerki was an important point on the government road which went from obozerskaya to onega. it was thought wise to protect this village as in winter mail would have to be sent out of archangel by way of obozerskaya, via onega, via kem, via kola, the open winter port on the murmansk coast hundreds of miles away to the west and north. and troops might be brought in, too. a look at the map will discover the strategic value of this point bolsheozerki. american and french troops now began to alternate in the occupation of that cluster of villages. a sergeant of "m" company might tell about the neat villages, about the evidences of a higher type than usual of agriculture in the broad clearing, about the fishing nets and wood cutters' tools, and last, but not least about the big schoolhouse and the winsome barishna who taught the primary room. nothing more than an occasional patrol or artillery exchange took place on the railroad although there was an occasional flurry when the british intelligence officers found out that the reds were plotting a raid or a general attack. it was known that they had begun to augment their forces on our front. sound of their axes had been as constant on the other side of no man's land as it had on our side. they were erecting blockhouses for the winter. occasionally their airplanes exchanged visits with ours, always dropping a present for us. no casualties resulted from their bombs directed at us. unfortunately one day our bombing plane mistook our front line for the red front line and dropped two big bombs on our own position and caused one death and one severe wound. the accident happened just as an american company was being relieved by a french company. and it was a good thing the commander of the company consumed the remainder of the day in getting his excited and enraged men back to obozerskaya because by that time the men were cooled off and the nervous royal air force had no occasion to use its rifles in self-defense as it had prepared to do. they wisely stayed inside, as in fact did the few other english sergeants and enlisted men at obozerskaya that ticklish night. the few wild yanks who roamed the dark, without pass, had all the room and road. there was a particularly good mission at once found for this american company on another front, whether by design or by coincidence. a board of officers whitewashed the canadian flyers of the royal air force and the incident was closed. of course all the accidents did not happen to americans. during the winter on the railroad, a sad one happened to a fine british officer. a brooding enlisted man of the american medical corps went insane one dark night and craftily securing a rifle held up the first englishman he found. he roundly berated the british officer with being the cause of the north russian war on the bolsheviki, told the puzzled but patiently listening officer to say a prayer and then suddenly blew off the poor man's head and himself went off his nut completely. with the beginning of the winter campaign pletsetskaya's importance to the red army began to loom up. trotsky's forces could be readily supplied from that city and his forces could be swiftly shifted from front to front to attack the widely dispersed forces of the allied expedition. it was seen now clearly that the fall offensive should have been pushed through to plesetskaya by the converging onega, railroad and kodish forces. and plans were made to retrieve the error by putting on a determined push late in december to take plesetskaya and reverse the strategic situation so as to favor the allied expeditionary forces. the onega force was to make a strong diversion toward the bolo extreme left; the kodish force was to smash through kodish to kochmas assisted by a heavy force of russians and english operating on and through gora and taresevo, and thence to plesetskaya; the french-trained company of russian courier-du-bois were to go on snow shoes through the snow from obozerskaya to the rear of emtsa for a surprise attack; and timed with all these was the drive of the americans and british liverpools on the railroad straight at the bolo fortifications at verst and emtsa. study of the big map will show that the plan had its merits. there were one or two things wrong with the plan. one was that it underestimated the increased strength of the bolshevik forces both in numbers and in morale and discipline. the other was the erroneous estimate of the time required to make the distances in the deep snow. of course it was not the fault of the plan that the information leaked out and disaffected men deserted the allied russian auxiliaries' ranks and tipped off the push to the bolsheviki. the story of the new year's battles by "h" on the one hand and "k" on the other have been told. it remains to relate here the "railroad push" fiasco. the courier-du-bois got stuck in the deep snow, exhausted and beaten before they were anywhere near emtsa. american machine gun men at verst front reported that s. b. a. l. deserters had gone over to the bolo lines. the reds on december th and th became very active with their artillery. reports came in of the failure of the russian-british force that was to attack tarsevo, and of the counter attack of the reds in the onega valley. so the liverpools and the french company and winslow's "i" company and lt. donovan's combination company of two platoons of "g" and "m" who were all set for the smash toward emtsa and plesetskaya found their orders suddenly countermanded on december st and settled down to the routine winter defensive. in order to facilitate troop movements and to make command more compact, the french colonel in command of the railroad force arranged that the americans should man the sectors of defense during the month of february all alone and that the french battalion should occupy in march. this worked out fairly satisfactory. "l" company and half of "e" company, after rest at archangel from their desperate work at kodish, joined "i" company and half of "g" company on the railroad under major nichols, where an uneventful but busy month was passed in patrolling, instruction and so forth. every sector of the railroad front was made practically impregnable to infantry attack by the energetic work of "a" and "b" company engineers and the pioneer platoon of headquarters company. and the dugouts which they constructed at verst proved during the intermittent artillery shelling of january-march to be proof against the biggest h. e. the bolo threw. major nichols sure drove the job of fortification through with thoroughness and secured a very formidable array of all sorts of weapons of defense. a great naval gun that could shoot twenty versts was mounted on an american flat car and taken to his popular field headquarters at verst , where it was the pet of the crew of russian sailors. and constant instruction and practice with the various weapons of the british, french and russian types, which were in the hands of the americans gave them occupation during the many days of tension on this winter front, where they daily expected the same thing to happen that was overpowering their comrades on the river fronts. and when at the very end of the winter and the break of spring, the reds did come in great force the defenses were so strong and well manned that they held at every point. in march the french had a little excitement while the battalion of americans were at rest in archangel. a daring bolshevik patrol in force circumnavigated through the deep snow of the pine woods on skiis and surprised the poilu defenders of their favorite howitzer on the railway track, killing several and capturing the big six-inch trouble maker. they destroyed it by feeding it a german hand grenade and then made their getaway. successes on other fronts seemed to stimulate the bolos to try out the defenses on this hitherto very quiet front. they gave the frenchies lots of trouble with their raiding parties. whether the fact that the french had local russian troops with them had anything to do with the renewal of activity is not provable, but it seems probable, judging from the hatred seen expressed between bolos and anti-bolsheviks on other fronts that winter. and before the month of march was gone, major nichols was hurried back to the railroad front, taking "l" and "e" companies with him. the french-russian forces were in trouble. they had lost the strategic bolsheozerki, story of the severe fighting about which will form a separate chapter. rumor has it that the russian troops on the front were demoralized and that the enemy would strike before the americans could get there to relieve the french-russian force. general ironside himself went to the railroad and the new bolsheozerki front and saw that quick action only could save the situation. he gave major nichols free hand with his battalion and released "e" company which was on the bolsheozerki front by sending "m" company to the desperate spot. nichols with characteristic decisiveness determined to make the relief before the set time and have his own men meet the attack. it worked at all points. at verst , the very front, "i" company gallantly went in to relieve the french and russian under artillery barrage and a heavy machine gun barrage together with a heavy infantry attack on one flank. this company which has been unjustly accused of having mutinied the day before at archangel, was on this day and three succeeding days subjected to all the fury of attack that the red army commander had been mustering up for so many days to crush the french-russian force. and "i" company supported by the french artillery, by machine gun and trench mortar men, stood the reds off with great resolution and inflicted terrible losses. the railroad front line was saved. the flank position gained by the reds at bolsheozerki would be of doubtful value to them as long as the railroad sectors held. the stoutness of the american defenses and the stoutness of their morale had both been vindicated in terrific battle action. and hereafter any veteran of the winter campaign fighting the bolsheviki, who still meets the false story of alleged mutiny of one of the companies of the th infantry in archangel, a false story that will not down even after emphatic denial by high army authorities who investigated the reports that slipped out to the world over the british cables, may ignore the charges as distortions which partisans who are pro-bolshevik are in the habit of giving currency with the vain idea of trying to show that the bolshevik propaganda convinced the american soldier. they may refer to this valorous battle action of the alleged mutinous company and to shining examples of its morale and valor in the long fall and winter campaign fighting the bolsheviki. the story of the discontent which gave rise to the false story is told elsewhere. in this connection the editors wish to add further that in their estimation the morale of this fighting company and of the other american units was remarkably good. and the story of this "i" company going in to relieve the french-russian force under a terrific bombardment and barrage of machine guns, the distant roar of which was heard for three days and nights by the writer who was on an adjoining front, has not been told with complete emphasis to the good fighting spirit of captain winslow's men. we would like to make it stronger. the winter drive of the reds on the railroad merged into their spring raids and threats. the french soldiers did not return again to the front and the americans stayed on. major nichols began breaking in units of the new archangel government troops who served alongside the yanks and were in the spring to relieve the american entirely. xxiii bolsheozerki bolsheozerki one-reel thriller--brilliant strategy of trotsky's northern army commander--general ironside and major nichols take personal command of critical situation--twelve miles out in woods with five pieces of artillery--"m" company relieves "e"--little force beleaguered for days--three invincible days and nights--reds ambush several parties--enemy baffled and punished dreadfully--american pluck and luck triumph. bolsheozerki was a one reel thriller. kodish had been a repetition of nightmares both for the reds and the yanks. shenkursk had been a five act drama the tragic end of which had been destined when the americans were ordered to dig in so far forward, isolated from the supporting forces. this last front, bolsheozerki, sprang suddenly into acute importance in march just at the end of winter and was savagely fought. the brilliant strategy of the bolo northern army commander, general kuropatkin, in sending a bolo general with a great flying wedge between the onega force and the railroad force was executed with a surprisingly swift flank movement that caught the french napping at the lightly held bolsheozerki position, march - . their force was annihilated, a convoy was captured, and the old priest of the area came fleeing to obozerskaya with news of this enemy drive that would soon, unless checked, capture obozerskaya, and thus pierce a vital point of the whole archangel defense. the railroad front sectors would be cut off, seletskoe would be pinched, and the river fronts taken in rear if obozerskaya with its stores, munitions and transportation fell into the hands of the bolsheviki. general ironside hastened to obozerskaya to take personal command. the french colonel commanding there had himself been cut off at chinova on the west side of bolsheozerki and had failed to fight his way through the next day, march th, with an escort of "h" company men, story of which is related elsewhere. ironside ordered up three companies of yorks and a polish company, who had been on the road from onega to bolsheozerki to join the americans at chinova for a smash at the gathering reds in bolsheozerki. their gallant but futile fight with its hard losses on march rd, from the enemy fire and winter frost has been told. meanwhile general ironside hurried out an american company from archangel together with an archangel regiment company and eighty yorks and some of the french legion courier du bois to make an attack on the reds at the same time on their other flank. but the reds had their artillery all set to command the road at verst and threw the russian troops into confusion with severe losses. "e" company of americans resolutely floundered for hours through the five-foot snow to reach a distant viewpoint of the village of bolsheozerki where they could hear the furious action between "h" and the reds on the farther side, but by field telephone, were ordered by colonel guard to return to verst on the road and dig in. for a few days both sides used the winter sleigh roads for all they were worth in bringing up artillery and supplies and men and wire, and so forth. the reds had sixty versts to haul their loads but they had the most horses, which they used without mercy. an american soldier who was ambushed and taken prisoner during this fighting says that he never saw before nor since so many dead horses, starved and overdriven, as he saw on the winter trail south from bolsheozerki. the reds brought up artillery enough to cover approaches to both their west and east fronts where the allied forces were menacing them. ironside ordered out five pieces of french-russian artillery, a hazardous but necessary move. these guns were set along the snowpacked broad corduroy highway near verst , twelve miles from obozerskaya, and four miles from the overwhelming force of bolsheviks. day and night the old howitzer, with airplane observation, roared defiance at bolsheozerki and the russian 's barked viciously first at the village positions of the reds and then at their wood's artillery and infantry positions which the reds were pushing forward at this devoted allied force that stood resolutely between them and obozerskaya. fresh companies of americans and russians relieved those who were shivering and exhausted in the snow camp at verst . company "c," th engineers platoon, hastily threw up barricades of logs for the doughboys and before the day of attack, had completed two of the several projected blockhouses. part of them, who had not been sent back to build the second defense position that now seemed inevitable, were found with the doughboys, rifle in hand, during the desperate days that followed. the company of yanks who now took over the active defense of this camp, "m" company, was a resourceful outfit which soon improved its barricades and built brush shelters within which they could conceal their warm fires. by their reputation as fighters and by their optimism they won the spirited support of the green russian supporting company. and the machine gun crews of russians who stood with the americans at the critical front and rear road positions did themselves proud. every day made the verst position less hazardous. the reds made a mistake in waiting to mass up a huge force, seven thousand--their prisoners and their own newspapers afterward admitted. if they had struck quickly after march rd the allied force would have soon been out of ammunition and been compelled to retire. but during the days devoted to massing up the red forces and working around through the deep snow to attack the rear of the verst camp, the allied force of two hundred americans and four hundred allied troops, mostly russians, were stocked up with food and munitions and artillery shells sufficient to stand against a desperate, continuous onslaught. and they did. came then the three days' continuous attack by the enemy in his determined attempt to gain possession of the road so as to be able to move his artillery over it to attack obozerskaya. his men could travel light through the woods on skiis but to get artillery and the heavy munitions across he must have that one road. he must first dispose of the stubborn force in the road at verst . for this attack, he used three regiments. the nd moscow, whose commissar we took prisoner the first day; the th saratov whose commanding officer was shot from his white horse the second day; and the nd kasan. the first day's fight began, on the morning of the last day of march with a surprise attack at the rear, cutting our communications off, ambushing two parties of officers and men, and threatening to capture the two 's which were guarded by a single platoon of "m" company and two russian machine guns. the artillery officer reversed his guns and gave the enemy direct fire, shrapnel set for muzzle burst. another platoon reinforced the one and a lewis gun corporal distinguished himself by engaging the two bolo machine guns that had been set in the road to the rear. the guns were held. meanwhile under cover of this attack at the rear a heavy assault was delivered against the forward blockhouses and barricades. fortunately the reds directed their attack at the points held by the americans rather than at the four flank positions held by the green archangel troops. the shooting was good that day for the veteran yanks and they repulsed all attacks at front and rear with terrible losses to the enemy. night found the americans shaking hands with themselves for being in a tightly fortified place and carrying plenty more ammunition to every firing point where the enemy was expected to appear again the next day. according to the prisoners taken this was only a preliminary attack to develop our lines of fire. the next day he would envelop the little force in great numbers. he did. at day-break, : a. m., april st, he threw his weight into three waves of assault on the front line and attacked later in the rear. the stoutly fortified men did not budge but worked every death dealing weapon with great severity. rifle grenades came into use as the enemy by sheer weight of masses surged within their -yard range. the machine guns faltered only once and then a yankee corporal, william russell, company "m" th infantry, won for himself a posthumous american citation and d. s. c. for his heroic deed in regaining fire control by engaging the enemy machine gun which crawled up to short range in the thick woods with his lewis gun. the russian artillery observer distinguished himself by his accuracy in covering the enemy assaulting lines with shrapnel. as on the preceding day every attacking line of the enemy was repulsed. and darkness closed the scene at : p. m. with the little force still intact but standing to arms all night, front, flanks and rear. the cold was severe but the bolsheviki lying on their arms out in the snow where their assaulting lines faltered and dug in, suffered even more and many crawled in to give themselves up rather than freeze. back to their camp they could not go for they had been promised the usual machine gun reception if they retired from the fight. that probably accounts for their commanding officer's riding up on his white horse to his death. he thought his men had won their objective when fire ceased for an hour in the middle of the day, and he rode almost to our barricade. this was the fiercest fighting. the all night's vigil did not bring a renewal of the attack till after the bolo artillery gave the position two thorough rakings which destroyed one of the barricades and drove everyone to shelter behind the pine trees. then the infantry attack petered out before noon. this was the day that "h" company and the yorks again attacked on the other side of bolsheozerki, with the severe losses mentioned elsewhere. but their attack helped the badly wearied "m" company who stood bearing the brunt of attack in the bolo's road to obozerskaya. their artillery vigorously shelled the reds in bolsheozerki and felt out his advance lines with patrols but were content mainly to stand fast to their works and congratulate themselves that their losses had been so slight after so terrific a struggle. the horse shoes had again been with that outfit of americans. three dead, three missing in action, one wounded and three shell shocked. the yorks and russians suffered no casualties. the ground was covered with bolshevik dead. on the night of april th the american company was relieved by a company of yorks and an additional company of russians, and for a few more days the bolos occupied bolsheozerki but they had shot their bolt. they made no more attempts to break through to the railroad and take obozerskaya. savagely the red guards had three times resisted attempts to dislodge them from bolsheozerki. just as stubbornly and with terrible deadliness the little force at verst had held the reds in bolsheozerki when they tried to move upon obozerskaya. and when the april sun began to soften the winter roads into slush he had to feint an attack on volshenitsa and escape between two days from bolsheozerki, returning to shelaxa. the americans had never had such shooting. they knew the enemy losses were great from the numbers of bodies found and from statements of prisoners and deserters. later accounts of our american soldiers who were ambushed and captured, together with statements that appeared in bolshevik newspapers placed the losses very high. the old russian general massed up in all over seven thousand men in this spectacular and well-nigh successful thrust. and his losses from killed in action, wounded, missing and frost-bitten were admitted by the bolshevik reports to be over two thousand. it was in this fighting that bolshevik prisoners were taken in almost frozen condition to the american y. m. c. a. man's tent for a drink of hot chocolate which he was serving to the americans, yorks, russians and all during those tight days. and the genial frank olmstead was recognized by the prisoners as a "y" man who had been in the interior of russia in the days when russians were not fighting americans but germans. to the doughboy or medic or engineer who stood there at bay those three invincible days, bolsheozerki means deep snow, bitter cold, cheerless tents, whiz-bangs, high explosive, shrap, rat-tat-tat interminable, roar and crash, and zipp and pop of explosive bullet, with catch-as-catch-can at eats, arms lugged off with cases of ammunition, constant tension, that all ended up with luck to the plucky. [illustration: sentry in forest outlined by bright light (fire?) in background.] red cross photo flashlight of a doughboy outpost at verst [illustration: group of soldier admiring a sword.] u.s. official photo bolo commander's sword taken in battle of bolsheozerki [illustration: five smiling soldiers.] u.s. official photo after eight days--near bolsheozerki [illustration: several soldiers standing in deep snow.] u.s. official photo wood pile strong point--verst [illustration: about rail cars near a small siding.] u.s. official photo verst --"fort nichols" [illustration: six soldiers in white coveralls standing in front of log building.] wagner back from patrol [illustration: explosion in clearing of snow covered forest.] u s. official photo our shell bursts near bolo skirmish line [illustration: four soldiers standing in front of snow covered log shed.] wagner blockhouse, shred makrenga xxiv letting go the tail-holt preparing for spring defensive--river situation ticklish--must hold till our gunboats can get up--"f" company crosses river on cracking ice--canadian artillery well placed and effectively handled holds off red flotilla--engineers help clear dvina with dynamite--joyful arrival of british gunboat "glow worm"--we retake ignatavskaya--amusing yet dangerous fishing party--british relief forces arrive on vaga--toulgas is lost and retaken--british-russian drive at karpogora fails--old white guard pinega troops hold their city against red drive again--kodish and onega fronts quiet--railroad front active but no heavy fighting-- general richardson helps us let go tail-holt. many an uncomfortable hour in the winter general ironside and his staff spent studying over the spring defense against the reds. it was well known that the snows would melt and ice would loosen on the distant southern river valley heights and as customary the river from kotlas to toulgas would be open to the red gunboats several days before the ice would be released in the lower river stretches, necessary to permit the allied fleets of gunboats to come in from the arctic ocean and go up to help defend the advanced positions on the dvina and vaga upper river fronts. it was feared that red heavy artillery would blow our fortified positions into bits, force our evacuation at a time when there was no such thing as transportation except by the rivers. these would be for a few days in control of the reds. thus our americans and allies who had so gallantly reddened the snows with their stern defense in the winter might find themselves at the mercy of the reds. every effort was made to improve the shell-proof dugouts. engineers and doughboys slaved at the toil. wire was hurried for the double apron defenses on which to catch the mass attacks of the bolsheviki. supplies were stored at every point for sixty days so that a siege could be stood. and an allied fleet was arranged to come as soon as the icebreakers could get them through the choked-up neck of the white sea. and meanwhile the canadian artillery was strengthened with the hope that they could oppose the red fleets and delay them till the river opened to passage of the allied fleets coming to save the troops. the battle-worn veterans of "a" and "d" were strengthened by the men of "f" company who had come into the front lines in march and now were bearing their full share and then some of the winter's end defense against the red pressure. cossack allies and archangel regiments also were added to the russian quotas that had done service on those fronts in the winter. russian artillery units also were sent to toulgas. in every way possible these desperate fronts were prepared to meet the heralded spring drive of the red guards. as the ice and snow daily disappeared more and more americans began arranging "booby traps" and dummy machine gun posts in the woods. these machine gun posts were prepared by fastening a bucket of water with a small hole punched in the bottom above another bucket which was tied to the trigger of a machine gun or rifle. the amount of water could be regulated so as to cause the gun to fire at regular intervals of from thirty minutes to an hour. through the woods we strung concealed wires and sticks attached to hand grenades, the slightest touch of which would cause them to explode. meanwhile in the rear, "b" company engineers, who had relieved "a" company engineers, were busily engaged in stuffing gun cotton, explosives and inflammable material in every building and shed at kitsa and maximovskaya. on april nineteenth the ice in the vaga was heaving and cracking. kitsa, the doomed kitsa, where the yanks and scots and canadians alternately had held on so many days, expecting any time another overwhelming attack, was at this time being held by "f" company. but the british officer in command had delayed his order to evacuate till captain ramsay was barely able to lead his men across. one more foolhardy day of delay would have lost the british officer a company of much needed troops. sharp on the hour of midnight april th "f" company silently withdrew from the front line positions and started across the river, the ice of which was already beginning to move. as they marched through the inky darkness of the woods the dummy guns began discharging which kept the enemy deceived as to our movements. as the last man crossed the river a rocket went up as a signal to the engineers that "f" company and the other infantry units had arrived safely at ignatavskaya. the following moment the entire surrounding country shook to a series of terrific explosions both at kitsa and maximovskaya and then a great red glare emblazoned the sky as the two oil soaked villages burst into flame. the engineers quickly joined the party and from then on until the following morning they continued in a forced march back to prepared positions at mala-beresnik and nizhni kitsa on opposite sides of the river about eight versts in rear of kitsa. the positions here were a godsend after our experience of the past two months in the open and exposed positions further up the river. here for more than two months hundreds of russian laborers had been busily engaged in stringing mile after mile of barbed wire about the positions and constructed practically bomb-proof shelters. furthermore, our artillery commanded a good view of the river, which was all important, for as the ice was now moving out we knew that the enemy gunboats would soon come steaming down river with nothing but land batteries to stop them since the mouth of the dvina and the white sea would not be free from ice for several weeks to come, thus making it impossible for our gunboats there to get down to these positions. and the ice went out of the upper river with a crunching roar. the reds came on with their water attacks, but with little success. the canadian artillery was well prepared and so well manned that it beat the red flotilla badly. fortunately the bolo gunners were not as accurate as on former occasions. so losses from this source were comparatively few. the lower dvina was unusually rapid in clearing this spring. the th engineers had assisted by use of dynamite. the red army command had counted on three weeks to press his water attacks. but by may tenth gunboats had gone up the dvina to help batter toulgas into submission. and when on may seventeenth commander worlsley of antarctic fame went steaming up the vaga on board the "glow worm," a heavily armed river gunboat, the worries of the americans in the battle-scarred vaga column were at an end. with the gunboats now at their disposal the morale of all ranks was greatly improved and it was thereupon decided to retake the position at ignatavskaya immediately across the river from kitsa, which position was held by the enemy, giving him the opportunity of sheltering thousands of his troops there with his artillery on the opposite side of the river to further protect them. on the morning of may th several strong patrols went forward into the woods in the direction of the enemy and quickly succeeded in gaining contact with his outposts. the bolo must have sensed some activity for at : a. m. he commenced a violent artillery bombardment. shortly thereafter his airplanes came flying over our lines and machine-gunned our trenches. the men had long since become so accustomed to this little by-play that they gave it little consideration other than keeping well under cover. others even gave it less regard, as the following amusing incident indicates: during the shelling of that morning a great number of enemy shells exploded in the river and these explosions immediately brought large numbers of fish to the surface. the company cook, seeing such a splendid opportunity to replenish the company larder, crawled down to the edge of the river, jumped into a rowboat and soon was occupied in filling his boat with fish, utterly disregardful of the intermittent shelling and sniping. that evening, needless to say, the cook was the most popular man in his company. at : p. m. the boats brought down battalion after battalion of fresh russian troops from zaboria who were landed near our positions under cover preparatory to the attack on ignatavskaya. it might be well to mention here that at this time of the year the arctic sun was practically shining the entire twenty-four hours, only about midnight barely disappearing below the rim of the horizon, making it dark enough in the woods in the dull twilight to advance without observation. at midnight the infantry pushed forward along the road toward the bolo outpost positions. american infantry also covered the opposite bank of the river. our guns on the river in conjunction with the land batteries immediately opened up with a terrific bombardment, shelling the bolo positions for twenty minutes until the infantry had gained the outposts of the village and a few moments later when the barrage had lifted they entered ignatavskaya, which had been in the hands of the enemy for more than a month. our attack took the enemy clearly by surprise, for in the village itself we found great numbers of enemy dead and wounded, who had been caught under our curtain of fire from the artillery, and for the next several days we were busy in bringing in other wounded men and prisoners from the surrounding woods, estimated at more than two hundred alone. we quickly consolidated the new position with our old ones and patiently sat tight, awaiting the coming of the new british reinforcements, which had by this time landed in archangel. from this time on our fighting was practically at an end on the vaga river. over on the dvina during the months of march and april, "b" and "c" company were still holding forth at toulgas and kurgomin far up the river. they were daily employed in patrol and defensive duty. the bolo had acquired a healthy respect for these positions after his terrible repulses on this front during the winter. in fact, so strong was this position here that by april we had gradually begun relieving american troops at toulgas and supplanting them, about five to one, by fresh russian troops from archangel, who subsequently fell before the most vicious and deadly of all the enemy weapons--bolshevik propaganda. during the night of april and , these russian troops who had been secretly conniving with the red spies and agents, suddenly revolted, turned their guns on their own as well as the british officers there, and allowed the enemy lurking in the woods to walk unmolested into the positions that months of shelling and storm attacks had failed to shake. true, some of the russians, especially the artillery men, remained loyal and by superhuman efforts succeeded in withdrawing with some equipment and guns to shushuga on the same side of the river. yorkshire troops and machine gunners were quickly rushed up to bolster up these loyal men and a few days later retribution swift and terrible was visited upon the deserters and their newly made comrades. shortly prior to the defection of the troops in toulgas, and unknown to them, a battery of large six-inch guns had been brought up to the artillery position at kurgomin on the opposite side of the river, which, with the guns already in position there, made it one of our strongest artillery positions. the enemy was given ample time in which to fully occupy the position at toulgas, which he at once proceeded to do. on the th day of april our artillery suddenly opened fire on toulgas and at the same time dropped a curtain barrage on the far side of the village, making retreat practically impossible. during this time thousands of shells of high explosive gas and shrapnel were placed in the village proper with telling effect. unable to go forward or back, we inflicted enormous losses upon the enemy, and shortly thereafter the loyal russians, supported by english infantrymen, entered the village, putting the remaining numbers to flight and once again toulgas was ours. with the settling of the roads and trails the enemy was able to mass up forces and continue his harrying tactics but could make no impression on the allied lines. americans were gradually withdrawn from the front lines and russians served along with the liverpools and yorks, who were now looking every week for the promised volunteers from england who were to relieve not only the americans but the liverpools and yorks and other british troops in north russia. "f" company was active in patrolling during the month of may and reported last combat patrol with enemy near kitsa on may twentieth. this company of americans had been the last one to get into action in the fall and enjoyed the distinction of being the last one to leave the front, leaving on june for archangel. meanwhile the spring drive of the red guards who had massed up near trufanagora on the pinega river was menacing pinega. after the americans had been withdrawn from that area in march for duty on another front, pinega forces under command of colonel deliktorski were augmented by the previously mentioned "charlie" tschaplan, now a russian colonel with three companies, and supported by another section of russian artillery. also an old british veteran of the mesopotamian campaign, personal friend of general ironside, was sent out to leunova to take command of a joint drive at the bolsheviki. he had with him the well-known colonel edwards with his asiatic troops, the chinese coolies who had put on the s. b. a. l. uniform, and a valorous company of british troops equipped with skiis and sleds to make the great adventurous forest march across the broad base of the big inverted v so as to cut the reds off far in their rear near karpogora. but that british-russian adventure resulted disastrously. two british officers lost their lives and their troops were nearly frozen in the woods and badly cut up by the reds who had been all set for them with a murderous battery of machine guns. too late the british-russian command of the pinega valley found that the americans had been right in their strategy which had not failed to properly estimate the bolo strength and to properly measure the enormous labor and hardship of the cross-forest snows. again the enthusiastic and fearless but woefully reckless russian colonel and english colonel threw their men into death traps as they had done previously on other fronts. with success in defense the reds gained their nerve back and again, as in december, january and february, began a drive on pinega. then the stoutness of the city's white guard defenses and their morale was put to the test. "k" company men at kholmogori waited with anxiety for the decision, for if pinega fell then, red troops would press down the river to threaten kholmogori, which, though safe from winter attack because of the blockhouses built by american engineers and doughboys, would be at the mercy of the gunboats the reds were reported to have rigged up with guns sent over from kotlas. but the pinega artillery and machine guns and the stout barricades of the pelegor and kuligor infantrymen held out, though one of the gallant russian officers, who had won the admiration of the americans in the winter by continuing daily on duty with his machine gun company after he had been wounded severely in the arm, now fell among his men. later allied gunboats ascended the pinega river and that area was once more restored to safety. spring thaw-up severed the red communications with kotlas, which was on the dvina. the bolsheviki in the upper pinega could no longer maintain an offensive operation. archangel was relieved from the menace on its left. with the vaga and dvina rivers now so well protected by the naval forces of the allies, the bolo drives up the kodish-seletskoe road were now no longer of much strategic importance to them. in the latter part of the winter they had hopes of themselves controlling the water. then they had put on drives at shred mekhrenga and at the kodish front but with severe losses and no gains. now in the spring the warfare was reduced to combat patrol actions with an occasional raid, most of the aggressive being taken by our allies, the cossacks, and russian archangel troops. on the onega the spring was very quiet after the reds withdrew their huge force from bolsheozerki april . they withdrew under cover of a feinted attack in force on volshenitsa, which was on the other flank of the railroad force. with the opening of archangel harbor the onega-oborzerskaya road was no longer of so vital importance to us and the reds' one savage thrust at it just at the close of winter, as related already, was their last drive. "h" company had a quiet time during the remaining april and may days. and that company of men deserved the rest. on the railroad the coming of spring meant the renewal of activities. for us it meant constant combat patrols and daily artillery duels. however, the bolshevik seemed to be discouraged over his failure at the end of winter. his heralded may day drive did not materialize. we brought our russian infantrymen and machine gunners up to the front sectors, gradually displacing americans until finally on may seventh major nichols was relieved at verst --it should have been re-christened fort nichols--by colonel akutin, whose russian troops took over the active defense of the front, with the americans at obozerskaya in reserve. at this place and at bolsheozerki, "g", "l", "m", "i", and "e" companies in the order named at the end of may, together with machine gun company platoons, were relieved by british and russian troops. american engineers also withdrew from this front just about the time that the first battalion and "f" company were embarking from beresnik and "k" company was steaming out of yemeskoe and kholmogori for archangel. most of the boys of the first battalion had been up the river for months and had never seen the streets of archangel. one of the interesting features of the spring defensive was the arrival of general wilds p. richardson from france to take command of all american forces during the remainder of the time we were in north russia. he arrived on a powerful ice-breaker which cut its way into archangel on april seventeenth. at that time we were still running trains across the dvina river on the railroad track laid on the ice, and continued to do so for several days. general richardson, veteran of many years of service in alaska, immediately made his way to the various fronts. at verst on the railroad he said in part to the soldiers assembled there for his inspection: "when i was detailed to come to north russia, general pershing, commander-in-chief of the a. e. f., told me that he desired me to come up to command the troops, help out if i could, and to cheer them up, as he had an idea that you thought you had been overlooked and forgotten, and were not part of the a. e. f. when i arrived here i found a telegram from general pershing stating briefly all that i could have said, more and, better, and i only want to emphasize to you that which was sent out and published, that your comrades in france have been doing wonderful work just as well as you have up here. your people are pleased and proud of you. they have not forgotten you, nor has the a. e. f. in france. they want to see you come home as soon as you can, with the right spirit and without any act by company or individual that you will be ashamed of. you are here to do a certain duty, determined by the highest authority in our country and in others of our allies, and by the best minds in the world in connection with this great war which we have been waging and were drawn into through no fault of our own. "while the th and other detachments that have come with them to perform a share of the work in north russia seemed far away and at times you perhaps felt lonely and that you were not getting the same consideration, you still were as much a part of the game, as far as forces stand, as any portion of the western front. "remember, you are americans in a foreign country taking part in a great game, making history which will be written and talked of for generations, doing your duty as best you can so as to maintain the highest standard that the army has attained in europe." general pershing's telegram as transmitted to the americans fighting the bolsheviki in, north russia was as follows: "inform our troops that all america resounds with praise of the splendid record that the american expeditionary forces have made. the reputation of the american soldier for valor and for splendid discipline under the most trying conditions has endeared every member of the expeditionary forces not only to his relatives and friends but to all americans. their comrades in france have not forgotten that the americans in northern russia are part of the american expeditionary forces, and we are proud to transmit to you the generous praise of the american people. i feel sure that every soldier in northern russia will join his comrades here in the high resolve of returning to america with unblemished reputations. i wish every soldier in northern russia to know that i fully appreciate that his hardships have continued long after those endured by our soldiers in france and that every effort is being made to relieve the conditions in the north at the earliest possible moment." the americans had let go the tail holt. the spring defensive had been surprisingly easy after the desperate winter defensive with the persistently heralded threats of trotsky's northern army to punish the invaders with annihilation. in fact, there was a suspicion that the reds were content to merely harry the americans, but not to take any more losses going against them, preferring to wait till they had gone and then deal with the archangel regiments of some twenty-five thousand and the british troops coming out from england. probably if the truth were known kolchak and denikin were in the spring of taking much of trotsky's attention. they were getting the grain fields of russia that the reds needed, which was of more importance than the possession of the archangel province. then there was the political side of the case. the peace conference was struggling with the russian problem. lenine and trotsky could well afford to deal not too violently and crushingly with the allied troops in the north of russia while they were with both open and underground diplomacy and propaganda seeking to get recognition of their rule. anyway, we found ourselves letting go that tail holt which in the winter had seemed to be all that the detroit news cartoonist pictured it, "h--- to hang on, and death to let loose." and we did not get many more bad scratches or bites from the bolo bob-cat. [illustration: cartoon; american soldier holding on to the tail of a large wildcat marked "russia". an old man in the united states says "come on home, yank! what did you grab him for in the first place?" the soldiers observes "it is hell to hang on, but it's death to let loose."] the hard job is to let go from detroit news xxv the th engineers engineers busy right from start--seen on all fronts--great aid to doughboys--- occasionally obliged to join firing line--colonel morris gives interesting summary of engineer work--general ironside pays fine tribute to th engineer detachment. the th engineers went into quarters at bakaritza, september th, where it was said german agents two years before had blown up russian munitions even as they had blown many a dock in our own country. they looked mournfully at the potato fields the retreating bolos had robbed and destroyed and they fished for the one hundred motor trucks said to have been sunk in the dvina river by the reds, hoping to get the reward offered by the british. they fixed up their quarters, built sheds for the commissary and quartermaster stores of the americans and began preparations for their construction work upon the railroad and river fronts. on a dark night in october one platoon crossed the dvina in the storm thinking of g. w. crossing the delaware, and took station in solombola and began building "camp michigan." the third week in october the engineers saw the russki sleighs running about, but then came an indian summer-like period. the greater part of november was spent in making the russian box cars habitable for the soldiers and engineers on the railroad front. one american company on the railroad had hated to give up its taploo-shkas which they had fitted up for quarters, to the british units that had been weeks at archangel while they were overworked at the front. but col. stewart raised a fine hope. he ordered a detail of men from that company, resting ten days at archangel, to go to bakaritza to assist the american engineers to make a protected string of troop taplooshkas for the company. and while they were at it the engineers "found" an airplane motor and rigged up electric lights for the entire train. they set up their tiny sheet iron stoves, built there three tiers of bunks and were snug, dry, warm and light for the winter. some proud company that rode back to the front, feeling grateful to the engineers. it was zero weather when they went south just before thanksgiving to help build blockhouses and hospitals, y. m. c. a. and so forth, on the railroad. christmas found them at obozerskaya holding mass in a y. m. c. a. to usher in the day. in january this company "b" exchanged places with "a" company th engineers, who had been further forward on the railroad. there they constructed for major nichols the fine dugouts and the heavy log blockhouses which were to defy the winter's end drive and the spring shelling of the bolsheviki. on january th and th they found themselves under shell fire but suffered no casualties. in the latter part of february this "b" company of engineers responded to the great needs for new defenses on the vaga front, travelling by way of kholmogorskaya, yemetskoe and beresnik to reinforce the hard-working engineers then assisting the hard-pressed doughboys fighting their bitter retreat action. they were building defenses at kurgomin and getting ready for the opening of the river when toulgas fell, due to the treachery of the disaffected archangel russian troops. they saw the ice go out of the dvina, april th, snap shot of which is shown, and witnessed the first engagement between the british boat fleet and the red fleet in may. the greatest of camaraderie and loyalty were manifested between engineers of the th and doughboys of the th. they have been mentioned repeatedly in the narrative of battles and engagements. from the official report of lt.-col. p. s. morris, who commanded the th engineer detachment in north russia, we present the following facts of interest: the th engineers arrived in england, august rd, . the first battalion, under major p. s. morris, was detached from the regiment by verbal order of major-general biddle immediately upon arrival to cowshot camp, surrey, england, where we were equipped for the expedition. we remained under canvas until august th, , at which time we entrained for newcastle, england. on august th, the entire command left england on board h. m. s. "tydeus." the mess and quarters were clean and the food was good. the health of the men was exceptional, as none of the men contracted influenza which was very prevalent on the other three ships of the convoy. we anchored at archangel on september th, . and debarked on september th. when detached from the th engineers the entire headquarters detachment was taken with the second battalion, leaving this battalion without a non-com staff for headquarters; even the battalion sergeant-major was taken, as we were told there was no place in the table of organization for a battalion sergeant-major when the battalion is acting separately. no extra officers were furnished us. upon our arrival it was found necessary to open an engineer depot. capt. william knight, battalion adjutant, was put in charge. lieut. r. c. johnson, company "c," was detached from his company and assigned to duty as regimental adjutant, topographical officer and personnel adjutant. lieut. m. k. whyte, company "b," was assigned as supply and transportation officer. as the northern russian expedition covers a front of approximately five hundred miles and the th engineers were the only engineering troops with the expedition, the shortage of officers was a very great handicap. it was necessary to put sergeants first-class and sergeants in charge of sectors, with what engineers personnel could be spared. the shortage of officers was not relieved until april th, , when six engineer officers reported. all the engineering equipment went straight to france. we were re-equipped in england with english field company tools. the english table of organization does not include mapping or reconnaissance supplies, which were purchased in small quantities in london. upon arrival, the battalion was placed under the direction of lieut.-col. r. g. s. stokes, c. r. e., allied forces, north russia, for engineer operations and distributions of personnel. we remained under command of col. stewart, th infantry, senior american officer, for all administrative matters. there were very few engineers here at the time of our arrival and an immense amount of work to be done at the base besides furnishing engineer personnel for the forward forces in operation at the time. it was decided to place one company at the front and the two companies at the base until some of the important base work could be finished. "a" company was then ordered to the front and "b" and "c" companies remained at the base. "b" company at bakaritza and "c" company at solombola. on our arrival the forward forces consisted of three main columns or forces known as "a" force, operating on the archangel-vologda railroad, with obozerskaya as a base; "c" force, operating on the dvina and vaga rivers, with beresnik as a base; and "d" force, with seletskoe as a base. it was necessary to attach engineers to each of these forces; so one platoon of "a" company, commanded by an officer, joined "a" force; one sergeant and ten men joined "d" force, and the remainder of "a" company consisting of five officers and approximately one hundred eighty men joined "c" force, where they were divided into small detachments with each operating force. the base work consisted mainly of construction of warehouses and billets and operation of sawmills, street car systems, water works and power plants. this work was divided among "b" and "c" companies. later in the fall it became necessary to have two more columns in the field, one on the onega river with onega as a base and one on the pinega river with pinega as a base. by the time this became necessary, the rush on base work was over and "b" company was moved forward, having one detachment of one sergeant and twelve men with "d" force and one platoon with onega river column. the remainder of the company was doing construction and fortification work on the lines of communication along the railroad and roads to flanking forces. in spite of our shortage of personnel and equipment, the morale of the engineers has been the highest. they have gone about their work in a most soldier-like manner and have shown extreme gallantry in the actions in which they have participated. the engineers were found on every front, as well as at archangel, the various sub-bases, the force headquarters of the various columns, and also were found in winter at work on second and third line defenses. they often worked under fire as the narrative has indicated. at night they performed feats of engineering skill. never was a job that appalled or stumped them. they generally had the active and willing assistance of the doughboys in doing the rough work with axe and shovel and wire. the writers themselves have killed many a tedious hour out helping doughboy and engineer chop fire lanes and otherwise clear land for the field of fire. here is colonel morris' summary of the engineer work done. this includes much but not all of the doughboy engineering also. one thing the engineers, doughboys and medics did do in north russia was to demonstrate american industry: blockhouses (some of logs and some of lumber) machine gun emplacements dugouts double apron wire , yards knife rests (wire entanglement) , yards concertinas (wire entanglement) barricades (some of earth, some logs) billets (mostly of lumber) standard huts (of lumber) latrines washhouses (of lumber) warehouses (of lumber) stables (of lumber) clearing (fire lanes and field of fire) , acres railroad cars (lined and remodelled) rafts bridges (of lumber and of logs) , lineal feet roads , lineal yards trenches , yards topography--total copies of maps and designs , topography--plane table road traverses , miles in connection with their mapping work engineers took many pictures, several of which are included in this volume. all the mapping work of the expedition was done by the american engineers. see the one in this volume. the longest bridge constructed was the -foot wooden bridge which spanned the emtsa river. at verst , close to no man's land, a sixty-foot crib bridge was constructed by lieut. w. c. giffels. this work was completed in two nights and was entirely finished before the enemy knew that an advance was anticipated. not a single spike or bolt was driven on the job. railway spikes were driven into the ties behind our own lines and ties carried up and placed. finally the rails were forced in under the heads of the spikes and were permanently fastened. in this district there are three types of road--mail roads, winter roads, and trails. the mail roads are cleared about eighty feet wide through the woods. an attempt has been made at surfacing and ditching, and the bad places corduroyed. the winter roads are cleared about twenty feet wide. wherever possible they go through forestry clearings, swamps and lakes, or down rivers. for this reason they can only be used after a solid freeze-up. the trails are only cleared about six feet wide and are often impassable for a horse and sleigh. approximately four and one-half miles of road have been corduroyed by this regiment, and a considerable part of the front line roads were drained. this battalion was called upon for a great diversity of work, which it would have been impossible to do had not the men been carefully selected in the united states. company "c" was called upon to help operate the archangel power plant and street railway system the day they arrived. this they were able to do very successfully. shortly afterwards they raised and spliced a submerged power cable, used for conducting electricity under the river; one platoon was on railroad maintenance and construction work; and one platoon operated the saw mill. all the companies have been in action and have done construction work under fire. two main features have governed all our construction work; first, the large supply of timber, and second, the very cold climate. all of our barracks, washhouses, latrines, blockhouses, and stables, were designed to use available timber stocks. for a form of rapid construction we used double walls six inches apart and filled the spaces with sawdust. this proved very satisfactory and much faster than the local method which calls for a solid log construction. the supply of engineer material has presented many problems of difficulty and interest. the distance to the nearest home base, england, was two to three weeks voyage. the port was not opened to supplies until after the st of june. coupled with the necessary reshipment to the various fronts by barge and railway before the freeze-up, this caused a tremendous over-crowding of the dockage and warehouse facilities. the congestion and inevitable confusion at the port and warehouses has sometimes made it impossible to ever ascertain what had arrived. the local stocks of engineer materials are limited to what can be found in archangel itself and in the subsidiary ports of economia and bakaritza. in and , tremendous stocks of all sorts of war material were to be found here, mostly brought from england and destined for the rumanian and russian fronts. in the spring of , the bolsheviks, anticipating the allies landing, moved out to vologda and kotlas as much as they could rush out by the railway and river, and on the arrival of the first troops here not more than five per cent of the military material still remained. the materials of most use to the engineers, which still remained, were forty thousand reels of barb wire and cable. a large amount of heavy machinery was also left behind, from which we have been able to locate and put in use a considerable number of various sized electric generators. a dozen complete searchlight sets, somewhat damaged by weather, were among this equipment. we overhauled these and used them for night construction work and also used several of the generator units of these sets to illuminate the headquarters train, work train, and hospital trains employed on the railway front. the problem of transportation was one of the most difficult for us to contend with. the rail and road situations have already been explained. the country is very short of horses, the best specimens having long since been mobilized in the old russian army. with motor transportation, the situation is no better. the bolsheviks evacuated the best cars to vologda before the arrival of the expedition and it is alleged that most of those they did not get away, were run into the dvina river. the few trucks that did remain behind were in wretched condition. the british turned over two seabrook trucks to us. we made all repairs and furnished our own drivers. in addition to these two trucks, the battalion supply officer secured five more, four independently. the owners were willing to give them to us, without cost, in order to forestall their being requisitioned by the russian motor battalion. the condition of these trucks was poor. during the construction of the "michigan" barracks, the transportation was so inadequate that we were compelled to run both night and day. through our control of the makaroff sawmill, we had two tug-boats belonging to the mill, but it was only rarely that we could use them for other purposes. it was a fine record our comrades, the engineers, made in the expedition. as the ribald old marching song goes: "oh, the infantry, the infantry, with dirt behind their ears, the infantry, the infantry, that drink their weight in beers, artillery, the cavalry, the doggoned engineers, they could never lick the infantry in a hundred thousand years." but just the same the doughboy was proud to see the th engineers cited as a unit by general ironside who called the th engineers the best unit, bar none, that he had ever seen soldier in any land. he knows that without the sturdy and resourceful engineer boys with him in north russia the defense against the bolshevik army would have been impossible. xxvi "come get your pills" medical units do fine work--volunteers of old detroit red cross number eight appear in north russia as th ambulance--some unforgettable stories that make our teeth grit--wonderful work of th field hospital unit--death of powers--medical men do heroic duty. owing to the nature of the country in which the campaign was fought, the th ambulance company was not able to function as an ambulance company proper. it was split up into fifteen detachments serving in various parts of the area under conditions exactly as difficult as those described for the medical and hospital units. in fact, the three companies of men--medical, hospital, and ambulance--who ministered to the needs of the wounded and sick were very soon hopelessly mixed up on the various fronts. at first among the officers there were some heart-burnings as to the apparent incongruity of a hospital man doing field duty and an ambulance man doing hospital duty and so forth, but their american sense of humor and of humanity soon had each doing his level best wherever he might be found, whether under american or british senior officers or none. the writer remembers many a medical--or was he hospital or ambulance--man that did effective and sympathetic field service to wounded comrades with no medical officer to guide the work. the th ambulance company was originally a volunteer outfit known as no. red cross ambulance company of detroit. early in the history of the th division it came to camp custer and was trained for duty overseas. after a month in the archangel field several national army men were transferred to fill up again its depleted ranks. it was the commanding officer of this ambulance company, captain rosenfeld, who, though too strict to be popular with his outfit, was held in very high esteem by the doughboys for his vigilant attention to them. it was a sight to see him with his dope bottle of cough syrup going from post to post dosing the men who needed it. he will not be forgotten by the man who was stricken with acute appendicitis at a post where no medical detachment was stationed. he commandeered an engine and box car and ran out to the place and took the man into the field hospital himself and operated inside an hour, saving the man's life. for his gallantry in going to treat wounded men at posts which were under fire, the french commander remembered him with a citation. he is the officer whom the bolshevik artillery tried to snipe with three-inch shells, as he passed from post to post during a quiet time at verst . at yemetskoe in february, one night just after the terrible retreat from shenkursk, forty wounded american, british, and russian soldiers lay on stretchers on the floor in british field hospital. they were just in from the evacuation from shenkursk front, cold and faint from hunger. there was no american medical personnel at that village. they were all at the front. mess sgt. vincent of "f" company went in to see how the wounded soldiers were getting along. he was just in time to see the british medical sergeant come in with a pitcher of tea, tin cups, hard tack, and margarine and jam. he put it on the floor and said; "here is your supper; go to it." sgt. vincent protested to the english sergeant that the supper was not fit for wounded men and that they should be helped to take their food. the british sergeant swore at him, kicked him out of the hospital and reported him to the british medical officer who attempted, vainly, to put the outraged american sergeant under arrest. sergeant vincent then reported the matter to captain ramsay of "f" company, who ordered him to use "f" company funds to buy foods at the british n. a. c. b. canteen. this, with what the y. m. c. a. gave the sergeant, enabled him to feed the american and russian wounded the day that they rested there. this deed was done repeatedly by mess sgt. vincent during those dreadful days. in all, he took care of over three hundred sick and wounded americans and russians that passed back from the fighting lines through yemetskoe. doughboys at seletskoe tell of equally heartless treatment. there at degrees below zero they were required one day to form sick call line outside of the british medical officer's nice warm office. this was not necessary and he was compelled to accede to the firm insistence of the american company commander that his sick men should not stand out in the cold. that was only one of many such outrageous incidents. and the doughboys unfortunately did not always have a sturdy american officer present to protect them as in this case. corporal simon bogacheff states that he left archangel december th or th with seventy-three other wounded men and "flu" victims. after fifteen days the "stephen" landed at dundee after a very rough voyage in the pitching old boat. he had to buy stuff on the side from the cooks as he could not bear the british rations. men were obliged to steal raw potatoes and buy lard and fry them. the corporal, who could talk the serbian language, fraternized with them and gained entrance to a place where he could see english sergeants' mess. steaks and vegetables for them and cases of beer. alfred starikoff of detroit states that he was sent out of archangel in early winter suffering from an incurable running sore in his ear. he boarded an ice-breaker at the edge of the frozen white sea. after a four-hour struggle they cleared the icebound shore and made the open sea, which was not open but filled with a great floe of polar ice. at murmansk he was transferred to a hospital ship and then without examination of his ear trouble was sent to shore. there he put in five protesting weeks doing orderly work at british officers' quarters. finally he was allowed to proceed to england, leith, liverpool, southampton, london, notty ash, and thence to brest, thence to the u. s. in may to ford hospital. the delay in murmansk did him no good. american veterans of the campaign know that this is not the only case of where sick and wounded doughboys were delayed at murmansk, once merely to make room for british officers who were neither wounded nor sick. let uncle sam remember this in his next partnership war. [illustration: several people tending boats and fishing gear.] rouleau hot summer day at pinega before war [illustration: several people observing ice jams.] doud dvina river ice jam [illustration: a shed in a clearing in the forest.] wagner mejinovsky--near kodish [illustration: six soldiers standing in the snow.] mckee bolo general under flag truce near --april [illustration: several soldiers, some reading documents.] u s official photo after a prisoner exchange parley only on the pinega front did the american medical officer enjoy free action. an interesting story could be told of the american hospital and the two russian red cross (local) hospitals and the city civil hospital which were all under control of capt. c. r. laird, the red-haired, where he had any, unexcitable old doctor from nebraska, who treated one hundred and fourteen wounded russian soldiers in one night. and a romantic thread in the narrative would be the story of sistra lebideva, the alleged bolshevik female spy, who was released from prison in pinega by the american commanding officer and given duty as nurse in the russian receiving hospital. she was a trained nurse in an apron, and a russian beauty in her fine clothes. the russian lieutenant who acted as intelligence officer on the american commander's staff in investigating the nurse's case, fell hopelessly in love with her. an american lieutenant, out of friendship for the russian officer, several weeks later took the nurse to archangel disguised as a soldier. then the russian lieutenant was ordered to archangel to explain his conduct. he had risked his commission and involved himself in appearances of pro-bolshevism by disobeying an order to send the suspected nurse in as a spy. he had connived at her escape from her enemies in pinega, who, when the americans left, would have ousted her from the hospital and thrust her back into prison. he was saved by the intercession of the american officer and she was set free upon explanations. but the romance ended abruptly when sistra lebideva threw the russian lieutenant over and went to nurse on another front where later the russians turned traitor. the th field hospital company was trained at camp custer as a part of the th sanitary train, was detached in england and sent to north russia with the other american units. it was commanded by major jonas longley, fond du lac, wisconsin, who till april was the senior american medical officer. the enlisted personnel consisted of eighty men. the first duty of the unit in russia was caring for "flu" patients. it went up the dvina river to beresnik on september nd, taking over a russian civilian hospital, three weeks later the hospital barge dubbed "the michigan" came up from archangel with the "b" section of field hospital company. five days later this section of the field hospital proceeded by hospital sidewheeler to shenkursk and took over a large high school building for a permanent field hospital. here the unit gave service to the one hundred and fifty cases of "flu" among the russians. this was where miss valentine, the english girl who had been teaching school for several years in russia, came on to nurse the russians during the "flu" and later became very friendly with the americans, and was accused of being a bolshevik sympathizer, which story is wound all around by a thread of romance clean and pretty. during the bolo's smashing in of the ust padenga front and the subsequent memorable retreat from shenkursk this section of field hospital men had their hands full. it was in the field hospital at shenkursk that the gallant and beloved lt. ralph g. powers of the ambulance corps died and his body had to be left to the triumphant bolos. powers had been mortally wounded by a shell that entered his dressing station at ust padenga where he was alone with six enlisted men. his wounds were dressed by a russian doctor who was with the russian company supporting "a" company. lt. powers had gone to the railroad front in september, shifted to the kodish front during severe fighting, and then to the distant shenkursk front. he was never relieved from front line duty, although three medical officers at this time were in shenkursk. capt. kinyon immediately sent lt. katz to ust padenga upon the loss of powers, who will always be a hero to the expeditionary veterans. it was at ust padenga that corp. chas. a. thornton gave up his chair to a weary supply company man, comrade carl g. berger, just up from shenkursk with an ambulance, and a bolo three-inch shell hurled through the log wall and decapitated the luckless supply man. in the hasty retreat the hospital men, like the infantry men, had to abandon everything but the clothes and equipment on their backs. during the holding retreat of the st battalion of the vaga a small hospital was established temporarily at kitsa. later during the slowing up of the retreat, hospitals were opened at ust vaga and osinova. here this section stayed. the other section had been at beresnik all the time. during the latter days of the campaign the field hospital company took over the river front field medical duties so that the medical detachments of the th and the detachments of the th ambulance company could be assembled for evacuation at archangel. and the th field hospital company itself was assembled at archangel june th and sailed june th. their work had for the most part been under great strain in the long forest and river campaign, always seeing the seamy side of the war and lacking the frequent changes of scenery and the blood-stirring combats which the doughboy encountered. it took strong qualities of heart and nerve to be a field hospital man, or an ambulance or medical man. xxvii signal platoon wins commendation learning wireless in a few weeks--sterling work of field buzzers--with assaulting columns--wires repaired under shell fire--general ironside's commendatory official citation. in the north russian expedition the doughboy had to learn to do most anything that was needful. a sergeant, two corporals and four men of the headquarters company signal platoon actually in four months time mastered the mysteries of wireless telegraphy. this is usually a year's course in any technical school. but these men were forced by necessity to learn how to receive and to send messages in a few weeks' time. they were trained at first for a few days at tundra, the wireless station used by the british and french for intercepting messages. later at obozerskaya and at verst they gained experience that made them expert in picking messages out of the air. at one time the writer was shown a message which was intercepted passing from london to bagdad. it was no uncommon thing for a doughboy to intercept messages from egypt or mesopotamia and other parts of the mediterranean world, from red moscow, socialist berlin, starving vienna and from london. at one period in the spring defensive of the archangel-vologda railroad, this american wireless crew was the sole reliance of the force, as the obozerskaya station went out of order for a time, and the various points, onega, seletskoe and archangel were kept in communication by this small unit at verst . "h" company men will recall that out of the blue sky from the east one day came a message from major nichols asking if their gallant leader, phillips, had any show of recovering from the bolo bullet in his lung. the message sent back was hopeful. the record of the signal platoon under lieutenant anselmi, of detroit, shows also that several of these signal men rendered great service as telegraphers. one of the pleasant duties of the doughboy buzzer operators one day in spring was to receive and transmit to major j. brooks nichols the message from his royal majesty, king george of great britain and ireland, that for gallantry in action he had been honored with election to the distinguished service order, the d. s. o. but it is the field telephone men who really made the signal platoon its great reputation. general ironside's letter of merit is included later in this account. here let us record in some detail the work of the american signal platoon. thirty men maintained nearly five hundred miles of circuit wire that lay on the surface of the ground and was subject in one-third of that space to constant disruption by enemy artillery fire and to constant menace from enemy patrols. the switchboard at verst was able to give thirty different connections at once at any time of day or night; at , ten; and at , six. this means a lot of work. the writer knows that the field telephone man is an important, in fact, invaluable adjunct to his forces whether in attack or in defense. for when the attack has been successful and the officer in command wishes to send information quickly to his superior officer asking for supplies of ammunition or for more forces or for artillery support to come up and assist in beating off the enemy counter-attack, the field telephone is indispensable. hence the doughboy who carries his reels of wire along with the advancing skirmish line shares largely in the credit for doing a job up thoroughly. at the capture of verst the signal men were able to talk through to major nichols at within four minutes of the time the doughboys' cheers of victory had sounded! and within fifteen minutes a line had been extended out to the farthest point where doughboys were digging in. there they were able later to give the artillery commander information of the effect of his shells long before he could get his own signals into place for observation. the british signals were good, but, as the writers well recall, it was especially assuring when the buzzer sounded to have an american doughboy at the other end say he would make the connection or take the message. they never fell down on the job. general ironside's commendation is not a bit too strong in its praises of the signal platoon. we are glad to make it a part of the history, and without doubt all the veterans who read these pages will join us in the little glow of pride with which we pass on this official citation of the commanding general's, which is as follows: "the signal platoon of the th infantry, under second lieutenant anselmi, has performed most excellent work on this front. besides forming the signals of the railway detachment, the platoon provided much needed reinforcements for other allied signal units, and the readiness with which they have co-operated with the remainder of allied signal service has been of the greatest service throughout. "please convey to all ranks of the platoon my appreciation of the services they have rendered." (signed) e. ironside, major-general, commander-in-chief, allied forces, archangel, russia. g. h. q., rd may, . and our american commander, general richardson, in transmitting the letter through regimental headquarters said, "their work adds further to the splendid record made by american forces in europe." xxviii the doughboy's money in archangel coin and paper of north russia--trafficking in exchange--new issue of paper roubles--trying to peg rouble currency--yanks lose on pay checks drawn on british pound sterling banks. the writer has a silver nicholas the fifth rouble. it is one of the very few silver coins seen in russia. here and there a soldier was able to get hold of silver and gold coins of the old days, but they were very scarce. the russian peasant had to feel a high degree of affection for an american before he would part with one of his hoarded bits of real money. of paper money there was no end. when the americans landed, they were met by small boys on the streets with sheets of archangel state money under their arms. the perforations of some kerenskies were not yet disturbed when great sheets and rolls of it were taken from the bodies of dead bolos. everybody had paper money. the bolsheviki were counterfeiting the old czar's paper money and the kerensky money and issuing currency of their own. the polar bear and walrus -rouble notes of archangel and their sign-board size government gold bond notes were printed in england, as were later the other denominations of archangel roubles, better known as british roubles. needless to say there was a great speculation in money and exchange. nickolai and kerensky and archangel and british guaranteed roubles tumbled over one another in the market. of course trafficking in money was taboo but was brisk. early the yankee got on to this game. his american money was even more prized than the english or french. the russian gave him great rolls of roubles of various sorts for his greenbacks. then he took the good money on the ships in the harbor and bought, usually through a sailor, boxes of candy and cartons of cigarettes and,--whisper this, bottles and cases of whiskey of which thousands of cases found their way to archangel. the russian then went out into the ill-controlled markets and side streets of archangel and sold to his own countrymen these luxuries at prices that would make an american sugar profiteer or bootlegger seem a piker. meanwhile the yank or tommie or poilu went to his own commissary or to the british navy and army canteen bureau, "n. a. c. b." to the doughboy's memory, or to our various "y" canteens and at a fixed rate of exchange--a rate fixed by the bankers in london--to use his roubles in buying things. he could also use the roubles in buying furs and skins of the russians who still had the same saved from the looting bolsheviki. at the rate first established, an english pound sterling was exchangeable for forty-eight roubles and vice versa. but on the illicit market, the pound would bring anywhere from eighty to one hundred and forty roubles. the american five dollar bill which was approximately worth fifty roubles in this "pegged" rouble money on the market when an american ship was in the harbor, would bring one hundred to one hundred and fifty roubles. no wonder the doughboy who was stationed around archangel or bakaritza found it possible to stretch his money a good way. many a dollar of company fund was made to buy twice as much or more than it otherwise would have bought. and in passing, let it be remarked that the yank who had access to n. a. c. b. and other canteen stores was not slow in joining the thrifty russki in this trafficking game, illicit though it was. and truth to tell, many a case of british whiskey was stolen by yank and tommie and russki and poilu and sent rejoicing on its way through these devious underground channels of traffic. one american officer in responsible position had to suffer for it when he returned to the states. the doughboys and medics and engineers who were up there are still filled with mixed emotions on the subject, a mixture of indignation and admiration. "let him now who is guiltless throw the first stone." returning to the discussion of currency, let it be recorded that after the market was flooded with all sorts of money and after the ships stopped coming because of the great ice barrier, the money market became wilder than ever. finally the london bankers who had been the victims of this speculation, decided upon a new issue of pegged currency. at forty to the pound the old roubles were called in. that is, every soldier who had forty-eight roubles could exchange them for forty new crisp and pretty roubles. their beauty was marred by the rubber stamp which was put over the sign of old nicholas' rule, which the thoughtless or tactless london money maker printed on the issue. the russian would have none of this new money with that suggestion of restoration of czar rule. inconsistently enough they still prized the old nickolai rouble notes as the very best paper currency in the land, and loud was the outcry at giving forty-eight nickolais for forty english-printed and guaranteed roubles of their own new archangel government. to stimulate the retirement of all other forms of currency, which measure in a settled country would have been a sensible economic pressure, the archangel government set a date when not forty-eight but fifty-six roubles might be exchanged for forty new roubles. then a date for sixty-four, then for seventy-two and then eighty. thus the skeptical peasant and the suspicious soldier saw his old roubles steadily decline in exchange value for the new roubles. of course they had always grabbed all the counterfeit stuff and used it in exchange with no compunctions. that was the winning part of the game. now they were pinched. it afforded some merriment to hear the outcries of some who had been making rolls of money in the trafficking. at the same time there was real suffering on the part of peasants in far distant areas who could not get their currency up for exchange or for stamping and punching which itself was finally necessary to even get the eighty-forty rate. they felt mistreated. to their simple hearts and ignorant minds, it was nothing short of robbery by the distant london bankers. soldiers on the far distant fronts were caught also in the currency reform. some of the fault was neglect by their own american officers and some was indifference to the subject by those american officers at archangel who were in position to know what was going to be the result of the attempt to peg the currency at a fixed rate. an officer who was in archangel during the summer on graves commission service after the american units had been withdrawn, reports that speculators for a song bought up great bales of the old kerensky and nickolai currency supposed to be cancelled, dead, defunct stuff, and when there was a considerable evacuation of central russians who had been for months refugees in archangel, this currency came out of hiding, and its traffickers realized a handsome profiteerski by selling it to the returning people at sixty to the pound sterling, for in interior russia the old stuff was still in circulation. at any rate that was shylokov's advertisement. during the summer, the money market, says lieut. primm, became a violent wonder. on one day a person could not obtain two hundred and fifty roubles for one hundred north russian roubles and a day or two later he might be importuned to take three hundred old for one hundred new. neither the soldiers nor the russians saw any justice in this flip-flopping of the currency market, to which of course they themselves were contributors. the thing they saw clearly was that when they had need of english credit (that is, checks) to send money to london banks or when they wanted to buy goods from england or america, then they could buy only with the new, the guaranteed rouble, which might be dear, even at one hundred and twenty-five to the pound sterling and was dearer of course in terms of old roubles, the more the demand was for the new roubles which were in the hands of speculators who manipulated the market as sweetly for themselves as the american profiteers with their oral and written advertisements manipulate our foodstuffs and goods for us. on the other hand, if the soldier or peasant or small merchant had dues coming to him in english money he then found them valued at forty to the pound sterling. this difference between eighty and one hundred and twenty-five he thought (naturally enough to his unsophisticated mind) was due to the vacillation in policy of enforcement of the pegged rate and prosecution of the traffickers. however opinion may differ as to the blame for the inability to peg the exchange, we know it was a bonanza to the speculators. ponzi ought to have been there to compete with the whiskered money sharks. and we know there were americans as well as british, french, russians and other nationals who were numbered among those speculators. after all is said we must admit that the money situation was one that was exceedingly difficult to handle. it was infinitely worse in bolshevikdom. the doughboy who used to find pads of undetached counterfeit kerenskie on the dead bolsheviks, can well believe that thirty dollars of good american chink one day in the soviet part of russia bought an american newspaper man one million paper roubles of the lenine-trotsky issue, and that before night, spending his money at the famine prices in the worthless paper, he was a dead-broke millionaire. during the time american soldiers were in russia they were paid in checks drawn on london. during the war, this was at the pegged rate ($ . - / ) which had been fixed by agreement between london and new york bankers to prevent violent fluctuations. but at the end of the war, after the armistice, the peg was pulled and the natural course of the market sent the pound sterling steadily downward, as the american dollar rose in value as compared with other currencies of the world. to those who were dealing day by day this was all in the game of money exchange. but to the soldier in far-off north russia who had months of pay coming to him when he left the forests of the vaga and onega this was a real financial hardship. many a doughboy whose wife or mother was in need at home because of the rapidly mounting prices put up by the slackers in the shops and the slackers in the marts of trade, now saw his little pay check shrink up in exchange value. he felt that his superior officers in the war department had hardly looked after his interests as well as they might have done. major nichols did succeed at brest in getting the old pegged rate for the men and officers, but many had already parted with the checks at heavy discount for fear that the nearer they got to the land for which they had been fighting, the more discount there would be on the pay checks with which their quartermaster had paid them their pittances. soldiers of the second detachment came on home with colonel stewart to camp custer and were obliged (most of them) to take their little $ . per pound sterling of the british pound sterling paid them by quartermaster major ely in north russia, at $ . - / . later, through the efforts of the late congressman nichols, many of those soldiers were reimbursed. of course complete restitution would have been made by the war department if all the soldiers had sent their claims in. hundreds of american veterans of the north russian campaign lost ten to twenty per cent of their pay check's hard earned value. xxix propaganda and propaganda and-- propaganda two-edged tool--from crusaders to carping cynics--be warned-- afraid to tell the truth--startling stories of bolo atrocities published--distortion disgusts brave men--wrong to play on race prejudices--our own government missed main chance--doughboy beset by active enemy in front and plagued by active propaganda of hybrid varieties--sample of bolshevik propaganda used on americans--yanks punched holes in red propaganda--propaganda to doughboy connotes lies and distortion and concealment of truth. "over there, over there, the yanks are coming," sang the soldiers in training camp as they changed from recruits into fighting units of the th division at battle creek. and the morale of the th was evidenced, some thought, by the fervor with which the officers and men roared out their hate chorus, "keep your head down, you dirty hun. if you want to see your father in your fatherland, keep your head down, you dirty hun." maybe so, maybe not. maybe morale is made of finer stuff than hate and bombast. maybe idealism does enter into it. of course there are reactionary periods in the history of a people when selfishness and narrowness and bigotry combine to cry down the expression of its idealism. not in . no secret was made of the fact that the americans went into the war with a fervor born of an aroused feeling of world-responsibility. we must do our part to save christian civilization from the mad nationalism of the german people led by their diabolic hohenzollern reigning family and war bureaucracy. too much kultur would ruin the world. germany must be whipped. we tingled with anticipation of our entrance to the trenches beside the bled-white france. we were going "over there" in the spirit of crusaders. what transformed a hesitating, reluctant, long-suffering people into crusaders? propaganda. press work. five-minute men. open and secret work. it was necessary to uncover and oppose the open and secret propaganda of paid agents of germany, and woefully deluded german-americans who toiled freely to help kaiser bill, as though to disprove the wisdom of the statement that no man can serve two masters. we beat their propaganda, uncovered the tracks of the prussian beast in our midst, found out, we thought, the meaning of explosions and fires and other terrible accidents in our munition plants, and turned every community into vigilant searchers for evidences of german propaganda or deviltry of a destructive kind and we persecuted many an innocent man. and now we sadly suspect that in fighting fire with fire, that is in fighting propaganda with propaganda, we descended by degrees to use the same despicable methods of distorting truth for the sake of influencing people to a certain desired end. england and france and all other countries had the same sad experience. doubtless we could not very well avoid it. it is part of the hell of war to think about it now. propaganda, fair one, you often turn out to be a dissipated hag, a camp follower. many years from now some calm historian going over the various blue books and white books and red books, with their stories of the atrocities of the enemy, ad nauseam, will come upon the criminating official documents of various nations that sought to propagandize the world into trembling, cowering belief in a new dragon. bolshevism with wide-spread sable wings, thrashing his spiny tail and snorting fire from his nostrils was volplaning upon the people of earth with open red mouth and cruel fangs and horrid maw down which he would gulp all the political, economic and religious liberties won from the centuries past. the dragon was about to devour civilization. and the historian will shake his head sadly and say, "too bad they fell for all that propaganda. poor germans. poor britishers. poor frenchmen. poor russians. poor americans. too bad. what a mess that propaganda was. propaganda and propaganda and--well, there are three kinds of propaganda just as there are three kinds of lies; lies and lies and d--- lies." in this volume we are historically interested in the propaganda as it was presented and as it affected us in the campaign fighting the bolsheviki in north russia in - . we write this chapter with great hesitation and with consciousness that it is subject to error in investigation and sifting of evidences and subject to error of bias on the part of the writer. however, no attempt has been made to compel the parts of this volume to be consistent with one another. facts have been stated and comments have been written as they occurred to the writers. if they were forced to be consistent with one another it would be using the method of the propagandizer. we prefer to appear inconsistent and possibly illogical rather than to hold back or frame anything to suit the general prejudices of the readers. take this chapter then with fair warning. keenly disappointed we were to be told in england that we were not to join our american comrades who were starting "fritz" backward in northern france. we were to go to archangel for guard duty. the expert propagandists in england were busy at once working upon the american soldiers going to north russia. the bare truth of the matter would not be sufficient. oh no! all the truth must not be told at once either. it's not done, you know. certainly not. soldiers and the soldiers' government might ask questions. british war office experts must hand out the news to feed the troops. and they did. guard duty in archangel, as we have seen, speedily became a fall offensive campaign under british military command. and right from the jump off at the bolshevik rearguard forces, british propaganda began coming out. does anyone recall a general order that came out from our american commanding officer of the expedition? is there a veteran of the american expeditionary force in north russia who does not recall having read or hearing published the general orders of the british g. h. q. referring to the objects of the expedition and to the character of the enemy, the bolsheviki? "the enemy. bolsheviks. these are soldiers and sailors who, in the majority of cases are criminals," says general poole's published order, "their natural, vicious brutality enabled them to assume leadership. the bolshevik is now fighting desperately, firstly, because the restoration of law and order means an end to his reign, and secondly, because he sees a rope round his neck for his past misdeeds if he is caught. germans. the bolsheviks have no capacity for organization but this is supplied by germany and her lesser allies. the germans usually appear in russian uniform and are impossible to distinguish." why was that last sentence added? sure enough we did not distinguish them, not enough to justify the propaganda. immediately upon arrival of the americans in the archangel area they had found the french soldiers wildly aflame with the idea that a man captured by the bolsheviks was bound to suffer torture and mutilation. and one wicked day when the reds were left in possession of the field the french soldiers came back reporting that they had mercifully put their mortally wounded men, those whom they could not carry away, out of danger of torture by the red guards by themselves ending their ebbing lives. charge that sad episode up to propaganda. to be sure, we know that there were evidences in a few cases, of mutilation of our own american dead. but it was not one-tenth as prevalent a practice by the bolos as charged, and as they became more disciplined, their warfare took on a character which will bear safe comparison with our own. the writer remembers the sense of shame that seized him as he reluctantly read a general order to his troops, a british piece of propaganda, that recited gruesome atrocities by the bolsheviks, a recital that was supposed to make the american soldiers both fear and hate the enemy. brave men do not need to be fed such stuff. distortion of facts only disgusts the man when he finally becomes undeceived. "there seems to be among the troops a very indistinct idea of what we are fighting for here in north russia." this is the opening statement of another one of general poole's pieces of propaganda. "this can be explained in a very few words. we are up against bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple." yet in another statement he said: "the bolshevik government is entirely in the hands of germans who have backed this party against all others in russia owing to the simplicity of maintaining anarchy in a totally disorganized country. therefore we are opposed to the bolshevik-cum-german party. in regard to other parties we express no criticism and will accept them as we find them provided they are for russia and therefore for 'out with the boche.' briefly we do not meddle in internal affairs. it must be realized that we are not invaders but guests and that we have not any intention of attempting to occupy any russian territory." that was not enough. distortion must be added. "the power is in the hands of a few men, mostly jews" (an appeal to race hatred), "who have succeeded in bringing the country to such a state that order is non-existent. the posts and railways do not run properly, every man who wants something that some one else has got, just kills his opponent only to be killed himself when the next man comes along. human life is not safe, you can buy justice at so much for each object. prices of necessities have so risen that nothing is procurable. in fact the man with a gun is cock of the walk provided he does not meet another man who is a better shot." was not that fine stuff? of course there were elements of truth in it. it would not have been propaganda unless it had some. but its falsities of statement became known later and the soldiers bitterly resented the attempt to propagandize them. the effect of this line of propaganda was at last made the subject of an informal protest by major j. brooks nichols, one of our most influential and level-headed american officers, in a letter to general ironside, whose sympathetic letter of reply did credit to his respect for other brave men and credit to his judgment. he ordered that the propaganda should not be further circulated among the american soldiers. it must be admitted that the french soldiers also suffered revulsion of feeling when the facts became better known. the british war office methods of stimulating enthusiasm in the campaign against the bolsheviki was a miserable failure. distortion and deception will fail in the end. you can't fool all the soldiers all the while. truth will always win in the end. the soldier has right to it. he fights for truth; he should have its help. our own military and government authorities missed the main chance to help the soldiers in north russia and gain their most loyal service in the expedition. truth, not silence with its suspected acquiescence with british propaganda and methods of dealing with russians; truth not rumors, truth, was needed; not vague promises, but truth. in transmitting to us the thanksgiving day proclamation, our american diplomatic representative in north russia, mr. dewitt poole, published to the troops the following: "but so great a struggle cannot end so abruptly. in the west the work of occupying german territory continues. in the east german intrigue has delivered large portions of russia into unfriendly and undemocratic hands. the president has given our pledge of friendship to russia and will point the way to its fulfillment. confident in his leadership the american troops and officials in northern russia will hold to their task to the end." this was a statement made by our american charge d' affairs after the armistice, it will be noted. the new year's editorial in the sentinel, our weekly paper, says, in part: "we who are here in north russia constitute concrete evidence that there is something real and vital behind the words of president wilson and other allied statesmen who have pledged that 'we shall stand by russia.' few of us, particularly few americans, realize the debt which the whole world owes to russia for her part in this four years struggle against german junkerism. few of us now realize the significance that will accrue as the years go by to the presence of allied soldiers in russia during this period of her greatest suffering. the battle for world peace, for democracy, for free representative government, has not yet been fought to a finish in russia." with the sentiment of those two expressions, the american soldier might well be in accord. but he was dubious about the fighting; he was learning things about the bolsheviks; he was hoping for statement of purposes by his government. but as the weeks dragged by he did not get the truth from his own government. neither from colonel stewart, military head of the expedition, nor from the diplomatic and other united states' agencies who were in archangel, did he get satisfying facts. they allowed him to be propagandized, instead, both by the british press and news despatches and by the american press and political partisanships of various shades of color that came freely into north russia to plague the already over-propagandized soldier. of the bolshevik propaganda mention has been made in one or two other connections. we may add that the bolos must have known something of our unwarlike and dissatisfied state of mind, for they left bundles of propaganda along the patrol paths, some of it in undecipherable characters of the russian alphabet; but there was a publication in english, the call, composed in moscow by a bolshevik from milwaukee or seattle or some other well known soviet center on the home shore of the atlantic. these are some of the extracts. the reader may judge for himself: "do you british working-men know what your capitalists expect you to do about the war? they expect you to go home and pay in taxes figured into the price of your food and clothing, eight thousand millions of english pounds or forty thousand millions of american dollars. if you have any manhood, don't you think it would be fair to call all these debts off? if you think this is fair, then join the russian bolsheviks in repudiating all war debts. "do you realize that the principle reason the british-american financiers have sent you to fight us for, is because we were sensible enough to repudiate the war debts of the bloody, corrupt old czar? "you soldiers are fighting on the side of the employers against us, the working people of russia. all this talk about intervention to 'save' russia amounts to this, that the capitalists of your countries, are trying to take back from us what we won from their fellow capitalists in russia. can't you realize that this is the same war that you have been carrying on in england and america against the master class? you hold the rifles, you work the guns to shoot us with, and you are playing the contemptible part of the scab. comrade, don't do it! "you are kidding yourself that you are fighting for your country. the capitalist class places arms in your hands. let the workers cease using these weapons against each other, and turn them on their sweaters. the capitalists themselves have given you the means to overthrow them, if you had but the sense and the courage to use them. there is only one thing that you can do: arrest your officers. send a commission of your common soldiers to meet our own workingmen, and find out yourselves what we stand for." all of which sounds like the peroration of an eloquent address at a meeting of america's own i. w. w. in solemn conclave assembled. needless to say this was not taken seriously. soldiers were quick to punch holes in any propaganda, or at any rate if they could not discern its falsities, could clench their fists at those whom they believed to be seeking to "work them." fair words and explosive bullets did not match any more than "guard duty" and "offensive movements" matched. lt. costello, in his volume, "why did we go to russia.", says: "the preponderant reason why americans would never be swayed by this propaganda drive, lay in their hatred of laziness and their love of industry. if the bolsheviki were wasting their time, however, in their propaganda efforts directed at effects in the field, it must be a source of great comfort to lenin and trotsky, tchitcherin and peters and others of their ilk, to know that their able, and in some case, unwitting allies in america, who condone bolshevist atrocities, apologize for soviet shortcomings, appear before congressional committees and other agencies and contribute weak attempts at defense of this red curse are all serving them so well." "seeing red," we see red in many things that are really harmless. in russia, as in america, many false accusations and false assumptions are made. we now know that of certainty the bolshevik, or communistic party of russia was aided by like-minded people in america and vice versa, but we became rather hysterical in over those i.w.w.-red outbursts, and very nearly let the conflict between red propaganda and anti-red propaganda upset our best traditions of toleration, of free speech, and of free press. now we are seeing more clearly. justice and toleration and real information are desired. propaganda to the american people is becoming as detested as it was to the soldiers. experience of the veterans of the north russian campaign has taught them the foolishness of propaganda and the wisdom of truth-telling. the germans, the bolsheviks, the british war office, our war department and self-seeking individuals who passed out propaganda, failed miserably in the end. xxx real facts about alleged mutiny mail bags and morale--imaginative scoop reporters and alarmists--few men lost heads or hearts--colonel stewart cables to allay needless fears--but war department had lost confidence of people--too bad mutiny allegations got started--maliciously utilized--officially investigated and denied--secretary baker's letter here included--facts which afforded flimsy foundation here related--alleged mutinous company next day gallantly fighting--harsh term mutiny not applied by unbiased judges. four weeks to nine or twelve weeks elapsed between mailing and receiving. it is known that both ignorance and indifference were contributing causes. we know there is in existence a file of courteous correspondence between american and british g. h. q. over some bags of american mail that was left lying for a time at murmansk when it might just as well have been forwarded to archangel for there were no americans at that time on the murmansk. many slips between the arrival of mail at archangel and its distribution to the troops. how indignant a line officer at the front was one day to hear a visitor from the american g. h. q. say that he had forgotten to bring the mail bags down on his train. sometimes delivery by airplane resulted in dropping the sacks in the deep woods to be object of curiosity only to foxes and wolves and white-breasted crows, but of no comfort to the lonesome, disappointed soldiers. ships foundered off the coast of norway with tons of mail. sleds in the winter were captured by the bolos on the lines of communication. these troubles in getting mail into russia led the soldiers to think that there might be equal difficulty in their letters reaching home. and it certainly looked that way when cablegrams began insistently inquiring for many and many a soldier whose letters had either not been written, or destroyed by the censor, or lost in transit. and that leads to the discussion of what were to the soldier rather terrifying rules of censorship. intended to contribute to his safety and to the comfort and peace of mind of his home folks the way in which the rules were administered worked on the minds of the soldiers. let it be said right here that the american soldier heartily complied in most cases with the rules. he did not try to break the rules about giving information that might be of value to the enemy. and when during the winter there began to come into north russia clippings from american and british newspapers which bore more or less very accurate and descriptive accounts of the locations and operations, even down to the strategy, of the various scattered units, they wondered why they were not permitted after the armistice especially, to write such things home. and if as happened far too frequently, a man's batch of ancient letters that came after weeks of waiting, contained a brace of scented but whining epistles from the girl he had left behind him and perhaps a third one from a man friend who told how that same girl was running about with a slacker who had a fifteen-dollar a day job, the man had to be a jewel and a philosopher not to become bitter. and a bitter man deteriorates as a soldier. to the credit of our veterans who were in north russia let it be said that comparatively very few of them wrote sob-stuff home. they knew it was hard enough for the folks anyway, and it did themselves no good either. the imaginative "scoops" among the cub reporters and the violently inflamed imaginations and utterances of partisan politicians seeking to puff their political sails with stories of hardships of our men in north russia, all these and many other very well-meaning people were doing much to aggravate the fears and sufferings of the people at home. many a doughboy at the front sighed wearily and shook his head doubtfully over the mess of sob-stuff that came uncensored from the states. he sent costly cablegrams to his loved ones at home to assure them that he was safe and not "sleeping in water forty degrees below zero" and so forth. not only did the screeching press articles and the roars of certain congressmen keep the homefolks in perpetual agony over the soldiers in russia, but the reports of the same that filtered in through the mails to our front line campfires and archangel comfortable billets caused trouble and heart-burnings among the men. it seems incredible how much of it the men fell for. but seeing it in their own home paper, many of the men actually believed tales that when told in camp were laughed off as plain scandalous rumor. war is not fought in a comfortable parlor or club-room, but some of the tales which slipped through the censor from spineless cry-babies in our ranks of high and low rank, and were published in the states and then in clippings found their way back to north russia, lamented the fact of the hardship of war in such insidious manner as to furnish the most formidable foe to morale with which the troops had to cope while in russia. the americans only laughed at bolshevik propaganda which they clearly saw through. to the statement that the reds would bring a million rifles against archangel they only replied, "let 'em come, the thicker grass the heavier the swath." but when a man's own home paper printed the same story of the million men advancing on archangel with bloody bayonets fixed, and told of the horrible hardships the soldier endured--and many of them were indeed severe hardships although most of the news stories were over-drawn and untruthful, and coupled with these stories were shrieks at the war department to get the boys out of russia, together with stories of earnest and intended-to-help petitions of the best people of the land, asking and pleading the war department to get the boys out of russia, then the doughboy's spirit was depressed. [illustration: several soldiers standing outside burning building.] u. s. official photo pioneer platoon has fire at [illustration: two soldiers sawing logs.] u s. official photo ( ) th engineers near bolsheozerki [illustration: two soldiers carrying a large bucket.] u.s. official hospital "k. p.'s" [illustration: two women in heavy coats standing outside.] u.s. official photo red cross nurses [illustration: soldier and two civilians standing by a scale that holds a slab of meat.] u.s. official bartering [illustration: three people and a small bear.] u.s. official photo mascots [illustration: officers and soldiers; a large artillery piece is mounted on a rail car in the background.] u s. official photo col. dupont (french) at verst , bestows many croix de guerre medals. [illustration: about thirty soldiers around an artillery piece.] u s. official photo polish artillery and mascot [illustration: an artillery piece behind a log rampart, with tents in the background.] u. s. official photo ( ) russian artillery, verst suffer he did occasionally. many of his comrades had a lot of suffering from cold. but aside from the execrable boot that sir shakleton had dreamed into existence, he himself possessed more warm clothing than he liked to carry around with him. but not a few soldiers forgot to look around and take sober stock of their actual situation and fell prey to this sob-stuff. fortunately for the great majority of them, and this goes for every company, the great rank and file of officers and men never lost their heads and their stout hearts. and now we may as well deal with the actual facts in regard to the alleged mutiny of american troops in north russia. there was no mutiny. in february colonel stewart had cabled to the war department that "the alarmist reports of condition of troops in north russia as published in press end of december are not warranted by facts. troops have been well taken care of in every way and my officers resent these highly exaggerated reports, feeling that slur is cast upon the regiment and its wonderful record. request that this be given to the press and especially to detroit and chicago papers to allay any unnecessary anxiety." he was approximately correct in his statements. his intent was a perfectly worthy one. but it was not believed by the wildly excited people back home. perhaps if the war department had been entirely frank with the people in cases, say, like the publication of casualty reports and reports of engagements, then its well-meant censorship and its attempts to allay fear might have done some good. as it was the day, march st, , came when a not unwilling british cable was scandalled and a fearsome press and people was startled with the story of an alleged mutiny of a company of american troops in north russia. the "i-told-you-so's" and the "wish-they-would's" of the states were gratified. the british war office was, too, and made the most of the story to propagandize its tired veterans and its late-drafted youths who had been denied part in war by the sudden armistice. those were urged to volunteer for service in north russia, where it was alleged their english comrades had been left unsupported by the mutinous yanks. yes, there was a pretty mess made of the story by our own war department, too, who first was credulous of this really incredulous affair, tried to explain it in its usually stupid and ignorant way of explaining affairs in north russia, only made a bad matter worse, and then finally as they should have done at first, gave the american forces in north russia a commanding general, whose report as quoted from the army and navy journal of april , will say: "the incident was greatly exaggerated, but while greatly regretting that any insubordination took place, he praised the general conduct of the th infantry. colonel richardson states that the troops were serving under very trying conditions, and that much more serious disaffections appeared among troops of the allies on duty in north russia. he further says the disaffection in the company of the th infantry, u. s. a., was handled by the regimental commander with discretion and good judgment." colonel stewart, himself, stated to the press when he led his troops home the following july: "i did not have to take any disciplinary action against either an officer or soldier of the regiment in connection with the matter, so you may judge that the reports that have appeared have been very, very greatly exaggerated. every soldier connected with the incident performed his duty as a soldier. and as far as i am concerned, i think the matter should be closed." in a letter to a member of congress from michigan, secretary baker refers to the alleged mutiny as follows: "a cablegram, dated march , , received from the american military attache at archangel, read in part as follows: "'yesterday morning, march th, a company of infantry, having received orders to the railroad front, was ordered out of the barracks for the purpose of packing sleds for the trip across the river to the railroad station. the non-commissioned officer that was in charge of the packing soon reported to the officers that the men refused to obey. at this some of the officers took charge, and all except one man began reluctantly to pack after a considerable delay. the soldier who continued to refuse was placed in confinement. colonel stewart, having been sent for, arrived and had the men assembled to talk with them. upon the condition that the prisoner above mentioned was released, the men agreed to go. this was done, and the company then proceeded to the railway station and entrained there for the front. that they would not go to the front line positions was openly stated by the men, however, and they would only go to obozerskaya. they also stated that general mutiny would soon come if there was not some definite movement forthcoming from washington with regard to the removal of american troops from russia at the earliest possible date.' "the war department on april , , authorized the publication of this cablegram, and on april , , authorized the statement that the report from murmansk was to the effect that the organization which was referred to was company "i" of the th infantry, and that the dispatch stated: "'it is worthy to note that the questions that were put to the officers by the men were identical with those that the bolshevik propaganda leaflets advised them to put to them.' "if reports differing from the above appeared in the newspapers, they were secured from sources other than the war department and published without its authority. "on march , , brigadier general wilds p. richardson, u. s. army, was ordered by the commanding general, american expeditionary forces, to proceed to north russia and to assume command of the american forces in that locality. general richardson arrived at murmansk on april , , where it was reported to him that a company of american troops at archangel had mutinied and that his presence there was urgently needed. he arrived at archangel on april , , and found that conditions had been somewhat exaggerated, especially in respect to the alleged mutiny of the company of the th infantry. general richardson directed an investigation of this matter by the acting inspector general, american forces in north russia. this officer states the facts to be as follows: "'company "i", th infantry, was in rest area at smallney barracks, in the outskirts of archangel, russia, when orders were received to go to the railroad point and relieve another company. the following morning the first sergeant ordered the company to turn out and load sleds. he reported to the captain that the men did not respond as directed. the captain then went to the barracks and demanded of the men standing around the stove: "who refuses to turn out and load sleds?" no reply from the men. the captain then asked the trumpeter, who was standing nearby, if he refused to turn out and load the sleds, and the trumpeter replied he was ready if the balance were, but that he was not going out and load packs of others on the sleds by himself, or words to that effect. the captain then went to the phone and reported the trouble as "mutiny" to col. stewart, the commanding officer, american forces in north russia. col. stewart directed him to have the men assemble in y. m. c. a. hut and he would be out at once and talk to them. the colonel arrived and read the article of war as to mutiny and talked to the men a few minutes. he then said he was ready to answer any questions the men cared to ask. some one wanted to know 'what are we here for and what are the intentions of the u. s. government?' the colonel answered this as well as he could. he then asked if there was anyone of the company who would not obey the order to load the sleds; if so, step up to the front. no one moved. the colonel then directed the men to load the sleds without delay, which was done. "'the testimony showed that the captain commanding company "i", th infantry, did not order his company formed nor did he ever give a direct order for the sleds to be loaded. he did not report this trouble to the commanding officer (a field officer) of smallney barracks, but hastened to phone his troubles to the commanding officer, american forces in north russia.' "the inspector further states that the company was at the front when the investigation was being made (may, ) and that the service of all concerned, at that time, was considered satisfactory by the battalion commander. "the conclusions of the inspector were that from such evidence as could be obtained the alleged mutiny was nothing like as serious as had been reported, but that it was of such a nature that it could have been handled by a company officer of force. "the inspector recommended to the commanding general, american forces, north russia, that the matter be dropped and considered closed. the commanding general, american forces, north russia, concurred in this recommendation. "general richardson, in his report of operations on the american forces in north russia, referring to this matter states: "'morale. archangel and north russia reflected in high degree during the past winter the disturbed state of the civilized world after four years of devastating war. the military situation was difficult and at times menacing. "'our troops in this surrounding, facing entirely new experiences and uncertain as to the future, bore themselves as a whole with courageous and creditable spirit. it was inevitable that there should be unrest, with some criticism and complaint, which represented the normal per cent chargeable to the human equation under such conditions. this culminated, shortly before my arrival, in a temporary disaffection of one of the companies. this appears not to have extended beyond the privates in ranks, and was handled by the regimental commander with discretion and good judgment. "'this incident was given wide circulation in the states, and i am satisfied from my investigation that an exaggerated impression was created as to its seriousness. it is regrettable that it should have happened at all, to mar in any degree the record of heroic and valiant service performed by this regiment under very trying conditions.' "the above are the facts in regard to this matter, and it is hoped that this information may meet your requirements. "very sincerely yours, "newton d. baker, "secretary of war." however, as a matter of history the facts must be told in this volume. "i" company of the th infantry, commanded by captain horatio g. winslow, was on the th of march stationed at smolny barracks, archangel, russia. it had been resting for a few days there after a long period of service on the front. the spirit of the men had been high for the most part, although as usual in any large group of soldiers at rest there was some of what frazier hunt, the noted war correspondent, calls "good, healthy grousing." the men had the night before given a fine minstrel entertainment in the central y. m. c. a. group psychology and atmospheric conditions have to be taken into consideration at this point. by atmospheric conditions we mean the half-truths and rumors and expressions of feeling that were in the air. a sergeant of the company questioned carefully by the writer states positively that the expressions of ugliness were confined to comparatively few members of the company. the feeling seemed to spread through the company that morning that some of the men were going to speak their minds. here another fact must be introduced. a few nights before this there had been a fire in camp that spread to their barracks and burned the company out, resulting in the splitting of the company into two separated parts, and in giving the little first sergeant and commanding officer inconvenience in conveying orders and directions to the men. and it was rumored in the morning in one barracks that the men of the other barracks were starting something. the platoon officer in command there had gone to the front to make arrangements for the billeting and transportation of troops, who were to start that day for the front some several miles south of obozerskaya. now the psychology began to work. why hurry the loading, let's see what the men of that platoon now will do. the captain notices the delay in proceedings. he has heard a little something of what is in the air. it is nothing serious, yet he is nervous about it. his first sergeant, a nervous and a nervy little man too, for detroit has seen the croix de guerre he won, showed anxiety over the dilatoriness of the men in loading the sleighs. and the men were only just human in wanting to see what the captain was going to do about that other platoon that was rumored to be starting something. of course in the psychology of the thing it was not in their minds that they would be called upon to express themselves. the others were going to do that. but when the captain went directly to the men and asked them what they were thinking and feeling they found themselves talking to him. here and there a man spoke bitterly about the russian regiments in archangel not doing anything but drill in archangel. of course he had only half-truth. that is the way misunderstandings and bad feelings feed. at that moment a company of the archangel regiment was at a desperate front, bolsheozerki, standing shoulder to shoulder with "m" company out of "i" company's own battalion. but these american soldiers at that moment with their feelings growing warmer with expression of them, thought only of the drilling russian soldiers in archangel and of the s. b. a. l. soldiers who had mutinied earlier in the winter and been subdued by american soldiers in archangel. and so if the truth be told, those soldiers spoke boldly enough to their captain to alarm him. he thought that he really had a serious condition before him. from remarks by the men he judged that for the sake of the men and the chief commanding officer, colonel stewart, it would be well to have a meeting in the y. m. c. a. where they could be properly informed, where they could see all that was going on and not be deluded by the rumors that other groups of the company were doing something else, and where the common sense of the great, great majority of the men would show them the foolishness of the whole thing. and he invited the colonel to appear. meanwhile the senior first lieutenant of the company, lieut. albert e. may, one of the levelest-headed officers in the regiment, had put the first and only man who showed signs of insubordination to an officer under arrest. it developed afterward that the lieutenant was a little severe with the man as he really had not understood the command, he being a man who spoke little english and in the excitement was puzzled by the order and showed the "hesitation" of which so much was made in the wild accounts that were published. this arrest was afterward corrected when three sergeants of the platoon assured the officer that the man had not really intended insubordination. it is regrettable that the war department was so nervous about this affair that it would be fooled into making the explanation of this "hesitation" on the ground of the man's slavic genesis and the pamphlet propaganda of the reds. the first three men who died in action were slavs. the slavs who went from hamtramck and detroit to europe made themselves proud records as fighters. hundreds of them who had not been naturalized were citizens before they took off the o. d. uniform in which they had fought. it was a cruel slur upon the manhood of the american soldier to make such explanations upon such slight evidences. it would seem as though the war department could have borne the outcry of the people till the commanding officer of those troops could send detailed report. and as for the red pamphlets, every soldier in north russia was disgusted with general march's explanations and comments. to return to the account, let it be said, colonel stewart, when he appeared at the y. m. c. a. saw no murmurous, mutinous, wildly excited men, such as the mob psychology of a mutiny would necessarily call for. instead, he saw men seated orderly and respectfully. and they listened to his remarks that cleared up the situation and to his proud declaration that american soldiers on duty never quit till the job is done or they are relieved. questions were allowed and were answered squarely and plainly. while the colonel had been coming from his headquarters the remainder of the loading had been done under direction of lieut. may as referred to before, and at the conclusion of the colonel's address, captain winslow moved his men off across the frozen dvina, proceeded as per schedule to obozerskaya, put them on a troop train, and as related elsewhere took over the front line at a critical time, under heavy attack, and there the very next day after the little disaffection and apparent insubordination, which was magnified into a "mutiny," his company added a bright page to its already shining record as fighters. the editors have commented upon this at another place in the narrative. we wish here to state that we do not see how an unbiased person could apply so harsh a term as mutiny to this incident. the allegation has been proved to be false. there was no mutiny. any further repetition of the allegation will be a cruel slander upon the good name of the heroic men who were killed in action or died of wounds received in action in that desperate winter campaign in the snows of russia. and further repetition of the allegation will be insult to the brave men who survived that campaign and now as citizens have a right to enjoy the commendations of their folks and friends and fellow citizens because of the remarkably good record they made in north russia as soldiers and men. xxxi our allies, french, british and russians kaleidoscopic picture and chop suey talk in archangel--poilu comrades--captain boyer--dupayet, reval and major alabernarde--"ze french sarzhont, she say"--scots and british marines fine soldiers--canadians popular--yorks stand shoulder to shoulder--tribute to general ironside--daredevil "bob" graham of "australian light horse"--commander young of armored train--slavo-british allied legion--french legion--white guards--archangel regiments--chinese--deliktorsky, mozalevski, akutin. what a kaleidoscopic recollection of uniforms and faces we have when one asks us about our allies in north russia. what a mixture of voices, of gutturals and spluttering and yeekings and chatterings, combined with pursing of lips, eyebrow-twistings, bugging eyes, whiskers and long hair, and common hand signs of distress or delight or urgency or decisiveness: nitchevo, bonny braw, tres bien, khorashaw, finish, oi soiy, beaucoup, cheerio, spitzka, mozhnya barishna, c'mon kid, parlezvous, douse th' glim, yah ocean, dobra czechinski, amia spigetam, ei geh ha wa yang wa, lubloo, howse th' chow, pardonne, pawrdun, scuse, eesveneets,--all these and more too, strike the ear of memory as we tread again the board sidewalks of far off smelly archangel. what antics we witnessed, good humored miscues and errors of form in meeting our friends of different lands all gathered there in the strange potpourri. soldiers and "civies" of high and low rank, cultured and ignorant, and rich and poor, hearty and well, and halting and lame, mingled in archangel, the half-shabby, half-neat, half-modern, half-ancient, summer-time port on the far northern sea. rags and red herrings, and broadcloth and books, and o. d. and khaki, and horizon blue, crowded the dinky ding-ding tramway and counted out kopecs to the woman conductor. and many are the anecdotes that are told of men and occasions in north russia where some one of our allies or bunch of them figures prominently, either in deed of daring, or deviltry, or simply good humor. chiefly of our own buddies we recall such stories to be sure, but in justice to the memory of some of the many fine men of other lands who served with us we print a page or two of anecdotes about them. and we hope that some day we may show them detroit or some other good old american burg, or honk-honk them cross country through farm lands we now better appreciate than before we saw europe, by woods, lake and stream to camp in the warm summer, or spend winter nights in a land with us as hosts, a land where life is really worth living. those "mah-sheen" gunners in blue on the railroad who stroked their field pets with pride and poured steady lines of fire into the pine woods where lay the reds who were encircling the americans with rifle and machine gun fire. how the yankee soldiers liked them. and many a pleasant draught they had from the big pinaud canteen that always came fresh from the huge cask. how courteously they taught the doughboy machine gunner the little arts of digging in and rejoiced at the rapid progress of the american. how now, paul, my poilu comrade, bon ami, why don't you add the house itself to the pack on your back? sure, you'll scramble along somehow to the rest of the camp in the rear, and on your way you will pass bright remarks that we non compree but enjoy just the same, for we know you are wishing the doughboy good luck. how droll your antics when hard luck surprises. we swear and you grimace or paw wildly the air. and we share a common dislike for the asperity shown by the untactful, inefficient, bulldozing old jack. here is a good story that "buck" carlson used to tell in his inimitable way. scene is laid in the headquarters of the british colonel who is having a little difficulty with his mixed command that contains soldiers of america, france, poland, china, where not, but very few from england at that time. a french sergeant with an interpreter enters the room and salutes are exchanged. the sergeant then orders his comrade to convey his request to the colonel. "ker-nell, par-don," says the little interpreter after a snappy french salute which is recognized by a slight motion of the colonel's thumb in the general direction of his ear. "ze sarzhont, she say, zat ze french man will please to have ze tobak, ze masheen gun am-mu-nish-own and ze soap." "but, my man," says the colonel reddening, "i told you to tell the sergeant he should go on as ordered and these things will come later, i have none of these things now to give him, but they will soon arrive and he shall be supplied. but now he must hurry out with his detachment of machine gunners to help the americans. go, my man." more salutes and another conversation between the two french soldiers with arms and spit flying furiously. "ker-nell, sir, par-don, again, but ze sar-zhont, she say, zat wiz-out ze to-bak, ze am-mu-nish-own and ze soap, he weel not go, par-don, ker-nell!" this time the colonel was angered to popping point and he smote the table with a thump that woke every bedbug and cockroach in the building and the poor french interpreter looked wildly from the angry british colonel to his tough old french sergeant who now leaped quickly to his side and barked celtic rejoinder to the colonel's fist thumping language. no type could tell the story of the critical next moment. suffice it to say that after the storm had cleared the colonel was heard reporting the disobedience to a french officer miles in the rear. the officer had evidently heard quickly from his sergeant and was inclined to back him up, for in substance he said to the offended british officer: "wee, pardon, mon ker-nell, it eez bad," meaning i am sorry, "but will ze gallant ker-nell please to remember zat consequently zare eez no french offitzair wiz ze french de-tach-mont, ze sar-zhont will be treated wiz ze courtesy due to ze offitzair." and it was true that the sergeant, backed up by his french officer, refused to go as ordered till his men had been supplied with the necessary ammunition and "ze to-bak and ze soap." the incident illustrates the fact that the french officer's relation to his enlisted men is one of cordial sympathy. he sees no great gulf between officer and enlisted man which the british service persists to set up between officers and enlisted men. hop to it, now frenchie, you surely can sling 'em. we need a whole lot from your 's. we are guarding your guns, do not fear for the flanks. just send that barrage to the yanks at the front. and how they do send it. and we remember that the french artillery officers taught the russians how to handle the guns well and imbued them with the same spirit of service to the infantry. and many a red raid in force and well-planned attack was discouraged by the prompt and well-put shrapnel from our french artillery. and there was boyer. first we saw him mud-spattered and grimy crawling from a dugout at obozerskaya, day after his men had won the "po-zee-shown." his animation he seems to communicate to his leg-wearied men who crowd round him to hear that the yanks are come to relieve them. with great show of fun but serious intent, too, he "marries the squads" of americans and frenchies as they amalgamate for the joint attack. "kat-tsank-awn-tsank" comes to mean as he talks first in french to his poilus and then through our detroit doughboy french interpreter to the doughboys. captain he is of a colonial regiment, veteran of africa and every front in europe, with palm-leafed war cross, highest his country can give him, boyer. he relies on his soldiers and they on him. "fires on your outposts, captain?" "oui, oui, nitchevo, not ever mind, oui, comrade," he said laughingly. his soldiers built the fires so as to show the reds where they dare not come. truth was he knew his men must dry their socks and have a warm spot to sit by and clean their rifles. he trusted to their good sense in concealing the fire and to know when to run it very low with only the glowing coals, to which the resting soldier might present the soles of his snoozing shoes. captain boyer, to you, and to your men. it is not easy to pass over the names of dupayet and reval and alebernarde. for dynamic energy the first one stands. for linguistic aid the second. how friendly and clear his interpretation of the orders of the french command, given written or oral. soldier of many climes he. with songs of nations on his lips and the sparkle of mirth in his eye. "god save the king," he uttered to the guard as password when he supposed the outguard to be a post of tommies, and laughingly repeated to the american officer the quick response of the yank sentry man who said: "to hell with any king, but pass on french lieutenant, we know you are a friend." and alabernarde, sad-faced old major du battalion, often we see you passing among the french and american soldiers along with major nichols. your eyes are crow-tracked with experiences on a hundred fields and your bronzed cheek hollowed from consuming service in the world war. we see the affectionate glances of poilus that leap out at sight of you. you hastened the equipment of american soldiers with the automatics they so much needed and helped them to french ordnance stores generously. fate treated you cruelly that winter and left you in a wretched dilemma with your men in march on the railroad. we would forget that episode in which your men figured, and remember rather the comradery of the fall days with them and the inspiration of your soldierly excellence. to you, major alabernarde. on the various fronts in the fall the doughboy's acquaintance with the british allies was limited quite largely, and quite unfortunately we might say, to the shoulder strappers. and all too many of those out-ranked and seemed to lord it over the doughboy's own officers, much to his disgust and indignation. what few units of scots and english marines and liverpools got into action with the americans soon won the respect and regard of the doughboys in spite of their natural antipathy, which was edged by their prejudice against the whole show which was commonly thought to be one of british conception. tommie and scot were often found at kodish and toulgas and on the onega sharing privations and meagre luxuries of tobacco and food with their recently made friends among the yanks. and in the winter the yorks at several places stood shoulder to shoulder with doughboys on hard-fought lines. friendships were started between yanks and yorks as in the fall they had grown between frenchies and americans, scots and yanks, and liverpools and detroiters. bitter fighting on a back-to-the-wall defense had brought the english and american officers together also. arrogance and antipathy had both dissolved largely in the months of joint military operations and better judgment and kinder feelings prevailed. grievances there are many to be recalled. and they were not all on one side. but except as they form part of the military narrative with its exposure of causes and effects in the fall and winter and spring campaigns, those grievances may mostly be buried. rather may we remember the not infrequent incidents of comradeship on the field or in lonely garrison that brightened the relationships between scots and yorks and marines and liverpools in khaki on the one hand and the o. d. cousins from over the sea who were after all not so bad a lot, and were willing to acknowledge merit in the british cousin. it must be said that canadians, scots, yorks and tommies stood in about this order in the affections of the yankee soldiers. the boys who fought with support of the canadian artillery up the rivers know them for hard fighters and true comrades. and on the railroad detachment american doughboys one day in november were glad to give the canadian officer complimentary present-arms when he received his ribbon on his chest, evidence of his election to the d. s. o., for gallantry in action. loyally on many a field the canadians stood to their guns till they were exhausted, but kept working them because they knew their yankee comrades needed their support. one of the pictures in this volume shows a yank and a scot together standing guard over a bunch of bolshevik prisoners at a point up the dvina river. american doughboys risked their lives in rescuing wounded scots and the writer has a vivid remembrance of seeing a fine expression of comradeship between yanks and scots and american sailors starting off on a long, dangerous march. mention has been made in another connection of the friendship and admiration of the american soldiers for the men of the battalion of yorks. in the three day's battle at verst a york sergeant over and over assured the american officer that he would at all times have a responsible york standing beside the russki machine gunner and prevent the green soldiers from firing wildly without order in case the bolshevik should gain some slight advantage and a necessary shift of american soldiers might be interpreted by the green russian machine gunners as a movement of the enemy. and those machine guns which were stationed at a second line, in rear of the americans, never went off. the yorks were on the job. and after the crisis was past an american corporal asked his company commander to report favorably upon the gallant conduct of a york corporal who had stood by him with six men all through the fight. of the king's liverpools and other tommies mention has been made in these pages. sometimes we have to fight ourselves into favor with one another. really there is more in common between yank and tommie than there is of divergence. hardship and danger, tolerance and observation, these brought the somewhat hostile and easily irritated yank and tommie together. down underneath the rough slams and cutting sarcasm there exists after all a real feeling of respect for the other. this volume would not be complete without some mention of that man who acted as commanding general of the allied expedition, william edmund ironside. he was every inch a soldier and a man. american soldiers will remember their first sight of him. they had heard that a big man up at archangel who had taken gen. poole's job was cleaning house among the incompetents and the "john walkerites" that had surrounded g. h. q. in poole's time. he was putting pep into g. h. q. and reorganizing the various departments. when he came, he more than came up to promises. six foot-four and built accordingly, with a bluff, open countenance and a blue eye that spoke honesty and demanded truth. hearty of voice and breathing cheer and optimism, general ironside inspired confidence in the american troops who had become very much disgruntled. he was seen on every front at some time and often seen at certain points. by boat or sledge or plane he made his way through. he was the soldier's type of commanding officer. never dependent on an interpreter whether with russian, pole, or french, or serbian, or italian, he travelled light and never was seen with a pistol, even for protection. master of fourteen languages it was said of him, holder of an iron cross bestowed on him by the kaiser in an african war when he acted as an ox driver but in fact was observing for the british artillery, on whose staff he had been a captain though he was only a youth, he was a giant intellectually as well as physically. when british fighting troops could not be spared from the western front in the fall of and the british war office gambled on sending category b men to archangel--men not considered fit to undergo active warfare, a good healthy general had to be found. ironside, lover of forlorn hopes, master of the russian language, a good mixer, and experienced in dealing with amalgamated forces, was the obvious man. of course, there were some british officers who bemoaned the fact, in range of american ears too, that some titled high ranking officers were passed over to reach out to this major of artillery to act as major-general. and he was on the youthful side of forty, too. edmund ironside ought to have been born in the days of drake, raleigh, and cromwell. he would have a bust in westminster and his picture in the history books. but in his twenty years of army life he has done some big things and it can be imagined with what gusto he received his orders to relieve poole and undertook to redeem the expedition, to make something of the perilous, forlorn hope under the arctic winter skies. in the american sentinel issue of december th, which was the first issue of our soldier paper, we read: "it is a great honor for me to be able to address the first words in the first archangel paper for american soldiers. i have now served in close contact with the u. s. army for eighteen months and i am proud to have a regiment of the u. s. army under my command in russia. "i wish all the american soldiers the best wishes for the coming christmas and new year and i want them to understand that the allied high command takes the very greatest interest in their welfare at all times." edmund ironside, major-general. without doubt the general was sincere in his efforts to bring about harmony and put punch and strength into the high command sections as well as into the line troops. but what a bag poole left him to hold. vexed to death must that big man's heart have been to spend so much time setting allies to rights who had come to cross purposes with one another and were blinded to their own best interests. british thought he was too lenient with the willful americans. americans thought he was pampering the french. british, french and americans thought he was letting the russkis slip something over on the whole allied expedition. green-eyed jealousy, provincial jealousy, just plain foolish jealousy tormented the man who was soon disillusioned as to the glories to be won in that forlorn expedition but who never exhibited anything but an undaunted optimistic spirit. he was human. when he was among the soldiers and talking to them it was not hard for them to believe the tale that after all he was an american himself, a western canadian who had started his career as a military man with the northwest mounted police. an american corporal for several weeks had been in the field hospital near the famous kodish front. one day general ironside leaned over his bunk and said: "what's the trouble, corporal?" the reply was, "rheumatism, sir." at which the british hospital surgeon asserted that he thought the rheumatism was a matter of the american soldier's imagination. but he regretted the remark, for the general, looking sternly at the officer, said: "don't talk to me that way about a soldier. i know, if you do not, that many a young man, with less exposure than these men have had in these swamps, contracts rheumatism. do not confuse the aged man's gout with the young man's muscular rheumatism." then he turned his back on the surgeon and said heartily to the corporal: "you look like a man with lots of grit. cheer up, maybe the worst is over and you will be up and around soon. i hope so." and there was many a british officer who went out there to russia who won the warm friendship of americans. of course, those were short friendships. but men live a lot in a small space in war. one day a young second lieutenant--and those were rare in the british uniforms, for the british war office had given the commanding general generous leeway in adding local rank to the under officers--had come out to a distant sector to estimate the actual needs in signal equipment. he rode a russian horse to visit the outpost line of the city. he rode in a reindeer sled to the lines which the russian partisan forces were holding. he sat down in the evening to that old russian merchant trader's piano, in our headquarters, and rambled from chords and airs to humoresque and rhapsodies. and the american and russian officers and the orderlies and batmen each in his own place in the spacious rooms melted into a tender hearing that feared to move lest the spell be broken and the artist leave the instrument. men who did not know how lonesome they had been and who had missed the refinements of home more than they knew, blessed the player with their pensive listening, thanked fortune they were still alive and had chances of fighting through to get home again. and after playing ceased the british officer talked quietly of his home and the home folks and americans thought and talked of theirs. and it was good. it was an event. in sharp contrast is the vivid memory of that picturesque lt. bob graham of the australian light horse. he could have had anything the doughboy had in camp and they would have risked their lives for him, too, after the day he ran his russian lone engine across the bridge at verst into no man's land and leaped from the engine into a marsh covered by the bolo machine guns and brought out in his own arms an american doughboy. starting merely a daredevil ride into no man's land, his roving eye had spied the doughboy delirious and nearly dead flopping feebly in the swamp. hero of gallipoli's ill-fated attempt, scarred with more than a score of wounds; with a dead man's shin bone in the place of his left upper arm bone that a hun shell carried off; with a silver plate in his head-shell; victim of as tragic an occurrence as might befall any man, when as a sergeant in the flying squadron in france he saw a young officer's head blown off in a trench, and it was his own son, bob graham, "australian force" on the railroad detachment, was missed by the doughboys when he was ordered to report to archangel. there the heroic bob went to the bad. he participated in the shooting out of all the lights in the paris cafe of the city in regular wild western style; he was sent up the river for his health; he fell in with an american corporal whose acquaintance he had made in a sunnier clime, when the american doughboy had been one of the marines in panama and bob graham was an agent of the united fruit company. they stole the british officer's bottled goods and trafficked unlawfully with the natives for fowls and vegetables to take to the american hospital, rounded up a dangerous band of seven spies operating behind our lines, but made such nuisances of themselves, especially the wild australian "second looie," that he was ordered back to archangel. there the old general, who knew of his wonderful fighting record, at last brought him on to the big carpet. and the conversation was something like this: "graham, what is the matter? you have gone mad. i had the order to strip you of your rank as an officer to see if that would sober you. but an order from the king today by cable raises you one rank and now no one but the king himself can change your rank. you deserved the promotion but as you are going now it is no good to you. all i can do is to send you back to england. but i do not mean it as a disgrace to you. i could wish that you would give me your word that you would stop this madness of yours." and the general looked kindly at bob. "sir, you have been white with me. you have a right to know why i have been misbehaving these last weeks. here, sir, is a letter that came to me the day i helped shoot up the cafe. in belgium i married an american red cross nurse. this is a picture of her and the new-born son come to take the place of the grown-up son who fell mortally wounded in my arms in france. to her and the baby i was bound to go if i had to drink russia dry of all the shipped-in scotch and get myself reduced to the ranks for insubordination and deviltry. sir, i'm fed up on war. i thank you for sending me back to england." and corporal aldrich tells us that his old friend bob graham's present address is first national bank, mobile, alabama. his father, an immigrant via canada from old dundee in scotland, was elected governor of alabama on the dry issue. and officers and doughboys who knew the wild australian in north russia know that his father might have had some help if bob were at home. with a genial word for every man, with a tender heart that winced to see a child cry, with a nimble wit and a brilliant daring, lt. bob graham won a place in the hearts of americans that memory keeps warm. and other british officers might be mentioned. there was, for example, the grizzled naval officer, commander young, whose left sleeve had been emptied at zeebrugge, running our first armored train. we missed his cheery countenance and courteous way of meeting american soldiers and officers when he left us to return to england to take a seat in parliament which the socialists had elected him to. we can see him again in memory with his polish gunners, his russian lewis gun men, standing in his car surrounded by sand bags and barbed wire, knocking hot wood cinders from his neck, which the russki locomotive floated back to him. and many a time we were moved to bless him when his guns far in our rear spoke cheeringly to our ears as they sent whining shells curving over us to fall upon the enemy. it is no discredit to say that many a time the doughboy's eye was filled with a glistening drop of emotion when his own artillery had sprung to action and sent that first booming retort. and some of those moments are bound in memory with the blue-coated figure of the gallant commander young. the russian army of the north was non-existent when the allies landed. all the soldiery previously in evidence had moved southward with the last of the lootings of archangel and joined the armies of the soviet at vologda, or were forming up the rear guard to dispute the entrance of the allies to north russia. the allied supreme command in north russia, true to its dream of raising over night a million men opened recruiting offices in archangel and various outlying points, thinking that the population would rally to the banners (and the ration carts) in droves. but the large number of british officers waited in vain for months and months for the pupils to arrive to learn all over the arts of war. at last after six months two thousand five hundred recruits had been assembled by dint of advertising and coaxing and pressure. they were called the slavo-british allied legion, s. b. a. l. for short. these slavo-brits as they were called never distinguished themselves except in the slow goose step--much admired by colonel stewart, who pointed them out to one of his captains as wonders of precision, and also distinguished themselves in eating. they failed several times under fire, once they caused a riffle of real excitement in archangel when they started a mutiny, and finally they were used chiefly as labor units and as valets and batmen for officers and horses. they were charged with having a mutinous spirit and with plotting to go over to the bolsheviks. they did in small numbers at times. it is interesting to note that they were trained under british officers who enlisted them from among renegades, prisoners and deserters from ranks of the bolsheviks, refugees and hungry willies, and, that once enlisted they were not fed the standard british ration of food or tobacco, the which they held as a grievance. it never made the american soldier feel comfortable to see the prisoners he had taken in action parading later in the s, b. a. l. uniform, and especially in the case of russians who came over from the bolo lines and gave up with suspiciously strong protestations of dislike for their late commanders. the russians who were recruited and trained by the french in the so-called french legion, under the leadership of the old veteran boyer who is mentioned elsewhere were found usually with a better record. the courier du bois on skiis in white clothing did remarkably valuable scouting and patrolling work and at times as at kodish and bolsheozerki hung off on the flanks of the encircling bolo hordes and worried the attackers with great effectiveness. the french also had better luck in training the russian artillery officers and personnel than did the british although some of the latter units did good work. it seemed to be a better class of russian recruit that chose the artillery. doughboys who were caught on an isolated road like rats in a trap will remember with favor the russian artillery men who with their five field pieces on that isolated road ate, slept and shivered around their guns for eight days without relief, springing to action in a few seconds at any call. by their effective action they contributed quite largely to the defense, active fighting of which fell upon two hundred yanks facing more than ten times the number. why should it surprise one to find an occasional yank returned from archangel who will say a good word for a russian soldier. there were cordial relations between americans and more than a few russian units. in certain localities in the interior where the peasants had organized to resist the rapacious red guard looters, there were little companies of good fighters, in their own way. these were usually referred to as partisans or white guards depending upon the degree to which they were authorized and organized by the local county governments. they always at first strongly co-operated with the allied troops, which they looked upon as friends sent in to help them against the bolsheviki. toward the americans they maintained their cordial relations throughout, but after the first months seemed to cool toward the other allied troops. this sounds conceited, and possibly is, but the explanation seems to be that the russian understood american candor and cordial democracy, the actual sympathetic assistance offered by the doughboy to the russian soldier or laborer and took it at par value. further explanation of the cooling of the ardor of the local partisans toward the british in particular may be found in the fact that the british field commanders often found it convenient and really necessary to send the local troops far distant from their own areas. there they lost the urge of defending their firesides and their families. they were in districts which they quite simply and honestly thought should themselves be aiding the british to keep off the bolsheviki. they could not understand the military necessities that had perhaps called these local partisans off to some other part of the fighting line on those long forest fronts. he lacked the broader sense of nationality or even of sectionalism. and as demands for military action repeatedly came to him the justice of which he saw only darkly he became a poorer and poorer source of dependence. he would not put his spirit into fighting, he was quite likely to hit through the woods for home. when the allies early in the fall found they could not forge through to the south, rolling up a bigger and bigger russian force to crush the bolsheviki, who were apparently, as told us, fighting up to keep us from going a thousand miles or so to hit the germans a belt--a fly-weight buffet as it were--and when we heard of the armistice and began digging in on a real defensive in the late fall and early winter, the provisional government at archangel under tchaikowsky had already made some progress in assembling an army. in the winter small units of this archangel army began co-operating in various places, and as the winter wore on, began to take over small portions of the line, as at toulgas, shred mekrenga, bolsheozerki, usually however with a few british officers and some allied soldiers to stiffen them. although many of these men had been drafted by the archangel government and as we have seen by such local county governments as pinega, they were fairly well trained under old russian officers who crept out to serve when they saw the new government meant business. and many capable young officers came from the british-russian officers' school at bakaritsa. [illustration: nine soldiers working an artillery piece.] red cross photo canadian artillery--americans were strong for them [illustration: a woman kneading dough on a flat rock in front of a low pile of rocks forming the oven. two women and a man are observing. the oven is outdoors, near a tree, with a river or lake in the background.] rozanskey making "khleba"--black bread [illustration: three soldiers in front of a reinforced log shed, covered with snow.] wagner stout defense of kitsa needless to say, these troops were at their best when they were in active work on the lines. rest camp and security from attack quickly reduced their morale. and the next time they were sent up to the forward posts they were likely to prove undependable. in doing the ordinary drudgery of camp life the russian soldier as the doughboy saw him was very unsatisfactory. many a yank has itched to get his hands on the russian archangelite soldier, especially some of our hard old sergeants who wanted to put them on police and scavenger details to see them work. in this reluctance to work, their refusal sometimes even when the doughboy pitched into the hateful job and set them a good example, they were only like the civilian males whose aversion to certain kinds of work has been mentioned before. when some extensive piece of work had to be done for the allies like policing a town, that is, cleaning it up for sake of health of the soldiers or smoothing off a landing place for airplanes, it was a problem to get the labor. in the erection of large buildings or bridges the russian man's axe and saw and mallet and plane worked swiftly and skillfully and unceasingly and willingly. those tools were to him as playthings. not so with an american-made long-handled shovel in his hands. then it was necessary to hire both women and men. the men thought they themselves were earning their pay, but as the women in russia do most of the back-breaking, stooping work anyway, they just caught on to those american shovels and to the astonishment of the american doughboy who superintended the work they did twice as much as the men for just half the pay and with half the bossing. it is not a matter of false pride on the part of the slavic male that keeps him from vying with his better half in doing praiseworthy work. it is lack of education. he has never learned. he is so constituted that he cannot learn quickly. he will work himself to exhaustion day after day in raising a house, cradling grain, playing an accordeon, or performing a folk dance. his earliest known ancestors did those things with fervor and it is doubtful if the modus operandi has changed much since the beginning, since adam was a russian. the "h" company boys could tell you stories of the chinese outfit of s. b. a. l. under the british officer, the likable capt. card, who later lost his life in the forlorn hope drive on karpogora in march. one day he was approached by a chinese soldier who begged the loan of a machine gun for a little while. it seems that the chinese had gotten into argument with a company of russian s. b. a. l. men as to the relative staying qualities of russians and chinese under fire. and they had agreed upon a machine gun duel as a fair test. the writer one night at four in the morning woke when his russian sleigh stopped in a village and rubbed his sleepy eyes open to find himself looking up into the questioning face of a burly sentry of the chinese race. and he obeyed the sentry's directions with alacrity. he was not taking any chances on a misunderstanding that might arise out of an attempted explanation in a three-cornered russo-chino-english conversation. captain odjard's men might tell stories about the redoubtable russian colonel deliktorsky, who was in the push up the rivers in september. impetuous to a fault he flung himself and his men into the offensive movement. "in twelve minutes we take toulgas," was his simple battle order to the americans. no matter to him that ammunition reserves were not ordered up. sufficient to him that he showed his men the place to be battled for. and he was a favorite. on the railroad in the fall a young bolshevik officer surrendered his men to the french. next time the american officer saw him he was reporting in american headquarters at pinega that he had conducted his men to safety and dug in. afterwards bolshevik assassins or spies shot him in ambush and succeeded only in angering him and he went into battle two days later with a bandage covering three wounds in his neck and scalp. "g" and "m" company men will remember this fiery mozalevski. then there was the studious capt. akutin, a three-year veteran of a russian machine gun battalion, a graduate student of science in a russian university, a man of new army and political ideals in keeping with the principles of the russian revolution. his great success with the pinega valley volunteers and drafted men was due quite largely to his strength of character, his adherence to his principles. the people did not fear the restoration of the old monarchist regime even though he was an officer of the czar's old army. american soldiers in pinega gained a genuine respect and admiration for this russian officer, capt. akutin, and he once expressed great pleasure in the fact that they exchanged salutes with him cordially. xxxii felchers, priests and icons felcher is student of medicine--or pill passer of army experience --sanitation and ventilation--priests strange looking to soldiers --duties and responsibilities--effect of bolshevism on peasant's religious devotions--the icons--interesting stories--doughboys buried by russian priests--respect for russian religion. during the fall of when the influenza epidemic was wreaking such great havoc among the soldiers and natives in the archangel province, our medical corps as heretofore explained were put to almost superhuman efforts in combating the spread of this terrible disease. there were very few native doctors in the region, and it was, therefore, well nigh impossible to enlist outside aid. in some of the villages we received word that there were men called felchers who could possibly be of some assistance. we were at once curious to ascertain just what kind of persons these individuals were and upon investigation found that the russian company located in our sector had a young officer who was also a felcher and who was giving certain medical attention to his troops. we immediately sent for him and in answer to our inquiries he explained as nearly as possible just what a felcher was. it seems that in russia, outside the large cities and communities, there is a great scarcity of regularly licensed medical practitioners, many of these latter upon graduation enter the army where the pay is fairly good and the work comparatively easy, the rest of them enter the cities where, of course, practice is larger and the remuneration much better than would be possible in a small community. these facts developed in the smaller communities the use of certain second-rate students of medicine or anyone having a smattering of medical knowledge, called felchers. in many cases the felcher is an old soldier who has traveled around the world a bit; and from his association in the army hospitals with doctors and students has picked up the technique of dressing wounds, setting broken bones and administering physic. very often they are, of course, unable to properly diagnose the ailments or conditions of their patients. they, however, are shrewd enough to follow out the customary army method of treating patients and regardless of the disease promptly administer vile doses of medicine, usually a physic, knowing full well that to the average patient, the stronger the medicine and the more of it he gets, the better the treatment is, and a large percentage of the recoveries effected by these felchers is more or less a matter of faith rather than physic or medicine. the regularly licensed practitioners as a rule have great contempt for these felchers, but the fact remains that in the small communities where they practice the felcher accomplishes a great amount of good, for having traveled considerably and devoted some time to the study of medicine he is at least superior in intelligence to the average peasant, and, therefore, better qualified to meet such emergencies as may arise. this lack of medical practitioners, coupled with the apathy of the peasants regarding sanitary precautions and their unsanitary methods of living accounts to some extent for the violence and spread of plagues, so common throughout russia. regarding the spread of disease and plagues through russia caused as above stated by lack of sanitary conditions, a word or two further would not be amiss. in the province of archangel, for example, a great majority of houses are entirely of log construction, built and modelled throughout by the owner, and perhaps some of his good neighbors. they are really a remarkable example of what may be done in the way of construction without the use of nails and of the modern improved methods of house construction. it is an actual fact that these simple peasants, equipped only with their short hand axes, with the use of which they are adepts, can cut down trees, hew the logs and build their homes practically without the use of any nails whatever. the logs, of course, are first well seasoned before they are put into the house itself and when they are joined together they are practically air tight, but to make sure of this fact the cracks are sealed tight with moss hammered into the chinks. next the windows of these houses are always double, that is, there is one window on the outside of the frame and another window on the inside. needless to say, during the winter these windows are practically never opened. during the winter months the entire family--and families in this country are always large--eat, sleep, and live in one room of the house in which the huge brick home-made stove is located. in addition to the human beings living in the room there are often a half dozen or more chickens concealed beneath the stove, sometimes several sheep, and outside the door may be located the stable for the cattle. nevertheless, the peasants are remarkably healthy, and in this region of the world epidemics are rather uncommon which may perhaps be explained by the fact that the peasants are out of doors a large part of the time and in addition thereto the air is very pure and healthful. sewerage systems and such means of drainage are entirely unknown, even in the city of archangel, which at the time we were there, contained some hundred thousand inhabitants. the only sewerage there was an open sewer that ran through the streets of the city. small wonder it is under such conditions that when an epidemic does break out that it spreads so far and so rapidly. one of the most familiar characters seen in every town, large or small, was the batushka. this character is usually attired in a long, black or gray smock and his hair reaches in long curls to his shoulders. at first sight to the yankee soldiers he resembled very much the members of the house of david or so-called "holy roller" sect in this country. this mysterious individual, commonly called batushka, as we later discovered, was the village priest. the priest of course belonged to the russian orthodox church and whose head in the old days was the czar. the priests differ very greatly from the ministers of the gospel and priests in the english-speaking world. they have certain religious functions to perform in certain set ways, outside of which they never venture to stray. the russian priest is merely expected to conform to certain observances and to perform the rites and ceremonies prescribed by the church. he rarely preaches or exhorts, and neither has nor seeks to have a moral control over his flock. marriage among the priests is not prohibited but is limited, that is to say, the priest is allowed to marry but once, and consequently, in choosing the wife he usually picks one of the strongest and healthiest women in the community. this selection is in all seriousness an important matter in the priest's life because he draws practically no salary from his position and must own a share of the community land, till and cultivate the same in exactly the same manner as the rest of the community, consequently his wife must be strong and healthy in order to assist him in the many details of managing his small holdings. in case she were such a strong and healthy person, the loss of the wife would be a calamity in more ways than one to the priest as is apparent by the above statements. while the religious beliefs and doctrines of the average peasant is only used by him as a practical means toward an end, yet it must be admitted that the russian people are in a certain sense religious. they regularly go to church on sundays and holy days, of which there are countless numbers, cross themselves repeatedly when they pass a church or icon, take the holy communion at stated seasons, rigorously abstain from animal food, not only on wednesdays and fridays but also during lent and the other long fasts, make occasional pilgrimages to the holy shrines and in a word fulfill carefully the ceremonial observance which they suppose necessary for their salvation. of theology in its deeper sense the peasant has no intelligent comprehension. for him the ceremonial part of religion suffices and he has the most unbounded childlike confidence in the saving efficacy of the rites which he practices. men of education and of great influence among the people were these sad-faced priests, until the bolsheviks came to undermine their power; for the bolsheviks have spared not the old imperial government. the church had been a potent organization for the czar to strengthen his sway throughout his far-reaching dominions and every priest was an enlisted crusader of the little father. so the bolsheviki, sweeping over the country, have seized, first of all, upon these priests of romanoff, torturing them to death with hideous cruelty, if there be any truth in stories, and finding vindictive delight in deriding sacred things and violating holy places. the moujik, ever susceptible to influence, has been quick to become infected with this bacillus of agnosticism, and while he still professes the faith and observes many of the forms as by habit, his fervor is cooling and already is grown luke-warm. now on sundays, despite all of the execrations of the priest, and the terrible threats of eternal damnation, he often dozes the sabbath away unperturbed on the stove; and lets the women attend to the church going. under bolshevik rule holy russia will be agnostic russia; and it is a pity, for religious teaching was the guiding star of these poor people, and religious precepts, hard, gloomy and dismal though they were, the foundation of the best in their character. icons are pictorial, usually half length representations of the saviour or the madonna or some patron saint, finished in a very archaic byzantine style on a yellow or gold background, and vary in size from a square inch to several square feet. very often the whole picture is covered with various ornaments, ofttimes with precious stones. in respect to their religious significance icons are of two classes, simple or miracle-working. the former are manufactured in enormous quantities and are to be found in every russian house, from the lowest peasant to the highest official. they are generally placed high up in a corner of the living room facing the door, and every good orthodox peasant on entering the door bows in the direction of the icon and crosses himself repeatedly. before and after meals the same ceremony is always performed and on holiday or fete days a small taper or candle is kept burning before the icon throughout the day. an amusing incident is related which took place in the allied hospital in shenkursk. a young medical officer had just arrived from archangel and was sitting in the living room or entrance-way of the hospital directly underneath one of these icons. one of the village ladies, having occasion to call at the hospital, entered the front door and as usual stepped toward the center of the room facing the icon, bowed very low and started crossing herself. the young officer who was unacquainted with the russian custom, believing that she was saluting him, quickly stepped forward and stretched forth his hand to shake hands with her while she was still in the act of crossing herself. great was his consternation when he was later informed by his interpreter of the significance of this operation. doughboys on the railroad front at obozerskaya will recall the fact that when the first three americans killed in action in north russia were buried, it was impossible to get one of our chaplains from archangel to come to obozerskaya to bury them. the american officer in command engaged the local russian priest to perform the religious service. by some trick of fate it had happened that these first americans who fell in action were of slavic blood, so the strange funeral which the doughboys witnessed was not so incongruous after all. with the long-haired, wonderfully-robed priest came his choir and many villagers, who occupied one side of the square made by the soldiers standing there in the dusk to do last honors to their dead comrades. with chantings and doleful chorus the choir answered his solemn oratory and devotional intercessions. he swung his sacred censer pot over each body and though we understood no word we knew he was doing reverence to the spirit of sacrifice shown by our fallen comrades. there in the darkness by the edge of the forest, the priest and his ceremony, the firing squad's volley, and the bugler's last call, all united to make that an allied funeral. the american soldier and the priest and his pitiful people had really begun to spin out threads of sympathy which were to be woven later into a fabric of friendliness. the doughboy always respected the honest peasant's religious customs. xxxiii bolshevism why chapter is written--venerable kropotkin's message direct from central russia--official report of united states department of state --conclusions of study prepared for national chamber of commerce --authoritative comment by men who are in position to know--a cartoon and comment which speak for veterans. the writers have an idea that the veterans of the north russian expedition would like a short, up-to-date chapter on bolshevism. we used to wonder why it was that john bolo was so willing to fight us and the white guards. we would not wish to emphasize the word willing for we remember the fact that many a time when he was beaten back from our defenses we knew by the sound that he was being welcomed back to his camp by machine guns. and the prisoners and wounded whom we captured were not always enthusiastic about the bolshevism under whose banner they fought. to be fair, however, we must remark that we captured some men and officers who were sure enough believers in their cause. and the general reader will probably like a chapter presented by men who were over in that civil war-torn north country and who might be expected to gather the very best materials available on the subject of bolshevism. and what we have gathered we present with not much comment except that we ourselves are trying to keep a tolerant but wary eye upon those who profess to believe in bolshevism. we say candidly that we think bolshevism is a failure. but we do not condemn everyone else who differs with us. let there be fair play and justice to all, freedom of thought and speech, with decent respect for the rights of all. the first article is adapted from an article in the new york times of recent date, according to which margaret bondfield, a member of the british labor delegation which recently visited russia, went to see peter kropotkin, the celebrated russian economist and anarchist, at his home at dimitroff, near moscow. the old man gave her a message to the workers of great britain and the western world: "in the first place, the workers of the civilized world and their friends among other classes should persuade their governments to give up completely the policy of armed intervention in the affairs of russia, whether that intervention is open or disguised, military, or under the form of subventions by different nations. "russia is passing through a revolution of the same significance and of equal importance that england passed through in - and france in - . the nations of today should refuse to play the shameful role to which england, prussia, austria, and russia sank during the french revolution. "moreover, it is necessary to consider that the russian revolution--which seeks to erect a society in which the full production of the combined efforts of labor, technical skill and scientific knowledge shall go to the community itself--is not a mere accident in the struggle of parties. the revolution has been in preparation for nearly a century by socialist and communist propaganda, since the times of robert owen, saint-simon, and fourier. and although the attempt to introduce the new society by the dictatorship of a party apparently seems condemned to defeat, it must be admitted that the revolution has already introduced into our life new conceptions of the rights of labor, its true position in society, and the duties of each citizen. not only the workers, but all progressive elements in the civilized nations should bring to an end the support so far given to the adversaries of the revolution. this does not mean that there is nothing to oppose in the methods of the bolshevist government. far from it! but all armed intervention by a foreign power necessarily results in an increase of the dictatorial tendencies of the rulers and paralyzes the efforts of those russians who are ready to aid russia, independent of her government, in the restoration of her life. "the evils inherent in the party dictatorship have grown because of the war conditions in which this party has maintained itself. the state of war has been the pretext for increasing the dictatorial methods of the party as well as the reason for the tendency to centralize each detail of life in the hands of the government, which has resulted in the cessation of many branches of the nation's usual activities. the natural evils of state communism have been multiplied tenfold under the pretext that the distress of our existence is due to the intervention of foreigners. "it is my firm opinion that if the military intervention of the allies is continued it will certainly develop in russia a bitter sentiment with respect to the western nations, a sentiment that will be utilized some day in future conflicts. this bitter feeling is already growing. "so far as our present economic and political situation is concerned, the russian revolution, being the continuation of the two great revolutions in england and france, undertakes to progress beyond the point where france stopped when she perceived that actual equality consists in economic equality. "unfortunately, this attempt has been made in russia under the strongly centralized dictatorship of a party, the maximalist social democrats. the baboeuf conspiracy, extremely centralized and jacobinistic, tried to apply a similar policy. i am compelled frankly to admit that, in my opinion, this attempt to construct a communist republic with a strongly centralized state communism as its base, under the iron law of the dictatorship of a party, is bound to end in a fiasco. we are learning in russia how communism should not be introduced, even by a people weary of the ancient regime and making no active resistance to the experimental projects of the new rulers. "the soviet idea--that is to say, councils of workers and peasants, first developed during the revolutionary uprisings of and definitely realized during the revolution of february, --the idea of these councils controlling the economic and political life of the country, is a great conception. especially so because it necessarily implies that the councils should be composed of all those who take a real part in the production of national wealth by their own personal efforts. "but as long as a country is governed by the dictatorship of a party, the workers' and peasants' councils evidently lose all significance. they are reduced to the passive role formerly performed by the states generals and the parliaments when they were convened by the king and had to combat an all-powerful royal council. "a labor council ceases to be a free council when there is no liberty of the press in the country, and we have been in this situation for nearly two years--under the pretext that we are in a state of war. but that is not all. the workers' and peasants' councils lose all their significance unless the elections are preceded by a free electoral campaign and when the elections are conducted under the pressure of the dictatorship of a party. naturally, the stock excuse is that the dictatorship is inevitable as a method to fight the ancient regime. but such a dictatorship evidently becomes a barrier from the moment when the revolution undertakes the construction of a new society on a new economic basis. the dictatorship condemns the new structure to death. "the methods resorted to in overthrowing governments already tottering are well known to history, ancient and modern. but when it is necessary to create new forms of life--especially new forms of production and exchange--without examples to follow, when everything must be constructed from the ground up, when a government that undertakes to supply even lamp chimneys to every inhabitant demonstrates that it is absolutely unable to perform this function with all its employees, however limitless their number may be, when this condition is reached such a government becomes a nuisance. it develops a bureaucracy so formidable that the french bureaucratic system, which imposes the intervention of functionaries to sell a tree blown across a national road by a storm, becomes a bagatelle in comparison. this is what you, the workers in the occidental countries, should and must avoid by all possible means since you have at heart the success of a social reconstruction. send your delegates here to see how a social revolution works in actual life. "the prodigious amount of constructive labor necessary under a social revolution cannot be accomplished by a central government, even though it may be guided by something more substantial than a collection of socialist and anarchistic manuals. it requires all the brain power available and the voluntary collaboration of specialized and local forces, which alone can attack with success the diversity of the economic problems in their local aspects. to reject this collaboration and to rely on the genius of a party dictatorship is to destroy the independent nucleus, such as the trade unions and the local co-operative societies by changing them into party bureaucratic organs, as is actually the case at present. it is the method not to accomplish the revolution. it is the method to make the realization of the revolution impossible. and this is the reason why i consider it my duty to warn you against adopting such methods. it must be evident to the reader that russia is at present being ruled by a system of pyramided majorities, many of which are doubtful popular majorities. in the name of the red party lenin and trotsky rule. they themselves admit it. the dictatorship of the proletariat, and similar terms are used by them in referring to their highly centralized control. we americans are in the habit of overturning state and national administrations when we think one party has ruled long enough. even a popular war president at the pinnacle of his power found the american people resenting, so it has been positively affirmed, his plea for the return of his party to continued control in . can we as a self-governing people look with anything but wonder at the occasional american who fails to see that the perpetual rule of one party year after year which we as americans have always doubted the wisdom of, is the very thing that lenin and trotsky have fastened upon russia. russia, that wanted to be freed from the romanoff rule and its bureaucratic system of fraud, waste, and cruelty, today groans under a system of despotism which is just as, if not more, wasteful, fraudulent and cruel. there are sincere people who might think that because the bolsheviks have kept themselves in power, that they must be right. we can not agree with the reasoning. even if we knew nothing about the bayonets and machine guns and firing squads and prisons, we would not agree to the reasoning that the bolshevik government is right just because it is in power. we prefer the reasoning of the greatest man whom america has produced, abraham lincoln, whose words, which we quote, seem to us to exactly fit the present russian situation: "a majority held in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only free sovereign of a free people. whoever rejects it does of necessity fly to anarchy or to despotism. unanimity is impossible. the rule of a minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left."--abraham lincoln. the chamber of commerce of the united states has, through frederic j. haskin, washington, d. c., distributed an admirable pamphlet, temperate and judicial, which compares the soviet system with the american constitutional system. this pamphlet written by hon. burton l. french, of idaho, concludes his discussion as follows: "in a government that has been heralded so widely as being the most profound experiment in democracy that has ever been undertaken, we would naturally expect that the franchise would be along lines that would recognize all mankind embraced within the citizenship of the nation as standing upon an equal footing. the united states has for many years adhered to that principle. it was that principle largely for which our fathers died when they established our government, and yet that principle seems foreign to the way of thinking of lenin and trotsky as they shaped the russian constitution. parallel --those who may vote russia . the franchise extends to all over years of age who have acquired the means of living through manual labor, and also persons engaged in housekeeping for the former. . soldiers of the army and navy. . the former two classes when incapacitated. united states all men (and women in many states, and soon in all) who are citizens and over years of age, excepting those disfranchised on account of illiteracy, mental ailment or criminal record. "bear in mind the liberal franchise with which the american nation meets her citizens and let me ask you to contemplate the franchise that is handed out to the people of russia who are; years of age or over who have acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to society and persons engaged in housekeeping in behalf of the former are entitled to the franchise. who else? the soldiers of the army and navy. who else? any of the former two classes who have become incapacitated. "now turn to the next sections of the russian constitution and see who are disfranchised. "the merchant is disfranchised; ministers of all denominations are disfranchised; and then, while condemning the czar for tyranny, the soviet constitution solemnly declares that those who were in the employ of the czar or had been members of the families of those who had ruled in russia for many generations shall be denied suffrage. "persons who have income from capital or from property that is theirs by reason of years of frugality, industry, and thrift are penalized by being denied the right to vote. they are placed in the class with criminals, while the profligate, the tramp who works enough to obtain the means by which he can hold body and soul together, is able to qualify under the constitution of russia and is entitled to a vote. under that system in the united states the loyal men and women who bought liberty bonds, in their country's peril would be disfranchised while the slacker would have the right of suffrage. "persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profits may not vote or hold office. under that system the manufacturer who furnishes employment for a thousand men would be denied the ballot, while those in his employ could freely exercise the right of franchise. under that system the farmer who hires a crew of men to help him harvest his crop is denied the franchise. under that system the dairyman who hires a boy to milk his cows or to deliver milk is denied the franchise. "the constitution of russia adopts the declaration of rights as part of the organic act to the extent that changes have not been made, by the constitution. examine them--the constitution and the declaration of rights--we find other most astounding doctrines in the soviet fundamental law. i shall not discuss but merely mention a few of them. they do not pertain so much to the structure of government as they do to the economic and social conditions surrounding the people under the soviet system: "first. private ownership of land is abolished. (no compensation, open or secret, is paid to the former owner.) "second. civil marriage alone is legal. by act of the all-russian congress of soviets a marriage may be accomplished by the contracting parties declaring the fact orally, or by writing to the department of registry of marriage. divorce is granted by petition of both or either party upon proof alone that divorce is desired. "third. the teaching of religious doctrines is forbidden in private schools, as well as in schools that are public. "fourth. no church or religious society has the right to own property. (the soviet leaders boldly proclaim the home and the church as the enemies of their system, and from the foregoing it would seem that they are trying to destroy them.) "fifth. under the general authority granted to the soviets by the constitution inheritance of property by law or will has been abolished. "these amazing features of the constitution and laws enacted under the constitution speak more eloquently than any words that could be used to amplify them in portraying the hideousness of a system of government that, if permitted to continue, must inevitably crush out the home in large part by the flippancy with which marriage and divorce are regarded, by the refusal of permitting the land to be held in private ownership, and by refusing the parent the right at death to pass on to his wife or to his children the fruits of years of toil. "what, then, is my arraignment of sovietism according to the soviet constitution? " . the people have no direct vote or voice in government, except the farmers in their local rural soviets and the city dwellers in their urban soviets. " . the rural, county, provincial, regional, and all-russian soviets are elected indirectly, and the people have no direct vote in the election. " . the people have no voice in the election of executive officers of the highest or lowest degrees. " . there is no mention of independent judicial officers in the constitution. " . the people are very largely disfranchised. " . the farmer of russia is discriminated against. " . the system raises class against class; the voters vote by trade and craft groups instead of on the basis of thought units. " . the system strikes a blow at the church and the home. " . the system is pyramidal and means highly centralized and autocratic power. "the soviet system of government can not be defended. it is against the interests of the very men for whom it is supposed to have been established--the laboring man. he is the man most of all who must suffer under any kind of government or system that is wrong. he is the man who would be out of bread within the shortest time. he is the man whose family would be destitute of clothing in the shortest time. he is the man whose family will suffer through disease, famine, and pestilence in the shortest time. "as it is against the best interest of the laboring man, so it is against the best interest of all the people, and, as a matter of fact, the overwhelming mass of people of this country and all countries is made up of laboring people. "finally, the soviet government, as foreshadowed in its constitution, is obviously unjust, unfair and discriminatory. this fact will appear at once to any mind trained to the american manner of thought, which takes the trouble to investigate sovietism, and whatever tendency there may be to approve will disappear with better understanding." "men in high places who have had opportunity to get the facts," says mr. burton, "give their impressions of the experiment: "woodrow wilson, president of the united states.--'there is a closer monopoly of power in moscow and petrograd than there ever was in berlin.' "samuel gompers, president of the american federation of labor.-- 'bolshevism is as great an attempt to disrupt the trade unions as it is to overturn the government of the united states. it means the decadence or perversion of the civilization of our time. to me, the story of the desperate samson who pulled the temple down on his head is an example of what is meant by bolshevism.' "morris hillquit, international secretary of the socialist party.--'the socialists of the united states would have no hesitancy whatsoever in joining forces with the rest of their countrymen to repel the bolsheviki who would try to invade our country and force a form of government upon our people which our people were not ready for, and did not desire.' "herbert hoover, former united states food administrator.--'the united states has been for one hundred and fifty years steadily developing a social philosophy of its own. this philosophy has stood this test in the fire of common sense. we have a willingness to abide by the will of the majority. for all i know it may be necessary to have revolutions in some places in europe in order to bring about these things, but it does not follow that such philosophies have any place with us.' "william howard taft, former president of the united states.--'i do not fear bolshevism in this country. i do not mean that in congested centers foreigners and agitators will not have influence. but americans as a whole have a deep love for america. it is a vital love that the sensational appeals of bolshevists and agitators cannot weaken'." a yellowed and tattered cartoon that hung on a company bulletin board at when the snow was slipping away. "america looks mighty. good after you've seen europe" is the title. on the right stands the bolshevik orator on a soap box. his satchel bursting out with propaganda and pamphlets on bolshevism from europe. in his hand he holds a pamphlet that has a message for the returning doughboys. the agitator's hair and whiskers bristle with hatred and envy. his yellow teeth look hideous between his snarling lips. and he points a long skinny finger for the doughboy to see his message, which is, "down with america, it's all wrong." so much for the man who came from europe to wreck america. now look at the man who went to europe to save america and is now back on the west side of the statue of liberty. does he look interested in bolshevism or downhearted over america? no. in his figure a manful contrast to the scraggly agitator. in his face no hate, no malice. he does not even hate the self-deluded agitator. his clean-brushed teeth are exposed by a good-humored smile of assurance and confidence. he does not extend a fist but he waves off the fool bolshevik orator with a good-natured but nevertheless final answer. and here it is: "go on--take that stuff back to where you got it--i wouldn't trade a log hut on a swamp in america for the whole of europe!" we are thinking that the cartoon just about says it for all returned soldiers from north russia. we want nothing to do with the bolo agitator in this country who would make another russia of the united states. we let them blow off steam, are patient with their vagaries, are willing to give every man a fair hearing if he has a grievance, but we don't fall for their wild ideas about tearing things up by the roots. [illustration: cartoon. ship at an american pier in the background. soldier standing erect on the left says "go on--take that stuff back to where you got it--i wouldn't trade a log hut on a swamp in america for the whole of europe!" orator standing crouched on soapbox on the right. orator is holding a paper saying "down with america! it's all wrong!" papers in orator's sack: "bolshevism from europe" "east side of new york propaganda"] america looks mighty good after you've seen europe --columbus evening dispatch xxxiv y. m. c. a. and y. w. c. a. with troops justice where justice is due--summary of work of "y" men--"y" women and hostess house--seen near front--devoted women stay in russia when we leave--christian associations point way to help russia. the editors have felt that "justice where justice is due" demands a few pages in this volume about the service of our y. m. c. a. with us in north russia. we know that there is a great deal of bitterness against the "y." much of it was engendered by the few selfish and crooked and cowardly men who crept into the "y" service, and the really great service of the y. m. c. a. is badly discounted and its war record sadly sullied. we know that here and there in north russia a "y" man failed to "measure up" but we know that on the whole our y. m. c. a. in north russia with us, did great service. to get a fair and succinct story, we wrote to mr. crawford wheeler, whose statement follows. he was the chief secretary in the north russia area. the first paragraph is really a letter of transmissal, but we approve its sentiment and commend its manly straightforwardness to our comrades and the general reader: "this is written purely from memory. i haven't a scrap of material at hand and i have hurried in order that you might have the stuff promptly. please indicate, in case you use this material, that it is not based on records,--for i cannot vouch for all the figures. however, in the main, the outline is right. i wish the "y" might have a really good chapter in your book, for i always have felt, with many of the other boys in our service, that we are condemned back here for the sins of others. if the "y" in north russia was not a fairly effective organization which went right to the front and stayed there, then a lot of officers and men in the th poured slush in my ears. were it not for the rather unfortunate place which a "y" man occupies back here, none of us would seek even an iota of praise, for in comparison with the rest of you, we deserve none; but i'm sure you understand the circumstances which impel me to insert the foregoing plea, 'justice where justice is due.' that's all. "the y. m. c. a. shared the lot of the american north russian expeditionary force as an isolated fighting command from the day it landed until the last soldier left archangel. it shared in the successes and the failures of the expedition. it contributed something now and then to the welfare and comfort and even to the lives of the american and allied troops both at the front and in the base camps. it made a record which only the testimony of those who were part of the expedition is qualified to estimate. "when the american soldiers of the th infantry landed in archangel on september th, , they found a "y" in town ahead of them. the day after the port was captured by allied forces early in august, allen craig of the american y. m. c. a. had secured a spacious building in the heart of the city for use as a "y" hut. with very little equipment he managed to set up a cocoa and biscuit stand and a reading and writing room and the hall of the building was opened for band concerts and athletic nights. it really was little more than a barn until the arrival of secretaries and supplies in october made improvements possible. "a party of ten secretaries, who had spent the previous year in central russia under the bolshevik regime, landed in the first week of october, having come around from sweden and norway. two weeks later another ten secretaries arrived from the same starting point. these men formed the nucleus of the "y" personnel which was to serve the american troops through the winter and spring. they were sent to points at the front immediately after their arrival, and more than a few doughboys will remember the first trip of the big railroad car to the front south of obozerskaya, with frank olmstead in charge. "the british y. m. c. a. sent a party of twenty-five secretaries to archangel early in the fall and considerations of practical policy made it advisable to combine operations under the title of the allied y. m. c. a. to the credit of the british secretaries, it must be said that they turned over all their supplies to the american management. these supplies constituted practically all the stock of biscuit and canteen products used until christmas time, and british secretaries took their places under the direction of the american headquarters. "the "y" was fortunate to have secured several trucks and ford cars in a shipment before the allied landing, and they became part of the expeditionary transport system at once. the supply company of the th used one truck, and the british transport staff borrowed the other one. major ely, quartermaster of the american forces, got one of the fords, and another one went to the american red cross. "by the middle of november the "y" had secretaries on the river fronts near seletskoe and beresnik at the railroad front and with the pinega detachment. supplies dribbled through to them in pitifully small amounts, usually half of the stuff stolen before it reached the front. the british n. a. b. c. sold considerable quantities of biscuit and cigarettes to the "y," both at the front bases and from the archangel depot. on the railroad front a really respectable service was maintained, because transport was not so difficult. one secretary made the trip around the blockhouses and outposts daily with a couple of packsacks filled with gum, candy and cigarettes, which were distributed as generously as the small capacity of the sacks permitted. two cars equipped with tables for reading and writing and with a big cocoa urn were stationed at verst , where the headquarters train and reserve units stood. these cars were moved to points north and south on the line twice weekly for small detachments to get their ration of biscuit and sweets, small as it was. [illustration: soldiers seated for dinner at tables decorated with tablecloths and candles. walls are decorated with pine boughs.] red cross photo christmas dinner, convalescent hospital [illustration: several soldiers standing in the snow; they being served food from a rail car.] u. s. official photo "come and get it" at verst [illustration: soldiers seated on the ground, with richardson and mccully in the foreground.] wagner doughboys drubbed sailors brig. gen. richardson and adm. mccully at army-navy game [illustration: large group of soldiers huddled together inside a barbed wire stockade.] wagner yank and scot guarding prisoners "another row of cars was maintained at obozerskaya, where the first outpost entertainment hut was opened about christmas time with a program of moving pictures, athletic stunts and feeds. shipments were made from this base to the secretaries at seletskoe, who did their best to make the winter less monotonous and miserable for the second battalion men stationed on that front. the "y" opened a hut in pinega in early november, and by the middle of december had established a point for the "h" company men west of emtsa on, the onega river line. "meanwhile, the central "y" hut at archangel had been remodelled and fully equipped for handling large crowds, and it served several hundred allied soldiers daily. whenever a company of americans came in from the front, a special night was arranged for them to have a program in the theatre hall, with movies, songs, stunts and eats on the bill. a series of basketball games was carried on between the base unit companies and other commands which were in archangel for a week or more awaiting transfer to another point. huts were opened in the smolny base camp at solombola, both of them barely large enough to afford room for a cocoa and biscuit counter, a piano, and a reading room. shortly after christmas another "y" station was put in commission across the river at the preestin railroad terminal, where detachments and individuals often endured a long wait in the cold or arrived chilled to the bone from a trip on the heatless cars. "about christmas time twenty-five more secretaries arrived from the american y. m. c. a. headquarters in england, and with this addition to personnel, it was possible to make headquarters something more than a table and a telephone. a fairly efficient supply and office staff was built up and with the landing of two or three belated cargoes, "y" folk began to see a rosier period ahead. but transport difficulties made it almost impossible to get stuff moved to the front, where the men needed it most. 'when there are neither guns nor ammunition enough,' said the british headquarters, 'how can we afford to take sleds for sending up biscuits and cigarettes?' "nevertheless, by hook or crook, several convoys were pushed through to bereznik, each time reviving the hopes of the men in the outposts, who thought at last they might get some regular service. tom cotton and "husky" merrill, two football stars from dartmouth, were in charge of the "y" points on the dvina advanced front, and whatever success the "y" attained in that vicinity belongs primarily to their credit. they ended an eventful career in the spring of by getting captured when the bolsheviks and russian mutineers staged a coup d'etat at toulgas and captured the village. their escape was more a matter of luck than of planning. they paddled down the river in a boat. in their hasty exit from the village, they left behind all their personal belongings. "at shenkursk the "y" hut and stock also fell to the bolos, but the secretaries got out with the troops. the column which made the terrible retreat from shenkursk found the "y" waiting for it at shegovari, with hot cocoa and biscuit. despite the congested transport, the service on this line was kept up all through the winter and spring, "dad" albertson, "ken" hollinshead and brackett lewis making themselves mighty effective in their service to the men on this sector. albertson has written a book, "fighting without a war," which embodies his experiences and observations with the doughboys at the front. "one of the best pieces of service performed by the "y" during the whole campaign was carried on at the time of the fierce bolshevik drive for obozerskaya from the west in february and march. this drive cost the "y" two of its best secretaries, but service was maintained without a break from the first day until the end when the bolos retreated. merle arnold was in the village running a "y" post when the attack occurred and was captured along with six american soldiers. bryant ryall, who ran the "y" tent in the woods at verst , next fell a victim to the bolos, while on the way to obozerskaya for more supplies. olmstead, who came from to help in this desperate place, remained, and as a result of his work at this front, received the french croix de guerre and the russian st. george cross. "other decorations were awarded to ernest rand on the pinega sector and to "dad" albertson on the dvina front, both of them receiving the st. george cross. the british military medal was to have been given albertson, but technicalities made it impossible. several other secretaries were mentioned in despatches by the american and british commands, all of them for service at the fighting front. it was the policy of the "y" from the start to send the best men to the front, rush the best supplies to the front, give the men from the front the best service while at the base camps, and do it without thought of payment. it is a fact that the archangel 'show' cost the "y" more per capita served than any other piece of front service rendered overseas. the heavy cost was accentuated by the immense loss to supplies in the supply ships, warehouses and cars or convoys, from theft and breakage and freezing. the totals of the business done by the "y" up in the russian arctic area are astounding, when the difficulties of transport are considered more than $ , , worth of supplies were received and distributed before the american troops left archangel. this included twenty-five motion picture outfits, everyone of which was in use by late spring, a million and a half feet of film, fairly large shipments of athletic goods, baseball equipment and phonographs, and thousands of books and magazines, which filled a most important part in the program. until early spring the "y" bought most of its canteen supplies from the british n. a. c. b., through a credit established in london. these stocks were sold to the "y" virtually at the british retail prices and were resold at the same figures, with a resulting loss to the "y," as the loss and damage mounted up to forty per cent at times. in may, several shipments of american canteen stocks arrived at archangel, which enabled the secretaries to cut loose the strings on 'ration plans' before the troops started home. "a hut was opened at the embarkation point, economia, in the early spring, and troops quartered there had a complete red triangle service ready for them when sailing time arrived. a secretary or two went with each transport, equipped with a small stock of sweets and cigarettes to distribute on the voyage. most of the american secretaries did not leave, however, until after the troops departed. some of them remained until the closing act of the show in august. two more were captured when the bolos staged their mutiny at onega. all these men eventually were released from captivity in moscow and reached america safely. "the y. m. c. a. received hearty co-operation from the american red cross, from the american embassy, and from the american headquarters units. sugar and cocoa were turned over frequently by the red cross when the "y" ran completely out of stocks and an unstinted use of red cross facilities was open at all times to the "y" men. the embassy and consulate transmitted the "y" cables through their offices to england and america and co-operated with urgent pleas for aid at times when such pleas were essential to the adoption of policies to better the "y" service. the headquarters of the th infantry and the th engineers responded to every reasonable request made by the "y" for assignments of helpers, huts or other facilities in the different areas where work was carried on. the naval command showed special courtesies in forwarding supplies on cruisers and despatch boats from england and murmansk and in permitting the "y" men to travel on their ships. "altogether more than sixty american secretaries took part in the north russian show. about eight or ten of them, however, were on the murmansk line, and were said by the american command to have done good work with the engineers and sailors in that area. whatever record the american "y" made in north russia, it can in truth be said of the secretarial force that with few exceptions they gave the best that was in them and they never felt satisfied with their work. the service which olmstead and cotton and arnold and albertson and beekman and a dozen others rendered, ranks with the best work done by the y. m. c. a. men in any part of the world. correspondents from the front in france and members of the american command who arrived late in the day, expressed their surprise and gratification at the spirit which animated the "y" workers up in the russian arctic region. but the best test is the record which lives in the hearts of american soldiers, and on their fairminded testimony the "y" men wish to secure their verdict for whatever they deserve for their service in north russia with the american soldiers fighting the bolsheviki." to our y. w. c. a. american girls in that old school reader of ours we used to read with wet eyes and tight throat the story of the soldier who lay dying at bingen on the rhine and told his buddie to tell his sister to be kind to all the comrades. how he yearned for the touch of his mother's or sister's hand in that last hour, how the voice of woman and her liquid eye of love could soothe his dying moments. and the veterans of the world war now understand that poetic sentiment better than they did when as barefooted boys they tried to conceal their emotions behind the covers of the book, for in the unlovely grime and grind of war the soldier came to long for the sight of his own women kind. they will now miss no opportunity to sing the praises of their war time friends, the salvation army lassies and the girls of the y. w. c. a. in north russia we were out of luck in the lack of salvation army lassies enough to reach around to our front, but in that isolated war area we were fortunate to receive several representatives of the american y. w. c. a. some were girls who had already been in russia for several years in the regular mission work among the russian people, and two of them we hasten to add right here, were brave enough to stay behind when we cut loose from the country. miss dunham and miss taylor were to turn back into the interior of the country and seek to help the pitiful people of russia. we take our hats off to them. what doughboy will forget the first sight he caught of an american "y" girl in north russia? he gave her his eyes and ears and his heart all in a minute. was he in the hospital? her smile was a memory for days afterward. if a convalescent who could dance, the touch of her arm and hand and the happy swing of the steps swayed him into forgetfulness of the pain of his wounds. if he were off outpost duty on a sector near the front line and seeking sweets at a y. m. c. a. his sweets were doubled in value to him as he took them from the hand of the "y" girl behind the counter. or at church service in archangel her voice added a heavenly note to the hymn. in the hostess house, he watched her pass among the men showering graciousness and pleasantries upon the whole lonesome lot of doughboys. one of the boys wrote a little poem for the american sentinel which may be introduced here in prose garb a la walt mason. "there's a place in old archangel, that we never will forget, and of all the cozy places, it's the soldier's one best bet. it's the place where lonely sammies hit the trail for on the run, there they serve you cake and coffee, 'till the cake and coffee's done. and they know that after eating, there's another pleasure yet,-- so to show how they are thoughtful, they include a cigarette. there's a place back in the corner, where you get your clothing checked, and the place is yours, they tell you, --well--or words to that effect. there are magazines a-plenty, from the good old u. s. a. there's a cheery home-like welcome for you any time of day. will we, can we e'er forget them, in the future golden years, and the kindness that was rendered, by these lady volunteers? just as soon as work is finished, don't you brush your hair and blouse, and go double-double timing, to the cordial hostess house?" one of the pretty weddings in archangel that winter was that celebrated by the boys when miss childs became home-maker for bryant ryal, the "y" man who was later taken prisoner by the bolsheviki. she was within twelve miles of him the day he was captured. doughboys were quick to offer her comforting assurances that he would be treated well because american "y" men had done so much in russia for the russian soldiers before the bolshevik debacle. and when they heard that he was actually on his way to moscow with fair chance of liberation, they crowded the taplooska ryal home and made it shine radiantly with their congratulations. but it was not the institutional service such as the hostess house or the huts or the box car canteen, such as it was, which endeared the "y" girls to the doughboys as a lot. it was the genuine womanly friendliness of those girls. the writer will never forget the scene at archangel when the american soldiers left for economia where the ship was to take them to america. genuine were the affectionate farewells of the people--men, women and children; and genuine were the responses of the soldiers to those pitiable people. our miss dickerson, of the y. w. c. a. hostess house, was surrounded by a tearful group of russian high school girls who had been receiving instruction in health, sanitation and other social betterments and catching the american young women's christian association vision of usefulness to the sick, ignorant and unhappy ones of the community. around her they gathered, a beautiful picture of feminine grief in its sweet purity of girlish tears, and at the same time a beautiful picture of promising hope for the future of russia when all of that long-suffering people may be reached by our tactful christian women. in this connection now i think of the conversation with our miss taylor the last sunday we were in economia. she and miss dunham were staying on in archangel hoping to get permission to go into the interior of the country again. and it is reported that they did. she said to me: "wherever you can, back home among christian people, tell them that these poor people here in russia have had their religious life so torn up by this strife that now they long for teachers to come and help them to regain a religious expression." a prominent worker among the college y. m. c. a.'s in america, "ken" hollinshead, who was a "y" secretary far up on the dvina river in the long, cold, desperate winter, also caught the vision of the needs of the russian people who had been rasputinized and leninized out of the faith of their fathers and were pitifully like sheep without a shepherd. he remarked to the writer that when the bolshevist nightmare is over in russia, he would like to go back over there and help them to revive what was vital and essential in their old faith and to improve it by showing them the american way of combining cleanliness with godliness, education with creed-holding, work with piety. can the russians be educated? the soldiers know that many a veteran comrade of theirs in the war was an americanized citizen. he had in a very few years in america gained a fine education. the general reader of this page may look about him and discover examples for himself. last winter in a little church in michigan the writer found the people subscribing to the support of a citizen of the city who, a russian by birth, came to this country to find work and opportunity. he was drawn into the so-called mission church in the foreign settlement of the city, learned to speak and read english, caught a desire for education, is well-educated and now with his american bride goes to russia on a christian mission, to labor for the improvement of his own nation. he is to be supported by that little congregation of american people who have a vision of the kind of help russia needs from our people. another story may be told. when the writer saw her first in russia, she was the centre of interest on the little community entertainment hall dance floor. she had the manner of a lady trying to make everyone at ease. american soldiers and russian soldiers and civil populace had gathered at the hall for a long program--a russian drama, soldier stunts, a raffle, a dance which consisted of simple ballet and folk dances. the proceeds of the entertainment were to go toward furnishing bed linen, etc., for the red cross hospital being organized by the school superintendent and his friends for the service of many wounded men who were falling in the defense of their area. she was trim of figure and animated of countenance. her hair was dressed as american women attractively do theirs. her costume was dainty and her feet shod in english or american shoes. we could not understand a word of her russian tongue but were charmed by its friendly and well-mannered modulations. we made inquiries about her. she was the wife of a man who, till the bolsheviki drove the "intelligenza" out, had been a professor in an agricultural school of a high order. now they were far north, seeking safety in their old peasant city and she was doing stenographer duty in the county government office. we often mused upon the transformation. only a few years before she had been as one of the countless peasant girls of the dull-faced, ill-dressed, red-handed, coarse-voiced type which we had seen everywhere with tools and implements of drudgery, never with things of refinement, except, perhaps, when we had seen them spinning or weaving. and here before us was one who had come out from among them, a sight for weary eyes and a gladness to heavy ears. how had she accomplished the metamorphosis? the school had done it, or rather helped her to the opportunity to rise. she had come to the city-village high school and completed the course and then with her ability to patter the keys of a russian typewriter's thirty-six lettered keyboard, had travelled from archangel to moscow, to petrograd, to paris, to complete her education. and she told the writer one time that she regretted she had not gone to london and new york before she married the young russian college professor. the school,--the common school and the high school--therein lies the hope of russia. what that woman has done, has been done by many another ambitious russian girl and will be done by many girls of russia. russian boys and girls if given the advantages of the public school will develop the russian nation. xxxv "dobra" convalescent hospital description of hospital building--grateful memories--summary of medical and surgical cases--feeding the convalescents--care and entertainment --captain greenleaf fine manager. the american convalescent hospital at archangel, russia (american expeditionary forces, north russia), was opened october , , in a building formerly used as a naval school of merchant sailors. a two and one-half story building, facing the dvina river and surrounded by about two acres of land, over one-half of which was covered with an attractive growth of white birch trees. the entire building, with the exception of one room, chief surgeon's office, and two smaller rooms, for personnel of the chief surgeon's office and the convalescent hospital, was devoted to the american convalescent patients and their care. the half story, eighty-five by eighty-five feet square, over the main building, was used for drying clothes and as a store room. the building proper was of wood construction, with two wings (one story) constructed with -inch brick and plaster walls. the floors were wood, the walls smoothly plastered and the general appearance, inside and outside, attractive. in addition to the inside latrines, an outside latrine with five seats and a urinal was built by our men. this latrine contained a heater. nearly all the windows, throughout the building, were double sash and glass and could be opened for sufficient air, dependent upon the outside temperature. the first floor ceilings were fourteen feet in height, those on the second floor were twelve feet high. no patient had less than six hundred cubic feet of air space. large brick stoves, one in the smaller and two in the larger rooms, heavily constructed and lined with fire brick, heated the building. a wood fire was built in these stoves twice daily, with sufficient heat being thrown off to produce a comfortable, uniform temperature at all times. the building was lighted by electricity. the entire building was rewired by american electricians and extra lights placed as necessary. the beds were wooden frame with heavy canvas support. these beds were made by american carpenters. each patient was supplied with five blankets. during the first four months it was necessary for the men to use a near-by russian bath-house for bathing. this was done weekly and a check kept upon the patients. february st, , a wing was completed with a thresh disinfector (for blankets and clothing), a wash room and three showers. a large boiler furnished hot water at all hours. the construction of this building was begun november st, , but inability to obtain a boiler and plumbing materials deferred its completion. three women were employed for washing and ironing, and clean clothing was available at all times. water buckets were located on shelves in accessible places throughout the building for use in case of fire. each floor had a hose attachment. two fires from overheated stoves were successfully extinguished without injury to patients or material damage to the building. the main floors were scrubbed daily with a two per cent creosole solution, the entire floor space every other day. all rooms contained sufficient box cuspidors filled with sawdust. the kitchen contained a large brick stove and ovens and this, in conjunction with a smaller stove on the second floor, could be utilized to prepare food for three hundred men. bartering with the russians was permitted. by this means, as well as comforts supplied by the american red cross, such as cocoa, chocolate, raisins, condensed milk, honey, sugar, fruit (dried and canned), oatmeal, corn meal, rice, dates and egg powder, a well balanced diet was maintained throughout the winter. semi-monthly reports of all exchanges, by bartering, were forwarded to headquarters. the usual mess kits and mess line were employed. the large dining and recreation room had sufficient tables and benches to seat all patients. boiled drinking water was accessible at all times. during the eight months the hospital has been operating, over , pounds of grease, , pounds of bones and , pounds of broken and stale bread have been bartered with russian peasants. in return, besides eggs, fish, veal and other vegetables over , pounds ( poods) of potatoes have been received. accompanying this report is a statement (a) of british rations (one week issue), (b) a statement of food barter ( days) and (c) the menu for one week. the large room, facing the river, twenty-eight feet by sixty-one feet, was available for mess hall, recreation and entertainments. the space, twenty-eight feet by twenty-one feet, was separated by a projecting wall and pillars and contained a victrola and records, a piano, a library (one hundred fifty books furnished by the american red cross, exchanged at intervals), a magazine rack, reading table, machine guns and rack, a bulletin board and several comfortable chairs made by convalescents. a portable stage for entertainments was placed in this space when required. a complete set of scenery with flies and curtains was presented by the american red cross. in the center of the room a regulation boxing ring could be strung, the benches and tables being so arranged as to form an amphitheatre. the entire room could be cleared for dancing. at one end was a movie screen and in the adjoining room a no. powers movie machine which was obtained from the american y. m. c. a. and installed december th, . during the winter the following entertainments were given: vaudeville boxing exhibitions lectures minstrel shows dances musical entertainments russian english band concert kangaroo court a twelve-piece orchestra from the th infantry band furnished music for the dances as well as occasionally during sunday dinners. each wednesday and sunday nights moving pictures were shown. these included a number of war films showing operations on the western front and productions of fairbanks, farnum, billy burke, eltinge, hart, mary pickford, kerrigan, arbuckle, bunny and chaplin. during may baseballs, gloves and bats have been supplied by the american y. m. c. a. sunday afternoons religious services were conducted by chaplains of the american force. canteen supplies, consisting of chocolate, stick candy, gum, cigars, cigarettes, smoking and chewing tobacco, toilet soap, tooth paste, canned fruits (pineapple, pears, cherries, apricots, peaches) and canned vegetables could be purchased from the supply company, th infantry. these supplies were drawn on the first of each month and furnished the men at cost. the personnel consisted of capt. c. a. greenleaf, commanding officer, medical corps; an officer from the supply company, th infantry (charge of equipment); two sergeants, medical corps; three privates, medical corps. with these exceptions all the details required for the care and maintenance of the hospital were furnished by men selected from the convalescent patients. it took seventy-six men every day for the various kitchen, cleaning, clerical and guard details and in addition other details from convalescent patients were made as follows: six patrols of ten men each, each patrol in charge of a non-commissioned officer and three sections of machine gunners were always prepared for an emergency. guards were furnished for headquarters building. two type-setters and one proof-reader reported for work, daily, at the office of the american sentinel (a weekly publication for the american troops). typists, stenographers and clerks were furnished different departments at headquarters as required. orderlies, kitchen police and cooks were furnished to the american red cross hospital and helpers to american red cross headquarters. this was light work always which was conducive to the convalescence of the men. captain greenleaf always managed to care for all patients. on january th, , a ward was opened at olga barracks which accommodated twenty-five patients. these patients were rationed by headquarters company and reported for sick call at the infirmary located in the same building. on march th, , an annex was opened at smolny barracks with eighty beds. for this purpose a barracks formerly occupied by enlisted men was remodelled. new floors were put in, the entire building sheathed on the inside, rooms constructed for office and sick call and a kitchen in which a new stove and ovens were built. this annex was operated from the convalescent hospital, one sergeant, medical corps, and two privates, medical corps, were detailed to this building. details from the patients operated the mess and took care of the building. supplies were sent daily from the hospital to the annex and the mess was of the same character. on april th, , three tents were erected in the yard of the hospital. plank floors were built, elevated on logs and these accommodated thirty-six patients. on april th, , with the hospital, annex and tents two hundred eight-two patients could be accommodated. this number represents the maximum convalescent hospital capacity, during its existence and was sufficient for the requirements of the american forces. the ward at olga barracks was only used for a few weeks. during april eighty-two patients were discharged from the convalescent hospital and sent to smolny barracks for "temporary light duty at base." the convalescent hospital was the best place, bar none, in russia, to eat in winter of - . the commanding officer was fortunate to have as a patient the mess sergeant of company "d." that resourceful doughboy took the rations issued by the british and by systematic bartering with the natives he built up a famous mess. below is a verbatim extract from captain greenleaf's report. barter return period: days--from march th, , to april th. commodities bartered bread, stale lbs. bread, pieces of grease lbs. bones lbs. beans lbs. peas lbs. rice lbs. dates lbs. bacon lbs. lard lbs. sugar lbs. jam lbs. pea soup pkgs. limejuice cases commodities received in return potatoes lbs. carrots lbs. cabbage . lbs. turnips lbs. onions lbs. veal lbs. liver . lbs. eggs the menu for the week of april - , inclusive, was as follows: april --sunday breakfast boiled eggs fried bacon oatmeal and milk bread and butter coffee dinner roast veal and gravy mashed potatoes sage dressing stewed tomatoes apple pie mixed pickles bread and butter coffee supper roast beef potato salad lemon cake bread and jam cocoa april --monday breakfast oatmeal and milk fried bacon wheatcakes and syrup bread and jam coffee dinner steaks creamed potatoes cabbage, fried bread and butter peach pudding coffee supper beef stew fried cakes bread and butter tea april --tuesday breakfast oatmeal and milk fried bacon bread and jam coffee dinner roast mutton baked potatoes mashed turnips bread and butter chocolate pudding coffee supper hamburger steak boiled potatoes stewed dates bread and butter coffee april --wednesday breakfast oatmeal and milk fried bacon bread and jam coffee dinner roast beef mashed potatoes creamed peas bread and butter bread pudding coffee supper mutton chops boiled potatoes bread and butter chocolate cake coffee april --thursday breakfast oatmeal and milk fried bacon bread and jam coffee dinner roast beef escalloped potatoes baked turnips bread and butter rice pudding coffee supper mutton stew rolls and jam tea april --friday breakfast oatmeal and milk fried bacon wheatcakes and syrup bread and jam coffee dinner steaks boiled potatoes creamed onions bread and butter fruit pudding, cherry coffee supper hamburger steak boiled potatoes stewed apricots bread and butter coffee april --saturday breakfast rice and milk fried bacon bread and butter coffee dinner roast beef creamed potatoes baked beans bread and butter chocolate pudding coffee supper vegetable stew stewed prunes bread and butter tea to the doughboy, who that week in april was eating his bully and hardtack in the forest at kurgomin or khalmogora or bolsheozerki or chekuevo or verst , this menu seems like a fairy tale, but he knows that the boys who had fought on the line and fallen before bolo fire or fallen ill with the hardship strain, were entitled to every dainty and luxury that was afforded by the dobra convalescent hospital. from october st, , to june th, , this american convalescent hospital served eleven hundred and eighty out of the fifty-five hundred americans of the expeditionary force. from captain greenleaf's official report the following facts of interest are presented. of infectious and epidemic diseases there were two hundred and forty-six cases of which four were mumps, one hundred and sixty-seven were influenza and the remainder complications which resulted from influenza. the pneumonia cases developed early. one man reported from guard duty, developed a rapidly involving pneumonia which soon became general and culminated in death within twenty-four hours. the best results followed the use of dovers powder and quinine,--alternation two and one-half grains of dovers with five grains of quinine every two hours, five to ten grains of dovers being given at bedtime. expectorants were given as required. very little stimulation was necessary. many of these cases, after the acute symptoms subsided, showed a persistent tachycardia which continued for some days and in a few cases (seven) became chronic. in these cases medication proved of little benefit, rest and a proper diet being the most efficacious treatment. patients convalescing from pneumonia were evacuated to england or given base duty. of tuberculosis there were only thirteen cases which were as far as possible isolated. of venereal cases there were only one hundred and seventy-four. they had received treatment in british rd stationary hospital, and came to the american convalescent hospital simply for re-equipment. nearly all were immediately discharged to duty. of nervous diseases there were nineteen cases, all of which were neuritis except two cases of paralysis. of mental diseases and defects there were only fourteen. this is a remarkable showing when we consider the strain of the strange, long, dark winter campaign, and of these fourteen cases six were mental deficiency that were not detected by the experts at time of enlistment and induction, three were hysteria, two neurasthenia, and three psychasthenia. here let us add that there was only one case of suicide and one case of attempted suicide. there were eighteen eye cases and nineteen ear cases, three nose, and eighteen of the throat. of the circulatory system the total was sixty-eight of which twenty-two were heart trouble and thirty-one hemorrhoids brought on by exposure. there were eighty respiratory cases, ninety-three digestive cases, of which sixteen were appendicitis and thirty-two were hernia. of genito-urinary, which were non-venereal, there were twenty cases. of skin diseases there were thirty-nine. scabies was the only skin lesion which has been common among the troops. warm baths and sulphur ointment were used with excellent results. from exposure there were one hundred and one cases of bones and locomotion. trench feet were bad to treat. from external causes there were two hundred and fifty-five cases. of these two were burns, two dislocation, twenty-six severe frost bite cases, two exhaustion from exposure, twenty-three fractures and sprains, and two hundred wound cases. many severely wounded were sent to hospital ship "kalyon," and many were evacuated to base section three in england and only the convalescent wounded, of course, came to the dobra convalescent hospital. the following is capt. greenleaf's summary: patients hospital days, actual hospital days, per patient . hospital days, awaiting evacuation hospital days, per patient . hospital days, special duty hospital days, per patient . hospital days, total hospital days, per patient . note--this table is made out in this manner for several reasons. in the first place evacuation lists were submitted to the chief surgeon each friday, containing a list of those patients who were unfit for further front line duty in russia. lack of transportation and the long delays in completing the evacuations should not be charged to actual hospital days. again it was necessary, under the conditions and owing to the fact that the hospital was dependent upon patients for its existence, that men be selected who were competent to have charge of certain work. a most efficient mess sergeant and competent cooks were selected. the men to have charge of the heating system and boilers were chosen. good interpreters were held. and many cases in which a competent man entered as a patient, who was skillful in certain work, that man was held indefinitely, for the good of the service and the hospital. in this summary these cases have been listed as hospital days, special duty. disposition of patients in american convalescent hospital evacuated to england october , december , december , january , february , june , ---- total discharged to american red cross hospital for surgical attention for medical attention discharged to british hospitals for special treatment discharged to duty the medical care of our comrades was as well-looked after as possibly could be in north russia. all patients were examined, when they entered the hospital and classified. they were marked,--no duty, light duty inside, light duty outside, light duty sitting, or light duty not involving the use of right (or left) arm. a record, showing their organization, company, rank, duty, diagnosis, date of admission, source of admission, room and bed, was made. their business in private life was considered and they were assigned to work compatible with their training. any medication they might need was prescribed. owing to lack of bottles patients reported for medicine four times daily and a record was thus kept of dosage. patients were examined weekly and re-classified. sick call was held, daily, at : a. m., at which time patients requiring special attention, reported and also, surgical dressings were applied. the last patient was discharged to duty june th, . we know that the one thousand one hundred and eighty men who passed through that hospital join the writers in saying that, considering conditions, the convalescent hospital was a wonder. xxxvi american red cross in north russia american red cross on errands of mercy precede troops--summary of aid given people--aid and comforts freely given american troops --summary--commendatory words of general richardson--our weekly "sentinel" put out by red cross--returned men strong for american red cross work in north russia. even before the question of american participation in the allied expedition to north russia had been decided upon, the american red cross had dispatched a mission of thirteen persons, with four thousand two hundred tons of food and medicine, for the relief of the civilian population. when, shortly thereafter, a considerable detachment of american doughboys, engineers and ambulance corps troops were landed, the red cross had the nucleus of an organization to provide for the needs of our soldiers as well as for the civilian population. a report, made public here by the american red cross on its work in north russia, gives an interesting picture of conditions on our arctic battle front during the war. the food situation among the civilian population was acute. with the city swollen in population through a steady influx of refugees, few fresh supplies were coming in and hoarded supplies were rapidly diminishing. coarse bread and fish were staple articles of food, and there was a grave shortage of clothing. the desperate need for foodstuffs in the regions far north along the arctic shores was brought sharply to the attention of the allied food committee when delegates from pechora arrived by reindeer teams and camped at the doors of the committee urging assistance. they brought samples of the bread they were forced to eat. it was made of a small quantity of white flour mixed with ground-up dried fish. other samples which were shown were made from immature frostbitten rye grain, and a third was composed of a small quantity of white flour mixed with reindeer moss. a small quantity of rye flour mixed with chopped coarse straw, was the basis of a fourth example. much attention was devoted by the red cross to caring for school children and orphans. over two million hot lunches were distributed, during a period of a few months, to three hundred and thirty schools with twenty thousand pupils. every orphanage in the district was outfitted with the things it needed and received a regular fortnightly issue of food supplies. over twenty thousand suits of underwear were given out to refugees. to provide for the many persons separated from their families or from employment on account of the war, the red cross established a regular free employment agency. the writer recalls having seen in pinega in february men who had left their petchora homes eight months before to go to archangel for the precious flour provided by the american red cross. the civil war had made transportation slow and extremely hazardous. expeditions were constantly sent out from archangel to various points with supplies of food, clothing, and medicaments. the most extensive of the civilian relief enterprises undertaken by the red cross mission to russia was the sending of a boat from archangel to kern with a cargo of fifty-five tons. this was distributed either by the red cross officials themselves or by responsible local authorities. food rations and clothing were given to three hundred destitute families in archangel which, upon careful investigation, were found to be deserving. housing conditions were improved and clothing, which had been salvaged from sunken steamers and lay idle in the customs house, was dried and distributed. besides supplying all russian civilian hospitals in and around archangel regularly with medicine, sheets, blankets, pillows and food rations, the red cross opened up a red cross hospital in archangel, which was finally turned over to the local government to be used as a base hospital for the russian army. red cross medicines are credited with having checked the serious influenza epidemic and with having worked against its recurrence. medicaments worth one million roubles were sent by the red cross to the various district zemstvos. russian prisoners of war, returning from germany through the bolshevik lines to north russia, were also taken care of. work among the american soldiers in north russia was thorough and effective. the daily ration was supplemented and many american soldiers received from the red cross quantities of rolled oats, sugar, milk, and rice, besides all the regular red cross comforts, including cigarettes, stationery, chewing gum, athletic goods, playing cards, toilet articles, phonographs, sweaters, socks, blankets, etc. supplies were sent as regularly as possible to the troops on the line, generally in the face of apparently insurmountable transportation difficulties. units of troops, even in the most inaccessible and out of the way places, were visited by red cross workers, occasionally at great danger to their lives. with the assistance of the red cross the american sentinel, a weekly newspaper, was printed and distributed among the troops and did much to keep up their morale. one of the last acts performed by the red cross for the american expeditionary forces in archangel was to help and speed to their new homes eight war brides. the veteran of the north russian expedition will never look at his old knit helmet or wristlets, scarf, or perhaps eat a rare dish of rolled oats, or bite off a chew of plug, or listen to a certain piece on the graphaphone, or look at a red cross christmas seal without a warm feeling under his left breast pocket for the american red cross. [illustration: city street with several large buildings.] primm view of archangel in summer [illustration: soldiers at attention with rifles.] u s. official photo general ironside inspecting doughboys [illustration: many soldiers standing at grave.] u s official photo burial of lieut. clifford phillips xxxvii captive doughboys in bolshevikdom doughboy captives still coming out of red russia--red cross starts prisoner exchange in archangel area--white flag incidents in no man's land--remarkable picture taken--men who were liberated--sergeant leitzell's gripping story of their captivity. in august, , came out of bolshevik russia, as startlingly as though from the grave, corp. prince of "b" company, who had been wounded and captured at toulgas, march , . this leads to our story of the captives in bolshevikdom. one of the interesting incidents of the spring defensive was the exchange of prisoners. it was brought about quite largely through the efforts of the american red cross, which was very anxious to try to get help to the americans still in interior russia, especially the prisoners of war. when the bolsheviki captured the allied men at bolsheozerki in march they took a british chaplain, who pleaded that he was a non-combatant and belonged to a fraternal order whose principles were similar to the soviet principles. thinking they had a convert, the soviet commissar gave father roach his freedom and sent him through the lines at the railroad front in april. news was brought back by father roach that many american and british and french prisoners were at moscow or on their way to moscow. accordingly, the american red cross was instrumental in prevailing upon the military authorities to open white flag conversations at the front line in regard to a possible exchange of prisoners. a remarkable photograph is included in this volume of that first meeting. one or two other meetings were not quite so formal. at one time the excited bolos forgot their own men and the enemy who were parleying in the middle of no man's land, and started a lively artillery duel with the french artillery. at another time the americans' russian archangel allies got excited and fired upon the bolshevik soldiers who were sitting under a white flag on the railroad track watching the american captain come towards them. happy to say, there were no casualties by this mistake. but it sure was a ticklish undertaking for the americans themselves later in the day to walk out under a flag of truce to explain the mistake and inquire about the progress of the prisoners exchange conversations going on. at vologda, american, british and french officers were guests of the bolshevik authorities. their return was expected and came during the first week of may. one american soldier, pvt. earl fulcher, of "h" company, and one french soldier were brought back and in exchange for them four former bolshevik officers were given. report was brought that other soldiers were being given their freedom by the bolshevik government and were going out by way of petrograd and viborg, finland. it was learned that some american soldiers were in hospital under care of the bolshevik medical men. every effort was made by military authorities in north russia to clear up the fate of the many men who had been reported missing in action and missing after ambush by the reds who cut off an occasional patrol of americans or british or french soldiers. but the bolshevik military authorities were unable to trace all of their prisoners. in the chaos of their organization it is not surprising. we know that our own war department lost comrade anthony konjura, company "a" th engineers, while he was on his way home from russia, wounded, on the hospital ship which landed him in england. there his mother went and found him in a hospital. an american sergeant whose story appears in this volume, says that while he was in moscow six british soldiers were luckily discovered by the red authorities in a foul prison where they had been lost track of. even as this book goes to press we are still hoping that others of our own american comrades and of our allies will yet come to life out of russia and be restored to their own land and loved ones. corporal arthur prince, of "b" company, who was ambushed and wounded and captured in march, , at toulgas was, finally in august, , released from hospital and prison in russia and crippled and sick joined american troops in germany. his pluck and stamina must have been one hundred per cent to stand it all those long seventeen months. his comrade, herbert schroeder, of "b" company, who was captured on the st of september, has never been found. his comrades still hope that he was the american printer whom the reds declared was printing their propaganda in english for them at viatka. comrade george albers, "i" company, in november, , was on a lone observation post at the railroad front. a bolo reconnaissance patrol surprised and caught him. he was the american soldier who was shown to the comrades at kodish on the river bridge after armistice day. he was afterward sent on to moscow and went out with others to freedom. with him went out comrades walter huston and mike haurlik of "c" company, who had been taken prisoners in action on november th near ust padenga on the same day that gallant cuff and his ten men were trapped and all were killed or captured. these two men survived. in this liberated party was also comrade anton vanis, of company "d" who was lost in the desperate rear guard action at shegovari. also came comrade william r. schuelke, "h" company, who had been given up for dead. and in the party was merle v. arnold, american "y" man, who had been captured in march at bolsheozerki. six of our allied comrades, royal scots, came out with the party. these men all owed their release chiefly to the efforts of mr. l. p. penningroth, of tipton, iowa, secretary of the prisoners-of-war release station in copenhagen, who secured the release of the men by going in person to moscow. with the return of comrade schuelke we learn that he was one of the "h" company patrol under corporal collins which was ambushed near bolsheozerki, march th. one of his comrades, august peterson, died april th in a bolshevik hospital. his corporal, earl collins, was in the same hospital severely wounded. his fate is still unknown but doubtless he is under the mossy tundra. his comrade, josef romatowski, was killed in the ambush, comrade john frucce was liberated via finland and his comrade, earl fulcher, as we have seen, was exchanged on the railroad front in may. on march st two other parties of americans were caught in ambush by the reds who had surrounded the verst force near bolsheozerki. mechanic jens laursen of "m" company was captured along with father roach and the british airplane man wounded in the action which cost also the life of mechanic dial of "m" company. and at the same time another party going from the camp toward obozerskaya consisting of supply sergeant glenn leitzell and pvt. freeman hogan of "m" company together with bryant ryal, a "y" man, going after supplies, were captured by the reds. these men were all taken to moscow and later liberated. their story has been written up in an interesting way by comrade leitzell. it fairly represents the conditions under which those prisoners of war in bolshevikdom suffered till they were liberated: "on march st, , at : a. m. i left the front lines with a comrade, freeman hogan, and a russian driver, on my way back to obozerskaya for supplies. about a quarter of a verst, yards, from our rear artillery, we were surprised by a patrol of bolos, ten or twelve in number, who leaped out of the snowbanks and held us up at the point of pistols, grenades and rifles. then they stripped us of our arms and hurried us off the road and into the woods. to our great surprise we were joined by mr. ryal, the y. m. c. a. secretary who had been just ahead of us. "at once they started us back to their lines with one guard in front, three in the rear and three on snow skiis on each side of the freshly cut trail in the deep snow. we knew from the signs and from the fire fight that soon followed that a huge force of the reds were in rear of our force. after seven versts through the snow we reached the village of bolsheozerki. on our arrival we were met by a great many bolsheviks who occupied the villages in tremendous numbers. some tried to beat us with sticks and cursed and spat on us as we were shoved along to the bolshevik commander. "one of the camp loiterer's scowling eyes caught sight of the sergeant's gold teeth. his cupidity was aroused. raising his brass-bound old whipstock he struck at the prisoner's mouth to knock out the shining prize. but the prisoner guard saved the american soldier from the blow by shoving him so vigorously that he sprawled in the snow while the heavy whip went whizzing harmlessly past the soldier's ear. the bolo sleigh driver swore and the prisoner guard scowled menacingly at the brutal but baffled comrade. the american soldiers needed no admonitions of skora skora to make them step lively toward the red general's headquarters. "one of the first things we saw on our arrival was a russian sentry who had gone over from our lines. they demanded our blouses and fur caps, also our watches and rings. in a little while we saw three others arrive--father roach of the th king's company of liverpool and private stringfellow of the liverpools, also mechanic jens laursen of our own "m" company who had escaped death in the machine gun ambush that had killed his comrade mechanic dial and driver and horse. later lieut. tatham of the royal air force came in with a shattered arm. his two companions and the sleigh drivers had been mortally wounded and left by the bolsheviks on the road. "after that we had our interview with a bolshevik intelligence officer who tried to get information from us. but he got no information from us as we pleaded that we were soldiers of supply and were not familiar with the details of the scheme of defense. and it worked. he sent us away under guard, who escorted us in safety through the camp to a shack. "here we were billetted in a filthy room with a lot of russian prisoners, some the survivors of the defense of bolsheozerki and some the recalcitrants or suspected deserters from the bolo ranks. we were given half of a salt fish, a lump of sour black bread and some water for our hunger. on the bread we had to use an ax as it was frozen. we managed to thaw some of it out and wash it down with water. after this we stretched in exhaustion on the floor and slept off the day and night in spite of the constant roar of bolo guns and the bursting of shells that were coming from our camp at verst . by that sign we knew the bolo had not overpowered our comrades by his day's fighting. it was the only comforting thought we had as we pulled the dirty old rags about us that the reds had given us in exchange for our overcoats and blouses, and went to sleep. "we woke up in the morning midst the roar of a redoubled fight. a fine april fool's day we thought. we were stiff and sore and desperately hungry. but our breakfast was the remainder of the fish and sour bread. later the guard relieved us of some of our trinkets and pocket money, after which they gave us our rations for the day, consisting of a half can of horse meat, a salt fish, and twelve ounces of black bread. "then we were taken to see the general commanding this huge force. he gave us a cigarette, which was very acceptable as we were quite unnerved, not knowing what would happen to us afterwards if we gave no more information than we had the day before. he tried to impress us by taking his pistol and pointing out on a map of the area just where his troops were that day surrounding our comrades in the beleagured camp in the woods at verst on the road, as well as many versts beyond them cutting a trail through the deep snow to the very railroad in rear of obozerskaya. he boasted that his forces that day would crush the opposing force and he would move upon obozerskaya and go up and down the railroad and clear away every obstacle as he had done in the upper vaga valley, where he boasted he had driven the allied troops from shenkursk and pursued them for over sixty miles. then he informed us that we were to be sent as prisoners to moscow. "later in the morning we were started south toward emtsa on foot. we could hear the distant cannonading on the front as we marched along during the day on the winter trail which if it had been properly patrolled by the french and russians would not have permitted the surprise flank march in force by this small army that menaced the whole vologda force. our thirty-five verst march that day and night--for we walked till : p. m.--was made more miserable by the thought that our comrades were up against a far greater force than they dreamed, as was evidenced to us by the hordes of men we had seen in bolsheozerki and the transportation that filled every verst of the trail from the south. we made temporary camp in a log hut along the road, building a roaring fire outside. we would sleep a half hour and then go outside the hut to thaw out by the fire, and so on through the wretched night. "at : a. m. we started again our footsore march, after a fragment of black bread and a swallow of water, and walked twenty-seven versts to shelaxa, the red concentration camp. here we underwent a minute search. all papers were taken for examination. our american money was returned to us, as was later a check on a london bank which one of my officers had given me. i secreted it and some money so well in a waist belt that later i had the satisfaction of cashing the check in sweden into kronen in king gustave's royal bank in stockholm. after a meal of salt fish and black bread fried in fish oil, and some hot water to drink, we were given an hour's rest and then started on the road again to emtsa, twenty-four versts away, reaching that railroad point at midnight. here we were brought before the camp commandant who roughly stripped us of all our clothes except our breeches and gave us the bolshevik underwear and ragged outer garments that they had discarded. and buddies who have seen bolo prisoners come into our lines can imagine how bad a discarded bolo coat or undershirt must be. after this we were locked up in a box car with no fire and three guards over us. "next morning, april rd, the car door was opened and the bolshevik soldiers made angry demonstrations toward us and were kept out only by our guards' bayonets. we were fed some barley wash and the rye bread which tasted wonderful after the previous food. i paid a british two-shilling piece which i had concealed in my shoe to a guard to get me a tin to put our food in, and we made wooden spoons. that night we were lined up against the car and asked if we knew that we were going to be shot. but this event, i am happy to say, never took place. we went by train to plesetskaya that day. father roach was taken to the commandant's quarters and we did not see him till the next day, when he told us he had enjoyed a fine night's sleep and expected to be sent back across the lines and would take messages to our comrades to let them know we were alive and on our way to moscow." it is interesting to note that the american sergeant's insistence that he and his companions be given bath and means to shave, won the respect and assistance of the guard and the bolshevik officer. of course in making the two day's march in prisoner convoy from bolsheozerki to emtsa there had been severe hardship and privation and painful uncertainty and mental agony over their possible fate. and they had not stopped long enough in one place to enable them to make an appeal for fair treatment. imagine the three american soldiers and the "y" man and the two british soldiers sitting disconsolately in a filthy taplooshka, hands and faces with three days and nights of grime and dirt, scratching themselves under their dirty rags, cussing the active cooties that had come with the shirts, and trying to soothe their itching bewhiskered faces. here the resourceful old sergeant keenly picked out the cleanest one of the guards and approached him with signs and his limited russki gavareet and made his protest at being left dirty. he won out. the soldier horoshawed several times and seechassed away to return a few minutes later with a long russian blade and a tiny green cake of soap and a tin of hot water. under the stimulation of a small silver coin from the sergeant's store he assumed the role of barber and smoothed up the faces of the whole crowd of prisoners. and then followed the trip under guard to the steaming bath-house that is such a vivid memory to all soldiers who soldiered up there under the arctic circle. in this connection it may be related that later on at moscow the obliging commissar of the block in which they were quartered hunted up for them razors and soap and even found for them tooth brushes and tubes of toothpaste which had been made in detroit, u. s. a., and sold to moscow merchants in a happier time. "on april th we left plesetskaya, after saying good-bye to the english chaplain who seemed greatly pleased that he was to get his freedom and had his pockets full of bolshevik propaganda. we reached naundoma after a night of terrible cold in the unheated car and during the next two days on the railway journey to vologda had nothing to eat. on april th we reached that city and were locked up with about twenty russians. here we got some black bread that seemed to have sand in it and some sour cabbage soup which we all shared, russians and all, from a single bucket. next day we thought it a real improvement to have a separate tin and a single wooden spoon for the forlorn group of americans and british. "at plesetskaya we were questioned very thoroughly by a russian officer who spoke english very well and showed marked sympathy toward us and saw to it that we were better treated, and later in moscow saw to it that we had some small favors. in three days' time we were again on the train for moscow, travelling in what seemed luxury after our late experience. the trains to moscow ran only once a week as there were no materials to keep up the equipment. "on our arrival we found the streets sloppy and muddy, with heaps of ice and snow and dead horses among the rubbish. few business places were open, all stores having been looted. here and there was a semi-illicit stand where horsemeat, salt fish, carrots or cabbage and parsnips, and sour milk could be bought on the sly if you had the price. but it was very little at any price and exceedingly uncertain of appearance. we were sent to join the other prisoners, french, english, scotch and americans who had preceded us from the front to moscow. they had tales similar to ours to tell us. "the next morning at : a. m. we were wondering when we would eat. the answer was: twelve noon. cabbage soup headed the menu, then came dead horse meat, or salt fish if you chose it, black bread and water. same menu for supper. we learned that the people of the city fared scarcely better. all were rationed. the soldiers and officials of the bolsheviks fared better than the others. children were favored to some extent. but the 'intelligenza' and the former capitalists were in sore straits. many were almost starving. death rate was high. the soldier got a pound of bread, workmen half a pound, others a quarter of a pound. in this way they maintained their army. fight, work for the red government or starve. some argument. liberty is unknown under the soviet rule. their motto as i saw it is: what is yours is mine.'" captivity with all its desperate hardships and baleful uncertainties, had its occasional brighter thread. the american boys feel especially grateful to mr. merle v. arnold, of. lincoln, nebraska, the american y. m. c. a. man who had been captured by the red guards a few days preceding their capture. he was able to do things for them when they reached moscow. and when he was almost immediately given his liberty and allowed to go out through finland, he did not forget the boys he left behind. he carried their case to the british and danish red cross and a weekly allowance of roubles found its way over the belligerent lines to moscow and was given to the boys, much to the grateful assistance of the starving allied prisoners of war. but they became resourceful as all american soldiers seem to become, whether at bakaritza, smolny, archangel, kholmogora, moscow or wherenot, and they found ways of adding to their rations. imagine one of them lining up with the employees of a bolo public soup kitchen and going through ostensibly to do some work and playing now-you-see-it-now-you-don't-see-it with a dish of salt or a head of cabbage or a loaf of bread or a chunk of sugar, or when on friendly terms with the bolshevik public employees volunteering to help do some work that led them to where a little money would buy something on the side at inside employees' prices. imagine them with their little brass kettle, stewing it over their little russian sheet-iron stove, stirring in their birdseed substitute for rolled oats and potatoes and cabbage and perhaps a few shreds of as clean a piece of meat as they could buy, on the sly. see the big wooden spoons travelling happily from pot to lips and hear the chorus of dobra, dobra. they will not ever forget the english red cross woman who constantly looked out for the five americans, the thirty-five british and fifteen french prisoners, finding ways to get for them occasional morsels of bacon and bread and small packages of tea and tobacco. on easter day she entertained them all in the old palace of ivan the terrible. how good it was one day to meet an american woman who had eighteen years before married a russian in chicago and come to moscow to live. her husband was a grain buyer for the bolshevik government but she was a hater of the red rule and gave the boys all the comfort she could, which was little owing to the surveillance of the red authorities. and one day the sergeant met an american dentist who had for many years been the tooth mechanic for the old czar and his family. he fixed up a tooth as best he could for the american soldier. the reds had about stripped him but left him his tools and his shop so that he could serve the red rulers when their molars and canines needed attention. the american boys gained the confidence of the russians in moscow just as they had always done in north russia. they were finally given permission to participate in the privileges of one of the numerous clubs that the red officials furnished up lavishly for themselves in the palatial quarters of old moscow. here they could find literature and lectures and lounging room and for a few roubles often gained a hot plate of good soup or a delicacy in the shape of a horse steak. of course the latter was always a little dubious to the american doughboy, for in walking the street he too often saw the poor horse that dropped dead from starvation or overdriving, approached by the butcher with the long knife. he merely raised the horse's tail, slashed around the anal opening of the animal with his blade, then reached in his great arm and drew out the entrails and cast them to one side for the dogs to growl and fight over. later would come the sleigh with axes and other knives to cut up the frozen carcass. on may day the boys nearly lost their membership in the club, along with its soup and horse-steak privileges because they would not march in the red parade to the gaily decorated square to hear lenin speak to his subjects. was the red government able to feed the people by commandeering, the food? no. at last the peasants gained the sufferance of the red rulers to traffic their foodstuffs on the streets even as we have seen them with handfuls of vegetables on the market streets of archangel. prices were out of sight. under a shawl in a tiny box, an old peasant woman on easter day was offering covertly a few eggs at two hundred roubles apiece. imagine the feelings of the boys when they walked about freely as they did, being dressed in the regular russian long coats and caps and being treated with courtesy by all russians who recognized them as americans. here they found themselves looking at the great hotel built on american lines of architecture to please the eye and shelter the american travellers of the olden times before the great war, a building now used by the red department of state. here they were examined by one of tchicherin's men upon their arrival in the red capital. further they could walk about the kremlin, and visit a part of it on special occasions. they could see the execution block and the huge space laid out by ivan the terrible, where thousands of russians bled this life away at the behest of a cruel government. or they could stand before the st. saveur cathedral, a noble structure of solid marble with glorious murals within to remind the slavic people of their unconquerable resistance to the great napoleon and of his disastrous retreat from their beloved moscow. they cannot be blamed for coming out of moscow convinced that the heart of the slavic people is not in this bolshevik class hatred and class dictatorship stuff of lenin and trotsky; equally convinced that the heart of the russian people is not unfearful of the attempted return of the old royalist bureaucrats to their baleful power, and convinced that the heart of this great, courteous, patient, longsuffering slavic people is groping for expression of self-government, and that america is their ideal--a hazy ideal and one that they aspire toward only in general outlines. their ultimate self-government may not take the shape of american constitutionalism, but russian self-government must in time come out of the very wrack of foreign and internecine war. and every american soldier who fought the bolshevik russian in arms or stood on the battle line beside the archangel republic anti-bolshevik russian, might join these returned captives from bolshevikdom in wishing that there may soon come peace to that land, and that they may develop self-government. "we finally received our release. we had known of the liberation of mr. arnold and several of our north russian comrades and had been hoping for our turn to come. mr. frank taylor, an associated press correspondent, was helpful to us, declaring to the bolshevik rulers that american troops were withdrawing from archangel. we had been faithful (sic) to the lectures, for a purpose of dissimulation, and the red fanatics really thought we were converted to the silly stuff called bolshevism. it was plain to us also that they were playing for recognition of their government by the united states. so we were given passports for finland. the propaganda did not deceive us. "at the border a suspicious sailor on guard searched us. he turned many back to petrograd. the train pulled back carrying four hundred women and children and babies disappointed at the very door to freedom, weeping, penniless, and starving, starting back into russia all to suit the whim of an ignorant under officer. under the influence of flattery he softened toward us and after robbing us of everything that had been provided us by our friends for the journey, taking even the official papers sent by the bolshevik government to our government which we were to deliver to american representatives in finland, he let us go. "after he let us go we saw the soldiers in the house grabbing for the american money which mr. taylor had given us. they had not thought it worth while to take the russian roubles away from us. of course they were of no value to us in finland. after a two kilometer walk, carrying a sick english soldier with us, my three comrades and i reached the little bridge that gave us our freedom."--by sgt. glenn w. leitzell, co. m, th inf. xxxviii military decorations in the north russian expedition fighting the bolsheviki, american officers and men fought at one time or another under the field standards of four nations, american, british, french, and (north) russian. and for their valor and greatly meritorious conduct, mostly over and beyond the call of duty, many soldiers were highly commended by their field officers, american, french, british, and russian, in their reports to higher military authorities. many, but not all, of these officers and soldiers were later cited in orders and awarded decorations. not every deserving man received a citation. that is the luck of war. it was a matter of keen regret to the british commanding general that he was so hedged by orders from england that his generous policy of awarding decorations to american soldiers was abruptly ended in mid-winter when it became apparent that the united states would not continue the campaign against the bolsheviki but would withdraw american troops at the earliest possible moment. the russian military authorities were eager to show their appreciation of their american soldier allies, but due to the indifference of colonel stewart to this not many soldiers were decorated with russian old army decorations. the french decorations were probably the sincerest marks of esteem and admiration. they were bestowed by french officers who were close to the doughboy in the field. and they are prized as tokens of the affection of the french for americans. in speaking of american decorations we can hardly write without heat. the doughboy did not get his just deserts. and he, without doubt, is correct in placing the blame for the neglect at the door of the american commanding officer, colonel stewart. men and officers who died heroically up there in that north russian campaign, and others who carry wound scars, and yet others who performed valiantly in that desperate campaign, went unrewarded. american decorations distinguished service cross bugler james f. revels, "i" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, sept. th, , obozerskaya, russia. lieut. charles f. chappel, "k" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, sept. th, , kodish, russia. (citation posthumous.) sgt. mathew g. grahek, "m" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, sept. th, , at verst , obozerskaya, russia. sgt. cornelius t. mahoney, "k" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, october th, , kodish, russia. corp. robert m. pratt, "m" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, october th, , verst , near emtsa, russia. pvt. victor stier, "a" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, january th, , ust padenga, russia. (citation posthumous.) pvt. lawrence b. kilroy, th ambulance company, for gallantry in action, kodish, russia. pvt. hubert c. paul, th ambulance company, for gallantry in action, kodish, russia. lieut. clifford f. phillips, "h" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, april nd, , near bolsheozerki. (citation posthumous.) corp. theodore sieloff, "i" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, nov. th, , at verst , near emtsa, russia. pvt. clarence h. zech, th ambulance company, for gallantry in action, kodish, russia. corp. william h. russell, "m" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, april st, , near bolsheozerki, russia. (citation posthumous.) pvt. chester h. everhard, th ambulance company, for gallantry in action, april nd, , near bolsheozerki, russia. lieut. howard h. pellegrom, "h" co., th inf., for gallantry in action, april nd, , near bolsheozerki, russia. french decorations legion of honor major j. brooks nichols, th inf. col. george e. stewart, th inf. croix de guerre pvt. walter streit, "m" co. sgt. mathew g. grahek, "m" co. pvt. james driscoll, "m.g." co. pvt. clarence a. miller, "m" co. pvt. arthur frank, "m.g." co. pvt. leo r. ellis, "i" co. lieut. james r. donovan, "m" co. th inf. sgt. frank getzloff, "m" co. corp. c. a. grobbell, "i" co. lieut. george w. stoner, "m" co., th inf. pvt. john h. rompinen, "m" co. pvt. alfred fuller, "k" co. major michael j. donoghue, th inf. lieut. clarence j. primm, "m" co., th inf. lieut. dwight fistler, "i" co., th inf. sgt. charles hebner, "m" co. pvt. otto georgia, "k" co. lieut. percival l. smith, "hq." co., th inf. lieut. wesley k. wright, "m" co., th inf. lieut. gilbert t. shillson, "k" co., th inf. sgt. harvey b. peterson, "m" co. pvt. herman a. soder, "i" co. pvt. thomas mcelroy, "m" co. corp. benjamin jondro, "m" co. pvt. tobias leplant, "k" co. pvt. frank rank, "i" co. sgt. charles v. riha, "m" co. lieut. robert j. wieczorek, "m" co., th inf. lieut. woodhull spitler, "m.g." co., th inf. sgt. john p. gray, "m" co. capt. joseph rosenfeld, th amb. sgt. jacob kantrowitz, "m" co. lieut. john j. baker, "e" co., th inf. pvt. clyde peterson, "k" co. corp. theodore h. sieloff, "i" co. pvt. ray lawrence, "m" co. capt. horatio g. winslow, "i" co., th inf. corp. john c. smolinski, "i" co. pvt. john kukoris, "i" co. lieut. lewis e. jahns, "k" co., th inf. major j. brooks nichols, th inf., commanding officer allied troops, railway detachment. pvt. samuel h. darrah, "k" co. lieut. charles b. ryan, "k" co., th inf. corp. frank l. o'connor, "m" co. mr. frank olmstead, y. m. c. a. pvt. oscar lighter, "m" co. pvt. alfred starikoff, "m" co. corp. robert m. pratt, "m" co. pvt. ernest p. rouleau, "m" co. capt. joel r. moore, "m" co., th inf. (with silver star, divisional citation). british decorations distinguished service order major j. brooks nichols, th inf. commanding officer american and allied troops, railway detachment, fall offensive and winter and spring defensive campaigns of vologda force. major michael j. donoghue, th inf. commanding officer american and allied troops, kodish offensive in fall and winter defensive campaigns of the seletskoe detachment of vologda force. captain robert p. boyd, "b" co., th inf. commanding officer american and allied troops left bank of dvina, fall offensive and winter defensive campaigns of dvina-kotlas force. lieut.-col. p. s. morris, jr., th engineers. chief engineer a. e. f., north russia, during fall offensive and winter and spring campaigns. military cross capt. otto a. odjard, commanding officer "a" co., th inf. lieut. albert m. smith, "b" co., th inf. lieut. lawrence p. keith, "m.g." co. th inf. lieut. gordon b. reese, "i" co., th inf. lieut. harry s. steele, "c" co., th inf. lieut. w. c. giffels, "a" co., th engrs. lieut. harry m. dennis, "b" co. th inf. lieut. john a. commons, "k" co., th inf. lieut. h. d. mcphail, "a" co., th inf. lieut. charles b. ryan, "k" co., th inf. lieut. h. t. ketcham, "h" co., th inf. lieut. harry j. costello, "m.g." co., th inf. (received his medal from the hand of the prince of wales, in washington, d. c.) major clare s. mcardle, commanding officer st battalion th engrs. lieut. edwin j. stephenson, "a" co., th engrs. lieut. b. a. burns, "a" co., th engrs. capt. w. o. axtell, "b" co., th engrs. lieut. e. w. legier, "c" co., th engrs. distinguished conduct medal sgt. mathew g. grahek, "m" co., th inf. sgt. f. w. wolfe, "k" co., th inf. sgt. g. m. walker, "k" co., th inf. sgt. chas. j. hayden, "i" co., th inf. corp. j. c. downs, "b" co., th inf. sgt. a. v. tibbals, "a" co., th engrs. corp. george r. yohe, signal platoon, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. walter a. springsteen, signal platoon, "hq." co., th inf. corp. james morrow, "b" co., th inf. sgt. peter csatlos, "a" co., th engrs. sgt. floyd a. wallace, "b" co., th inf. military medal sgt. carl w. venable, "l" co., th inf. pvt. st class james w. driscoll, "m.g." co., th inf. sgt. michael j. kenney, "k" co., th inf. sgt. e. j. herman, "a" co., th engrs. corp. j. s. manderfield, "a" co., th engrs. sgt. e. p. trombley, "a" co., th inf. corp. h. t. danielson, "a" co., th inf. corp. j. franczac, "a" co., th inf. bugler c. j. campus, "a" co., th inf. mech. a. j. horn, "a" co., th inf. sgt. j. a. nees, "a" co., th inf. sgt. arnold w. nolf, "a" co., th engrs. sgt. h. h. hamilton, "a" co., th engrs. pvt. berger w. bergstrom, "a" co., th engrs. pvt. russell f. mcguire, "a" co., th engrs. pvt. michael kowalski, "h" co., th inf. sgt. e. w. pausch, "c" co., th inf. sgt. john benson, "c" co., th engrs. sgt. silver k. parish, "b" co., th inf. pvt. charles bell, "b" co., th inf. pvt. joseph edyinson, "b" co., th inf. sgt. l. e. stover, "b" co., th engrs. corp. w. c. butz, "b" co., th engrs. corp. f. w. wilkie, "k" co., th inf. sgt. l. bartels, "k" co., th inf. corp. j. steyskal, "k" co., th inf. pvt. e. e. helman, "k" co., th inf. corp. william c. shaughnessey, signal platoon, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. louis l. hopkins, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. charles e. garrett, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. guy hinman, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. james r. waggener, "hq." co., th inf. pvt. clarence a. miller, "m" co., th inf. meritorious service medal sgt. ewald t. billeau pvt. a. h. dittberner sgt. l. s. schneider sgt. delbert kratz st. sgt. v. b. rogers sgt. f. w. yates pvt. jerry daubek corp. a. n. erickson all of "a" company, th engineers russian decorations st. vladimir with swords and ribbons rear-admiral newton a. mccully, commanding u. s. naval forces. major michael j. donoghue, th inf. major j. brooks nichols, th inf. col. james a. ruggles, chief of american military mission, military attache to embassy in russia. st. anne with swords capt. joel r. moore, "m" co., th inf. lieut. j. r. donovan; "m" co., th inf. lieut. albert m. smith, "b" co., th inf. lieut. gordon b. reese, "i" co., th inf. lieut. harry s. steele, "c" co., th inf. lieut. george w. stoner, "m" co., th inf. lieut. clarence j. primm, "m" co., th inf. lieut. f. b. little, med. corps, th inf. lieut. w. c. giffells, "a" co., th engrs. lieut. e. w. legler, "c" co., th engrs. lieut. harry j. costello, "m.g." co., th inf. capt. eugene prince, military mission. capt. hugh s. martin, military mission. capt. j. a. hartzfeld, military mission. lieut. sergius m. riis, naval attache to embassy. st. stanislaus capt. otto a. odjard, "a" co., th inf. capt. robert p. boyd, "b" co., th inf. major c. s. mcardle, th engrs. capt. john j. conway, "g" co., th inf. lieut. lawrence p. keith, "hq." co., th inf. lieut. wesley k. wright, "m" co., th inf. lieut. john a. commons, "k" co., th inf. lieut. h. t. ketcham, "h" co., th inf. lieut. harry m. dennis, "b" co., th inf. lieut. charles b. ryan, "k" co., th inf. lieut. h. d. mcphail, "a" co., th inf. capt. william knight, th engrs. lieut. robert j. wieczorek, "m" co., th inf. lieut. dwight fistler, "i" co., th inf. lieut. b. a. burns, "a" co., th engrs. lieut. a. w. kliefoth, military mission. lieut. m. b. rogers, military mission. lieut. e. l. packer, military mission. major d. o. lively, american red cross. capt. roger lewis, american red cross. lieut. fred mason, american red cross. lieut. george pollats, american red cross. cross of st. george pvt. john c. adams pvt. harrison bush sgt. joseph curry pvt. fred delaney st. sgt. w. dundon bugler george garton sgt. m. g. grahek pvt. geo. hanrahan sgt. chas. a. hebner corp. fred hodges sgt. wm. r. huston sgt. jacob kantrowitz corp. wm. nieman corp. f. l. o'connor sgt. chas. w. page corp. robt. m. pratt sgt. chas. v. riha corp. f. j. romanski pvt. john rompinen corp. jos. ryduchowski pvt. leo schwabe sgt. norman zapfe corp. w. zimmerman all of "m" company, th infantry. also mr. ernest rand, and mr. frank olmstead, y. m. c. a. st. anne silver medal corporal walter j. picard, "m" company, th inf. st. stanislaus silver medal pvt. harold metcalfe pvt. ernest rouleau pvt. frank stepnavski cook joseph pavlin cook theodore zech all of "m" company, th infantry [illustration: officer seated at a desk in a small office.] u. s. official photo major nichols in his railway detachment field headquarters [illustration: long parade of soldiers.] lanman ready to head memorial day parade [illustration: about fifty crosses with an american flag in the foreground.] lanman american cemetery in archangel [illustration: several hundred people standing outdoors.] lanman soldiers and sailors of six nations reverence dead [illustration: three rough wooden crosses in the foreground. a huge pile of logs in the background.] u, s. official photo graves of first three americans killed fighting bolsheviki--obozerskaya, russia [illustration: parade on a city street.] lanman sailors parade on memorial day, archangel [illustration: ship surrounded by ice.] lanman through ice floes in arctic homeward-bound [illustration: ship on the left and a spit of land on the right. in the center the sun is just touching the horizon.] rozanskey out of white sea into arctic under midnight sun xxxix homeward bound "at the earliest possible date"--work of detroit's own welfare association--"getting the troops out of russia"--we assemble at economia--delousers and ball games--war mascots--war brides--remarkable memorial day service in american military cemetery in archangel--tribute to our comrades who could not go home--our honored dead. "at the earliest possible moment" was the date set by the war department for the withdrawal of the troops from russia. this was the promise made the american people during the ice-bound winter, the promise made more particularly to appease vigorous protests of "the detroit's own welfare association," which under the leadership of mr. d. p. stafford, had been untiring in its efforts to move the hand of the war department. congressmen doremus and nichols and townsend had also been very active in "getting the americans out of north russia." to us wearied veterans of that strange war, the nine months of guerrilla war, always strenuous and at times taking on large proportions,--to us the "earliest possible moment" could not arrive a minute too soon. we had fought a grim fight against terrible odds, we had toiled to make the defenses more and more impregnable so that those who relieved us might not be handicapped as we had been. we hated to be thought of as quitters, we suffered under the reproachful eyes of newly arriving veteran scots and tommies who had been mendaciously deceived into thinking we were quitters. we suffered from the thought that the distortion, exaggeration and partisan outcry at home was making use of half-statements of returned comrades or half-statements from uncensored letters, in such a way as to make us appear cry-babies and quitters. but down in our hearts we were conscious that our record, our morale, our patriotism were sound. we believed we were entitled to a speedy getaway for home. we accepted the promise with pleasure. we felt friendly toward the detroit's own welfare association for its efforts and the efforts of others. we could have wished that there had not been so much excitement of needless fears and incitement of useless outcry. it cost us hard earned money to cable home assurances to our loved ones that we were well and safe, so that they need not believe the wild tales that we were sleeping in water forty below zero, or thawing out the cows before we milked them, or simply starving to death. we could have wished that returned comrades who tried to tell the real facts and allay needless fears--the actual facts were damnable enough--might not have been treated as shamefully as some were by a populace fooled by a mixed propaganda that was a strange combination, as it appears to us now, of earnest, sympathetic attempts to do something for "detroit's own," of bitter partisan invective, and of insidious pro-bolshevism. for the cordial welcome home which was given to the polar bear veterans in july, our heartfelt appreciation is due. veterans who marched behind major j. brooks nichols between solid crowds of cheering home-folks on july th at belle isle could not help feeling that the city of detroit was proud of the record of the men who had weathered that awful campaign. it was a greeting that we had not dreamed of those days away up there in the northland when we were watching the snow and ice melt and waiting news of the approach of troopships. at economia we assembled for the purpose of preparing for our voyage home. to the silt-sawdust island doughboys came from the various fronts. by rail from obozerskaya and bolsheozerki, by barge from beresnik and kholmogori and onega, came the veterans of this late side show of the great world war. with them they had their mascots and their war brides, their trophies and curios, their hopeful good humor and healthy play spirit. who will not recall with pleasure the white canvass camp we made on the "policed-up" sawdust field. did soldiers ever police quite so willingly as they did there on the improvised baseball diamond, where "m" company won the championship and the duffle-bagful of roubles when the first detachment of the th was delousing and turning over russian equipment, and "f" company won the port belt and roubles in the series played while the remainder of the polar bears were getting ready to sail. who will forget the day that the cruiser "des moines" steamed in from the arctic? every doughboy on the island rushed to the dvina's edge. they stood in great silent throat-aching groups, looking with blurred eyes at the colors that grandly flew to the breeze. and then as the jackies gave them a cheer those olive drab boys answered till their throats were hoarse. that night they sat long in their tents--it was not dusk even at midnight, and talked of home. a day or so later they spied from the fire-house tower vessels that seemed to be jammed in a polar ice floe which a north wind crowded into the throat of the white sea. then to our joy a day or two later came the three transports, the long deferred hope of a homeward voyage. everyone was merry those days. even the daily practice march with full-pack ordered by colonel stewart, five miles round and round on the rough board walks of the sawdust port, was taken with good humor. preparations for departure included arrangements for carrying away our brides and mascots. here and there in the economia embarkation camp those days and nightless nights in early june many a secret conclave of doughboys was held to devise ways and means of getting their russian mascots aboard ship. of these boys and youths they had become fond. they wanted to see them in "civvies" in america and the mascots were anxiously waiting the outcome at the gangplank. at chamova one winter night a little twelve-year old russian boy wandered into the "b" company cook's quarters where he was fed and given a blanket to sleep on. welz, the cook, mothered him and taught him to open bully cans and speak amerikanski. this incident had its counterpart everywhere. at obozerskaya "m" company picked up a boy whose father and mother had been carried off by the bolsheviks. he and his pony and water-barrel cart became part of the company. at pinega the "g" company boys adopted a former russian army youth who for weeks was the only man who could handle their single colt machine gun. in trying to get him on board the "von stenben" in brest--it had been simple in economia--they got their commanding officer into trouble. lt. birkett was arrested, compelled to remain at brest but later released and permitted to bring the youth to america with him where he lives in wisconsin. and out on a ranch in wyoming a russian boy who unofficially enlisted with the american doughboys to fight for his archangel state is now learning to ride the american range with lt. smith. major donoghue's "little sergeant" is in america too and goes to school and his massachusetts school teacher calls him michael donoghue. and others came too. in marked contrast to these passengers who came with the veterans from north russia via brest, which they remember for its bokoo eats and its lightning equipment-exchange mill, is the story of one of the fifty general prisoners whom they guarded on the "von steuben." one of them was a bad man, since become notorious. he was missing as the ship dropped anchor that night in the dark harbor. it was feared by the "second looie" and worried old sergeant that the man was trying to make an escape. when they found him feigning slumber under a life boat on a forbidden deck they chose opposite sides of the life boat and kicked him fervently, first from one side then the other till he was submissive. the name of the man at that time meant little to them--it was lt. smith. but a few days afterward they could have kicked themselves for letting smith off so easy, for the press was full of the stories of the brutalities of "hardboiled" smith. lt. wright and sergeant gray are not yearning to do many events of the russian campaign over but they would like to have that little event of the homeward bound voyage to do over so they could give complete justice to "hardboiled" smith. in contrast with the stories of brutal prison camps of the world war we like to think of our buddies making their best of hardships and trials in north russia. we have asked two well-known members of the expedition to contribute reminiscences printed below. "as ithers see us" is here shown by extract from a letter by a red cross man who saw doughboys as even our colonel commanding did not see. this red cross officer, major williams, of baltimore, saw doughboys on every front and sector of the far-extended battle and blockhouse line. he may speak with ample knowledge of conditions. in part he writes: "americans, as a rule, are more popular in russia than any other nationality. the american soldier in north russia by his sympathetic treatment of the villagers, his ability to mix and mingle in a homey fashion with the russian peasants in their family life and daily toil, and particularly the american soldier's love of the little russian children, and the astonishing affection displayed by russian children toward the americans furnishes one of the most illuminating examples of what was and may be accomplished through measures of peaceful intercourse. the american soldier demonstrated in north russia that he is a born mixer. "i could write a book, giving concrete examples coming under my observation, from voluminous notes in my possession. as i dictate this, there is a vision of an american soldier who stopped by my sled, at some remote village in a trackless forest, and urged me to visit with him a starving family. this soldier, from his own rations, was helping to feed thirteen russians, and his joy was as great as theirs when the red cross came to their relief." the next contribution is from the pen of a man who, born in kiev, russia, had in youth seen the czar's old army, who had served years in the u. s. army after coming to america, who was one of the finest soldiers and best known men in the north russian expedition. "it is almost an axiom with the regular army of our own country and those of foreign nations, that soldier and discipline are synonymous. meaning thereby the blind discipline of the prussian type. "that such an axiom is entirely wrong has been shown us by the national army. no one will affirm that the new-born army was a model to pass inspection even before our own high moguls of the regular army. and yet, what splendid success has that sneered at, 'undisciplined,' army achieved. "and where is the cause of its success? the 'uneducatedness' in the sense of the regular army. the american citizen in a soldier uniform acted like a free human being, possessing initiative, self-reliance, and confidence, which qualities are entirely subdued by the so called education of a soldier. it is not the proper salute or clicking of the heels that makes the good soldier, but the spirit of the man and his character. and these latter qualities has possessed our national army. fresh from civilian life with all the liberty-loving tendencies, our boys have thrown themselves into the fight on their own accord, once they realized the necessity of it. the whip of discipline could never accomplish so much as the conscience of necessity. and that is what the national army possessed. and that is the cause of its success. and therefore i love it. "so long as the united states remains a free country, there is no danger for the american people. that spirit which has manifested itself in the national army is capable to accomplish everything. it is the free institutions of the country that brought us victory, not the so called 'education' gotten in the barracks. "i admired the national army man in fight, because i loved him as a citizen. and unless he changes as a citizen, he will not change as a fighter. to me the citizen and soldier are synonymous. a good citizen makes a good soldier, and vice versa. let the american citizen remain as free-loving and self-reliant as he is now, and he will make one of the best soldiers in the world. let him lose that freedom loving spirit, and he will have to be prussianized. "i have my greatest respect for the national army man, because i have seen him at his best. in the moments of gravest danger he has exhibited that courage which is only inborn in a free man. and when i saw that courage, i said, he does not need any 'education.' let him remain a free man, and god help those who will try to take away his freedom." sgt. j. kant, co. "m" th inf. from distant morjagorskaya, hundreds of versts, walked a bright-eyed slavic village school teacher to say goodbye to her doughboy friend who was soon to sail for home. but to her great joy and reward, nina rozova found that her lover, george geren, of detroit, had found a way to make her his wife at once. one certain sympathetic american consul, mr. shelby strother, had told george he would help him get his bride to america if he wanted to marry the pretty teacher. blessings on that warm-hearted consul. he helped eight of the boys to bring away their brides. in this volume is a picture of a doughboy-barishna wedding party, joe chinzi and elena farizy. on a boat from brest to hoboken, among one hundred sixty-seven war brides from france, belgium, england and russia, elena was voted third highest in the judges' beauty list. and john karouch saw his russian bride, alexandra kadrina, take the first beauty prize. the writer well remembers the beautiful young russian woman of archangel who wore mourning for an american corporal and went to see her former lover's comrades go away on the tug for the last time. they had been to the cemetery and they looked respectfully and affectionately at her for they knew it was her hand that had made the corporal's grave there in the american cemetery in archangel the one most marked by evidences of loving care. one of the last duties of the veterans of this campaign was the paying of honors to their dead comrades in the american cemetery which ambassador francis had purchased for our dead. this was without doubt the most remarkable memorial day service in american history. from the american sentinel is taken the following account: "american memorial day was celebrated at archangel yesterday. headed by the american band, a company of american troops, and detachments of the u. s. navy, russian troops, russian navy, british troops, british navy, french troops, french navy, italian and polish troops, formed in parade at sabornaya at ten o'clock in the morning and marched to the cemetery. "here a short memorial service was held. brief addresses were delivered by general richardson, general miller, charge d'affaires poole, and general ironside. "in his introductory address general richardson said: "'fellow soldiers of america and allied nations: we are assembled here on the soil of a great ally and a traditional friend of our country, to do what honor we may to the memory of america's dead here buried, who responded to their country's call in the time of her need and have laid down their lives in her defense. throughout the world wherever may be found american soldiers or civilians, are gathered others today for the fulfillment of this sacred and loving duty. i ask you to permit your thought to dwell at this time with deep reverence upon the fact that no higher honor can come to a soldier than belongs to those who have made this supreme sacrifice, and whose bodies lie here before us, but whose spirits, we trust, are with us.' "before introducing general miller, general richardson thanked the allied representatives for their participation in the celebration of memorial day. "mr. poole said: "'this day was first instituted in memory of those who fell in the american civil war. it became the custom to place flowers on the graves of soldiers and strew flowers on the water in memory of the sailor dead, marking in this way one day in each year when the survivors of the war might join with a later generation to revere the memory of those who had made for the common good the supreme sacrifice of life. for americans it is an impressive thought that we are renewing this consecration today in russia, in the midst of a civic struggle which recalls the deep trials of our own past and which is, moreover, inextricably bound up with the world war which has been our common burden. "'this war, which was begun to put down imperial aggression upon the political liberties, of certain peoples, has evolved into a profound social upheaval, touching the most remote countries. we cannot yet see definitely what the results of its later developments will be, but already there lies before forward looking men the bright prospect of peace and justice and liberty throughout the world such as we recently dared hope for only within the narrow confines of particular countries. to the soldiers of the great war--inspired from the outset by a dim foresight of this stupendous result--we now pay honor; and in particular, to the dead whose graves are before us. "'these men, like their comrades elsewhere in the most endless line of battle, have struck their blow against the common enemy. they have had the added privilege of assisting in the most tragic, and at the same time the most hopeful, upheaval for which the war has been the occasion. autocracy in russia is gone. a new democracy is in the struggle of its birth. the graves before us are tangible evidence of the deep and sympathetic concern of the older democracies. these men have given their lives to help russia. they have labored in an enterprise which is a forecast of a new order in the world's affairs and have made of it a prophecy of success. here within this restricted northern area there has been an acid test of the practicability of co-operation among nations for the attainment of common ends. nowhere could material and moral conditions have been more difficult than we have seen them these past months; under no circumstances could differences in national temperament or the frailties and shortcomings of individuals be brought into stronger relief. yet the winter of our initial difficulties is given way to a summer of maturing success. co-operation begun in the most haphazard fashion has developed after a few months of mutual adjustment into concerted and harmonious action. it seems to me that herein lies striking proof of the generous spirit of modern international intercourse and proof of the most practical kind that, as nations succeed to doing away with war, they will be able to apply the energies thus released to common action in the beneficent field of world wide social and political betterment. if this ideal is to be measurably attained, as i believe it is, these men have indeed made their sacrifice to a great cause. they have given their lives to the progress of civilization and their memory shall be cherished as long as civilization lasts.' "the northern morning, a russian daily of archangel, reported on the memorial day exercises as follows: "'in memory of the fallen during the civil war in america, on the initiative of president lincoln, the th of may was fixed as a day to remember the fallen heroes. in this year our american friends have to pass this day far from their country, america, in our cold northland, between the graves of those who are dear not only to our friends, allies, but also to us russians; the sacred graves beneath which are concealed those who, far from their own country, gave away their lives to save us. these are now sacred and dear places, and the day of the thirtieth of may as a day of memorial to them will always be to us a day of mourning. this day will not be forgotten in the russian soul. it has to be kept in memory as long as the name of russian manhood exists. "'after the speeches a military salute was fired. a heart-breaking call of the trumpet over the graves of the fallen sounded the mourning notes. those who attended the meeting will never forget this moment of the bugle call. the signal as it broke forth filled the air with sorrowness and grief, as if it called the whole world to bow before those who, loving their neighbors, without hesitation gave their lives away for the sacred cause of humanity.' "honor be to the fallen: blessings and eternal rest to those protectors of humanity who gave their lives away for the achievement of justice and right. sleep quietly now, sons of liberty and light. you won before the world never-fading honor and eternal glory." and so at last came the day to sail. we were going out. no americans were coming to take our place. we were going to leave the "show" in the hands of the british--who themselves were to give it up before fall. the derided bolshevik bands of brigands whom we had set out to chase to vologda and kotlas, had developed into a well-disciplined, well-equipped fighting organization that responded to the will of leon trotsky. although we had seen an archangel state military force also develop behind our lines and come on to the active fighting sectors, we knew that archangel was in desperate danger from the bolshevik northern army of red soldiers. they were out there just beyond the fringe of the forest only waiting, perhaps, for us to start home. we must admit that when we thought of those wound-chevroned scots who had remained on the lines with the new archangel troops of uncertain morale and recalled the looks in their eyes, we sensed a trace of bitter in our cup of joy. why if the job had been worth doing at all had it not been worth while for our country to do it wholeheartedly with adequate force and with determination to see it through to the desired end. we thought of the many officers and men who had given their lives in this now abandoned cause. and again arose the old question persistent, demanding an answer: why had we come at all? was it just one of those blunders military-political that are bound to happen in every great war? the thought troubled us even as we embarked for home. that night scene with the lowering sun near midnight gleaming gold upon the forest-shaded stretches of the dvina river and casting its mellow, melancholy light upon the wrecked church of a village, is an ineffaceable picture of north russia. for this is our russia--a church; a little cluster of log houses, encompassed by unending forests of moaning spruce and pine; low brooding, sorrowful skies; and over all oppressive stillness, sad, profound, mysterious, yet strangely lovable to our memory. near the shell-gashed and mutilated church are two rows of unadorned wooden crosses, simple memorials of a soldier burial ground. come vividly back into the scene the winter funerals in that yard of our buddies, brave men who, loving life, had been laid away there, having died soldier-like for a cause they had only dimly understood. and the crosses now rise up, mute, eloquent testimony to the cost of this strange, inexplicable war of north russia. we cast off from the dirty quay and steamed out to sea. on the deck was many a reminiscent one who looked back bare-headed on the paling shores, in his heart a tribute to those who, in the battle field's burial spot or in the little russian churchyards stayed behind while we departed homeward bound. this closes our narrative. it is imperfectly told. we could wish we had time to add another volume of anecdotes and stories of heroic deeds. for errors and omissions we beg the indulgence of our comrades. we trust that the main facts have been clearly told. here by way of further dedication of this book to our honored dead, whose names appear at the head of our lengthy casualty list of five hundred sixty-three, let us add a few simple verses of sentiment, the first two of which were written by "dad" hillman and the others added on by one of the writers. the honor roll of the american expedition who fought against the bolsheviki in north russia - [illustration: the following poem is enclosed in a cross.] in russia's fields (after flanders fields) in russia's fields no poppies grow there are no crosses row on row to mark the places where we lie, no larks so gayly singing fly as in the fields of flanders. we are the dead. not long ag'o we fought beside you in the snow and gave our lives, and here we lie though scarcely knowing reason why like those who died in flanders. at ust padenga where we fell on railroad, kodish, shot and shell we faced, from just as fierce a foe as those who sleep where poppies grow, our comrades brave in flanders. in toulgas woods we scattered sleep, chekuevo and kitsa's tangles creep across our lonely graves. at night the doleful screech owl's dismal flight heart-breaking screams in russia. near railroad bridge at four-five-eight, and chamova's woods, our bitter fate we met. we fell before the reds where wolves now howl above our heads in far off lonely russia. in shegovari's desperate fight, vistavka's siege and seltso's night, in bolsheozerki's hemmed-in wood, in karpogor, till death we stood like they who died in flanders. and some in archangel are laid 'neath rows of crosses russian-made with marker of the stars and stripes not minding bugle, drum or pipes we sleep, the brave, in russia. and comrades as you gather far away in god's own land on some bright day and think of us who died and rest just tell our folks we did our best in far off fields of russia. our roll of honored dead killed in action agnew, john, sgt. co. k sept. , , belfast, ireland anderson, jake c., pvt. st class co. b nov. , , cave city, ky. angove, john p., pvt. co. b nov. , , painesdale, mich. assire, myron j., co. a, th engrs oct. , auslander, floyd r., pvt. co. h april , , decker, mich. austin, floyd e., pvt. st class co. e dec. , , scottsburg, ind. avery, harley, pvt. co. h oct. , , lexington, mich. ballard, clifford b., second lt. m. g. co feb. , , cambridge, mass. berger, carl g., wag. sup. co jan. , , detroit. berger, carl h., second lt. co. e dec. , , mayville, wis. boreson, john, pvt. co. h, oct. , , stephenson, mich. bosel, john j., corp. co. c nov. , , detroit chappel, charles f., first lt. co. k sept. , , toledo, ohio cheeney, roy d., corp. co. c. nov. , , pueblo, colo. christian, arthur, pvt. co. l. oct. , , atlanta, mich. clark, joshua a., pvt. co. c. feb. , , woodville, mich. clemens, raymond c., pvt. co. c. nov. , , st. joseph, mich. cole, elmer b., pvt. co. a jan. , , hamersluya, pa. conrad, rex h., corp. co. f mar. , , ponca, mich. crook, alva, pvt. co. m april , , lakeview, mich. cronin, louis, pvt. co. k oct. , , flushing, mich. crowe, bernard c., sgt. co. k dec. , , detroit cuff, francis w., first lt. co. c nov. , , rio, wis. deamicis, guiseppe, corp. co. a jan. , , detroit dial, charles o., mech. co. m mar. , , carlisle, ind. dyment, schlioma, pvt. co. m sept. , , detroit ellis, leo r, pvt. co. i. nov. , , chicago, ill. foley, morris j., corp. co. b sept. , , detroit fuller, alfred w., pvt. st class co. k dec. , , trenton, mich. gasper, leo, pvt. co. b nov. , , chesaning, mich. gauch, charles d., pvt. hq. co oct. , , kearney, n. j. gottschalk, milton e., corp. co. a jan. , , detroit graham, claus, pvt. co. h oct. , , toledo, ohio hester, harley h., corp. m. g. co sept. , , cave city, ky. kenney, michael j., sgt. co. k dec. , , detroit kenny, bernard f., corp. co. a mar. , , hemlock, mich. kissick, thurman l., pvt. co. c nov. , , ringos mill, ky. kreizinger, edward, corp. co. l. sept. , , detroit kudzba, peter, pvt. co. b sept. , , chicago, ill. kwasniewski, ignacy h., mech. co. i. sept. , , detroit ladovich, nikodem, pvt. co. c feb. , , pittsburgh, pa. malm, clarence a., pvt. st class co. g dec. , , battle creek, mich. marriott, fred r, sgt. co. b nov. , , port huron, mich. mcconvill, edward, pvt. co. h mar. , , shawmut, mass. mclaughlin, frank s., pvt. co. i oct. , , elks rapids, mich. merrick, walter a., pvt. co. m oct. , , sandusky, mich. mertens, edward l., corp. co. l sept. , , detroit moore, albert e., corp. co. a mar. , , detroit mueller, frank j., pvt. co. e dec. , , marshfield, wis. ozdarski, joseph s., pvt. co. l. oct. , , detroit patrick, ralph m., pvt. co. a jan. , , long lake, mich. pawlak, joseph, pvt. co. b mar. , , detroit pilarski, alek, pvt. co. b nov. , , detroit pitts, jay b., pvt. co. g dec. , , kalamazoo, mich. ramotowske, josef, pvt. st class co. h mar. , , detroit redmond, nathan l., corp. co. h mar. , , detroit richardson, eugene e., pvt. co. h oct. , , detroit richey, august k, corp. co. a jan. , , dowagiac, mich. ritcher, edward, pvt. co. h oct. , , mishawaka, ind. robbins, daniel, pvt. co. b mar. , , blaine, mich. rogers, yates k, sgt. co. a jan. , , memphis, tenn. ruth, frank j., pvt. co. b mar. , , detroit sapp, frank e., corp. co. m april , , rodney, mich. savada, john, corp. co. b nov. , , hamtramck, mich. schmann, adolph, pvt. co. c. nov. , , milwaukee, wis. scruggs, frank w., pvt. co. a jan. , , bettelle, ala. silkaitis, frank, pvt. co. h oct. , , chicago, iii. smith, wilbur b., sgt. co. c. jan. , , fort williams, canada soczkoski, anthony, pvt. co. i sept. , , detroit sokol, philip, pvt. co. l. sept. , , pittsburgh, pa. spelcher, elmer e., cook co. c feb. , , akron, ohio staley, glenn p., pvt. co. k sept. , , whitemore, mich. sweet, earl d., pvt. co. a mar. , , mcgregor, mich. syska, frank, pvt. co. d jan. , , detroit taylor, otto v., pvt. co. k oct. , , alexandria, ind. trammell, dausie w., pvt. co. a mar. , , clio, ky. vandermeer, john, pvt. co. b sept. , , kalamazoo, mich vanherwynen, john, pvt. co. d sept. , , vriesland, mich. vojta, charles j., pvt. co. k sept. , , chicago, iii. wagner, harold h., pvt. st class co. e. dec. , , harlan, mich. welstead, walter j., pvt. co. a mar. , , chicago, iii. wenger, irvin, pvt. co. c nov. , grand rapids, mich. zajaczkowski, john, pvt. co. b nov. , , detroit death from other causes bloom, elmer, sgt. co. a., th engrs. (drowned) oct. , connor, lloyd, corp. co. a., th engrs. (drowned) oct. , dargan, arthur, pvt. co. a., th engrs. (drowned) oct. , hill, c. b., lt. co. a., th engrs. (drowned) oct. , lovell, albert w., pvt. hq. co aug. , (drowned), england marchlewski, joseph d., pvt. co. g oct. , (accident), alpena, mich. martin, j. c., corp. co. e. oct. , (accidentally shot), portland, mich. russell, wm. h., corp. co. m april , (accident by grenade), detroit sawickis, frank k, pvt. co. i april , (bolo grenade), racine, wis. sickles, floyd a., pvt. co. m dec. , (accident), deckerville, mich. szymanski, louis a., pvt. co. c nov. , (accidentally shot), detroit wilson, dale, pvt. st class co. b april , , alexander, mich. wing, homer, pvt. co. a, th engrs may , (rly. accident), detroit young, edward l., sgt. co. g mar. , (suicide), moosie, pa. fighting the bolsheviki died of wounds received in action ball, elbert, pvt. st class co. b nov. , , henderson, ky. bowman, william h., sgt. co. b mar. , , penn laird, va. clish, frank, pvt. co. b mar. , , baraga, mich. collins, edmund r., first lt. co. h mar. , , racine, wis. cook, clarence, pvt. co. a feb. , , stilton, kan. detzler, allick f., pvt. co. b nov. , , prescott, mich. dunaetz, isiador, pvt. co. c jan. , , sodus, mich. etter, frank m., sgt. co. c feb. , , marion, ind. franklin, walter e., pvt. co. e dec. , , bellevue, mich. gray, alson w., corp. co. k nov. , , south boston, va. koslousky, mattios, pvt. co. h april , , chicago, ill. lehmann, william j., corp. co. a jan. , , danville, iii. lencioni, sebastiano, pvt. co. a jan. , , whitewater, wis. lyttle, alfred e., corp. co. a., th engrs oct. , meister, emanuel a., sgt. co. c sept. , , detroit morris, john h. w., pvt. co. b, th engrs oct. , mylon, james j., corp. co. e dec. , , detroit niemi, mattie i, pvt. co. m sept. , , verona, mich. peterson, august b., pvt. co. h mar. , , whitehall, mich. phillips, clifford f., first lt. co. h may , , lincoln, nebr. powers, ralph e., lt. th amb. co jan. , , detroit rose, benjamin, pvt. co. a mar. , , packard, ky. skoselas, andrew, pvt. co. c feb. , , eastlake, mich. smith, george j., pvt. co. a jan. , , yale, mich. stier, victor, pvt. co. a jan. , , cincinnati, ohio tamas, stanley p., pvt. co. d oct. , , manistee, mich. ziegenbein, william j., corp. co. a, th engrs oct. , missing in action babinger, william r., corp. hq. co oct. , , detroit carter, james, pvt. hd. co. oct. , , cornwall, england carter, william j., pvt. st class co. a jan. , , detroit collins, earl w., corp. co. h mar. , , detroit cwenk, joseph, pvt. st class co. a jan. , , milan, mich. frank, arthur, pvt. m. g. co sept. , , detroit gutowski, boleslaw, pvt. co. c nov. , , wyandotte, mich. hodge, elmer w., pvt. co. c nov. , , shelby, mich. hutchinson, alfred g., pvt. co. a jan. , , plainwell, mich. jenks, stillman v., pvt. st class co. a jan. , , shelby, mich. jonker, nicholas, pvt. co. c. nov. , , grand rapids, mich. keefe, thomas h., pvt. co. c feb. , , chicago, ill. kieffer, simon p., pvt. m. g. co sept. , , detroit kowalski, stanley, pvt. co. a jan. , , lodz, poland kussrath, charles aug., jr., pvt. co. a jan. , , chicago, ill. kurowski, max j., pvt. co. a jan. , , grand rapids, mich. mannor, john t., pvt. st class co. a jan. , , menominee, mich. martin, william j., pvt. co. a jan. , , detroit mctavish, stewart m., pvt. st class co. a jan. , , stratford, can. peyton, edward w., corp. co. a jan. , , richmond, ky. poth, russell a., pvt. co. a jan. , , brown city, mich. rauschenberger, albert, corp. co. a jan. , , grand rapids, mich. retherford, lindsay, pvt. st class co. a jan. , , hustonville, ky. russell, archie e., pvt. st class co. a jan. . , hesperia. mich. sajnaj, leo, pvt. st class co. a jan. , , chicago, ill. schroeder, herbert a., corp. co. b sept. , , detroit scott, perry c, corp. hq. co oct. , , detroit weitzel, henry r., pvt. co. c nov. , . bay city, mich. williams, edson a., pvt. co. a jan. , , minneapolis. minn. prisoners of war albers, george, pvt. st class co. i nov. , , muskegon, mich. frucce, john, pvt. co. h mar. . , muskegon, mich. fulcher, earl w., pvt. co. h mar. , , tyre, mich. haurilik, mike m., pvt. co. c nov. , , detroit hogan, freeman, pvt. co. m mar. , , detroit huston, walter l.. pvt. co. c. nov. . . muskegon, mich. laursen, jens c. mech. co. m may , . marlette, mich. leitzell, glenn w., sgt. co. m mar. . , mifflinburg. pa. prince, arthur, corp. co. b mar. . , onaway, mich. triplett, johnnie, pvt. co. c nov. , , lackay, ky. scheulke, william r. pvt. co. h mar. , , stronach, mich. vanis, anton j., pvt. co. d jan. , , chicago, ill. died of disease bayer, arthur, pvt. co. g sept. , , kalamazoo, mich. bayer, charles, pvt. co. f sept. , , detroit berryhill, chester w., pvt. co. f sept. , , midland, mich. rickert, albert f., pvt. co. c. sept. . , mt. clemens, mich. bigelow, john w., pvt. co. e sept. . , copefish, mich. brieve, joseph, pvt. co. e sept. . , holland, mich. burdick, andrew, pvt. co. b sept. , , manitou island, mich. byles, james b., wag. sup. co feb. , , valdosta, ga. cannizzaro, rayfield, pvt. co. k sept. , . edmore, mich. casey, marcus t., second lt. co. c sept. . , new richmond, wis. ciesielski, walter, pvt. st class co. e feb. , , detroit clark, clyde, pvt. co. l. sept. , , lansing. mich. dusablom, william h., pvt. co. i sept. , , trenton, mich. easley, albert h., pvt. co. l. sept. , , kewadin, mich. farrand, ray, pvt. co. i. sept. , , armada, mich. fields, clarence, pvt. co. f sept. , . bay city. mich. finnegan, leo, pvt. co. b sept. , , grand rapids, mich. gariepy, henry, sergt. co. b sept. , . sault ste. marie, mich. gresser, joseph a., pvt. co. c. sept. , . wyandotte, mich. hendy, alfred h., pvt. co. c. sept. , , grosse ile, mich. henley, john t., pvt. co. i. sept. , , chicago. ill. hodgson, fred l., pvt. co. m sept. . , cassopolis, mich. hunt, bert, pvt. co. d sept. , , hudsonville, mich. jackson, jesse c, pvt. st class hq. co sept. , , detroit jordan, carl b., pvt. co. b sept. , . ferry, mich. kalaska, joseph. pvt. co. i sept. , , trenton, mich. keicz, andrzei, pvt. co. c sept. , , detroit kistler, herbert b., pvt. co. i sept. , , lancaster pa. kroll, john, jr., pvt. co. d sept. , , holland, mich. kukla, valentine, pvt. co. k sept. . , kawkawlin, mich. kulwicki, andrew j., pvt. co. k jan. , . milwaukee, wis. lanter, marion f., pvt. co. i april , , savoy, ky. lauzon, henry, pvt. co. l sept. , , pinconning. mich. link, stephen j., first lt. hq. co sept. , , taylorville, ill. malusky, joseph, pvt. co. c sept. , , fountain, mich. maybaum, harold, pvt. co. e sept. , , ainsworth, ind. mcdonald, angus, pvt. co. e sept. , , marilla, mich. mead, william c, pvt. co. b sept. , , mayville, mich. michel, lewis m., pvt. co. c. sept. , , parnassus, pa. neri, vincent, bug. co. c sept. , , detroit nicholls, charles b., pvt. co. b sept. , , rose city, mich. nunn, arthur, pvt. co. m sept. , . croswell, mich. o'brien, raymond, pvt. hq. co sept. , , saginaw, mich. o'connor, lawrence s., corp. co. c sept. , , lancaster, ohio parrott, jesse f., pvt. co. k sept. , , mt. clemens, mich. passow, ferdinand, pvt. co. d sept. . , mosinee, wis. petraska, oscar h., pvt. co. k sept. , . wyandotte, mich. petulski, john, pvt. co. k sept. , , detroit rose, floyd, pvt. co. i. sept. , . vicksburg, mich. rowe, ezra t., pvt. m. g. co sept. , , hart, mich. rynbrandt, raymond r, pvt. co. d sept. , , byron center, mich. schepel, tiemon, pvt. co. d sept. , , holland, mich. shaughnessy, john, pvt. hq. co sept. , , missoula, mont. shingledecker, dwight, pvt. co. a sept. , , dowagiac, mich. stocken, orville i., pvt. co. a sept. , , battle creek, mich. surran, harry h., pvt. co. a sept. , , culver, ind. teggus, william g., corp. hq. co sept. , , pontiac, mich. thompson, henry, pvt. co. a sept. , , elkhart, ind. van deventer, george e., pvt. co. c sept. , , rupert, idaho wadsworth, laurence l., pvt. co. i sept. , , aurora, ind. waldeyer, norbert c, pvt. co. d sept. , , detroit waprzycki, sylvester, pvt. th amb. co sept. . weaver, lewis t., pvt. co. a sept. , . marlette, mich. weesner, cliffford e., pvt. co. f sept. . , jackson, mich. wetershof, john t., pvt. co. b sept. , , grand rapids. mich. whitford, jason, pvt. co. c. sept. , , whitemore, mich. witt, louis c, pvt. hq. co sept. . , detroit wood, stewart w., corp. co. c sept. . , atlanta, ga. zlotcha, mike, pvt. co. e sept. , . hamtramck, mich. and the online proofreading team. from october to brest-litovsk by leon trotzky authorized translation from the russian translator's notes: . in this book trotzky (until near the end) uses the russian calendar in indicating dates, which, as the reader will recall, is days behind the gregorian calendar, now introduced in russia. . the abbreviation s. r. and s. r.'s is often used for "social-revolutionist(s)" or "socialist-revolutionaries." . "maximalist" often appears instead of "bolshevik," and "minimalist" instead of "menshevik." the middle-class intellectuals in the revolution events move so quickly at this time, that it is hard to set them down from memory even in chronological sequence. neither newspapers nor documents are at our disposal. and vet the repeated interruptions in the brest-litovsk negotiations create a suspense which, under present circumstances, is no longer bearable. i shall endeavor, therefore, to recall the course and the landmarks of the october revolution, reserving the right to complete and correct this exposition subsequently in the light of documents. what characterized our party almost from the very first period of the revolution, was the conviction that it would ultimately come into power through the logic of events. i do not refer to the theorists of the party, who, many years before the revolution--even before the revolution of --as a result of their analysis of class relations in russia, came to the conclusion that the triumphant development of the revolution must inevitably transfer the power to the proletariat, supported by the vast masses of the poorest peasants. the chief basis of this prognosis was the insignificance of the russian bourgeois democracy and the concentrated character of russian industrialism--which makes of the russian proletariat a factor of tremendous social importance. the insignificance of bourgeois democracy is but the complement of the power and significance of the proletariat. it is true, the war has deceived many on this point, and, first of all, the leading groups of bourgeois democracy themselves. the war has assigned a decisive role in the events of the revolution to the army. the old army meant the peasantry. had the revolution developed more normally--that is, under peaceful circumstances, as it had in --the proletariat would always have held a dominant position, while the peasant masses would gradually have been taken in tow by the proletariat and drawn into the whirlpool of the revolution. but the war produced an altogether different succession of events. the army welded the peasants together, not by a political, but by a military tie. before the peasant masses could be drawn together by revolutionary demands and ideas, they were already organized in regimental staffs, divisions and army corps. the representatives of petty bourgeois democracy, scattered through this army and playing a leading role in it, both in a military and in a conceptual way, were almost completely permeated with middle-class revolutionary tendencies. the deep social discontent in the masses became more acute and was bound to manifest itself, particularly because of the military shipwreck of czarism. the proletariat, as represented in its advanced ranks, began, as soon as the revolution developed, to revive the tradition and called upon the masses of the people to organize in the form of representative bodies--soviets, consisting of deputies. the army was called upon to send its representatives to the revolutionary organizations before its political conscience caught up in any way with the rapid course of the revolution. whom could the soldiers send as deputies? eventually, those representatives of the intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who chanced to be among them and who possessed the least bit of knowledge of political affairs and could make this knowledge articulate. in this way, the petty bourgeois intellectuals were at once and of necessity raised to great prominence in the awakening army. doctors, engineers, lawyers, journalists and volunteers, who under pre-bellum conditions led a rather retired life and made no claim to any importance, suddenly found themselves representative of whole corps and armies and felt that they were "leaders" of the revolution. the nebulousness of their political ideology fully corresponded with the formlessness of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses. these elements were extremely condescending toward us "sectarians," for we expressed the social demands of the workers and the peasants most pointedly and uncompromisingly. at the same time, the petty bourgeois democracy, with the arrogance of revolutionary upstarts, harbored the deepest mistrust of itself and of the very masses who had raised it to such unexpected heights. calling themselves socialists, and considering themselves such, the intellectuals were filled with an ill-disguised respect for the political power of the liberal bourgeoisie, towards their knowledge and methods. to this was due the effort of the petty bourgeois leaders to secure, at any cost, a cooperation, union, or coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie. the programme of the social-revolutionists--created wholly out of nebulous humanitarian formulas, substituting sentimental generalizations and moralistic superstructures for a class-conscious attitude, proved to be the thing best adapted for a spiritual vestment of this type of leaders. their efforts in one way or another to prop up their spiritual and political helplessness by the science and politics of the bourgeoisie which so overawed them, found its theoretical justification in the teachings of the mensheviki, who explained that the present revolution was a bourgeois revolution, and therefore could not succeed without the participation of the bourgeoisie in the government. in this way, the natural bloc of social-revolutionists and mensheviki was created, which gave simultaneous expression to the political lukewarmness of the middle-class intellectuals and its relation of vassal to imperialistic liberalism. it was perfectly clear to us that the logic of the class struggle would, sooner or later, destroy this temporary combination and cast aside the leaders of the transition period. the hegemony of the petty bourgeois intellectuals meant, in reality, that the peasantry, which had suddenly been called, through the agency of the military machine, to an organized participation in political life, had, by mere weight of numbers, overshadowed the working class and temporarily dislodged it. more than this: to the extent that the middle-class leaders had suddenly been lifted to terrific heights by the mere bulk of the army, the proletariat itself, and its advanced minority, had been discounted, and could not but acquire a certain political respect for them and a desire to preserve a political bond with them; it might otherwise be in danger of losing contact with the peasantry. in the memories of the older generation of workingmen, the lesson of was firmly fixed; then, the proletariat was defeated just because the heavy peasant reserves did not arrive in time for the decisive battle. this is why in this first period of the revolution even the masses of workingmen proved so much more receptive to the political ideology of the social-revolutionists and the mensheviki. all the more so, since the revolution had awakened the hitherto dormant and backward proletarian masses, thus making uninformed intellectual radicalism into a preparatory school for them. the soviets of workingmen's, soldiers' and peasants' deputies meant, under these circumstances, the domination of peasant formlessness over proletarian socialism, and the domination of intellectual radicalism over peasant formlessness. the soviet institution rose so rapidly, and to such prominence, largely because the intellectuals, with their technical knowledge and bourgeois connections, played a leading part in the work of the soviet. it was clear to us, however, that the whole inspiring structure was based upon the deepest inner contradictions, and that its downfall during the next phase of the revolution was quite inevitable. the revolution grew directly out of the war, and the war became the great test for all parties and revolutionary forces. the intellectual leaders were "against the war." many of them, under the czarist regime, had considered themselves partisans of the left wing of the internationale, and subscribed to the zimmerwald resolution. but everything changed suddenly when they found themselves in responsible "posts." to adhere to the policy of revolutionary socialism meant, under those circumstances, to break with the bourgeoisie, their own and that of the allies. and we have already said that the political helplessness of the intellectual and semi-intellectual middle class sought shelter for itself in a union with bourgeois liberalism. this caused the pitiful and truly shameful attitude of the middle-class leaders towards the war. they confined themselves to sighs, phrases, secret exhortations or appeals addressed to the allied governments, while they were actually following the same path as the liberal bourgeoisie. the masses of soldiers in the trenches could not, of course, reach the conclusion that the war, in which they had participated for nearly three years, had changed its character merely because certain new persons, who called themselves "social-revolutionists" or "mensheviki," were taking part in the petrograd government. milyukov displaced the bureaucrat pokrovsky; tereshtchenko displaced milyukov--which means that bureaucratic treachery had been replaced first by militant cadet imperialism, then by an unprincipled, nebulous and political subserviency; but it brought no objective changes, and indicated no way out of the terrible war. just in this lies the primary cause of the subsequent disorganization of the army. the agitators told the soldiers that the czarist government had sent them into slaughter without any rime or reason. but those who replaced the czar could not in the least change the character of the war, just as they could not find their way clear for a peace campaign. the first months were spent in merely marking time. this tried the patience both of the army and of the allied governments, and prompted the drive of june , which was demanded by the allies, who insisted upon the fulfillment of the old czarist obligations. scared by their own helplessness and by the growing impatience of the masses, the leaders of the middle class complied with this demand. they actually began to think that, in order to obtain peace, it was only necessary for the russian army to make a drive. such a drive seemed to offer a way out of the difficult situation, a real solution of the problem--salvation. it is hard to imagine a more amazing and more criminal delusion. they spoke of the drive in those days in the same terms that were used by the social-patriots of all countries in the first days and weeks of the war, when speaking of the necessity of supporting the cause of national defence, of strengthening the holy alliance of nations, etc., etc. all their zimmerwald internationalistic infatuations had vanished as if by magic. to us, who were in uncompromising opposition, it was clear that the drive was beset with terrible danger, threatening perhaps the ruin of the revolution itself. we sounded the warning that the army, which had been awakened and deeply stirred by the tumultuous events which it was still far from comprehending, could not be sent into battle without giving it new ideas which it could recognize as its own. we warned, accused, threatened. but as for the dominant party, tied up as it was with the allied bourgeoisie, there was no other course; we were naturally threatened with enmity, with bitter hatred. the campaign against the bolsheviki the future historian will look over the pages of the russian newspapers for may and june with considerable emotion, for it was then that the agitation for the drive was being carried on. almost every article, without exception, in all the governmental and official newspapers, was directed against the bolsheviki. there was not an accusation, not a libel, that was not brought up against us in those days. the leading role in the campaign was played, of course, by the cadet bourgeoisie, who were prompted by their class instincts to the knowledge that it was not only a question of a drive, but also of all the further developments of the revolution, and primarily of the fate of government control. the bourgeoisie's machinery of "public opinion" revealed itself here in all its power. all the organs, organizations, publications, tribunes and pulpits were pressed into the service of a single common idea: to make the bolsheviki impossible as a political party. the concerted effort and the dramatic newspaper campaign against the bolsheviki already foreshadowed the civil war which was to develop during the next stage of the revolution. the purpose of the bitterness of this agitation and libel was to create a total estrangement and irrepressible enmity between the laboring masses, on the one hand, and the "educated elements" on the other. the liberal bourgeoisie understood that it could not subdue the masses without the aid and intercession of the middle-class democracy, which, as we have already pointed out, proved to be temporarily the leader of the revolutionary organizations. therefore, the immediate object of the political baiting of the bolsheviki was to raise irreconcilable enmity between our party and the vast masses of the "socialistic intellectuals," who, if they were alienated from the proletariat, could not but come under the sway of the liberal bourgeoisie. during the first all-russian council of soviets came the first alarming peal of thunder, foretelling the terrible events that were coming. the party designated the th of june as the day for an armed demonstration at petrograd. its immediate purpose was to influence the all-russian council of soviets. "take the power into your own hands"--is what the petrograd workingman wanted to say plainly to the social-revolutionists and the mensheviki. "sever relations with the bourgeoisie, give up the idea of coalition, and take the power into your own hands." to us it was clear that the break between the social-revolutionists and the mensheviki on the one hand, and the liberal bourgeoisie on the other, would compel the former to seek the support of the more determined, advanced organization of the proletariat, which would thus be assured of playing a leading role. and this is exactly what frightened the middle-class leaders. together with the government, in which they had their representatives, and hand in hand with the liberal and counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, they began a furious and insane campaign against the proposed demonstration, as soon as they heard of it. all their forces were marshalled against us. we had an insignificant minority in the council and withdrew. the demonstration did not take place. but this frustrated demonstration left the deepest bitterness in the minds of the two opposing forces, widened the breach and intensified their hatred. at a secret conference of the executive committee of the council, in which representatives of the minority participated, tseretelli, then minister of the coalition government, with all the arrogance of a narrow-minded middle-class doctrinaire, said that the only danger threatening the revolution was the bolsheviki and the petrograd proletariat armed by them. from this he concluded that it was necessary to disarm the people, who "did not know how to handle fire-arms." this referred to the workingmen and to those parts of the petrograd garrison who were with our party. however, the disarming did not take place. for such a sharp measure the political and psychological conditions were not yet quite ripe. to afford the masses some compensation for the demonstration they had missed, the council of soviets called a general unarmed demonstration for the th of june. but it was just this very day that marked the political triumph of our party. the masses poured into the streets in mighty columns; and, despite the fact that they were called out by the official soviet organization, to counteract our intended demonstration of the th of june, the workingmen and soldiers had inscribed on their banners and placards the slogans of our party: "down with secret treaties," "down with political drives," "long live a just peace!" "down with the ten capitalistic ministers," and "all power to the soviets." of placards expressing confidence in the coalition government there were but three one from a cossack regiment, another from the plekhanov group, and the third from the petrograd organization of the bund, composed mostly of non-proletarian elements. this demonstration showed not only to our enemies, but also to ourselves as well that we were much stronger in petrograd than was generally supposed. the drive of june th a governmental crisis, as a result of the demonstration by these revolutionary bodies, appeared absolutely inevitable. but the impression produced by the demonstration was lost as soon as it was reported from the front that the revolutionary army had advanced to attack the enemy. on the very day that the workingmen and the petrograd garrison demanded the publication of the secret treaties and an open offer of peace, kerensky flung the revolutionary troops into battle. this was no mere coincidence, to be sure. the projectors had everything prepared in advance, and the time of attack was determined not by military but by political considerations. on the th of june, there was a so-called patriotic demonstration in the streets of petrograd. the nevsky prospect, the chief artery of the bourgeoisie, was studded with excited groups, in which army officers, journalists and well-dressed ladies were carrying on a bitter campaign against the bolsheviki. the first reports of the military drive were favorable. the leading liberal papers considered that the principal aim had been attained, that the drive of june , regardless of its ultimate military results, would deal a mortal blow to the revolution, restore the army's former discipline, and assure the liberal bourgeoisie of a commanding position in the affairs of the government. we, however, indicated to the bourgeoisie a different line of future events. in a special declaration which we made in the soviet council a few days before the drive, we declared that the military advance would inevitably destroy all the internal ties within the army, set up its various parts one against the other and turn the scales heavily in favor of the counter-revolutionary elements, since it would be impossible to maintain discipline in a demoralized army--an army devoid of controlling ideas--without recourse to severe repressive measures. in other words, we foretold in this declaration those results which later came to be known collectively under the name of "kornilovism." we believed that the greatest danger threatened the revolution in either case--whether the drive proved successful, which we did not expect, or met with failure, which seemed to us almost inevitable. a successful military advance would have united the middle class and the bourgeoisie in their common chauvinistic tendencies, thus isolating the revolutionary proletariat. an unsuccessful drive was likely to demoralize the army completely, to involve a general retreat and the loss of much additional territory, and to bring disgust and disappointment to the people. events took the latter course. the news of victory did not last long. it was soon replaced by gloomy reports of the refusal of many regiments to support the advancing columns, of the great losses in commanding officers, who sometimes composed the whole of the attacking units, etc. in view of its great historical significance, we append an extract from the document issued by our party in the all-russian council of soviets on the rd of june, , just two weeks before the drive. * * * * * "we deem it necessary to present, as the first order of the day, a question on whose solution depend not only all the other measures to be adopted by the council, but actually and literally the fate of the whole russian revolution the question of the military drive which is being planned for the immediate future. "having put the people and the army, which does not know in the name of what international ends it is called upon to shed its blood, face to face with the impending attack (with all its consequences), the counter-revolutionary circles of russia are counting on the fact that this drive will necessitate a concentration of power in the hands of the military, diplomatic, and capitalistic groups affiliated with english, french and american imperialism, and thus free them from the necessity of reckoning later with the organized will of russian democracy. "the secret counter-revolutionary instigators of the drive, who do not stop short even of military adventurism, are consciously trying to play on the demoralization in the army, brought about by the internal and international situation of the country, and to this end are inspiring the discouraged elements with the fallacious idea that the very fact of a drive can rehabilitate the army--and by this mechanical means hide the lack of a definite program for liquidating the war. at the same time, it is clear that such an advance cannot but completely disorganize the army by setting up its various units one against the other." * * * * * the military events were developing amid ever increasing difficulties in the internal life of the nation. with regard to the land question, industrial life, and national relations, the coalition government did not take a single resolute step forward. the food and transportation situations were becoming more and more disorganized. local clashes were growing more frequent. the "socialistic" ministers were exhorting the masses to be patient. all decisions and measures, including the calling of the constituent assembly, were being postponed. the insolvency and the instability of the coalition regime were obvious. there were two possible ways out: to drive the bourgeoisie out of power and promote the aims of the revolution, or to adopt the policy of "bridling" the people by resorting to repressive measures. kerensky and tseretelli clung to a middle course and only muddled matters the more. when the cadets, the wiser and more far-sighted leaders of the coalition government, understood that the unsuccessful military advance of june th might deal a blow not only to the revolution, but also to the government temporarily, they threw the whole weight of responsibility upon their allies to the left. on the nd of july came a crisis in the ministry, the immediate cause of which was the ukrainian question. this was in every respect a period of most intense political suspense. from various points at the front came delegates and private individuals, telling of the chaos which reigned in the army as a result of the advance. the so-called government press demanded severe repressions. such demands frequently came from the so-called socialistic papers, also kerensky, more and more openly, went over to the side of the cadets and the cadet generals, who had manifested not only their hatred of revolution, but also their bitter enmity toward revolutionary parties in general. the allied ambassadors were pressing the government with the demand that army discipline be restored and the advance continued. the greatest panic prevailed in government circles, while among the workingmen much discontent had accumulated, which craved for outward expression. "avail yourselves of the resignations of the cadet ministers and take all the power into your own hands!" was the call addressed by the workingmen of petrograd to the socialist-revolutionists and mensheviki in control of the soviet parties. i recall the session of the executive committee which was held on the nd of july. the soviet ministers came to report a new crisis in the government. we were intensely interested to learn what position they would take now that they had actually gone to pieces under the great ordeals arising from coalition policies. their spokesman was tseretelli. he nonchalantly explained to the executive committee that those concessions which he and tereshchenko had made to the kiev rada did not by any means signify a dismemberment of the country, and that this, therefore, did not give the cadets any good reason for leaving the ministry. tseretelli accused the cadet leaders of practising a centralistic doctrinairism, of failing to understand the necessity for compromising with the ukrainians, etc., etc. the total impression was pitiful in the extreme: the hopeless doctrinaire of the coalition government was hurling the charge of doctrinairism against the crafty capitalist politicians who seized upon the first suitable excuse for compelling their political clerks to repent of the decisive turn they had given to the course of events by the military advance of june th. after all the preceding experience of the coalition, there would seem to be but one way out of the difficulty--to break with the cadets and set up a soviet government. the relative forces within the soviets were such at the time that the soviet's power as a political party would fall naturally into the hands of the social-revolutionists and the mensheviki. we deliberately faced the situation. thanks to the possibility of reelections at any time, the mechanism of the soviets assured a sufficiently exact reflection of the progressive shift toward the left in the masses of workers and soldiers. after the break of the coalition with the bourgeoisie, the radical tendencies should, we expected, receive a greater following in the soviet organizations. under such circumstances, the proletariat's struggle for power would naturally move in the channel of soviet organizations and could take a more normal course. having broken with the bourgeoisie, the middle-class democracy would itself fall under their ban and would be compelled to seek a closer union with the socialistic proletariat. in this way the indecisiveness and political indefiniteness of the middle-class democratic elements would be overcome sooner or later by the working masses, with the help of our criticism. this is the reason why we demanded that the leading soviet parties, in which we had no real confidence (and we frankly said so), should take the governing power into their own hands. but even after the ministerial crisis of the nd of july, tseretelli and his adherents did not abandon the coalition idea. they explained in the executive committee that the leading cadets were, indeed, demoralized by doctrinairism and even by counter-revolutionism, but that in the provinces there were still many bourgeois elements which could still go hand in hand with the revolutionary democrats, and that in order to make sure of their co-operation it was necessary to attract representatives of the bourgeoisie into the membership of the new ministry. dan already entertained hopes of a radical-democratic party to be hastily built up, at the time, by a few pro-democratic politicians. the report that the coalition government had been broken up, only to be replaced by a new coalition, spread rapidly through petrograd and provoked a storm of indignation among the workingmen and soldiers everywhere. thus the events of july rd- th were produced. the july days already during the session of the executive committee we were informed by telephone that a regiment of machine-gunners was making ready for attack. by telephone, too, we adopted measures to check these preparations, but the ferment was working among the people. representatives of military units that had been disciplined for insubordination brought alarming news from the front, of repressions which aroused the garrison. among the petrograd workingmen the displeasure with the official leaders was intensified also by the fact that tseretelli, dan and cheidze misrepresented the general views of the proletariat in their endeavor to prevent the petrograd soviet from becoming the mouthpiece of the new tendencies of the toilers. the all-russian executive committee, formed in the july council and depending upon the more backward provinces, put the petrograd soviet more and more into the background and took all matters into its own hands, including even local petrograd affairs. a clash was inevitable. the workers and soldiers pressed from below, vehemently voiced their discontent with the official soviet policies and demanded greater resolution from our party. we considered that, in view of the backwardness of the provinces, the time for such a course had not yet arrived. at the same time, we feared that the events taking place at the front might bring extreme chaos into the revolutionary ranks, and desperation to the hearts of the people. the attitude of our party toward the movement of july rd- th was quite well defined. on the one hand, there was the danger that petrograd might break away from the more backward parts of the country; while on the other, there was the feeling that only the active and energetic intervention of petrograd could save the day. the party agitators who worked among the people were working in harmony with the masses, conducting an uncompromising campaign. there was still some hope that the demonstration of the revolutionary masses in the streets might destroy the blind doctrinairism of the coalitionists and make them understand that they could retain their power only by breaking openly with the bourgeoisie. despite all that had recently been said and written in the bourgeois press, our party had no intention whatever of seizing power by means of an armed revolt. in point of fact, the revolutionary demonstration started spontaneously, and was guided by us only in a political way. the central executive committee was holding its session in the taurida palace, when turbulent crowds of armed soldiers and workmen surrounded it from all sides. among them was, of course, an insignificant number of anarchistic elements, which were ready to use their arms against the soviet center. there were also some "pogrom" elements, black-hundred elements, and obviously mercenary elements, seeking to utilize the occasion for instigating pogroms and chaos. from among the sundry elements came the demands for the arrest of chernoff and tseretelli, for the dispersal of the executive committee, etc. an attempt was even made to arrest chernoff. subsequently, at kresty, i identified one of the sailors who had participated in this attempt; he was a criminal, imprisoned at kresty for robbery. but the bourgeois and the coalitionist press represented this movement as a pogromist, counter-revolutionary affair, and, at the same time, as a bolshevist crusade, the immediate object of which was to seize the reins of government by the use of armed force against the central executive committee. the movement of july rd- th had already disclosed with perfect clearness that a complete impotence reigned within the ruling soviet parties at petrograd. the garrison was far from being all on our side. there were still some wavering, undecided, passive elements. but if we should ignore the junkers, there were no regiments at all which were ready to fight us in the defense of the government or the leading soviet parties. it was necessary to summon troops from the front. the entire strategy of tseretelli, chernoff, and others on the rd of july resolved itself into this: to gain time in order to give kerensky an opportunity to bring up his "loyal" regiments. one deputation after another entered the hall of the taurida palace, which was surrounded by armed crowds, and demanded a complete separation from the bourgeoisie, positive social reforms, and the opening of peace negotiations. we, the bolsheviki, met every new company of disgruntled troops gathered in the yards and streets, with speeches, in which we called upon them to be calm and assured them that, in view of the present temper of the people, the coalitionists could not succeed in forming a new coalition. especially pronounced was the temper of the kronstadt sailors, whom we had to restrain from transcending the limits of a peaceful demonstration. the fourth demonstration, which was already controlled by our party, assumed a still more serious character. the soviet leaders were quite at sea; their speeches assumed an evasive character; the answers given by cheidze to the deputies were without any political content. it was clear that the official leaders were marking time. on the night of the th the "loyal" regiments began to arrive. during the session of the executive committee the taurida palace resounded to the strains of the marseillaise. the expression on the faces of the leaders suddenly changed. they displayed a look of confidence which had been entirely wanting of late. it was produced by the entry into the taurida palace of the volynsk regiment, the same one, which, a few months later, was to lead the vanguard of the october revolution, under our banners. from this moment, everything changed. there was no longer any need to handle the delegates of the petrograd workmen and soldiers with kid gloves. speeches were made from the floor of the executive committee, which referred to an armed insurrection that had been "suppressed" on that very day by loyal revolutionary forces. the bolsheviki were declared to be a counter-revolutionary party. the fear experienced by the liberal bourgeoisie during the two days of armed demonstration betrayed itself in a hatred that was crystallized not only in the columns of the newspapers, but also in the streets of petrograd, and more especially on the nevsky prospect, where individual workmen and soldiers caught in the act of "criminal" agitation were mercilessly beaten up. the junkers, army-officers, policemen, and the st. georgian cavaliers were now the masters of the situation. and all these were headed by the savage counter-revolutionists. the workers' organizations and establishments of our party were being ruthlessly crushed and demolished. arrests, searches, assaults and even murders came to be common occurrences. on the night of the th the then attorney-general, pereverzev, handed over to the press "documents" which were intended to prove that the bolshevist party was headed by bribed agents of germany. the leaders of the social-revolutionist and menshevik parties have known us too long and too well to believe these accusations. at the same time, they were too deeply interested in their success to repudiate them publicly. and even now one cannot recall without disgust that saturnalia of lies which was celebrated broadcast in all the bourgeois and coalition newspapers. our organs were suppressed. revolutionary petrograd felt that the provinces and the army were still far from being with it. in workingmen's sections of the city a short period of tyrannical infringements set in, while in the garrison repressive measures were introduced against the disorganized regiments, and certain of its units were disarmed. at the same time, the political leaders manufactured a new ministry, with the inclusion of representatives of third-rate bourgeois groups, which, although adding nothing to the government, robbed it of its last vestige of revolutionary initiative. meanwhile events at the front ran their own course. the organic unity of the army was shaken to its very depths. the soldiers were becoming convinced that the great majority of the officers, who, at the beginning of the revolution, bedaubed themselves with red revolutionary paint, were still very inimical to the new regime. an open selection of counter-revolutionary elements was being made in the lines. bolshevik publications were ruthlessly persecuted. the military advance had long ago changed into a tragic retreat. the bourgeois press madly libelled the army. whereas, on the eve of the advance, the ruling parties told us that we were an insignificant gang and that the army had never heard of us and would not have anything to do with us, now, when the gamble of the drive had ended so disastrously, these same persons and parties laid the whole blame for its failure on our shoulders. the prisons were crowded with revolutionary workers and soldiers. all the old legal bloodhounds of czarism were employed in investigating the july - affair. under these circumstances, the social-revolutionsts and the alensheviki went so far as to demand that lenin, zinoviev and others of their group should surrender themselves to the "courts of justice." the events following the july days the infringements of liberty in the working-men's quarters lasted but a little while and were followed by accessions of revolutionary spirit, not only among the proletariat, but also in the petrograd garrison. the coalitionists were losing all influence. the wave of bolshevism began to spread from the urban centers to every part of the country and, despite all obstacles, penetrated into the army ranks. the new coalition government, with kerensky at its head, had already openly embarked upon a policy of repression. the ministry had restored the death penalty in the army. our papers were suppressed and our agitators were arrested; but this only increased our influence. in spite of all the obstacles involved in the new elections for the petrograd soviet, the distribution of power in it had become so changed that on certain important questions we already commanded a majority vote. the same was the case in the moscow soviet. at that time i, together with many others, was imprisoned at kresty, having been arrested for instigating and organizing the armed revolt of july - , in collusion with the german authorities, and with the object of furthering the military ends of the hohenzollerns. the famous prosecutor of the czarist regime, aleksandrov, who had prosecuted numerous revolutionists, was now entrusted with the task of protecting the public from the counter-revolutionary bolsheviki. under the old regime the inmates of prisons used to be divided into political prisoners and criminals. now a new terminology was established: criminals and bolsheviks. great perplexity reigned among the imprisoned soldiers. the boys came from the country and had previously taken no part in political life. they thought that the revolution had set them free, once and for all. hence they viewed with amazement their doorlocks and grated windows. while taking their exercise in the prison-yard, they would always ask me what all this meant and how it would end. i comforted them with the hope of our ultimate victory. toward the end of august occurred the revolt of korniloff; this was the immediate result of the mobilization of the counter-revolutionary forces to which a forceful impulse had been imparted by the attack of july th. at the celebrated moscow congress, which took place in the middle of august, kerensky attempted to take a middle ground between the propertied elements and the democracy of the small bourgeoisie. the maximalists were on the whole considered as standing beyond the bounds of the "legal." kerensky threatened them with blood and iron, which met with vehement applause from the propertied half of the gathering, and treacherous silence on the part of the bourgeois democracy. but the hysterical outcries and threats of kerensky did not satisfy the chiefs of the counter-revolutionary interests. they had only too clearly observed the revolutionary tide flooding every portion of the country, among the working class, in the villages, in the army; and they considered it imperative to adopt without any delay the most extreme measures to curb the masses. after reaching an understanding with the property-owning bourgeoisie--who saw in him their hero--korniloff took it upon himself to accomplish this hazardous task. kerensky, savinkoff, filonenko and other socialist-revolutionists of the government or semi-government class participated in this conspiracy, but each and every one of them at a certain stage of the altering circumstances betrayed korniloff, for they knew that in the case of his defeat, they would turn out to have been on the wrong side of the fence. we lived through the events connected with korniloff, while we were in jail, and followed them in the newspapers; the unhindered delivery of newspapers was the only important respect in which the jails of kerensky differed from those of the old regime. the cossack general's adventure miscarried; six months of revolution had created in the consciousness of the masses and in their organization a sufficient resistance against an open counter-revolutionary attack. the conciliable soviet parties were terribly frightened at the prospect of the possible results of the korniloff conspiracy, which threatened to sweep away, not only the maximalists, but also the whole revolution, together with its governing parties. the social-revolutionists and the minimalists proceeded to legalize the maximalists--this, to be sure, only retrospectively and only half-way, inasmuch as they scented possible dangers in the future. the very same kronstadt sailors--whom they had dubbed burglars and counter-revolutionists in the days following the july uprising--were summoned during the korniloff danger to petrograd for the defence of the revolution. they came without a murmur, without a word of reproach, without recalling the past, and occupied the most responsible posts. i had the fullest right to recall to tseretelli these words which i had addressed to him in may, when he was occupied in persecuting the kronstadt sailors: "when a counter-revolutionary general attempts to throw the noose around the neck; of the revolution, the cadets will grease the rope with soap, while the kronstadt sailors will come to fight and die together with us." the soviet organizations had revealed everywhere, in the rear and at the front, their vitality and their power in the struggle with the korniloff uprising. in almost no instance did things ever come to a military conflict. the revolutionary masses ground into nothingness the general's conspiracy. just as the moderates in july found no soldiers among the petrograd garrison to fight against us, so now korniloff found no soldiers on the whole front to fight against the revolution. he had acted by virtue of a delusion and the words of our propaganda easily destroyed his designs. according to information in the newspapers, i had expected a more rapid unfolding of subsequent events in the direction of the passing of the power into the hands of the soviets. the growth of the influence and power of the maximalists became indubitable and had gained an irresistable momentum. the maximalists had warned against the coalition, against the attack of the th of july, they predicted the korniloff affair--the masses of the people became convinced by experience that we were right. during the most terrifying moments of the korniloff conspiracy, when the caucasian division was approaching petrograd, the petrograd soviet was arming the workingmen with the extorted consent of the authorities. army divisions which had been brought up against us had long since achieved their successful rebirth in the stimulating atmosphere of petrograd and were now altogether on our side. the korniloff uprising was destined to open definitely the eyes of the army to the inadmissibility of any continued policy of conciliation with the bourgeois counter-revolution. hence it was possible to expect that the crushing of the korniloff uprising would prove to be only an introduction to an immediate aggressive action on the part of the revolutionary forces under the leadership of our party for the purpose of seizing sole power. but events unfolded more slowly. with all the tension of their revolutionary feeling, the masses had become more cautious after the bitter lesson of the july days, and renounced all isolated demonstrations, awaiting a direct instruction and direction from above. and, also, among the leadership of our party there developed a "watchful-waiting" policy. under these circumstances, the liquidation of the korniloff adventure, irrespective of the profound regrouping of forces to our advantage, did not bring about any immediate political changes. the conflict with the soviets in the petrograd soviet, the domination of our party was definitely strengthened from that time on. this was evidenced in dramatic fashion when the question of the personnel of its presiding body came up. at that epoch, when the social-revolutionists and the minimalists were holding sway in the soviets, they isolated the maximalists by every means in their power. they did not admit even one maximalist into the membership of the executive committee at petrograd, even when our party represented at least one-third of all the soviet members. afterwards, when the petrograd soviet, by a dwindling majority, passed the resolution for the transfering of all power into the hands of the soviet, our party put forth the demand to establish a coalition executive committee formed on a proportional basis. the old presiding body, the members of which were cheidze, tseretelli, kerensky, skobeloff, chernoff, flatly refused this demand. it may not be out of place to mention this here, inasmuch as representatives of the parties broken up by the revolution speak of the necessity of presenting one front for the sake of democracy, and accuse us of separatism. there was called at that time a special meeting of the petrograd soviet, which was to decide the question of the presiding body's fate. all forces, all reserves had been mobilized on both sides. tseretelli came out with a speech embodying a programme, wherein he pointed out that the question of the presiding body was a question of orientation. we reckoned that we would sway somewhat less than half of the vote and were ready to consider that a sign of our progress. actually, however, the vote showed that we had a majority of nearly one hundred. "for six months," said tseretelli at that time, "we have stood at the head of the petrograd soviet and led it from victory to victory; we wish that you may hold for at least half of that time the positions which you are now preparing to occupy." in the moscow soviet a similar change of leadership among the parties took place. one after the other the provincial soviets joined the bolshevik position. the date of convoking the second all-russian congress of soviets was approaching. but the leading group of the central executive committee was striving with all its might to put off the congress to an indefinite future time, in order thus to destroy it in advance. it was evident that the new congress of soviets would give our party a majority, would correspondingly alter the make-up of the central executive committee, and deprive the fusionists of their most important position. the struggle for the convocation of the all-russian congress of soviets assumed the greatest importance for us. to counterbalance this, the mensheviks (minimalists) and the social-revolutionists put forth the democratic conference idea. they needed this move against both us and kerensky. by this time the head of the ministry assumed an absolutely independent and irresponsible position. he had been raised to power by the petrograd soviet during the first epoch of the revolution: kerensky had entered the ministry without a preliminary decision of the soviets, but his admission was subsequently approved. after the first congress of soviets, the socialist ministers were held accountable to the central executive committee. their allies, the cadets (constitutional democrats) were responsible only to their party. to meet the bourgeoisie's wishes, the general executive committee, after the july days, released the socialist ministers from all responsibility to the soviets, in order, as it were, to create a revolutionary dictatorship. it is rather well to mention this, too, now that the same persons who built up the dictatorship of a coterie, come forth with accusations and imprecations against the dictatorship of a class. the moscow conference, at which the skilfully manipulated professional and democratic elements balanced each other, aimed to strengthen kerensky's power over classes and parties. this aim was attained only in appearance. in reality, the moscow conference revealed kerensky's utter impotence, for he was equally remote from both the professional elements and the bourgeois democracy. but since the liberals and conservatives applauded his onslaughts against democracy, and the fusionists gave him ovations when he cautiously upbraided the counter-revolutionaries, the impression was growing upon him that he was supported, as it were, by both the former and the latter, and, accordingly, commanded unlimited power. over workingmen and revolutionary soldiers he held the threat of blood and iron. his policy continued the bargaining with korniloff behind the scenes--a bargaining which compromised him even in the fusionists' eyes: in evasively diplomatic terms, so characteristic of him, tseretelli spoke of "personal" movements in politics and of the necessity of curbing these personal movements. this task was to be accomplished by the democratic conference, which was called, according to arbitrary forms, from among representatives of soviets, dumas, zemstvos, professional trade unions and co-operative societies. still, the main task was to secure a sufficiently conservative composition of the conference, to dissolve the soviets once for all in the formless mass of democracy, and, on the new organizational basis, to gain a firm footing against the bolshevik tide. here it will not be out of place to note, in a few words, the difference between the political role of the soviets and that of the democratic organs of self-government. more than once, the philistines called our attention to the fact that the new dumas and zemstvos elected on the basis of universal suffrage, were incomparably more democratic than the soviets and were more suited to represent the population. however, this formal democratic criterion is devoid of serious content in a revolutionary epoch. the significance of the revolution lies in the rapid changing of the judgment of the masses, in the fact that new and ever new strata of population acquire experience, verify their views of the day before, sweep them aside, work out new ones, desert old leaders and follow new ones in the forward march. during revolutionary times, formally democratic organizations, based upon the ponderous apparatus of universal suffrage, inevitably fall behind the development of the political consciousness of the masses. quite different are the soviets. they rely immediately upon organic groupings, such as shop, mill, factory, volost, regiment, etc. to be sure, there are guarantees, just as legal, of the strictness of elections, as are used in creating democratic dumas and zemstvos. but there are in the soviet incomparably more serious, more profound guarantees of the direct and immediate relation between the deputy and the electors. a town-duma or zemstvo member is supported by the amorphous mass of electors, which entrusts its full powers to him for a year and then breaks up. the soviet electors remain always united by the conditions of their work and their existence; the deputy is ever before their eyes, at any moment they can prepare a mandate to him, censure him, recall or replace him with another person. if during the revolutionary month preceding the general political evolution expressed itself in the fact that the influence of the fusionist parties was being replaced by a decisive influence of the bolsheviki, it is quite plain that this process found its most striking and fullest expression in the soviets, while the dumas and zemstvos, notwithstanding all their formal democratism, expressed yesterday's status of the popular masses and not to-day's. this is exactly what explains the gravitation toward dumas and zemstvos on the part of those parties which were losing more and more ground in the esteem of the revolutionary class. we shall meet with the same question, only on a larger scale, later, when we come to the constituent assembly. the democratic conference the democratic conference, called by tseretelli and his fellow-combatants in mid-september, was totally artificial in character, representing as it did a combination of soviets and organs of self-government in a ratio calculated to secure a preponderance of the fusionist parties. born of helplessness and confusion, the conference ended in a pitiful fiasco. the professional bourgeoisie treated the conference with the greatest hostility, beholding in it an endeavor to push the bourgeoisie away from the positions it had approached at the moscow conference. the revolutionary proletariat, and the masses of soldiers and peasants connected with it, condemned in advance the fraudulent method of calling together the democratic conference. the immediate task of the fusionists was to create a responsible ministry. but even this was not achieved. kerensky neither wanted nor permitted responsibility, because this was not permitted by the bourgeoisie, which was backing him. irresponsibility towards the organs of the so-called democracy meant, in fact, responsibility to the cadets and the allied embassies. for the time being this was sufficient for the bourgeoisie. on the question of coalition the democratic conference revealed its utter insolvency: the votes in favor of a coalition with the bourgeoisie slightly outnumbered those against the coalition; the majority voted against a coalition with the cadets. but with the cadets left out, there proved to be, among the bourgeoisie, no serious counter-agencies for the coalition. tseretelli explained this in detail to the conference. if the conference did not grasp it, so much the worse for the conference. behind the backs of the conference, negotiations were carried on without concealment with the cadets, whom they had repudiated, and it was decided that the cadets should not appear as cadets, but as "social workers." pressed hard on both right and left, the bourgeois democracy tolerated all this dickering, and thereby demonstrated its utter political prostration. from the democratic conference a soviet was picked, and it was decided to complete it by adding representatives of the professional elements; this pre-parliament was to fill the vacant period before the convocation of the constituent assembly contrary to tseretelli's original plan, but in full accord with the plans of the bourgeoisie, the new coalition ministry retained its formal independence with regard to the pre-parliament. everything together produced the impression of a pitiful and impotent creation of an office clerk behind which was concealed the complete capitulation of the petty bourgeois democracy before the professional liberalism which, a month previously, had openly supported korniloff's attack on the revolution. the sum total of the whole affair was, therefore, the restoration and perpetuation of the coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie. no longer could there be any doubt that quite independently of the make-up of the future constituent assembly, the governmental power would, in fact, be held by the bourgeoisie, as despite all the preponderance given them by the masses of the people the fusionist parties invariably arrived at a coalition with the cadets, deeming it impossible, as they did, to create a state power without the bourgeoisie. the attitude of the masses toward milyukov's party was one of the deepest hostility. at all elections during the revolutionary period, the cadets suffered merciless defeat, and yet, the very parties--i.e., the social-revolutionists and mensheviks--which victoriously defeated the cadet party at the elections, after election gave it the place of honor in the coalition government. it is natural that the masses realized more and more that in reality the fusionist parties were playing the role of stewards to the liberal bourgeoisie. meantime, the internal situation was becoming more and more complicated and unfavorable. the war dragged on aimlessly, senselessly and interminably. the government took no steps whatever to extricate itself from the vicious circle. the laughable scheme was proposed of sending the menshevik skobeloff to paris to influence the allied imperialists. but no sane man attached any importance to this scheme. korniloff gave up riga to the germans in order to terrorize public opinion, and having brought about this condition, to establish the discipline of the knout in the army. danger threatened petrograd. and the bourgeois elements greeted this peril with unconcealed malicious joy. the former president of the duma, rodzyanko, openly said again and again that the surrender of debauched petrograd to the germans would not be a great misfortune. for illustration he cited riga, where the deputy soviets had been done away with after the coming of the germans, and firm order, together with the old police system, had been established. would the baltic fleet be lost? but the fleet had been debauched by the revolutionary propaganda; ergo the loss was not so great. the cynicism of a garrulous nobleman expressed the hidden thoughts of the greater part of the bourgeoisie, that to surrender petrograd to the germans did not mean to lose it. under the peace treaty it would be restored, but restored ravaged by german militarism. by that time the revolution would be decapitated, and it would be easier to manage. kerensky's government did not think of seriously defending the capital. on the contrary, public opinion was being prepared for its possible surrender. public institutions were being removed from petrograd to moscow and other cities. in this setting, the soldiers' section of the petrograd soviet had its meeting. feeling was tense and turbulent, was the government incapable of defending petrograd? if so, let it make peace. and if incapable of making peace, let it clear out. the frame of mind of the soldiers' section found expression in this resolution. this was already the heat-lightning of the october revolution. at the front, the situation grew worse day by day. chilly autumn, with its rains and winds, was drawing nigh. and there was looming up a fourth winter campaign. supplies deteriorated every day. in the rear, the front had been forgotten--no reliefs, no new contingents, no warm winter clothing, which was indispensable. desertions grew in number. the old army committees, elected in the first period of the revolution, remained at their places and supported kerensky's policy. re-elections were forbidden. an abyss sprang up between the committees and the soldier masses. finally the soldiers began to regard the committees with hatred. with increasing frequency delegates from the trenches were arriving in petrograd and at the sessions of the petrograd soviet put the question point blank: "what is to be done further? by whom and how will the war be ended? why is the petrograd soviet silent?" inevitability of the struggle for power the petrograd soviet was not silent. it demanded the immediate transfer of all power into the hands of the soviets in the capitals and in the provinces, the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants, the workingmen's control of production, and immediate opening of peace negotiations. so long as we remained an opposition party, the motto--all power to the soviets--was a propaganda motto. but as soon as we found ourselves in the majority in all the principal soviets, this motto imposed upon us the duty of a direct and immediate fight for power. in the country villages, the situation had grown entangled and complicated in the extreme. the revolution had promised land to the peasant, but at the same time, the leading parties demanded that the peasant should not touch this land until the constituent assembly should meet. at first the peasants waited patiently, but when they began to lose patience, the coalition ministry showered repressive measures upon them. meanwhile the constituent assembly was receding to ever remoter distances. the bourgeoisie insisted upon calling the constituent assembly after the conclusion of peace. the peasant masses were growing more and more impatient. what we had foretold at the very beginning of the revolution, was being realized: the peasants were seizing the land of their own accord. repressive measures grew, arrests of revolutionary land committees began. in certain uyezds (districts) kerensky introduced martial law. a line of delegates, who came on foot, flowed from the villages to the petrograd soviet. they complained that they had been arrested when they attempted to carry out the petrograd soviet's programme and to transfer the estate holder's land into the hands of the peasant committees. the peasants demanded protection of us. we replied that we should be in a position to protect them only if the power were in our hands. from this, however, it followed that the soviets must seize the power if they did not wish to become mere debating societies. "it is senseless to fight for the power of the soviets six or eight weeks before the constituent assembly," our neighbors on the right told us. we, however, were in no degree infected with this fetish worship of the constituent assembly. in the first place, there were no guarantees that it really would be called. the breaking up of the army, mass desertions, disorganization of the supplies department, agrarian revolution--all this created an environment which was unfavorable to the elections for the constituent assembly. the surrender of petrograd to the germans, furthermore, threatened to remove altogether the question of elections from the order of the day. and, besides, even if it were called according to the old registration lists under the leadership of the old parties, the constituent assembly would be but a cover and a sanction for the coalition power. without the bourgeoisie neither the s. r.'s nor the mensheviks were in a position to assume power. only the revolutionary class was destined to break the vicious circle wherein the revolution was revolving and going to pieces. the power had to be snatched from the hands of the elements which were directly or indirectly serving the bourgeoisie and making use of the state apparatus as a tool of obstruction against the revolutionary demands of the people. all power to the soviets! demanded our party. translated into party language, this had meant, in the preceding period, the power of the s. r.'s and mensheviks, as opposed to a coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie. now, in october , the same motto meant handing over all power to the revolutionary proletariat, at the head of which, at this period, stood the bolshevik party. it was a question of the dictatorship of the working class, which was leading, or, more correctly, was capable of leading the many millions of the poorest peasantry. this was the historical significance of the october uprising. everything led the party to this path. since the first days of the revolution, we had been preaching the necessity and inevitability of the power passing to the soviets. after a great internal struggle, the majority of the soviets made this demand their own, having accepted our point of view. we were preparing the second all-russian congress of soviets at which we: expected our party's complete victory. under dan's leadership (the cautious cheidze had departed for the caucasus), the central executive committee attempted to block in every way the calling of the congress of the soviets. after great exertions, supported by the soviet fraction of the democratic assembly, we finally secured the setting of the date of the congress for october th. this date was destined to become the greatest day in the history of russia. as a preliminary, we called in petrograd a congress of soviets of the northern regions, including the baltic fleet and moscow. at this congress, we had a solid majority, and obtained a certain support on the right in the persons of the left s. r. faction, besides laying important organizational premises for the october uprising. the conflict regarding the petrograd garrison but even earlier, previous to the congress of northern soviets, there occurred an event which was destined to play a most important role in the subsequent political struggle. early in october there came to a meeting of the petrograd executive committee, the soviet's representative in the staff of the petrograd military district and announced that headquarters demanded that two-thirds of the petrograd garrison should be sent to the front. for what purpose? to defend petrograd. they were not to be sent to the front at once, but still it was necessary to make ready immediately. the staff recommended that the petrograd soviet approve this plan. we were on our guard. at the end of august, also, five revolutionary regiments, complete or in parts, had been taken out of petrograd. this had been done at the request of the then supreme commander korniloff, who at that very time was preparing to hurl a caucasian division against petrograd, with the intention of once for all settling with the revolutionary capital. thus we had already the experience of purely political transfer of regiments under the pretext of military operations. anticipating events. i shall say, that from documents brought to light after the october revolution it became clear beyond any doubt that the proposed removal of the petrograd garrison actually had nothing to do with military purposes, but was forced upon commander-in-chief dukhonin, against his will, by none else but kerensky, who was striving to clear the capital of the most revolutionary soldiers, i.e., those most hostile to him. but at that time, early in october, our suspicions evoked at first a storm of patriotic indignation. the staff people were pressing us, kerensky was impatient, for the ground under his feet had grown too hot. we, on the other hand, delayed answering. danger undoubtedly threatened petrograd and the question of defending the capital loomed before us in all its terrible significance. but after the korniloff experience, after rodzyanko's words concerning the desirability of the german occupation, whence should we take the assurance that petrograd would not be maliciously given up to the germans in punishment for its seditious spirit? the executive committee refused to affix its seal blindly to the order to transfer two-thirds of the garrison. it was necessary to verify, we said, whether there really were military considerations back of this order, and therefore it was necessary to create an organization for this verification. thus was born the idea of creating--by the side of the soldiers' section of the soviet, i. e., the garrison's political representation--a purely military organization, in the form of a military revolutionary committee, which subsequently acquired enormous power and became the real tool of the october revolution. undoubtedly, even in those hours, when putting forth the idea of creating an organization in whose hands would be concentrated the threads for guiding the petrograd garrison on the purely military side, we clearly realized that this very organization might become an irreplaceable revolutionary tool. at that time we were already openly heading for the uprising, and were preparing for it in an organized way. as indicated above, the all-russian congress of soviets was ret for october th. there could be no longer any doubt that the congress would declare itself in favor of power being handed over to the soviets. but such a resolution must forthwith be put into actuality, else it would turn into a worthless, platonic demonstration. the logic of events, therefore, required us to set the uprising for october th. exactly so the entire bourgeois press interpreted it. but in the first place, the fate of the congress depended upon the petrograd garrison: would it allow kerensky to surround the congress of soviets and disperse it with the assistance of several hundred or thousand military cadets, ensigns and thugs? did not the very attempt to remove the garrison mean that the government was preparing to disperse the congress of soviets? and strange it would be if it were not preparing, since we were, before the entire land, openly mobilizing the soviet forces in order to deal the coalition forces a death blow. thus the conflict at petrograd was developing on the basis of the question of the garrison's fate. first and foremost this question touched all the soldiers to the quick. but the working-men, too, felt the liveliest interest in the conflict, fearing as they did that upon the garrison's removal they would be smothered by the cadets and cossacks. thus the conflict was assuming a character of the very keenest nature and developing on a soil extremely unfavorable for kerensky's government. parallel with this was going on the above-described struggle for convoking the all-russian congress of soviets--we, openly declaring, in the name of the petrograd soviet and the northern region congress, that the second congress of soviets must set kerensky's government aside and become the true master of the russian land. as a matter of fact the uprising was already on. it was developing quite openly before the eyes of the whole country. during october the question of the uprising played an important role in our party's inner life. lenin, who was in hiding in finland, insisted, in numerous letters, upon more resolute tactics. the lower strata were in ferment, and dissatisfaction was accumulating because the bolshevik party, which had proved to be in the majority in the petrograd soviet, was drawing no practical conclusions from its own mottos. on october th a conspiratory meeting of the central committee of our party took place, with lenin present. the question of the uprising was on the order of the day. by a majority of all against two votes it was decided that the only means of saving the revolution and the country from final dissolution lay in armed insurrection which must transfer power into the hands of the soviets. the democratic soviet and "pre-parliament" the democratic soviet which had detached itself from the democratic conference had absorbed all the helplessness of the latter. the old soviet parties, the social-revolutionists and the mensheviks, had created an artificial majority in it for themselves, only the more strikingly to reveal their political prostration. behind the soviet curtains, tseretelli was carrying on involved parleys with kerensky and the representatives of the "professional elements" as they began to say in the soviet,--in order to avoid the "insulting" term bourgeoisie. tseretelli's report on the course and issue of the negotiations was a sort of funeral oration over a whole period of the revolution. it turned out that neither kerensky nor the professional elements had consented to responsibility toward the new semi-representative institution. on the other hand, outside the limits of the cadet party, they had not succeeded in finding so-called "efficient" social leaders. the organizers of the venture had to capitulate on both points. the capitulation was all the more eloquent, because the democratic conference had been called exactly for the purpose of doing away with the irresponsible regime, while the conference, by a formal vote, rejected a coalition with the cadets. at several meetings of the democratic soviet which took place prior to the revolution, there prevailed an atmosphere of tenseness and utter incapacity for action. the soviet did not reflect the revolution's march forward but the dissolution of the parties that had lagged behind the revolution. even previous to the democratic conference, in our party faction, i had raised the question of demonstratively withdrawing from the conference and boycotting the democratic soviet. it was necessary to show the masses by action that the fusionists had led the revolution into a blind alley. the fight for building up the soviet power could be carried on only in a revolutionary way. the power must be snatched from the hands of those who had proven incapable of doing any good and were furthermore even losing their capacity for active evil. their method of working through an artificially picked pre-parliament and a conjectural constituent assembly, had to be opposed by our political method of mobilizing the forces around the soviets, through the all-russian congress of soviets and through insurrection. this could be done only by means of an open break, before the eyes of the entire people, with the body created by tseretelli and his adherents, and by focusing on the soviet institutions, the entire attention and all the forces of the working class. this is why i proposed the demonstrative withdrawal from the conference and a revolutionary agitation, in shops and regiments, against the attempt to play false with the will of the revolution and once again turn its progress into the channel of cooperation with the bourgeoisie. lenin, whose letter we received a few days later, expressed himself to the same effect. but in the party's upper circles hesitation was still apparent on this question. the july days had left a deep impression in the party's consciousness. the mass of workingmen and soldiers had recovered from the july debacle much more rapidly than had many of the leading comrades who feared the nipping of the revolution in the bud by a new premature onslaught of the masses. in our group of the democratic conference, i mustered votes in favor of my proposal against who declared for participating in the democratic council. however, the experience of this participation soon strengthened the party's left wing. it was growing too manifest that combinations bordering on trickery, combinations that aimed at securing further leadership in the revolution for the professional elements, with the assistance of the fusionists, who had lost ground among the lower levels of the people, offered no escape from the impasse into which the laxness of bourgeois democracy had driven the revolution. by the time the democratic soviet, its ranks filled up with professional elements, became a pre-parliament, readiness to break with this institution had matured in our party. the s. r.'s and mensheviks we were confronted with the question whether the s. r.'s would follow us in this path. this group was in the process of formation, but this process, according to the standards of our party, went on too slowly and irresolutely. at the outset of the revolution, the s. r.'s proved the predominating party in the whole field of political life. peasants, soldiers, even workingmen voted en masse for the s. r.'s. the party itself had not expected anything of the kind, and more than once it looked as if it were in danger of being swamped in the waves of its own success. excluding the purely capitalistic and landholder groups and the professional elements among the intellectuals, one and all voted for the revolutionary populists' party. this was natural in the initial stage of the revolution, when class lines had not had time to reveal themselves, when the aspirations of the so-called united revolutionary front found expression in the diffuse program of a party that was ready to welcome equally the workingman who feared to break away from the peasant; the peasant who was seeking land and liberty; the intellectual attempting to guide both of them; the chinovnik (officeholder) endeavoring to adjust himself to the new regime. when kerensky, who had been counted a laborite in the period of czarism, joined the s. r.'s party after the victory of the revolution, that party's popularity began to grow in proportion as kerensky mounted the rungs of power. out of respect, not always of a platonic nature, for the war minister, many colonels and generals hastened to enrol in the party of the erstwhile terrorists. old s. r.'s, with revolutionary traditions, regarded with some uneasiness the ever increasing number of "march s. r.'s" that is, such party members as had discovered within themselves a revolutionary populist soul only in march, after the revolution had overthrown the old regime and placed the revolutionary populists in authority. thus, within the limits of its formlessness, this party contained not only the inner contradictions of the developing revolution, but also the prejudices inherent in the backwardness of the peasant masses, and the sentimentalism, instability and career-chasing of the intellectual strata. it was perfectly clear that in that form the party could not last long. with regard to ideas, it proved impotent from the very start. politically, the guiding role belonged to the mensheviks who had gone through the school of marxism and derived from it certain procedures and habits, which aided them in finding their bearings in the political situation to the extent of scientifically falsifying the meaning of the current class struggle and securing the hegemony of the liberal bourgeoisie in the highest degree possible under the given circumstances. this is why the mensheviks, direct pleaders for the bourgeoisie's right to power, exhausted themselves so rapidly and, by the time of the october revolution, were almost completely played out. the s. r.'s, too, were losing influence more and more--first among the workingmen, then in the army, and finally in the villages. but toward the time of the october upheaval, they remained still a very powerful party, numerically. however, class contradictions were undermining them from within. in opposition to the right wing which, in its most chauvinistic elements, such as avksentyef, breshko-breshkovskaya, savinkoff, etc., had finally gone over into the counter-revolutionary camp, a left wing was forming, which strove to preserve its connection with the toiling masses. if we merely recall the fact that the s. r., avksentyef, as minister of the interior, arrested the peasant land committees, composed of s. r.'s, for their arbitrary solution of the agrarian question, the amplitude of "differences" within this party will become sufficiently clear to us. in its center stood the party's traditional leader, chernoff. a writer of experience, well-read in socialist literature, an experienced hand in factional strife, he had constantly remained at the head of the party, when party life was being built up in emigrant circles abroad. the revolution which had raised the s. r. party to an enormous height with its first indiscriminating wave, automatically raised chernoff, too, only to reveal his complete impotence even as compared with the other leading political lights of the first period. the paltry resources which had secured to chernoff a preponderance in the populist circles abroad, proved too light in the scales of the revolution. he concentrated his efforts on not taking any responsible decisions, evading in all critical cases, waiting and abstaining. for some little time, tactics of this kind secured for him the position as center between the ever more diverging flanks. but there was no longer any possibility of preserving party unity for long. the former terrorist, savinkof, took part in korniloff's conspiracy, was in touching unanimity with the counter-revolutionary circles of cossack officers and was preparing an onslaught on petrograd workingmen and soldiers, among whom there were quite a few left s. r.'s. as a sacrifice to the left wing, the center expelled savinkof from the party, but hesitated to raise a hand against kerensky. in the pre-parliament, the party showed signs of extreme disruption: three groups existed independently, though under the banner of one and the same party, but none of the groups knew exactly what it wanted. the formal domination of this "party" in the constituent assembly would have meant only a continuation of political prostration. withdrawing from the pre-parliament. the voice of the front before withdrawing from the membership in the pre-parliament where, according to kerensky's and tseretelli's political statistics, we were entitled to some half a hundred seats, we arranged a conference with the left s. r. group. they refused to follow us, claiming that they still had to demonstrate practically before the peasantry the insolvency of the pre-parliament. said one of the leaders of the left s. r.'s: "we deem it necessary to warn you that if you want to withdraw from the pre-parliament in order forthwith to go into the streets for an open fight, we shall not follow you." the bourgeois-fusionist press accused us of striving to kill prematurely the pre-parliament, for the very purpose of creating a revolutionary situation. at our faction meeting in the pre-parliament, it was decided to act independently and not wait for the left s. r.'s. our party's declaration, proclaimed from the pre-parliament rostrum and explaining why we were breaking with this institution, was greeted with a howl of hatred and impotence on the part of the majority groups. in the petrograd soviet of deputies, where our withdrawal from the pre-parliament was approved by an overwhelming majority, the leader of the tiny "internationalist" menshevik group, martof, explained to us that the withdrawal from the temporary soviet of the republic (such was the official appellation of this little-respected institution) would be sensible only in case we proposed immediately to assume an open offensive. but the point is that this is just what we intended. the prosecutors for the liberal bourgeoisie were right, when accusing us of striving to create a revolutionary situation. in open insurrection and direct seizure of power we beheld the only way out of the situation. again, as in the july days, the press and all the other organs of so-called public opinion were mobilized against us. from the july arsenals were dragged forth the most envenomed weapons which had been temporarily stored away there after the korniloff days. vain efforts! the mass was irresistibly moving toward us, and its spirit was rising hour by hour. from the trenches delegates kept arriving. "how long," said they, at the petrograd soviet meetings, "will this impossible situation last? the soldiers have told us to declare to you: if no decisive steps for peace are made by november st, the trenches will be deserted, the entire army will rush to the rear!" this determination was really spreading at the front. there the soldiers were passing on, from one unit to another, home-made proclamations, summoning them not to remain in the trenches later than the first snowfall. "you have forgotten about us," the delegates on foot from the trenches exclaimed at the soviet meetings. "if you find no way out of the situation, we shall come here ourselves, and with our bayonets we shall disperse our enemies, including you." in the course of a few weeks the petrograd council had become the center of attraction for the whole army. after its leading tendency had been changed and new presiding officers elected, its resolutions inspired the exhausted and despondent troops at the front with the hope that the way out of the situation could be practically found in the manner proposed by the bolsheviks: by publishing the secret treaties and proposing an immediate truce on all fronts. "you say that power must pass into the hands of the soviets, grasp it then. yon fear that the front will not support you. cast all misgivings aside, the soldier masses are with you in overwhelming majority." meanwhile the conflict regarding the transfer of the garrison kept on developing. almost daily, a garrison conference met, consisting of committees from the companies, regiments and commands. the influence of our party in the garrison was established definitely and indestructibly. the petrograd district staff was in a state of extreme perplexity. now it would attempt to enter into regular relations with us, then again, egged on by the leaders of the central executive committee, it would threaten us with repressive measures. above, mention has already been made of organizing, at the petrograd soviet, a military revolutionary committee, which was intended to be, in fact, the soviet staff of the petrograd garrison in opposition to kerensky's staff. "but the existence of two staffs is inadmissible," the representatives of the fusionist parties dogmatically admonished us. "but is a situation admissible, wherein the garrison mistrusts the official staff and fears that the transfer of soldiers from petrograd has been dictated by a new counter-revolutionary machination?" we retorted. "the creation of a second staff means insurrection," came the reply from the right. "your military revolutionary committee's task will not be so much to verify the operative projects and orders of the military authorities as the preparation and execution of an insurrection against the present government." this objection was just: but for that very reason it did not frighten anybody. an overwhelming majority of the soviet was aware of the necessity of overthrowing the coalition power. the more circumstantially the mensheviks and s. r.'s demonstrated that the military revolutionary committee would inevitably turn into an organ of insurrection, the greater the eagerness with which the petrograd soviet supported the new fighting organization. the military revolutionary committee's first act was to appoint commissioners to all parts of the petrograd garrison and all the most important institutions of the capital and environs. from various quarters we were receiving communications that the government, or more correctly, the government parties, were actively organizing and arming their forces. from various arms-depots-governmental and private-rifles, revolvers, machine guns and cartridges were being brought forth for arming cadets, students and bourgeois youths in general. it was necessary to take immediate preventive measures. commissioners were appointed to all arms-depots and stores. almost without opposition they became masters of the situation. to be sure, the commandants and proprietors of the depots tried not to recognize them, but a mere application to the soldiers' committee or the employees of each institution sufficed to cause the immediate breakdown of the opposition. after that, arms were issued only on order of our commissioners. even prior to that, regiments of the petrograd garrison had their commissioners, but these had been appointed by the central executive committee. above, we said that after the june congress of soviets, and particularly after the june th demonstration which revealed the ever growing power of the bolsheviks, the fusionist parties had almost entirely deprived the petrograd soviet of any practical influence on the course of events in the revolutionary capital. the leadership of the petrograd garrison was concentrated in the hands of the central executive committee. now the task everywhere was to put in the petrograd soviet's commissioners. this was achieved with the most energetic cooperation of the soldier masses. meetings, addressed by speakers of various parties, had the result, invariably, that regiment after regiment declared it would recognize only the petrograd soviet's commissioners and would not budge a step without its decision. an important role in appointing these commissioners was played by the bolsheviks' military organization. before the july days it had developed a widespread agitational activity. on july th, a battalion of cyclists, brought by kerensky to petrograd, battered down the isolated kshessinsky mansion where our party's military organization was quartered. the majority of leaders, and many privates among the members were arrested, the publications were stopped, the printing shop was wrecked. only by degrees did the organization begin to repair its machinery afresh, conspiratively this time. numerically it comprised in its ranks but a very insignificant part of the petrograd garrison, a few hundred men all told. but there were among them many soldiers and young officers, chiefly ensigns, resolute, and with heart and soul devoted to the revolution, who had passed through kerensky's prisons in july and august. all of them had placed themselves at the military revolutionary committee's disposal and were being assigned to the most responsible fighting posts. however, it would not be superfluous to remark that precisely the members of our party's military organization assumed in october an attitude of extraordinary caution and even some skepticism toward the idea of an immediate insurrection. the closed character of the organization and its officially military character involuntarily inclined its leaders to underestimate the purely technical and organizational resources of the uprising, and from this point of view we were undoubtedly weak. our strength lay in the revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and their readiness to fight under our banner. parallel with the organizing activity a stormy agitation was being carried on. this was the period of incessant meetings at works, in the "modern" and "chinizelli" circuses, at clubs, in barracks. the atmosphere at all the meetings was charged with electricity. each mention of the insurrection was greeted with a storm of plaudits and shouts of delight. the bourgeois press merely increased the state of universal panic. an order issued over my signature to the syestroyetsk munitions factory to issue five thousand rifles to the red guard evoked an indescribable panic in bourgeois circles. "the general massacre" in course of preparation was talked and written about everywhere. of course, this did not in the least prevent the workingmen of the syestroyetsk munitions factory from handing the arms over to the red guards. the more frantically the bourgeois press slandered and baited us, the more ardently the masses responded to our call. it was growing clearer and clearer for both sides that the crisis must break within the next few days. the press of the s. r.'s and mensheviks was sounding an alarm. "the revolution is in the greatest danger. a repetition of the july days is being prepared--but on a much wider basis and therefore still more destructive in its consequences." in his novaya zhizn, gorki daily prophesied the approaching wreck of all civilization. in general, the socialistic veneer of the bourgeois intellectuals was wearing off at the approach of the stern domination of the workers' dictatorship. but, on the other hand, the soldiers of even the most backward regiments hailed with delight the military revolutionary committee's commissioners. delegates came to us from cossack units and from the socialist minority of military cadets. they promised at least to assure the neutrality of their units in case of open conflict. manifestly kerensky's government was losing its foundations. the district staff began negotiations with us and proposed a compromise. in order to size up the enemy's full resistance, we entered into pourparlers. but the staff was nervous; now they exhorted, then threatened us, they even declared our commissioners to be without power, which, however, did not in the least affect their work. in accord with the staff, the central executive committee appointed captain of staff malefski to be chief commissioner for the petrograd military district and magnanimously consented to recognize our commissioners, on condition of their being subordinate to the chief commissioner. the proposal was rejected and the negotiations broken off. prominent mensheviks and s. r.'s came to us as intermediaries, exhorted, threatened and foretold our doom and the doom of the revolution. the "petrograd soviet day" at this period the smolny building was already completely in the hands of the petrograd soviet and of our party. the mensheviks and the s. r.'s transferred their political activity to the maryiinsky palace, where the infant pre-parliament was already expiring. in the pre-parliament kerensky delivered a great speech, in which, stormily applauded by the bourgeois wing, he endeavored to conceal his impotence behind clamorous threats. the staff made its last attempt at opposition. to all units of the garrison it sent out invitations to appoint two delegates to conferences concerning the removal of troops from the capital. the first conference was called for october nd, at p. m. from the regiments we immediately received information about it. by telephone we issued a call for a garrison conference at a. m. withal, a part of the delegates did get to the staff quarters, only to declare that without the petrograd soviet's decision they would not move anywhere. almost unanimously the garrison conference confirmed its allegiance to the military revolutionary committee. objections came only from official representatives of the former soviet parties, but they found no response whatever among the regimental delegates. the staff's attempt brought out only more strikingly that we were standing on firm ground. in the front rank there was the volhynian regiment, the very one which on july th, with its band playing, had invaded the tauri'da palace, in order to put down the bolsheviks. as already mentioned earlier, the central executive committee had charge of the petrograd soviet's treasury and its publications. an attempt to obtain even a single one of these publications brought no results. beginning with the end of september, we initiated a series of measures toward creating an independent newspaper of the petrograd soviet. but all printing establishments were occupied and their owners boycotted us with the assistance of the central executive committee. it was decided to arrange for a "petrograd soviet day," for the purpose of developing a widespread agitation and collecting pecuniary resources for establishing a newspaper. about a fortnight before, this day was set for october nd, and consequently it coincided with the moment of the open outburst of the insurrection. with complete assurance, the hostile press announced that on october nd an armed insurrection of the bolsheviks would occur in the streets of petrograd. that the insurrection would occur, nobody had any doubt. they only tried to determine exactly when; they guessed, they prophesied, striving in this way to force a denial or confession on our part. but the soviet calmly and confidently marched forward, making no answer to the howl of bourgeois public opinion. october nd became the reviewing day for the forces of the proletarian army. it went off magnificently in every respect. in spite of the warnings coming from the right that blood would flow in torrents in the streets of petrograd, the masses of the populace were pouring in floods to the petrograd soviet meetings. all our oratorical forces were mobilized. all public places were filled. meetings were held unceasingly for hours at a stretch. they were addressed by speakers of our party, by delegates arriving for the soviet congress, by representatives from the front, by left s.r.'s and by anarchists. public buildings were flooded by waves of working-men, soldiers and sailors. there had not been many gatherings like that even in the time of the revolution. up rose a considerable mass of the petty townfolk, less frightened than aroused by the shouts, warnings and baiting of the bourgeois press. waves of people by tens of thousands dashed against the people's house building, rolled through the corridors, filled the halls. on the iron columns huge garlands of human heads, feet and hands were hanging like bunches of grapes. the air was surcharged with the electric tension that heralds the most critical moments of revolution. "down with kerensky's government! down with the war! all power to the soviets!" not one from the ranks of the previous soviet parties ventured to appear before those colossal throngs with a word of reply. the petrograd soviet held undivided sway. in reality the campaign had already been won. it only remained to deal the last military blow to this spectral authority. the most cautious in our midst were reporting that there still remained units that were not with us: the cossacks, the cavalry regiment, the semyonofski regiment, the cyclists. commissioners and agitators were assigned to these units. their reports sounded perfectly satisfactory: the red-hot atmosphere was infecting one and all, and the most conservative elements of the army were losing the strength to withstand the general tendency of the petrograd garrison. in the semyonofski regiment, which was considered the bulwark of kerensky's government, i was present at a meeting which took place in the open air. the most prominent speakers of the right wing addressed it. they clung to the conservative guard regiments as to the last support of the coalition power. nothing would avail. by an overwhelming majority of votes, the regiment expressed itself for us and did not even give the ex-ministers a chance to finish their speeches. the groups which still opposed the soviet watch-words were made up mainly of officers, volunteers and generally of bourgeois intellectuals and semi-intellectuals. the masses of peasants and workmen were with us one and all. the demarcation ran as a distinct social line. the fortress of peter and paul is the central military base of petrograd. as commandant thereof we appointed a young ensign. he proved the best man for the post and within a few hours he became master of the situation. the lawful authorities withdrew, biding their time. the element regarded as unreliable for us were the cyclists, who in july had smashed our party's military organization in the kshessinsky mansion and taken possession of the mansion itself. on the rd, i went to the fortress about p. m. within the courtyard a meeting was being held. the speakers of the right wing were cautious and evasive in the extreme, painstakingly avoiding the question of kerensky, whose name inevitably aroused shouts of protest and indignation even among the soldiers. we were listened to, and our advice vas followed. about four o'clock, the cyclists assembled nearby, in the "modern" circus, for a battalion meeting. among the speakers appearing there was quartermaster-general paradyelof. he spoke with extreme caution. the days had been left far behind, when official and semi-official speakers referred to the party of the workers merely as to a gang of traitors and hired agents of the german kaiser. the lieutenant-commander of the staff accosted me with: "we really ought to be able to come to some agreement." but it was already too late. the whole battalion, with only thirty dissenting votes, had voted for handing over all power to the soviets. the beginning of the revolution the government of kerensky was restlessly looking for refuge, now one way, now another. two new cyclist battalions, and the zenith battery were called back from the front, and an attempt was made to call back some companies of cavalry.... the cyclists telegraphed while on the road to the petrograd soviet: "we are led to petrograd without knowing the reasons. request explanations." we ordered them to stop and send a delegation to petrograd. their representatives arrived and declared at a meeting of the soviet that the battalion was entirely with us. this was greeted by enthusiastic cheers. the battalion received orders to enter the city immediately. the number of delegates from the front was increasing every day. they came to get information about the situation. they gathered our literature and went to bring the message to the front that the petrograd soviet was conducting a struggle for the power of the workers, soldiers and peasants. "the men in the trenches will support you," they told us. all the old army committees which had not been reelected for the last four or five months, sent threatening telegrams to us, which, however, made no impression. we knew that these committees were no less out of touch with the rank and file of the soldiers than the central executive committee with the local soviets. the military revolutionary committee appointed commissaries to all railroad depots. these commissaries kept a watchful eye upon all the arriving and departing trains and especially upon the movements of troops. continuous telephone and motor car communication was established with the neighboring cities and their garrisons. the soviets of all the communities near petrograd were charged with the duty of vigilantly preventing any counter-revolutionary troops, or, rather, troops misled by the government, from entering the capital. the railroad officials of lower rank and the workmen recognized our commissaries immediately. difficulties arose on the th at the telephone station. they stopped connecting us. the cadets took possession of the station and under their protection the telephone operators began to oppose the soviet. this was the first appearance of the future sabotage. the military revolutionary committee sent a detachment to the telephone station and placed two small cannons there. in this way the seizing of all departments of the government and instruments of administration was started. the sailors and red guards occupied the telegraph station, the post office and other institutions. measures were taken to take possession of the state bank. the center of the government, the institute of smolny, was turned into a fortress. there were in the garret, as a heritage of the old central executive committee, a score of machine guns, but they were in poor condition and had been entirely neglected by the caretakers. we ordered an additional machine gun company to the smolny institute. early in the morning the sailors rolled the machine gun with a deafening rumble over the cement floors of the long and half-dark corridors of the building. out of the doors the frightened faces of the few s. r.'s and mensheviks were looking and wondering. the soviet held daily meetings in the smolny and so did the garrison council. on the third floor of the smolny, in a small corner room, the military revolutionary committee was in continuous session. there was centered all the information about the movements of the troops, the spirit of the soldiers and workers, the agitation in the barracks, the undertakings of the pogrom instigators, the councils of the bourgeois politicians, the life at the winter palace, the plans of the former soviet parties. informers came from all sides. there came workers, officers, porters, socialist cadets, servants, ladies. many brought pure nonsense. others gave serious and valuable information. the decisive moment drew near. it was apparent that there was no going back. on the evening of the th of october, kerensky appeared in the preliminary parliament and demanded approval of repressive measures against the bolsheviki. the preliminary parliament, however, was in a sad state of indetermination and complete disintegration. the constitutional democrats tried to persuade the right s. r.'s to adopt a vote of confidence. the right s. r.'s exercised pressure upon the center. the center hesitated. the "left" wing conducted a policy of parliamentary opposition. after many conferences, debates, hesitations, the resolution of the "left" wing was adopted. this resolution condemned the rebellious movement of the soviet, but the responsibilities for the movement were laid at the door of the anti-democratic policy of the government. the mail brought scores of letters daily informing us of death sentences pronounced against us, of infernal machines, of the expected blowing up of the smolny, etc. the bourgeois press howled wildly, moved by hatred and terror. gorki, who had forgotten all about "the song of the falcon," continued to prophesy in his novaya zhizn the approach of the end of the world. the members of the military revolutionary committee did not leave the smolny during the entire week. they slept on sofas and only at odd intervals, wakened by couriers, scouts, cyclists, telegraph messengers and telephone calls. the night of the th- th was the most restless. we received a telephone communication from pavlovsky that the government had called artillery from the peterhof school of ensigns. at the winter palace, kerensky gathered the cadets and officers. we gave out orders over the telephone to place on all the roads leading to petrograd reliable military defence and to send agitators to meet the military detachment called by the government. in case persuasion would not help they were instructed to use armed force. all the negotiations were held over the telephone in the open, and therefore were accessible to the agents of the government. the commissaries informed us over the telephone that on all the roads leading to petrograd our friends were on the alert. a cadet detachment from oranienbaum nevertheless succeeded in getting by our military defence during the night and over the telephone we followed their further movements. the outer guard of the smolny was strengthened by another company. communications with all the detachments of the garrison went on continuously. the companies on guard in all the regiments were awake. the delegates of every detachment were day and night at the disposal of the military revolutionary committee. an order was given to suppress the agitation of the black hundred without reserve, and at the first attempts at pogroms on the streets, arms should be used without mercy. during this decisive night all the most important points of the city passed into our hands--almost without any opposition, without struggle and without bloodshed. the state bank was guarded by a government detachment and an armored car. the building was surrounded on all sides by our troops. the armored car was taken by an unexpected attack and the bank went over into the hands of the military revolutionary committee without a single shot being fired. there was on the river neva, behind the franco-russian plant, the cruiser aurora, which was under repair. its crew consisted entirely of sailors devotedly loyal to the revolution. when korniloff, at the end of august, threatened petrograd the sailors of the aurora were called by the government to guard the winter palace, and though even then they already hated the government of kerensky, they realized that it was their duty to dam the wave of the counter-revolution, and they took their post without objection. when the danger passed they were sent back. now, in the days of the october uprising, they were too dangerous. the aurora was ordered by the minister of the navy to weigh anchor and to get out of petrograd. the crew informed us immediately of this order. we annulled it and the cruiser remained where it was, ready at any moment to put all its military forces and means at the disposal of the soviets. the decisive day at the dawn of the th, a man and woman, employed in the party's printing office, came to smolny and informed us that the government had closed the official journal of our body and the "new gazette" of the petrograd soviet. the printing office was sealed by some agent of the government. the military revolutionary committee immediately recalled the orders and took both publications under its protection, enjoining upon the "gallant wolinsky regiment the great honor of securing the free socialist press against counter-revolutionary attempts." the printing, after that, went on without interruption and both publications appeared on time. the government was still in session at the winter palace, but it was no more than its own shadow. as a political power it no longer existed. on the th of october the winter palace was gradually surrounded by our troops from all sides. at one o'clock in the afternoon i declared at the session of the petrograd soviet, in the name of the military revolutionary committee, that the government of kerensky had ceased to exist and that forthwith, and until the all-russian convention of the soviets might decide otherwise, the power was to pass into the hands of the military revolutionary committee. a few days earlier lenin left finland and was hiding in the outskirts of the city, in the workingmen's quarters. on the evening of the th, he came secretly to the smolny. according to newspaper information, it seemed to him that the issue would be a temporary compromise between ourselves and the kerensky government. the bourgeois press had so often clamored about the approach of the revolution, about the demonstration of armed soldiers on the streets, about pillaging and unavoidable streams of blood, that now this press failed to notice the revolution which was really taking place, and accepted the negotiations of the general staff with us at their face value. meanwhile, without any chaos, without street fights, without firing or bloodshed, the government institutions were occupied one after another by severe and disciplined detachments of soldiers, sailors and red guards, in accordance with the exact telephone orders given from the small room on the third floor of the smolny institute. in the evening a preliminary session of the second all-russian convention of soviets was held. in the name of the central executive committee, dan presented a report. he presented an indictment of the rebellious usurpers and insurgents and attempted to frighten the convention with a vision of the inevitable failure of the insurrection, which, he claimed, would be suppressed by the forces from the front. his address sounded unconvincing and out of place within the walls of a hall where the overwhelming majority of the delegates were enthusiastically observing the victorious advance of the petrograd revolution. by this time the winter palace was surrounded, but it was not yet taken. from time to time there were shots from the windows upon the besiegers, who were closing in slowly and cautiously. from the petropavlovsk fortress, two or three shells from cannons were directed at the palace. their thunder was heard at the smolny. martof spoke with helpless indignation from the platform of the convention, about civil war and especially about the siege of the winter palace, where among the ministers there were--oh, horror!--members of the mensheviki party. the sailors who came to bring information from the battle-place around the palace took the floor against him. they reminded the accusers of the offensive of the th of june, of the treacherous policy of the old government, of the re-establishment of the death penalty for soldiers, of the annihilation of the revolutionary organization, and wound up by vowing to win or die. they also brought word of the first victims from our ranks in the battle before the palace. all arose as if at an unseen signal and, with a unanimity which could be created only by a high moral inspiration, sang the funeral march. he who lived through that moment will never forget it. the session was interrupted. it was impossible to deliberate theoretically the question of the means of reconstructing the government among the echoes of the fighting and shooting under the walls of the winter palace, where the fate of that very government was being decided in a practical way. the taking of the palace, however, was rather slow, and this caused hesitation among the less determined elements of the convention. the orators of the right wing prophesied our near destruction. all anxiously awaited news from the arena of the palace. presently antonoff appeared, who directed the operations against the palace. a death-like silence fell upon the hall. the winter palace was taken; kerensky had fled; other ministers had been arrested and consigned to the fortress of petropavlovsk. the first chapter of the october revolution was over. the right revolutionists and the mensheviki, altogether sixty men, that is, about one-tenth of the convention, left the session in protest. as there was nothing else left to' them, they "placed the entire responsibility" for the coming events upon the bolsheviki and left s. r.'s. the latter were passing through moments of indecision. the past tied them strongly to the party of chernoff. the right wing of this party swerved to the middle and petty bourgeois elements, to the intellectuals of the middle classes, to the well-to-do elements of the villages; and on all decisive questions went hand in hand with the liberal bourgeoisie against us. the more revolutionary elements of the party, reflecting the radicalism of the social demands of the poorest masses of the peasantry, gravitated to the proletariat and their party. they feared, however, to sever the umbilical cord which linked them to their old party. when we left the preliminary parliament, they refused to follow us and warned us against "adventurers," but the insurrection put before them the dilemma of taking sides for or against the soviets. not without hesitation, they assembled on our side of the barricades. the formation of the soviet of the people's commissaries the victory in petrograd was complete. the power went over entirely to the military revolutionary committee. we issued our first decree, abolishing the death penalty and ordering reelections in the army committees, etc. but here we discovered that we were cut off from the provinces. the higher authorities of the railroads, post office and telegraph were against us. the army committees, the municipalities, the zemstvos continued to bombard the smolny with threatening telegrams in which they declared outright war upon us and promised to sweep the insurgents out within a short time. our telegrams, decrees and explanations did not reach the provinces, for the petrograd telegraph agency refused to serve us. in this atmosphere, created by the isolation of the capital from the rest of the country, alarming and monstrous rumors easily sprang up and gained popularity. when finally convinced that the soviet had really taken over the powers of the government, that the old government was arrested, that the streets of petrograd were dominated by armed workers, the bourgeois press, as well as the press which was for effecting a compromise, started a campaign of incomparable madness indeed; there was not a lie or libel which was not mobilized against the military revolutionary committee, its leaders or its commissaries. on the th there was a session of the petrograd soviet, which was attended by delegates from the all-russian council, members of the garrison conference, and numerous members of various parties. here, for the first time in nearly six months, spoke lenin and zinoviev, who were given a stormy ovation. the jubilation over the recent victory was marred somewhat by apprehensions as to how the country would take to the new revolt and as to the soviets' ability to retain control. in the evening an executive session of the council of soviets was held. lenin introduced two decrees: on peace and on the land question. after brief discussion, both decrees were adopted unanimously. it was at this session, too, that a new central authority was created, to be known as the council of people's commissaries. the central committee of our party tried to win the approval of the left s. r.'s, who were invited to participate in establishing the soviet government. they hesitated, on the ground that, in their view, this government should bear a coalition character within the soviet parties. but the mensheviki and the right s. r.'s broke entirely with the council of soviets, deeming a coalition with anti-soviet parties necessary. there was nothing left for us to do but to let the party of left s. r.'s persuade their neighbors to the right to return to the revolutionary camp; and while they were engaged in this hopeless task, we thought it our duty to take the responsibility for the government entirely upon our party. the list of peoples' commissaries was composed exclusively of bolsheviki. there was undoubtedly some political danger in such a course. the change proved too precipitate. (one need but remember that the leaders of this party were only yesterday still under indictment under statute law no. --that is, accused of high treason). but there was no other alternative. the other soviet groups hesitated and evaded the issue, preferring to adopt a waiting policy. finally we became convinced that only our party could set up a revolutionary government. the first days of the new regime the decrees on land and peace, approved by the council, were printed in huge quantities and--through delegates from the front, peasant pedestrians arriving from the villages, and agitators sent by us to the trenches in the provinces--were strewn broadcast all over the country. simultaneously the work of organizing and arming the red guards was carried on. together with the old garrison and the sailors, the red guard was doing hard patrol duty. the council of people's commissaries got control of one government department after another, though everywhere encountering the passive resistance of the higher and middle grade officials. the former soviet parties tried their utmost to find support in this class and organize a sabotage of the new government. our enemies felt certain that the whole affair was a mere episode, that in a day or two--at most a week--the soviet government would be overthrown. the first foreign councillors and members of the embassies, impelled quite as much by curiosity as by necessary business on hand, appeared at the smolny institute. newspaper correspondents hurried thither with their notebooks and cameras. everyone hastened to catch a glimpse of the new government, being sure that in a day or two it would be too late. perfect order reigned in the city. the sailors, soldiers and the red guards bore themselves in these first days with excellent discipline and nobly supported the regime of stern revolutionary order. in the enemy's camp fear arose lest the "episode" should become too protracted, and so the first force for attacking the new government was being hastily organized. in this, the initiative was taken by the social-revolutionists and the mensheviki. in the preceding period they would not, and dared not, take all the power into their own hands. in keeping with their provisional political position, they contented themselves with serving in the coalition government in the capacity of assistants, critics, and benevolent accusers and defenders of the bourgeoisie. during all elections they conscientiously anathematized the liberal bourgeoisie, while in the government they just as regularly combined with it. in the first six months of the revolution they managed, as a result of this policy, to lose absolutely all the confidence of the populace and army; and now, the october revolt was dashing them from the helm of the state. and yet, only yesterday they considered themselves the masters of the situation. the bolshevik leaders whom they persecuted were in hiding, as under czarism. to-day the bolsheviki were in power, while yesterday's coalitionist ministers and their co-workers found themselves cast aside and suddenly deprived of every bit of influence upon the further course of events. they would not and could not believe that this sudden revolt marked the beginning of a new era. they preferred to consider it as merely accidental, the result of some misunderstanding, which could be removed by a few energetic speeches and accusational newspaper articles. but every hour they encountered more and more insurmountable obstacles. this is what caused their blind, truly furious hatred. the bourgeois politicians did not venture, to be sure, to get too close to danger. they pushed to the front the social-revolutionists and mensheviki, who, in the attack upon us acquired all that energy which they had lacked during the period when they were a semi-governing power. their organs circulated the most amazing rumors and lies. in their name it was that the proclamations containing open appeals to crush the new government were issued. it was they, too, who organized the government officials for sabotage and the cadets for military resistance. on the th and th we continued to receive persistent threats by telegraph from army committees, town dumas, vikzhel zemstvos, and organizations (which had charge of the management of the railroad union). on the nevsky prospect, the principal thoroughfare of the capital's bourgeoisie, things were becoming more and more lively. the bourgeois youth was emerging from its stupor and, urged on by the press, was developing a wider and wider agitation against the soviet government. with the help of the bourgeois crowd, the cadets were disarming individual red guardsmen. on the side-streets red guardsmen and sailors were being shot down. a group of cadets seized the telephone station. attempts were made by the same side to seize the telegraph office. finally, we learned that three armored cars had fallen into the hands of some inimical military organization. the bourgeois elements were clearly raising their heads. the newspapers heralded the fact that we had but a few hours more to live. our friends intercepted a few secret orders which made it clear, however, that a militant organization had been formed to fight the petrograd soviet. the leading place in this organization was taken by the so-called committee for the defence of the revolution, organized by the local duma and the central executive committee of the former regime. here and there right social-revolutionists and mensheviki held sway. at the disposal of this committee were the cadets, students, and many counter-revolutionary army officers, who sought, from under cover of the coalitions, to deal the soviets a mortal blow. the cadet uprising of october th the stronghold of the counter-revolutionary organization was the cadet schools and the engineering castle, where considerable arms and ammunition were stored, and from where attacks were made upon the revolutionary government's headquarters. detachments of red guards and sailors had surrounded the cadet schools and were sending in messengers demanding the surrender of all arms. some scattering shots came in reply. the besiegers were trampled upon. crowds of people gathered around them, and not infrequently stray shots fired from the windows would wound passers-by. the skirmishes were assuming an indefinitely prolonged character, and this threatened the revolutionary detachments with demoralization. it was necessary, therefore, to adopt the most determined measures. the task of disarming the cadets was assigned to the commandant of petropavlovsk fortress, ensign b. he closely surrounded the cadet schools, brought up some armored cars and artillery, and gave the cadets ten minutes' time to surrender. renewed firing from the windows was the answer at first. at the expiration of the ten minutes, b. ordered an artillery charge. the very first shots made yawning breaches in the walls of the schoolhouse. the cadets surrendered, though many of them tried to save themselves by flight, firing as they fled. considerable rancor was created, such as always accompanies civil war. the sailors undoubtedly committed many outrages upon individual cadets. the bourgeois press later accused the sailors and the soviet government of inhumanity and brutality. it never mentioned, however, the fact that the revolt of october th- th had been brought about with hardly any firing or sacrifice, and that only the counter-revolutionary conspiracy which was organized by the bourgeoisie and which threw the young generation into the flame of civil war against the workers, soldiers and sailors, led to unavoidable severities and sacrifices. the th of october marked a decided change in the mood of the inhabitants of petrograd. events took on a more tragic character. at the same time, our enemies realized that the situation was far more serious than they thought at first and that the soviet had not the slightest intention of relinquishing the power it had won just to oblige the junkers and the capitalistic newspapers. the work of clearing petrograd of counter-revolutionary centers was carried on intensively. the cadets were almost all disarmed, the participators in the insurrection were arrested and either imprisoned in the petropavlovsk fortress or deported to kronstadt. all publications which openly preached revolt against soviet authority were promptly suppressed. orders were issued for the arrest of such of the leaders of the former soviet parties whose names figured on the intercepted counter-revolutionary edicts. all military resistance in the capital was crushed absolutely. next came a long and exhausting struggle against the sabotage of the bureaucrats, technical workers, clerks, etc. these elements, which by their earning capacity belong largely to the downtrodden class of society, align themselves with the bourgeois class by the conditions of their life and by their general psychology. they had sincerely and faithfully served the government and its institutions when it was headed by czarism. they continued to serve the government when the authority passed over into the hands of the bourgeois imperialists. they were inherited with all their knowledge and technical skill, by the coalition government in the next period of the revolution. but when the revolting workingmen, soldiers and peasants flung the parties of the exploiting classes away from the rudder of state and tried to take the management of affairs into their own hands, then the bureaucrats and clerks flew into a passion and absolutely refused to support the new government in any way. more and more extensive became this sabotage, which was organized mostly by social-revolutionists and mensheviki, and which was supported by funds furnished by the banks and the allied embassies. kerensky's advance on petrograd the stronger the soviet government became in petrograd, the more the bourgeois groups placed their hopes on military aid from without. the petrograd telegraph agency, the railroad telegraph, and the radio-telegraph station of tsarskoye-selo brought from every side news of huge forces marching on petrograd with the object of crushing the rebels there and establishing order. kerensky was making flying trips to the front, and the bourgeois papers reported that he was leading innumerable forces against the bolsheviki. we found ourselves cut off from the rest of the country, as the telegraphers refused to serve us. but the soldiers, who arrived by tens and hundreds on commissions from their respective regiments, invariably said to us: "have no fears of the front; it is entirely on your side. you need but give the word, and we will send to your aid--even this very day--a division or a corps." it was the same in the army as everywhere else; the masses were for us, and the upper classes against us. in the hands of the latter was the military-technical machinery. various parts of the vast army proved to be isolated one from another. we were isolated from both the army and the people. nevertheless, the news of the soviet government at petrograd and its decrees spread throughout the country and roused the local soviets to rebel against the old government. the reports of kerensky's advance on petrograd, at the head of some forces or other, soon became more persistent and assumed more definite outlines. we were informed from tsarskoye-selo that cossack echelons were not far from there, while an appeal, signed by kerensky and general krassnov, was being circulated in petrograd calling upon the whole garrison to join the government's forces, which were expected any hour to enter the capital. the cadet insurrection of october th was undoubtedly connected with kerensky's undertaking, only that it broke out too soon, owing to determined action on our part. the tsarskoye-selo garrison was ordered to demand of the approaching cossack regiments recognition of the soviet government. in case of refusal, the cossacks were to be disarmed. but that garrison proved to be ill-fitted for military operations. it had no artillery and no leaders, its officers being unfriendly toward the soviet government. the cossacks took possession of the radio-telegraph station at tsarskoye-selo, the most powerful one in the country, and marched on. the garrisons of peterhof, krasnoye-selo and gatchina displayed neither initiative nor resolution. after the almost bloodless victory at petrograd, the soldiers confidently assumed that matters would take a similar course in the future. all that was necessary, they thought, was to send an agitator to the cossacks, who would lay down their arms the moment the object of the proletarian revolution was explained to them. korniloff's counter-revolutionary uprising was put down by means of speeches and fraternization. by agitation and well-planned seizure of certain institutions--without a fight--the kerensky government was overthrown. the same methods were now being employed by the leaders of the tsarskoye-selo, krasnoye-selo and the gatchina soviets with general krassnov's cossacks. but this time they did not work. though without determination or enthusiasm, the cossacks did advance. individual detachments approached gatchina and krasnoye-selo, engaged the scanty forces of the local garrisons, and sometimes disarmed them. about the numerical strength of kerensky's forces we at first had no idea whatever. some said that general krassnov headed ten thousand men; others affirmed that he had no more than a thousand; while the unfriendly newspapers and circulars announced, in letters an inch big, that two corps were lined up beyond tsarskoye-selo. there was a general want of confidence in the petrograd garrison. no sooner had it won a bloodless victory, than it was called upon to march out against an enemy of unknown numbers and engage in battles of uncertain outcome. in the garrison conference, the discussion centered about the necessity of sending out more and more agitators and of issuing appeals to the cossacks; for to the soldiers it seemed impossible that the cossacks would refuse to rise to the point of view which the petrograd garrison was defending in its struggle. nevertheless, advanced groups of cossacks approached quite close to petrograd, and we anticipated that the principal battle would take place in the streets of the city. the greatest resolution was shown by the red guards. they demanded arms, ammunition, and leadership. but everything in the military machine was disorganized and out of gear, owing partly to disuse and partly to evil intent. the officers had resigned. many had fled. the rifles were in one place and the cartridges in another. matters were still worse with artillery. the cannons, gun carriages and the military stores were all in different places; and all these had to be groped for in the dark. the various regiments did not have at their disposal either sappers' tools or field telephones. the revolutionary general staff, which tried to straighten out things from above, encountered insurmountable obstacles, the greatest of which was the sabotage of the military-technical employees. then we decided to appeal directly to the working class. we stated that the success of the revolution was most seriously threatened, and that it was for them--by their energy, initiative, and self-denial--to save and strengthen the regime of proletarian and peasant government. this appeal met with tremendous practical success almost immediately. thousands of workingmen proceeded toward kerensky's forces and began digging trenches. the munition workers manned the cannon, themselves obtaining ammunition for them from various stores; requisitioned horses; brought the guns into the necessary positions and adjusted them; organized a commissary department; procured gasoline, motors, automobiles; requisitioned provisions and forage; and put the sanitary trains on a proper footing--created, in short, the entire war machinery, which we had vainly endeavored to create from above. when scores of heavy guns reached the lines, the disposition of our soldiers changed immediately. under cover of the artillery they were ready to repulse the cossacks' attack. in the first lines were the sailors and red guards. a few officers, politically unrelated to us but sincerely attached to their regiments, accompanied their soldiers to the lines and directed their operations against krassnov's cossacks. collapse of kerensky's attempt meanwhile telegrams spread the report all over the country and abroad that the bolshevik "adventure" had been disposed of and that kerensky had entered petrograd and was establishing order with an iron hand. on the other hand, in petrograd itself, the bourgeois press, emboldened by the proximity of kerensky's troops, wrote about the complete demoralization of the petrograd garrison; about an irresistible advance of the cossacks, equipped with much artillery; and predicted the imminent fall of the smolny institute. our chief handicap was, as already stated, the lack of suitable mechanical accessories and of men able to direct military operations. even those officers who had conscientiously accompanied their soldiers to the lines, declined the position of commander-in-chief. after long deliberation, we hit upon the following combination: the garrison council selected a committee of five persons, which was entrusted with the supreme control of all operations against the counter-revolutionary forces moving on petrograd. this committee subsequently reached an understanding with colonel muravief, who was in the opposition party under the kerensky regime, and who now, on his own initiative, offered his services to the soviet government. on the cold night of october th, muravief and i started by automobile for the lines. wagons with provisions, forage, military supplies and artillery trailed along the road. all this was done by the workingmen of various factories. several times our automobile was stopped on the way by red guard patrols who verified our permit. since the first days of the october revolution, every automobile in town had been requisitioned, and no automobile could be ridden through the streets of the city or in the outskirts of the capital without a permit from the smolny institute. the vigilance of the red guards was beyond all praise. they stood on watch about small camp fires, rifle in hand, hours at a time. the sight of these young armed workmen by the camp fires in the snow was the best symbol of the proletarian revolution. many guns had been drawn up in position, and there was no lack of ammunition. the decisive encounter developed on this very day, between krasnoye-selo and tsarskoye-selo. after a fierce artillery duel, the cossacks, who kept on advancing as long as they met no obstacles, hastily withdrew. they had been fooled all the time by tales of harsh and cruel acts committed by the bolsheviki, who wished, as it were, to sell russia to the german kaiser. they had been assured that almost the entire garrison at petrograd was impatiently awaiting them as deliverers. the first serious resistance completely disorganized their ranks and sealed the fate of kerensky's entire undertaking. the retreat of krassnov's cossacks enabled us to get control of the radio station at tsarskoye-selo. we immediately wirelessed the news of our victory over kerensky's forces. our foreign friends informed us subsequently that the german wireless station refused, on orders from above, to receive this wireless message. [footnote: i cite here the text of this wireless message: "selo pulkovo. general staff : p. m. the night of october th- st will go down in history. kerensky's attempt to march counter-revolutionary forces upon the capital of the revolution has received a decisive check. kerensky is retreating, we are advancing. the soldiers, sailors and workingmen of petrograd have shown that they can and will, gun in hand, affirm the will and power of proletarian democracy. the bourgeoisie tried to isolate the army of the revolution and kerensky attempted to crush it by cossackism. both have been frustrated. "the great idea of the reign of a workingmen's and peasants' democracy united the ranks of the army and hardened its will. the whole country will now come to understand that the soviet government is not a passing phenomenon, but a permanent fact of the supremacy of the workers, soldiers and peasants. kerensky's repulse was the repulse of the middle class, the bourgeoisie and the kornilovites. kerensky's repulse means the affirmation of the people's rights to a free, peaceful life, to land, food and power. the pulkovsky division, by their brilliant charge, is strengthening the cause of the proletarian and peasant revolution. there can be no return to the past. there is still fighting, obstacles and sacrifice ahead of us. but the way is open and victory assured. "revolutionary russia and the soviet government may well be proud of their pulkovsky division, commanded by colonel walden. may the names of the fallen never be forgotten. all honor to the fighters for the revolution--the soldiers and the officers who stood by the people! long live revolutionary and socialist russia! in the name of the council of people's commissaries, l. trotzky, oct. st, ."] the first reaction of the german authorities to the events of october was thus one of fear--fear lest these events provoke disturbances in germany itself. in austria-hungary, part of our telegram was accepted and, so far as we can tell, has been the source of information for all europe upon the ill-starred attempt of kerensky to recover his power and its miserable failure. discontent was rife among krassnov's cossacks. they began sending their scouts into petrograd and even official delegates to smolny. there they had the opportunity to convince themselves that perfect order reigned in the capital, thanks to the petrograd garrison, which unanimously supported the soviet government. the cossacks' disorganization became the more acute as the absurdity of the plan to take petrograd with some thousand horsemen dawned upon them--for the supports promised them from the front never arrived. krassnov's detachment withdrew to gatchinsk, and when we started out thither the next day, krassnov's staff were already virtually prisoners of the cossacks themselves. our gatchinsk garrison was holding all the most important military positions. the cossacks, on the other hand, though not yet disarmed, were absolutely in no position for further resistance. they wanted but one thing: to be allowed as soon as possible to return to the don region or, at least, back to the front. the gatchinsk palace presented a curious sight. at every entrance stood a special guard, while at the gates were artillery and armored cars. sailors, soldiers and red guards occupied the royal apartments, decorated with precious paintings. scattered upon the tables, made of expensive wood, lay soldiers' clothes, pipes and empty sardine boxes. in one of the rooms general krassnov's staff had established itself. on the floor lay mattresses, caps and greatcoats. the representative of the revolutionary war committee, who escorted us, entered the quarters of the general staff, noisily dropped his rifle-butt to the floor and resting upon it, announced: "general krassnov, you and your staff are prisoners of the soviet authorities." immediately armed red guards barred both doors. kerensky was nowhere to be seen. he had again fled, as he had done before from the winter palace. as to the circumstances attending this flight, general krassnov made a written statement on november st. i cite here in full this curious document. * * * * * november st, , o'clock. about o'clock today, i was summoned by the supreme commander-in-chief, kerensky. he was very agitated and nervous. "general," said he, "you have betrayed me--your cossacks here positively say that they will arrest me and turn me over to the sailors." "yes," i answered, "there is talk about it, and i know that you have no sympathizers here at all." "but are the officers, too, of the same mind?" "yes, the officers are especially dissatisfied with you." "then, what am i to do? i'll have to commit suicide." "if you are an honest man, you will proceed immediately to petrograd under a flag of truce and report to the revolutionary committee, where you will talk things over, as the head of the government." "yes, i'll do that, general!" "i will furnish a guard for you and will ask that a sailor accompany you." "no, anyone but a sailor. don't you know that dybenko is here?" "no, i don't know who dybenko is." "he is an enemy of mine." "well, that can't be helped. when one plays for great stakes, he must be prepared to lose all." "all right. only i shall go at night." "why? that would be flight. go calmly and openly, so that everyone can see that you are fleeing." "well, all right. only you must provide for me a dependable convoy." "all right." i went and called out a cossack from the th don cossack regiment, a certain rysskov, and ordered him to appoint eight cossacks to guard the supreme commander-in-chief. half an hour later, the cossacks came and reported that kerensky had gone already--that he had fled. i gave an alarm and ordered a search for him. i believe that he cannot have escaped from gatchinsk and must now be in hiding here somewhere. commanding the rd corps, major-general krassnov. * * * * * thus ended this undertaking. our opponents still would not yield, however, and did not admit that the question of government power was settled. they continued to base their hopes on the front. many leaders of the former soviet parties--chernoff, tseretelli, avksentiev, gotz and others--went to the front, entered into negotiations with the old army committees, and, according to newspaper reports, tried even in the camp, to form a new ministry. all this came to naught. the old army committees had lost all their significance, and intensive work was going on at the front in connection with the conferences and councils called for the purpose of reorganizing all army organizations. in these re-elections the soviet government was everywhere victorious. from gatchinsk, our divisions proceeded along the railroad further in the direction of the luga river and pskov. on the way, they met a few more trainloads of shock-troops and cossacks, which had been called out by kerensky, or which individual generals had sent over. with one of these echelons there was even an armed encounter. but most of the soldiers that were sent from the front to petrograd declared, as soon as they met with representatives of the soviet forces, that they had been deceived and that they would not lift a finger against the government of soldiers and workingmen. internal friction in the meantime, the struggle for soviet control spread all over the country. in moscow, especially, this struggle took on an extremely protracted and bloody character. perhaps not the least important cause of this was the fact that the leaders of the revolt did not at once show the necessary determination in attacking. in civil war, more than in any other, victory can be insured only by a determined and persistent course. there must be no vacillation. to engage in parleys is dangerous; merely to mark time is suicidal. we are dealing here with the masses, who have never held any power in their hands, who are therefore most wanting in political self-confidence. any hesitation at revolutionary headquarters demoralizes them immediately. it is only when a revolutionary party steadily and resolutely makes for its goal, that it can help the toilers to overcome their century-old instincts of slavery and lead them on to victory. and only by these means of aggressive charges can victory be achieved with the smallest expenditure of energy and the least number of sacrifices. but the great difficulty is to acquire such firm and positive tactics. the people's want of confidence in their own power and their lack of political experience are naturally reflected in their leaders, who, in their turn, find themselves subjected, besides, to the tremendous pressure of bourgeois public opinion, from above. the liberal bourgeoisie treated with contempt and indignation the mere idea of the possibility of a working class government and gave free vent to their feelings on the subject, in the innumerable organs at their disposal. close behind them trailed the intellectuals, who, with all their professions of radicalism and all the socialistic coating of their world-philosophy, are, in the depths of their hearts, completely steeped in slavish worship of bourgeois strength and administrative ability. all these "socialistic" intellectuals hastily joined the right and considered the ever-increasing strength of the soviet government as the clear beginning of the end. after the representatives of the "liberal" professions came the petty officials, the administrative technicians--all those elements which materially and spiritually subsist on the crumbs that fall from the bourgeois table. the opposition of these elements was chiefly passive in character, especially after the crushing of the cadet insurrection; but, nevertheless, it might still seem formidable. we were being denied co-operation at every step. the government officials would either leave the ministry or refuse to work while remaining in it. they would turn over neither the business of the department nor its money accounts. the telephone operators refused to connect us, while our messages were either held up or distorted in the telegraph offices. we could not get translators, stenographers or even copyists. all this could not fail to create such an atmosphere as led various elements in the higher ranks of our own party to doubt whether, in the face of a boycott by bourgeois society, the toilers could manage to put the machinery of government in working order and continue in power. opinions were voiced as to the necessity of coalition. coalition with whom? with the liberal bourgeoisie. but an attempt at coalition with them had driven the revolution into a terrible morass. the revolt of the th of october was an act of self-preservation on the part of the masses after the period of impotence and treason of the leaders of coalition government. there remained for us only coalition in the ranks of so-called revolutionary democracy, that is, coalition of all the soviet parties. such a coalition we did, in fact, propose from the very beginning--at the session of the second all-russian council of soviets, on the th of october. the kerensky government had been overthrown, and we suggested that the council of soviets take the government into its own hands. but the right parties withdrew, slamming the door after them. and this was the best thing they could have done. they represented an insignificant section of the council. they no longer had any following in the masses, and those classes which still supported them out of mere inertia, were coming over to our side more and more. coalition with the right social-revolutionists and the mensheviki could not broaden the social basis of the soviet government; and would, at the same time, introduce into the composition of this government elements which were completely disintegrated by political skepticism and idolatry of the liberal bourgeoisie. the whole strength of the new government lay in the radicalism of its program and the boldness of its actions. to tie itself up with the chernofi and tseretelli factions would mean to bind the new government hand and foot--to deprive it of freedom of action and thereby forfeit the confidence of the masses in the shortest possible time. our nearest political neighbors to the right were the so-called "left social revolutionists." they were, in general, quite ready to support us, but endeavored, nevertheless, to form a coalition socialist government. the management of the railroad union (the so-called vikzhal), the central committee of the postal telegraph employees, and the union of government officials were all against us. and in the higher circles of our own party, voices were being raised as to the necessity of reaching an understanding with these organizations, one way or another. but on what basis? all the above-mentioned controlling organizations of the old period had outlived their usefulness. they bore approximately the same relation to the entire lower personnel as did the old army committees to the masses of soldiers in the trenches. history has created a big gulf between the higher classes and the lower. unprincipled combinations of these leaders of another day--leaders made antiquated by the revolution--were doomed to inevitable failure. it was necessary to depend wholly and confidently upon the masses in order, jointly with them, to overcome the sabotage and the aristocratic pretensions of the upper classes. we left it to the left social-revolutionists to continue the hopeless efforts for coalition. our policy was, on the contrary, to line up the toiling lower classes against the representatives of organizations which supported the kerensky regime. this uncompromising policy caused considerable friction and even division in the upper circles of our party. in the central executive committee, the left social revolutionists protested against the severity of our measures and insisted upon the necessity for compromises. they met with support on the part of some of the bolsheviki. three people's commissaries gave up their portfolios and left the government. a few other party leaders sided with them in principle. this created a very deep impression in intellectual and bourgeois circles. if the bolsheviki could not be defeated by the cadets and krassnov's cossacks, thought they, it is quite clear that the soviet government must now perish as a result of internal dissension. however, the masses never noticed this dissension at all. they unanimously supported the soviet of people's commissaries, not only against counter-revolutionary instigators and sabotagers but also against the coalitionists and the skeptics. the fate of the constituent assembly when, after the korniloff episode, the ruling soviet parties tried to smooth over their laxness toward the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, they demanded a speedier convocation of the constituent assembly. kerensky, whom the soviets had just saved from the too light embraces of his ally, korniloff, found himself compelled to make compromises. the call for the constituent assembly was issued for the end of november. by that time, however, circumstances had so shaped themselves that there was no guarantee whatever that the constituent assembly would really be convoked. the greatest degree of disorganization was taking place at the front. desertions were increasing every day; the masses of soldiers threatened to leave the trenches, whole regiments at a time, and move to the rear, devastating everything on their way. in the villages, a general seizure of lands and landholders' utensils was going on. martial law had been declared in several provinces. the germans continued to advance, captured riga, and threatened petrograd. the right wing of the bourgeoisie was openly rejoicing over the danger that threatened the revolutionary capital. the government offices at petrograd were being evacuated, and kerensky's government was preparing to move to moscow. all this made the actual convocation of the constituent assembly not only doubtful, but hardly even probable. from this point of view, the october revolution seems to have been the deliverance of the constituent assembly, as it has been the savior of the revolution generally. when we were declaring that the road to the constituent assembly was not by way of tseretelli's preliminary parliament, but by way of the seizure of the reigns of government by the soviets, we were quite sincere. but the interminable delay in convoking the constituent assembly was not without effect upon this institution itself. heralded in the first days of the revolution, it came into being only after eight or nine months of bitter class and party struggle. it came too late to play a creative role. its internal inadequacy had been predetermined by a single fact--a fact which might seem unimportant at first, but which subsequently took on tremendous importance for the fate of the constituent assembly. numerically, the principal revolutionary party in the first epoch was the party of social-revolutionists. i have already referred to its formlessness and variegated composition. the revolution led inevitably to the dismemberment of such of its members as had joined it under the banner of populism. the left wing, which had a following among part of the workers and the vast masses of poor peasants, was becoming more and more alienated from the rest. this wing found itself in uncompromising opposition to the party and middle bourgeois branches of social revolutionists. but the inertness of party organization and party tradition held back the inevitable process of cleavage. the proportional system of elections still holds full sway, as every one knows, in party lists. since these lists were made up two or three months before the october revolution and were not subject to change, the left and the right social revolutionists still figured in these lists as one and the same party. thus, by the time of the october revolution--that is, the period when the right social revolutionists were arresting the left and then the left were combining with the bolsheviki for the overthrow of kerensky's ministry, the old lists remained in full force; and in the elections for the constituent assembly the peasants were compelled to vote for lists of names at the head of which stood kerensky, followed by those of left social revolutionists who participated in the plot for his overthrow. if the months preceding the october revolution were months of continuous gain in popular support for the left--of a general increase in bolshevik following among workers, soldiers and peasants--then this process was reflected within the party of social revolutionists in an increase of the left wing at the expense of the right. nevertheless, on the party lists of the social revolutionists there was a predominance of three to one of old leaders of the right wing--of men who had lost all their revolutionary reputation in the days of coalition with the liberal bourgeoisie. to this should be added also the fact that the elections themselves were held during the first weeks after the october revolution. the news of the change traveled rather slowly from the capital to the provinces, from the cities to the villages. the peasantry in many places had but a very vague idea of what was taking place in petrograd and moscow. they voted for "land and liberty," for their representatives in the land committees, who in most cases gathered under the banner of populism: but thereby they were voting for kerensky and avksentiev, who were dissolving the land committees, and arresting their members. as a result of this, there came about the strange political paradox that one of the two parties which dissolved the constituent assembly--the left social-revolutionists--had won its representation by being on the same list of names with the party which gave a majority to the constituent assembly. this matter-of-fact phase of the question should give a very clear idea of the extent to which the constituent assembly lagged behind the course of political events and party groupings. we must consider the question of principles. the principles of democracy and proletarian dictatorship as marxists, we have never been idol-worshippers of formal democracy. in a society of classes, democratic institutions not only do not eliminate class struggle, but also give to class interests an utterly imperfect expression. the propertied classes always have at their disposal tens and hundreds of means for falsifying, subverting and violating the will of the toilers. and democratic institutions become a still less perfect medium for the expression of the class struggle under revolutionary circumstances. marx called revolutions "the locomotives of history." owing to the open and direct struggle for power, the working people acquire much political experience in a short time and pass rapidly from one stage to the next in their development. the ponderous machinery of democratic institutions lags behind this evolution all the more, the bigger the country and the less perfect its technical apparatus. the majority in the constituent assembly proved to be social revolutionists, and, according to parliamentary rules of procedure, the control of the government belonged to them. but the party of right social revolutionists had a chance to acquire control during the entire pre-october period of the revolution. yet, they avoided the responsibilities of government, leaving the lion's share of it to the liberal bourgeoisie. by this very course the right social revolutionists lost the last vestiges of their influence with the revolutionary elements by the time the numerical composition of the constituent assembly formally obliged them to form a government. the working class, as well as the red guards, were very hostile to the party of right social revolutionists. the vast majority of soldiers supported the bolsheviki. the revolutionary element in the provinces divided their sympathies between the left social revolutionists and the bolsheviki. the sailors, who had played such an important role in revolutionary events, were almost unanimously on our side. the right social revolutionists, moreover, had to leave the soviets, which in october--that is, before the convocation of the constituent assembly--had taken the government into their own hands. on whom, then, could a ministry formed by the constituent assembly's majority depend for support? it would be backed by the upper classes in the provinces, the intellectuals, the government officials, and temporarily by the bourgeoisie on the right. but such a government would lack all the material means of administration. at such a political center as petrograd, it would encounter irresistible opposition from the very start. if under these circumstances the soviets, submitting to the formal logic of democratic conventions, had turned the government over to the party of kerensky and chernov, such a government, compromised and debilitated as it was, would only introduce temporary confusion into the political life of the country, and would be overthrown by a new uprising in a few weeks. the soviets decided to reduce this belated historical experiment to its lowest terms, and dissolved the constituent assembly the very first day it met. for this, our party has been most severely censured. the dispersal of the constituent assembly has also created a decidedly unfavorable impression among the leading circles of the european socialist parties. kautsky has explained, in a series of articles written with his characteristic pedantry, the interrelation existing between the social-revolutionary problems of the proletariat and the regime of political democracy. he tries to prove that for the working class it is always expedient, in the long run, to preserve the essential elements of the democratic order. this is, of course, true as a general rule. but kautsky has reduced this historical truth to professorial banality. if, in the final analysis, it is to the advantage of the proletariat to introduce its class struggle and even its dictatorship, through the channels of democratic institutions, it does not at all follow that history always affords it the opportunity for attaining this happy consummation. there is nothing in the marxian theory to warrant the deduction that history always creates such conditions as are most "favorable" to the proletariat. it is difficult to tell now how the course of the revolution would have run if the constituent assembly had been convoked in its second or third month. it is quite probable that the then dominant social revolutionary and menshevik parties would have compromised themselves, together with the constituent assembly, in the eyes of not only the more active elements supporting the soviets, but also of the more backward democratic masses, who might have been attached, through their expectations not to the side of the soviets, but to that of the constituent assembly. under such circumstances the dissolution of the constituent assembly might have led to new elections, in which the party of the left could have secured a majority. but the course of events has been different. the elections for the constituent assembly occurred in the ninth month of the revolution. by that time the class struggle had assumed such intensity that it broke the formal frames of democracy by sheer internal force. the proletariat drew the army and the peasantry after it. these classes were in a state of direct and bitter war with the right social revolutionists. this party, owing to the clumsy electoral democratic machinery, received a majority in the constituent assembly, reflecting the pre-october epoch of the revolution. the result was a contradiction which was absolutely irreducible within the limits of formal democracy. and only political pedants who do not take into account the revolutionary logic of class relations, can, in the face of the post-october situation, deliver futile lectures to the proletariat on the benefits and advantages of democracy for the cause of the class struggle. the question was put by history far more concretely and sharply. the constituent assembly, owing to the character of its majority, was bound to turn over the government to the chernov, kerensky and tseretelli group. could this group have guided the destinies of the revolution? could it have found support in that class which constitutes the backbone of the revolution? no. the real kernel of the class revolution has come into irreconcilable conflict with its democratic shell. by this situation the fate of the constituent assembly had been sealed. its dissolution became the only possible surgical remedy for the contradiction, which had been created, not by us, but by all the preceding course of events. peace negotiations at the historic night session of the second all-russian congress of the soviets the decree on peace was adopted. (the full text is printed in the appendix.) at that moment the soviet government was only becoming established in the important centers of the country and there was very little confidence abroad in its power. the soviet adopted the decree unanimously. but this seemed to many no more than a political demonstration. those who were for a compromise preached at every opportunity that our resolution would bring no results; for, on the one hand, the german imperialists would not recognize and would not deal with us; on the other hand, our allies would declare war upon us as soon as we should start negotiating a separate peace. under the shadow of these predictions we took our first steps to secure a general democratic peace. the decree was adopted on the th of october, when kerensky and krassnov were at the gates of petrograd. on the th of november, we addressed by wireless an invitation to our allies and enemies to conclude a general peace. in reply the allied governments addressed to general dukhonin, then commander-in-chief, through their military attaches, a communication stating that further steps to separate peace negotiations would lead to the gravest consequences. to this protest we answered the th of november by appealing to all the workers, soldiers and peasants. in this appeal we declared that under no circumstances would we permit our army to shed its blood under the club of the foreign bourgeoisie. we swept aside the threat of the western imperialists and took upon ourselves the responsibility for our peace policy before the international working class. first of all, we published, in accordance with our promises, made as a matter of principle, the secret treaties and declared that we would relinquish everything in these treaties that was against the interests of the masses of the people in all countries. the capitalist governments made an attempt to make use of our disclosures against one another, but the masses of the people understood and recognized us. not a single social patriotic publication, as far as we know, dared to protest against having all the methods of diplomacy radically changed by a government of peasants and workers; they dared not protest against us for denouncing the dishonest cunning, chicanery and cheating of the old diplomacy. we made it the task of our diplomacy to enlighten the masses of the peoples, to open their eyes to the real meaning of the policy of their governments, in order to weld them together in a common struggle and a common hatred against the bourgeois capitalist order. the german bourgeois press accused us of "dragging on" the peace negotiations; but all nations anxiously followed the discussions at brest-litovsk, and in this way we rendered, during the two months and a half of peace negotiations, a service to the cause of peace which was recognized even by the more honest of our enemies. the question of peace was first put before the world in a shape which made it impossible to side-track it any longer by machinations behind the scenes. on the nd of november a truce was signed to discontinue military activities on the entire front from the baltic to the black sea. once more we requested our allies to join us and to conduct together with us the peace negotiations. there was no reply, though this time the allies did not again attempt to frighten us by threats. the peace negotiations were started december th, a month and a half after the peace decree was adopted. the accusations of the purchased press and of the social-traitor press that we had made no attempt to agree with our allies on a common policy was therefore entirely false. for a month and a half we kept our allies informed about every step we made and always called upon them to become a party to the peace negotiations. our conscience is clear before the peoples of france, italy and great britain.... we did all in our power to get all the belligerents to join the peace negotiations. if we were compelled to start separate peace negotiations, it was not because of any fault of ours, but because of the western imperialists, as well as those of the russian parties, which continued predicting the approaching destruction of the workmen's and peasants' government of russia and who persuaded the allies not to pay serious attention to our peace initiative. but be that as it may, on the th of december the peace conversations were started. our delegation made a statement of principles which set forth the basis of a general democratic peace in the exact expressions of the decree of the th of october ( th of november). the other side demanded that the session be broken off, and the reopening of the sessions was later, at the suggestion of kuehlmann, repeatedly delayed. it was clear that the delegation of the teuton allies experienced no small difficulty in the formulation of its reply to our delegation. on the th of december this reply was given. the diplomats of the teuton allies expressed agreement with our democratic formula of peace without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples. we saw clearly that this was but pretense; but we had not expected even that they would try to pretend; because, as the french writer has said, hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue. the fact that the german imperialists found it necessary to make this tribute to the principles of democracy, was, in our eyes, evidence that the situation of affairs within germany was serious enough.... but if we, generally speaking, had no illusions concerning the love for democracy of messrs. kuehlmann and czernin--we know well enough the nature of the german and austro-hungarian dominating classes--it must nevertheless be admitted that we had not the slightest idea of the chasm which separated the real intentions of german imperialism from those principles which were put forth on the th of december by mr. von kuehlmann as a parody on the russian revolution--a chasm which was revealed so strikingly a few days later. such audacity we had never expected. kuehlmann's reply made a tremendous impression upon the working masses of russia. it was interpreted as a result of the fear felt by the dominant classes of the central empires because of the discontent and the growing impatience of the working masses of germany. on the th of december there took place in petrograd a joint demonstration of workmen and soldiers for a democratic peace. the next morning our delegation came back from brest-litovsk and brought those brigand demands which mr. von kuehlmann made to us in the name of the central empires as an interpretation of his "democratic" formulae. at the first glance it may seem incomprehensible why the german diplomacy should have presented its democratic formulae if it intended within two or three days to disclose its wolfish appetite. what was it that the german diplomacy expected to bring about? at least, the theoretic discussions which developed around the democratic formulae, owing largely to the initiative of kuehlmann himself, were not without their danger. that the diplomacy of the central empires could not reap many laurels in that way must have been clear beforehand to that diplomacy itself. but the secret of the conduct of the diplomacy of kuehlmann consisted in that that gentleman was sincerely convinced of our readiness to play a four-handed game with him. his way of reasoning was approximately as follows: russia needs peace. the bolsheviki got the power because of their struggle for peace. the bolsheviki desire to remain in power and this is possible for them only on condition that peace is concluded. it is true that they bound themselves to a definite democratic program of peace, but why do diplomats exist if not for the purpose of making black look white? we germans will make it easier for the bolsheviki by covering our plunders by democratic formulas. the bolshevist diplomacy will have plenty of reason not to dig for the political essence of the matter, or, rather, not to expose to the entire world the contents of the enticing formulae.... in other words, kuehlmann relied upon a silent agreement with us. he would return to us our fine formulas and we should give him a chance to get provinces and peoples for germany without a protest. in the eyes of the german workers, the annexations by force would thus receive the sanction of the russian revolution. when during the discussions, we showed that with us, it was not a matter of empty words or of camouflaging a conspiracy concluded behind the scenes, but a matter of democratic principles for the international life of the community of nations, kuehlmann took it as a willful and malicious breaking of the silent agreement. he would not by any means recede from the position taken in the formulas of the th of december. relying upon his cunning, bureaucratic and judicial logic, he tried in the face of the entire world to show that white is in no way different from black, and it was our own perverseness which made us insist that there was such a difference. count czernin, the representative of austria-hungary, played a part in those negotiations which no one would consider inspiring or satisfactory. he was an awkward second and upon instructions from kuehlmann took it upon himself in all critical moments to utter the most extreme and cynical declarations. general hoffmann brought a refreshing note into the negotiations. showing no great sympathy for the diplomatic constructions of kuehlmann, the general several times put his soldierly boot upon the table, around which a complicated judicial debate was developing. we, on our part, did not doubt for a single minute that just this boot of general hoffmann was the only element of serious reality in these negotiations. the important trump in the hands of mr. kuehlmann was the participation in the negotiations of a delegation of the kiev rada. for the ukrainian middle classes, who had seized the power, the most important factor seemed to be the "recognition" of their government by the capitalist governments of europe. at first the rada placed itself at the disposal of the allied imperialists, received from them some pocket money, and immediately thereupon sent their representatives to brest-litovsk in order to make a bargain behind the back of the russian people with the government of austria-hungary for the recognition of the legitimate birth of their government. they had hardly taken this first step on the road to "international" existence, when the kiev diplomacy revealed the same narrow-mindedness and the same moral standards which were always so characteristic of the petty politicians of the balkan peninsula. messrs. kuehlmann and czernin certainly had no illusions concerning the solidity of the new participant in the negotiations. but they thought, and correctly so, that the participation of the kiev delegation complicated the game not without advantage for themselves. at its first appearance at brest-litovsk, the kiev delegation characterized ukraine as a component part of the russian federated republic that was in progress of formation. this apparently embarrassed the diplomats of the central empires, who considered it their main task to convert the russian republic into a new balkan peninsula. at their second appearance the delegates of the rada declared, under dictation from the austro-hungarian diplomacy, that ukraine refused to join the russian federation and was becoming an entirely independent republic. in order to give the reader an opportunity to get a better idea of the situation which was thus created for the soviet power in the last moment of the peace negotiations, i think it best to reproduce here in its basic parts the address made by the author of these lines in his capacity as the people's commissar on foreign affairs at the session of the central executive committee on the th of february, . address of the peoples commissar on foreign affairs comrades: upon soviet russia has fallen the task not only to construct the new but also to recapitulate the old to a certain degree, or, rather, to a very large degree--to pay all bills, first of all the bills of the war, which has lasted three and a half years. the war put the economic power of the belligerent countries to a severe test. the fate of russia, a poor, backward country, in a protracted war was predetermined. in the terrible collision of the military machines the determining factor, after all is said and done, is the ability of the country to adapt its industries to the military needs, to rebuild it on the shortest notice and to produce in continuously increasing quantities the weapons of destruction which are used up at such an enormous rate during this massacre of peoples. almost every country, including the most backward, could and did have powerful weapons of destruction at the beginning of the war; that is, it obtained them from foreign countries. that is what all the backward countries did, and so did russia. but the war speedily wears out its dead capital, demanding that it be continuously replenished. the military power of every single country drawn into the whirlpool of the world massacre was, as a matter of fact, measured by its ability to produce independently and during the war itself, its cannons and shells and the other weapons of destruction. if the war had decided the problem of the balance of power in a very short time, russia might conceivably have turned out to be on that side of the trenches which victory favored. but the war dragged along for a long time, and it was not an accident that it did so. the fact alone that the international politics were for the last fifty years reduced to the construction of the so-called european "balance of power," that is, to a state in which the hostile powers approximately balance one another, this fact alone was bound--when the power and wealth of the present bourgeois nations is considered--to make it a war of an extremely protracted character. that meant first of all the exhaustion of the weaker and economically less developed countries. the most powerful country in a military sense proved to be germany, because of the strength of the industries and because of their modern and rational construction as against the archaic construction of the german state. france, with its undeveloped state of capitalism, proved to be far behind germany, and even such a powerful colonial power as great britain, owing to the conservative and routine character of the english industries, proved to be weaker than germany. when history put before the russian revolution the question of the peace negotiations, we had no doubt that in these negotiations, and so long as the decisive power of the revolutionary proletariat of the world had not interfered, we should be compelled to stand the bill of three and a half years of war. there was no doubt in our minds that in the person of the german imperialism we were dealing with an opponent who was saturated with the consciousness of his immense power, which was strikingly revealed during the present war. all the arguments made by bourgeois cliques that we might have been incomparably stronger if we had conducted these negotiations together with our allies are absolutely without foundation. in order that we might at an indefinite future date conduct negotiations together with our allies, we should first of all have had to continue the war together with them. and if our country was weakened and exhausted, the continuation of the war, a failure to bring it to a conclusion, would have still further weakened and exhausted it. we should have had to settle the war under conditions still more unfavorable to us. in the case even that the combination of which russia, owing to international intrigues of czarism and the bourgeoisie, had become a part--the combination headed by great britain--in the case even that this combination had come out of the war completely victorious--let us for a moment admit the possibility of such a not very probable issue--even in that case, comrades, it does not mean that our country would also have come out victorious. for during further continuation of this protracted war, russia would have become even more exhausted and plundered than now. the masters of that combination, who would concentrate in their hands the fruits of the victory, that is, great britain and america, would have displayed toward our country the same methods which were displayed by germany during the peace negotiations. it would be absurd and childish to appraise the politics of the imperialistic countries from the point of view of any considerations other than those considerations of naked interests and material power. consequently, if we, as a nation are at present weakened before the imperialism of the world, we are weakened, not because of extricating ourselves from the fiery ring of the war, having already previously extricated ourselves from the shackles of international military obligations: no! we are weakened by that very policy of the czarists and the bourgeois classes, which we, as a revolutionary party, have always fought against before this war and during this war. you remember, comrades, under what conditions our delegation went to brest-litovsk last time, right after one of the sessions of the third all-russian congress of the soviets. at that session, we reported on the state of the negotiations, and the demands of our opponents. these demands, as you remember, were really no more than masked, or, rather, half-masked annexationist aspirations at the expense of lithuania, courland, a part of livonia, the isles of moon sound, as well as a half-masked demand for a punitive war indemnity which we then estimated would amount to six, eight or even ten milliards of rubles. during interruption of the sessions, which continued for about ten days, a considerable disturbance took place in austria-hungary; strikes of masses of workers broke out, and these strikes were the first recognition of our methods of conducting peace negotiations that we met with from the proletariat of the central empires, as against the annexationist demands of the german militarism. we promised here no miracles but we did say that the road we were pursuing was the only road remaining to the revolutionary democracy for securing the possibility of its further development. there is room for complaint that the proletariat of the other countries, and particularly of the central empires, is too slow to enter the road of open revolutionary struggle, yes, it must be admitted that the pace of its development is all too slow--but, nevertheless, there could be observed a movement in austria-hungary which swept the entire state and which was a direct echo of the brest-litovsk negotiations. leaving for brest-litovsk, it was our common opinion that there was no ground to believe that just this wave would sweep away the austro-german militarism. if we had been convinced that this could be expected, we would gladly have given the promise that several persons demanded from us, namely, that under no circumstances would we sign a separate peace with germany. i said at that very time, that we could not make such a promise, for it would amount to taking upon ourselves the obligation of vanquishing the german militarism. the secret of attaining such a victory was not in our possession. and inasmuch as we would not undertake the obligation to change the balance of the world powers at a moment's notice, we frankly and openly declared that revolutionary power may under certain conditions be compelled to agree to an annexationist peace. a revolutionary power would fall short of its high principles only in the event that it should attempt to conceal from its own people the predatory character of the peace, but by no means, however, in the event that the course of the struggle should compel it to adopt such a peace. at the same time, we indicated that we were leaving to continue negotiations under conditions which were seemingly improving for us and becoming worse for our enemies. we observed the movement in austria-hungary, and there were signs indicating (this was made the basis for statements by representatives of the german social democracy in the reichstag) that germany was on the eve of similar events. we went with this hope. during the first days of this visit to brest-litovsk the wireless brought us from vilna the first news that in berlin an enormous strike movement was developing; this movement as well as that of austria-hungary was directly connected with the course of negotiations in brest. however, as is often the case, by reason of the dialectic of the class struggle, just this conspicuous beginning of the proletarian rising, which surpassed anything germany had ever seen, was bound to push the property classes to a closer consolidation and to greater hostility against the proletariat. the german dominating classes are saturated with a sufficiently strong instinct of self-preservation to understand that concessions in such an exigency as they were in, under the pressure of the masses of their own people--concessions however small--would amount to capitulation before the idea of the revolution. that is why, after the first moment of perplexity and panic, the time when kuehlmann deliberately dragged out the negotiations by minor and formal questions, had passed--as soon as the strikes were disposed of, as soon as he came to the conclusion that for the time being no imminent danger threatened his masters, he again changed front and adopted a tone of unlimited self-confidence and aggression. our negotiations were complicated by the participation of the kiev rada. we called attention to this last time, too. the delegation from the kiev rada appeared at a time when the rada represented a fairly strong organization in the ukraine and when the way out of the war had not yet been predetermined. just at that time, we made the rada an official offer to conclude a definite treaty with us, making as one of the conditions of such a treaty the following demand: that the rada declare kaledin and korniloff to be counter-revolutionists and put no hindrance in the way of our waging war on these two leaders. the delegation from the kiev rada arrived, just when we hoped to reach an understanding with it on these matters. we declared that as long as the people of the ukraine recognized the rada, we considered its independent participation in these negotiations permissible. but with the further development of events in russian territory and in the ukraine, and the more the antagonism between the ukrainian masses and the rada increased, the greater became the rada's readiness to conclude any kind of treaty with the governments of the central empires, and, if need be, to drag german imperialism into the internal affairs of the russian republic, in order to support the rada against the russian revolution. on the th day of february (n. s.) we learned that the peace negotiations carried on behind our backs between the rada and the central powers, had been signed. the th of february happened to be the birthday of leopold of bavaria, and, as is the custom in monarchical countries, the triumphant historical act was timed--with or without the consent of the kiev rada for this festive day. general hoffmann had a salute fired in honor of leopold of bavaria, having previously asked permission to do so of the kiev delegation, since by the treaty of peace brest-litovsk had been ceded to ukraine. events had taken such a turn, however, that at the time general hoffmann was asking permission for a military salute, the kiev rada had but very little territory left outside of brest-litovsk. on the strength of the telegrams we had received from petrograd, we officially made it known to the central powers' delegation that the kiev rada no longer existed, a circumstance which certainly had some bearing on the course of the peace negotiations. we suggested to count czernin that his representatives accompany our officers into ukrainian territory to ascertain whether the kiev rada existed or not. czernin seemed to welcome this suggestion, but when we asked him if this meant that the treaty made with the kiev delegation would not be signed before the return of his own mission, he hesitated and promised to ask kuehlmann about it. having inquired, he sent us an answer in the negative. this was on february th. by the th, they had to sign the treaty. this could not be delayed, not only on account of leopold's birthday, but for a more important reason, which kuehlmann undoubtedly explained to czernin: "if we should send our representatives into the ukraine just now, they might really convince themselves that the rada does not exist; and then we shall have to face a single all-russian delegation which would spoil our prospects in the negotiations."... by the austro-hungarian delegation we were advised to put principle aside and to place the question on a more practical plane. then the german delegation would be disposed to concessions.... it was unthinkable that the germans should decide to continue the war over, say, the moon islands, if you put this demand in concrete form. we replied that we were ready to look into such concessions as their german colleagues were prepared to make. "so far we have been contending for the self-determination of the lithuanians, poles, livonians, letts, esthonians, and other peoples; and on all these issues you have told us that such self-determination is out of the question. now let us see what your plans are in regard to the self-determination of another people--the russians; what designs and plans of a military strategic nature are behind your seizure of the moon islands. for these islands, as an integral part of an independent esthonian republic, or as a possession of the federated russian republic would have only a defensive military importance, while in the hands of germany they would assume offensive significance, menacing the most vital centers of our country, and especially petrograd." but, of course, hoffmann would make no concessions whatsoever. then the hour for reaching a decision had come. we could not declare war, for we were too weak. the army had lost all of its internal ties. in order to save our country, to overcome this disorganization, it was imperative to establish the internal coherence of the toilers. this psychological tie can only be created by constructive work in factory, field and workshop. we had to return the masses of laborers, who had been subjected to great and intense suffering--who had experienced catastrophes in the war--to the fields and factories, where they must find themselves again and get a footing in the labor world, and rebuild internal discipline. this was the only way to save the country, which was now atoning for the sins of czarism and the bourgeoisie. we had to get out of the war and withdraw the army from the slaughter house. nevertheless, we threw this in the face of the german militarism: the peace you are forcing down our throats is a peace of aggression and robbery. we cannot permit you, messrs. diplomats, to say to the german workingmen: "you have characterized our demands as avaricious, as annexationist. but look, under these very demands we have brought you the signature of the russian revolution." yes, we are weak, we cannot fight at present. but we have sufficient revolutionary courage to say that we shall not willingly affix our signature to the treaty which you are writing with the sword on the body of living peoples. we refused to affix our signature. i believe we acted properly, comrades. i do not mean to say, friends, that a german advance upon russia is out of the question. it were too rash to make such an assertion in view of the great strength of the german imperialistic party. but i do believe that the stand we have taken in the matter has rendered it far more difficult for german militarism to advance upon us. what would happen if it should advance? to this there is but one thing to say: if it is possible in our country, a country completely exhausted and in a state of desperation, to raise the spirits of the more revolutionary energetic elements; if a struggle in defence of our revolution and the territory comprised within it is still possible, then this is the case only as a result of our abandoning the war and refusing to sign the peace treaty. the second war and the signing of peace during the first few days following the breaking off of negotiations the german government hesitated, not knowing what course to pursue. the politicians and diplomats evidently thought that the principal objects had been accomplished and that there was no reason for coveting our signatures. the military men were ready, in any event, to break through the lines drawn by the german government at brest-litovsk. professor krigge, the advisor of the german delegation, told a member of our delegation that a german invasion of russia under the existing conditions was out of the question. count mirbach, then at the head of the german missions at petrograd, went to berlin with the assurance that an agreement concerning the exchange of prisoners of war had been satisfactorily reached. but all this did not in the least prevent general hoffmann from declaring on the fifth day after the brest-litovsk negotiations had been broken off--that the armistice was over, antedating the seven-day period from the time of the last brest-litovsk session. it were really out of place to dilate here on the moral indignation caused by this piece of dishonesty. it fits in perfectly with the general state of diplomatic and military morality of the ruling classes. the new german invasion developed under circumstances most fatal for russia. instead of the week's notice agreed upon, we received notice only two days in advance. this circumstance intensified the panic in the army which was already in state of chronic dissolution. resistance was almost unthinkable. the soldiers could not believe that the germans would advance after we had declared the state of war at an end. the panicky retreat paralyzed the will even of such individual detachments as were ready to make a stand. in the workingmen's quarters of petrograd and moscow, the indignation against the treacherous and truly murderous german invasion reached a pitch of greatest intensity. in these alarming days and nights, the workers were ready to enlist in the army by the ten thousand. but the matter of organizing lagged far behind. isolated tenacious detachments full of enthusiasm became convinced themselves of their instability in their first serious clashes with german regulars. this still further lowered the country's spirits. the old army had long ago been hopelessly defeated and was going to pieces, blocking all the roads and byways. the new army, owing to the country's general exhaustion, the fearful disorganization of industries and the means of transportation, was being got together too slowly. distance was the only serious obstacle in the way of the german invasion. the chief attention of the austro-hungarian government was centered on the ukraine. the rada, through its delegation, had appealed to the governments of the central empires for direct military aid against the soviets, which had by that time completely defeated the ukrainians. thus did the petty-bourgeois democracy of the ukraine, in its struggle against the working class and the destitute peasants, voluntarily open the gates to foreign invasion. at the same time, the svinhufvud government was seeking the aid of german bayonets against the finnish proletariat. german militarism, openly and before the whole world, assumed the role of executioner of the peasant and proletarian revolution in russia. in the ranks of our party hot debates were being carried on as to whether or not we should, under these circumstances, yield to the german ultimatum and sign a new treaty, which--and this no one doubted--would include conditions incomparably more onerous than those announced at brest-litovsk. the representatives of the one view held that just now, with the german intervention in the internal war of the russian republic, it was impossible to establish peace for one part of russia and remain passive, while in the south and in the north, german forces would be establishing a regime of bourgeois dictatorship. another view, championed chiefly by lenin, was that every delay, even the briefest breathing spell, would greatly help the internal stabilization and increase the russian powers of resistance. after the whole country and the whole world had come to know of our absolute helplessness against foreign invasion at this time, the conclusion of peace would everywhere be understood as an act forced upon us by the cruel law of disproportionate forces. it would be childish to argue from the standpoint of abstract revolutionary ethics. the point is not to die with honor but to achieve ultimate victory. the russian revolution wants to survive, must survive, and must by every means at its disposal avoid fighting an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the western revolutionary movement will come to its aid. german imperialism is still engaged in a fierce annexationist struggle with english and american militarism. only because of this is the conclusion of peace between russia and germany at all possible. we must fully avail ourselves of this situation. the welfare of the revolution is the highest law. we should accept the peace which we are unable to reject; we must secure a breathing spell to be utilized for intensive work within the country and, especially, for the creation of an army. at the conference of the communist party as well as at the fourth conference of the soviet, the peace partisans triumphed. they were joined by many of those who in january considered it impossible to sign the brest-litovsk treaty. "then," said they, "our signature would have been looked upon by the english and french workingmen as a shameful capitulation, without an attempt to fight. even the base insinuations of the anglo-french chauvinists to the secret compact between the soviet government and the germans, might in case that treaty had been signed find credence in certain circles of european laborers. but after we had refused to sign the treaty, after a new german invasion, after our attempt to resist it, and after our military weakness had become painfully obvious to the whole world, after all this, no one dare to reproach us for surrendering without a fight." the brest-litovsk treaty, in its second enlarged edition, was signed and ratified. in the meantime, the executioners were doing their work in finland and the ukraine, menacing more and more the most vital centers of great russia. thus the question of russia's very existence as an independent country is henceforth inseparably connected with the question of the european revolution. conclusion when our party took over the government, we knew in advance what difficulties we had to contend with. economically the country had been exhausted by the war to the very utmost. the revolution had destroyed the old administrative machinery and could not yet create anything to take its place. millions of workers had been wrested from their normal nooks in the national economy of things, declassified, and physically shattered by the three years' war. the colossal war industries, carried on on an inadequately prepared national foundation, had drained all the lifeblood of the people; and their demobilization was attended with extreme difficulties. the phenomena of economic and political anarchy spread throughout the country. the russian peasantry had for centuries been held together by barbarian national discipline from below and iron-czarist rule from above. economic development had undermined the former, the revolution destroyed the latter. psychologically, the revolution meant the awakening of a sense of human personality among the peasantry. the anarchic manifestations of this awakening are but the inevitable results of the preceding oppression. a new order of things, an order based on the workers' own control of industry, can come only through gradual and internal elimination of the anarchic manifestations of the revolution. on the other hand, the propertied classes, even though deprived of political power, will not relinquish their advantages without a fight. the revolution has brought to a head the question of private property in land and the tools of production--that is, the question of vital significance to the exploiting classes. politically this means ceaseless, secret or open civil war. in its turn, civil war inevitably nourishes anarchical tendencies within the workingmen's movement. with the disorganization of industries, of national finances, of the transportation and provisioning systems, prolonged civil strife thus sets up tremendous difficulties in the way of constructive organizing work. nevertheless, the soviet government can look the future in the face with perfect confidence. only a careful inventory of all the country's resources; only a rational organization of industries--an organization born of one general plan; only wise and careful distribution of all the products, can save the country. and this is socialism. either a complete descent to colonial status or a socialist resurrection--these are the alternatives before which our country finds itself. the war has undermined the soil of the entire capitalistic world. herein lies our unconquerable strength. the imperialistic ring that is pressing around us will lie burst asunder by the proletarian revolution. we do not doubt this for a minute, any more than we doubted during our decades of underground struggle the inevitableness of the downfall of czarism. to struggle, to unite our forces, to establish industrial discipline and a socialist regime, to increase the productivity of labor, and to press on in the face of all obstacles--this is our mission. history is working in our favor. the proletarian revolution will flare up, sooner or later, both in europe and america, and will bring emancipation not only to the ukraine, poland, lithuania, courland, and finland, but also to all suffering humanity. rasputin the rascal monk disclosing the secret scandal of the betrayal of russia by the mock-monk grichka and the consequent ruin of the romanoffs. with official documents revealed and recorded for the first time.. by william le queux published by hurst & blackett, limited, paternoster house, london ec. rasputin the rascal monk, by william le queux. ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ rasputin the rascal monk, by william le queux. preface. why this book is written. in the following pages i have attempted to take the reader behind the veil of the imperial russian court, and to disclose certain facts which, in this twentieth century, may appear almost incredible. as one who knows russia, who has traversed the empire from virballen to the pacific coast, and who has met personally both the ex-emperor and his consort, as well as many of the persons herein mentioned, i confess that i myself have often been astounded when examining the mass of documents which this dirty siberian peasant--the convicted horse-stealer who rose to be the secret adviser of nicholas ii--had happily secreted in the safe in his cellar in the gorokhovaya, in petrograd, so that the real truth of his traitorous dealings with the kaiser might be chronicled in history. i had hoped to be able to reproduce many of the cipher telegrams and letters in facsimile, but the present shortage of paper has precluded this, and it could only be done if this book were issued in expensive form. to me, it seems best that the british public should have access to it in a cheap and popular form, and hence i have abandoned the idea of facsimiles. i here publish the story of the mock-monk's amazing career as a further contribution to the literature upon germany's spy system and propaganda so cleverly established as an insidious adjunct to her military attack upon the civilisation of our times. the conversations herein recorded have been disclosed by patriotic russians, the truth has been winnowed out of masses of mere hearsay, and the cipher telegrams and letters i have copied from the de-coded originals placed at my disposal by certain russians, allies of ours, who desire, for the present, to remain anonymous. william le queux. devonshire club, london, s.w. november, . chapter one. the cult of the "sister-disciples." the war has revealed many strange personalities in europe, but surely none so sinister or so remarkable as that of the mock-monk gregory novikh--the middle-aged, uncleanly charlatan, now happily dead, whom russia knew as rasputin. as one whose duty it was before the war to travel extensively backwards and forwards across the face of europe, in order to make explorations into the underworld of the politics of those who might be our friends-- or enemies as fate might decide--i heard much of the drunken, dissolute scoundrel from siberia who, beneath the cloak of religion and asceticism, was attracting a host of silly, neurotic women because he had invented a variation of the many new religions known through all the ages from the days of rameses the great. on one occasion, three years before the world-crisis, i found myself at the obscure little fishing-village called alexandrovsk, on the arctic shore, a grey rock-bound place into which the black chill waves sweep with great violence and where, for four months in the year, it is perpetual night. to-day, alexandrovsk is a port connected with petrograd by railway, bad though it be, which passes over the great marshy tundra, and in consequence has been of greatest importance to russia since the war. while inspecting the quays which had then just been commenced, my friend volkhovski, the russian engineer, introduced me to an unkempt disreputable-looking "pope" with remarkable steel-grey eyes, whose appearance was distinctly uncleanly, and whom i dismissed with a few polite words. "that is grichka (pronounced greesh-ka), the miracle-worker!" my friend explained after he had ambled away. "he is one of the very few who has access to the tsar at any hour." "why?" i asked, instantly interested in the mysterious person whose very name the russian censor would never allow to be even mentioned in the newspapers. my friend shrugged his broad shoulders and grinned. "many strange stories are told of him in moscow and in petrograd," he said. "no doubt you have heard of his curious new religion, of his dozen wives of noble birth who live together far away in pokrovsky!" i glanced back at the receding shock-haired figure in the long black clerical coat and high boots, little dreaming that i had met the mock-saint whose evil influence was to cause the downfall of the imperial house of romanoff. strange it is that to-day i have before me the amazing official reports of his career from revolutionary and private sources--reports from which i intend to here set out certain astounding facts. first, it is quite beyond question that the pravoslavny church, with its malign influences and filthy practices, is, in the main, responsible for gregory novikh's success as a worker of bogus "miracles." the evil-minded libertine upon whom his fellow-villagers in pokrovsky, in the siberian province of tobolsk, bestowed the name of rasputin (or in russian, "ne'er-do-well-son)," was a fisherman who possessed an inordinate fondness for the village lasses, and also for vodka. a mere illiterate mujik, disgusting in his habits and bestial in his manners, he grew lazy and dissolute, taking to theft and highway-robbery, for which, according to the official report of the court of tobolsk, before me, he was imprisoned twice, and a third time was publicly flogged and so degraded that he was compelled to bid farewell to pokrovsky, much to the relief of the villagers. behind him he left a peasant wife, a little son, named dmitri, and two daughters. he also left behind him a handsome young peasant woman known as guseva, a person who was destined to contribute a few years later in no small measure to his dramatic death. sins always follow the sinners. after a year or two of wandering as a rogue and vagabond, committing thefts where he could, and betraying any woman he came across, he suddenly conceived the brilliant idea of posing as a "holy man." this idea came to him because, while in pokrovsky, he had had as boon companion and fellow-drunkard a certain market-gardener who had joined the pravoslavny church and is to-day by his influence actually a bishop! in most eastern countries, especially in india and china, there are many wandering "holy men," and modern russia is no exception. to lead a "gospel life" of endless pilgrimages to "holy" places and to collect money for nonexistent charities appealed to the fellow as an easy mode of lazy sensual self-indulgence. therefore he adopted it, being aided by the ex-market-gardener, who was already in the church. so both prospered exceedingly well. rasputin had by this time discovered himself possessed of quite extraordinary powers. indeed a report upon him written by a great russian alienist who knew him intimately, has recently reached london, and from its voluminous pages which i have had before me, i gather that both physiologically and psychically he was abnormal, while his natural hypnotic influence was marked by the rare power he possessed of being able to contract the pupils of his steel-grey eyes at will, regardless of sunlight or shadow. few persons can do this. it is a sign well known to alienists that the person is a criminal degenerate. rasputin never smiled, even when he drank heavily. he could consume three bottles of champagne and still be quite sober! with vodka, his favourite spirit, he became talkative, but never indiscreet. he was a lunatic of an intensely erotic type; a satyr who possessed a truly appalling influence over women of all ages, and even at his word men in high positions did not hesitate to cast off their brilliant uniforms and decorations and mortify their flesh! from this man, crafty, cunning and elusive, a fiendish satyr whose hypnotic influence was irresistible, no woman, however high-born, high-minded, or highly religious was safe. he lived upon his wits, and lived well. with that amazing cunning usual in such criminals he affected a deep piety, so that at the various monasteries where he sought hospitality he was welcomed. in russia many of the religious houses still unfortunately savour of the most disgraceful debauchery, as they did in england before the reformation, and at such institutions rasputin became a popular figure. at certain convents the mock-monk, with the connivance of the pravoslavny church, was eagerly entertained by the dissolute nuns, more especially at novo tchevkask, on the don, as well as at viatka, and at saratov, in kasan. from the convent of novo dievichy (the convent of the virgins) near the last-mentioned town, a great place which overlooks the volga half way to wolgsk, some terrible scandals leaked out, when the mother-superior, probably to save herself from the public indignation, brought in four sturdy mujiks from the countryside, who pitched the "saint" out into the road, and administered such a severe kicking that the "holy father"--as the tsaritza afterwards called him--could only creep about in pain for many days after! two months later, according to a report countersigned by paul dragomrioff, superintendent of the secret police of moscow--a screed which, being somewhat ill-written, is difficult of translation--rasputin was in that city. i here quote from it:-- "report of ivan obroutcheff, police-agent, number , of the nd division, secret police, stationed at moscow. april nd:-- "according to instructions from police headquarters, i visited at orders of superintendent dragomrioff, number , tverskaia, next to loukonture's papier-mache factory at : a.m. to-day. i there found in a carpeted but barely furnished room an assembly of the cult of the naked believers kneeling before the monk, gregory novikh. twenty-eight persons, all being women, fourteen of them ladies of birth and education, were present, and as i entered with my eight assistants the `holy man' stood at the lectern, reading passages from the gospel of st luke, interspersed with his own exhortations of the trials of the flesh. the walls of the room were decorated with disgusting pictures of a nature which would shock the modesty of all but the _demi-monde_, while behind the monk novikh hung a copy of the holy ikon of novgorod. "in accordance with instructions all present were arrested after they had dressed, and i ordered them to be conducted to the central police bureau, where their names and addresses were taken, and they were interrogated singly. most of the midnight worshippers expressed indignation, and more especially the `saint' rasputin, who demanded in the name of the tsar that he might telegraph to the empress. my superior officer, nemiloff, chief of secret police of moscow, could not deny him this privilege. the result has been that by eleven o'clock next day an order came from the tsar for the release of all the prisoners, and orders that no facts should be permitted to appear in the press. grichka has left for the capital by the : express this afternoon. "signed: ivan obroutcheff." the report above quoted shows rasputin in the early stages of his shameless debauchery. in london we have had the notorious swami, with her male accomplice, practising similar acts upon innocent girls, but in moscow the drunken and verminous monk with his hair-shirt, a rope around his waist and sandals upon his bulging feet, had attracted a select _coterie_ of society women, daughters and wives of some of the greatest nobles of russia, who, in secret and with gold in their hands, vowed themselves as docile followers of this siberian fisherman whom nature had equipped as a satyr of such a type that happily none has ever been known in britain in all its glorious years of history. i readily admit that the career of grichka, the man whose name the censor does not allow to be mentioned, the sinister power that later on so suddenly appeared behind the russian throne and whose true story i am here revealing, will appear incredible to my readers. i have written many works of fiction which some, of you may have read. but no work of mine has ever contained facts so extraordinary as the real life of this unwashed charlatan who, under the active protection of his debauched church--and i write here with a true and reverent sense of our christian religion--succeeded in establishing himself in the apartments of the favourite lady-in-waiting upon the empress, and further, to teach his horrible "religion" to the innocent daughters of the tsar in turn! much has already appeared in the newspapers regarding the sturdy unkempt rogue, but the greater part of it has emanated from the brains of writers who have not had access to official documents. in these present articles my intention is to tell the british public the bare unvarnished truth culled from documentary evidence at my disposal, and to leave them to form their own conclusions. russia, our great ally, is, alas, still mysterious and much behind the times. true, she has a press, a duma, and many modern social institutions. yet her civilisation is only upon the surface. the empire is, unfortunately, still the same as england was under the tudors, an underworld of profligacy, plotting, and strange superstitions. the latter have, of course, been recently revived in london, as is proved by the prosecution of the fortune-tellers of regent street and st john's wood. again, were not the scandals of the "abode of love" much the same as that of rasputin's dozen-wived harem which he established in pokrovsky? the criminal records of holy russia teem with amazing stories of this "holy" scoundrel who from a drunken siberian fisherman rose, by erotic suggestion, to become the greatest consolation to the empress, and the lever by which "nikki the autocrat" was flung from his throne. i remember how, when in sofia, in the pre-war days with sir george buchanan, then our minister to bulgaria, and now ambassador to russia, a cultured and clever diplomat to whom great britain owes more than she can ever know, and hence cannot acknowledge, we discussed the mystery of russia and of the subtle influences near the throne. little did either of us dream that he would now be ambassador to the russian court, and i would be writing this exposure of the evil life of the blasphemous satyr rasputin. the cult established by the pilgrimages of this illiterate peasant grew apace. the "holy father" whose disgraceful past is recorded in the police _dossiers_ at tyumen and tobolsk had, by his astounding power of hypnotism, gathered around him a crowd of "sister-disciples," mostly of the upper and leisured classes, to whom the new religion of nature strongly appealed. upon his constant pilgrimages to jaroslav, vologda, vitebsk, orel and other places, he made converts everywhere. he declared that no woman could obtain favour of the almighty without first committing sexual sin, because that sin was the one which was forgiven above all others. at his weekly seances at which, strange to say, the highest born ladies in the empire attended in secret, the most disgraceful scenes were witnessed, the dirty unwashed monk, a most repellent creature to all save his "disciples," acting as the high-priest of this erotic sisterhood. soon the disgusting rogue began to perform "miracles." into his confidence he took a young man named ilya kousmitch--who, be it said, afterwards made certain statements to those who at last meted out justice and who provided me with certain details--and with the young fellow's connivance he succeeded in bamboozling a number of perfectly respectable and honest women in petrograd, as well as in moscow and kiev, where he effected some really mysterious "cures." in one instance at the house of a certain madame litvinoff, in the sergiyevskaya, the most fashionable quarter of petrograd, the man known as "the stareb," or "grichka," held a select meeting of his followers. the shameless charlatan treated the ladies who had assembled to worship him and to contribute lavishly to his imaginary charities, with the greatest disdain and most brutal contempt. this man, guilty of the most appalling vices, addressed them as usual in a strange illiterate jumble, urging them to follow the new religion which he called "the trial of the flesh," interspersing his remarks with occult jargon from works upon black magic, interlarded with those self-same scriptural quotations which will be found marked in that big bible used by the swami and her fellow-criminal--a volume now preserved in the black museum at scotland yard. one of the women present, a certain baroness korotki, was suffering from acute rheumatism. the "saint" placed his hands upon her, looked into her eyes with that intense unwavering stare of his, uttered some strange incantation, and lo! the pains left her, and she declared herself healed! the effect was electrical. others declared themselves suffering from various imaginary maladies, and after performing certain rites as laid down by the "holy father," he laid hands upon them one after the other, and hypnotised them into a belief that they were cured. next day reports of these amazing "cures" ran like wildfire through petrograd, and the superstitious lower-classes were at once seized by a belief that the saint "grichka," head of the fast-growing organisation of thinly disguised sensuality, was really a holy man and could work miracles. around him crowded the halt and maimed and the blind, and aided by his accomplice ilya kousmitch, he not only pretended to effect cures, but succeeded in making many more converts among the lower-class women by declaring, as he had told the society dames, that there was in him a portion of the divine with whom, as he put it, "all that would be saved must be one in the flesh and in the spirit!" at one of his reunions, held a week or so later at madame litvinoff's, there attended madame vyrubova, the handsome leading lady-in-waiting at court, and the chamber-confidante of both tsar and tsaritza. like the others, this intriguing woman at once fell beneath the mock-monk's inexplicable spell. his new religion of the flesh appealed to her erotic temperament, and she at once became one of his most passionate devotees, a few days later introducing him at court with astonishing result. the subtle intrigues of madame vyrubova were many. as chamber-confidante of both emperor and empress she had for a long time assisted in the spiritualistic seances which were given in private at tsarskoe-selo by a russian monk named helidor and his french friend, known as "philippe." the young tsarevitch was in a state of fast-declining health, and helidor, as a "holy man," had, at madame's suggestion, been called in to pray for him. spiritualistic practices followed in strictest secrecy, and the credulous empress first believed that the "holy man's" dealings with the unseen were resulting in a beneficial effect upon the weakly lad. at last, however, owing to. court intrigue, helidor fell out of favour. it was just after this when anna vyrubova first met and fell beneath the evil influence of rasputin. grichka was a "miracle-worker," and might, she thought, perhaps restore the tsarevitch to health! she knew that the empress, a shallow-minded, ephemeral woman, lived for one object alone, namely, to secure for her son the crown of romanoff. but the physicians gave but little hope of this. in a year--perhaps before--he must die, they had whispered. helidor had been dismissed. would rasputin be more successful? madame sought out the charlatan who was busy with many "cures," and suggested that he should accompany her to the palace, but with lordly disdain the drunken fisherman from pokrovsky declared that to him all men and women were equal. to a friend, a certain madame kovalenko, wife of one of the high court officials, madame vyrubova described this interview. it took place in petrograd at the house of a rich merchant living in the tavritsheskaya, opposite the gardens. when the lady-in-waiting, who had, like so many others, fallen beneath his spell, had made the suggestion that the master should be introduced to the court circle, he placed his left hand behind his back, a favourite attitude of his, drew himself up and began to address her in that strange jargon which she hardly understood-- quotations from the "lives of the saints" jumbled up with lewd suggestions, high phrases, and meaningless sentences. as conclusion to this speech, however, the wily fellow added: "i care nothing for the rulers of earth, but only for the ruler of heaven, who has bestowed upon me his blessing, and has led me into the path of honour, righteousness and peace. the rulers, of earth worship in their chapels and their tinsel cathedrals, but i worship everywhere, in the air, in the woods, in the streets, and you, lady, worship with me in body and in soul." and he raised his cold eyes upward, his right hand with its bulgy joints and broken dirty finger nails being placed across his breast. then he sighed, as he added: "ah! you do not yet understand! god has placed within me the power to smite--as well as to heal." madame vyrubova, fascinated by his strange hypnotic glance, fell upon her knees before the "saint," and kissing his bulgy unclean hand begged of him again and again to see the empress. but the artful scoundrel remained obdurate. he knew of helidor's disgrace, and did not intend to hold himself at all cheaply. the result was that madame vyrubova sought him next day and, handed him an autograph note from the empress inviting him to come to the winter palace and see the grand duke alexis. he read it, secretly much gratified, for he knew that not only had his latest devotee prevailed upon the empress to seek the aid of another russian monk to succeed the degraded helidor, but that the pravoslavny church, the most powerful influence of state governance, had also been responsible for the invitation he held within his dirty fingers. from that moment rasputin's power became assured--a power he wielded for evil from that hour until the day of his well-deserved end. when that grey afternoon the unkempt libertine was introduced to the small white-and-gold private salon of the empress, which overlooks the gardens and the neva on the northern wing of the palace, the princess obolensky, princess orbeliani and countess hendrikoff, maids-of-honour, were with her majesty, curious to see what manner of man it was who could perform miracles, and whom so many of the society women in petrograd and moscow now acknowledged and addressed as "master." upon the threshold the mock-monk halted, and in that dramatic attitude, struck in order to impress his hearers, he stood with his left arm behind him, erect, with his unkempt head thrown back, his face stern and relentless, his grey eyes sharp and piercing. for some moments he remained there in statuesque silence, well-knowing how women were impressed by that pose. the hypnotism of those grey eyes few of the opposite sex could withstand. his conquests, or "conversions" as he termed them--were in every direction, and in every city. the cult of the naked believers had rapidly spread everywhere. he was besieged by female disciples eager to hold meetings, for without the actual presence of the saint true worship of the erotic could not take place. "great lady!" he exclaimed at last in his deep, heavy voice, still that of the siberian mujik, "you desire me here? i have come!" the empress rose and stretching out her hand eagerly welcomed the unholy charlatan into the court circle, and half-an-hour later introduced him to fully a dozen of the highest-born women of the empire, all of whom were at once impressed by his affected piety and humility. but a "dark force" had now entered the very heart of russia, and later that afternoon, in a luxuriously furnished bedroom the miracle-worker was shown the poor little heir to the throne lying upon his sick couch, he placed hands upon him, and her majesty herself fell victim to that strange spell which other women had found so indescribable and so inexplicable. "i will cure your son," said rasputin slowly, after he had knelt beside him and looked long and earnestly into his eyes without uttering a word. madame vyrubova was present and exchanged glances of relief with the empress. to the latter, easily impressionable as she was, though all believed her to be a staid mother of a family, rasputin became at once a saint, a divine agent, a miraculous guide. he had cured the poor; why could he not, if he willed it, cure her son? then in the days that followed "incidents" occurred in the palace. at select assemblies of one or two of the empress's confidantes--parties, of course, arranged by madame vyrubova, rasputin expounded his shameless "religion." his jargon, the jumbled phrases of an illiterate peasant who knew not the meaning of what he uttered, his exhortations to commit sin so that it might be forgiven, his declaration of self-divinity, and his odds and ends of scripture mixed with the foulest vocabulary of russian, was listened to with bated breath. why? because, strange though it may seem, the health of the young grand duke alexis had taken a sudden turn for the better. even his physicians were compelled to acknowledge it! whether the latter were in any way under the influence of rasputin by means of money-payment--for the fellow had by this time acquired a considerable fortune from his dupes--has not yet been ascertained. one thing, however, is shown in the documents before me, namely, that the mock-monk's "miracles" were often effected by means of secret drugs of which he had quite a curious extensive knowledge. how this was acquired is again a mystery, save that he was very friendly with a certain student of chinese and thibetan medicine, named badmayeff, and that this person regularly furnished him at high prices with certain little-known drugs from the far east. with the gradual improvement of the health of the poor little grand duke, rasputin's ascendancy over the empress rapidly increased. he had been introduced to the emperor, who, though regarding him with askance, tolerated him merely because his beloved son was improving beneath his daily prayerful treatment. meanwhile, the canker-worm of rasputin's religion had, fostered by the empress's favourite lady-in-waiting, entered into the court circle, and many secret meetings were held in the palace where under the pseudo-religious cloak certain ladies of the russian court became devotees of the "holy father," and practised abominations absolutely incredible. official reports contain both dates and names of those who gave themselves into the unscrupulous hands of this man who claimed the divine right and thus worshipped as "believers." rasputin was too clever a scoundrel to allow matters to proceed quite smoothly. several chance conversations with the emperor and with stolypin convinced him that he might ultimately share the same obscurity as helidor. he therefore one day pretended to be offended at some words of the empress--whom he now addressed by the familiar terms of "thee" and "thou" which he used to his disciples, though even the grand dukes and duchesses would have hesitated so to address the empress--and after a dramatic farewell, he took himself off to the wonderful and luxurious monastery which, according to his statement to the empress, he had built at his native pokrovsky with the money he had collected upon his various pilgrimages. to the female section of petrograd society he had been never tired of describing the beauties of this monastery where his fellow-monks lived a life of severe asceticism and constant prayer, therefore at his sudden resolve to leave, the capital--or the better-class women of it--grew tearful and the empress most of all. within four days of his departure for siberia the little tsarevitch was taken suddenly ill, and the empress, beside herself at having expressed any words of doubt concerning the unkempt saint who had so entirely entered into her life, telegraphed wildly to him. this message, since unearthed by the revolutionary party, which ran as follows:-- "i cannot bear your absence. life is so grey and hopeless without you, my dear comforter, my master. alexis has been taken ill. do not take any notice of kokovtsov. he is responsible for my hasty words to you and shall suffer for it. forgive me. return--for my sake and for the life of alexis-alec." but the crafty mujik was not to be thus entrapped. he had been guest of the minister kokovtsov, a week before, and his host and his friends had made him roaring drunk. in his cups he had made certain revelations. what they were the saint could not recollect. hence he had absented himself from court, in order to maintain his divine dignity--and to plot further. at this point it is necessary to make a critical remark. for two years rasputin had been speaking of his monastery at pokrovsky. in the salons and boudoirs of moscow and kiev as well as in petrograd, society spoke of the institute, discussed it and declared that indeed grichka was a holy man. the metropolitan with his rich robes and jewels, and all the bishops were as common clay in comparison with the "holy father" who could cure by the laying-on of hands, who walked in humility and who devoted himself to good works. curiously enough it had occurred to nobody, not even to the ever-ubiquitous police of petrograd, to investigate the story told by rasputin regarding his monastery at far-off pokrovsky. the world of russia did not, of course, know that in that siberian village there still lived rasputin's peasant-wife with her children, or that his life had been so evil, a career of drink and profligacy which even in siberia stood out in letters of scarlet in the police _dossiers_ of tobolsk. it, however, remained for a female spy of the revolutionary party--a certain lady named vera aliyeff, from whose report i am writing--to travel to that sordid siberian village and watch the court charlatan in his home. i may here say that to the untiring efforts of mademoiselle aliyeff is in a great measure due the downfall and assassination of the terribly sinister influence which cost the tsar nicholas his throne, and hundreds of women their good name--as i shall afterwards show. but to relate matters in their proper sequence as history i may here quote from the report of this patriotic woman-revolutionary who travelled to rasputin's home in disguise, because he knew her, and as she was good-looking, he had already endeavoured to induce her to join the cult of the naked believers. she reports:-- "i found the great monastery of pokrovsky to be a dirty repellent hamlet of mujiks of the worst and most illiterate type. there was no trace of the marble palace which rasputin had described as having erected as the main building of the monastery. the latter was, i found, a large, cheaply built, ordinary-looking house, three rooms of which were given up to the `saint's' peasant-wife, his son dmitri and the younger of his two daughters, while in the other part of the house lived twelve women of varying ages--the youngest being sixteen--who were his fascinated devotees and who had given up their lives in europe to enter the seclusion of that sordid home and become his spiritual brides." here mademoiselle aliyeff had an interview with the woman guseva, and later on after an inspection of the police records at tobolsk and tyumen, she returned to petrograd and reported the result of her visit to the right party in the duma. meanwhile, the empress and also her favourite lady-in-waiting telegraphed to rasputin urgently imploring him to return to petrograd. but the verminous libertine was in too comfortable quarters with his dozen devotees to stir out far from his nest, and while going about the village standing drinks to all and sundry and ingratiating himself everywhere, he at the same time treated his old and ugly wife with brutal unconcern, and refused even to reply to the imperial demand. at last he grew weary of his retirement--for, truth to tell, he usually retired there whenever he disappeared upon his many pretended pilgrimages in russia--whereupon he one day sent a telegram to the empress saying that he had at last been directed by a divine call to again return to the bedside of the tsarevitch. this message was received with the greatest joy at tsarskoe-selo, where it set a-flutter hearts in which beat the noblest blood of russia. "the holy father is on his way back to us!" such was the message whispered along the long stone corridors of the winter palace, the many windows of which look out upon the grey neva. the empress went to her son's bedroom and told him the glad news, laying a tender hand upon the poor lad's brow. and madame vyrubova meeting the emperor as he came out of his private cabinet chatting with the duke of mecklenburg-strelitz and the minister protopopoff, whispered the news into his ear. the tsar smiled happily. little did his majesty dream that by that return of the unwashed scoundrel whom the most delicately nurtured women worshipped, he was doomed to lose his throne. on rasputin's arrival some intensely dramatic scenes ensued--scenes that would be deemed fantastic if any modern novelist had dared to describe them even as fiction. but from these voluminous reports and the _dossier_ before me i shall attempt to describe them. chapter two. scandals at the winter palace. the rascalities of rasputin were unparalleled, even in russia. the mock-monk, much against his will, returned to the winter palace where the court had gone for a few days and only because of the divine call, as he pretended. he treated the distracted tsaritza with utter disdain when early one wintry morning he drove in from the dvortsovy square, passed the palace guards, and ascended the wide black-and-white marble staircase of the great hall, where she stood eager to receive him. "ah! forgive me! forgive me, my master!" implored the empress in a low agonised tone. "i was thoughtless and foolish." "take me to alexis," said the charlatan roughly interrupting her. "he is ill--very ill--and god has sent me to him." eagerly the empress conducted him to the bedside of her son, the little tsarevitch. madame vyrubova, the mistress of rasputin, was awaiting him, together with two nurses and a physician named letchitzki. with rough deep-voiced dismissal the unkempt profligate sent everyone from the room, including the empress herself. he wished to pray by the sick lad's bedside, he explained. this he did, madame vyrubova alone remaining. when the door was closed the blasphemous rascal quickly bent over the heir to ascertain that he was sleeping, then he raised his own dirty hands for madame to kiss, crossing himself at the same time, and whispering "the drug? it seems to have acted well--eh? where is it?" she slipped a tiny green-glass phial from her cream silk blouse and handed it to him, saying: "yes, badmayeff was right! each time i gave it to him in his milk, he grew worse." "ah!" laughed the verminous fellow, his sensuous face bearded and blotchy with drink. "now that i have returned divine providence will restore him. he will not get his six drops each day!" the dastardly charlatan and poisoner of russia's heir concealed the thibetan drug in the folds of his ample habit, and whispering in his rough uncouth peasant way, "now let the fools in again!" he threw himself upon his knees by the bedside commencing a fervent prayer. "o god--the great! the merciful! the giver of all bounties, the creator, and the death-giver--the maker of kings and the destroyer of nations--to thee we pray--and of thee we ask--" and as he uttered those blasphemous words the favourite lady-in-waiting opened the long white-and-gold door to admit the imperial mother of the poor half-conscious elder son of the great house of romanoff--the boy whose life was being trifled with by the administration of those pernicious drugs which, at any moment, when "rasputin" willed, might cause death from haemorrhage. the fellow novikh, the low-born thief and blackmailer from the far-off wilds of siberia, had planted himself in the winter palace as a divinity to be worshipped. the court circle of silly women in search of sensation, and headed by the empress herself, had fallen entirely beneath his baneful influence, believing that only by first practising his disgusting rites could they offer prayers to the almighty. another of the empress's intimates who had joined the palace circle of believers was countess ignatieff, who had also become a most devout follower of rasputin and who exerted all her great influence in officialdom for his benefit and protection. war had broken out, and while the newspapers of the allies were full of russia's greatness and the irresistible power of her military "steamroller," the world was in utter ignorance that the empress was actually educating her own daughters to enter the secret cult of the "believers," a suggestion which they eventually obeyed! such was the truly horrible state of affairs at court. thus in a few brief months that unmasked thief whom the workers of petrograd contemptuously called "grichka," and whose very name rasputin meant "the ne'er-do-well" had, by posing as a holy man, and a worker of mock "miracles," become a power supreme at court. daily at eleven each morning this verminous libertine, whose weekly reunions were in reality orgies as disgraceful as any organised by the imperial satyr tiberius, knelt at the bedside of the poor little tsarevitch to drone his blasphemous appeals to god, while the empress, always present, knelt humbly in a corner listening to that jumble of exhortations, threats, and amazing assertions of his own divine right as high-priest of the believers. the empress had fallen completely beneath the hypnotism of the grey steely eyes, the hard sphinx-like countenance that never smiled, and those long dirty knotted fingers, the nails of which were never cleaned. to her, filth, both moral and personal, was synonymous with godliness. then, after each prayer, madame vyrubova would assist the mock-monk to rise and declare-- "the holy father is, alas! tired," and then lead him off into the adjoining ante-room overlooking the neva where a silk-stockinged flunkey stood ready to serve the scoundrel with his usual bottle of heidsieck monopole--the entire contents of which he would quickly empty and smack his lips over in true peasant manner. mademoiselle sophie tutcheff, governess of the tsar's daughters, very quickly perceived a change in the demeanour of her charges. they were no longer the charming ingenuous girls they were before. she had overheard whispered conversations between the grand duchess tatiana and her sister, marie. rasputin, moreover, had now been given luxurious apartments in the palace, close to the rooms occupied by madame vyrubova, and each day he came to the schoolroom in which the three younger princesses, tatiana, marie and anastasia were prosecuting their studies. it did not take mademoiselle tutcheff long to discern the true state of affairs. the monk one day used the most lewd language while chatting with the three young grand duchesses, whereupon mademoiselle, who belonged to one of the highest families in russia, went off to the empress in disgust and indignation. her protests were, as may be imagined, met with withering scorn. "i am empress and the holy father is our guest in the palace," exclaimed the tsaritza, who was taking tea with two ladies of the court who were her fellow-believers. "what you have said is an insult to him. you are dismissed in disgrace." and an hour later poor mademoiselle left the palace without her pupils being allowed to bid her farewell. this, however, was but one illustration of the power which the rascally ex-highwayman had secured over the imperial court, and hence over the great russian empire itself. his influence was more powerful than that of all the grand dukes, the council of the empire, and the council of ministers put together. true, his majesty was tsar, but gregory rasputin was equally powerful, if not more so, because of his innate craftiness, his pseudo-divinity, his mock miracles, and the support he received from a certain section of the church. possessed of the curious cunning of the erotic criminal lunatic, rasputin never allowed matters to run calmly for very long. he was much too clever for that, well knowing, that while protopopoff, minister of the interior was his friend, he had as powerful enemies, both stolypin and miliukoff--who, later on, became minister for foreign affairs. both the latter he feared, as well as the grand duke nicholas michailovitch. the latter had secretly learnt much concerning the ex-thief of the far-off siberian village--more, indeed, than rasputin had ever dreamed. one day, a week after the departure of mademoiselle sophie tutcheff, the grand duke attended a great reception at the winter palace. the usual brilliant throng had assembled; the usual imperial procession had taken place down the great nicholas hall, that famous salon wherein three thousand people can dance at one time--the salon the walls of which are adorned with golden plates, and where on the night of a court ball the assembly is indeed a gorgeous one of stars, medals, exquisite dresses and brilliant uniforms. though russia was at war, the empress had given the ball, and all russian court society had assembled. among the throng were two men the bishop teofan, of the pravoslavny church, and with him the monk, silent and unbending, upon whom the eyes of all the women were turned. naturally there were many strange whisperings among those who were "believers" and those who had not been initiated into the cult of the "sister-disciples," whispers among the old and young--whispers which were not meant for any male ear. bishop and monk passed down the great ballroom, through the beautiful winter-garden beyond, where many men and women were chatting beneath the palms, and then into the oriental gallery, a place decorated with those engraved golden and silver plates which catherine the great received with bread and salt from those who came to do her homage. thence the pair disappeared into one of the side rooms to what is known as the jordan entrance. a tall, bald-headed man with heavy brow, moustache, small round beard, and wearing a brilliant white uniform with many decorations had followed the pair from the ball-room. with him walked a young, clean-shaven, dark-haired man in uniform, erect and determined. the elder was the grand duke nicholas michailovitch, the younger the grand duke dmitri pavlovitch. they entered the small room unceremoniously, and confronted the illiterate bishop and the peasant charlatan. "we have come to turn you out of the palace!" exclaimed the elder man firmly. "your presence is obnoxious to us, especially the charlatan of pokrovsky. we are grand dukes of russia, and we have no intention to mix with convicted thieves and beguilers of women! come!" his imperial highness cried, "go! you are not wanted here!" "and pray by what right do you speak thus?" asked the starets with offensive insolence. "by the right of my position," was the grand duke's reply. in response, rasputin spat upon the pale blue carpet in defiance. in a moment the young grand duke dmitri pavlovitch, an athletic young officer who had only the day before returned from the german front where he had been with von rennenkampf, took the dirty monk by the scruff of his neck and flung him outside into the big marble hall, administering to him a severe kick in the presence of a dozen of the astonished palace guards. "put this scoundrel outside!" he commanded the men, and two minutes later, rasputin, with his dirty black habit badly torn, found himself flung down the steps headlong into the snow. meanwhile the grand duke nicholas had administered to the dissolute bishop--whose sister, by the way, was one of rasputin's "spiritual brides" at his monastery, or harem, at pokrovsky--a very severe castigation and with his own hands had torn the big crucifix from his neck and cast it across the room. then, when at last the bishop emerged into the hall, he shared, at the grand duke's order, the same indignity that had befallen the dissolute blackguard whom the empress caressed and called her "holy father." of this episode rasputin made no mention to her majesty. it, however, caused him considerable misgivings and before morning he had decided upon a dramatic course of action. next afternoon, a wednesday, was the day fixed for the usual performance of the bi-weekly secret rites. he took luncheon with the emperor and empress in their private apartments, madame vyrubova alone being the only other person at table. suddenly the monk who had been talking with the emperor, using his uncouth siberian expressions, and even eating with his fingers, clasped his knotted, peasant fingers together and turning to the empress, announced: "to-night, great lady, i go upon a pilgrimage. divine god has called me to moscow, where work there awaits me. i know not what it is, but when i arrive there i shall receive his divine direction. alexis will be well in my absence, and will improve, for twice each day he will have my prayers. god has called me--i cannot remain." "not even this afternoon?" gasped the unnerved hysterical woman who was empress of russia in this our twentieth century. "no. i must take leave of you, great lady, to obey the call," was his deep answer. and by that night's express he left in a luxurious sleeping-berth for moscow where, truth to tell, the countess ignatieff was awaiting him. the only "call" the licentious blackguard had received was the news that two very prepossessing young girls, named vera and xenie, daughters of the late baroness koulomzine, of moscow, had expressed their desire to countess ignatieff to join the secret cult. the countess had shown him their photographs and the libertine, in pretence of performing a pilgrimage, travelled to moscow in order to initiate them. next day, at the convent of the ascension, where the libertine had spent the night, he interviewed the two young gentlewomen. before an ikon with flowers upon the altar and in the presence of the lady-superior, he exorcised their sins according to his prescribed rite. it was a strange scene. the penitents in the dimly-lit chapel each touched their forehead and breast with thumb and forefinger, gazing immobile and fascinated at the miracle-working "master," their lips moving in proper response to the prayers of the heaven-sent confessor. at what subsequently transpired i can only hint. according to the official report before me the girls confessed to two officers, their half-brothers, that after the benediction the verminous monk induced them both to go to the turkish baths together, for "purification" as he put it. well, the mock-monk found himself under arrest, and only by the most strenuous efforts of the countess ignatieff was he released, after spending forty hours in a cell. but rasputin merely smiled. he knew his own power. next day he returned to petrograd, and within twelve hours of his arrival plestcheff, chief of police of moscow, had, at the instance of the empress, been relieved of his post in disgrace. rasputin's exploits in moscow brought him very nearly to disaster. master-criminal that he was and as my intention is to show, he calmly reviewed his position, and saw that by cleverly playing his cards--now that the empress and her easily gulled court had become so completely enthralled by his "wonder-working"--he might assume his own position as the most powerful man in the empire. his personal magnetism is indisputable. i can personally vouch for that. on the occasion when i met him in that grey cold repellent village on the arctic shore, i myself felt that there was something strangely indescribable, something entirely uncanny about the fellow. those grey eyes were such as i had never before seen in all my long cosmopolitan experience. in those moments when we had exchanged greetings and bowed to each other he seemed to hold me beneath a weird curious spell. he was demon rather than man. therefore i can quite conceive that the ordinary russian woman of any class would easily succumb to his blasphemous advances and his assertions that he was possessed of a divinity as the deliverer of russia. within the russian soul, two centuries behind the times, of to-day, mysticism is still innate, and the mock-monk had already proved up to the hilt to his own complete satisfaction that, by pretending to fast, yet having a good square meal in secret; by pretending to make pilgrimages--but really throwing off his monkish "habits" and as a gay man about town taking a joy-ride in a motor car--and by crossing himself continuously and bowing low before every ikon at which he secretly sneered, he could gull the average woman whether she wore pearls or tended the pigs. rasputin, a low-born immoral brute, by reason of the discovery of his own hypnotic powers, treated womenkind with the most supreme and utter contempt, and it seems that while clearly masquerading beneath that cloak of extreme piety and aided by his gardener-friend, the bishop teofan--a fellow-adventurer from pokrovsky--he resolved after his moscow adventure, to make a bold bid for further power. most men in such circumstances as these would have been both cowed and careful. against him he had stolypin, at that moment one of the most powerful men in the empire, as well as the grand dukes nicholas and dmitri pavlovitch, m. gutchkoff--a bearded man in gold pince-nez with whom i had had before the war many interesting chats in paris and in petrograd, and who subsequently became minister of war and marine--m. miliukoff, the whole-hearted deputy for petrograd in the duma, and what was far more serious, he had fifty or more wildly irate husbands and fathers, all eager and anxious to bring about the scoundrel's downfall. traps were laid for him, but, with the amazing cunning of the erotic lunatic, he eluded them all. back in petrograd, in the salons of the highest in the empire, he lived in luxury, with cars always at his disposal. the "holy father" who had his own suite in the private apartments of the imperial family was welcomed everywhere he deigned to go. his creature, ilya kousmitch, warned him of the pitfalls that were being set. even his dissolute crony the bishop teofan--whom, through the empress, he had himself created--grew grave. but the "saint" merely bit his dirty finger nails, as is the habit of the siberian peasant, and replied: "gregory novikh has been sent to russia by divine providence. he has no fear!" soon after his narrow escape in moscow he received a letter from the father of the two young girls who had so completely fallen beneath his pious blandishments--a letter in which the angry father declared that he would shoot him at sight. to that letter rasputin, with the overbearing impudence of one who smoked and spat upon the carpet actually in the empress's presence, and, who had the audacity to prompt the tsar in making his appointments and dealing with the affairs of state, replied by telegram--a message still upon record--sent over the private wire from the winter palace: "shoot--and god will reward your daughters bountifully.--gregory." though rasputin presented a remarkably calm exterior, he no doubt, was much perturbed by that threat. a single false step would certainly land him either in oblivion or in prison. but criminal lunatics of his sort are notoriously clever and astute. "jack-the-ripper" was of exactly similar type, and he defied the whole detective police of the world. the secret police of russia, the wiles of which have been so vaunted by the modern novelist, were as childish idiots when their brains became pitted against those of the uncouth siberian peasant, who, calling himself a "saint," could induce every silly woman to follow his immoral directions. just then the empress, whose shallow impressionable mind led her to adopt any new craze, and to seek any new sensation, met a person in whom she indiscreetly placed her trust--a treacherous, long-bearded political adventurer, named boris sturmer. this man was a boon companion of the "saint" in his debaucheries in the midnight wilds of petrograd, for rasputin, when believed to be absent for a week of prayer and self-denial, usually bathed himself, and wearing a well-cut evening-suit plunged into the gay midnight life at the old donon, the belle vue, or the bouffes, on the fontanka. thus boris sturmer, a strong pro-german who had many family connections with the enemy--and the bosom friend of rasputin--actually became prime minister of russia, such being the mock-monk's astounding influence over the imperial autocrat, whose wife and family were, alas! as but clay within his filthy hands. this latest triumph proved conclusively to rasputin that his power was as great as that of the emperor--indeed, to certain of his intimates he used laughingly to declare himself to be the uncrowned tsar! "i live in the palace," he would declare. "the empress does my bidding; her daughters are as my children; the court bows to me; nikki only smiles as an idiot--therefore, am i not the real emperor of russia?" discovering his own overwhelming influence this sinister favourite of both tsar and tsaritza suddenly resolved upon a further move, the cleverness of which was indeed well within keeping with his marvellously astute reasoning. he decided not to be dependent upon the charity of the imperial pair, whom the bishop teofan had one day declared kept him in the winter palace as a tame saint. his friend's taunt stung him to the quick. in consequence, he took a luxurious house in the gorokhovaya, just beyond the moyka, and close to the palace, and while still retaining his apartments in the palace, he lived mostly in his new abode, where in future he announced that the bi-weekly meeting of his disciples for prayer and consolation would be held. like wildfire the decision of the "wonder-worker" ran through the salons of society. there was now a chance for others to enter the cult of the "sister-disciples," and to become as one flesh with the saint, and to be cured by divine agency of any ill. hundreds of society women were frantically anxious to enter this new sisterhood. his house was an expensive one, but only a few of the rooms were well furnished. the dining-room on the ground floor was a large rather bare-looking place, with cheap chairs set round and equally cheap tables of polished walnut. on the walls were portraits of the tsar, the tsaritza and himself. upstairs was his study, a large luxurious apartment, and from it led the bedroom of the "holy" man, which even eclipsed the study in luxury. to this house the smart band of society converts who called themselves the "sister-disciples" went regularly twice each week to hear the "miracle-worker" descant upon the beauties of his new religion. among the members of this degenerate group were:--the pretty fluffy-haired little princess boyarski, madame pistolcohrse, sister of madame vyrubova, a certain countess yepantchine, whose splendid house was in the sergiyevskaya, the most fashionable quarter without equal in petrograd, as well as the grand duchess olga, daughter of the tsaritza, and many others. though the blasphemous discourses were delivered and the disgusting secret rites practised twice each week at rasputin's house, as well as also twice weekly in secret at tsarskoe-selo, many women seeking knowledge of the new religion--after having fallen beneath the spell of the mock-saint's eyes--went to the monk alone by appointment, and there had what the blackguard termed "private converse" with him in his upstairs study adjoining his luxurious sleeping apartment. the uncouth peasant's actions, his open immorality, and the cold-blooded manner in which he turned wife from husband, and betrothed from her lover, had now become open gossip at the street corners. whenever the mock-saint went forth in any car or carriage of his female admirers or of the court, the people grinned and recognising the lady, would whisper-- "look! grichka has taken yet another bride!" at some of the mysterious meetings rasputin's old friend the dissolute bishop teofan was present, and on one occasion a dramatic incident occurred. the little princess boyarski had apparently grown jealous of the "saint" because he had paid too great attention to a new convert, a certain mademoiselle zernin, just turned twenty. high words arose in the select circle of worshippers, and the bishop with his big golden cross on his breast endeavoured to quell the dispute. the princess then turned furiously upon the bishop, expressing the deepest resentment that he should have been admitted to their private conference at all, and vowed that she would use all her influence to get him turned out of the church he had dishonoured. rasputin and his friend ridiculed her threats, but two days later both grew extremely uneasy, for teofan was already extremely unpopular with the court circle, and all were only too ready to effect his dismissal and disgrace. indeed, forty-eight hours after the princess had uttered those threats, she, with the countess kleinmichel, contrived to secure his expulsion from the church. only after rasputin had threatened the empress that he would leave petrograd, and in that case the tsarevitch would, he declared, die, that he secured the re-instalment of his fellow-criminal. such was the scoundrel's influence at court in these present war-days! by various tricks, in which he was assisted by the young servant, the man ilya, the charlatan still performed "miracles" upon the poor, which naturally caused his fame to spread all over russia, while his sinister influence was now being felt both in the orthodox church, and in the conduct of the war. contrary to what is generally supposed, he had never been ordained a priest, while he never attended church nor observed any of the forms of religious worship, save the immoral practices of his own invention. he claimed a semi-divinity, and thus declared himself to be above all man-made laws. in those scandalous discourses, in which he made use of the most erotic suggestions, he always urged his female devotees that only through his own body could they seek the protection and forgiveness of the almighty. "i show you the way!" he would constantly say as he stood with his hand behind his back, his other hand upon the bible. "i am here to give you salvation." such was his power in ecclesiastical matters in russia that the most lucrative posts in the church were now filled by men who had paid him for their nominations, and he boasted that the procurator of the holy synod was merely his puppet. from certain evidence before me i am inclined to believe this to be the truth, for some of the supposed "miracles" could never have been "worked" without the procurator's connivance. daily, smart society women came to rasputin's house for "private converse." sometimes one of the circle of his elect would bring with her a young society girl who had heard vaguely of "the disciples," and whose curiosity was naturally aroused, to meet the wonderful wonder-worker. at others, women went alone. but in each case the result was the same. one afternoon the young wife of the wealthy count ivanitski went there in secret, attired in one of her maid's dresses, so as to escape observation, passing through the servants' entrance. the count, however, had heard whispers of this intended visit and, awaiting her return, followed her back to the furshtavkaya, where they lived in a handsome house a few doors from the liteyny prospect. he then coolly called his servants and compelled her to confess before them all that had happened to her in rasputin's house. afterwards he drew a revolver and shot her dead. then he walked out and gave himself up to the police. within an hour news of the affair was brought to the empress and to rasputin, who were dining together in the palace. the monk made a sarcastic grimace when he heard of the murder of the woman who had that afternoon been his victim. "poor fool!" he exclaimed, his glass of wine in his hand. "the countess had already become a devoted disciple." but the empress at once bestirred herself in fear of public indignation being aroused against the holy father, and telephoning to the minister of the interior, ordered the count's immediate release. on another occasion, a week later, a young lieutenant of cavalry named olchowski, who had been with von rennenkampf at brest-litovsk, had returned to petrograd, being met at the railway station by his devoted young wife, a mere chit of a girl, the daughter of a baroness living at ostroff. they returned home together, whereupon somebody slipped into his hand an anonymous letter, stating that his pretty young wife vera had become one of the "spiritual brides" who attended the bi-weekly meetings in the gorokhovaya. the lieutenant said nothing, but watching next afternoon he followed her to the meeting place of the "naked believers," and having satisfied himself that during his absence at the front his beloved wife had fallen beneath the "saint's" spell, he concealed himself in the porch of a neighbouring house until after the worshippers had all departed. then rasputin presently descended the steps to enter one of the imperial carriages which had called for him as was usual each day. in an instant the outraged husband, half-mad with fury, flung himself upon the "holy" libertine and plunged a long keen knife into his breast. but rasputin, whose strength was colossal, simply tossed his assailant away from him without a word, and entered the carriage. beneath his monkish hair-shirt he had for some time, at the empress's urgent desire, worn another shirt which she had had specially made for him in paris, as also for the tsar--a light but most effective shirt of steel-mail. chapter three. how rasputin poisoned the tsarevitch. the dark forces established so ingeniously by the kaiser behind the russian throne in april, , had now become actively at work. the small but all-powerful clique of which rasputin was the head because he practically lived with the imperial family and ate at their table-- the little circle which the russians called "the camarilla"--were actively plotting for the betrayal of the allies and a separate peace with germany. sturmer, the austrian who had been pushed into the office of prime minister of russia by his boon companion and fellow _bon-viveur_, the mock-monk of pokrovsky, had already risen in power. the man whose long goatee-beard swept over the first button of his gorgeous uniform, all true loyal russians in their unfortunate ignorance cheered wildly as he drove swiftly with the _pristyazhka_, or side-horse, along the nevski, for he was believed to be "winning the war." russia, alas! to-day knows that with german gold flowing freely into his pocket he was in secret doing all he could to prevent ministers arriving from great britain, and laughing up his sleeve at his success in ordering a mock-railway from alexandrovsk to be built in order to connect petrograd to an ice-free port--a line which subsequently had to be taken up and relaid! even our british journalists were cleverly bamboozled, for they returned from russia and wrote in our newspapers of her coming great offensive, when they would sweep back the kaiser's hordes and be into berlin ere we should know it. in petrograd one heard of rasputin as the shadowy somebody. but most people declared that he was only a monk, a pious person whom silly women admired, as women so often admire a fashionable preacher even in our own country, and further because of "something," the censor refused to allow his name to appear in any paper. in russia the censorship is full of vagaries. my own novels came under his ban twenty years ago, because as correspondent of _the times_ i had spoken some very plain truths in that journal. i remember well old monsieur de stael, then russian ambassador in london and the cheeriest of good souls, laughing when i came back from russia at my complaint regarding the censorship. "why!" he said, "they censor my letters to my own daughter in nijni! please do not think any the less of russia for that. you have been across the empire, into siberia, and surely you know how far we are behind the times!" russia had, after all, advanced but little in those intervening twenty years, though it has produced the rascal rasputin. that small circle of germanophiles who met so frequently in secret at rasputin's house in the gorokhovaya--the scene of the bi-weekly orgies of the "sister-disciples"--though they were unaware of it were, with clever insinuation, being taught that a separate peace with germany would be of greatest advantage to the empire. they were hourly plotting, and the details of their conspiracies which have now come to light and are before me, documents in black and white, which had been carefully preserved by the monk, are truly amazing. surely no novelist, living or dead, could have ever imagined a situation so astounding and yet so tragic, for the fate of one of the mightiest imperial houses of the modern world was now trembling in the balance. that both the prime minister and his long-moustached sycophant protopopoff, a political adventurer whose past is somewhat shady and obscure, were in daily consultation is plain from the reports of secret agents of the revolutionists. the duke charles michael, though heir to the grand duchy of mecklenburg-strelitz, had, as part of the german emperor's subtle plot, become naturalised as a russian three weeks before the declaration of war, and he, with the erotic scoundrel, was actively carding out berlin's set programme in the salons of tsarskoe-selo. "grichka," the convicted thief from the far-off siberian village, the man who had a dozen "spiritual brides" at pokrovsky, uncouth, unlettered and unwashed, had by this time obtained such hypnotic hold upon the female portion of petrograd society that when he deigned to accept an invitation to dine at the various palaces of the nobility he would eat from his plate with his dirty fingers and his female admirers actually licked them clean! this is absolute fact, vouched for by dozens of patriotic russians whose names i could give. it is contained in a plain report in cold unvarnished language in an official russian report which is before me. readers will, i believe, halt aghast. but such men have exercised the same powers over women-- criminal lunatics always--through the long pages of history. the heart of russia was being eaten out by the german canker-worm. the high-born women of petrograd were being used by rasputin to play the kaiser's game. outwardly sturmer, protopopoff, the bishop teofan, and their place-seeking friends were good loyal russians bent upon winning the war. in secret, however, they were cleverly arranging to effect various crises. the supply of food was held up by a ring of those eager to profit, and the empire became suddenly faced with semi-starvation, so that rioting ensued, and the police were kept busy. then there succeeded serious railway troubles, congestion of traffic to and from the front, "faked" scandals of certain females whom the camarilla charged with giving away russia's secrets to germany. some highly sensational trials followed, much perjured evidence was given, false reports of _agents provocateurs_ produced, and several officers in high command who, though perfectly innocent, were actually condemned as traitors, merely because they had become obnoxious to rasputin and his circle. one day a sensational incident occurred when rasputin visited the ministry of the interior, and sought the adjunct-minister dzhunkovsky, who controlled the police of the empire. on being shown into his room the monk insolently demanded why he was being followed by police-agents, and why his friends who visited his house in the gorokhovaya were being spied upon. "my duty, my dear father, is to know what is in progress in petrograd," replied the minister coldly. "are you not aware that i am immune from espionage by your confounded agents?" cried rasputin in anger. "are you in ignorance that my personal safety is in charge of the special palace police who are responsible for the safety of the emperor?" "my own actions are my own affair," was the chill reply--for truth to tell--the revolutionists had already imparted to dzhunkovsky certain evidence they had collected as to the traitorous conduct of the pseudo-monk and his traitorous friends. high words arose. grichka, losing his temper, made use of some very insulting remarks regarding the minister's young wife, whereupon dzhunkovsky sprang from his chair and promptly knocked down the "saint." an hour later rasputin, with his eye bandaged, sat with the empress in her room overlooking the neva, and related how he had been assaulted by the adjunct-minister of the interior, merely because he had expressed his unswerving loyalty to the throne. to the empress the unwashed charlatan was as a holy man, and such insult caused her blood to boil with indignation. the fellow knew quite well that no word uttered against himself was ever believed by either emperor or empress. they were all said to be stories invented by those jealous of the saint's exalted position, and the wicked inventions of enemies of the dynasty. therefore, what happened was exactly what he expected. in a fury the neurotic empress rose and went off to the tsar who, then and there, signed a decree dismissing his loyal adjunct-minister from office, and appointing an obscure friend of rasputin's in his place! in that same week another incident occurred which caused the saint no little apprehension. his majesty had appointed samarin as procurator of the holy synod, an appointment which rasputin knew might easily result in his own downfall. samarin, an honest, upright man, was one of his most bitter enemies, for he knew the disgraceful past of both him and teofan, and further he had gained accurate knowledge of which appointments of bishops in the pravoslavny church had been the outcome of the ex-horse stealer's influence. therefore, the arch-adventurer saw that at all hazards this new procurator must not be allowed to remain in office, for already he had announced his intention to clear the pravoslavny church of its malign influences and filthy practices. three days later rasputin went out to tsarskoe-selo, where the emperor happened to be, and entering his majesty's private cabinet said in a confidential tone: "listen, friend. i have a secret to whisper to thee! last night i was with sturmer, and he revealed that a great revolutionary plot is afoot for thy deposition from the throne!" "what!" cried the emperor, pale with alarm as he sprang from his chair. "another plot! by whom?" "its chief mover is the man samarin, whom thou hast appointed procurator of the holy synod," replied the crafty adventurer. "sturmer urged me to come at once and to tell thee in private." "are you quite certain of this, holy father?" asked the emperor, looking straight into his bearded face. the monk's grey steely eyes, those hypnotic eyes which few women could resist, met the tsar's unwaveringly. "thou knowest me!" was the "saint's" grave reply. "when i speak to thee, i speak but only the truth." that same day samarin was removed from office and disgraced. everyone wondered why his appointment had been of such brief duration, but that same night, the prime minister sturmer and rasputin drank champagne and rejoiced together at the house in the gorokhovaya, while anna vyrubova, the favourite lady-in-waiting, was also with them, laughing at their great triumph. not a person in all the great empire could withstand rasputin's influence. honest men feared him just as honest women regarded him with awe. from dozens, nay hundreds, of place-hunters and favour-seekers he took bribes on every hand, but woe betide those who fell beneath the blackguard's displeasure. it meant death to them. he was certainly the most powerful and fearless secret agent of all that the huns possessed, scattered as they were in every corner of the globe. yet it must not be supposed that there were none who did not suspect him. indeed, a certain committee of revolutionaries, to whose action russia is to be indebted, were watching the fellow's career very closely, and some of the secret reports concerning him here as i write form intensely interesting reading, astounding even for the unfathomable land of russia. within a few weeks of his triumph over the newly-appointed procurator of the holy synod he discovered, with the innate shrewdness of the russian mujik, that certain secret reports seriously compromising him had been given into the emperor's hand. his majesty, in turn, had shown them to his wife. once again, he saw himself in peril, so, before any action could be taken, he abruptly entered the empress's room at tsarskoe-selo, and boldly said: "heaven hath revealed to me in a vision that the enemies of the dynasty have spoken ill of me, have maligned me, and have questioned my divine power. i have therefore come to bid farewell of thee!" the empress, who was seated with madame vyrubova, and the old countess ignatieff, rose from her chair, pale to the lips. "you--you--you are surely not going, holy father!" she gasped. "you cannot mean that you will desert us!" she cried. "what of poor little alexis?" and the words faded from her lips. "yes, truly i am going! our enemies have, alas, triumphed! evil triumphs over good in this terrible war," was his slow, impressive answer. "of alexis,"--and he shook his shock head mournfully. "ah, no!" shrieked the unhappy empress hysterically. "listen!" commanded the deep-voiced saint very gravely. "i must not conceal the truth from thee. on the twentieth day of my departure, thy son alexis will be taken ill--and alas! the poor lad will not recover!" madame vyrubova pretended to be horrified at this terrible prophecy, while the empress shrieked and fainted. whereupon the saint crossed himself piously and, turning, with bent head left the room. within half-an-hour he was on his way to his twelve "spiritual brides" in his sordid house at pokrovsky. the empress lived for the next twenty days in a state of terrible dread. alas! true to the holy father's prophecy the boy, on the twentieth day, was seized with a sudden mysterious illness which puzzled the court physicians who were hastily summoned from petrograd. indeed, a dozen of the best medical men in the capital held a consultation, but opinions differed regarding the cause of the haemorrhage, and the empress again sent wild telegrams urging her pet saint to return. little did she dream that her favourite lady-in-waiting had six hours before administered a dose of a certain secret chinese drug to the young tsarevitch and purposely caused the illness which the rascal had predicted. time after time did her majesty telegraph, urging her "holy father" to return and save the boy's life, signing herself affectionately "your sister alec." yet the wires were dumb in reply. an imperial courier brought back no response. the doctors, as before, could make nothing out of the poor boy's illness, and were unable to diagnose it. the charlatan was playing with the life of the heir of the romanoffs. it has, however, been since revealed by analysis that the compound sold to rasputin by the chemist--a secret administrator of drugs to petrograd society named badmayeff--was a poisonous powder produced from the new horns of stags, mixed with the root of "jen-shen." in the early spring when the stags shed their horns there appear small knobs where the new horns will grow. it is from these that the chinese obtain the powder which, when mixed with "jen-shen," produces a very strong medicine highly prized in china and thibet as being supposed to rejuvenate old persons, and to act as a kind of love-philtre. when used in strong doses it produces peculiar symptoms, and also induces dangerous haemorrhage. it is evident from evidence i have recently obtained, that on the twentieth day after rasputin's departure the high priestess of his cult, madame vyrubova, administered to the poor helpless little lad a strong dose in his food. day followed day; she increased that dose, until the poor little boy's condition became most precarious, and the deluded empress was equally frantic with grief. at any moment he might die, the doctors declared. one night rasputin returned quite unexpectedly without having replied even once to the tsaritza's frantic appeals. he made a dramatic appearance in her private boudoir, dressed in sandals and his monk's habit, as though he had just returned from a pilgrimage. "i have come to thee, o lady, to try and save thy son!" he announced earnestly in that deep raucous voice of his, crossing himself piously as was his constant habit. the distracted empress flew to the boy's room where the mock-saint laid his hands upon the lad's clammy brow and then falling upon his knees prayed loudly in his strange jumble of scraps of holy writ interspersed with profanity, that curious jargon which always impressed his "sister-disciples." "thy son will recover," declared the saint, thus for the second time impressing upon her majesty that his absence from court would inevitably cause the boy's death. "but why, holy father, did you leave us?" demanded the empress when they were alone together ten minutes afterwards. "because thou wert prone to believe ill of me," was his stern reply. "i will not remain here with those who are not my friends." "ah! forgive me!" cried the hysterical woman, falling upon her knees and wildly kissing his dirty hand. "remain--remain here always with us! i will never again think ill of thee, o holy father! all that is said is by your enemies--who are also mine." the pious rascal's house in the gorokhovaya, besides being the meeting-place of the society women who, believers in "table turning," were his sister-disciples, was also the active centre of german intrigues. it was the centre of germany's frantic effort to absorb the russian empire. twice each week meetings were held of that weird cult of "believers" of whom the most sinister whisperings were heard from the neva to the black sea. the "sister-disciples" were discussed everywhere. the "holy father" still retained his two luxurious suites of rooms, one in the winter palace, and the other in tsarskoe-selo, but he seldom occupied them at night, for he was usually at his own house receiving in secret one or other of his "friends" of both sexes. his influence over both nicholas ii and his german wife was daily increasing, while he held petrograd society practically in the hollow of his hand. now and then, in order to justify his title of "saint" he would, with the connivance of a mujik of his siberian village, who was his confederate, perform a "miracle" upon some miserable poor person who could easily be bribed and afterwards packed off to some distant part of the empire so that he, or she, could tell no further tales. a hundred roubles goes far in russia. the prime minister sturmer, the blackmailer protopopoff, the dissolute bishop teofan, a court official named sabouroff, and ivanitski, a high official in the ministry for foreign affairs, all knew the absurd farce of these mock-miracles, yet it was to the interest of them that rasputin should still hold grip over the weak-minded empress and that crowd of foolish women of the court who had become his "sister-disciples." oh! that we in britain were in ignorance of all this! surely it is utterly deplorable. the men mentioned, together with half-a-dozen others with high-sounding titles, were bent upon ruining russia, and giving her over body and soul as prey to germany. all had been arranged, even to the price they were each to receive for the betrayal of their country. this was told to the empress time after time by count kokovtsov, the adjunct-minister of the interior dzhunkovsky, the grand dukes nicholas michailovitch, dmitri pavlovitch, and others. but her majesty would listen to nothing against her pet "saint," the divine director, that disgracefully erotic humbug who pretended that he could heal or destroy the little tsarevitch. when any stories were told of him, anna, her favourite lady-in-waiting, would declare that they were pure inventions of those jealous of "dear gregory's" position and influence. while boris sturmer, frantically scheming for a separate peace with germany, was with his traitorous gang engineering all sorts of disasters, outrages and military failures in order to prevent the russian advance, kurloff, another treacherous bureaucrat, sat in the ministry of the interior collecting the gangs of the "black hundred," those hired assassins whom he clothed in police-uniforms and had instructed in machine-gun practice. rasputin and protopopoff were now the most dominant figures in the sinister preparations to effect russia's downfall. rasputin was busy taking bribes on every hand for placing his associates into official positions and blackmailing society women who, having been his "disciples," had, from one cause or another, left his charmed circle. protopopoff, who once posed as our friend and hobnobbed; with mr lloyd george, was a man of subtle intrigue. from being a friend of britain, as he pretended to be when he came here as vice-president of the duma, he was enticed away by germany to become the catspaw of the kaiser, and was hand in glove with the holy rascal, with his miracle-working, behind the throne. rasputin, himself receiving heavy payments from germany, had acquired already the most complete confidence of the tsar and tsaritza; indeed, to such an extent that no affair of state was even decided by the weak-kneed autocrat without the horse-stealer's evil counsel. loyal to his potsdam paymaster, rasputin gave his advice with that low and clever cunning which ever distinguished him. he gave it as a loyal russian, but always with the ulterior motive of extending the tentacles of german influence eastward. in the voluminous confidential report here before me as i write, the disclosures of the rise and fall of rasputin, i find an interesting memorandum concerning a certain paul rodzevitch, son of a member of the council of the empire. alexander makaroff, one of the three private secretaries of the emperor, had died suddenly of heart disease, the result of a drinking bout at the old donon, and at the dinner-table of the imperial family at tsarskoe-selo the matter was being discussed, rasputin being present. he was unkempt, unwashed--with untrimmed beard, and a filthy black coat greasy at the collar, and his high boots worn down at heel, as became a "holy man." the tsar was deploring the death of this fellow makaroff, a person whose evil life was notorious in petrograd, and whose young wife--then only twenty--had followed the example of the empress, and had become a "sister-disciple." "friend!" exclaimed the "saint" with pious upward glance, for he had the audacity to address the emperor thus familiarly, "friend! thou needst not seek far for another secretary; i know of one who is accomplished, loyal and of noble birth. he is paul rodzevitch. i will bring him to thee to-morrow as thy new secretary--and he will serve thee well." his majesty expressed satisfaction, for the holy man, the holiest man in all holy russia, as was his reputation, had spoken. next day the good-looking young fellow was appointed, and into his hand was given his majesty's private cipher. none knew, until it was revealed by the band of russian patriots united to unmask the spy, that this fellow rodzevitch had spent two years in germany before the war, or that he was in receipt of a gratuity of twenty-five thousand marks annually from the spy bureau in the koniggratzer-strasse in berlin! by this means rasputin placed a spy of germany upon all the tsar's most confidential correspondence. madame vyrubova, and the infernal witchdoctor, were already all-dominant. sturmer and protopopoff were but pawns in the subtle and desperate game which germany was playing in russia. the food scarcity engineered by kurloff; the military scandals engineered by a certain creature of the kaiser's called nicolski; the successful plot which resulted in the destruction of a great munition works with terrible loss of life near petrograd; the chaos of all transport; the constant wrecking of trains, and the breakdown of the strategic line from the arctic coast across the lapland marshes, were all combining to hurl the empire to the abyss of destruction. one day the grand duke nicholas visited tsarskoe-selo, where he had a private interview with the emperor--rasputin's creature, the new secretary rodzevitch, being present. the emperor had every belief in the man's loyalty. his majesty, weak and easily misled, never dreamed of treachery within his private cabinet. the words spoken by the grand duke that afternoon were terse, and to the point. "the empire is doomed!" he said. "this verminous fellow rasputin--the man contemptuously known in the slums of the capital as `grichka,' is working out germany's plans. i have watched and discovered that he is the associate of pro-germans, and that his is the hand which in secret is directing all these disasters which follow so quickly upon each other." "but he is a friend of protopopoff!" the emperor exclaimed. "protopopoff has been to england. he has gone over the munition factories in scotland that are working for us; he has visited the british fleet, and when i gave him audience a few weeks ago, he expressed himself as a firm supporter of our allies. read his speech in the duma only the night before last!" "i have already read it," replied the grand duke. "but it does not alter my opinion in the least. he is hand-in-glove with the monk and with the duke of mecklenburg-strelitz. why you continue to have either of them about you i cannot imagine. if you do not dismiss them, then the house of romanoff must fall, i tell you that," he declared quite bluntly. his majesty pandered for a moment and replied--"then i will give orders to the censor that the names of neither are in future to be mentioned publicly." this is all the notice the emperor took of the grand duke's first warning. the people did not dare in future to mention "grichka," for fear of instant arrest. since the outbreak of war mother grundy has expired in every country in europe. an unfortunate wave of moral irresponsibility seems to have swept the world, and nowhere has it been more apparent than in russia. this unwashed rascal who posed as a saint, who, by his clever manoeuvres, his secret drugs and his bribes, had become so popular with the people, was entirely unsuspected by the simple folks who comprise the bulk of russia's millions. to them he was a "holy man" whom the great tsar admired and fed at his table. no one suspected the miracle-worker to be the secret ambassador of the assassin of potsdam. everywhere he went--moscow, kazan, odessa, nijni, and other cities, he was fierce in his hatred of the kaiser, and while cleverly scheming for the downfall of his own people, he was yet at the same time urging them to prosecute the war. a man of abnormal intellect, he was a criminal lunatic of that types which the world sees once every century; a man whose physical powers were amazing, and who though dirty and verminous, with long hair unbrushed and beard untrimmed for a year at a time, could exercise a weird and uncanny fascination which few women, even the most refined, could resist. the terms upon which rasputin was with the empress it has been given to me to reveal in this volume. they would have been beyond credence if the german spy who had been placed as secretary to the emperor, had been loyal to his unscrupulous employers. but he was not. money does much in these war-days, and in consequence of a big payment made to him by rasputin's enemies, the patriots of russia--and they were many--he intercepted a letter sent by the empress to her "holy father" early in --a copy of which i have in the formidable dossier of confidential documents from which i am culling these curious details. the "holy father" in hair-shirt and sandals had gone forth upon a pilgrimage, and the female portion of petrograd society were in consequence desolate. the house in the gorokhovaya stood with its closed wooden shutters. sturmer was at the empress's side, but protopopoff--satan in a silk hat as he has been called--had gone upon a mission to paris. the letter before me was addressed in her majesty's hand to rasputin, at the verkhotursky monastery at perm, whither he had retired in order to found a provincial branch of his "believers" and initiate them into the mysteries of his new religion. this amazing letter which plainly shows the terms upon which the empress of russia was with the convicted criminal from pokrovsky, contains many errors in russian, for the german wife of the tsar has never learnt to write russian correctly, and reads as follows-- "holy father! why have you not written? why this long dead silence when my poor heart is hourly yearning for news of you, and for your words of comfort? "i am, alas! weak, but i love you, for you are all in all to me. oh! if i could but hold your dear hand and lay my head upon your shoulder! ah! can i ever forget that feeling of perfect peace and blank forgetfulness that i experience when you are near me? now that you have gone, life is only one grey sea of despair. there was a court last night, but i did not attend. instead, anna (madame vyrubova) and i read your sweet letters together, and we kissed your picture. "as i have so often told you, dear father, i want to be a good daughter of christ. but oh! it is so very difficult. help me, dear father. pray for me. pray always for alexis (the tsarevitch). come back to us at once. nikki (the tsar) says we cannot endure life without you, for there are so many pitfalls before us. for myself, i am longing for your return--longing--always longing! "without our weekly meetings all is gloom. "only the everlasting toll of war! germany is winning--as she will surely win. but we must all of us maintain a brave face towards our russian public. in you alone i have faith. may god bring you back to us very soon. alexis is asking for you daily. we are due to go to yalta, but shall not move before we meet here. i embrace you, and so do nikki and anna. "your devoted daughter, alec." has history ever before recorded such an astounding letter written by a reigning empress to a sham saint? it must not be thought that rasputin was without enemies. he had hosts of them, but in an almost incredible manner he seemed to scent danger wherever it lurked, and eluded the various traps set for him. this was probably because he had surrounded himself by creatures ready to do any evil work he ordered. not only had he earned the most bitter vengeance of wronged husbands and fathers, but he had against him a small league of patriotic russians, men and women, headed by a civil servant named vilieff, who had banded themselves together with a view to tear away the veil and unmask the traitor. the rascal knew this, and was ever upon his guard, while sturmer and kurloff used their great influence for his protection. at the same time rasputin had corrupted the russian church in its centres of power and administration until nearly half its high ecclesiastics were agents of germany. in order to exhibit a swift, relentless hand in dealing with any enemy who should arise against him, rasputin one evening cordially invited vilieff, who had sworn to open the eyes of the people to the mock-monk's villainy. indeed, he had travelled to far-off pokrovsky and collected much damning evidence concerning grichka's past. kurloff was at dinner to meet the young man, the bait offered by rasputin being that the official of the ministry of the interior intended to promote him to a highly lucrative post in his department. according to a statement made by the monk's wily accomplice, yepantchine, who afterwards came forward and made so many revelations, only the trio sat down to dinner, whereupon the traitorous bureaucrat openly suggested that the band he had formed against rasputin should be betrayed to the palace police, in return for which he had ready for him five thousand roubles in cash, and, in addition, would there and then appoint him to a lucrative position in the chancellerie of the ministry. on hearing this, the young man sprang up and angrily denounced both monk and minister as traitors, declaring that he would at once expose the effort to purchase his silence. without further ado rasputin drew a revolver and, secretly approaching him, shot him dead. his body was found in the snow near the corner of the kazanskaya early next morning. the dead man's friends, who knew of his visit to rasputin that night, informed the police, but the monk was already before them. at dawn he sought the emperor at the tsarskoe-selo, and found him in his dressing-gown. to him he complained that enemies were making a disgraceful charge against him, and added:-- "i seek thy protecting hand, friend. wilt thou give orders to the police to leave me unmolested?" the emperor, who believed in him as implicitly as his wife, at once gave orders over the telephone, and thus the murder was suppressed. a week later a man named rouchine, who had, with yepantchine, assisted him in his mock-miracles, discovered him with a certain swede named wemstedt, who was chief of the german secret service in stockholm, and who had come in disguise to petrograd to obtain certain reports furnished by sturmer. his secret visit to rasputin's house was to get the documents for transmission to germany, and to make one of the large monthly payments to the monk for his services as the kaiser's agent. their meeting was watched by rouchine, who overheard greater part of the conversation of the pair ere the "saint" became aware there was an eavesdropper. instantly he scented danger, for he trusted nobody; the monk made no sign, but when wemstedt had gone he placed a bottle of vodka in a spot where he knew that rouchine would find it. as he expected, his servant drank a glass, and within half-an-hour he expired in terrible agony, with rasputin jeering at him in his death-throes. it is computed that during no fewer than twenty persons lost their lives in consequence of visits to that sinister house within the shadow of the winter palace. armed with those secret chinese drugs, the pious assassin could administer baneful doses which proved fatal hours afterwards, with symptoms which completely deceived the doctors. knowing his own danger, he one day hit upon a new plan for his own protection, and when at dinner at the imperial table he, addressing the empress, said: "a vision of the fixture hath to-day been revealed unto me! it is a warning--one that thou surely shouldst heed! when i die, alexis will live but forty days longer. surrounded as i am by those who seek my downfall and death, i know not what plots may be formed against me. i only know that assuredly alexis will only survive me through forty days. if god wills it, my end may be to-morrow!" he added, raising his eyes piously. at this the empress betrayed terrible distress. but the ruse of the wily scoundrel worked well, for the personal protection at once afforded him by order of the tsar was as complete as the surveillance upon the emperor himself. chapter four. the "hidden hand" of berlin. rasputin, though revealing himself constantly as a blasphemous blackguard, had by the middle of become the greatest power in russia. through his good offices germany hoped to crush the empire. examination of the confidential reports concerning his scandalous activities here before me causes me to halt aghast that the imperial court, which i attended in peace time, petrograd society, and the hard-working classes in russia, should have become so completely and so utterly hypnotised by his disgraceful "religion." the latter had eaten into the empire's heart, causing an outburst of open and disgraceful immorality in the higher circles--a new "sensation" that was appalling. in moscow, kazan, tambov, and other cities, "circles" of the "sister-disciples" had been eagerly formed, together with a branch which were meeting in secret at a small old-world monastery called jedelevo, in the province of simbirsk, and about whose doings many scandalous whispers reached petrograd. "grichka" possessed the reputation of being a popular preacher. that was not so. he had never been ordained a priest; he was a pure adventurer, and did not belong to any ecclesiastical order. therefore he had no licence to preach in a church. he was simply a siberian peasant convicted of theft, blackmail, and outrage, who had set himself up to be a "holy man." and as such, all russia, from the empress downwards, accepted him and swallowed any lie that he might utter. truly the whole situation was amazing in this twentieth century. he preached often to his "sister-disciples" in their _salons_, and sometimes at "at homes," where fast society women who had fallen beneath the pious scoundrel's fascination hoped to make other converts. to such "at homes" only young and pretty women were ever invited. rasputin had no use for the old and angular. one evening one of these reunions for recruiting purposes was held by the yellow-toothed old baroness guerbel, at her big house in the potemkinskaya, and to it a young married woman, wife of an officer named yatchevski, who was well-known in petrograd, had been invited. her husband, hearing of this, called three of his own burly cossacks, and next night they concealed themselves close to rasputin's house. there they waited until the bearded "holy man" emerged to go upon his usual evening visit to the winter palace; when the men suddenly sprang upon him, and hustling him into a narrow side street, stripped him of his finely embroidered silk shirt, of the usual russian model, his wide velvet knickerbockers, and his patent-leather top-boots. after that they administered to the fellow a sound and well-deserved thrashing, having first gagged and bound him. afterwards they placed him, attired only in his underwear, upon a manure heap in a neighbouring stable-yard, while the clothes they had taken from him were packed in a big cardboard costume-box and delivered by special messenger privately to the empress at the palace. her majesty was, of course, furiously indignant that her dear "father" should thus be made, sport of. at once a rigid inquiry was ordered, but the perpetrators of the well-merited punishment were never discovered. rasputin was ever active as head of the camarilla. the attention of the holy synod had time after time been called to the amazing exploits of this pious charlatan, until at last it was deemed expedient to hold yet another inquiry, into the fellow's conduct. supplied with german money, he employed spies on every hand to keep him informed of any untoward circumstances, or any undue inquisitiveness. so he quickly heard of this proposed inquiry and consulted bishop teofan, brother of one of his favourite "sister-disciples," who lived in siberia. that night both monk and bishop sought the tsar and tsaritza. rasputin declared angrily that there was a most formidable plot against himself. he therefore intended to leave petrograd, and return to siberia for ever. "because by divine grace i possess the power off healing, thy church is jealous of me," he declared to the emperor. "the holy synod is seeking my overthrow! always have i acted for the benefit of mankind, and so through me thy dear son is under god's grace. but the russian church seeks to drive me forth. therefore, i must bow to the inevitable--and i will depart?" "no! no!" cried the empress in despair. then, turning quickly to her husband, who had left some important business of state, which he was transacting in his private cabinet with the war minister, her majesty exclaimed: "nikki. this ecclesiastical interference cannot be tolerated. it is abominable! we cannot lose our dear father! order a list of his enemies in the church to be made, and at once dismiss them all. put our friends into their places." "if thou wilt leave matters entirely to me," said the sham saint, addressing the feeble yet honest autocrat, "i will furnish the list, together with names of their successors." "i give thee a free hand, dear gregory," was the emperor's reply. within twelve hours all those in the russian church who had sought to unmask the pious rascal found themselves dismissed, while in their places were appointed certain of the most drunken and dissolute characters that in all the ages have ever disgraced the christian religion, their head being the arch-plotter bishop teofan. about this time, after many secret meetings of the camarilla at rasputin's house, protopopoff succeeded in bribing certain generals at the front with cash--money supplied from germany, to prevent a further offensive. in consequence, at a dozen points along the russian lines the troops were defeated and hurled back. this created exactly the impression desired by the camarilla, namely, to show to the russian people that germany was invincible, and that a separate peace was far preferable to continued hostility. it was to secure this that rasputin and his gang were incessantly working. scandal after scandal was brought to light, and more than one officer of the high russian command was arrested and tried by court-martial. rasputin and protopopoff had now become more than ever unscrupulous. generals and others who had accepted bribes to further germany's cause were secretly betrayed to the ministry of war, care, however, always being taken that they could produce no absolute evidence against those who had previously been their paymasters. a notorious case was that of general maslovsky, who, before the war, commanded the thirteenth army corps at smolensk. he, with general rosen, commandant of the twenty-third army corps at warsaw, had been induced by a "sister-disciple" of rasputin's--a pretty young frenchwoman--to accept a large sum paid into his account at the volga kama bank in moscow, provided that the russians retreated in the novo georgievsk region. this they did, allowing great quantities of machine-guns, ammunition and motor lorries to fall into the enemy's hands. in order to create scandal and public distrust, the "holy man" secretly denounced these two traitors, who were arrested and tried by court-martial at samara. the prisoners in turn revealed the fact that big payments had been made by the young frenchwoman. so she, in turn, was also arrested. rasputin, however, did not lift a finger to save his catspaw. she declared that she had simply been the tool of the mock-monk, but the latter privately informed the president of the court that the young frenchwoman was a well-known spy of germany known to the court, and whom he had held in suspicion for a considerable time. no word against rasputin's loyalty was ever believed, for was he not the most intimate and loyal friend of both emperor and empress? therefore the court-martial found the prisoners guilty, and the trio paid the penalty of all spies--they were shot in the barrack-square of samara! this is but one illustration of rasputin's crafty intrigue and cool unscrupulousness. possessed of a deeply criminal instinct as he was, it was impossible for him to do an honest action. he never failed to betray his friends, or even send them to their graves upon false charges secretly laid, if by so doing he could further his own despicable ends. the dissolute rascal, possessed of superhuman cunning, held russia in the hollow of his hand, and aided by his fellow-scoundrel, protopopoff, he could make or break the most powerful men in a single hour. that he was in active communication with germany, and that the vile plots against the russian arms were being manufactured in berlin, is plainly shown by the following letter, which after his death was discovered, together with a quantity of other highly incriminating correspondence--which i shall disclose later--in a small safe concealed beneath the stone floor of the well-stocked wine-cellar at the house in the gorokhovaya. it is in one of the sentence-ciphers of the german secret service, but fortunately in the same safe the de-cipher was found, and by it that communication as well as others is now revealed. the letter is written upon thin pale-yellow paper, so that it might be the more easily concealed. it had probably been bound up in the cardboard cover of a book and thus transmitted. this letter before me reads as follows:-- "number . august th, . "your reports upon the activity of krusenstern (commander of the th army corps), and also upon the friendship of sakharoff and yepantchine (two prominent members of the duma), is duly noted. the firm of berchmann brothers, of kiev, are paying into the credit lyonnais in petrograd , roubles to your account, with a similar sum to your friend s. (boris sturmer, prime minister of russia). "instructions are as follows: suggest to s. this plan against the duma. from the archives of the ministry of the interior he can obtain a list of the names and places of residence of thousands of russian revolutionists of the extreme school. these he can, if we order it, place in prison or have them tried by court-martial and shot. he will, however, act most generously and secretly. he will, under promise of protection send them forth as his agents, well supplied with funds, and thus arrange for a considerable number of pro-german social democrats to enter petrograd and work alongside the russian anarchists, tolstoyans, pacifists, communists and red socialists. with such a widespread propaganda of wild and fierce agitators in the munition factories, we shall be able to create strikes and commit outrages at any moment instructions are given. they should be ordered to continually urge the working men to strike and to riot, and thus begin the movement that is to make europe a federation of socialist republics. this plan attracts the working-class, and has already succeeded on the clyde and in ireland. your only serious opponent is gutchkoff, but you will arrange with the empress that his activities be at once diverted into another sphere. "enlist on our side as many members of the duma as possible. furnish from time to time a list of payments made by you, and the firm of berchmann will sustain your balance at the credit lyonnais. "we await the result of your good services, which are highly appreciated by his majesty, and which will be amply and most generously rewarded when we have russia in our hands, which will not be long. "messages: tell s. (sturmer, the pro-german prime minister and a creature of the empress) to be extremely careful of the grand duke dmitri. he holds a compromising letter written by nada litvinoff regarding her attempt to suborn brusiloff. the woman litvinoff is reported to be staying at the regina hotel in petrograd. no effort should be spared to obtain and destroy that letter, as it is very compromising. professor miliukoff should be removed. ten thousand roubles will be paid for that service. j. or b. might be approached. both are in need of money. "instruct anna (madame vyrubova) to tell the empress to receive a woman named geismann, who will demand audience at noon on august th. she carries a verbal message from the emperor. it is important that you should know countess zia kloieff, of voroneje. she possesses influence in a certain military quarter that will eventually be most useful and highly essential. "h--(a spy whose identity is up to the present unknown) has fixed august th, at : a.m., for the disaster at the shell-filling factory at krestovsky. an electric line is laid beneath the neva, and all is prepared. "salutations from all three of us.--n." such were the secret instructions received from berlin by the murderous charlatan who posed as one of the most loyal russians in the empire. his reply, of which a copy is appended--for strangely--enough he was a businesslike rascal--is as follows. it is brief but to the point:-- "yours and remittances received. s. already at work. have informed her majesty. all is being prepared for our great coup. the more disasters and loss of life in munition factories the better the impression towards yourselves. s. has already sent four hundred extreme revolutionists to the front with money and instructions. have noted all your points. martos takes this to helsingfors, and will await your reply with any further orders. "have had no instructions concerning the englishman c. please send. suggest imprisonment upon false charge of espionage. if so, please send incriminating papers to produce as evidence.--g." the scoundrel's reply here before me is, in itself, in his own handwriting, the most damning evidence against him. that sturmer and protopopoff acted upon those instructions has since become apparent. events have shown it. puppets in the hands of the emperor william, with money flowing to them in an ever-endless stream from businesslike sources entirely unsuspected by the highly patriotic banks handling those substantial amounts, they were swiftly yet surely undermining the greatness of the russian empire and seriously cutting the claws of the russian bear. the "russian steam-roller," as certain english prophets--oh! save them!--were so fond of calling the muscovite army in the early days of the war, was growing rusty for want of proper lubrication. rasputin and his friends were placing its machinery in the reverse gear by their marvellously well-concealed intrigues, and their lavish distribution of money to those long-haired revolutionists who had honestly believed that by removing the autocrat they would liberate their dear russia. no plot more subtle, more widespread, or more utterly amazing has ever been conceived in the whole world's history than the one which i am here disclosing. a convicted criminal, a mere unmannered and uncouth peasant from far siberia, held both emperor and empress of russia beneath his thumb. he gave to both of them orders which they weakly obeyed. if one of the erotic scoundrel's "sister-disciples" asked a favour--the appointment of lover or of husband to a lucrative post--he went at once to the emperor, and actually with his own illiterate hand wrote out the orders for his majesty to sign. and to that unkempt blackguard, who seldom indulged in the luxury of a bath. her majesty the empress bowed her knee, honestly believing that the almighty had endowed him with powers superhuman, and that he could cause disaster or death whenever he willed it. further amazing and incriminating letters are before me as i write, and i shall print more of this secret correspondence in order that readers in great britain may know the depths of germany's villainy and the exact methods by which russia has been betrayed. the official _dossier_ concerning the crimes and conspiracies of the arch-scoundrel is astounding. it becomes increasingly amazing as one turns over its voluminous pages, its confidential reports, its copies of telegrams dispatched under fictitious names, since obtained from the telegraph bureaux of russia, and its originals of secret instructions from berlin. in the latter one finds the subtle hand of the notorious steinhauer, the head of the kaiser's spy-bureau, the fair-bearded, middle-aged prussian who accompanied the german emperor to buckingham palace on his last visit to london, and who was one of the select party of german motorists who came to tour england with prince henry of prussia at their head. it devolved upon myself to accompany and watch that tour very closely. even then one department in whitehall had not been chloroformed by the dope of the sleep-quietly-in-your-beds party--a department in the formation of which i had had some hand. steinhauer i had met in germany, though he did not know me, and when he came to england with his imperial highness, as herr eschenburg of stuttgart, driving his big red "mercedes," i considered that it was high time to keep a strict eye upon him--which i did. what i discovered of his movements and of his associates has been of greatest advantage since the outbreak of war. no more expert spy exists in all the world today than "herr eschenburg of stuttgart", whose real name is steinhauer, known in the german secret service as "number seventy." the _dossier_ here placed at my disposal shows that herr steinhauer visited rasputin in petrograd four times before august, , while his underlings arrived at the house in the gorokhovaya many times after the two empires had come to grips. rasputin, in his unique position as autocrat aver the autocrat, felt himself the personal agent of the kaiser, and as such seems to have somewhat resented steinhauer's rather arrogant orders. indeed, he complained bitterly to the german emperor, who, in reply, propitiated the siberian peasant by explaining that he was so occupied by the campaign against his enemies that he left all matters of detail to "our trusted and loyal friend steinhauer, whose actions and orders are as my own." on august th, , there arrived in petrograd a pretty dark-haired young dutch woman named helene geismann. she presented a letter of introduction to rasputin that evening at his house, and was promised audience of her majesty the empress at noon next day. the monk was at tsarskoe-selo when the young woman called. it was a meeting day of the higher, or court circle of the "sister-disciples," such seances being held at five o'clock each friday afternoon. three new "disciples" had been initiated into the mysteries of the mock-pious rascal's new "religion." their names were the baroness zouieff, and mesdemoiselles olga romanenkoff and nadjezda tavascherne, the two latter being of the noblest families of moscow, and all moving in the court entourage. nicholas ii was away at the front, therefore rasputin on such occasions ruled the empire, and actually signed with his own hand orders and appointments, as his majesty's representative. when the emperor was absent the dirty, unkempt peasant, who called himself a monk, usurped his place in the imperial household. through this unprincipled scoundrel and blackmailer germany was cleverly working to undermine and effect the fall of the muscovite empire. no expense was being spared, nor were there any scruples. germany intended that the russian defensive should crumble. when the empress received the young woman geismann, an emissary from berlin and the bearer of several documents, including an autograph letter from the kaiser, the "holy father" was also present. the superstitious, neurotic empress could do nothing without the advice of the man who had by his mock-piety and his sensuous "religion" so completely entranced her. she, like her weak, narrow-minded husband, had become completely hypnotised by the dissolute charlatan, in whose hands lay absolute power. when the kaiser's messenger presented the secret letter to the empress, she also handed another to rasputin. this was found among the contents of the safe in the basement of "grichka's" house, and is in german, as follows:-- "_strictly private and confidential_. "general headquarters in france, montmedy, august th, . "your excellent service to our empire has been reported to me by herr steinhauer. i congratulate you, happy in the knowledge that the empress alexandra has, in yourself, such a good and wise counsellor. you have done much, but there is still more good work for you to accomplish. "your friends must see that there is an increasing lack of material and ammunition, that information reaches berlin regarding orders for guns, explosives and automobiles placed in england, in order that we can watch for them near the finland coast, and destroy them. disasters on railways, in munition works and elsewhere are advisable. steinhauer is sending you six trusted agents to effect these. your friends must afford them official protection, and they must be also afforded opportunity. "i have also sent certain suggestions to her majesty the empress which she will discuss with you. your two most dangerous enemies at the moment appear to be prince yuri lvov, who has a great following, and the man from tiflis, m. cheidze. if their activities could be ended, you would be in far less danger. it may be possible for you to arrange this. consult with the empress. it is my imperial will that the payment arranged between us shall be doubled from this date. salutations. "wilhelm r. and i." could any letter be more incriminating? the kaiser, with his constant appeals to almighty god, was suggesting outrage and assassination to his paid agent--the man who, aided by the prime minister sturmer and the blackmailer protopopoff, held the future of russia in his unwashed hands! for half-an-hour the young dutch woman, the kaiser's secret messenger, was kept waiting in an ante-room while the empress consulted with her "holy father." then at last her majesty handed the woman an autograph letter to take back to the emperor william. all that is knows of the contents of that note is that it contained a promise that germany should triumph. what chance had poor suffering russia against such crafty underhand conspiracy? every one of her proposed military movements were being betrayed to germany long before they were executed, and thousands of lives of her fine soldiers were daily being sacrificed, while the arch-traitor rasputin continued his career of good-living, heavy-drinking, and bi-weekly "reunions." at these meetings the blackguard usually crossed his hands upon his breast, and with appalling blasphemy declared himself sent by the almighty to deliver russia from the invader. towards all--to society, to those of the immoral cult that he had founded, to russia's millions, he posed as a stern patriot. every one believed him to be so. if not, surely, he would not be so closely intimate with their majesties they argued. nobody in russia dreamed that he was the agent of the kaiser, or that the empress had full knowledge of the great plot in progress. in the following month there occurred a number of mysterious disasters. four explosions occurred in rapid succession; two at petrograd, one at moscow, and one at kostrovna, all involving considerable loss of life, while troop trains were derailed at several important junctions, and other outrages committed, by which it was apparent that german agents were actively work. yet the police were powerless to detect the perpetrators of these dastardly acts. truly the black eagle of prussia had struck its talons deep into russia's heart. late one night rasputin was carousing at his house with the prime minister sturmer and two "sister-disciples," young married women whose names were baroness gliuski and madame pantuhine, well-known in petrograd society for their loose living, and who were helping the plotters and receiving large sums from german sources for their assistance. the "father" had only an hour before returned from tsarskoe-selo, where he had knelt at the bedside of the poor little tsarevitch and then performed a pretended miracle. the truth was that madame vyrubova had administered to the boy in secret several doses of that secret drug with which the mock-monk had provided her. in consequence, he had become ill and his imperial mother had once again called rasputin to "heal" him. this the fellow did, for madame vyrubova withheld the dose, and within four hours of rasputin placing his dirty hands upon the poor boy's brow and uttering those cabalistic nine words of jargon from one of the blasphemous prayers which the scoundrel had written for use by the "sister-disciples," the heir had recovered. and in that way, with his degenerate confederate, the rascal worked his "miracles." the four were seated around the monk's dining-table, smoking and drinking, the two women ever and anon devotedly kissing the "saint's" dirty hands, when his body-servant entered with a note for his master. as rasputin read it his face fell. "danger!" he gasped. "what is it?" inquired the bearded prime minister eagerly, putting down his glass of champagne untouched. "letchitzki! he is arrested!" "letchitzki!" echoed boris sturmer, who was in uniform, as he had been to a diplomatic function at the united states embassy that night. "this is indeed serious for us! why is he arrested? who has dared to do that?" "goutchkoff, minister of munitions, has ordered his arrest for embezzlement--ninety thousand roubles!" "curse goutchkoff!" cried sturmer, starting up. "in that case, our friend protopopoff, as minister of the interior, is powerless to act in his interest!" "is it really very serious?" asked the fair-haired young baroness, who was at that moment holding the "saint's" hand. "serious!" cried the uncouth siberian peasant, who had so completely hypnotised both the women. "very. if his trial took place he would certainly expose us! we cannot afford that. he has sent me this secret message placing the onus of his release upon me, and i must secure it at once. he has documents, letters i have written him. if they were found, then the whole affair must become public property!" "that must not be!" declared sturmer. "at any moment miliukoff, or that young lawyer kerensky, may get to know." "kerensky was again arrested yesterday at my orders for his speech in the duma," said rasputin. "i agree. the prosecution of letchitzki must not proceed. it is far too dangerous." "is there anything i can do?" asked the pretty baroness, one of the most unscrupulous women in russia. "yes," replied the monk. "you know the minister goutchkoff. go to him early to-morrow morning, and appeal on letchitzki's behalf. take with you ninety thousand roubles which i will give you as soon as the banks open. pretend to the minister that he is your lover, that he has embezzled the money to pay for presents to yourself--then hand over the sum missing." "excellent idea!" declared sturmer. "you are always ingenious when cornered, gregory!" "by that we shall clear the way for further action. we must both see the empress at once. it is not yet too late," rasputin added, and the merry quartette at once broke up, the "sister-disciples" to their own homes, and the monk to drive to the palace. both conspirators, so well-known, passed the sentries unchallenged, and traversing the long corridors to the private apartments, went by the gigantic cossack on duty at the end, and through the big swing-doors to the luxurious wing of the great palace. it was already long past midnight, and the only person they could find was the tsar's eldest daughter, the grand duchess olga, who had with the eldest of her sisters entered rasputin's "sisterhood" a year before. every one, including the servants, had retired. the princess, who was reading an english novel in her own little sitting-room, appeared surprised to see the "holy father" at that hour, but took from him an urgent message to the empress. ten minutes later the tsaritza, in a dainty lace boudoir-cap and rich silk kimono, entered the room where the pair of scoundrels awaited her. when alone, rasputin revealed the fact of letchitzki's arrest, adding: "thou canst realise the great danger to us all. if that man is brought before the court believing that we have not endeavoured to save him, he will, no doubt, reveal and produce certain letters i have sent to him. our plans will then become public, and russia will rise and crush us! at present they do not suspect thee of any pro-german leanings. thou art the great and patriotic tsaritza. but if this prosecution proceeds, then assuredly will the truth become known!" "but, holy father, what can i do?" asked the weak hysterical woman, alarmed and distracted. "thou must telegraph at once to thy husband to order the prosecution to be dropped," said the crafty scoundrel, standing in that erect attitude he was so fond of assuming, with one hand upon his breast and the other behind his back. "i will do all that you wish," was her eager response, and she sat down at once to write the message to the tsar who, on that night, was with his gallant soldiers at the front. "paul letchitzki, under-secretary of the ministry of munitions, has been arrested for embezzlement of public funds," she wrote. "it is highly necessary, for our peace, that the prosecution shall be instantly stopped. every moment's delay means danger. i will explain when you return. telegraph your order for his immediate release and the end of all proceedings against him. i await your acknowledgment.--alec." then, having read the telegram, of which both men approved, she gave rasputin her golden bangle from her wrist. from it was suspended the tiny master-key of the escritoire in her boudoir. "will you, my holy father, fetch me my private cipher-book?" she asked the mock-monk, at the same time bending and kissing his hand. the fellow knew where the little book was kept in such privacy, and in a few moments he had brought it. then sturmer at once sat down and put the message into cipher, afterwards taking it himself to the clerk in the telegraph room on the other side of the palace, for transmission to the emperor. at ten o'clock next morning a reply in code was handed to the empress. when, with the aid of her little book, she de-coded it, she read: "i cannot understand how the prosecution of a thief of whose name i am ignorant can affect us adversely. i have, however, at your desire ordered his release and the suppression of all proceedings.--nikki." to this, the tsaritza, after she had sent a copy of the reassuring despatch to rasputin, replied: "i thank you for your kind generosity. how noble of you! accused was an innocent victim of his enemies, and our action shows that you are open and just. our father and myself anxiously await your return.-- alec." the moment rasputin received the message from the hands of the trusted cossack, ivan khanoff, the personal guardian of the young tsarevitch, whom the empress trusted with all her private correspondence, he telegraphed to boris sturmer at the ministry of foreign affairs, telling him of the order of the tsar. and both laughed triumphantly at each other over the telephone. yet both certainly had had a very narrow escape of exposure, and for the first time the tsaritza saw the handwriting on the wall. chapter five. rasputin's secret orders from berlin. some pages of rasputin's _dossier_ concern his intimate friendship with the imperial family, and more especially with the tsar's daughters, whom the empress herself had placed beneath his "tuition" and influence. it seems that the monk helidor--who because of his patriotism fell out of favour when rasputin commenced to perform his conjuring tricks, which the imperial court believed to be miracles--still retained his friendship with the grand duchess olga, and the governess of the imperial children, the honest and straightforward madame tutcheva. to helidor--who afterwards revealed all he knew to the revolutionary party--the young grand duchess confessed her love for a certain very handsome officer, nicholas loutkievitch, of the imperial guard. she saw him often in the vicinity of the palace, and also when she went to church, and he used to smile at her. "holy father," she said one clay to helidor, "what can i do? i love him. but alas! love is forbidden to me--for i am an imperial princess. it is my torment." helidor had tried to console her by saying that she was young, and that she would love many times before she found the man who was to be her husband. it was surely not strange that the handsome young grand duchess should be attracted by a handsome man, for after all, even imperial princesses are human. helidor, who belonged to the pravoslavny church, under bishop teofan, saw rasputin a few days later and incidentally mentioned the youthful infatuation of the young princess. "oh! i have already cured all that!" said the scoundrel with a laugh. "her infatuation has been dispelled. i have cast the devil out of her." then rasputin boastingly disclosed to helidor certain things which left no doubt in the latter's mind as to the true state of affairs existing at tsarskoe-selo, or the truth of what madame tutcheff had alleged. indeed, among the filed pages of the _dossier_ which deal with this particular incident, is a letter which i venture here to reproduce. rasputin, with all his mujik's shrewdness, preserved many letters written to him by women of all grades, hoping that when cast out of the imperial circle he could use them for purposes of blackmail. here is one of them: "palace of peterhof. "march rd, . "holy father,--dear true friend, we are all desolate without you. when are you returning from pokrovsky? you promised to be here on the third, yet we have had no word from you. dear true friend and father, how is matroysha (rasputin's peasant wife)--and the children? give my love to them. tatiana and i are sending them some things by the courier to-day. each time we go to anna's (madame vyrubova) all is but blank despair. we miss our sweet and helpful reunions, and long always for your return. you, my holy father, are my inestimable friend. i no longer think of nicholas, but of you alone, and of our holy religion. my mother is desolate without you. pray for me. i kiss your dear hands. your loving daughter, olga." i copy this from the great mass of papers before me--the documentary evidence of the tragic story of the downfall of the great imperial house of romanoff--in order that the reader may be able to form some slight idea of the marvellous, almost incredible grip which germany had upon the tsar's family, his household and his nation through the medium of the verminous peasant who had declared himself a heaven-sent apostle of god. the moral atmosphere of the court was shocking. rasputin, chief agent of the kaiser, was posing, just as the kaiser himself posed, as a god-fearing, prayerful man sent by divine-right as a deliverer. the monk's mission was, however, to deliver russia into the hands of germany. the next pages of the _dossier_ contain advice notes of german funds paid to the "saint" through the most unsuspicious channels. as instance of these i copy the following dates and extracts, the actual letters of advice themselves being of a pretended business character and of no importance: april th.--payment to his excellency boris sturmer by jules wick, morskaya , advocate, sum due from the estates of the late baroness nikeleuko, of doubno.-- , roubles. april th.--payment made to gregory rasputin by nicholas pokotilo. address select hotel, ligovskaya , petrograd, representatives of messrs. solovoioff, of odessa.-- , roubles. june st.--payment to his excellency d.a. protopopoff made for rent of lands at vyazma, by alexander koltchak, agent of the estate of prince tchekmareff, less per cent, commission to messrs. montero and company, of kieff;-- , roubles. june rd.--payment to vera zoueff, dancer at luna park, by g. merteus, nevsky , petrograd.-- , roubles. (the woman who passed as a russian was one, bertha riehl, a german dancer, and a secret agent of berlin.) june th.--payment to sophie tatistcheff (who had married baron roukhloff, one of the tsar's secretaries who had control of his majesty's private correspondence), by safonov's bank, in settlement of an insurance claim for property destroyed by fire at poltava. i have copied these in their order of sequence, but the items number over one hundred, and reveal payments of huge sums of german secret service money to rasputin and his friends, thus forming a most illuminating disclosure as to the manner in which russia was rapidly being undermined. with such dark forces at work in the very heart of the empire, it is indeed marvellous that general brusiloff could have effected his superhuman offensive between pripet and the roumanian frontier. he started with his four armies early in june, , and by the middle of august had captured , officers, , men and guns. berlin became seriously alarmed at such a situation. all rasputin's plotting with sturmer, count fredericks, protopopoff, countess ignatieff, madame vyrubova, and a dozen other less prominent but equally importunate officials, together with all the steady stream of german marks flowing into petrograd could not stem the russian tide on the german and austrian front's. the russian "steam-roller" seemed really progressing. the kaiser grew seriously alarmed. at the instigation of count von wedel, his right-hand in espionage and unscrupulous propaganda, a secret message was sent to rasputin--a message which he preserved among his other papers. it runs as follows, and is in the german cipher of the koniggratzer-strasse of which the mock-monk kept a de-cipher in his interesting safe. hence it has been available: "f.g. , -- . "memorandum from `number ,' august th, . "it is deemed of extreme urgency that the offensive of the pripet should at once cease; and be turned into a victory for the central powers as promised us in your despatch of july st. you are not keeping faith with us! what is wrong? s. (sturmer, the prime minister) is inciting the russians to victory in his speeches. "his triumphant telegrams to asquith must cease. they only serve to encourage the allies. this advance must not continue. further, the munition factories at vologda and bologoye have not yet been destroyed as we ordered. we know that k. (a clock-maker named kartzoff who blew up the explosive works at viborg in which lives were lost), who did such good work in that direction, is arrested and shot, together with the woman r. (mdlle. raevesky, whose father was in the ministry of the interior under protopopoff). we note that you gave information to the police concerning both persons, because they became lovers and were likely to open their mouths and thus become dangerous to us. "_secret instructions_:--that to nicholas meder be entrusted the task of destroying the vologda and bologoye works, and that madame fleischer, who lives in volkovo, be appointed as his assistant--each to receive six thousand roubles for their services. "as your efforts to prevent the offensive in the pripet region have failed up to the present, it is ordered that general brusiloff be removed by the means already employed in other enemy countries. send a trustworthy messenger to doctor klouieff, living in the vozkresenskaya, in kazan, to ask for `a tube.' he will know. the contents of the tube introduced into any drink will produce tetanus--with a rapid end. klouieff is german, and may be entirely trusted. brusiloff has a body-servant named ivan, sawvitch who is a friend of boris koltchak, a soldier in the th infantry regiment of muisk. koltchak, who has been in our service for five years, is to be ordered and facilities rendered him to visit his friend sawvitch at general headquarters, and to introduce the contents of the tube into brusiloff's food or drink. for this service you are ordered to pay in secret twenty-five thousand roubles upon its completion. the man sawvitch is in love with the sister of koltchak, a fact which will ease certain difficulties. be careful, however, of marya ustryaloff, who is jealous of the woman in question. "general korniloff may be removed by the accidental explosion of a hand-grenade, in the same manner in which general zhukovsky was removed in march last at pultusk. this service could be entrusted to the soldier paul krizhitsky, of the th grenadiers of moscow, who is a despatch-rider and constantly at the general headquarters. he should examine the bomb--a pine-apple one, in preference, and release the pin by accident. for this service you can pay in secret up to eighteen thousand roubles. "further, it is urgent that you should induce the emperor at once to order the release of the men polenov and levitsky, and the woman erich, who were arrested in the hotel brosi at vitebsk. their papers, if found, must be restored to them. the documents are probably stored in the strong rooms of either the ootchotny bank, in the hevsky, or at lampe's. so get hold of them, as they contain facts incriminating s. (sturmer) and v (madame vyrubova). it is of most urgent importance that the prosecution in question be dismissed, and further, that those who instigated it should be degraded in pursuance of our policy. for this service you will be granted a generous extra payment. s.-- ." the signature, scribbled in blue ink upon these remarkable instructions, is that of the notorious herr steinhauer, the kaiser's chief spy and controller of the whole secret ramifications of imperial germany throughout the civilised world. i venture to publish it in these pages in order to show the devilish cunning of germany, and their frantic efforts, by any underground and dastardly means, to stem the tide of war which threatened to overwhelm them. in consequence of these instructions rasputin immediately set to work to execute the wicked command of his imperial master in berlin. on the day following that secret message being delivered into his hands by a woman dressed as a peasant, as, descending from his carriage, he entered a house in the nevski, he walked into the emperor's private study and, placing his hand across his breast in that mock-pious attitude he so often assumed, he said: "friend! thou hast always been held by thy people to be a just and honest ruler; but in vitebsk those who act in thy imperial name are acting illegally and persecuting two poor men and a woman with motives of revenge. god has placed his holy protecting hand upon our dear russia, and has given victory unto our gallant brusiloff. but if injustice be done in thy imperial name then the divine providence will most assuredly withdraw protection from us." "what is this, holy father?" asked the emperor in great surprise. "at vitebsk two men, polenov and levitsky, together with a woman called erich, three patriotic russians who have, been engaged in red cross work--have, because of the ill-will of the governor wauthier, been apprehended, and false charges instituted against them." "of what nature?" "of communicating with the enemy--a vague charge which to-day may be made against even the most patriotic," replied the monk, the "holy father" of the empress, standing in that same attitude he had at first assumed. "from the holy father of the monastery at vitebsk i have received a confidential, and urgent report that the governor wauthier, an ill-living official, has instituted these false charges in order to conceal his own disgraceful misdeeds, which the woman erich has threatened to expose." then, after a pause, the dissolute monk and secret agent of the german emperor said in that insolent, familiar manner he assumed when addressing the tsar: "friend! this governor, against whom the holy father at vitebsk sends me secret information, should be dismissed and disgraced, and thy three innocent subjects released. if thou wilt permit injustice in thy empire, then the success of thy arms cannot be maintained." "holy father," said the weak impotent monarch, "the governor shall be dismissed. pass me over a telegraph-form." and rasputin took from the writing-table one of the forms upon which the tsar wrote his autocratic orders, and actually at the monk's dictation his majesty wrote an order for this release of the prisoners and the dismissal of the innocent, patriotic governor, against whom the lying agent of the kaiser had, according to his instructions from berlin, laid a charge! truly the great patriotic russian empire had already fallen beneath the "mailed fist," even though thousands of her sons were daily sacrificing their lives to secure her freedom. on the day following, petkoff; who had already opened his separatist propaganda among the ukrainian prisoners, in favour of germany, arrived hot-foot in petrograd, and spent some hours with rasputin at his house, where the prime minister sturmer and his excellency protopopoff were also closeted. the secret meeting was held at three o'clock and lasted until eight, when one of the imperial carriages came from the winter palace, as it did daily, to convey the "holy father" there. the emperor had left again for the front three hours before, but the empress remained. the dirty monk at once sought her, explaining that germany had reached the last limits of her power upon the eastern front, and urgently needed a slackening of the russian offensive. "it is truly god's will that our friends the germans shall not be crushed!" declared the cunning blackguard. "are we not told that if we are smitten by an enemy upon one cheek we should turn the other? i declare to thee that if we press our enemies further, then the wrath of god will assuredly fall upon thy house--and upon thy son the tsarevitch," he said in his low base voice, crossing himself piously the while. indeed, that night, so deeply did the charlatan impress the poor empress that she sat trembling at the fate which must be russia's should brusiloff's victory be maintained. incredible as it may seem, the kaiser now held russia in the hollow of his hand. no despatch from petrograd to the allies; no order for material; no communication of whatever sort, imperial, diplomatic or private, but copies were at once transmitted to the wilhelmstrasse, where the negotiations were known as soon as they were in downing street--and sometimes sooner! within a fortnight of rasputin's grim prophecy of russia's downfall if she further defied the imperial power of germany, the cunning plot to infect general brusiloff with tetanus was attempted by the soldier koltchak, while in a train conveying him from borisoff to petrograd, on a flying visit to consult with the minister of war. happily the plot failed, but the coffee in which the deadly culture had been placed was, alas! unfortunately drunk by a certain major dobrovolski, who died mysteriously and in great agony four days later; the general, of course, being entirely ignorant of berlin's vile plot against him. an attempt was also made upon general korniloff at chernitsa ten days later. a soldier who had no business near, handled a hand-grenade carelessly, just as the general happened to be riding by. the bomb exploded, killing the general's horse on the spot, but he himself escaped with a deep cut over the left eye. everybody, of course, believed it to be a pure accident, therefore the affair was never reported. these two attempts upon the lives of russia's military leaders, the documentary evidence of which exists, were only the forerunners of several others even more ingenious and more desperate, as i shall later on disclose in these pages. the failure of the attempts to assassinate brusiloff and korniloff, and the continuation of the russian offensive, now caused the greatest consternation in berlin, where it was believed that rasputin was neglecting the work for which he was being paid so heavily. a message was conveyed to him through swedish sources telling him of the kaiser's extreme displeasure at the failure of the plans, and reminding him of his majesty's words when he had had secret audience and accepted the imperial proposals to become chief agent of germany in russia. certain further instructions were also given as matters of extreme urgency. the russian progress had aroused the most serious fears in berlin. meanwhile the monk's ambition knew no bounds. with marvellous cunning he was busy blackmailing a number of unfortunate society women who, having entered his cult, had afterwards abandoned it, and while being the practical ruler of russia, because of the tsaritza's devotion to him, yet he was daily plotting with his pro-german friends for the nation's downfall. at each of the reunions of his sister-disciples he would strut about and play the part of "saint." on each occasion he would declare: "if you repulse me, god will abandon you! i am the chosen of god--sent to deliver holy russia!" to those who were sceptical he would speak more plainly and convincingly, saying "if you do not obey me, then i will see that you are punished by my friends." so by this means he surrounded himself by an increasing number of hysterical women whose wealth he exploited, and from whom he took bribes to procure high places, distinctions and decorations for their husbands and brothers or their lovers. indeed, before him the highest officials in the empire bowed, crossed themselves, and kissed his hand--not because he was a priest--but because they constantly feared lest they should incur his displeasure, well knowing that if they did, they would at once be superseded. at peterhof, or at tsarskoe-selo, the actions of the bearded blackguard were believed to be inspired by providence. this dissolute siberian fakir, the madame vyrubova, and her imperial mistress, the tsaritza, formed a trinity which ruled the empire at war; and thousands of brave russian soldiers died in consequence. the pro-german propaganda, fostered in secret by the dissolute three, was permeating every department of the state, and was even being spread among the armies at the front. at each success of the russians the empress would grow irritable and despondent, while the slightest success of the enemy caused her to be wildly jubilant. one day, at one of the seances of the higher circle of sister-disciples held at tsarskoe-selo, news was conveyed to her majesty that the germans were retreating and that their fortified base at vladimir volgnsk, near lutsk, had been captured. thereupon the empress cried in great distress: "why is this allowed! why is this advance against the germans not stopped? russia will never crush germany. she shall not do so! holy father! pray for our dear germany!" "o sister! in thy heart harbour neither fear nor distrust, for indeed god hath revealed unto me that there will be a separate peace and the ultimate triumph of the german arms," replied the mock-saint, assuming his most pious attitude, with his hands crossed upon the russian blouse of rich dark blue silk deeply embroidered with gold, which it was his habit to wear at the seances at court. "while on my pilgrimage last week with father macaire, in the monastery of verkhotursky, i had a vision." "a vision!" echoed the empress, while her daughter olga and a dozen ladies of the court sat agape and eager. "holy father, tell us of what has been revealed," urged her majesty. "i saw hosts of men entering a great city as conquerors--hordes from the west bringing to us all the benefits and a higher civilisation. i saw his majesty the german emperor advance and grasp the hand of thy imperial husband the tsar, and kiss him fraternally upon both cheeks. and over all was set the halo of god's glory, and russia rejoiced that she had cast off the yoke of her allies." "god be thanked!" gasped the empress hysterically. "then we need no longer fear. truly heaven is good to send thee to us, dear father!" she added, taking his rough hand, with its bulgy knuckles and unclean nails, and kissing it fervently, while all her court echoed the words so constantly used at the gatherings of the cult: "holy father! god be thanked that we are thy chosen sisters." on the following day, however, rasputin having returned to his house in petrograd, a secret meeting was held at the house of a man named roukhloff, situate in the vereiskaya. the meeting was convened by certain of the monk's enemies in order to expose him as an impostor and a charlatan. it must be remembered that none dreamed that the scoundrel was the direct secret agent of the kaiser himself, or that sturmer and protopopoff were anything else than fine sterling russian patriots. all three were urging every one to "get on with the war." and with this in mind it induces one to wonder whether a similar farce is not to-day being played in certain political circles in other countries of the allies! rasputin had many friends, but he had also made many bitter enemies. as an outcome of that secret meeting, the man roukhloff, son of a functionary in the ministry of foreign affairs, defied the authorities and publicly denounced the "saint" as "a dangerous erotic humbug." the effect was electrical. the emperor, with the empress, count fredericks, and madame vyrubova, was in the imperial train, travelling to the crimea. the moment of that hostile attack was well-chosen, and for a time the "saint's" position was a precarious one. but as soon as it became known in petrograd that he had been denounced, his house was crowded by his faithful sister-disciples, who would have no word said against him. he at once announced his intention to return to siberia, and addressing them with his usual mock piety, said: "the people of petrograd have cast out the man sent to them by god. i will return to my monastery at pokrovsky, and pray for their salvation. assuredly god will punish the disbelievers. you, my sisters, keep faith in your belief. if i never return--then pray for me." an hour afterwards the impostor left for the nicolas station, accompanied by a crowd of women-believers of all classes, but instead of travelling to siberia he changed his route at moscow and hurried in the track of their majesties. meanwhile, the ill-living archbishop teofan, who had declared that he "heard in the holy father rasputin the voice of god," and that to hound him from petrograd meant the incurring of the divine displeasure and the downfall of the empire, and bishop hermogene, another of the monk's creations who had also belauded him, now both saw an opportunity of denouncing the monk's duplicity and malpractices, and thereby securing the favour of the people for themselves. this they did, and in consequence a great sensation was caused in society, both in petrograd and in moscow. in the duma, rasputin was openly denounced by m. goutchkoff, a man of large experience and who had worked in the manchuria campaign and done much to assist the grand duke nicholas and general alexeieff in the munition crisis of . he was director of the committee of war industries, and had, introduced into this committee some highly capable labour delegates, who were now no longer blinded by the halo of sanctity which rasputin had assumed for himself. thus a storm suddenly burst over the head of the holy rascal who had practised his abominations under his pseudo-religious cloak, and who was at the same time secretly plotting for the triumph of germany. but so cleverly did he juggle with the future of the russian empire that he went post-haste across europe, down to yalta in the crimea, and on arrival drove through the pine woods to the imperial palace. he arrived there at six o'clock in the morning, after a long and fatiguing journey. but such was his iron nerve and strong constitution that he was as fresh as when he bade farewell to his clinging devotees in petrograd who had so fervently kissed his dirty hands. he had the audacity to go straight to the tsar's dressing-room, and there met his majesty as he was coming from his bath. naturally nicholas ii was surprised, and on inquiring the reason of his unexpected visit, the "saint" exclaimed: "they have driven me, the man of the lord, from petrograd! i go back to siberia to dwell there in peace. but god will now assuredly weak vengeance upon russia, and all that she holds most dear--as well as upon thy son and heir." "but, holy father!" gasped the emperor, "what has happened? tell me." as the tsar sat in his red bath-wrap, the unwashed "saint" made explanation that both the church and the duma had declared him to be an impostor, adding: "i will not trouble myself over those who defame me. they are as dust. god has sent me to russia, and the russians have despised me." "but who are your enemies?" asked his majesty anxiously. that was the question which rasputin intended that the emperor should ask. at once he explained that the archbishop teofan and bishop hermogene had both turned against him, and in consequence the tsar called his servant to bring him a telegraph-form at once. "whither shall i send those persons?" asked his majesty. "nowhere. let them work their evil will against thy empire. god will himself punish them!" replied the fakir and ex-thief who had self-assumed the title of "father." "i shall leave to-night for siberia, and shall not return." "no. forgive them, holy father," urged the emperor apprehensively. "for my sake and for russia's sake forgive them. i will send teofan, your false friend, to the taurida, and hermogene shall retire to the monastery of tobolsk. helidor, too, is no friend of yours. he shall be sent to prison." "thy will shall be done regarding the two first, but spare helidor. he may yet be useful unto thee," was the crafty mujik's reply. "is there any other enemy who should be removed?" inquired the emperor. "tell me, holy father--and i will deal with him if you will still remain with us. if you leave, poor little alexis will die." the mock-saint, sprawling his legs in the emperor's dressing-room, reflected for a few moments. he knew that by his own hand russia was ruled. "yes," he said presently. "god has told me to forgive my enemies. i will do so if thou wilt assist me. too little consideration is given to our friends." "all consideration shall be given them. to whom do you refer?" the monk drew from beneath his, long black habit a scrap of paper already prepared, and consulting, it, said: "i wrote down here yesterday certain appointments which should be given to those who support thee, against thy enemies." it was a list of favours which the rascal had promised to women for their male acquaintances, and from each he would receive a generous _douceur_, according to the means of the person indicated. "you will note ivan scheveleff, of the imperial chancellerie. he has served thee well for the past five years, and should have the title of excellency, and consequent promotion," said the religious rascal. "again, there is sergius timacheff, of the imperial printing works, who should be appointed a privy councillor; and madame grigoiovitch, who is in the peter-and-paul prison, should be released and amends made to her for the false charge upon which she was convicted at the instance of michael alexandrovitch." "i will telegraph orders in each case," was the emperor's reply, as he lit a cigarette prior to his valet entering. "and the salary of the minister protopopoff is far too little. it should be increased by at least one-half. he is thy most devout and devoted friend and servant of russia." "that shall be done," was the monarch's weak reply. little did his majesty dream that protopopoff was one of russians traitors. "brusiloff should be watched, as there is evidence of treachery against him. before the war he was friendly with a man named von weber, an agent of germany. nekrasov, minister of communications, is also a traitor, and should be dismissed," said the monk, thus denouncing two of russia's strongest and most patriotic fighters, who were perfectly innocent. "it shall be done," replied the emperor quietly. "father, i am glad you have, told me." indeed, owing, to the false statements of pro-german police officials, general brusiloff was within an ace of arrest a week later. the minister nekrasov, however, received his dismissal, protopopoff being one of his enemies, and in that manner was the monk playing germany's game. thus the evil power of this arch-scoundrel was paramount. by his influence men were made and broken daily. indeed, to-day dozens of men who because of their suspicion of the saint's "divinity," incurred the blasphemer's displeasure are, languishing in gaol in various remote parts of the empire, while german agents occupied some of the "highest offices in russia," while the head of the church of holy russia had been appointed by the unwashed blackguard himself. as proof of this interview at livadia, the _dossier_ of gregory rasputin, the siberian cagliostro, which is before me, contains the following letter: "rizhsky prospect, . "my dear father,--i have heard that you have left upon a pilgrimage to your own monastery in siberia. may god be with you, and bless you. to-day my title of excellency is officially announced. my bankers have passed to yours the sum of , roubles. there will be a further sum of , roubles passed if you will kindly send me, under cover, those two letters of the countess birileff. i await your reply.--ivan scheveleff." rasputin's mania for filing his correspondence is the basis of our true knowledge of his astounding career and activity, for the next folio in the _dossier_ is a copy of a blackmailing letter he wrote a few weeks after his visit to the crimea, to the man sergius timacheff. it reads as follows: "friend,--it is now many days since his majesty appointed you privy councillor of the empire, but i have received no word from you or from your bank as we arranged. if i receive nothing by next thursday, the facts concerning your son's implication in the platanoff affair (the blowing up of a russian battleship in the baltic by german agents) will be passed on to the admiralty. if double the sum we arranged passes to my bank before the date i have named, i shall remain silent. if not, i shall take immediate action.--g." the "holy" blackmailer was becoming more and more unscrupulous. behind him he had the emperor and empress, soothed to sleep by his marvellous cunning and his mock miracles. incredible as it seems, he was able to evade all the many pitfalls set for him by his enemies, because he swept them all from his path by imperial orders and stood forth alone as the "holy father," sent by providence to create a new and prosperous russia. he had no fear of death. he wore a shirt of mail, and the palace police, the same ever-alert surveillance as that placed upon the person of the tsar himself, kept a watchful eye upon him, though through protopopoff they had orders to relinquish their watchfulness at any moment the "saint" deemed it necessary. he frequently deemed it necessary if he held his conferences with sturmer, protopopoff, anna vyrubova, and the small camarilla of persons who were being so richly rewarded by mysterious incomes from estates they did not possess--or, plainly speaking, by money from berlin. rasputin saw that in order to keep faith with his "sister-disciples" in petrograd, it was necessary for him to journey again to his siberian village. he therefore declared to the emperor that he had much business there, and promised that he would return to peterhof as soon as the imperial family arrived there. when the tsar of all the russias had bent and kissed the monk's filthy hands, and promised that his orders should be despatched at once by telegram to petrograd, the monk sought the empress, told her what had occurred, explaining how his enemies had denounced "the man sent by god." the tsaritza sat appalled. could the russian people have denounced her "holy father"? to her it seemed impossible. she bent before the rascal and wept bitterly. "oh, sister!" he said in his deep voice, "i will retire to pokrovsky until these enemies of russia have been discomfited and defeated. then, verily, i will return to stand beside thee and fight as thy friend, as god has commanded me." then he took his leave and travelled to the so-called "monastery" he had established in his far-off siberian village--the big house in which a dozen of his female devotees were so eagerly awaiting him. chapter six. rasputin's secret instructions from berlin. now that rasputin's amazing career is being here investigated, chapter by chapter, the facts disclosed seem almost incredible, but, of course, such a situation could only have occurred in a country where nearly ninety per cent, of the priest-ridden inhabitants are unable to read or write, and which is in most things a full century behind the times. surely in no other country in all the world to-day could an illiterate, verminous mujik, who had actually been convicted and punished for the crimes of horse-stealing, falsely obtaining money, and assaulting two young girls, be accepted as a divine healer, a "holy" man, and the saviour of russia. here was a man whose whole life had been one of scandalous ill-living, a low drunken libertine of the very worst and most offensive class, actually ruling the empire as secret agent, of the kaiser! by the clever ruse of establishing his cult of "sister-disciples" he had so secured the ears of the weak-kneed emperor and his consort, that whatever views he declared to them they at once became law. so amazingly cunning was he that he realised that the only way in which to retain the hold he had established at court was now and then to absent himself from it, first making certain "prophecies," the fulfilment of which could be effected by his secret friends. as often as he uttered a prophecy and left petrograd upon one of his erotic adventures--to found provincial circles of the cult of believers--so surely would that prophecy come true. he foretold the downfall of one official, the death of another upon a certain date, a further relapse of the tsarevitch, and so on, until their majesties held him in awe as heaven-inspired. in the high court circle of which he was the centre, this "holy father" could do no wrong, while his most disgraceful exploits, scandals unprintable, were merely regarded as mundane pleasures allowable to him as a "saint." no reign since the days of the caesars was more fraught by disgraceful scandals than those last days of the _regime_ of the ill-fated romanoffs. the roman empresses were never traitors as the tsaritza most certainly was. can any one have sympathy with the once-imperial, afterwards exiled to siberia--that same zone of that illimitable tundra to which the tsar of all the russias had exiled so many of his innocent and patriotic subjects, men and women who fought for russia's right to live, to expand, and to prosper? let us remember that in siberia to-day lie the bones of a hundred thousand russian patriots, persecuted under the evil _regimes_ of alexander and of nicholas. in the days of the ex-tsar's father i went to siberia, and i visited the convict prisons there. i saw convicts in the mines chained to wheelbarrows by forged fetters, and i saw those poor tortured wretches who worked in the dreaded quicksilver mines of nertchinsk, their teeth falling out and their scalps bare. of what i myself witnessed, i years ago placed on record in black and white. those reports of mine will be found in the public libraries of great britain. but to-day they do not concern the reader of this book only inasmuch as they furnish proofs, with others, of the oppressive hand of the romanoffs upon the devoted and long-suffering people of holy russia--"holy"--save the mark! the erotic rascal rasputin was in himself a striking example of the men who control the paroslavny church. this mock-pious blackguard, to whose artful cunning and clever cupidity has been due the death of hundreds of thousands of brave russians of all classes in the field, held the fortunes of the great empire within the hollow of his dirty paw. the contents of the big _dossier_ of his private papers disclose this satanic scoundrel's double-dealing, and the true terms in which he stood with the wilhelmstrasse. to me, as i study the documents, it is astounding how accurately the germans had gauged who were their actual friends in russia and who were their enemies. surely their sources of information were more astounding and more complete than even the great stiebur, the king of spydom, had ever imagined. it sterns that while rasputin was living a dissolute life at the "monastery" he had established in his far-off native village of pokrovsky, he received many telegrams from tsarskoe-selo, both from the emperor and empress, urging him to forgive his traducers and to return. to none of these he responded. one day, however, he received a telegraphic message which came over the wires as a government one, marked "on his imperial majesty's service," from madame vyrubova. its copy is here before me, and reads: "return at once to petrograd. a dear friend from afar, awaits you. it is most urgent that you should come back at once. there is much to be done.--anna." such an urgent summons showed him that his presence was required. he knew too well that the "dear friend" was a german agent sent in secret to see him. therefore he bade farewell to his dozen "sister-disciples," the head of whom was the opulent "sister vera," sister of the dissolute bishop teofan whom rasputin himself had created. teofan was a fellow-criminal of his who had been imprisoned for horse-stealing in tobolsk, and now he wore richly embroidered ecclesiastical robes and bent the knee before the altar daily. in consequence of this message from his friend anna, rasputin hastened back to petrograd. now madame vyrubova was rasputin's tool throughout. hers had been a strange history. her past had been shrouded in mystery, yet i here disclose it for the first time. as mademoiselle taneieff, daughter of the director of the private chancellerie of the tsar, she became five years before one of the maids-of-honour of the empress. a pretty, high-spirited girl, she at first amused and afterwards attracted the neurotic spouse of the stolid, weak-minded autocrat. in due course she married a rather obscure but good-looking naval officer named vyrubova-- a lieutenant on board the cruiser _kazan_. the husband, after a year at sea, learned certain scandals, and therefore he went one night boldly to the emperor--who happened to be at peterhof--and asked that he might divorce his wife. his majesty was both surprised and angry. he made inquiry, and discovered a very curious state of affairs--a scandal that had been hushed up and is now revealed by the new light shining upon russian court life and the internal scandals of the empire. briefly put. his majesty found that his wife the empress had fallen in love with a certain general o--. the dark-haired madam vyrubova had acted as go-between for the couple--a fact which her husband knew, and threatened to expose as a vulgar scandal if the emperor did not allow his divorce! it seemed that general o--had rather slighted the empress, and had taken up with a certain princess b--, who had been on the stage, and who was declared to be one of the prettiest women in all russia. the general had followed the beautiful princess to cairo. a week later at assouan, in upper egypt, he had been seized by a mysterious illness and died. the explanation given to the emperor by the husband vyrubova was that the general had fallen a victim to the jealousy of his wife the empress. the tsar made secret inquiry, and to his surprise found that all the officer had asserted had been correct. madame vyrubova had at the empress's orders followed the general and arranged his death. therefore his majesty could do nothing else than allow the officer to divorce his wife, who, truth to tell, was the catspaw of the poisoner rasputin, who held her in his grip. these widespread ramifications of the mock-monk's influence and his power created by the judicious expenditure of german palm-oil are utterly astounding. the more deeply one delves into this voluminous _dossier_, the more amazing does it become, until the enemy's wicked attempts to undermine russia, our ally, almost stagger belief. when rasputin at last returned to petrograd, in response to the orders of the handsome anna, he was handed a secret communication from germany. this confidential despatch, as it lies here before me, speaks for itself. it is in a german letter-cipher, different from all the others, and for a considerable time it defied all efforts, to decipher it. at last it was accomplished by the russian secret police, and it certainly reveals a most dastardly series of amazingly cunning plots. here it is: "memorandum . . "`number ' is sending to you sister molfetta, of the italian red cross, whose number is . she will leave berlin on the rd prox, and travel by way of gothenburg. please inform p. (protopopoff) and request him to give her his protection and prepare her dear passport. she will stay at the house of b. (bukoff, a furrier in the vereiskaya, who was a german agent and assistant to rasputin); you will call upon her there. "the object of her mission is to cultivate friendly relations with the barrister alexander kerensky, who, though at present obscure, will, it is here believed, shortly make his influence felt very strongly against us. the woman has orders to compromise him, and afterwards create a public scandal in order to discredit him in the eyes of the public. "further, we seriously view the strength of kerensky and the influence he may exert in the prosecution of the war, therefore we leave it to your personal discretion whether or not he should be removed. number possesses the means, and will act upon your orders. "_secret instructions_.--you are to inform his majesty in confidence that m.i. tereshchenko (now minister for foreign affairs) is dangerous, and should be arrested. if his house in kiev is searched, compromising papers which have been placed there by s. (a german agent named schumacher) will be discovered. tereshchenko is threatening to expose your friend s. (sturmer, prime minister), and should it once be suppressed by imprisonment. "the letter herewith enclosed please give into the hands of her majesty the empress in secret. also inform her that the wishes she has expressed in her last letter to his majesty shall be carried out. "you are to inform s. and p. (sturmer and protopopoff) that the shortage of food in russia is, owing to birileff's indecisive policy, not sufficiently marked. he must be dismissed upon grounds of incompetence, and they must appoint a new food controller who will, connive, by holding up supplies, to create a famine. an epidemic, if spread in moscow, kazan, kharkow, odessa, and other cities at the same time as the famine, would greatly contribute towards germany's success. the matter has already been discussed, and an outbreak of cholera suggested. you should consider the suggestion at your end, and if you decide upon it, the necessary steps can easily be taken, though we consider nothing should be done in petrograd, because of yourselves and the imperial family. "the bearer of this will remain in petrograd four days, and then bring back any news you can send regarding the future situation. matters are now becoming desperate with us. hindenburg has decided that at all hazards we must withdraw troops from your frontier, and send them to the west. we rely upon you and your friends to create a famine, for which you will receive increased gratuities, as in the case of the retreat from warsaw." thus will it be seen that the "holy" blackguard, the right-hand and adviser of the emperor nicholas, was posing as the saviour of the great russian empire, whom great britain was supplying with munitions of war, and while he was everywhere declaring that brusiloff's strategy would wreck the german offensive, yet at the same time he was plotting famine and pestilence in the very heart of the empire! none knew this secret--except the german-born tsaritza. from her, rasputin held back nothing. in secret he showed her all the despatches he received from the koniggratzer-strasse. his influence upon her majesty at this stage is made vividly apparent by significant remarks which he made to sturmer on the night after his return to petrograd, and the delivery into his hands of that cipher despatch from berlin as revealed above. "my dear excellency!" he said, tossing off a glass of vodka and eating some caviare at the great carved sideboard in his own room before sitting down to dinner, "you have been speaking of the tsar and the tsaritza. to the tsar i am christ, the saviour of russia and the world! their majesties salute me; they bow to me and they kiss my hand. what higher sphere can i achieve? the imperial children prostrate before me; they kiss my hands. ah! my dear excellency, i could disclose to you things which--well, which i could not relate without blushing!" it was at this period, when a friend of the "holy" peasant, striaptcheff, a fellow-thief of pokrovsky and a man convicted of burglary, pressed his attentions upon the "holy father" and demanded an appointment. incredible as it may appear, yet the criminal in question was six days later appointed as a bishop of the russian church, with the usual fat emoluments, and he could scarcely read or write. truly holy russia was progressing beneath the rasputin _regime_. she had a burglar as bishop. meanwhile, the monk proceeded at once to carry out his secret orders from berlin. we know that the camarilla held council a week later, and that sturmer, protopopoff, striaptcheff--who had now become inseparable from rasputin--as well as manuiloff, an ex-journalist who conducted the secret police under sturmer, were present at the monk's house. at the meeting the false red cross sister from berlin was also present. it was agreed that it would be best to remove kerensky, who, though a headlong enthusiast, would be a very difficult man for a woman to compromise. it was known that he possessed secret sources of knowledge regarding the intention of the camarilla to betray russia into germany's hands, therefore the woman molfetta was given orders to carry out her plot, to secure his assassination at the hands of a renegade jew of warsaw named levinski, who was ready to commit any crime if paid for it. the attempt was made three weeks later. while kerensky, who lived to become afterwards prime minister of the new government, was turning the corner by the alexandra hospital to cross the fontanka to the sadovaya, late one night, on his way home to the offitzerskaya, he was shot at three times by the fellow levinski. each shot happily went wide, and as a result alexander kerensky still lives to pilot russia to her freedom. the manner in which the traitorous camarilla brought about a famine in the capital, and in certain districts in the empire, until the people of petrograd paraded the city crying "give us bread, or end the war!" is well known to all. but how they attempted to carry out the dastardly orders of berlin to create an epidemic of cholera at the same time, i will reveal with quotations from official documents in the next chapter. chapter seven. the plot to spread epidemics in russia. in my work of unmasking rasputin i find that constant secret communications were at that time passing between the "holy" scoundrel and his infamous paymasters in the koniggratzer-strasse, while messages were continually being exchanged in strictest confidence between the kaiser and the german-born tsaritza, who lived beneath the thraldom of this common horse-stealer. berlin, with all its devilish inventions for unfair warfare prohibited by the hague convention, had not overlooked the fact that owing to the primitive sanitation of russia, epidemics had very often been widespread and most difficult to stamp out; therefore the suggestion to artificially produce outbreaks of bubonic plague and asiatic cholera in the heart of the empire had been suggested to that traitor, the prime minister boris sturmer, and his fellow-conspirators of the "camarilla," of whom the siberian charlatan known as "holy father" was the head. while the imperial court bowed its knees to the erotic rascal, yet strangely enough the people doubted him, and in secret jeered at him. the satanic suggestion from berlin, however, appealed to the camarilla of pro-german plotters. the russian army was gallantly holding out, even though many traitors held highest commands. the germans had reached the height of their offensive power on that front, and a separate peace with russia was in berlin admitted to be, highly necessary, if the ultimate success of their arms was to be achieved. therefore, if a devastating epidemic broke out, then sturmer would have excuse to go to the tsar and strongly urge the necessity for peace as the only salvation of the empire. hence the necessary steps were at once taken by the conspirators who were in the habit of meeting almost daily in the gorokhovaya. proof of what was on foot is disclosed by the following secret despatch from berlin, which is included in rasputin's private papers, which so fortunately fell into the hands of the patriotic party of russia. i here reproduce it: "memorandum . . "`number ' has placed your communication and suggestions before a high quarter, and they are all approved. he is sending you, by way of malmo, karl johnke, whose number is , a bacteriologist of the frankfort institute, who will arrive in petrograd on the th, and seek you. by the same ship will arrive, consigned to our friends the firm of yakowleff and company, wholesale fruiterers, of the nikolskaya, in moscow, one hundred and twenty-six barrels of canadian apples, with ninety cases of canary bananas. these will be distributed in the ordinary course of trade to kazan, kharkow, odessa, and other centres. see that p. (protopopoff) grants easy facilities for rapid transport to the consignees in moscow, as they are perishable. "`number ' has full instructions to deal with ivan yakowleff, who is our `fixed post' in moscow, and who is receiving his instructions in secret by the messenger who brings you this. the fruit must not be handled or eaten, as it has been treated and is highly dangerous. "cholera should occur within three weeks of the arrival of the fruit. we rely upon p. taking steps to facilitate its rapid delivery. some of it should be presented to charitable institutes for distribution among the poor. "inform a. (anna vyrubova) that korniloff (general korniloff, whom all know to be one of the most successful of russian generals) suspects her concerning the zarudni affair and has at his house some correspondence which is incriminating. it is in a cupboard in his bedroom and should be secured at once. (g. zarudni was active in political law cases before the revolution, and has since been appointed minister of justice in the kerensky cabinet.) zarudni is working against both s. (sturmer) and yourself. if an accident happened to him it would render the atmosphere more clear. the same applies to his friend n.v. nekrasov, who is on the duma budget committee and on the railway committee. both may upset our plans. "against general ostrogradski, inspector-general of cavalry, a charge of treason should be made. the bearer brings documents in order to arouse suspicion that he has sold military secrets to austria. these can be produced at his trial. his continued activity against us, and his hatred of yourself are both dangerous. "`number ' will make personal reports to you concerning the negotiations with roumania and also regarding the efforts we are making to prevent war material from england reaching russia. "`number ' notes with gratification that the explosion at the nitro-glycerine works at viborg has been effected, and that the factory was totally destroyed and most of the workmen killed. please pay e. (an analytical chemist named paul eck, who was a friend of rasputin's) the sum promised. "it would be best if their majesties removed to tsarskoe-selo. anna vyrubova should cultivate boris savenkov, commissioner to the seventh army. (this suggestion shows the remarkable foresight of berlin, for to-day boris savenkov is acting minister of war.) you yourself should lose no time in becoming acquainted with countess vera kokoskin, who lives at potemkinskaya, . she is eager to meet you. admit her as a disciple, for being an attractive and ambitious woman, she has considerable knowledge of what is in progress in certain quarters in the duma. being in want of money, and being blackmailed by a penniless lover named sievers, she would probably be ready to become our friend. `number ' therefore throws out this suggestion, yet at the same time impresses upon you and your friends the necessity of the creation of the epidemic and the bringing in of roumania on the side of the allies." those final words of that cipher despatch disclose a cunning that was indeed unequalled. i know full well that readers may be inclined to pause and to doubt that such dastardly methods could actually be pursued against civilisation. to such i can only point out that boxes of the same microbes were found in the german legation in bucharest, and were officially reported by the united states legation in that city. the fierce german octopus--so carefully fostered and so well prepared-- had alas! stretched its thousand searching tentacles upon the patriotic russian people who were ruled by their weak and careless emperor, while the pro-german empress listened to every rumour, and in her heart hoped for a separate peace with germany as the only salvation of her land. truly the romanoffs have proved themselves a weak-kneed and irresponsible dynasty. alexander, however, was never weak. in the long-ago days when i had audience with his late majesty one morning in his small reception-room in the winter palace, he wore a rough drab shooting suit; bluff and full-bearded as any of his ministers, he talked to me fully of his regret that the nihilists should be ever plotting to kill him, and assured me of his own personal efforts to free his people from a corrupt church and an iron bureaucracy. "please tell your british people that as tsar i am doing the utmost in my power to improve and civilise my dear russian people, to whom i am devoted, and to whom i will if necessary give my life." those words of the father of the tsar nicholas will be found reproduced in the columns of _the times_ after my joining as "russian correspondent." but let us examine the result of the secret order to rasputin from berlin which i have reproduced above. in the first place i find among the papers, a letter dated from the potemkinskaya, , as follows: "holy father,--i thank you for your introduction yesterday to her majesty the empress, and to the grand duchess olga. truly we are all your kindred spirits and disciples, who know at last the joys and pleasures of the life which almighty god has given unto us. anna was most charming, and i saw his majesty as arranged. at your suggestion i mentioned the gospodin sievers, and the emperor has promised to appoint him vice-governor of omsk. all thanks to you, dear holy father. i shall be at our reunion at your house to-morrow, and my daughter nada, who is in search of the truth, will accompany me. till then, i kiss your dear hand.--vera kokoskin." this letter speaks for itself. another document is a letter to rasputin dated from the hotel metropole, moscow, and is in plain language as follows: "the consignment of fruit from your generous donors has duly reached the maison yakowleff and is being distributed in various charitable quarters and is much appreciated in these days when prices are so high. some of it has been sent to the director of the borgoroditsky convent at kazan, and also some to the society of st george at kiev. please inform and thank the donors.--karl johnke." eagerly the camarilla awaited the result of their dastardly handiwork. the allotted three weeks passed, but no epidemic was reported. evidently the monk wrote to the german bacteriologist, who was posing as a dane, for the latter wrote from the hotel continental at kiev: "the fruit, owing to delays in transit, was not in a condition for human consumption. this is extremely regrettable after all the trouble of our kind donors." therefore, while certain isolated cases of cholera were reported from several cities--as the sanitary records prove--russia had had indeed a providential escape from a terrible epidemic, the infected fruit being distributed over a wide area by charitable organisations quite unsuspicious of its source. failure to produce the desired result induced rasputin and his paymasters in berlin to adopt yet another method of forcing russia into a separate peace. brusiloff had recommenced his gallant offensive, and the situation was being viewed with increased apprehension by the german general staff. roumania was still undecided whether or not to throw in her cause with that of the allies. the great plot to destroy roumania is again revealed by documentary evidence contained among rasputin's papers, and also in the despatches received in bucharest--where, of course, the clever intrigue was never suspected. a message in cipher received by rasputin, on august th, the day of general letchitzki's great triumph, reveals a truly machiavellian plan. it reads thus: "memorandum . . "matters in the dobroudja are approaching a serious crisis. urge s. (boris sturmer, the prime minister) to suggest at once to the emperor, while at the same time you make a similar suggestion to her majesty, that roumania must be forced to take up arms against us. she must not be allowed to remain neutral any longer. s. must send a despatch to bucharest so worded that it is our ultimatum. if she does not join the allies immediately she must fight against russia." accordingly, three days later, after the holy father and his unholy fellow-conspirator had had audiences at tsarskoe-selo, sturmer sent an urgent despatch to the roumanian government demanding that it should join the allies, without further delay. at bucharest no plot was suspected, and indeed on the face of things, it seemed no unusual request. even people in great britain were daily asking each other "when will roumania come in it?" the reason she had not joined was because she was not yet prepared. germany knew that and with rasputin's aid had laid a plot to invade her. she was, while still unready, forced into the war by sturmer. nineteen days after the despatch of that cipher message from berlin she formally declared hostilities against austria-hungary. berlin was delighted, and the sinister "dark force" of russia rubbed his dirty hands with delight. the plot he saw must succeed. truly it was a vile and devilish one, which not even the shrewdest diplomat suspected, namely, to deliver roumania and her resources of grain and oil to the enemy. as an outcome of the conspiracy the russo-roumanian army, owing to treachery in the latter, at once retreated under pressure from mackensen's forces, and very quickly, almost before the allies were aware of it, roumania and the constanza railway were in the enemy's hands. disaster, engineered by the camarilla, followed disaster after that "now or never" ultimatum of sturmer's. the promises made to the brave roumanians were broken one after the other. why? because with rasputin, protopopoff and certain generals suborned by the mock-monk, the prime minister's intention was to use the great retreat and the rapid absorption of roumania as a means to force the tsar and his empire into a separate peace. indeed, rasputin--in attendance daily at tsarskoe-selo--by declaring to the empress and his sister-disciples at court that he had been accorded a vision of the tsar and kaiser fraternising, and interpreting this as a divine direction that peace should at once be made with germany, had very nearly induced his majesty to sign a declaration of peace, when one man in the empire discovered the dastardly manoeuvre, the deputy gospodin miliukoff, whose actions i will describe in a further chapter. chapter eight. the mock-monk unmasked. documentary evidence contained in the papers which the monk so carefully preserved shows conclusively that he paid a secret visit to berlin in the first week of october, . while the brave russian army were fighting valiantly, ever and anon being betrayed by their leaders, treachery of the worst and vilest sort was afoot in the highest quarters. that german potentate, the duke of mecklenburg-strelitz, who occupied an important position in the entourage of the tsar, was acting as counsellor to the tsaritza, and at the same time, aided actively by the woman vyrubova, was working to delude the emperor and defeat his gallant armies. at russian field headquarters the tsar was cheered everywhere, and his officers were enthusiastic. it was known that the german offensive had spent itself, and it was believed by those who were being bamboozled that, when all was ready, russia would press on to her well-deserved victory. but the day of russia's great offensive never arrived. great britain and france were supplying her with guns and munitions conveyed up to alexandrovsk with much difficulty, and the allies were daily hoping that the "russian steam-roller" would once again start upon its westward course. london, paris and rome were in ignorance of the amazing plot of the pro-german traitors. meanwhile the mock-monk, in the garb of a dutch pastor, had arrived in berlin to make arrangements with the enemy for russia's final conquest. by the scoundrel's fatal weakness for preserving letters addressed to him, in the hope that when he fell out of favour at court he might use them for blackmailing purposes--for after all this "holy" man had started life as a common thief--we have again evidence of his treachery in the following letter dated from tsarskoe-selo, october th, the day following the allied landing in athens. addressed to rasputin, it is in german, in the fine handwriting of the tsaritza, and reads as follows: "holy father,--at last we have welcome news of you! this morning your messenger reached us bringing me a letter, and one for anna. what you tell us is indeed good news. we are glad that you have seen william (the emperor), and that he has been so gracious to you. your news regarding the forthcoming offensive against the british is most encouraging. the british are germany's real enemies. tell his majesty that all goes well, and that sturmer quite agrees that we must have a separate peace and is taking every step towards that end. "nikki is still at the front encouraging the troops. how foolish, and yet we have all to show a bold front. the news of the landing at athens has disconcerted us, though it has caused great joy in petrograd. inquire if nothing can be done further in an attempt to spread disease in the more populous regions. this would kill enthusiasm for the war and force peace quickly. "dmitri (the grand duke dmitri pavlovitch, who was rasputin's fiercest enemy) has been sent by nikki to samara. it would be a relief to us all if he never returned. he with nicholas (the grand duke nicholas michailovitch) are plotting to defeat us. but germany shall win. it shall be as you, my dear father, saw in your vision. "pray for us, o father. give us your benediction, for while you are absent we are all dull and lonely. tell william to send you back quickly and safely to us. give my best greetings to the brave hindenburg. it is horrid to be compelled to sustain an anti-german attitude when one knows that our fatherland is unconquerable, even though the russian flag be bathed in blood. "inform the general staff that the secret agent erbach-furstenau, who fell into general neudorff's hands last month has at my instigation been acquitted by the court-martial and will very shortly escape back to germany. i have personally arranged that the papers seized upon him shall be destroyed. "charges are being levelled against general sukhomlinoff. he has been betrayed by a man named kartzoff. in order to suppress the latter's further activity, he has been arrested for treason at my instigation and sent without trial to an unknown destination. so we have one enemy the less. it is reported that manasevitch-manuiloff (private secretary to prime minister sturmer) has been arrested for attempting to blackmail his chief. but i will see that nikki stops the trial. "my dear boy alexis is improving. anna is with him constantly. he sends his greetings and asks for your prayers. i kiss your holy hand. your sister alec." russia was still being betrayed by the empress, who had fallen so entirely beneath the occult influences of the rascal who, in turn, had become the catspaw of the kaiser. the charges against general sukhomlinoff, ex-minister of war, mentioned by the tsaritza, had apparently alarmed her. and well they might. an official in the ministry named kartzoff had betrayed his chief, whereupon colonel tugen baranovsky, late chief of the mobilisation department of the russian general staff, had made depositions to the effect that the mobilisation plans drafted by the general were full of errors, while rifles, machine-guns, and field and heavy guns were all lacking. depositions had been made by general petrovsky, late chief of the fortifications department, to the effect that the general had only twice visited the artillery administration during the whole time he held his portfolio as minister, while a third official, colonel batvinkine, one of the heads of the artillery administration, had asserted that general sukhomlinoff had insisted upon important contracts for machine-guns being given to the rickerts factory at a cost of two thousand roubles each while the toula factory could turn out excellent machine-guns at nine hundred roubles. such were a few of the charges against the ex-minister, a bosom friend of rasputin and of sturmer, and these were being whispered abroad everywhere, even though by the influence of the tsaritza the principal witness against the general had been sent to "an unknown destination!" written on the same day and conveyed secretly to the monk in berlin-- evidently by the same messenger who carried the tsaritza's letter to her "holy father"--was one from the conspirator protopopoff. it is on the private note-paper of the minister of the interior and discloses truly an amazing state of affairs, as follows: "brother gregory,--i send you this hastily and with some apprehension. both nicholas and dmitri (the grand dukes), are actively at work against us! beware! they know far too much, hence it behoves us to be most discreet. i was at tsarskoe-selo yesterday and discussed it with f. (count fredericks, minister of the imperial court). there is a secret movement to upset our plans, but i have ordered the secret police to spare no pains to present full and adequate reports to me, and rely on me to take drastic steps. "an hour ago it came to my knowledge that an individual named wilhelm gebhardt, living at hildegard-strasse, wilmersdorf, berlin, has knowledge that you are in the german capital and is probably watching your movements to report to our enemies here. give news of this to our friend `number ' and urge that he shall be immediately arrested as a spy of russia. if he is executed his mouth would be closed, for he is dangerous. the man with whom he is in association in petrograd, a person named tchartovyski, member of the duma, i have ordered to be arrested and charged with communicating with persons in germany. "s. (sturmer) is eager for news regarding the proposed german offensive against the british in flanders, and the exact position regarding the `u' boat campaign. inform the chancellor that news we received from washington to-day shows that president wilson is determined, and warn him that j. and g., whom he will know by initials as german agents in the united states, have been discovered, and may be arrested. he may perhaps communicate with them by wireless, and they may escape while there is still time. "further, inform the chancellor that our efforts to make more marked the shortage of food have been negatived by the action of nicholas and dmitri, for we fear to go further lest the truth be disclosed. their activity cannot be ignored. "urge that the distribution of fruit to charitable institutions be repeated. "the charges against sukhomlinoff are extremely grave, and may have serious consequences. i am, however, taking steps to ascertain the intentions and to arrest those who are in association. "her majesty is eager and nervous regarding you. write and assure her that all is well with your dear self. as the saviour of russia from the wiles of the allies, the russian people ought to regard you as great as the great peter himself. "a tall, thin individual named emil dollen will probably call upon you at your hotel. if so, receive him. he may convey a message from me sent by wireless to riga and re-transmitted. "present my humble compliments to his majesty the emperor. would that i were with you at glorious potsdam. these russians of ours are arrant fools, or we should have been hand-in-glove with berlin against the effete nations who are our allies. i salute you and await your return.--your brother, d.a. protopopoff." this autograph letter is from the man who was russian minister of the interior--the man in whom every true-born son of russia believed so implicitly that he went to his death fiercely and gallantly for his emperor! surely that position had no parallel in history. imperial germany with her long-prepared plans had seized the russian bear by the throat, and was throttling it, just as she has attempted to grapple with the british lion. if the ever-spreading tentacles of the kaiser's propaganda bureau and his unscrupulous and well-financed spy-service were so successful in russia, which before the war was half-germanised by the tsaritza, the villain rasputin and their traitor ministers, then one is permitted to wonder to what depths the koniggratzer-strasse, with the kaiser at its head, have descended in order to try and create famine and revolution in the british isles, wherein dwell "the worst enemies of germany." the documentary evidence extant shows that the unkempt "prophet," whose peasant hands were kissed by the empress of russia, and before whom bowed the greatest ladies of the imperial court, lived during the greater part of october, , in that small hotel, the westfalischer-hof, in the neusladische-strasse, on the north of the linden. he called himself pastor van meeuwen, and his companion was his trusty manservant, a cosmopolitan fellow, who afterwards disclosed much that i have here been able to reveal to british readers. that he had frequent audiences of the emperor william and received his personal instructions is apparent from the copies of telegrams which the revolutions eventually unearthed from the archives of the ministry of telegraphs. one message by wireless, despatched from a russian warship in the baltic to the admiralty station at reval, coded in the same cipher as that used by rasputin and his german confederates, the key of which was found in the safe in the gorokhovaya, is as follows: "to his excellency the minister protopopoff.--all goes well. i had an audience at the neues palais to-day of three hours' duration. inform charles michael (the duke charles michael of mecklenburg-strelitz, who was the german adviser of the tsaritza, and naturalised as a russian subject in july, ) that the emperor william sends his best greetings and acknowledgments of his despatch of the rd inst. it has been found necessary to recall the troops who have been held ready at hamburg and bremen for the invasion of britain. the general staff have, after due consideration, decided that an invasion might meet with disaster, hence they are turning their attention to submarine and aerial attacks upon britain in order to crush her. i have learnt from a conversation with the kaiser that london is to be destroyed by a succession of fleets of super-aeroplanes launching newly-devised explosive and poison-gas bombs of a terribly destructive character. "urge s. (sturmer) to disclaim at once all knowledge of the rickert contracts. the payments are completely concealed. i have no fear of sukhomlinoff's betrayal. he is discredited and will not be believed: yet it would be best if the emperor ordered the trial to be cancelled.-- the tsar did so, but the general was tried after his deposition. "to yourself and our dear empress greetings. i pray for you all, and send you my benedictions.--your brother, gregory efimovitch." that the rascal hurried back to petrograd is apparent by a letter dated a week later from madame kokoskin, the latest of his sister-disciples, who wrote from the potemkinskaya , petrograd, saying: "holy father,--i have just heard with joy from dear anna that you have returned to-night. may god grant you the fruits of your pilgrimage. (to his sister-disciples he had pretended to make a pilgrimage to the monastery of verkhotursky, where in secret most disgraceful orgies often took place.) my daughter nada will be with me at our reunion at anna's to-morrow at six.--vera." rasputin seems to have arrived in petrograd the bearer of certain verbal messages from the kaiser to the tsaritza, for he went at once to tsarskoe-selo and there remained all next day. that the empress had now grown very frightened regarding the attitude of the grand dukes nicholas and dmitri, the latter a young and energetic figure in russian politics, is proved by an attempt which, a few days later, she made to conciliate them both. but they discarded her advances, for, having already learnt much regarding the "holy father," they were actively preparing to bring about the prosecution of general sukhomlinoff, well knowing that its disclosures must wreck the _regime_ of the hated mock-monk and shake the house of romanoff to its foundations. hence it was that, two days later, the patriotic informer ivan kartzoff, the unfortunate official who had been sent by the tsaritza's influence to "an unknown destination," was found shot dead in a wood near kislovodsk, a small town in the north caucasus, while two of the other witnesses were arrested at protopopoff's orders upon false charges of treachery, incriminating papers--which had been placed among their effects by _agents provocateurs_--being produced as evidence against them. thus the most strenuous efforts were being made by the camarilla to prevent the bursting of that storm-cloud which grew darker over them with every day that passed. the monk was, however, fully alive to the danger of exposure, and he therefore resolved to play yet another bold clever card in the desperate game of the betrayal of the russian nation. chapter nine. documentary evidence of treachery. germany never plays straight, even with those who accept her gold to play the dangerous game of traitor. the few who know the ramifications of the underground politics of europe are well aware of this fact. this was brought home to rasputin, when immediately after his return to petrograd from his secret visit to the kaiser in the guise of a pious dutch pastor, the german press became guilty of a grave indiscretion. naturally the monk waxed furious. the _kolnische zeitung_, in its unwonted enthusiasm, wrote: "we germans need have no fear. sturmer may be relied upon not to place any obstacles in the way of russia's desire for peace with germany." while the _reichspost_ said: "we may rest assured that sturmer will be independent in his relations with downing street." and yet sturmer was at this moment crying, "no separate peace!" and had sent constant despatches to downing street assuring us of his intention to prosecute the war to the finish. by this he misled the allies, who naturally regarded the assertion of the german newspapers as mere frothy enthusiasm. but those indiscreet german assurances were instantly seized upon by that small and fearless band of russian patriots who--headed by the grand dukes nicholas and dmitri--had united to expose and destroy the disgraceful camarilla whose object it was to wreck the empire, and hand it mangled and defenceless to be torn by the eagle of germany. at the instigation of the peasant-charlatan and thief whose hand the empress kissed, calling him her holy father, sturmer--also paid lavishly by germany--was following a clever policy of isolation, and had raised a lofty barrier between the government and the elected representatives of the people. after ten months of office this _debauchee_ and traitor had only appeared in the duma on one occasion, and then he made a speech so puerile that he was greeted with ironical laughter. with the very refinement of cunning which betrayed the criminal mind, he, at rasputin's suggestion, crowded the work of legislation into the parliamentary recesses, and passed bills by virtue of article of the fundamental laws, which allowed the government to legislate when the duma was not in session. till then all had gone smoothly for berlin. but there opened a new chapter of the history of the downfall of the great romanoffs. early in november, , a number of very serious and secret conferences of the camarilla took place at rasputin's house. both sturmer and protopopoff were now viewing the situation with the gravest anxiety, for the empire was being swiftly aroused to a sense of its insecurity. there were sinister whispers on all hands of traitors, and of a disinclination on the part of the capitalists and government to win the war. the empress had been guilty of a serious indiscretion, for she had mentioned to a young officer at court the dastardly attempt of german agents to produce an epidemic of cholera by distribution of infected fruit to charitable institutions. that officer's name was tsourikoff. the hand of rasputin was heavy and swift. four days after the fact became known he died suddenly in his rooms in the moskovskaya quarter in petrograd. he had been to the bouffes in the fontanka, where he had met a dark-eyed siren with whom he had afterwards had supper at that well-known establishment, pivato's, in the morskaya. the lady could not be traced after his death. truly the hand of the illiterate monk was ruling russia with his pretence of working miracles, and with that mock-religious jargon in which he addressed his noble-born sister-disciple. he held secret death within his fingers, to be dealt to any who might upset his plans, or those of the empress. that the latter actually did, in an excess of her enthusiasm for the success of her native germany, betray the plans of rasputin and his paymasters to the young officer tsourikoff, is proved by a telegram which she addressed to the monk from the imperial train at sinelnikovo, on the way to livadia. this sardonic message still remains upon the records of the department of posts and telegraphs, and reads: "the accident to captain tsourikoff is to be deplored. please place a wreath upon the grave on my behalf. pray for us.--alec." in the last days of october, , the diabolical conspiracy entered upon a new and even more desperate stage, for very slowly the astounding truth was leaking out to the long-suffering russian people. the grand duke nicholas had been joined by the grand duke serge, formerly inspector-general of artillery, general vernandea, ex-assistant minister of war, and m. mimascheff, who all three had been actively investigating the alleged treachery of general sukhomlinoff. they had publicly made further statements most damning to the general. his late colleague vernandea had alleged that the minister of war had paid no heed to the equipment of the army, had given no contracts except to those factories who gave him bribes, and that after days of war the russian army were without shells. the grand duke serge had told a secret meeting in petrograd that general sukhomlinoff had suppressed the personal reports addressed to the tsar by all the heads of the ministry of war and had actually prevented new guns being ordered from the schneider works, while the ex-minister of commerce declared that the minister of war had never once requested him to organise manufacturers and owners of works for national defence. on hearing from rasputin that these allegations were being made, the empress at once, at the monk's instigation, telegraphed in cipher to the tsar, who was at the front: "suppress at once, i beg of you in the interest of us all, the base charges now being made against sukhomlinoff. boris threatens to resign if they continue. if you do not act immediately the situation will become a very ugly one." in reply the emperor sent a message to his wife at livadia next day, in which he said: "i have taken the necessary steps that the allegations shall not be repeated." they were, however, repeated in court at the trial of the ex-minister at petrograd on august , . meanwhile rasputin, sturmer, and protopopoff, a truly diabolical trio, proceeded to put into force a new and ingenious plan to create further unrest and by that means dishearten the people. the empress returned to tsarskoe-selo, where the charlatan immediately saw her and obtained her full approval to his suggestion. the plan was to disseminate the wildest rumours, in order to incite disorder among the proletariat. in that highly-charged atmosphere created by the growing food crisis--which sturmer and protopopoff had so cleverly brought about at germany's instigation--it was easy to throw a spark among the inflammable popular masses, exasperated and disorganised by the deplorable state of affairs. in consequence, a veritable whirlwind of false rumour was released in the hope that a movement would be started which would shatter, weaken for long, or stifle all manifestations of patriotism, and cause the country to sue for a separate peace. rasputin himself was responsible for putting this new plan into execution. rumours arose with a startling rapidity. it was said in petrograd that all moscow was involved in a rising; the wires were cut, the moscow police were on strike, and that the troops had refused to fire on the crowd. simultaneously, similar rumours were circulated in moscow concerning a sanguinary riot in petrograd; while at kharkoff it was believed that moscow was in revolution, and at moscow it was declared that there was a revolution at kharkoff. these rumours, which all emanated from the malignant brain of the "saint," were of course false, but colour was given to them by the dastardly outrages committed by two german secret agents, lachkarioff and filimonoff (who were subsequently allowed to escape to sweden), who blew up two great mills outside moscow, and also blew up the blast furnaces at the obukhov steel factory, causing great loss of life; while at the same time, a desperate attempt was made also by other german agents to destroy the great powder factory opposite schusselburg, which, before the war, had been owned by germans. the unrest thus created by rasputin quickly assumed alarming proportions, and the camarilla was secretly satisfied. the prime minister, sturmer, in order to mislead the public further, made a speech deploring the fact that anybody credited such unfounded reports; but he did not do so before the labour group of the central war industrial committee had issued a declaration to the working classes warning them to remain patient and prosecute the war with vigour. how amazingly clever was this traitorous camarilla, seeking to hurl russia to her destruction, is shown by a significant fact. on the very day of the issue of that labour declaration general brusiloff, interviewed at the russian headquarters of the south-west front by mr stanley washburn, said: "the war is won to-day, though it is merely speculation to estimate how much longer will be required before the enemy are convinced that the cause, for the sake of which they drenched europe with blood, is irretrievably lost. personally, never since the beginning have i believed that the enemy had a chance of winning." meanwhile the emperor was still absent at the front, and rasputin, in addition to directing the affairs of the empire through the empress, whom he visited daily at the palace, was holding constant reunions of his sister-disciples, whereat he pretended to see visions, while he was also blackmailing all and sundry, as his voluminous correspondence with some of his "sisters" plainly shows. two letters from the grand duchess olga, daughter of the tsar, dated october th and november st, are indeed plain evidence that the monk was forming a fresh "circle" of his female neophytes, consisting wholly of young girls of noble families. suddenly, like a bombshell, there dropped upon the tsaritza and the camarilla the startling news, that miliukoff, who had now at his back the grand dukes nicholas, serge and dmitri, intended to publicly expose the empress's pet "saint." from tsarskoe-selo she wrote to him on november th, apparently in great haste, for it is a pencilled note: "holy father,--anna has just told me of miliukoff's intention in the duma. the emperor must further adjourn its re-assembling (which had been prohibited from meeting since july). i have telegraphed to him urging him to do this. if not, noyo's suggestion to pay the agents j. or b. ten thousand roubles to remove him. i would willingly pay a hundred thousand roubles to close his mouth for ever. this must be done. suggest it to p. (protopopoff). surely the same means could be used as with tsourikoff, and the end be quite natural and peaceful! you could supply the means as before. but i urge on you not to delay a moment. all depends upon miliukoff's removal. if he reveals to the duma what he knows, then everything must be lost. i kiss your dear hands. with olga i ask your blessing.--your dutiful daughter, a." it seems incredible in this twentieth century that an empress should have been so completely beneath the thraldom of an erotic criminal lunatic. but the evidence is there in black and white. two previous attempts upon the life of professor miliukoff had happily failed, but the tenor of that letter illustrates the tsaritza's increasing fears lest the real traitor should be unmasked. a cipher telegram from the emperor, who was at the south-west headquarters, is on record, dated november th, and was addressed to the tsaritza. it was evidently a reply to her frantic request: "tell our dear father (rasputin) that to postpone the duma would, i fear, create an unfavourable impression, and i judge impossible. protopopoff has asked my authority to arrest miliukoff upon some technical charge, but i do not consider such a course good policy. i agree that to-day's situation is grave, and agree that at the last moment some steps should be taken to prevent him from speaking." on receipt of that very unsatisfactory reply the tsaritza summoned the mock-monk, who was remaining at the palace evidently awaiting the emperor's reply. sturmer and madame vyrubova, the high-priestess of the rasputin cult, were also present. what actually transpired at that council of three is unknown. it is, however, beyond question that it was arranged that m. miliukoff, whom they held in such fear--as well as a friend of his, a conservative deputy named puriskevitch--should be "removed." that the illiterate scoundrel, with his unique knowledge of the scriptures, was an adept in the art of using certain secret drugs, and that by his hand several persons obnoxious to the camarilla had died mysteriously is now proved beyond any doubt, for as cleverly as he systematically drugged the poor little tsarevitch, so also he could with amazing cunning "arrange" the deaths of those who might betray him. m. miliukoff, knowing that his patriotic and hostile intentions were being suspected, took such precautions, however, that even the bold emissaries of rasputin failed to approach him. at noon, on november th, the minister protopopoff wrote a hurried note upon the paper of the ministry of the interior, which is on record, and is as follows: "dear friend gregory,--how is it that your plans have so utterly failed and m. (miliukoff) is still active? to-day at the duma meets! cannot you arrange that he is absent? cannot you work a miracle? skoropadski (a well-known german agent) has betrayed us and put the most incriminating documents into m.'s hands. we tried to arrest the fellow last night in riga, but, alas, he has eluded us. take every precaution for your own safety. if m. attends the sitting we are all lost.--yours cordially, d.a.p." the plot to kill m. miliukoff had failed! the empress knew of it and sat in the winter palace, pale, breathless and eager for messages over her private telephone. the vile, black work done by her "holy father" was to be exposed! what if her own imperial self were exhibited in her true traitorous colours! meanwhile, at two o'clock, m. rodzianko took his seat as president at the tauris palace. the usual service was held and then the historic sitting of the duma opened. the house was crowded, and the british, french and italian ambassadors being in the diplomatic box, the members, octobrists, progressive nationalists, the centre, the zemsto octobrists and cadets, rose in one body and gave vociferous cheers for the allies. "russia will win!" they cried. the first speaker was m. garusewicz, who, on behalf of the polish club, addressed the allied powers, protesting against the austro-german action and expressing the hope and confidence that a final solution of the polish problem would be the outcome of the war. the two men whom the camarilla had plotted to murder were calmly in their places. m. miliukoff, a pleasant-looking grey-haired man, sat gazing at the speaker through his gold-rimmed spectacles, listening attentively until the speaker had concluded. meanwhile the tsaritza, sitting in her luxurious little room in the palace with the dissolute anna vyrubova as her sole companion, was listening to messages which, as arranged, came to her over the telephone every ten minutes. at last m. miliukoff rose, quite calm, and bowed to the president. instantly there was silence. without mincing matters in the least he told the house--in a speech which was wholly suppressed by the authorities--how the camarilla had endeavoured to remove him but in vain; and then, after many hard words which electrified all present, he denounced the "saint" as the dark and sinister force which was hurling the russian empire to its destruction. then, branding the pro-german prime minister boris sturmer as "judas the traitor," he took up a bundle of documents, and shaking them in his hand dramatically he declared: "i have here, gentlemen, the evidence of judas. evidence in cold figures-- the number of shekels, the pieces of silver, for betrayal." the house sat breathless! the ghastly truth was out. when m. miliukoff sat down his friend m. puriskevitch rose politely and asked permission and indulgence to make a speech in german--the hated language--promising it should be very brief. all he uttered were the two words: "hofmeister sturmer!" the duma, understanding, cheered to the echo. over the telephone the empress, pale and neurotic, listened to what had been alleged against her "holy father" and his friend sturmer, whereupon she suddenly gave a low scream and fainted. the truth was out at last! the first blow of retribution had on that afternoon fallen upon the imperial house of romanoff. but rasputin, the amazing, remained unperturbed. he merely smiled evilly. the game had become desperate, he knew, but he still had other cards to play. chapter ten. discloses the charlatan's wiles. up till this juncture the penalty for even mentioning the name of rasputin was imprisonment. the censorship, controlled by his catspaw protopopoff, took care to adopt the most drastic measures to suppress every mention of the mysterious "saint" who was the centre of that band of neurotic noblewomen who kissed his filthy hands and bowed their knees to him. "o holy father! the chosen one of god! give us thy blessing and we beseech of thee to pray for us. may the sin we here commit be committed for the purification of our souls; and may we, thy sister-disciples, be raised to thine own plane of piety by god's great mercy." thus ran the blasphemous opening prayer repeated at each of the scoundrel's erotic reunions--those meetings held with closed doors both within the palace of tsarskoe-selo, in the gorokhovaya, and elsewhere. but on that historic november th, , the "saint" had been publicly named, and hence became seriously alarmed. two hours after the fearless miliukoff had denounced him in the duma the whole of petrograd palpitated with excitement. all knew that the utterances of the fearless patriot who had actually pilloried the monk in public would be denied publication in the press. therefore those who were bent upon winning the war at once arranged to have typewritten copies of the speech circulated from hand to hand, and by that means the bold denunciation obtained a wider circulation than any other words ever spoken in the duma. the newspapers appeared with black columns. "m. miliukoff continued the debate," was all that was allowed to appear in print. the cables to the allies were rigorously censored, so that in england even downing street were in ignorance of what had really occurred. paris, london and rome were still living in a fool's paradise, thanks to the grip which germany had gained upon official petrograd, and were being led to believe that all in the russian empire were united against the hated hun. the reports in the british press of that period were most mystifying. that the duma were dissatisfied with the state of affairs was plain, but had not the house of commons often expressed equal dissatisfaction? the fact, however, that the name of rasputin had actually been mentioned and that the "holy father" had been exposed as germany's spy, who controlled the "hofmeister sturmer," was never dreamed until a month later, even by such outspoken journals as the paris _matin_. at tsarskoe-selo, however, all were in deadly fear. even anna vyrubova viewed the situation with greatest alarm. she wrote to him an hour after miliukoff had denounced him, as follows: "her majesty is prostrated. all seems lost. the emperor departs for the front again at midnight. he fears a rising in petrograd, and is regretful that m. (miliukoff) was not suppressed in time to save us. someone, he says, has blundered. if you would save yourself go instantly upon a pilgrimage. describe a vision that will allay the people's anger and give them further confidence in you. m. has denounced you as a mocker of god and a mere juggler with woman's credulity. our dear empress knows you are not. but she must continue in that belief. shall alexis be taken with another seizure? if so, prophesy the day and hour. i await word from you in secret, and ask your blessing.--your sister, anna." the suggestion in this letter is, of course, that a dose of the secret drug be administered to the poor little tsarevitch at an hour to be previously prophesied by the mock-monk. the matter was, however, on the alert. on receipt of the letter he went at once to the palace, abruptly leaving the camarilla who had assembled to plot further, and to save themselves and their own fat emoluments by more juggling with the security of the empire. to the empress, whom he found in her _neglige_ in her boudoir, with anna in sole attendance, he said: "truly, o sister! our enemies seek to encompass us! but god is our strength. as surely as the russian people have denounced me, so surely will god in his wrath send his punishment upon the heir to the throne. miliukoff, who has sought the protection of satan himself, has spoken his poisonous words against me. therefore i go to-morrow upon a pilgrimage to retire and to pray for the future of the empire, and the forgiveness of those who have dared to speak ill of one sent by god as the deliverer." "no! no!" gasped her majesty, starting from her chair in pale alarm. "you will not leave us at this juncture--you will not, holy father, leave us to our fate?" "it is decreed," he said in that low hard voice of his. "i have witnessed a vision even an hour since--i have heard the voice! i must obey. but," he added seriously, "i tell thee, o sister! that near five o'clock in the morning of the day following to-morrow thy dear son will be visited by god's wrath. he--" "he will be again ill!" gasped the unhappy woman, who believed that the bearded man in the black kaftan before her was sent by providence as russia's deliverer. "surely you cannot mean that! you will pray for him--you will save him. remember he is my son--my all!" "truly i mean what i have spoken, o sister!" was his reply. "but i will pray for his recovery--and all can be achieved by the sacrifice of the flesh and by prayer. god grant his recovery!" he added piously, making the sign of the cross and raising his mesmeric eyes heavenwards. at this the hysterical traitress in her pale-pink gown edged with wide eastern embroidery of emeralds and turquoises, fell upon her knees and kissed the scoundrel's knotted, unclean fingers, while her faithful anna looked on and crossed herself, muttering one of the prayers in the blasphemous jargon of the "sister-disciples." the failure to assassinate professor miliukoff had brought home to the camarilla and also to the spy-bureau in berlin--acting through swedish diplomatic channels--that the grand dukes nicholas, serge and dmitri, together with their small circle of staunch friends of the nobility, were determined to place them in the pillory. the agent of germany, skoropadski, a friend of the notorious azeff, of the russian secret police, whose exploits before the war were often chronicled, had betrayed his employers. commencing life as a russian _agent provocateur_, employed in warsaw against the revolutionists, and consequently a most unscrupulous and heartless person, he had entered the service of germany with protopopoff's connivance and had been the means of the ruin and downfall of dozens of patriotic russian officials. by virtue of his office as spy of germany he knew the double game that the prime minister, sturmer, was playing at rasputin's instigation. documents passed through his hands, and often he passed in secret between petrograd and berlin and _vice versa_, posing as a swede and travelling by way of stockholm. he was an expert spy, and ready to serve any paymaster. furthermore, he had a grudge against rasputin because one of his own lady friends had joined the cult of "believers," and thus had his hatred been aroused. therefore, when the little band of patriots at the head of which was the grand duke nicholas approached him in secret, he was at once ready to place the most damning documentary evidence in their hands--those papers which professor miliukoff had flashed in the faces of the duma. the anger of sturmer and protopopoff was now at a white heat. the latter, as controller of the secret police, made every effort to arrest the artful pole, but he happily escaped, and is now believed to be in paris. such was the story, revealed here for the first time, of the manner in which the revolutionists were able to present to the people's representative the infamous acts of the monk rasputin and his official "creatures" who wore their tinselled uniforms, their tin decorations and enjoyed titles of "excellency." traitors have been in every land since the creation; and, as i examined this amazing _dossier_ collected by the patriotic party in russia, with its original letters, its copies of letters, its photographs and its telegrams in the sloped calligraphy of their senders, i marvel, and wonder who in other countries are the traitors--who while pretending to serve their own kings or their presidents are also serving the mammon of germania? i pen these chapters of the downfall of tsardom with unwilling hand, for i have many friends in russia and, as a traveller in the land of the tsar over many thousands of versts, i have grown to know--perhaps only slightly--the hearty, homely and hospitable russian people. i have suffered discomforts for months among those clouds of mosquitoes on the great "tundra," and i have travelled many and many weary miles over the snows of winter, yet never did i think that i should sit to chronicle such a _debacle_. notwithstanding the tears of the empress, the villainous rasputin, having arranged with anna the hour when she should drug the poor little tsarevitch, departed on a pilgrimage to the monastery of tsarytsine. facts concerning this journey, when he fled from the wrath of the people, have just been revealed by his friend the monk helidor, who having learnt the manner in which he betrayed the empire, has come forward to elucidate many things hitherto mysterious. helidor, who is a man of high intelligence and true religious principles, has stated that at rasputin's invitation both he and monsignor hermogene joined "grichka," as he terms his dissolute friend, upon the pilgrimage. rasputin the traitor was received everywhere as an angel from heaven. the people of all classes prostrated themselves and kissed his unclean hands. in tsarytsine during two days he entered many houses, where he embraced all the good-looking women, but discarded the old and ugly. he was often drunk and riotous. on entering the monastery at last he isolated himself for four days on pretence of prayer, but he was assisted in his religious exercises by a good-looking young nun with whom he openly walked in the monastery grounds. tired of the retirement and the nun's companionship, he travelled to his native siberian village of pokrovsky, helidor accompanying him. "during our journey, which was a long one," helidor says, "i tried to discover some testimony to the sanctity of my companion. i only found him to be a most uncouth and dissolute person, whose constant talk was of women, and who drank incessantly. i had been mystified by him until then, but i realised that even having been denounced in the duma, he was quite undisturbed, for his egotism was colossal, and he constantly declared to me that he was the actual autocrat." helidor's description of the so-called "monastery" at pokrovsky is interesting as being from an authentic and reliable source. "we arrived there at last," he declared in an interview the other day. "it was a mean siberian village half hidden in the siberian snow, for the winter was unduly early. i observed my host closely, for i now knew him to be a traitor and a charlatan. the `monastery' as he called it in petrograd, and for which hundreds gave him subscriptions, was not a religious house at all, and it had never been consecrated as such. rasputin himself was not even a monk, for he had never been received into the church." in describing this "monastery" for which the monk had filched thousands upon thousands of roubles from the pockets of his neophytes in petrograd, helidor says: "it was a large house, which had only recently been furnished luxuriously. it was full of holy ikons, of portraits of women, and of magnificent presents from their majesties. the occupants of the place numbered a dozen women, mostly young, garbed as nuns and performing daily religious observances." apparently the establishment was a siberian "abode of love," much upon the lines, as the smyth-piggott cult, yet helidor has declared that what struck him most was the open hostility of the mujiks towards the "holy father." "they are annoyed, my dear brother helidor, because you have come with me from petrograd," the "saint" declared in excuse. but helidor noticed that antoine, the archbishop of tobolsk, who visited him, betrayed the same marked hostility, while the people of the village all declared without mincing matters that grichka, whom they had known as a convicted horse-thief and assaulter of women, was merely a _debauche_. again came wild telegrams from the empress. the "saint's" prophecy had been fulfilled and the tsarevitch had been taken seriously ill at the exact hour he had predicted. "nikki has returned. both of us are in deadly fear," she telegraphed. "kousmin (the court physician) cannot diagnose the malady. come to us at once, holy father, i pray to you, come and save us. give your blessing and your sympathy to your devoted sister.--a." at the same time his majesty sent a telegraphic message to the man who made and unmade ministers and who ruled all russia at home and in the field. it was despatched from the winter palace half-an-hour after the message of the empress, and read: "friend, i cannot command, but i beg of you to return instantly to us. we want your help. without it, alexis will die, and the house of romanoff is doomed. i have sent the imperial train to you. it leaves in an hour.--nicholas." of this summons the villainous ex-thief took no notice. helidor says: "he showed me the telegrams and laughed triumphantly, saying, `nikki seems very much troubled! why does he not return to the front and urge on his soldiers against the advancing hosts.' the greater our losses the nearer shall we be to peace. i shall take care that ignorant russia will not win against the causes of civilisation and humanity." "civilisation and humanity!" this illiterate and dissolute peasant, who each night became hopelessly intoxicated and who in his cups would revile his paymasters the huns and chant in his deep bass voice refrains of russian patriotic airs, was actually the dear "friend" of the tsar of all the russias! the vicious scoundrel's influence was reaching its zenith. to western readers the whole facts may well appear incredible. but those who know russia, with its complex world of official corruption and "religious" chicanery, are well aware how anything may happen to that huge empire when at war. after a fortnight's silence, during which the sinister hand of anna vyrubova regularly administered that secret drug to the poor, helpless son of the emperor, rasputin, with amazing effrontery, dared again to put his foot in petrograd. on the night of his arrival the tsaritza, awaiting him anxiously at tsarskoe-selo, sent him a note by ivan radzick, the trusted body-servant of the emperor for fifteen years, a note which the miracle-worker preserved most carefully, and which ran as follows: "holy father,--i await you eagerly. boris (sturmer) and fredericks are with me. things are increasingly critical. hasten to us at once and cure poor little alexis, or he will die. the doctors are powerless. i have had urgent news from berlin. miliukoff must be removed, and so must kerensky and nicholas (the grand duke). boris has arranged it. you have the means. something must happen to them within the next forty-eight hours. nicholas has handed nikki an abominable letter of threats. the british ambassador is wary and knows of this. his despatches to london to-night must be intercepted. i am sending the car for you, and await in eagerness once again to kiss your dear hands.-- your devoted sister, alec." chapter eleven. bamboozling the allies. as a result of the denunciation in the duma of "russia's dark forces," boris sturmer was deprived of the premiership and appointed by the tsaritza's influence to a high office in the imperial household, where he could still unite with baron fredericks in playing germany's game. a few days after this re-shuffling of the cards, m. trepoff, the new premier, made a reassuring statement to the duma, in which he said: "there will never be a premature or separate peace. nothing can change this resolution, which is the inflexible will of the august russian sovereign, who stands for the whole of his faithful people." how rasputin and the camarilla must have chuckled when they read these words of reassurance! on the very day that declaration was made the monk had received a telegram in cipher from stockholm, whither it had been first sent from the koniggratzer-strasse in berlin, and which, de-coded, reads as follows: "gregersen (a well-known german agent who had actively assisted von papen in america) is arriving at archangel upon a munition ship from new york. you will have early news of him. see that he is placed under p.'s (protopopoff's) protection. he will bring you four boxes. do not open them, but see they are stored carefully. hand them to our friend r. (professor rogovitch, of samara, a bacteriologist and friend of rasputin).--number ." the monk had "early news" of the arrival of the spy gregersen, for on the day following the receipt of that advice of his coming, the ship upon which he had travelled from new york blew up in archangel harbour, and no fewer than one thousand, eight hundred persons were killed or injured! gregersen arrived at the gorokhovaya that same night, and there met protopopoff, who furnished him with false papers, upon which his photograph was pasted and sealed. the four wooden boxes which the spy had brought from america, and which contained the bacilli of anthrax and bubonic plague, were, two days later, handed by the monk to the professor. but the latter, carelessly handling them when opening them, became infected with anthrax himself, and subsequently died in great agony. by the scoundrel's timely death russia was spared an epidemic of those two terrible diseases, it being the intention of rogovitch and rasputin to infect with plague the rats in moscow and other cities. the fact can never, of course, be disguised that the tsar was fully cognisant of rasputin's evil influence at the imperial court, though it seems equally certain that he never suspected him to be the arch-plotter and creature of the kaiser that he really was. before the war, nicholas ii had lived a hermit's life at tsarskoe-selo. every foreign diplomat who has been stationed in petrograd since his accession knows that he was the echo of everyone's opinion except his own. the flexibility of his mind was only equalled by its emptiness. personal in everything, weak, shallow-minded, yet well-intentioned, he had long been interested in spiritualistic seances and table-turning. indeed, the most notorious frauds and charlatans who brought psychical studies into disrepute have had the honour of "performing" before his majesty, and have even received decorations from the hands of the gulled emperor. it is, therefore, not surprising that this bold and amazingly cunning siberian peasant known as "grichka," with his mock miracles--worked by means of drugs supplied to him by the fellow badmayeff, another charlatan who represented himself as an expert upon "thibetan" medicine and who had a large clientele in petrograd society--could so gull the emperor that he actually consulted "the holy father" upon the most important matters concerning the state. through the critical year of grace, , when the future of the world's civilisation was trembling in the balance, the allies lived utterly unsuspicious of this astounding state of affairs. downing street and the quai d'orsay were in ignorance of the deeply-laid plot of the emperor william to crush and destroy that splendid piece of patriotic machinery, "the russian steam-roller." we in england were frantically making munitions for russia, and lending her the sinews of war, merely regarding the erotic monk as a society tea-drinking buffoon such as one meets in every capital. the truth has, however, been revealed by the amazing results of diligent inquiries made by that patriotic little band of russians who united at the end of to rid the empire of its most dangerous enemy, and have placed their secret reports in my hands. the emperor, though exceedingly rancorous, and though in appearance a quiet, inoffensive little man, was yet capable of the utmost cruelty and hardness. he has been responsible for some terrible miscarriages of justice. his callousness is well-known. after the catastrophe of khodinska, which cost the lives of nearly two thousand of his subjects, he danced the whole night at a ball given by the french ambassador, while on reading the telegram which told him of the disaster of tsushima, which cost russia her whole fleet and the loss of so many precious lives, he made no remark, but continued his game of tennis in the park of tsarskoe-selo. those of his personal entourage wondered. they asked themselves whether it was stoicism, indifference, or a strength of mind abnormal. it was neither. throughout the whole career of nicholas ii his only thought had been to flee from danger, and to leave to others the task of pulling the chestnuts from the fire. rasputin and his shrewd and clever fellow-traitors knew all this, and were acting upon the emperor's weaknesses, more especially upon his majesty's belief in spiritualism and his fear to thwart the imperious declarations of his german-born wife. alexandra feodorovna, the complex neurotic woman who had begun her career as empress by determining to exclude from court all ladies with blemished reputations, and all those black sheep who creep by back-stair influence into every court of europe, had now under rasputin's influence welcomed any of the monk's lady friends, however tarnished their reputations. there can be no doubt that the empress's nerves were not in a sound condition. true, she was in constant communication with germany, and her actions showed her readiness to betray russia into the hands of her own people. this fact the world ought to take into consideration. the empress is the most interesting character-study in the world to-day. we can have no sympathy with those who are traitors, yet it has been clearly proved that the horrors of the revolution had left a deep impression on her mind. she had no fatalism in her character, and she lived in daily dread of seeing her children and husband murdered. she had no courage. her highly-strung nature took more seriously to the soothing effect of the evil monk rasputin's teaching than would the mind of a woman of normal calibre; hence, while "nikki" her husband believed implicitly in "dear gregory's" advice, she also believed him to be the heaven-sent deliverer of russia, to wrest it from disaster, and to give to the poor little tsarevitch good health as heir to the romanoff dynasty. those latter days of were truly strenuous ones in the imperial household. on december th the emperor had left for moscow, and to him the tsaritza telegraphed in their private code, as follows: "tsarskoe-selo, december th, : a.m. "gregory says that zakomelsky is proposing a resolution denouncing him at the council of the empire to-morrow. at all costs this must be prevented. boris and fredericks agree. you must stop it.--alec." to this there was sent a reply, the copy being on record: "moscow, december th, p.m. "quite agree with undesirability of allowing z. to criticise, but cannot see how i can prevent it, unless by arrest. i am communicating with a certain quarter. shall return to-morrow.--nikki." apparently the emperor, whatever steps he took, was unable to secure the arrest of the leader of the centre, for on the following day, at the meeting of the council, the resolution was moved by the baron meller zakomelsky, who recognised m. trepoff's honest and sincere desire to combat the so-called "dark forces," but warned the prime minister that the method chosen by him was wrong. the only effective weapon, he said, was light, and the duma and the council called on the government to join them in revealing and denouncing the notorious sinister influence. the whole of russia awaited the eradication of the plague which was corroding the state organism. this resolution apparently stirred into action the forces gradually arising to combat the camarilla, for on december th, baroness mesentzoff, wife of baron paul mesentzoff, chamberlain and councillor of state, and a fair-haired "sister-disciple" of rasputin's, sent him a letter of warning which is in existence, and of which i here give an english translation. it was handed to him late at night at his home in the gorokhovaya. seated with him in that little sanctum into which his neophytes were admitted by his discreet body-servant, and drinking heavily as usual, were sturmer, the ex-premier, and a man named kartchevsky, a renegade, who was actually at that moment secretary to general von beseler, the german governor-general of warsaw. the letter read as follows: "holy father,--i have been with anna (madame vyrubova) and olga (the tsar's daughter) an hour ago. i have told them to warn her majesty the empress of a desperate plot against you. do beware, i pray you, of youssoupoff, and of the grand duke dmitri. there is a conspiracy to kill you! "your pretended friend pourichkevitch dined with me to-night, and he, too, intends that you shall be removed. we all pray that no harm shall befall you. but i send this at once in warning. i shall be at the seance tomorrow, when i hope to have an opportunity of speaking with you alone. a young friend of mine, nadjezda boldyieff, daughter of the general at kiev, is anxious to enter our circle. so i shall bring her with me. but do, i beg of you, heed this warning, and avoid all contact with the persons herein named.--your sister, feo." the monk, who was in his cups, as he usually was after midnight-- according to his servant's statement--handed the letter to sturmer with an inane laugh. and stroking his beard, said with his extraordinary egotism: "enemies! why do these silly impetuous women warn me? i am careful enough to look after myself. i rule russia--at the orders of the emperor william! the tsar is only tsar in name. the emperor is myself, gregory the monk!" "but pourichkevitch is dangerous," declared the traitorous ex-prime minister. "he is the fiercest member of the extreme right, and our friend protopopoff has lately received many reports concerning him through the secret police." "if so, then why is he not imprisoned?" asked rasputin. "protopopoff is far too hesitating. a few compromising documents introduced into his house, a police search, an arrest, a word to the emperor--and he would have an uncomfortable little room beneath the lake in the fortress of schusselburg. no, our friend protopopoff is far too weak. he dallies too much for the public favour. what is it worth? personally, i prefer their hatred." "and yet you are the great healer--the idol of the working-class, just as gapon was long ago!" laughed the ex-premier. "yes, i am their grichka," laughed rasputin in his drunken humour. "it is true, my dear boris. there is but one tsar, and it is myself--eh?" and he chuckled as he drained his glass of champagne, and laughed at the warning sent him by the woman who had sat at his knee and who had given over her whole private fortune to him, just as a dozen other society women in petrograd had done. if his "sister-disciples" failed him in funds, then he simply held their letters and blackmailed them till he drove them to desperation, and in six known cases to suicide. the fears of the empress alexandra feodorovna for the safety of her pet monk in whom she believed so devoutly, seem to have been aroused by the warning given by the baroness mesentzoff, for next day there came to him an urgent telegram from gatchina, where the tsaritza had gone on a visit to the dowager empress. it read: "you are in grave danger. mother superior paula, of the novo-devitsky nunnery, has disclosed something to me. come to tsarskoe-selo at once. nikki is eager to consult you.--a." the monk was quick to realise by this telegram his true position in the imperial household. only a few weeks before anna vyrubova, the high-priestess of his disgraceful cult, had warned him of his waning influence. but he had not cared one jot, because, in his safe, he had stowed hundreds of letters and telegrams from society women compromising themselves. by the sale of these he could obtain sufficient money to establish a fortune for the rest of his life. here, however, a new phase had arisen. he was in active communication with germany, he had already wrecked russia's splendid offensive, and was gradually bringing the empire into bad odour with neutrals. for this he had, in secret, received the heartfelt thanks of his imperial paymaster the kaiser. german money was flowing to him from all quarters, and german agents were swarming in petrograd, as well as across the russian front. brusiloff was doing his best, but having gauged the position, had realised that it was becoming hopeless. german influence was eating the heart out of russia as a canker-worm--and that canker-worm was gregory rasputin himself. in consequence of the telegram from the empress, followed by a letter sent by imperial messenger by the grand duchess olga, the monk hastened to the palace and had a long interview with her majesty. he left with anna vyrubova soon after noon in one of the imperial cars which were always at his disposal, in consequence of the seance arranged at his house in petrograd, and more especially because the baroness mesentzoff had sent him a photograph of nadjezda boldyieff, who was anxious to join the "disciples." notwithstanding the critical situation, the seance was held, and the handsome nadjezda was admitted to the "sisterhood." truly those were critical days in russia. the rascal had been warned, but did not heed. the allies, fighting for the just cause, were in ignorance of the fierce resentment now aroused in the hearts of the russian people by the denunciation in the duma by those who were bold enough to speak their minds and defy the camarilla. the news allowed out of russia during the last month of the year was most meagre. protopopoff, the kaiser's silk-hatted creature, controlled it, and only allowed intelligence of the most optimistic character to filter through to us. hence while the british, american, and french press were publishing wholly fictitious accounts of russia's gains, the "miracle-worker" was daily driving the imperial house of romanoff towards the abyss of oblivion. chapter twelve. the true story of rasputin's end. events were now proceeding apace. the grand duke nicholas michailovitch had dared to seek audience of the tsar, at which he had handed him a memorandum of protest. in this letter, which is still upon record, the grand duke wrote: "where is the root of the evil? let me explain it in a few words. "so long as your manner of choosing ministers was known to narrow circles, things could muddle along, but when it became a matter of public knowledge and all classes in russia talked about it, it was senseless to attempt to continue to govern russia in this fashion. often did you tell me that you could put faith in no one, and that you were being deceived. "if this is so, then it applies particularly to your wife, who loves you and yet led you into error, being surrounded by evil-minded intimates. you believe in alexandra feodorovna. this is natural. but the words she utters are the product of skilful machinations, not of truth. if you are powerless to liberate her from these influences, then at all events be on your guard against constant and systematic influence of intriguers who are using your wife as their instrument... if you could remove the persistent interference of dark forces in all matters, the regeneration of russia would instantly be advanced, and you would regain the confidence of the enormous majority of your subjects, which you have forfeited." this was pretty outspoken. but further, during the course of the conversation, the grand duke spoke of protopopoff and asked nicholas ii whether he was aware that this politician had been palmed off on him by the agency of rasputin, whom protopopoff had first met at the home of the charlatan badmayeff, the man who secretly practised so-called "thibetan" medicine and who supplied the "saint" with his drugs. the emperor smiled and declared that he was already acquainted with the facts. the emperor took the memorandum to the empress and read it aloud to her. when he came to the passage dealing with the evil influences surrounding her, she flew into a rage, seized the document, and tore it up in the tsar's face! meanwhile the camarilla were still plotting further the downfall of russia, and endeavouring to implicate sturmer's successor. suddenly, on december th, the greatest consternation was caused both in society circles in petrograd and at the palace of tsarskoe-selo, owing to rumours that rasputin was missing. he had been absent from the capital on many occasions, travelling upon his supposed pilgrimages, but there was persistent gossip on the nevski that something had happened. after the _debacle_ three telegrams in english were found in the department of posts and telegraphs. they had been sent by the empress from tsarskoe-selo to the emperor, and read as follows: "tsarskoe-selo, december th. "i am worried by the awful rumours. no details. remember what i wrote to you.--alec." four days later her majesty telegraphed again to the tsar: "tsarskoe-selo, december th, : p.m. "can you send voyeipoff to me at once? i want his help and advice. we still hope for the best. dmitri and felix are implicated.--alec." six hours later she again telegraphed frantically: "tsarskoe-selo, december th, : p.m. "nothing discovered yet. felix stopped on his way to crimea. how i wish you were here.--alec." and again at midnight she sent two further telegrams. the first read: "tsarskoe-selo, december th, : p.m. "father (rasputin) is no more. punish the enemies of russia and of our house. come back at once. i can bear it no longer.--alec." the second was addressed: "to father makarius, verkhotursky monastery, perm. "december th, midnight. "great misfortune. something happened to father (rasputin). pray for him and for us. those responsible will be punished. come at once to us.--alexandra." for days the sensational affair was hushed-up from the public by order of the tsar, and with the connivance of protopopoff. many fictitious accounts have appeared in the press regarding the final hours of the amazing rascal who, as tool of the emperor william, brought to an end the imperial house of romanoff. i am here enabled, however, to explain the truth from an authentic source, namely, from the statement of a lady--a russian nursing-sister-- who was an eye-witness and who is in london at the moment when i write. the lady in question is well known in london, and i have begged her to allow me to disclose her name, but for certain reasons she has held me to my promise of secrecy. there are, one must remember, still influential friends of rasputin in russia, and as she is returning there, her objection is obvious. it seems that on december th (russian style) the "saint" had been invited to the elegant house of prince youssoupoff to a merry supper. the _penchant_ of the monk for a pretty face and a mysterious adventure being well-known, it had been hinted to him that a certain lady who desired to remain incognito, wished to meet him. now the house of prince youssoupoff in petrograd--who, by the way, had a house in london before the war and was well-known in mayfair--runs from the moskaya to the offitzerskaya, where at a back entrance, the wine from the famous estate in the crimea is sold, just as wine is sold at the mediaeval palaces of florence. the prince was supposed to be alone to meet his guest and this mysterious young and pretty lady who desired to enter the cult of the "sister-disciples." as a matter of fact, however, there were assembled in a room on the first floor several persons determined to rid russia of this erotic traitor who was daily betraying her into the hands of the huns. they were the prince youssoupoff, the grand duke dmitri (who was suspected by the empress), the deputy of the extreme right, pourichkevitch, a man named stepanoff, a well-known _danseuse_ (the mysterious lady who acted as decoy, named mademoiselle c--), and the lady who has described the scene to me. eleven o'clock struck. it was a dramatic scene. all were anxious for rasputin's arrival, but he did not come. the prince went to the telephone and asked for the monk at his house. the reply was that the father had gone out to dine somewhere early in the evening. would he come? would he walk into the trap so cunningly baited for him? the moments seemed hours as the little assembly sat waiting and discussing whether any one could have given him warning, for it was known that the "miracle-worker" had, through his catspaw protopopoff, spies set everywhere. at twenty minutes past eleven a car was heard at the back-door in the offitzerskaya, and his host, rushing down, admitted him mysteriously. the monk removed his big sable-lined coat, disclosing his black clerical garb and big bejewelled cross suspended around his neck. then he removed his galoshes, for it was snowing hard outside. "you need not be afraid, father," said his host. "we are alone, except for my friend stepanoff. he is one of us," he laughed merrily. then he conducted the "saint" into the large handsome dining-room, where a tall, fair-bearded man, paul stepanoff, came forward to meet him. upon the table were two bottles of wine. into one cyanide of potassium had been introduced, and its potency had an hour before been tried upon a dog, which at the moment was lying dead in the yard outside. after stepanoff had been introduced, the prince said in a confidential tone: "the lady i mentioned has not yet arrived. i shall go to the door to await her so that the servants are not disturbed." thus the father was left with his merry, easy-going fellow-guest, who at a glance he saw was a _bon viveur_ like himself. the two men began to talk of spiritualism, in which stepanoff declared himself to be much interested, and a few minutes later he poured out some wine, filling the father's glass from the poisoned bottle while he attracted his attention to a picture at the end of the room. they raised their glasses, and drank. some dry biscuits were in a silver box, and after rasputin had drained his glass, he took a biscuit and munched it. but to stepanoff's amazement the poison took no effect! was the monk after all under some divine or mysterious protection? stepanoff was expecting him to be seized by paroxysms of agony every moment. on the contrary, he was still calm and expectant regarding the mysterious lady whom he was to meet. suddenly, however, rasputin, slightly paler than usual, exclaimed: "curious! i do not feel very well!" and he crossed the room to examine an ancient crucifix, beautifully jewelled, which was standing upon a side table. stepanoff rose and followed him, remarking on the beauty of the sacred emblem, yet aghast that the "saint" could take such a dose of poison and yet remain unharmed. prince youssoupoff with the others, was standing silent in the upstairs room eagerly awaiting stepanoff's announcement that the traitor was no more. those moments were breathless ones. what, they wondered, was happening below! they listened, and could hear the voices of the pair below still in conversation. "ah! that spasm has passed!" rasputin was heard to declare. passed! was he immune from the effects of that most deadly poison? they looked at each other astounded. the fact was that he had only sipped the wine, and having had sufficient already to drink he had contrived to empty his glass into a dark porcelain flower-bowl. the monk had taken the big crucifix in his hand to examine it the more closely, when stepanoff, seeing that rasputin was still unharmed suddenly drew a big browning pistol, and, placing it under the monk's arm and against his breast, fired. the others above, hearing the shot, rushed out upon the wide balcony, while stepanoff dashed up the stairs to meet them, crying: "the saint is dead at last! russia is freed of the scoundrel!" the others shouted joy, and re-entering the room, toasted the liberation and regeneration of russia. suddenly, they heard a noise and went out upon the balcony again, when, to their horror, they saw the door of the dining-room opened, and rasputin, haggard and blood-stained, staggering forth, with an imprecation upon his lips, to the door opening to the street, in an effort to escape! the attempt at poisoning him had failed, and he had only been wounded. the tension was breathless. was he after all endowed with some supernatural power? "you have tried to kill me!" shrieked the monk, his hands stained with blood. "but i still live--i live!--and god will give me my revenge!" with his hands clasped over the spot where he had been wounded, he gave vent to a peal of demoniacal laughter, which held the little knot of witnesses on the balcony utterly dumbfounded and appalled. only one man seemed to have courage to stir. according to the lady who was present and who gives me the description which i here reproduce--the only true and authentic account of the affair--stepanoff, his revolver still in his hand, again dashed down the stairs, and preventing the monk from opening the outer door, sprang upon him and emptied the contents of his weapon, barrel after barrel, into the monk's head. at last the spy and traitor was dead! ten minutes later a closed car arrived containing doctor stanislas l--, and driven by a soldier in uniform named ivan f--. in the car the body of the monk was placed by the doctor, the soldier, and the patriotic executioner stepanoff. leaving the prince and those who had assembled to witness the death of the hated agent of the kaiser who had so misled the russian imperial family and the russian people, and who had been directly and indirectly responsible for the death of thousands of brave men, british and french, on the various battle-fronts, the men drove with the fellow's body, the great golden cross still dangling around its neck, to the petrovsky bridge. it was very dark and snowy. nobody was about, therefore the doctor, the soldier, and the man who had that night lopped off the tentacle of the german octopus in russia, carried the body to a point between the second and third arches of the bridge. here it had been ascertained earlier in the night that the ice was broken, and a large hole existed. they raised the body to cast it over when, horror! the dead hand caught in the soldier's shoulder-strap! "is this a curse upon me?" gasped ivan. "curse or not, he goes!" cried stepanoff, and all three hurled him over the parapet. there was a loud splash. then all was silent again, and the trio, re-entering the car, drove hurriedly away. for six days there were rumours everywhere in petrograd that "something" had happened. fredericks, sturmer, and protopopoff were frantic. the secret police, at orders of the emperor, were making every inquiry, for the holy father was missing! on december st, at p.m., the tsaritza despatched the following telegram to nicholas ii. "order maksimovitch arrest dmitri (the grand duke) in your name. dmitri waited to see me to-day. i refused. the body has not yet been found.-- alec." to this his majesty replied that he was taking every measure, and that he had ordered the grand duke nicholas into exile to his estates. then, on the following day, the distracted empress, who was grief-stricken and inconsolable at the tragedy, telegraphed "thanks for your wire. body found in the river." an abandoned motor-car soaked in blood had been found miles out of the city. it was believed to belong to a grand duke. the entire police and detective force of the capital had in the meantime been afoot, and raked through all the houses of ill-fame, gipsy singers' haunts, and in fact every conceivable place, until the finding of a blood-stained galosh, proved to have belonged to rasputin, gave evidence of a tragedy. the ice on the river and canals was, of course, several feet thick, but it is the custom in russia to cut openings where water is obtained and linen is rinsed by laundresses. divers went down, but discovered nothing; eventually, however, the body was picked up near the bank, not far from where it had been thrown in. when it was discovered the empress saw it in secret and knelt before it, crying hysterically for half-an-hour. anna vyrubova standing in silence at her side. then, at the empress's orders, it was buried privately and at night at tsarskoe-selo. in the meantime the emperor had arrived post-haste from the front, and for three days extremely guarded references to an "interesting murder" appeared in the petrograd and foreign press. alongside were printed some biographical notes regarding the chief actors in the tragedy. no mention, however, was allowed to be made of rasputin. suddenly, however, the public were told that the notorious monk had "ended his life." but nothing was said as to when or by what means. thus closed the infamous career of the dark force in russia, and by the tragedy the whole amazing truth which i have here disclosed became revealed. the secret plotting of germany, and the using of the mock-monk to sap the power of russia's offensive, will live ever in history, and will, no doubt, be the theme of many future historians. but all will agree that the words of the weak, neurotic empress, when she was told by anna vyrubova of rasputin's death, were prophetic. "dead!" she gasped, her face blanched to the lips. "if the holy father is dead, then, alas! the dynasty of the romanoffs is dead also!" those words of hers were true indeed, for within three months the tsar had signed his abdication, and the imperial pair, together with the camarilla of traitors, were prisoners in the hands of those who intended that russia should yet be re-born and freed of its teuton taint, and of the disgraceful cult of that blasphemous and scheming rascal rasputin. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ the end. none the crisis in russia by arthur ransome to william peters of aberdeen introduction the characteristic of a revolutionary country is that change is a quicker process there than elsewhere. as the revolution recedes into the past the process of change slackens speed. russia is no longer the dizzying kaleidoscope that it was in . no longer does it change visibly from week to week as it changed in l . already, to get a clear vision of the direction in which it is changing, it is necessary to visit it at intervals of six months, and quite useless to tap the political barometer several times a day as once upon a time one used to do.... but it is still changing very fast. my journal of "russia in ," while giving as i believe a fairly accurate picture of the state of affairs in february and march of , pictures a very different stage in the development of the revolution from that which would be found by observers today. the prolonged state of crisis in which the country has been kept by external war, while strengthening the ruling party by rallying even their enemies to their support, has had the other effects that a national crisis always has on the internal politics of a country. methods of government which in normal times would no doubt be softened or disguised by ceremonial usage are used nakedly and justified by necessity. we have seen the same thing in belligerent and non-revolutionary countries, and, for the impartial student, it has been interesting to observe that, when this test of crisis is applied, the actual governmental machine in every country looks very much like that in every other. they wave different flags to stimulate enthusiasm and to justify submission. but that is all. under the stress of war, "constitutional safeguards" go by the board "for the public good," in moscow as elsewhere. under that stress it becomes clear that, in spite of its novel constitution, russia is governed much as other countries are governed, the real directive power lying in the hands of a comparatively small body which is able by hook or crook to infect with its conscious will a population largely indifferent and inert. a visitor to moscow to-day would find much of the constitutional machinery that was in full working order in the spring of now falling into rust and disrepair. he would not be able once a week or so to attend all-russian executive and hear discussions in this parliament of the questions of the day. no one tries to shirk the fact that the executive committee has fallen into desuetude, from which, when the stress slackens enough to permit ceremonial that has not an immediate agitational value, it may some day be revived. the bulk of its members have been at the front or here and there about the country wrestling with the economic problem, and their work is more useful than their chatter. thus brutally is the thing stated. the continued stress has made the muscles, the actual works, of the revolution more visible than formerly. the working of the machine is not only seen more clearly, but is also more frankly stated (perhaps simply because they too see it now more clearly), by the leaders themselves. i want in this book to describe the working of the machine as i now see it. but it is not only the machine which is more nakedly visible than it was. the stress to which it is being subjected has also not so much changed its character as become easier of analysis. at least, i seem to myself to see it differently. in the earlier days it seemed quite simply the struggle between a revolutionary and non-revolutionary countries. i now think that that struggle is a foolish, unnecessary, lunatic incident which disguised from us the existence of a far more serious struggle, in which the revolutionary and non-revolutionary governments are fighting on the same side. they fight without cooperation, and throw insults and bullets at each other in the middle of the struggle, but they are fighting for the same thing. they are fighting the same enemy. their quarrel with each other is for both parties merely a harassing accompaniment of the struggle to which all europe is committed, for the salvage of what is left of european civilization. the threat of a complete collapse of civilization is more imminent in russia than elsewhere. but it is clear enough in poland, it cannot be disregarded in germany, there is no doubt of its existence in italy, france is conscious of it; it is only in england and america that this threat is not among the waking nightmares of everybody. unless the struggle, which has hitherto been going against us, takes a turn for the better, we shall presently be quite unable to ignore it ourselves. i have tried to state the position in russia today: on the one hand to describe the crisis itself, the threat which is forcing these people to an extreme of effort, and on the other hand to describe the organization that is facing that threat; on the one hand to set down what are the main characteristics of the crisis, on the other hand to show how the comparatively small body of persons actually supplying the russian people with its directives set about the stupendous task of moving that vast inert mass, not along the path of least resistance, but along a path which, while alike unpleasant and extremely difficult, does seem to them to promise some sort of eventual escape. no book is entirely objective, so i do not in the least mind stating my own reason for writing this one (which has taken time that i should have liked to spend on other and very different things). knowledge of this reason will permit the reader to make allowances for such bias i have been unable to avoid, and so, by judicious reading, to make my book perhaps nearly as objective as i should myself wish it to be. it has been said that when two armies face each other across a battle front and engage in mutual slaughter, they may be considered as a single army engaged in suicide. now it seems to me that when countries, each one severally doing its best to arrest its private economic ruin, do their utmost to accelerate the economic ruin of each other, we are witnessing something very like the suicide of civilization itself. there are people in both camps who believe that armed and economic conflict between revolutionary and non-revolutionary europe, or if you like between capitalism and communism, is inevitable. these people, in both camps, are doing their best to make it inevitable. sturdy pessimists, in moscow no less than in london and paris, they go so far as to say "the sooner the better," and by all means in their power try to precipitate a conflict. now the main effort in russia to-day, the struggle which absorbs the chief attention of all but the few communist churchills and communist millerands who, blind to all else, demand an immediate pitched battle over the prostrate body of civilization, is directed to finding a way for russia herself out of the crisis, the severity of which can hardly be realized by people who have not visited the country again and again, and to bringing her as quickly as possible into a state in which she can export her raw materials and import the manufactured goods of which she stands in need. i believe that this struggle is ours as well as russia's, though we to whom the threat is less imminent, are less desperately engaged. victory or defeat in this struggle in russia, or anywhere else on the world's surface, is victory or defeat for every one. the purpose of my book is to make that clear. for, bearing that in mind, i cannot but think that every honest man, of whatever parity, who cares more for humanity than for politics, must do his utmost to postpone the conflict which a few extremists on each side of the barricades so fanatically desire. if that conflict is indeed inevitable, its consequences will be less devastating to a europe cured of her wounds than to a europe scarcely, even by the most hopeful, to be described as convalescent. but the conflict may not be inevitable after all. no man not purblind but sees that communist europe is changing no less than capitalist europe. if we succeed in postponing the struggle long enough, we may well succeed in postponing it until the war-like on both sides look in vain for the reasons of their bellicosity. contents introduction the shortage of things the shortage of men the communist dictatorship a conference at jaroslavl the trade unions the propaganda trains saturdayings industrial conscription what the communists are trying to do in russia rykov on economic plans and on the transformation of the communist party non-partyism possibilities ***i am indebted to the editor of the "manchester guardian" for permission to make use in some of the chapters of this book of material which has appeared in his paper. the crisis in russia the shortage of things nothing can be more futile than to describe conditions in russia as a sort of divine punishment for revolution, or indeed to describe them at all without emphasizing the fact that the crisis in russia is part of the crisis in europe, and has been in the main brought about like the revolution itself, by the same forces that have caused, for example, the crisis in germany or the crisis in austria. no country in europe is capable of complete economic independence. in spite of her huge variety of natural resources, the russian organism seemed in to have been built up on the generous assumption that with europe at least the country was to be permanently at peace, or at the lost to engage in military squabbles which could be reckoned in months, and would keep up the prestige of the autocracy without seriously hampering imports and exports. almost every country in europe, with the exception of england, was better fitted to stand alone, was less completely specialized in a single branch of production. england, fortunately for herself, was not isolated during the war, and will not become isolated unless the development of the crisis abroad deprives her of her markets. england produces practically no food, but great quantities of coal, steel and manufactured goods. isolate her absolutely, and she will not only starve, but will stop producing manufactured goods, steel and coal, because those who usually produce these things will be getting nothing for their labor except money which they will be unable to use to buy dinners, because there will be no dinners to buy. that supposititious case is a precise parallel to what has happened in russia. russia produced practically no manufactured goods ( per cent. of her machinery she received from abroad), but great quantities of food. the blockade isolated her. by the blockade i do not mean merely the childish stupidity committed by ourselves, but the blockade, steadily increasing in strictness, which began in august, , and has been unnecessarily prolonged by our stupidity. the war, even while for russia it was not nominally a blockade, was so actually. the use of tonnage was perforce restricted to the transport of the necessaries of war, and these were narrowly defined as shells, guns and so on, things which do not tend to improve a country economically, but rather the reverse. the imports from sweden through finland were no sort of make-weight for the loss of poland and germany. the war meant that russia's ordinary imports practically ceased. it meant a strain on russia, comparable to that which would have been put on england if the german submarine campaign had succeeded in putting an end to our imports of food from the americas. from the moment of the declaration of war, russia was in the position of one "holding out," of a city standing a siege without a water supply, for her imports were so necessary to her economy that they may justly be considered as essential irrigation. there could be no question for her of improvement, of strengthening. she was faced with the fact until the war should end she had to do with what she had, and that the things she had formerly counted on importing would be replaced by guns and shells, to be used, as it turned out, in battering russian property that happened to be in enemy hands. she even learned that she had to develop gun-making and shell-making at home, at the expense of those other industries which to some small extent might have helped her to keep going. and, just as in england such a state of affairs would lead to a cessation of the output of iron and coal in which england is rich, so in russia, in spite of her corn lands, it led to a shortage of food. the russian peasant formerly produced food, for which he was paid in money. with that money, formerly, he was able to clothe himself, to buy the tools of his labor, and further, though no doubt he never observed the fact, to pay for the engines and wagons that took his food to market. a huge percentage of the clothes and the tools and the engines and the wagons and the rails came from abroad, and even those factories in russia which were capable of producing such things were, in many essentials, themselves dependent upon imports. russian towns began to be hungry in . in october of that year the empress reported to the emperor that the shrewd rasputin had seen in a vision that it was necessary to bring wagons with flour, butter and sugar from siberia, and proposed that for three days nothing else should be done. then there would be no strikes. "he blesses you for the arrangement of these trains." in the peasants were burying their bread instead of bringing it to market. in the autumn of i remember telling certain most incredulous members of the english government that there would be a most serious food shortage in russia in the near future. in came the upheaval of the revolution, in peace, but for russia, civil war and the continuance of the blockade. by july, , the rarity of manufactured goods was such that it was possible two hundred miles south of moscow to obtain ten eggs for a box of matches, and the rarity of goods requiring distant transport became such that in november, , in western russia, the peasants would sell me nothing for money, whereas my neighbor in the train bought all he wanted in exchange for small quantities of salt. it was not even as if, in vital matters, russia started the war in a satisfactory condition. the most vital of all questions in a country of huge distances must necessarily be that of transport. it is no exaggeration to say that only by fantastic efforts was russian transport able to save its face and cover its worst deficiencies even before the war began. the extra strain put upon it by the transport of troops and the maintenance of the armies exposed its weakness, and with each succeeding week of war, although in and russia did receive locomotives from abroad, russian transport went from bad to worse, making inevitable a creeping paralysis of russian economic life, during the latter already acute stages of which the revolutionaries succeeded to the disease that had crippled their precursors. in russia had in all , locomotives, of which , burnt coal, , burnt oil and wood. but that figure of twenty thousand was more impressive for a government official, who had his own reasons for desiring to be impressed, than for a practical railway engineer, since of that number over five thousand engines were more than twenty years old, over two thousand were more than thirty years old, fifteen hundred were more than forty years old, and patriarchs had passed their fiftieth birthday. of the whole twenty thousand only , were under ten years of age. that was six years ago. in the meantime russia has been able to make in quantities decreasing during the last five years by and per cent. annually, , new locomotives. in of the locomotives then in russia about , were in working condition. in there were, in spite of new ones, only , . in the number of healthy locomotives was slightly higher, owing partly to the manufacture of at home in the preceding year and partly to the arrival of from abroad. in in spite of the arrival of a further small contingent the number sank to between , and , . early in the germans in the ukraine and elsewhere captured , . others were lost in the early stages of the civil war. the number of locomotives fell from , in january to , in april, after which the artificially instigated revolt of the czecho-slovaks made possible the fostering of civil war on a large scale, and the number fell swiftly to , in december. in the numbers varied less markedly, but the decline continued, and in december last year , engines were in working order. in january this year the number was , , rising slightly in february, when the number was , . a calculation was made before the war that in the best possible conditions the maximum russian output of engines could be not more than , annually. at this rate in ten years the russians could restore their collection of engines to something like adequate numbers. today, thirty years would be an inadequate estimate, for some factories, like the votkinsky, have been purposely ruined by the whites, in others the lathes and other machinery for building and repairing locomotives are worn out, many of the skilled engineers were killed in the war with germany, many others in defending the revolution, and it will be long before it will be possible to restore to the workmen or to the factories the favorable material conditions of - . thus the main fact in the present crisis is that russia possesses one-fifth of the number of locomotives which in was just sufficient to maintain her railway system in a state of efficiency which to english observers at that time was a joke. for six years she has been unable to import the necessary machinery for making engines or repairing them. further, coal and oil have been, until recently, cut off by the civil war. the coal mines are left, after the civil war, in such a condition that no considerable output may be expected from them in the near future. thus, even those engines which exist have had their efficiency lessened by being adapted in a rough and ready manner for burning wood fuel instead of that for which they were designed. let us now examine the combined effect of ruined transport and the six years' blockade on russian life in town and country. first of all was cut off the import of manufactured goods from abroad. that has had a cumulative effect completed, as it were, and rounded off by the breakdown of transport. by making it impossible to bring food, fuel and raw material to the factories, the wreck of transport makes it impossible for russian industry to produce even that modicum which it contributed to the general supply of manufactured goods which the russian peasant was accustomed to receive in exchange for his production of food. on the whole the peasant himself eats rather more than he did before the war. but he has no matches, no salt, no clothes, no boots, no tools. the communists are trying to put an end to illiteracy in russia, and in the villages the most frequent excuse for keeping children from school is a request to come and see them, when they will be found, as i have seen them myself, playing naked about the stove, without boots or anything but a shirt, if that, in which to go and learn to read and write. clothes and such things as matches are, however, of less vital importance than tools, the lack of which is steadily reducing russia's actual power of food production. before the war russia needed from abroad huge quantities of agricultural implements, not only machines, but simple things like axes, sickles, scythes. in her own production of these things had fallen to . per cent. of her already inadequate peacetime output. in it had fallen to . per cent. the soviet government is making efforts to raise it, and is planning new factories exclusively for the making of these things. but, with transport in such a condition, a new factory means merely a new demand for material and fuel which there are neither engines nor wagons to bring. meanwhile, all over russia, spades are worn out, men are plowing with burnt staves instead of with plowshares, scratching the surface of the ground, and instead of harrowing with a steel-spiked harrow of some weight, are brushing the ground with light constructions of wooden spikes bound together with wattles. the actual agricultural productive powers of russia are consequently sinking. but things are no better if we turn from the rye and corn lands to the forests. saws are worn out. axes are worn out. even apart from that, the shortage of transport affects the production of wood fuel, lack of which reacts on transport and on the factories and so on in a circle from which nothing but a large import of engines and wagons will provide an outlet. timber can be floated down the rivers. yes, but it must be brought to the rivers. surely horses can do that. yes, but, horses must be fed, and oats do not grow in the forests. for example, this spring ( ) the best organized timber production was in perm government. there sixteen thousand horses have been mobilized for the work, but further development is impossible for lack of forage. a telegram bitterly reports, "two trains of oats from ekaterinburg are expected day by day. if the oats arrive in time a considerable success will be possible." and if the oats do not arrive in time? besides, not horses alone require to be fed. the men who cut the wood cannot do it on empty stomachs. and again rises a cry for trains, that do not arrive, for food that exists somewhere, but not in the forest where men work. the general effect of the wreck of transport on food is stated as follows: less than per cent. of the oats required, less than per cent. of the bread and salt required for really efficient working, were brought to the forests. nonetheless three times as much wood has been prepared as the available transport has removed. the towns suffer from lack of transport, and from the combined effect on the country of their productive weakness and of the loss of their old position as centres through which the country received its imports from abroad. townsfolk and factory workers lack food, fuel, raw materials and much else that in a civilized state is considered a necessary of life. thus, ten million poods of fish were caught last year, but there were no means of bringing them from the fisheries to the great industrial centres where they were most needed. townsfolk are starving, and in winter, cold. people living in rooms in a flat, complete strangers to each other, by general agreement bring all their beds into the kitchen. in the kitchen soup is made once a day. there is a little warmth there beside the natural warmth of several human beings in a small room. there it is possible to sleep. during the whole of last winter, in the case i have in mind, there were no means of heating the other rooms, where the temperature was almost always far below freezing point. it is difficult to make the conditions real except by individual examples. the lack of medicines, due directly to the blockade, seems to have small effect on the imagination when simply stated as such. perhaps people will realize what it means when instead of talking of the wounded undergoing operations without anesthetics i record the case of an acquaintance, a bolshevik, working in a government office, who suffered last summer from a slight derangement of the stomach due to improper and inadequate feeding. his doctor prescribed a medicine, and nearly a dozen different apothecaries were unable to make up the prescription for lack of one or several of the simple ingredients required. soap has become an article so rare (in russia as in germany during the blockade and the war there is a terrible absence of fats) that for the present it is to be treated as a means of safeguarding labor, to be given to the workmen for washing after and during their work, and in preference to miners, chemical, medical and sanitary workers, for whose efficiency and health it is essential. the proper washing of underclothes is impossible. to induce the population of moscow to go to the baths during the typhus epidemic, it was sufficient bribe to promise to each person beside the free bath a free scrap of soap. houses are falling into disrepair for want of plaster, paint and tools. nor is it possible to substitute one thing for another, for russia's industries all suffer alike from their dependence on the west, as well as from the inadequacy of the transport to bring to factories the material they need. people remind each other that during the war the germans, when similarly hard put to it for clothes, made paper dresses, table-cloths, etc. in russia the nets used in paper-making are worn out. at last, in april, (so lenin told me), there seemed to be a hope of getting new ones from abroad. but the condition of the paper industry is typical of all, in a country which, it should not be forgotten, could be in a position to supply wood-pulp for other countries besides itself. the factories are able to produce only sixty per cent. of demands that have previously, by the strictest scrutiny, been reduced to a minimum before they are made. the reasons, apart from the lack of nets and cloths, are summed up in absence of food, forage and finally labor. even when wood is brought by river the trouble is not yet overcome. the horses are dead and eaten or starved and weak. factories have to cease working so that the workmen, themselves underfed, can drag the wood from the barges to the mills. it may well be imagined what the effect of hunger, cold, and the disheartenment consequent on such conditions of work and the seeming hopelessness of the position have on the productivity of labor, the fall in which reacts on all the industries, on transport, on the general situation and so again on itself. mr. j. m. keynes, writing with central europe in his mind (he is, i think, as ignorant of russia as i am of germany), says: "what then is our picture of europe? a country population able to support life on the fruits of its own agricultural production, but without the accustomed surplus for the towns, and also (as a result of the lack of imported materials, and so of variety and amount in the salable manufactures of the towns) without the usual incentives to market food in exchange for other wares; an industrial population unable to keep its strength for lack of food, unable to earn a livelihood for lack of materials, and so unable to make good by imports from abroad the failure of productivity at home." russia is an emphasized engraving, in which every line of that picture is bitten in with repeated washes of acid. several new lines, however, are added to the drawing, for in russia the processes at work elsewhere have gone further than in the rest of europe, and it is possible to see dimly, in faint outline, the new stage of decay which is threatened. the struggle to arrest decay is the real crisis of the revolution, of russia, and, not impossibly, of europe. for each country that develops to the end in this direction is a country lost to the economic comity of europe. and, as one country follows another over the brink, so will the remaining countries be faced by conditions of increasingly narrow self-dependence, in fact by the very conditions which in russia, so far, have received their clearest, most forcible illustration. the shortage of men in the preceding chapter i wrote of russia's many wants, and of the processes visibly at work, tending to make her condition worse and not better. but i wrote of things, not of people. i wrote of the shortage of this and of that, but not of the most serious of all shortages, which, while itself largely due to those already discussed, daily intensifies them, and points the way to that further stage of decay which is threatened in the near future in russia, and, in the more distant future in europe. i did not write of the shortage deterioration of labor. shortage of labor is not peculiar to russia. it is among the postwar phenomena common to all countries. the war and its accompanying eases have cost europe, including russia, an enormous number of able-bodied men. many millions of others have lost the habit of regular work. german industrialists complain that they cannot get labor, and that when they get it, it is not productive. i heard complaints on the same subject in england. but just as the economic crisis, due in the first instance to the war and the isolation it imposed, has gone further in russia than elsewhere, so the shortage of labor, at present a handicap, an annoyance in more fortunate countries, is in russia perhaps the greatest of the national dangers. shortage of labor cannot be measured simply by the decreasing numbers of the workmen. if it takes two workmen as long to do a particular job in as it took one man to do it in , then, even if the number of workman has remained the same, the actual supply of labor has been halved. and in russia the situation is worse than that. for example, in the group of state metal-working factories, those, in fact which may be considered as the weapon with which russia is trying to cut her way out of her transport difficulties, apart from the fact that there were in , workmen, whereas in there are only , , labor has deteriorated in the most appalling manner. in in these factories per cent. of the nominal working hours were actually kept; in work goes on during only per cent. of the nominal hours. it is estimated that the labor of a single workman produces now only one quarter of what it produced in . to take another example, also from workmen engaged in transport, that is to say, in the most important of all work at the present time: in the moscow junction of the moscow kazan railway, between november st and february th ( ), workmen and clerks missed , working days, being absent, on in average, forty days per man in the four months. in moscow passenger-station on this line, workmen missed in november days, in december , in january , and in february ; in an appalling crescendo further illustrated by the wagon department, where workmen missed in november days and in february . in november workmen absented themselves for single days. in february the same workmen were absent for the greater part of the month. the invariable excuse was illness. many cases of illness there undoubtedly were, since this period was the worst of the typhus epidemic, but besides illness, and besides mere obvious idleness which no doubt accounts for a certain proportion of illegitimate holidays, there is another explanation which goes nearer the root of the matter. much of the time filched from the state was in all probability spent in expeditions in search of food. in petrograd, the council of public economy complain that there is a tendency to turn the eight-hour day into a four-hour day. attempts are being made to arrest this tendency by making an additional food allowance conditional on the actual fulfilment of working days. in the donetz coal basin, the monthly output per man was in poods, in poods, in poods (figures taken from ekaterinoslav government), and in the output per man is estimated at being something near poods. in the shale mines on the volga, where food conditions are comparatively good, productivity is comparatively high. thus in a small mine near simbirsk there are workmen, of' whom to are skilled. the output for the unskilled is . poods in a shift, for the skilled . . but even there per cent. of the workmen are regular absentees, and actually the mine works only or days in a month, that is, per cent. of the normal number of working days. the remaining per cent. of normal working time is spent by the workmen in getting food. another small mine in the same district is worked entirely by unskilled labor, the workers being peasants from the neighboring villages. in this mine the productivity per man is less, but all the men work full time. they do not have to waste time in securing food, because, being local peasants, they are supplied by their own villages and families. in moscow and petrograd food is far more difficult to secure, more time is wasted on that hopeless task; even with that waste of time, the workman is not properly fed, and it cannot be wondered at that his productivity is low. something, no doubt, is due to the natural character of the russians, which led trotsky to define man as an animal distinguished by laziness. russians are certainly lazy, and probably owe to their climate their remarkable incapacity for prolonged effort. the russian climate is such that over large areas of russia the russian peasant is accustomed, and has been accustomed for hundreds of years, to perform prodigies of labor during two short periods of sowing and harvest, and to spend the immensely long and monotonous winter in a hibernation like that of the snake or the dormouse. there is a much greater difference between a russian workman's normal output and that of which he is capable for a short time if he sets himself to it, than there is between the normal and exceptional output of an englishman, whose temperate climate has not taught him to regard a great part of the year as a period of mere waiting for and resting from the extraordinary effort of a few weeks. [*] * given any particular motive, any particular enthusiasm, or visible, desirable object, even the hungry russian workmen of to-day are capable of sudden and temporary increase of output. the "saturdayings" (see p. ) provide endless illustrations of this. they had something in the character of a picnic, they were novel, they were out of the routine, and the productivity of labor during a "saturdaying" was invariably higher than on a weekday. for example, there is a shortage of paper for cigarettes. people roll cigarettes in old newspapers. it occurred to the central committee of the papermakers' union to organize a "sundaying" with the object of sending cigarette paper to the soldiers in the red army. six factories took part. here is a table showing the output of these factories during the "sundaying" and the average weekday output. the figures are in poods. made on average week factory the sunday day output krasnogorodskaya......... ............... griaznovskaya............. ................ medianskaya.............. ................ dobruzhskaya............. ............... belgiiskaya.............. ................ ropshinskaya.............. ................ ] but this uneven working temperament was characteristic of the russian before the war as well as now. it has been said that the revolution removed the stimulus to labor, and left the russian laziness to have its way. in the first period of the revolution that may have been true. it is becoming day by day less true. the fundamental reasons of low productivity will not be found in any sudden or unusual efflorescence of idleness, but in economic conditions which cannot but reduce the productivity of idle and industrious alike. insufficient feeding is one such reason. the proportion of working time consumed in foraging is another. but the whole of my first chapter may be taken as a compact mass of reasons why the russians at the present time should not work with anything like a normal productivity. it is said that bad workmen complain of their tools, but even good ones become disheartened if compelled to work with makeshifts, mended tools, on a stock of materials that runs out from one day to the next, in factories where the machinery may come at any moment to a standstill from lack of fuel. there would thus be a shortage of labor in russia, even if the numbers of workmen were the same today as they were before the war. unfortunately that is not so. turning from the question of low productivity per man to that of absolute shortage of men: the example given at the beginning of this chapter, showing that in the most important group of factories the number of workmen has fallen per cent. is by no means exceptional. walking through the passages of what used to be the club of the nobles, and is now the house of the trades unions during the recent trades union congress in moscow, i observed among a number of pictorial diagrams on the walls, one in particular illustrating the rise and fall of the working population of moscow during a number of years. each year was represented by the picture of a factory with a chimney which rose and fell with the population. from that diagram i took the figures for , and . these figures should be constantly borne in mind by any one who wishes to realize how catastrophic the shortage of labor in russia actually is, and to judge how sweeping may be the changes in the social configuration of the country if that shortage continues to increase. here are the figures: workmen in moscow in ............ , workmen in moscow in ........... , workmen in moscow in ............ , that is to say, that one-third of the workmen of moscow ceased to live there, or ceased to be workmen, in the course of a single year. a similar phenomenon is observable in each one of the big industrial districts. what has become of those workmen? a partial explanation is obvious. the main impulse of the revolution came from the town workers. of these, the metal workers were the most decided, and those who most freely joined the red guard in the early and the red army in the later days of the revolution. many, in those early days, when there was more enthusiasm than discipline, when there were hardly any experienced officers, and those without much authority, were slaughtered during the german advance of . the first mobilizations, when conscription was introduced, were among the workers in the great industrial districts. the troops from petrograd and moscow, exclusively workmen's regiments, have suffered more than any other during the civil war, being the most dependable and being thrown, like the guards of old time, into the worst place at any serious crisis. many thousands of them have died for the sake of the revolution which, were they living, they would be hard put to it to save. (the special shortage of skilled workers is also partially to be explained by the indiscriminate mobilizations of - , when great numbers of the most valuable engineers and other skilled workers were thrown into the front line, and it was not until their loss was already felt that the tsar's government in this matter came belatedly to its senses.) but these explanations are only partial. the more general answer to the question, what has become of the workmen? lies in the very economic crisis which their absence accentuates. russia is unlike england, where starvation of the towns would be practically starvation of the whole island. in russia, if a man is hungry, he has only to walk far enough and he will come to a place where there is plenty to eat. almost every russian worker retains in some form or other connection with a village, where, if he returns, he will not be an entire stranger, but at worst a poor relation, and quite possibly an honored guest. it is not surprising that many thousands have "returned to the land" in this way. further, if a workman retains his connection, both with a distant village and with a town, he can keep himself and his family fat and prosperous by ceasing to be a workman, and, instead, traveling on the buffers or the roof of a railway wagon, and bringing back with him sacks of flour and potatoes for sale in the town at fantastic prices. thereby he is lost to productive labor, and his uncomfortable but adventurous life becomes directly harmful, tending to increase the strain on transport, since it is obviously more economical to transport a thousand sacks than to transport a thousand sacks with an idle workman attached to each sack. further, his activities actually make it more difficult for the town population to get food. by keeping open for the village the possibility of selling at fantastic prices, he lessens the readiness of the peasants to part with their flour at the lower prices of the government. nor is it as if his activities benefited the working population. the food he brings in goes for the most part to those who have plenty of money or have things to exchange for it. and honest men in russia to-day have not much money, and those who have things to exchange are not as a rule workmen. the theory of this man's harmfulness is, i know, open to argument, but the practice at least is exactly as i have stated it, and is obviously attractive to the individual who prefers adventure on a full stomach to useful work on an empty. setting aside the theory with its latent quarrel between free trade and state control, we can still recognize that each workman engaged in these pursuits has become an unproductive middleman, one of that very parasitic species which the revolutionaries had hoped to make unnecessary. it is bad from the revolutionary point of view if a workman is so employed, but it is no less bad from the point of view of people who do not care twopence about the revolution one way or the other, but do care about getting russia on her feet again and out of her economic crisis. it is bad enough if an unskilled workman is so employed. it is far worse if a skilled workman finds he can do better for himself as a "food speculator" than by the exercise of his legitimate craft. from mines, from every kind of factory come complaints of the decreasing proportion of skilled to unskilled workmen. the superior intelligence of the skilled worker offers him definite advantages should he engage in these pursuits, and his actual skill gives him other advantages in the villages. he can leave his factory and go to the village, there on the spot to ply his trade or variations of it, when as a handy man, repairing tools, etc., he will make an easy living and by lessening the dependence of the village on the town do as much as the "food speculator" in worsening the conditions of the workman he has left behind. and with that we come to the general changes in the social geography of russia which are threatened if the processes now at work continue unchecked. the relations between town and village are the fundamental problem of the revolution. town and countryside are in sharp contradiction daily intensified by the inability of the towns to supply the country's needs. the town may be considered as a single productive organism, with feelers stretching into the country, and actual outposts there in the form of agricultural enterprises taking their directives from the centre and working as definite parts of the state organism. all round this town organism, in all its interstices, it too, with its feelers in the form of "food speculators," is the anarchic chaos of the country, consisting of a myriad independent units, regulated by no plan, without a brain centre of any kind. either the organized town will hold its own against and gradually dominate and systematize the country chaos, or that chaos little by little will engulf the town organism. every workman who leaves the town automatically places himself on the side of the country in that struggle. and when a town like moscow loses a third of its working population in a year, it is impossible not to see that, so far, the struggle is going in favor of that huge chaotic, unconscious but immensely powerful countryside. there is even a danger that the town may become divided against itself. just as scarcity of food leads to food speculation, so the shortage of labor is making possible a sort of speculation in labor. the urgent need of labor has led to a resurrection of the methods of the direct recruiting of workmen in the villages by the agents of particular factories, who by exceptional terms succeed in getting workmen where the government organs fail. and, of course, this recruiting is not confined to the villages. those enterprises which are situated in the corn districts are naturally able to offer better conditions, for the sake of which workmen are ready to leave their jobs and skilled workmen to do unskilled work, and the result can only be a drainage of good workmen away from the hungry central industrial districts where they are most of all needed. summing up the facts collected in this chapter and in the first on the lack of things and the lack of men, i think the economic crisis in russia may be fairly stated as follows: owing to the appalling condition of russian transport, and owing to the fact that since russia has been practically in a state of blockade, the towns have lost their power of supplying, either as middlemen or as producers, the simplest needs of the villages. partly owing to this, partly again because of the condition of transport, the towns are not receiving the necessaries of life in sufficient quantities. the result of this is a serious fall in the productivity of labor, and a steady flow of skilled and unskilled workmen from the towns towards the villages, and from employments the exercise of which tends to assist the towns in recovering their old position as essential sources of supply to employments that tend to have the opposite effect. if this continues unchecked, it will make impossible the regeneration of russian industry, and will result in the increasing independence of the villages, which will tend to become entirely self-supporting communities, tilling the ground in a less and less efficient manner, with ruder tools, with less and less incentive to produce more than is wanted for the needs of the village itself. russia, in these circumstances, may sink into something very like barbarism, for with the decay of the economic importance of the towns would decay also their authority, and free-booting on a small and large scale would become profitable and not very dangerous. it would be possible, no doubt, for foreigners to trade with the russians as with the natives of the cannibal islands, bartering looking-glasses and cheap tools, but, should such a state of things come to be, it would mean long years of colonization, with all the new possibilities and risks involved in the subjugation of a free people, before western europe could count once more on getting a considerable portion of its food from russian corn lands. that is the position, those the natural tendencies at work. but opposed to these tendencies are the united efforts of the communists and of those who, leaving the question of communism discreetly aside, work with them for the sake of preventing such collapse of russian civilization. they recognize the existence of every one of the tendencies i have described, but they are convinced that every one of these tendencies will be arrested. they believe that the country will not conquer the town but the reverse. so far from expecting the unproductive stagnation described in the last paragraph, they think of russia as of the natural food supply of europe, which the communists among them believe will, in course of time, be made up for "working men's republics" (though, for the sake of their own republic, they are not inclined to postpone trade with europe until that epoch arrives). at the very time when spades and sickles are wearing out or worn out, these men are determined that the food output of russia shall sooner or later be increased by the introduction of better methods of agriculture and farming on a larger scale. we are witnessing in russia the first stages of a titanic struggle, with on one side all the forces of nature leading apparently to an inevitable collapse of civilization, and on the other side nothing but the incalculable force of human will. the communist dictatorship how is that will expressed? what is the organization welded by adversity which, in this crisis, supersedes even the soviet constitution, and stands between this people and chaos? it is a commonplace to say that russia is ruled, driven if you like, cold, starving as she is, to effort after effort by the dictatorship of a party. it is a commonplace alike in the mouths of those who wish to make the continued existence of that organization impossible and in the mouths of the communists themselves. at the second congress of the third international, trotsky remarked. "a party as such, in the course of the development of a revolution, becomes identical with the revolution." lenin, on the same occasion, replying to a critic who said that he differed from, the communists in his understanding of what was meant by the dictatorship of the proletariat, said, "he says that we understand by the words 'dictatorship of the proletariat' what is actually the dictatorship of its determined and conscious minority. and that is the fact." later he asked, "what is this minority? it may be called a party. if this minority is actually conscious, if it is able to draw the masses after it, if it shows itself capable of replying to every question on the agenda list of the political day, it actually constitutes a party." and trotsky again, on the same occasion, illustrated the relative positions of the soviet constitution and the communist party when he said, "and today, now that we have received an offer of peace from the polish government, who decides the question? whither are the workers to turn? we have our council of people's commissaries, of course, but that, too, must be under a certain control. whose control? the control of the working class as a formless chaotic mass? no. the central committee of the party is called together to discuss and decide the question. and when we have to wage war, to form new divisions, to find the best elements for them-to whom do we turn? to the party, to the central committee. and it gives directives to the local committees, 'send communists to the front.' the case is precisely the same with the agrarian question, with that of supply, and with all other questions whatsoever." no one denies these facts, but their mere statement is quite inadequate to explain what is being done in russia and how it is being done. i do not think it would be a waste of time to set down as briefly as possible, without the comments of praise or blame that would be inevitable from one primarily interested in the problem from the capitalist or communist point of view what, from observation and inquiry, i believe to be the main framework of the organization whereby that dictatorship of the party works. the soviet constitution is not so much moribund as in abeyance. the executive committee, for example, which used to meet once a week or even oftener, now meets on the rarest occasions. criticism on this account was met with the reply that the members of the executive committee, for example, which used to meet once a week or even oftener, now meets on the rarest occasions. criticism on this account was met with the reply that the members of the executive committee were busy on the front and in various parts of russia. as a matter of fact, the work which that committee used to do is now done by central committee of the bolshevik party, so that the bulk of the members of the central executive are actually free for other work, a saving of something like men. this does not involve any very great change, but merely an economy in the use of men. in the old days, as i well remember, the opening of a session of the executive committee was invariably late, the reason being that the various parties composing it had not yet finished their preliminary and private discussions. there is now an overwhelming communist majority in the executive committee, as elsewhere. i think it may be regarded as proved that these majorities are not always legitimately obtained. non-communist delegates do undoubtedly find every kind of difficulty put in their way by the rather jesuitical adherents of the faith. but, no matter how these majorities are obtained, the result is that when the communist party has made up its mind on any subject, it is so certain of being able to carry its point that the calling together of the all-russian executive committee is merely a theatrical demonstration of the fact that it can do what it likes. when it does meet, the communists allow the microscopical opposition great liberty of speech, listen quietly, cheer ironically, and vote like one man, proving on every occasion that the meeting of the executive committee was the idlest of forms, intended rather to satisfy purists than for purposes of discussion, since the real discussion has all taken place beforehand among the communists themselves. something like this must happen with every representative assembly at which a single party has a great preponderance and a rigid internal discipline. the real interest is in the discussion inside the party committees. this state of affairs would probably be more actively resented if the people were capable of resenting anything but their own hunger, or of fearing anything but a general collapse which would turn that hunger into starvation. it must be remembered that the urgency of the economic crisis has driven political questions into the background. the communists (compare rykov's remarks on this subject, p. ) believe that this is the natural result of social revolution. they think that political parties will disappear altogether and that people will band together, not for the victory of one of several contending political parties, but solely for economic cooperation or joint enterprise in art or science. in support of this they point to the number of their opponents who have become communists, and to the still greater number of non-communists who are loyally working with them for the economic reconstruction of the country. i do not agree with the communists in this, nor yet with their opponents, who attribute the death of political discussion to fear of the extraordinary commission. i think that both the communists and their opponents underestimate the influence of the economic ruin that affects everybody. the latter particularly, feeling that in some way they must justify themselves to politically minded foreign visitors, seek an excuse for their apathy in the one institution that is almost universally unpopular. i have many non-communist friends in russia, but have never detected the least restraint that could be attributed to fear of anybody in their criticisms of the communist regime. the fear existed alike among communists and non-communists, but it was like the fear of people walking about in a particularly bad thunderstorm. the activities and arrests of the extraordinary commission are so haphazard, often so utterly illogical, that it is quite idle for any one to say to himself that by following any given line of conduct he will avoid molestation. also, there is something in the russian character which makes any prohibition of discussion almost an invitation to discuss. i have never met a russian who could be prevented from saying whatever he liked whenever he liked, by any threats or dangers whatsoever. the only way to prevent a russian from talking is to cut out his tongue. the real reason for the apathy is that, for the moment, for almost everybody political questions are of infinitesimal importance in comparison with questions of food and warmth. the ferment of political discussion that filled the first years of the revolution has died away, and people talk about little but what they are able to get for dinner, or what somebody else his been able to get. i, like other foreign visitors coming to russia after feeding up in other countries, am all agog to make people talk. but the sort of questions which interest me, with my full-fed stomach, are brushed aside almost fretfully by men who have been more or less hungry for two or three years on end. i find, instead of an urgent desire to alter this or that at once, to-morrow, in the political complexion of the country, a general desire to do the best that can be done with things as they are, a general fear of further upheaval of any kind, in fact a general acquiescence in the present state of affairs politically, in the hope of altering the present state of affairs economically. and this is entirely natural. everybody, communists included, rails bitterly at the inefficiencies of the present system, but everybody, anti-communists included, admits that there is nothing whatever capable of taking its place. its failure is highly undesirable, not because it itself is good, but because such failure would be preceded or followed by a breakdown of all existing organizations. food distribution, inadequate as it now is, would come to an end. the innumerable non-political committees, which are rather like boards of directors controlling the timber, fur, fishery, steel, matches or other trusts (since the nationalized industries can be so considered) would collapse, and with them would collapse not only yet one more hope of keeping a breath of life in russian industry, but also the actual livelihoods of a great number of people, both communists and non-communists. i do not think it is realized out-side russia how large a proportion of the educated classes have become civil servants of one kind or another. it is a rare thing when a whole family has left russia, and many of the most embittered partisans of war on russia have relations inside russia who have long ago found places under the new system, and consequently fear its collapse as much as any one. one case occurs to me in which a father was an important minister in one of the various white governments which have received allied support, while his son inside russia was doing pretty well as a responsible official under the communists. now in the event of a violent change, the communists would be outlaws with a price on every head, and those who have worked with them, being russians, know their fellow countrymen well enough to be pretty well convinced that the mere fact that they are without cards of the membership of the communist party, would not save them in the orgy of slaughter that would follow any such collapse. people may think that i underestimate the importance of, the extraordinary commission. i am perfectly aware that without this police force with its spies, its prisons and its troops, the difficulties of the dictatorship would be increased by every kind of disorder, and the chaos, which i fear may come, would have begun long ago. i believe, too, that the overgrown power of the extraordinary commission, and the cure that must sooner or later be applied to it, may, as in the french revolution, bring about the collapse of the whole system. the commission depends for its strength on the fear of something else. i have seen it weaken when there was a hope of general peace. i have seen it tighten its grip in the presence of attacks from without and attempted assassination within. it is dreaded by everybody; not even communists are safe from it; but it does not suffice to explain the dictatorship, and is actually entirely irrelevant to the most important process of that dictatorship, namely, the adoption of a single idea, a single argument, by the whole of a very large body of men. the whole power of the extraordinary commission does not affect in the slightest degree discussions inside the communist party, and those discussions are the simple fact distinguishing the communist dictatorship from any of the other dictatorships by which it may be supplanted. there are , members of the communist party ( , on april , ). there are nineteen members of the central committee of that party. there are, i believe, five who, when they agree, can usually sway the remaining fourteen. there is no need to wonder how these fourteen can be argued into acceptance of the views of the still smaller inner ring, but the process of persuading the six hundred thousand of the desirability of, for example, such measures as those involved in industrial conscription which, at first sight, was certainly repugnant to most of them, is the main secret of the dictatorship, and is not in any way affected by the existence of the extraordinary commission. thus the actual government of russia at the present time may be not unfairly considered as a small group inside the central committee of the communist party. this small group is able to persuade the majority of the remaining members of that committee. the committee then sets about persuading the majority of the party. in the case of important measures the process is elaborate. the committee issues a statement of its case, and the party newspapers the pravda and its affiliated organs are deluged with its discussion. when this discussion has had time to spread through the country, congresses of communists meet in the provincial centres, and members of the central committee go down to these conferences to defend the "theses" which the committee has issued. these provincial congresses, exclusively communist, send their delegates of an all-russian congress. there the "theses" of the central committee get altered, confirmed, or, in the case of an obviously unpersuaded and large opposition in the party, are referred back or in other ways shelved. then the delegates, even those who have been in opposition at the congress, go back to the country pledged to defend the position of the majority. this sometimes has curious results. for example, i heard communist trades unionists fiercely arguing against certain clauses in the theses on industrial conscription at a communist congress at the kremlin; less than a week afterwards i heard these same men defending precisely these clauses at a trades union congress over the way, they loyally abiding by the collective opinion of their fellow communists and subject to particularly uncomfortable heckling from people who vociferously reminded them (since the communist debates had been published) that they were now defending what, a few days before, they had vehemently attacked. the great strength of the communist party is comparable to the strength of the jesuits, who, similarly, put themselves and their opinions at the disposal of the body politic of their fellow members. until a decision had been made, a communist is perfectly free to do his best to prevent it being made, to urge alterations in it, or to supply a rival decision, but once it has been made he will support it without changing his private opinion. in all mixed congresses, rather than break the party discipline, he will give his vote for it, speak in favor of it, and use against its adversaries the very arguments that have been used against himself. he has his share in electing the local communist committee, and, indirectly, in electing the all-powerful central committee of the party, and he binds himself to do at any moment in his life exactly what these committees decide for him. these committees decide the use that is to be made of the lives, not only of the rank and file of the party, but also of their own members. even a member of the central committee does not escape. he may be voted by his fellow members into leaving a job he likes and taking up another he detests in which they think his particular talents will better serve the party aims. to become a member of the communist party involves a kind of intellectual abdication, or, to put it differently, a readiness at any moment to place the collective wisdom of the party's committee above one's individual instincts or ideas. you may influence its decisions, you may even get it to endorse your own, but lenin himself, if he were to fail on any occasion to obtain the agreement of a majority in the central committee, would have to do precisely what the committee should tell him. lenin's opinion carries great weight because he is lenin, but it carries less weight than that of the central committee, of which he forms a nineteenth part. on the other hand, the opinion of lenin and a very small group of outstanding figures is supported by great prestige inside the committee, and that of the committee is supported by overwhelming prestige among the rank and file. the result is that this small group is nearly always sure of being able to use the whole vote of , communists, in the realization of its decisions. now , men and women acting on the instructions of a highly centralized directive, all the important decisions of which have been thrashed out and re-thrashed until they have general support within the party; , men and women prepared, not only to vote in support of these decisions, but with a carefully fostered readiness to sacrifice their lives for them if necessary; , men and women who are persuaded that by their way alone is humanity to be saved; who are persuaded (to put it as cynically and unsympathetically as possible) that the noblest death one can die is in carrying out a decision of the central committee; such a body, even in a country such as russia, is an enormously strong embodiment of human will, an instrument of struggle capable of working something very like miracles. it can be and is controlled like an army in battle. it can mobilize its members, per cent. of them, per cent., the local committees choosing them, and send them to the front when the front is in danger, or to the railways and repair shops when it is decided that the weakest point is that of transport. if its only task were to fight those organizations of loosely knit and only momentarily united interests which are opposed to it, those jerry-built alliances of reactionaries with liberals, united-indivisible-russians with ukrainians, agrarians with sugar-refiners, monarchists with republicans, that task would long ago have been finished. but it has to fight something infinitely stronger than these in fighting the economic ruin of russia, which, if it is too strong, too powerful to be arrested by the communists, would make short work of those who are without any such fanatic single-minded and perfectly disciplined organization. a conference at jaroslavl i have already suggested that although the small central committee of the communist party does invariably get its own way, there are essential differences between this dictatorship and the dictatorship of, for example, a general. the main difference is that whereas the general merely writes an order about which most people hear for the first time only when it is promulgated, the central committee prepares the way for its dictation by a most elaborate series of discussions and counter discussions throughout the country, whereby it wins the bulk of the communist party to its opinion, after which it proceeds through local and general congresses to do the same with the trades unions. this done, a further series of propaganda meetings among the people actually to be affected smooths the way for the introduction of whatever new measure is being carried through at the moment. all this talk, besides lessening the amount of physical force necessary in carrying out a decision, must also avoid, at least in part, the deadening effect that would be caused by mere compulsory obedience to the unexplained orders of a military dictator. of the reality of the communist dictatorship i have no sort of doubt. but its methods are such as tend towards the awakening of a political consciousness which, if and when normal conditions-of feeding and peace, for example-are attained, will make dictatorship of any kind almost impossible. to illustrate these methods of the dictatorship, i cannot do better than copy into this book some pages of my diary written in march of this year when i was present at one of the provincial conferences which were held in preparation of the all-russian communist conference at the end of the month. at seven in the evening radek called for me and took me to the jaroslavl station, where we met larin, whom i had known in . an old menshevik, he was the originator and most urgent supporter of the decree annulling the foreign debts. he is a very ill man, partially paralyzed, having to use both hands even to get food to his mouth or to turn over the leaves of a book. in spite of this he is one of the hardest workers in russia, and although his obstinacy, his hatred of compromise, and a sort of mixed originality and perverseness keep him almost permanently at loggerheads with the central committee, he retains everybody's respect because of the real heroism with which he conquers physical disabilities which long ago would have overwhelmed a less unbreakable spirit. both radek and larin were going to the communist conference at jaroslavl which was to consider the new theses of the central committee of the party with regard to industrial conscription. radek was going to defend the position of the central committee, larin to defend his own. both are old friends. as radek said to me, he intended to destroy larin's position, but not, if he could help it, prevent larin being nominated among the jaroslavl delegates to all-russian conference which was in preparation. larin, whose work keeps him continually traveling, has his own car, specially arranged so that his uninterrupted labor shall have as little effect as possible on his dangerously frail body. radek and i traveled in one of the special cars of the central executive committee, of which he is a member. the car seemed very clean, but, as an additional precaution, we began by rubbing turpentine on our necks and wrists and angles for the discouragement of lice, now generally known as "semashki" from the name of semashko, the commissar of public health, who wages unceasing war for their destruction as the carriers of typhus germs. i rubbed the turpentine so energetically into my neck that it burnt like a collar of fire, and for a long time i was unable to get to sleep. in the morning radek, the two conductors who had charge of the wagons and i sat down together to breakfast and had a very merry meal, they providing cheese and bread and i a tin of corned beef providently sent out from home by the manchester guardian. we cooked up some coffee on a little spirit stove, which, in a neat basket together with plates, knives, forks, etc. (now almost unobtainable in russia) had been a parting present from the german spartacists to radek when he was released from prison in berlin and allowed to leave germany. the morning was bright and clear, and we had an excellent view of jaroslavl when we drove from the station to the town, which is a mile or so off the line of the railway. the sun poured down on the white snow, on the barges still frozen into the volga river, and on the gilt and painted domes and cupolas of the town. many of the buildings had been destroyed during the rising artificially provoked in july, , and its subsequent suppression. more damage was done then than was necessary, because the town was recaptured by troops which had been deserted by most of their officers, and therefore hammered away with artillery without any very definite plan of attack. the more important of the damaged buildings, such as the waterworks and the power station, have been repaired, the tramway was working, and, after moscow, the town seemed clean, but plenty of ruins remained as memorials of that wanton and unjustifiable piece of folly which, it was supposed, would be the signal for a general rising. we drove to the hotel bristol, now the headquarters of the jaroslavl executive committee, where rostopchin, the president, discussed with larin and radek the programme arranged for the conference. it was then proposed that we should have something to eat, when a very curious state of affairs (and one extremely russian) was revealed. rostopchin admitted that the commissariat arrangements of the soviet and its executive committee were very bad. but in the center of the town there is a nunnery which was very badly damaged during the bombardment and is now used as a sort of prison or concentration camp for a labor regiment. peasants from the surrounding country who have refused to give up their proper contribution of corn, or leave otherwise disobeyed the laws, are, for punishment, lodged here, and made to expiate their sins by work. it so happens, rostopchin explained, that the officer in charge of the prison feeding arrangements is a very energetic fellow, who had served in the old army in a similar capacity, and the meals served out to the prisoners are so much better than those produced in the soviet headquarters, that the members of the executive committee make a practice of walking over to the prison to dine. they invited us to do the same. larin did not feel up to the walk, so he remained in the soviet house to eat an inferior meal, while radek and i, with rostopchin and three other members of the local committee walked round to the prison. the bell tower of the old nunnery had been half shot away by artillery, and is in such a precarious condition that it is proposed to pull it down. but on passing under it we came into a wide courtyard surrounded by two-story whitewashed buildings that seemed scarcely to have suffered at all. we found the refectory in one of these buildings. it was astonishingly clean. there were wooden tables, of course without cloths, and each man had a wooden spoon and a hunk of bread. a great bowl of really excellent soup was put down in the middle of table, and we fell to hungrily enough. i made more mess on the table than any one else, because it requires considerable practice to convey almost boiling soup from a distant bowl to one's mouth without spilling it in a shallow wooden spoon four inches in diameter, and, having got it to one's mouth, to get any of it in without slopping over on either side. the regular diners there seemed to find no difficulty in it at all. one of the prisoners who mopped up after my disasters said i had better join them for a week, when i should find it quite easy. the soup bowl was followed by a fry of potatoes, quantities of which are grown in the district. for dealing with these i found the wooden spoon quite efficient. after that we had glasses of some sort of substitute for tea. the conference was held in the town theatre. there was a hint of comedy in the fact that the orchestra was playing the prelude to some very cheerful opera before the curtain rang up. radek characteristically remarked that such music should be followed by something more sensational than a conference, proposed to me that we should form a tableau to illustrate the new peaceful policy of england with regard to russia. as it was a party conference, i had really no right to be there, but radek had arranged with rostopchin that i should come in with himself, and be allowed to sit in the wings at the side of the stage. on the stage were rostopchin, radek, larin and various members of the communist party committee in the district. everything was ready, but the orchestra went on with its jig music on the other side of the curtain. a message was sent to them. the music stopped with a jerk. the curtain rose, disclosing a crowded auditorium. everybody stood up, both on the stage and in the theater, and sang, accompanied by the orchestra, first the "internationale" and then the song for those who had died for the revolution. then except for two or three politically minded musicians, the orchestra vanished away and the conference began. unlike many of the meetings and conferences at which i have been present in russia, this jaroslavl conference seemed to me to include practically none but men and women who either were or had been actual manual workers. i looked over row after row of faces in the theatre, and could only find two faces which i thought might be jewish, and none that obviously belonged to the "intelligentsia." i found on inquiry that only three of the communists present, excluding radek and larin, were old exiled and imprisoned revolutionaries of the educated class. of these, two were on the platform. all the rest were from the working class. the great majority of them, of course, had joined the communists in , but a dozen or so had been in the party as long as the first russian revolution of . radek, who was tremendously cheered (his long imprisonment in germany, during which time few in russia thought that they would see him alive again, has made him something of a popular hero) made a long, interesting and pugnacious speech setting out the grounds on which the central committee base their ideas about industrial conscription. these ideas are embodied in the series of theses issued by the central committee in january (see p. ). larin, who was very tired after the journey and patently conscious that radek was a formidable opponent, made a speech setting out his reasons for differing with the central committee, and proposed an ingenious resolution, which, while expressing approval of the general position of the committee, included four supplementary modifications which, as a matter of fact, nullified that position altogether. it was then about ten at night, and the conference adjourned. we drove round to the prison in sledges, and by way of supper had some more soup and potatoes, and so back to the railway station to sleep in the cars. next day the conference opened about noon, when there was a long discussion of the points at issue. workman after workman came to the platform and gave his view. some of the speeches were a little naive, as when one soldier said that comrades lenin and trotsky had often before pointed out difficult roads, and that whenever they had been followed they had shown the way to victory, and that therefore, though there was much in the central committee's theses that was hard to digest, he was for giving them complete support, confident that, as comrades lenin and trotsky were in favor of them, they were likely to be right this time, as so often heretofore. but for the most part the speeches were directly concerned with the problem under discussion, and showed a political consciousness which would have been almost incredible three years ago. the red army served as a text for many, who said that the methods which had produced that army and its victories over the whites had been proved successful and should be used to produce a red army of labor and similar victories on the bloodless front against economic disaster. nobody seemed to question the main idea of compulsory labor. the contest that aroused real bitterness was between the methods of individual and collegiate command. the new proposals lead eventually towards individual command, and fears were expressed lest this should mean putting summary powers into the hands of bourgeois specialists, thus nullifying "workers' control". in reply, it was pointed out that individual command had proved necessary in the army and had resulted in victory for the revolution. the question was not between specialists and no specialists. everybody knew that specialists were necessary. the question was how to get the most out of them. effective political control had secured that bourgeois specialists, old officers, led to victory the army of the red republic. the same result could be secured in the factories in the same way. it was pointed out that in one year they had succeeded in training , red commanders, that is to say, officers from the working class itself, and that it was not utopian to hope and work for a similar output of workmen specialists, technically trained, and therefore themselves qualified for individual command in the factories. meanwhile there was nothing against the employment of political commissars in the factories as formerly in the regiments, to control in other than technical matters the doings of the specialists. on the other hand, it was said that the appointment of commissars would tend to make communists unpopular, since inevitably in many cases they would have to support the specialists against the workmen, and that the collegiate system made the workmen feel that they were actually the masters, and so gave possibilities of enthusiastic work not otherwise obtainable. this last point was hotly challenged. it was said that collegiate control meant little in effect, except waste of time and efficiency, because at worst work was delayed by disputes and at best the workmen members of the college merely countersigned the orders decided upon by the specialists. the enthusiastic work was said to be a fairy story. if it were really to be found then there would be no need for a conference to discover how to get it. the most serious opposition, or at least the most serious argument put forward, for there was less opposition than actual discussion, came from some of the representatives of the trade unionists. a good deal was said about the position of the trades unions in a socialist state. there was general recognition that since the trade unions themselves controlled the conditions of labor and wages, the whole of their old work of organizing strikes against capitalists had ceased to have any meaning, since to strike now would be to strike against their own decisions. at the same time, certain tendencies to syndicalism were still in existence, tendencies which might well lead to conflict between different unions, so that, for example, the match makers or the metal worker, might wish to strike a bargain with the state, as of one country with another, and this might easily lead to a complete collapse of the socialist system. the one thing on which the speakers were in complete agreement was the absolute need of an effort in industry equal to, if not greater than, the effort made in the army. i thought it significant that in many of the speeches the importance of this effort was urged as the only possible means of retaining the support of the peasants. there was a tacit recognition that the conference represented town workers only. larin, who had belonged to the old school which had grown up with its eyes on the industrial countries of the west and believed that revolution could be brought about by the town workers alone, that it was exclusively their affair, and that all else was of minor importance, unguardedly spoke of the peasant as "our neighbor." in javoslavl, country and town are too near to allow the main problem of the revolution to be thus easily dismissed. it was instantly pointed out that the relation was much more intimate, and that, even if it were only "neighborly," peace could not long be preserved if it were continually necessary for one neighbor to steal the chickens of the other. these town workers of a district for the most part agricultural were very sure that the most urgent of all tasks was to raise industry to the point at which the town would really be able to supply the village with its needs. larin and radek severally summed up and made final attacks on each other's positions, after which radek's resolution approving the theses of the central committee was passed almost unanimously. larin's four amendments received , , and vote apiece. this result was received with cheering throughout the theater, and showed the importance of such conferences in smoothing the way of the dictatorship, since it had been quite obvious when the discussion began that a very much larger proportion of the delegates than finally voted for his resolution had been more or less in sympathy with larin in his opposition to the central committee. there followed elections to the party conference in moscow. rostopchin, the president, read a list which had been submitted by the various ouyezds in the jaroslavl government. they were to send to moscow fifteen delegates with the right to vote, together with another fifteen with the right to speak but not to vote. larin, who had done much work in the district, was mentioned as one of the fifteen voting delegates, but he stood up and said that as the conference had so clearly expressed its disagreement with his views, he thought it better to withdraw his candidature. rostopchin put it to the conference that although they disagreed with larin, yet it would be as well that he should have the opportunity of stating his views at the all-russian conference, so that discussion there should be as final and as many-sided as possible. the conference expressed its agreement with this. larin withdrew his withdrawal, and was presently elected. the main object of these conferences in unifying opinion and in arming communists with argument for the defence of this unified opinion a mong the masses was again illustrated when the conference, in leaving it to the ouyezds to choose for themselves the non-voting delegates urged them to select wherever possible people who would have the widest opportunities of explaining on their return to the district whatever results might be reached in moscow. it was now pretty late in the evening, and after another very satisfactory visit to the prison we drove back to the station. larin, who was very disheartened, realizing that he had lost much support in the course of the discussion, settled down to work, and buried himself in a mass of statistics. i prepared to go to bed, but we had hardly got into the car when there was a tap at the door and a couple of railwaymen came in. they explained that a few hundred yards away along the line a concert and entertainment arranged by the jaroslavl railwaymen was going on, and that their committee, hearing that radek was at the station, had sent them to ask him to come over and say a few words to them if he were not too tired. "come along," said radek, and we walked in the dark along the railway lines to a big one-story wooden shanty, where an electric lamp lit a great placard, "railwaymen's reading room." we went into a packed hall. every seat was occupied by railway workers and their wives and children. the gangways on either side were full of those who had not found room on the benches. we wriggled and pushed our way through this crowd, who were watching a play staged and acted by the railwaymen themselves, to a side door, through which we climbed up into the wings, and slid across the stage behind the scenery into a tiny dressing-room. here radek was laid hold of by the master of the ceremonies, who, it seemed, was also part editor of a railwaymen's newspaper, and made to give a long account of the present situation of soviet russia's foreign affairs. the little box of a room filled to a solid mass as policemen, generals and ladies of the old regime threw off their costumes, and, in their working clothes, plain signalmen and engine-drivers, pressed round to listen. when the act ended, one of the railwaymen went to the front of the stage and announced that radek, who had lately come back after imprisonment in germany for the cause of revolution, was going to talk to them about the general state of affairs. i saw radek grin at this forecast of his speech. i understood why, when he began to speak. he led off by a direct and furious onslaught on the railway workers in general, demanding work, work and more work, telling them that as the red army had been the vanguard of the revolution hitherto, and had starved and fought and given lives to save those at home from denikin and kolchak, so now it was the turn of the railway workers on whose efforts not only the red army but also the whole future of russia depended. he addressed himself to the women, telling them in very bad russian that unless their men worked superhumanly they would see their babies die from starvation next winter. i saw women nudge their husbands as they listened. instead of giving them a pleasant, interesting sketch of the international position, which, no doubt, was what they had expected, he took the opportunity to tell them exactly how things stood at home. and the amazing thing was that they seemed to be pleased. they listened with extreme attention, wanted to turn out some one who had a sneezing fit at the far end of the hall, and nearly lifted the roof off with cheering when radek had done. i wondered what sort of reception a man would have who in another country interrupted a play to hammer home truths about the need of work into an audience of working men who had gathered solely for the purpose of legitimate recreation. it was not as if he sugared the medicine he gave them. his speech was nothing but demands for discipline and work, coupled with prophecy of disaster in case work and discipline failed. it was delivered like all his speeches, with a strong polish accent and a steady succession of mistakes in grammar. as we walked home along the railway lines, half a dozen of the railwaymen pressed around radek, and almost fought with each other as to who should walk next to him. and radek entirely happy, delighted at his success in giving them a bombshell instead of a bouquet, with one stout fellow on one arm, another on the other, two or three more listening in front and behind, continued rubbing it into them until we reached our wagon, when, after a general handshaking, they disappeared into the night. the trade unions trade unions in russia are in a different position from that which is common to all other trades unions in the world. in other countries the trades unions are a force with whose opposition the government must reckon. in russia the government reckons not on the possible opposition of the trades unions, but on their help for realizing its most difficult measures, and for undermining and overwhelming any opposition which those measures may encounter. the trades unions in russia, instead of being an organization outside the state protecting the interests of a class against the governing class, have become a part of the state organization. since, during the present period of the revolution the backbone of the state organization is the communist party, the trade unions have come to be practically an extension of the party organization. this, of course, would be indignantly denied both by trade unionists and communists. still, in the preface to the all-russian trades union reports for , glebov, one of the best-known trade union leaders whom i remember in the spring of last year objecting to the use of bourgeois specialists in their proper places, admits as much in the following muddleheaded statement:-- "the base of the proletarian dictatorship is the communist party, which in general directs all the political and economic work of the state, leaning, first of all, on the soviets as on the more revolutionary form of dictatorship of the proletariat, and secondly on the trades unions, as organizations which economically unite the proletariat of factory and workshop as the vanguard of the revolution, and as organizations of the new socialistic construction of the state. thus the trade unions must be considered as a base of the soviet state, as an organic form complementary to the other forms of the proletariat dictatorship." these two elaborate sentences constitute an admission of what i have just said. trades unionists of other countries must regard the fate of their russian colleagues with horror or with satisfaction, according to their views of events in russia taken as a whole. if they do not believe that there has been a social revolution in russia, they must regard the present position of the russian trades unions as the reward of a complete defeat of trade unionism, in which a capitalist government has been able to lay violent hands on the organization which was protecting the workers against it. if, on the other hand, they believe that there has been a social revolution, so that the class organized in trades unions is now, identical with the governing, class (of employers, etc.) against which the unions once struggled, then they must regard the present position as a natural and satisfactory result of victory. when i was in moscow in the spring of this year the russian trades unions received a telegram from the trades union congress at amsterdam, a telegram which admirably illustrated the impossibility of separating judgment of the present position of the unions from judgments of the russian revolution as a whole. it encouraged the unions "in their struggle" and promised support in that struggle. the communists immediately asked "what struggle? against the capitalist system in russia which does not exist? or against capitalist systems outside russia?" they said that either the telegram meant this latter only, or it meant that its writers did not believe that there had been a social revolution in russia. the point is arguable. if one believes that revolution is an impossibility, one can reason from that belief and say that in spite of certain upheavals in russia the fundamental arrangement of society is the same there as in other countries, so that the position of the trade unions there must be the same, and, as in other countries they must be still engaged in augmenting the dinners of their members at the expense of the dinners of the capitalists which, in the long run (if that were possible) they would abolish. if, on the other hand, one believes that social revolution has actually occurred, to speak of trades unions continuing the struggle in which they conquered something like three years ago, is to urge them to a sterile fanaticism which has been neatly described by professor santayana as a redoubling of your effort when you have forgotten your aim. it 's probably true that the "aim" of the trades unions was more clearly defined in russia than elsewhere. in england during the greater part of their history the trades unions have not been in conscious opposition to the state. in russia this position was forced on the trades unions almost before they had time to get to work. they were born, so to speak, with red flags in their hands. they grew up under circumstances of extreme difficulty and persecution. from on they were in decided opposition to the existing system, and were revolutionary rather than merely mitigatory organizations. before they were little more than associations for mutual help, very weak, spending most of their energies in self-preservation from the police, and hiding their character as class organizations by electing more or less liberal managers and employers as "honorary members." , however, settled their revolutionary character. in september of that year there was a conference at moscow, where it was decided to call an all-russian trades union congress. reaction in russia made this impossible, and the most they could do was to have another small conference in february, , which, however, defined their object as that of creating a general trade union movement organized on all-russian lines. the temper of the trades unions then, and the condition of the country at that time, may be judged from the fact that although they were merely working for the right to form unions, the right to strike, etc., they passed the following significant resolution: "neither from the present government nor from the future state duma can be expected realization of freedom of coalition. this conference considers the legalization of the trades unions under present conditions absolutely impossible." the conference was right. for twelve years after that there were no trades unions conferences in russia. not until june, , three months after the march revolution, was the third trade union conference able to meet. this conference reaffirmed the revolutionary character of the russian trades unions. at that time the dominant party in the soviets was that of the mensheviks, who were opposed to the formation of a soviet government, and were supporting the provisional cabinet of kerensky. the trades unions were actually at that time more revolutionary than the soviets. this third conference passed several resolutions, which show clearly enough that the present position of the unions has not been brought about by any violence of the communists from without, but was definitely promised by tendencies inside the unions at a time when the communists were probably the least authoritative party in russia. this conference of june, , resolved that the trades unions should not only "remain militant class organizations... but... should support the activities of the soviets of soldiers and deputies." they thus clearly showed on which side they stood in the struggle then proceeding. nor was this all. they also, though the mensheviks were still the dominant party, resolved on that system of internal organizations and grouping, which has been actually realized under the communists. i quote again from the resolution of this conference: "the evolution of the economic struggle demands from the workers such forms of professional organization as, basing themselves on the connection between various groups of workers in the process of production, should unite within a general organization, and under general leadership, as large masses of workers as possible occupied in enterprises of the same kind, or in similar professions. with this object the workers should organize themselves professionally, not by shops or trades, but by productions, so that all the workers of a given enterprise should belong to one union, even if they belong to different professions and even different productions." that which was then no more than a design is now an accurate description of trades union organization in russia. further, much that at present surprises the foreign inquirer was planned and considered desirable then, before the communists had won a majority either in the unions or in the soviet. thus this same third conference resolved that "in the interests of greater efficiency and success in the economic struggle, a professional organization should be built on the principle of democratic centralism, assuring to every member a share in the affairs of the organization and, at the same time, obtaining unity in the leadership of the struggle." finally "unity in the direction (leadership) of the economic struggle demands unity in the exchequer of the trades unions." the point that i wish to make in thus illustrating the pre-communist tendencies of the russian trades unions is not simply that if their present position is undesirable they have only themselves to thank for it, but that in russia the trades union movement before the october revolution was working in the direction of such a revolution, that the events of october represented something like a trade union victory, so that the present position of the unions as part of the organization defending that victory, as part of the system of government set up by that revolution, is logical and was to be expected. i have illustrated this from resolutions, because these give statements in words easily comparable with what has come to pass. it would be equally easy to point to deeds instead of words if we need more forcible though less accurate illustrations. thus, at the time of the moscow congress the soviets, then mensheviks, who were represented at the congress (the object of the congress was to whip up support for the coalition government) were against strikes of protest. the trades unions took a point of view nearer that of the bolsheviks, and the strikes in moscow took place in spite of the soviets. after the kornilov affair, when the mensheviks were still struggling for coalition with the bourgeois parties, the trades unions quite definitely took the bolshevik standpoint. at the so-called democratic conference, intended as a sort of life belt for the sinking provisional government, only eight of the trades union delegates voted for a continuance of the coalition, whereas seventy three voted against. this consciously revolutionary character throughout their much shorter existence has distinguished russian from, for example, english trades unions. it has set their course for them. in october, , they got the revolution for which they had been asking since march. since then, one congress after another has illustrated the natural and inevitable development of trades unions inside a revolutionary state which, like most if not all revolutionary states, is attacked simultaneously by hostile armies from without and by economic paralysis from within. the excited and lighthearted trades unionists of three years ago, who believed that the mere decreeing of "workers' control" would bring all difficulties automatically to an end, are now unrecognizable. we have seen illusion after illusion scraped from them by the pumice-stone of experience, while the appalling state of the industries which they now largely control, and the ruin of the country in which they attained that control, have forced them to alter their immediate aims to meet immediate dangers, and have accelerated the process of adaptation made inevitable by their victory. the process of adaptation has had the natural result of producing new internal cleavages. change after change in their programme and theory of the russian trades unionists has been due to the pressure of life itself, to the urgency of struggling against the worsening of conditions already almost unbearable. it is perfectly natural that those unions which hold back from adaptation and resent the changes are precisely those which, like that of the printers, are not intimately concerned in any productive process, are consequently outside the central struggle, and, while feeling the discomforts of change, do not feel its need. the opposition inside the productive trades unions is of two kinds. there is the opposition, which is of merely psychological interest, of old trades union leaders who have always thought of themselves as in opposition to the government, and feel themselves like watches without mainsprings in their new role of government supporters. these are men in whom a natural intellectual stiffness makes difficult the complete change of front which was the logical result of the revolution for which they had been working. but beside that there is a much more interesting opposition based on political considerations. the menshevik standpoint is one of disbelief in the permanence of the revolution, or rather in the permanence of the victory of the town workers. they point to the divergence in interests between the town and country populations, and are convinced that sooner or later the peasants will alter the government to suit themselves, when, once more, it will be a government against which the town workers will have to defend their interests. the mensheviks object to the identification of the trades unions with the government apparatus on the ground that when this change, which they expect comes about, the trade union movement will be so far emasculated as to be incapable of defending the town workers against the peasants who will then be the ruling class. thus they attack the present trades union leaders for being directly influenced by the government in fixing the rate of wages, on the ground that this establishes a precedent from which, when the change comes, it will be difficult to break away. the communists answer them by insisting that it is to everybody's interest to pull russia through the crisis, and that if the trades unions were for such academic reasons to insist on their complete independence instead of in every possible way collaborating with the government, they would be not only increasing the difficulties of the revolution in its economic crisis, but actually hastening that change which the mensheviks, though they regard it as inevitable, cannot be supposed to desire. this menshevik opposition is strongest in the ukraine. its strength may be judged from the figures of the congress in moscow this spring when, of , delegates, over , were communists or sympathizers with them; were mensheviks and were non-party, the bulk of whom, i fancy, on this point would agree with the mensheviks. but apart from opposition to the "stratification" of the trades unions, there is a cleavage cutting across the communist party itself and uniting in opinion, though not in voting, the mensheviks and a section of their communist opponents. this cleavage is over the question of "workers' control." most of those who, before the revolution, looked forward to the "workers' control", thought of it as meaning that the actual workers in a given factory would themselves control that factory, just as a board of directors controls a factory under the ordinary capitalist system. the communists, i think, even today admit the ultimate desirability of this, but insist that the important question is not who shall give the orders, but in whose interest the orders shall be given. i have nowhere found this matter properly thrashed out, though feeling upon it is extremely strong. everybody whom i asked about it began at once to address me as if i were a public meeting, so that i found it extremely difficult to get from either side a statement not free from electioneering bias. i think, however, that it may be fairly said that all but a few lunatics have abandoned the ideas of , which resulted in the workmen in a factory deposing any technical expert or manager whose orders were in the least irksome to them. these ideas and the miseries and unfairness they caused, the stoppages of work, the managers sewn up in sacks, ducked in ponds and trundled in wheelbarrows, have taken their places as curiosities of history. the change in these ideas has been gradual. the first step was the recognition that the state as a whole was interested in the efficiency of each factory, and, therefore, that the workmen of each factory had no right to arrange things with no thought except for themselves. the committee idea was still strong, and the difficulty was got over by assuring that the technical staff should be represented on the committee, and that the casting vote between workers and technical experts or managers should belong to the central economic organ of the state. the next stage was when the management of a workshop was given a so called "collegiate" character, the workmen appointing representatives to share the responsibility of the "bourgeois specialist." the bitter controversy now going on concerns the seemingly inevitable transition to a later stage in which, for all practical purposes, the bourgeois specialist will be responsible solely to the state. many communists, including some of the best known, while recognizing the need of greater efficiency if the revolution is to survive at all, regard this step as definitely retrograde and likely in the long run to make the revolution not worth preserving. [*] * thus rykov, president of the supreme council of public economy: "there is a possibility of so constructing a state that in it there will be a ruling caste consisting chiefly of administrative engineers, technicians, etc.; that is, we should get a form of state economy based on a small group of a ruling caste whose privilege in this case would be the management of the workers and peasants." that criticism of individual control, from a communist, goes a good deal further than most of the criticism from people avowedly in opposition.] the enormous importance attached by everybody to this question of individual or collegiate control, may be judged from the fact that at every conference i attended, and every discussion to which i listened, this point, which might seem of minor importance, completely overshadowed the question of industrial conscription which, at least inside the communist party, seemed generally taken for granted. it may be taken now as certain that the majority of the communists are in favor of individual control. they say that the object of "workers' control" before the revolution was to ensure that factories should be run in the interests of workers as well of employers. in russia now there are no employers other than the state as a whole, which is exclusively made up of employees. (i am stating now the view of the majority at the last trades union congress at which i was present, april, .) they say that "workers' control" exists in a larger and more efficient manner than was suggested by the old pre-revolutionary statements on that question. further, they say that if workers' control ought to be identified with trade union control, the trades unions are certainly supreme in all those matters with which they have chiefly concerned themselves, since they dominate the commissariat of labor, are very largely represented on the supreme council of public economy, and fix the rates of pay for their own members. [*] * the wages of workmen are decided by the trades unions, who draw up "tariffs" for the whole country, basing their calculations on three criteria: (i) the price of food in the open market in the district where a workman is employed, ( )the price of food supplied by the state on the card system, ( )the quality of the workman. this last is decided by a special section of the factory committee, which in each factory is an organ of the trades union.] the enormous communist majority, together with the fact that however much they may quarrel with each other inside the party, the communists will go to almost any length to avoid breaking the party discipline, means that at present the resolutions of trades union congresses will not be different from those of communists congresses on the same subjects. consequently, the questions which really agitate the members, the actual cleavages inside that communist majority, are comparatively invisible at a trades union congress. they are fought over with great bitterness, but they are not fought over in the hall of the unions-once the club of the nobility, with on its walls on congress days the hammer and spanner of the engineers, the pestle and trowel of the builders, and so on-but in the communist congresses in the kremlin and throughout the country. and, in the problem with which in this book we are mainly concerned, neither the regular business of the unions nor their internal squabbles affects the cardinal fact that in the present crisis the trades unions are chiefly important as part of that organization of human will with which the communists are attempting to arrest the steady progress of russia's economic ruin. putting it brutally, so as to offend trades unionists and communists alike, they are an important part of the communist system of internal propaganda, and their whole organization acts as a gigantic megaphone through which the communist party makes known its fears, its hopes and its decisions to the great masses of the industrial workers. the propaganda trains when i crossed the russian front in october, , the first thing i noticed in peasants' cottages, in the villages, in the little town where i took the railway to moscow, in every railway station along the line, was the elaborate pictorial propaganda concerned with the war. there were posters showing denizen standing straddle over russia's coal, while the factory chimneys were smokeless and the engines idle in the yards, with the simplest wording to show why it was necessary to beat denizen in order to get coal; there were posters illustrating the treatment of the peasants by the whites; posters against desertion, posters illustrating the russian struggle against the rest of the world, showing a workman, a peasant, a sailor and a soldier fighting in self-defence against an enormous capitalistic hydra. there were also-and this i took as a sign of what might be-posters encouraging the sowing of corn, and posters explaining in simple pictures improved methods of agriculture. our own recruiting propaganda during the war, good as that was, was never developed to such a point of excellence, and knowing the general slowness with which the russian centre reacts on its periphery, i was amazed not only at the actual posters, but at their efficient distribution thus far from moscow. i have had an opportunity of seeing two of the propaganda trains, the object of which is to reduce the size of russia politically by bringing moscow to the front and to the out of the way districts, and so to lessen the difficulty of obtaining that general unity of purpose which it is the object of propaganda to produce. the fact that there is some hope that in the near future the whole of this apparatus may be turned over to the propaganda of industry makes it perhaps worth while to describe these trains in detail. russia, for purposes of this internal propaganda, is divided into five sections, and each section has its own train, prepared for the particular political needs of the section it serves, bearing its own name, carrying its regular crew-a propaganda unit, as corporate as the crew of a ship. the five trains at present in existence are the "lenin," the "sverdlov," the "october revolution," the "red east," which is now in turkestan, and the "red cossack," which, ready to start for rostov and the don, was standing, in the sidings at the kursk station, together with the "lenin," returned for refitting and painting. burov, the organizer of these trains, a ruddy, enthusiastic little man in patched leather coat and breeches, took a party of foreigners-a swede, a norwegian, two czechs, a german and myself to visit his trains, together with radek, in the hope that radek would induce lenin to visit them, in which case lenin would be kinematographed for the delight of the villagers, and possibly the central committee would, if lenin were interested, lend them more lively support. we walked along the "lenin" first, at burov's special request. burov, it seems, has only recently escaped from what he considered a bitter affliction due to the department of proletarian culture, who, in the beginning, for the decoration of his trains, had delivered him bound hand and foot to a number of futurists. for that reason he wanted us to see the "lenin" first, in order that we might compare it with the result of his emancipation, the "red cossack," painted when the artists "had been brought under proper control." the "lenin" had been painted a year and a half ago, when, as fading hoarding in the streets of moscow still testify, revolutionary art was dominated by the futurist movement. every carriage is decorated with most striking but not very comprehensible pictures in the brightest colors, and the proletariat was called upon to enjoy what the pre-revolutionary artistic public had for the most part failed to understand. its pictures are "art for art's sake," and cannot have done more than astonish, and perhaps terrify, the peasants and the workmen of the country towns who had the luck to see them. the "red cossack" is quite different. as burov put it with deep satisfaction, "at first we were in the artists' hands, and now the artists are in our hands," a sentence suggesting the most horrible possibilities of official art under socialism, although, of course, bad art flourishes pretty well even under other systems. i inquired exactly how burov and his friends kept the artists in the right way, and received the fullest explanation. the political section of the organization works out the main idea and aim for each picture, which covers the whole side of a wagon. this idea is then submitted to a "collective" of artists, who are jointly responsible for its realization in paint. the artists compete with each other for a prize which is awarded for the best design, the judges being the artists themselves. it is the art of the poster, art with a purpose of the most definite kind. the result is sometimes amusing, interesting, startling, but, whatever else it does, hammers home a plain idea. thus the picture on the side of one wagon is divided into two sections. on the left is a representation of the peasants and workmen of the soviet republic. under it are the words, "let us not find ourselves again..." and then, in gigantic lettering under the right-hand section of the picture, "... in the heaven of the whites." this heaven is shown by an epauletted officer hitting a soldier in the face, as was done in the tsar's army and in at least one army of the counter revolutionaries, and workmen tied to stakes, as was done by the whites in certain towns in the south. then another wagon illustrating the methods of tsardom, with a state vodka shop selling its wares to wretched folk, who, when drunk on the state vodka, are flogged by the state police. then there is a wagon showing the different cossacks-of the don, terek, kuban, ural-riding in pairs. the cossack infantry is represented on the other side of this wagon. on another wagon is a very jolly picture of stenka razin in his boat with little old-fashioned brass cannon, rowing up the river. underneath is written the words: "i attack only the rich, with the poor i divide everything." on one side are the poor folk running from their huts to join him, on the other the rich folk firing at him from their castle. one wagon is treated purely decoratively, with a broad effective characteristically south russian design, framing a huge inscription to the effect that the cossacks need not fear that the soviet republic will interfere with their religion, since under its regime every man is to be free to believe exactly what he likes. then there is an entertaining wagon, showing kolchak sitting inside a fence in siberia with a red soldier on guard, judenitch sitting in a little circle with a sign-post to show it is esthonia, and denikin running at full speed to the asylum indicated by another sign-post on which is the crescent of the turkish empire. another lively picture shows the young cossack girls learning to read, with a most realistic old cossack woman telling them they had better not. but there is no point in describing every wagon. there are sixteen wagons in the "red cossack," and every one is painted all over on both sides. the internal arrangements of the train are a sufficient proof that russians are capable of organization if they set their minds to it. we went through it, wagon by wagon. one wagon contains a wireless telegraphy station capable of receiving news from such distant stations as those of carnarvon or lyons. another is fitted up as a newspaper office, with a mechanical press capable of printing an edition of fifteen thousand daily, so that the district served by the train, however out of the way, gets its news simultaneously with moscow, many days sometimes before the belated izvestia or pravda finds its way to them. and with its latest news it gets its latest propaganda, and in order to get the one it cannot help getting the other. next door to that there is a kinematograph wagon, with benches to seat about one hundred and fifty persons. but indoor performances are only given to children, who must come during the daytime, or in summer when the evenings are too light to permit an open air performance. in the ordinary way, at night, a great screen is fixed up in the open. there is a special hole cut in the side of the wagon, and through this the kinematograph throws its picture on the great screen outside, so that several thousands can see it at once. the enthusiastic burov insisted on working through a couple of films for us, showing the communists boy scouts in their country camps, children's meetings in petrograd, and the big demonstrations of last year in honor of the third international. he was extremely disappointed that radek, being in a hurry, refused to wait for a performance of "the father and his son," a drama which, he assured us with tears in his eyes, was so thrilling that we should not regret being late for our appointments if we stayed to witness it. another wagon is fitted up as an electric power-station, lighting the train, working the kinematograph and the printing machine, etc. then there is a clean little kitchen and dining-room, where, before being kinematographed-a horrible experience when one is first quite seriously begged (of course by burov) to assume an expression of intelligent interest--we had soup, a plate of meat and cabbage, and tea. then there is a wagon bookshop, where, while customers buy books, a gramophone sings the revolutionary songs of demian bledny, or speaks with the eloquence of trotsky or the logic of lenin. other wagons are the living-rooms of the personnel, divided up according to their duties-political, military, instructional, and so forth. for the train has not merely an agitational purpose. it carries with it a staff to give advice to local authorities, to explain what has not been understood, and so in every way to bring the ideas of the centre quickly to the backwoods of the republic. it works also in the opposite direction, helping to make the voice of the backwoods heard at moscow. this is illustrated by a painted pillar-box on one of the wagons, with a slot for letters, labelled, "for complaints of every kind." anybody anywhere who has grievance, thinks he is being unfairly treated, or has a suggestion to make, can speak with the centre in this way. when the train is on a voyage telegrams announce its arrival beforehand, so that the local soviets can make full use of its advantages, arranging meetings, kinematograph shows, lectures. it arrives, this amazing picture train, and proceeds to publish and distribute its newspapers, sell its books (the bookshop, they tell me, is literally stormed at every stopping place), send books and posters for forty versts on either side of the line with the motor-cars which it carries with it, and enliven the population with its kinematograph. i doubt if a more effective instrument of propaganda has ever been devised. and in considering the question whether or no the russians will be able after organizing their military defence to tackle with similar comparative success the much more difficult problem of industrial rebirth, the existence of such instruments, the use of such propaganda is a factor not to be neglected. in the spring of this year, when the civil war seemed to be ending, when there was a general belief that the poles would accept the peace that russia offered (they ignored this offer, advanced, took kiev, were driven back to warsaw, advanced again, and finally agreed to terms which they could have had in march without bloodshed any kind), two of these propaganda trains were already being repainted with a new purpose. it was hoped that in the near future all five trains would be explaining not the need to fight but the need to work. undoubtedly, at the first possible moment, the whole machinery of agitation, of posters, of broadsheets and of trains, will be turned over to the task of explaining the government's plans for reconstruction, and the need for extraordinary concentration, now on transport, now on something else, that these plans involve. saturdayings so much for the organization, with its communist party, its system of meetings and counter-meetings, its adapted trades unions, its infinitely various propaganda, which is doing its best to make headway against ruin. i want now to describe however briefly, the methods it has adopted in tackling the worst of all russia's problems-the non-productivity and absolute shortage of labor. i find a sort of analogy between these methods and those which we used in england in tackling the similar cumulative problem of finding men for war. just as we did not proceed at once to conscription, but began by a great propaganda of voluntary effort, so the communists, faced with a need at least equally vital, did not turn at once to industrial conscription. it was understood from the beginning that the communists themselves were to set an example of hard work, and i dare say a considerable proportion of them did so. every factory had its little communist committee, which was supposed to leaven the factory with enthusiasm, just as similar groups of communists drafted into the armies in moments of extreme danger did, on more than one occasion, as the non-communist commander-in-chief admits, turn a rout into a stand and snatch victory from what looked perilously like defeat. but this was not enough, arrears of work accumulated, enthusiasm waned, productivity decreased, and some new move was obviously necessary. this first move in the direction of industrial conscription, although no one perceived its tendency at the time, was the inauguration of what have become known as "saturdayings". early in the central committee of the communist party put out a circular letter, calling upon the communists "to work revolutionally," to emulate in the rear the heroism of their brothers on the front, pointing out that nothing but the most determined efforts and an increase in the productivity of labor would enable russia to win through her difficulties of transport, etc. kolchak, to quote from english newspapers, was it "sweeping on to moscow," and the situation was pretty threatening. as a direct result of this letter, on may th, a meeting of communists in the sub-district of the moscow-kazan railway passed a resolution that, in view of the imminent danger to the republic, communists and their sympathizers should give up an hour a day of their leisure, and, lumping these hours together, do every saturday six hours of manual labor; and, further, that these communist "saturdayings" should be continued "until complete victory over kolchak should be assured." that decision of a local committee was the actual beginning of a movement which spread all over russia, and though the complete victory over kolchak was long ago obtained, is likely to continue so long as soviet russia is threatened by any one else. the decision was put into effect on may th, when the first communist "saturdaying" in russia took place on the moscow-kazan railway. the commissar of the railway, communist clerks from the offices, and every one else who wished to help, marched to work, in all, and put in , hours of manual labor, in which they finished the repairs of four locomotives and sixteen wagons and loaded and unloaded , poods of engine and wagon parts and material. it was found that the productivity of labor in loading and unloading shown on this occasion was about per cent. of the normal, and a similar superiority of effort was shown in the other kinds of work. this example was immediately copied on other railways. the alexandrovsk railway had its first "saturdaying" on may th. ninety-eight persons worked for five hours, and here also did two or three times as much is the usual amount of work done in the same number of working hours under ordinary circumstances. one of the workmen, in giving an account of the performance, wrote: "the comrades explain this by saying that in ordinary times the work was dull and they were sick of it, whereas this occasion they were working willingly and with excitement. but now it will be shameful in ordinary hours to do less than in the communist 'saturdaying.'" the hope implied in this last sentence has not been realized. in pravda of june th there is an article describing one of these early "saturdayings," which gives a clear picture of the infectious character of the proceedings, telling how people who came out of curiosity to look on found themselves joining in the work, and how a soldier with an accordion after staring for a long time open-mouthed at these lunatics working on a saturday afternoon put up a tune for them on his instrument, and, delighted by their delight, played on while the workers all sang together. the idea of the "saturdayings" spread quickly from railways to factories, and by the middle of the summer reports of similar efforts were coming from all over russia. then lenin became interested, seeing in these "saturdayings" not only a special effort in the face of common danger, but an actual beginning of communism and a sign that socialism could bring about a greater productivity of labor than could be obtained under capitalism. he wrote: "this is a work of great difficulty and requiring much time, but it has begun, and that is the main thing. if in hungry moscow in the summer of hungry workmen who have lived through the difficult four years of the imperialistic war, and then the year and a half of the still more difficult civil war, have been able to begin this great work, what will not be its further development when we conquer in the civil war and win peace." he sees in it a promise of work being done not for the sake of individual gain, but because of a recognition that such work is necessary for the general good, and in all he wrote and spoke about it he emphasized the fact that people worked better and harder when working thus than under any of the conditions (piece-work, premiums for good work, etc.) imposed by the revolution in its desperate attempts to raise the productivity of labor. for this reason alone, he wrote, the first "saturdaying" on the moscow-kazan railway was an event of historical significance, and not for russia alone. whether lenin was right or wrong in so thinking, "saturdayings" became a regular institution, like dorcas meetings in victorian england, like the thousands of collective working parties instituted in england during the war with germany. it remains to be seen how long they will continue, and if they will survive peace when that comes. at present the most interesting point about them is the large proportion of non-communists who take an enthusiastic part in them. in many cases not more than ten per cent. of communists are concerned, though they take the initiative in organizing the parties and in finding the work to be done. the movement spread like fire in dry grass, like the craze for roller-skating swept over england some years ago, and efforts were made to control it, so that the fullest use might be made of it. in moscow it was found worth while to set up a special bureau for "saturdayings." hospitals, railways, factories, or any other concerns working for the public good, notify this bureau that they need the sort of work a "saturdaying" provides. the bureau informs the local communists where their services are required, and thus there is a minimum of wasted energy. the local communists arrange the "saturdayings," and any one else joins in who wants. these "saturdayings" are a hardship to none because they are voluntary, except for members of the communist party, who are considered to have broken the party discipline if they refrain. but they can avoid the "saturdayings" if they wish to by leaving the party. indeed, lenin points, out that the "saturdayings" are likely to assist in clearing out of the party those elements which joined it with the hope of personal gain. he points out that the privileges of a communists now consist in doing more work than other people in the rear, and, on the front, in having the certainty of being killed when other folk are merely taken prisoners. the following are a few examples of the sort of work done in the "saturdayings." briansk hospitals were improperly heated because of lack of the local transport necessary to bring them wood. the communists organized a "saturdaying," in which persons took part, including military specialists (officers of the old army serving in the new), soldiers, a chief of staff, workmen and women. having no horses, they harnessed themselves to sledges in groups of ten, and brought in the wood required. at nijni persons spent their saturday afternoon in unloading barges. in the basman district of moscow there was a gigantic "saturdaying" and "sundaying" in which , persons (in this case all but a little over being communists) worked in the heavy artillery shops, shifting materials, cleaning tramlines for bringing in fuel, etc. then there was a "saturdaying" the main object of which was a general autumn cleaning of the hospitals for the wounded. one form of "saturdaying" for women is going to the hospitals, talking with the wounded and writing letters for them, mending their clothes, washing sheets, etc. the majority of "saturdayings" at present are concerned with transport work and with getting and shifting wood, because at the moment these are the chief difficulties. i have talked to many "saturdayers," communist and non-communist, and all alike spoke of these saturday afternoons of as kind of picnic. on the other hand, i have met communists who were accustomed to use every kind off ingenuity to find excuses not to take part in them and yet to preserve the good opinion of their local committee. but even if the whole of the communist party did actually indulge in a working picnic once a week, it would not suffice to meet russia's tremendous needs. and, as i pointed out in the chapter specially devoted to the shortage of labor, the most serious need at present is to keep skilled workers at their jobs instead of letting them drift away into non-productive labor. no amount of saturday picnics could do that, and it was obvious long ago that some other means, would have to be devised. industrial conscription the general principle of industrial conscription recognized by the russian constitution, section ii, chapter v, paragraph , which reads: "the russian socialist federate soviet republic recognizes that work is an obligation on every citizen of the republic," and proclaims, "he who does not work shall not eat." it is, however, one thing to proclaim such a principle and quite another to put it into action. on december , , the moment it became clear that there was a real possibility that the civil war was drawing to an end, trotsky allowed the pravda to print a memorandum of his, consisting of "theses" or reasoned notes about industrial conscription and the militia system. he points out that a socialist state demands a general plan for the utilization of all the resources of a country, including its human energy. at the same time, "in the present economic chaos in which are mingled the broken fragments of the past and the beginnings of the future," a sudden jump to a complete centralized economy of the country as a whole is impossible. local initiative, local effort must not be sacrificed for the sake of a plan. at the same time industrial conscription is necessary for complete socialization. it cannot be regardless of individuality like military conscription. he suggests a subdivision of the state into territorial productive districts which should coincide with the territorial districts of the militia system which shall replace the regular army. registration of labor necessary. necessary also to coordinate military and industrial registration. at demobilization the cadres of regiments, divisions, etc., should form the fundamental cadres of the militia. instruction to this end should be included in the courses for workers and peasants who are training to become officers in every district. transition to the militia system must be carefully and gradually accomplished so as not for a moment to leave the republic defenseless. while not losing sight of these ultimate aims, it is necessary to decide on immediate needs and to ascertain exactly what amount of labor is necessary for their limited realization. he suggests the registration of skilled labor in the army. he suggests that a commission under general direction of the council of public economy should work out a preliminary plan and then hand it over to the war department, so that means should be worked out for using the military apparatus for this new industrial purpose. trotsky's twenty-four theses or notes must have been written in odd moments, now here now there, on the way from one front to another. they do not form a connected whole. contradictions jostle each other, and it is quite clear that trotsky himself had no very definite plan in his head. but his notes annoyed and stimulated so many other people that they did perhaps precisely the work they were intended to do. pravada printed them with a note from the editor inviting discussion. the ekonomitcheskaya jizn printed letter after letter from workmen, officials and others, attacking, approving and bringing new suggestions. larin, semashko, pyatakov, bucharin all took a hand in the discussion. larin saw in the proposals the beginning of the end of the revolution, being convinced that authority would pass from the democracy of the workers into the hands of the specialists. rykov fell upon them with sturdy blows on behalf of the trades unions. all, however, agreed on the one point--that something of the sort was necessary. on december th a commission for studying the question of industrial conscription was formed under the presidency of trotsky. this commission included the people's commissars, or ministers, of labor, ways of communication, supply, agriculture, war, and the presidents of the central council of the trades unions and of the supreme council of public economy. they compiled a list of the principal questions before them, and invited anybody interested to bring them suggestions and material for discussion. but the discussion was not limited to the newspapers or to this commission. the question was discussed in soviets and conferences of every kind all over the country. thus, on january st an all-russian conference of local "departments for the registration and distribution of labor," after prolonged argument, contributed their views. they pointed out ( ) the need of bringing to work numbers of persons who instead of doing the skilled labor for which they were qualified were engaged in petty profiteering, etc.; ( ) that there evaporation of skilled labor into unproductive speculation could at least be checked by the introduction of labor books, which would give some sort of registration of each citizen's work; ( ) that workmen can be brought back from the villages only for enterprises which are supplied with provisions or are situated in districts where there is plenty. ("the opinion that, in the absence of these preliminary conditions, it will be possible to draw workmen from the villages by measures of compulsion or mobilization is profoundly mistaken.") ( ) that there should be a census of labor and that the trades unions should be invited to protect the interests of the conscripted. finally, this conference approved the idea of using the already existing military organization for carrying out a labor census of the red army, and for the turning over to labor of parts of the army during demobilization, but opposed the idea of giving the military organization the work of labor registration and industrial conscription in general. on january , , the central committee of the communist party, after prolonged discussion of trotsky's rough memorandum, finally adopted and published a new edition of the "theses," expanded, altered, almost unrecognizable, a reasoned body of theory entirely different from the bundle of arrows loosed at a venture by trotsky. they definitely accepted the principle of industrial conscription, pointing out the immediate reasons for it in the fact that russia cannot look for much help from without and must somehow or other help herself. long before the all-russian congress of the communist party approved the theses of the committee, one form of industrial conscription was already being tested at work. very early in january, when the discussion on the subject was at its height, the soviet of the third army addressed itself to the council of defense of the republic with an invitation to make use of this army (which at least for the moment had finished its military task) and to experiment with it as a labor army. the council of defense agreed. representatives of the commissariats of supply, agriculture, ways and communications, labor and the supreme council of public economy were sent to assist the army soviet. the army was proudly re-named "the first revolutionary army of labor," and began to issue communiques "from the labor front," precisely like the communiques of an army in the field. i translate as a curiosity the first communique issued by a labor army's soviet: "wood prepared in the districts of ishim, karatulskaya, omutinskaya, zavodoutovskaya, yalutorovska, iushaly, kamuishlovo, turinsk, altynai, oshtchenkovo, shadrinsk, , cubic sazhins. working days, , . taken to the railway stations, , cubic sazhins. working days on transport, , . one hundred carpenters detailed for the kizelovsk mines. one hundred carpenters detailed for the bridge at ufa. one engineer specialist detailed to the government council of public economy for repairing the mills of chelyabinsk government. one instructor accountant detailed for auditing the accounts of the economic organizations of kamuishlov. repair of locomotives proceeding in the works at ekaterinburg. january , , midnight." the labor army's soviet received a report on the state of the district covered by the army with regard to supply and needed work. by the end of january it had already carried out a labor census of the army, and found that it included over , laborers, of whom a considerable number were skilled. it decided on a general plan of work in reestablishing industry in the urals, which suffered severely during the kolchak regime and the ebb and flow of the civil war, and was considering a suggestion of one of its members that if the scheme worked well the army should be increased to , men by way of mobilization. on january rd the council of defense of the republic, encouraged to proceed further, decided to make use of the reserve army for the improvement of railway transport on the moscow-kazan railway, one of the chief arteries between eastern food districts and moscow. the main object is to be the reestablishment of through traffic between moscow and ekaterinburg and the repair of the kazan-ekaterinburg line, which particularly suffered during the war. an attempt was to be made to rebuild the bridge over the kama river before the ice melts. the commander of the reserve army was appointed commissar of the eastern part of the moscow-kazan railway, retaining his position as commander of the army. with a view of coordination between the army soviet and the railway authorities, a member of the soviet was also appointed commissar of the railway. on january th it was announced that a similar experiment was being made in the ukraine. a month before the ice broke the first train actually crossed the kama river by the rebuilt bridge. by april of this year the organization of industrial conscription had gone far beyond the original labor armies. a decree of february th had created a chief labor committee, consisting of five members, serebryakov and danilov, from the commissariat of war; vasiliev, from the commissariat of the interior; anikst, from the commissariat of labor; dzerzhinsky, from the commissariat of internal affairs. dzerzhinsky was president, and his appointment was possibly made in the hope that the reputation he had won as president of the extraordinary committee for fighting counter-revolution would frighten people into taking this committee seriously. throughout the country in each government or province similar committees, called "troikas," were created, each of three members, one from the commissariat of war, one from the department of labor, one from the department of management, in each case from the local commissariats and departments attached to the local soviet. representatives of the central statistical office and its local organs had a right to be present at the meeting of these committees of three, or "troikas," but had not the right to vote. an organization or a factory requiring labor, was to apply to the labor department of the local soviet. this department was supposed to do its best to satisfy demands upon it by voluntary methods first. if these proved insufficient they were to apply to the local "troika," or labor conscription committee. if this found that its resources also were insufficient, it was to refer back the request to the labor department of the soviet, which was then to apply to its corresponding department in the government soviet, which again, first voluntarily and then through the government committee of labor conscription, was to try to satisfy the demands. i fancy the object of this arrangement was to prevent local "troikas" from referring to government "troikas," and so directly to dzerzhinsky's central committee. if they had been able to do this there would obviously have been danger lest a new network of independent and powerful organizations should be formed. experience with the overgrown and insuppressible committees for fighting counter-revolution had taught people how serious such a development might be. such was the main outline of the scheme for conscripting labor. a similar scheme was prepared for superintending and safeguarding labor when conscripted. in every factory of over , workmen, clerks, etc., there was formed a commission (to distinguish it from the committee) of industrial conscription. smaller factories shared such commissions or were joined for the purpose to larger factories near by. these commissions were to be under the direct control of a factory committee, thereby preventing squabbles between conscripted and non-conscripted labor. they were to be elected for six months, but their members could be withdrawn and replaced by the factory committee with the approval of the local "troika." these commissions, like the "troikas," consisted of three members: ( ) from the management of the factory, ( ) from the factory committee, ( ) from the executive committee of the workers. (it was suggested in the directions that one of these should be from the group which "has been organizing 'saturdayings,' that is to say that he or she should be a communist.) the payment of conscripted workers was to be by production, with prizes for specially good work. specially bad work was also foreseen in the detailed scheme of possible punishments. offenders were to be brought before the "people's court" (equivalent to the ordinary civil court), or, in the case of repeated or very bad offenses, were to be brought before the far more dreaded revolutionary tribunals. six categories of possible offenses were placed upon the new code: ( )avoiding registration, absenteeism, or desertion. ( )the preparation of false documents or the use of such. ( )officials giving false information to facilitate these crimes. ( )purposeful damage of instruments or material. ( )uneconomical or careless work. ( )(probably the most serious of all: instigation to any of these actions. the "troikas" have the right to deal administratively with the less important crimes by deprival of freedom for not more than two weeks. no one can be brought to trial except by the committee for industrial conscription on the initiative of the responsible director of work, and with the approval either of the local labor inspection authorities or with that of the local executive committee. no one with the slightest knowledge of russia will suppose for a moment that this elaborate mechanism sprang suddenly into existence when the decree was signed. on the contrary, all stages of industrial conscription exist simultaneously even today, and it would be possible by going from one part of russia to another to collect a series of specimens of industrial conscription at every stage of evolution, just as one can collect all stages of man from a baboon to a company director or a communist. some of the more primitive kinds of conscription were not among the least successful. for example, at the time (in the spring of the year) when the russians still hoped that the poles would be content with the huge area of non-polish territory they had already seized, the army on the western front was without any elaborate system of decrees being turned into a labor army. the work done was at first ordinary country work, mainly woodcutting. they tried to collaborate with the local "troikas," sending help when these committees asked for it. this, however, proved unsatisfactory, so, disregarding the "troikas," they organized things for themselves in the whole area immediately behind the front. they divided up the forests into definite districts, and they worked these with soldiers and with deserters. gradually their work developed, and they built themselves narrow-gauge railways for the transport of the wood. then they needed wagons and locomotives, and of course immediately found themselves at loggerheads with the railway authorities. finally, they struck a bargain with the railwaymen, and were allowed to take broken-down wagons which the railway people were not in a position to mend. using such skilled labor as they had, they mended such wagons as were given them, and later made a practice of going to the railway yards and in inspecting "sick" wagons for themselves, taking out any that they thought had a chance even of temporary convalescence. incidentally they caused great scandal by finding in the smolensk sidings among the locomotives and wagons supposed to be sick six good locomotives and seventy perfectly healthy wagons. then they began to improve the feeding of their army by sending the wood they had cut, in the trains they had mended, to people who wanted wood and could give them provisions. one such train went to turkestan and back from the army near smolensk. their work continually increased, and since they had to remember that they were an army and not merely a sort of nomadic factory, they began themselves to mobilize, exclusively for purposes of work, sections of the civil population. i asked unshlicht, who had much to do with this organization, if the peasants came willingly. he said, "not very," but added that they did not mind when they found that they got well fed and were given packets of salt as prizes for good work. "the peasants," he said, "do not grumble against the government when it shows the sort of common sense that they themselves can understand. we found that when we said definitely how many carts and men a village must provide, and used them without delay for a definite purpose, they were perfectly satisfied and considered it right and proper. in every case, however, when they saw people being mobilized and sent thither without obvious purpose or result, they became hostile at once." i asked unshlicht how it was that their army still contained skilled workmen when one of the objects of industrial conscription was to get the skilled workmen back into the factories. he said: "we have an accurate census of the army, and when we get asked for skilled workmen for such and such a factory, they go there knowing that they still belong to the army." that, of course, is the army point of view, and indicates one of the main squabbles which industrial conscription has produced. trotsky would like the various armies to turn into units of a territorial militia, and at the same time to be an important part of the labor organization of each district. his opponents do not regard the labor armies as a permanent manifestation, and many have gone so far as to say that the productivity of labor in one of these armies is lower than among ordinary workmen. both sides produce figures on this point, and trotsky goes so far as to say that if his opponents are right, then not only are labor armies damned, but also the whole principle of industrial conscription. "if compulsory labor-independently of social condition-is unproductive, that is a condemnation not of the labor armies, but of industrial conscription in general, and with it of the whole soviet system, the further development of which is unthinkable except on a basis of universal industrial conscription." but, of course, the question of the permanence of the labor armies is not so important as the question of getting the skilled workers back to the factories. the comparative success or failure of soldiers or mobilized peasants in cutting wood is quite irrelevant to this recovery of the vanished workmen. and that recovery will take time, and will be entirely useless unless it is possible to feed these workers when they have been collected. there have already been several attempts, not wholly successful, to collect the straying workers of particular industries. thus, after the freeing of the oil-wells from the whites, there was a general mobilization of naphtha workers. many of these had bolted on or after the arrival of krasnov or denikin and gone far into central russia, settling where they could. so months passed before the red army definitely pushed the area of civil war beyond the oil-wells, that many of these refugees had taken new root and were unwilling to return. i believe, that in spite of the mobilization, the oil-wells are still short of men. in the coal districts also, which have passed through similar experiences, the proportion of skilled to unskilled labor is very much smaller than it was before the war. there have also been two mobilizations of railway workers, and these, i think, may be partly responsible for the undoubted improvement noticeable during the year, although this is partly at least due to other things beside conscription. in the first place trotsky carried with him into the commissariat of transport the same ferocious energy that he has shown in the commissariat of war, together with the prestige that he had gained there. further, he was well able in the councils of the republic to defend the needs of his particular commissariat against those of all others. he was, for example able to persuade the communist party to treat the transport crisis precisely as they had treated each crisis on the front-that is to say, to mobilize great numbers of professed communists to meet it, giving them in this case the especial task of getting engines mended and, somehow or other, of keeping trains on the move. but neither the bridges mended and the wood cut by the labor armies, nor the improvement in transport, are any final proof of the success of industrial conscription. industrial conscription in the proper sense of the words is impossible until a government knows what it has to conscript. a beginning was made early this year by the introduction of labor books, showing what work people were doing and where, and serving as a kind of industrial passports. but in april this year these had not yet become general in moscow although the less unwieldy population of petrograd was already supplied with them. it will be long even if it is possible at all, before any considerable proportion of the people not living in these two cities are registered in this way. a more useful step was taken at the end of august, in a general census throughout russia. there has been no russian census since . there was to have been another about the time the war began. it was postponed for obvious reasons. if the communists carry through the census with even moderate success (they will of course have to meet every kind of evasion), they will at least get some of the information without which industrial conscription on a national scale must be little more than a farce. the census should show them where the skilled workers are. industrial conscription should enable them to collect them and put them at their own skilled work. then if, besides transplanting them, they are able to feed them, it will be possible to judge of the success or failure of a scheme which in most countries would bring a government toppling to the ground. "in most countries"; yes, but then the economic crisis has gone further in russia than in most countries. there is talk of introducing industrial conscription (one year's service) in germany, where things have not gone nearly so far. and perhaps industrial conscription, like communism itself, becomes a thing of desperate hope only in a country actually face to face with ruin. i remember saying to trotsky, when talking of possible opposition, that i, as an englishman, with the tendencies to practical anarchism belonging to my race, should certainly object most strongly if i were mobilized and set to work in a particular factory, and might even want to work in some other factory just for the sake of not doing what i was forced to do. trotsky replied: "you would now. but you would not if you had been through a revolution, and seen your country in such a state that only the united, concentrated effort of everybody could possibly reestablish it. that is the position here. everybody knows the position and that there is no other way." what the communists are trying to do in russia we come now to the communist plans for reconstruction. we have seen, in the first two chapters, something of the appalling paralysis which is the most striking factor in the economic problem to-day. we have seen how russia is suffering from a lack of things and from a lack of labor, how these two shortages react on each other, and how nothing but a vast improvement in transport can again set in motion what was one of the great food-producing machines of the world. we have also seen something of the political organization which, with far wider ambitions before it, is at present struggling to prevent temporary paralysis from turning into permanent atrophy. we have seen that it consists of a political party so far dominant that the trades unions and all that is articulate in the country may be considered as part of a machinery of propaganda, for getting those things done which that political party considers should be done. in a country fighting, literally, for its life, no man can call his soul his own, and we have seen how this fact-a fact that has become obvious again and again in the history of the world, whenever a nation has had its back to the wall-is expressed in russia in terms of industrial conscription; in measures, that is to say, which would be impossible in any country not reduced to such extremities; in measures which may prove to be the inevitable accompaniment of national crisis, when such crisis is economic rather than military. let us now see what the russians, with that machinery at their disposal are trying to do. it is obvious that since this machinery is dominated by a political party, it will be impossible to understand the russian plans, without understanding that particular political party's estimate of the situation in general. it is obvious that the communist plans for russia must be largely affected by their view of europe as a whole. this view is gloomy in the extreme. the communists believe that europe is steadily shaking itself to pieces. they believe that this process has already gone so far that, even given good will on the part of european governments, the manufacturers of western countries are already incapable of supplying them with all the things which russia was importing before the war, still less make up the enormous arrears which have resulted from six years of blockade. they do not agree with m. clemenceau that "revolution is a disease attacking defeated countries only." or, to put it as i have heard it stated in moscow, they believe that president wilson's aspiration towards a peace in which should be neither conqueror nor conquered has been at least partially realized in the sense that every country ended the struggle economically defeated, with the possible exception of america, whose signature, after all, is still to be ratified. they believe that even in seemingly prosperous countries the seeds of economic disaster are already fertilized. they think that the demands of labor will become greater and more difficult to fulfill until at last they become incompatible with a continuance of the capitalist system. they think that strike after strike, irrespective of whether it is successful or not, will gradually widen the cracks and flaws already apparent in the damaged economic structure of western europe. they believe that conflicting interests will involve our nations in new national wars, and that each of these will deepen the cleavage between capital and labor. they think that even if exhaustion makes mutual warfare on a large scale impossible, these conflicting interests will produce such economic conflicts, such refusals of cooperation, as will turn exhaustion to despair. they believe, to put it briefly, that russia has passed through the worst stages of a process to which every country in europe will be submitted in turn by its desperate and embittered inhabitants. we may disagree with them, but we shall not understand them if we refuse to take that belief into account. if, as they imagine, the next five years are to be years of disturbance and growing resolution, russia will get very little from abroad. if, for example, there is to be a serious struggle in england, russia will get practically nothing. they not only believe that these things are going to be, but make the logical deductions as to the effect of such disturbances on their own chances of importing what they need. for example, lenin said to me that "the shock of revolution in england would ensure the final defeat of capitalism," but he said at the same time that it would be felt at once throughout the world and cause such reverberations as would paralyze industry everywhere. and that is why, although russia is an agricultural country, the communist plans for her reconstruction are concerned first of all not with agriculture, but with industry. in their schemes for the future of the world, russia's part is that of a gigantic farm, but in their schemes for the immediate future of russia, their eyes are fixed continually on the nearer object of making her so far self-supporting that, even if western europe is unable to help them, they may be able to crawl out of their economic difficulties, as krassin put it to me before he left moscow, "if necessary on all fours, but somehow or other, crawl out." some idea of the larger ambitions of the communists with regard to the development of russia are given in a conversation with rykov, which follows this chapter. the most important characteristic of them is that they are ambitions which cannot but find an echo in russians of any kind, quite regardless of their political convictions. the old anomalies of russian industry, for example, the distances of the industrial districts from their sources of fuel and raw material are to be done away with. these anomalies were largely due to historical accidents, such as the caprice of peter the great, and not to any economic reasons. the revolution, destructive as it has been, has at least cleaned the slate and made it possible, if it is possible to rebuild at all, to rebuild russia on foundations laid by common sense. it may be said that the communists are merely doing flamboyantly and with a lot of flag-waving, what any other russian government would be doing in their place. and without the flamboyance and the flag-waving, it is doubtful whether in an exhausted country, it would be possible to get anything done at all. the result of this is that in their work of economic reconstruction the communists get the support of most of the best engineers and other technicians in the country, men who take no interest whatsoever in the ideas of karl marx, but have a professional interest in doing the best they can with their knowledge, and a patriotic satisfaction in using that knowledge for russia. these men, caring not at all about communism, want to make russia once more a comfortably habitable place, no matter under what government. their attitude is precisely comparable to that of the officers of the old army who have contributed so much to the success of the new. these officers were not communists, but they disliked civil war, and fought to put an end of it. as sergei kamenev, the commander-in-chief, and not a communist, said to me, "i have not looked on the civil war as on a struggle between two political ideas, for the whites have no definite idea. i have considered it simply as a struggle between the russian government and a number of mutineers." precisely so do these "bourgeois" technicians now working throughout russia regard the task before them. it will be small satisfaction to them if famine makes the position of any government impossible. for them the struggle is quite simply a struggle between russia and the economic forces tending towards a complete collapse of civilization. the communists have thus practically the whole intelligence of the country to help them in their task of reconstruction, or of salvage. but the educated classes alone cannot save a nation. muscle is wanted besides brain, and the great bulk of those who can provide muscle are difficult to move to enthusiasm by any broad schemes of economic rearrangement that do not promise immediate improvement in their own material conditions. industrial conscription cannot be enforced in russia unless there is among the conscripted themselves an understanding, although a resentful understanding, of its necessity. the russians have not got an army of martians to enforce effort on an alien people. the army and the people are one. "we are bound to admit," says trotsky, "that no wide industrial mobilization will succeed, if we do not capture all that is honorable, spiritual in the peasant working masses in explaining our plan." and the plan that he referred to was not the grandiose (but obviously sensible) plan for the eventual electrification of all russia, but a programme of the struggle before them in actually getting their feet clear of the morass of industrial decay in which they are at present involved. such a programme has actually been decided upon-a programme the definite object of which is to reconcile the workers to work not simply hand to mouth, each for himself, but to concentrate first on those labors which will eventually bring their reward in making other labors easier and improving the position as a whole. early this year a comparatively unknown bolshevik called gusev, to whom nobody had attributed any particular intelligence, wrote, while busy on the staff of an army on the southeast front, which was at the time being used partly as a labor army, a pamphlet which has had an extraordinary influence in getting such a programme drawn up. the pamphlet is based on gusev's personal observation both of a labor army at work and of the attitude of the peasant towards industrial conscription. it was extremely frank, and contained so much that might have been used by hostile critics, that it was not published in the ordinary way but printed at the army press on the caucasian front and issued exclusively to members of the communist party. i got hold of a copy of this pamphlet through a friend. it is called "urgent questions of economic construction." gusev sets out in detail the sort of opposition he had met, and says: "the anarchists, social revolutionaries and mensheviks have a clear, simple economic plan which the great masses can understand: 'go about your own business and work freely for yourself in your own place.' they have a criticism of labor mobilizations equally clear for the masses. they say to them, 'they are putting simeon in peter's place, and peter in simeon's. they are sending the men of saratov to dig the ground in the government of stavropol, and the stavropol men to the saratov government for the same purpose.' then besides that there is 'nonparty' criticism: "'when it is time to sow they will be shifting muck, and when it is time to reap they will be told to cut timber.' that is a particularly clear expression of the peasants' disbelief in our ability to draw up a proper economic plan. this belief is clearly at the bottom of such questions as, 'comrade gusev, have you ever done any plowing?' or 'comrade orator, do you know anything about peasant work?' disbelief in the townsman who understands nothing about peasants is natural to the peasant, and we shall have to conquer it, to get through it, to get rid of it by showing the peasant, with a clear plan in our hands that he can understand, that we are not altogether fools in this matter and that we understand more than he does." he then sets out the argument which he himself had found successful in persuading the peasants to do things the reward for which would not be obvious the moment they were done. he says, "i compared our state economy to a colossal building with scores of stories and tens of thousands of rooms. the whole building has been half smashed; in places the roof has tumbled down, the beams have rotted, the ceilings are tumbling, the drains and water pipes are burst; the stoves are falling to pieces, the partitions are shattered, and, finally, the walls and foundations are unsafe and the whole building is threatened with collapse. i asked, how, must one set about the repair of this building? with what kind of economic plan? to this question the inhabitants of different stories, and even of different rooms on one and the same story will reply variously. those who live on the top floor will shout that the rafters are rotten and the roof falling; that it is impossible to live, there any longer, and that it is immediately necessary, first of all, to put up new beams and to repair the roof. and from their point of view they will be perfectly right. certainly it is not possible to live any longer on that floor. certainly the repair of the roof is necessary. the inhabitants of one of the lower stories in which the water pipes have burst will cry out that it is impossible to live without water, and therefore, first of all, the water pipes must be mended. and they, from their point of view, will be perfectly right, since it certainly is impossible to live without water. the inhabitants of the floor where the stoves have fallen to pieces will insist on an immediate mending of the stoves, since they and their children are dying of cold because there is nothing on which they can heat up water or boil kasha for the children; and they, too, will be quite right. but in spite of all these just demands, which arrive in thousands from all sides, it is impossible to forget the most important of all, that the foundation is shattered and that the building is threatened with a collapse which will bury all the inhabitants of the house together, and that, therefore, the only immediate task is the strengthening of the foundation and the walls. extraordinary firmness, extraordinary courage is necessary, not only not to listen to the cries and groans of old men, women, children and sick, coming from every floor, but also to decide on taking from the inhabitants of all floors the instruments and materials necessary for the strengthening of the foundations and walls, and to force them to leave their corners and hearths, which they are doing the best they can to make habitable, in order to drive them to work on the strengthening of the walls and foundations." gusev's main idea was that the communists were asking new sacrifices from a weary and exhausted people, that without such sacrifices these people would presently find themselves in even worse conditions, and that, to persuade them to make the effort necessary to save themselves, it was necessary to have a perfectly clear and easily understandable plan which could be dinned into the whole nation and silence the criticism of all possible opponents. copies of his little book came to moscow. lenin read it and caused excruciating jealousy in the minds of several other communists, who had also been trying to find the philosopher's stone that should turn discouragement into hope, by singling out gusev for his special praise and insisting that his plans should be fully discussed at the supreme council in the kremlin. trotsky followed lenin's lead, and in the end a general programme for russian reconstruction was drawn up, differing only slightly from that which gusev had proposed. i give this scheme in trotsky's words, because they are a little fuller than those of others, and knowledge of this plan will explain not only what the communists are trying to do in russia, but what they would like to get from us today and what they will want to get tomorrow. trotsky says:-- "the fundamental task at this moment is improvement in the condition of our transport, prevention of its further deterioration and preparation of the most elementary stores of food, raw material and fuel. the whole of the first period of our reconstruction will be completely occupied in the concentration of labor on the solution of these problems, which is a condition of further progress. "the second period (it will be difficult to say now whether it will be measured in months or years, since that depends on many factors beginning with the international situation and ending with the unanimity or the lack of it in our own party) will be a period occupied in the building of machines in the interest of transport, and the getting of raw materials and provisions. "the third period will be occupied in building machinery, with a view to the production of articles in general demand, and, finally, the fourth period will be that in which we are able to produce these articles." does it not occur, even to the most casual reader, that there is very little politics in that program, and that, no matter what kind of government should be in russia, it would have to endorse that programme word for word? i would ask any who doubt this to turn again to my first two chapters describing the nature of the economic crisis in russia, and to remind themselves how, not only the lack of things but the lack of men, is intimately connected with the lack of transport, which keeps laborers ill fed, factories ill supplied with material, and in this way keeps the towns incapable of supplying the needs of the country, with the result that the country is most unwilling to supply the needs of the town. no russian government unwilling to allow russia to subside definitely to a lower level of civilization can do otherwise than to concentrate upon the improvement of transport. labor in russia must be used first of all for that, in order to increase its own productivity. and, if purchase of help from abroad is to be allowed, russia must "control" the outflow of her limited assets, so that, by healing transport first of all, she may increase her power of making new assets. she must spend in such a way as eventually to increase her power of spending. she must prevent the frittering away of her small purse on things which, profitable to the vendor and doubtless desirable by the purchaser, satisfy only individual needs and do not raise the producing power of the community as a whole. rykov on economic plans and on the transformation of the communist party alexei rykov, the president of the supreme council of public economy, is one of the hardest worked men in russia, and the only time i was able to have a long talk with him (although more than once he snatched moments to answer particular questions) was on a holiday, when the old siberian hotel, now the offices of the council, was deserted, and i walked through empty corridors until i found the president and his secretary at work as usual. after telling of the building of the new railway from alexandrovsk gai to the emba, the prospects of developing the oil industry in that district, the relative values of those deposits and of those at baku, and the possible decreasing significance of baku in russian industry generally, we passed to broader perspectives. i asked him what he thought of the relations between agriculture and industry in russia, and supposed that he did not imagine that russia would ever become a great industrial country. his answer was characteristic of the tremendous hopes that nerve these people in their almost impossible task, and i set it down as nearly as i can in his own words. for him, of course, the economic problem was the first, and he spoke of it as the director of a huge trust might have spoken. but, as he passed on to talk of what he thought would result from the communist method of tackling that problem, and spoke of the eventual disappearance of political parties, i felt i was trying to read a kind of palimpsest of the economist and news from nowhere, or listening to a strange compound of william morris and, for example, sir eric geddes. he said: "we may have to wait a long time before the inevitable arrives and there is a supreme economic council dealing with europe as with a single economic whole. if that should come about we should, of course, from the very nature of our country, be called upon in the first place to provide food for europe, and we should hope enormously to improve our agriculture, working on a larger and larger scale, using mechanical plows and tractors, which would be supplied us by the west. but in the meantime we have to face the fact that events may cause us to be, for all practical purposes, in a state of blockade for perhaps a score of years, and, so far as we can, we must be ready to depend on ourselves alone. for example, we want mechanical plows which could be procured abroad. we have had to start making them ourselves. the first electric plow made in russia and used in russia started work last year, and this year we shall have a number of such plows made in our country, not because it is economic so to make them, but because we could get them in no other way. in so far as is possible, we shall have to make ourselves self-supporting, so as somehow or other to get along even if the blockade, formal or perhaps willy-nilly (imposed by the inability of the west to supply us), compels us to postpone cooperation with the rest of europe. every day of such postponement is one in which the resources of europe are not being used in the most efficient manner to supply the needs not only of our own country but of all." i referred to what he had told me last year about the intended electrification of moscow by a station using turf fuel. "that," he said, "is one of the plans which, in spite of the war, has gone a very long way towards completion. we have built the station in the ryezan government, on the shadul peat mosses, about versts from moscow. before the end of may that station should be actually at work. (it was completed, opened and partially destroyed by a gigantic fire.) another station at kashira in the tula government (on the oka), using the small coal produced in the moscow coalfields, will be at work before the autumn. this year similar stations are being built at ivano-voznesensk and at nijni-novgorod. also, with a view to making the most economic use of what we already possess, we have finished both in petrograd and in moscow a general unification of all the private power-stations, which now supply their current to a single main cable. similar unification is nearly finished at tula and at kostroma. the big water-power station on the rapids of the volkhov is finished in so far as land construction goes, but we can proceed no further until we have obtained the turbines, which we hope to get from abroad. as you know, we are basing our plans in general on the assumption that in course of time we shall supply the whole of russian industry with electricity, of which we also hope to make great use in agriculture. that, of course, will take a great number of years." [nothing could have been much more artificial than the industrial geography of old russia. the caprice of history had planted great industrial centers literally at the greatest possible distance from the sources of their raw materials. there was moscow bringing its coal from donetz, and petrograd, still further away, having to eke out a living by importing coal from england. the difficulty of transport alone must have forced the russians to consider how they could do away with such anomalies. their main idea is that the transport of coal in a modern state is an almost inexcusable barbarism. they have set themselves, these ragged engineers, working in rooms which they can hardly keep above freezing-point and walking home through the snow in boots without soles, no less a task than the electrification of the whole of russia. there is a state committee presided over by an extraordinary optimist called krzhizhanovsky, entrusted by the supreme council of public economy and commissariat of agriculture with the working out of a general plan. this committee includes, besides a number of well-known practical engineers, professors latsinsky, klassen, dreier, alexandrov, tcharnovsky, dend and pavlov. they are investigating the water power available in different districts in russia, the possibilities of using turf, and a dozen similar questions including, perhaps not the least important, investigation to discover where they can do most with least dependence on help from abroad.] considering the question of the import of machinery from abroad, i asked him whether in existing conditions of transport russia was actually in a position to export the raw materials with which alone the russians could hope to buy what they want. he said: "actually we have in hand about two million poods (a pood is a little over thirty-six english pounds) of flax, and any quantity of light leather (goat, etc.), but the main districts where we have raw material for ourselves or for export are far away. hides, for example, we have in great quantities in siberia, in the districts of orenburg and the ural river and in tashkent. i have myself made the suggestion that we should offer to sell this stuff where it is, that is to say not delivered at a seaport, and that the buyers should provide their own trains, which we should eventually buy from them with the raw material itself, so that after a certain number of journeys the trains should become ours. in the same districts we have any quantity of wool, and in some of these districts corn. we cannot, in the present condition of our transport, even get this corn for ourselves. in the same way we have great quantities of rice in turkestan, and actually are being offered rice from sweden, because we cannot transport our own. then we have over a million poods of copper, ready for export on the same conditions. but it is clear that if the western countries are unable to help in the transport, they cannot expect to get raw materials from us." i asked about platinum. he laughed. "that is a different matter. in platinum we have a world monopoly, and can consequently afford to wait. diamonds and gold, they can have as much as they want of such rubbish; but platinum is different, and we are in no hurry to part with it. but diamonds and gold ornaments, the jewelry of the tsars, we are ready to give to any king in europe who fancies them, if he can give us some less ornamental but more useful locomotives instead." i asked if kolchak had damaged the platinum mines. he replied, "not at all. on the contrary, he was promising platinum to everybody who wanted it, and he set the mines going, so we arrived to find them in good condition, with a considerable yield of platinum ready for use." (i am inclined to think that in spite of rykov's rather intransigent attitude on the question, the russians would none the less be willing to export platinum, if only on account of the fact in comparison with its great value it requires little transport, and so would make possible for them an immediate bargain with some of the machinery they most urgently need.) finally we talked of the growing importance of the council of public economy. rykov was of opinion that it would eventually become the centre of the whole state organism, "it and trades unions organizing the actual producers in each branch." "then you think that as your further plans develop, with the creation of more and more industrial centres, with special productive populations concentrated round them, the councils of the trades unions will tend to become identical with the soviets elected in the same districts by the same industrial units?" "precisely," said rykov, "and in that way the soviets, useful during the period of transition as an instrument of struggle and dictatorship, will be merged with the unions." (one important factor, as lenin pointed out when considering the same question, is here left out of count, namely the political development of the enormous agricultural as opposed to industrial population.) "but if this merging of political soviets with productive unions occurs, the questions that concern people will cease to be political questions, but will be purely questions of economics." "certainly. and we shall see the disappearance of political parties. that process is already apparent. in the present huge trade union conference there are only sixty mensheviks. the communists are swallowing one party after another. those who were not drawn over to us during the period of struggle are now joining us during the process of construction, and we find that our differences now are not political at all, but concerned only with the practical details of construction." he illustrated this by pointing out the present constitution of the supreme council of public economy. there are under it fifty-three departments or centres (textile, soap, wool, timber, flax, etc.), each controlled by a "college" of three or more persons. there are members of these colleges or boards in all, and of them are workmen, are engineers, was an ex-director, were from the clerical staff, and unclassified. politically were communists, were "non-party," and were of non-communist parties. he continued, "further, in swallowing the other parties, the communists themselves will cease to exist as a political party. think only that youths coming to their manhood during this year in russia and in the future will not be able to confirm from their own experience the reasoning of karl marx, because they will have had no experience of a capitalist country. what can they make of the class struggle? the class struggle here is already over, and the distinctions of class have already gone altogether. in the old days, members of our party were men who had read, or tried to read, marx's "capital," who knew the "communist manifesto" by heart, and were occupied in continual criticism of the basis of capitalist society. look at the new members of our party. marx is quite unnecessary to them. they join us, not for struggle in the interests of an oppressed class, but simply because they understand our aims in constructive work. and, as this process continues, we old social democrats shall disappear, and our places will be filled by people of entirely different character grown up under entirely new conditions." non-partyism rykov's prophecies of the disappearance of political parties may be falsified by a development of that very non-partyism on which he bases them. it is true that the parties openly hostile to the communists in russia have practically disappeared. many old-time mensheviks have joined the communist party. here and there in the country may be found a social revolutionary stronghold. here and there in the ukraine the mensheviks retain a footing, but i doubt whether either of these parties has in it the vitality to make itself once again a serious political factor. there is, however, a movement which, in the long run, may alter russia's political complexion. more and more delegates to soviets or congresses of all kinds are explicitly described as "non-party." non-partyism is perhaps a sign of revolt against rigid discipline of any kind. now and then, of course, a clever menshevik or social revolutionary, by trimming his sails carefully to the wind, gets himself elected on a non-party ticket. 'when this happens there is usually a great hullabaloo as soon as he declares himself. a section of his electors agitates for his recall and presently some one else is elected in his stead. but non-partyism is much more than a mere cloak of invisibility for enemies or conditional supporters of the communists. i know of considerable country districts which, in the face of every kind of agitation, insist on returning exclusively non-party delegates. the local soviets in these districts are also non-party, and they elect usually a local bolshevik to some responsible post to act as it were as a buffer between themselves and the central authority. they manage local affairs in their own way, and, through the use of tact on both sides, avoid falling foul of the more rigid doctrinaires in moscow. eager reactionaries outside russia will no doubt point to non-partyism as a symptom of friendship for themselves. it is nothing of the sort. on all questions of the defense of the republic the non-party voting is invariably solid with that of the communists. the non-party men do not want denikin. they do not want baron wrangel. they have never heard of professor struhve. they do not particularly like the communists. they principally want to be left alone, and they principally fear any enforced continuation of war of any kind. if, in the course of time, they come to have a definite political programme, i think it not impossible that they may turn into a new kind of constitutional democrat. that does not mean that they will have any use for m. milukov or for a monarch with whom m. milukov might be ready to supply them. the constitution for which they will work will be that very soviet constitution which is now in abeyance, and the democracy which they associate with it will be that form of democracy which were it to be accurately observed in the present state of russia, that constitution would provide. the capitalist in russia has long ago earned the position in which, according to the constitution, he has a right to vote, since he has long ago ceased to be a capitalist. supposing the soviet constitution were today to be literally applied, it would be found that practically no class except the priests would be excluded from the franchise. and when this agitation swells in volume, it will be an agitation extremely difficult to resist, supposing russia to be at peace, so that there will be no valid excuse with which to meet it. these new constitutional democrats will be in the position of saying to the communists, "give us, without change, that very constitution which you yourselves drew up." i think they will find many friends inside the communist party, particularly among those communists who are also trade unionists. i heard something very like the arguments of this new variety of constitutional democrat in the kremlin itself at an all-russian conference of the communist party. a workman, sapronov, turned suddenly aside in a speech on quite another matter, and said with great violence that the present system was in danger of running to seed and turning into oligarchy, if not autocracy. until the moment when he put his listeners against him by a personal attack on lenin, there was no doubt that he had with him the sympathies of quite a considerable section of an exclusively communist audience. given peace, given an approximate return to normal conditions, non-partyism may well profoundly modify the activities of the communists. it would certainly be strong enough to prevent the rasher spirits among them from jeopardizing peace or from risking russia's chance of convalescence for the sake of promoting in any way the growth of revolution abroad. of course, so long as it is perfectly obvious that soviet russia is attacked, no serious growth of non-partyism is to be expected, but it is obvious that any act of aggression on the part of the soviet government, once russia had attained peace-which she has not known since -would provide just the basis of angry discontent which might divide even the disciplined ranks of the communists and give non-partyism an active, instead of a comparatively passive, backing throughout the country. non-partyism is already the peasants' way of expressing their aloofness from the revolution and, at the same time, their readiness to defend that revolution against anybody who attacks it from outside. lenin, talking to me about the general attitude of the peasants, said: "hegel wrote 'what is the people? the people is that part of the nation which does not know what it wants.' that is a good description of the russian peasantry at the present time, and it applies equally well to your arthur hendersons and sidney webbs in england, and to all other people like yourself who want incompatible things. the peasantry are individualists, but they support us. we have, in some degree, to thank kolchak and denikin for that. they are in favor of the soviet government, but hanker after free trade, not understanding that the two things are self-contradictory. of course, if they were a united political force they could swamp us, but they are disunited both in their interests and geographically. the interests of the poorer and middle class peasants are in contradiction to those of the rich peasant farmer who employs laborers. the poorer and middle class see that we support them against the rich peasant, and also see that he is ready to support what is obviously not in their interests." i said, "if state agriculture in russia comes to be on a larger scale, will there not be a sort of proletarianization of the peasants so that, in the long run, their interests will come to be more or less identical with those of the workers in other than agricultural industry!" he replied, "something in that direction is being done, but it will have to be done very carefully and must take a very long time. when we are getting many thousands of tractors from abroad, then something of the sort would become possible." finally i asked him point blank, "did he think they would pull through far enough economically to be able to satisfy the needs of the peasantry before that same peasantry had organized a real political opposition that should overwhelm them!" lenin laughed. "if i could answer that question," he said, "i could answer everything, for on the answer to that question everything depends. i think we can. yes, i think we can. but i do not know that we can." non-partyism may well be the protoplasmic stage of the future political opposition of the peasants. possibilities i have done my best to indicate the essential facts in russia's problem today, and to describe the organization and methods with which she is attempting its solution. i can give no opinion as to whether by these means the russians will succeed in finding their way out of the quagmire of industrial ruin in which they are involved. i can only say that they are unlikely to find their way out by any other means. i think this is instinctively felt in russia. not otherwise would it have been possible for the existing organization, battling with one hand to save the towns front starvation, to destroy with the other the various forces clothed and armed by western europe, which have attempted its undoing. the mere fact of continued war has, of course, made progress in the solution of the economic problem almost impossible, but the fact that the economic problem was unsolved, must have made war impossible, if it were not that the instinct of the people was definitely against russian or foreign invaders. consider for one moment the military position. although the enthusiasm for the polish war began to subside (even among the communists) as soon as the poles had been driven back from kiev to their own frontiers, although the poles are occupying an enormous area of non-polish territory, although the communists have had to conclude with poland a peace obviously unstable, the military position of soviet russia is infinitely better this time than it was in or . in the ukraine was held by german troops and the district east of the ukraine was in the hands of general krasnov, the author of a flattering letter to the kaiser. in the northwest the germans were at pskov, vitebsk and mohilev. we ourselves were at murmansk and archangel. in the east, the front which became known as that of kolchak, was on the volga. soviet russia was a little hungry island with every prospect of submersion. a year later the germans had vanished, the flatterers of the kaiser had joined hands with those who were temporarily flattering the allies, yudenitch's troops were within sight of petrograd, denikin was at orel, almost within striking distance of moscow; there had been a stampede of desertion from the red army. there was danger that finland might strike at any moment. although in the east kolchak had been swept over the urals to his ultimate disaster, the situation of soviet russia seemed even more desperate than in the year before. what is the position today! esthonia, latvia, lithuania, and finland are at peace with russia. the polish peace brings comparative quiet to the western front, although the poles, keeping the letter rather than the spirit of their agreement, have given balahovitch the opportunity of establishing himself in minsk, where, it is said, that the pogroms of unlucky jews show that he has learnt nothing since his ejection from pskov. balahovitch's force is not important in itself, but its existence will make it easy to start the war afresh along the whole new frontier of poland, and that frontier shuts into poland so large an anti-polish population, that a moment may still come when desperate polish statesmen may again choose war as the least of many threatening evils. still, for the moment, russia's western frontier is comparatively quiet. her northern frontier is again the arctic sea. her eastern frontier is in the neighborhood of the pacific. the ukraine is disorderly, but occupied by no enemy; the only front on which serious fighting is proceeding is the small semi-circle north of the crimea. there denikin's successor, supported by the french but exultantly described by a german conservative newspaper as a "german baron in cherkass uniform," is holding the crimea and a territory slightly larger than the peninsula on the main land. only to the immense efficiency of anti-bolshevik propaganda can be ascribed the opinion, common in england but comic to any one who takes the trouble to look at a map, that soviet russia is on the eve of military collapse. in any case it is easy in a revolution to magnify the influence of military events on internal affairs. in the first place, no one who has not actually crossed the russian front during the period of active operations can well realize how different are the revolutionary wars from that which ended in . advance on a broad front no longer means that a belt of men in touch with each other has moved definitely forward. it means that there have been a series of forward movements at widely separated, and with the very haziest of mutual, connections. there will be violent fighting for a village or a railway station or the passage of a river. small hostile groups will engage in mortal combat to decide the possession of a desirable hut in which to sleep, but, except at these rare points of actual contact, the number of prisoners is far in excess of the number of casualties. parties on each side will be perfectly ignorant of events to right or left of them, ignorant even of their gains and losses. last year i ran into whites in a village which the reds had assured me was strongly held by themselves, and these same whites refused to believe that the village where i had spent the preceding night was in the possession of the reds. it is largely an affair of scouting parties, of patrols dodging each other through the forest tracks, of swift raids, of sudden conviction (often entirely erroneous) on the part of one side or the other, that it or the enemy has been "encircled." the actual number of combatants to a mile of front is infinitely less than during the german war. further, since an immense proportion of these combatants on both sides have no wish to fight at all, being without patriotic or political convictions and very badly fed and clothed, and since it is more profitable to desert than to be taken prisoner, desertion in bulk is not uncommon, and the deserters, hurriedly enrolled to fight on the other side, indignantly re-desert when opportunity offers. in this way the armies of denikin and yudenitch swelled like mushrooms and decayed with similar rapidity. military events of this kind, however spectacular they may seem abroad, do not have the political effect that might be expected. i was in moscow at the worst moment of the crisis in when practically everybody outside the government believed that petrograd had already fallen, and i could not but realize that the government was stronger then than it had been in february of the same year, when it had a series of victories and peace with the allies seemed for a moment to be in sight. a sort of fate seems to impel the whites to neutralize with extraordinary rapidity any good will for themelves which they may find among the population. this is true of both sides, but seems to affect the whites especially. although general baron wrangel does indeed seem to have striven more successfully than his predecessors not to set the population against him and to preserve the loyalty of his army, it may be said with absolute certainty that any large success on his part would bring crowding to his banner the same crowd of stupid reactionary officers who brought to nothing any mild desire for moderation that may have been felt by general denikin. if the area he controls increases, his power of control over his subordinates will decrease, and the forces that led to denikin's collapse will be set in motion in his case also. [*] * on the day on which i send this book to the printers news comes of wrangel's collapse and flight. i leave standing what i have written concerning him, since it will apply to any successor he may have. each general who has stepped into kolchak's shoes has eventually had to run away in them, and always for the same reasons. it may be taken almost as an axiom that the history of great country is that of its centre, not of its periphery. the main course of english history throughout the troubled seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was never deflected from london. french history did not desert paris, to make a new start at toulon or at quiberon bay. and only a fanatic could suppose that russian history would run away from moscow, to begin again in a semi-tartar peninsula in the black sea. moscow changes continually, and may so change as to make easy the return of the "refugees." some have already returned. but the refugees will not return as conquerors. should a russian napoleon (an unlikely figure, even in spite of our efforts) appear, he will not throw away the invaluable asset of a revolutionary war-cry. he will have to fight some one, or he will not be a napoleon. and whom will he fight but the very people who, by keeping up the friction, have rubbed aladdin's ring so hard and so long that a djinn, by no means kindly disposed towards them, bursts forth at last to avenge the breaking of his sleep? and, of course, should hostilities flare up again on the polish frontier, should the lions and lambs and jackals and eagles of kossack, russian, ukrainian and polish nationalists temporarily join forces, no miracles of diplomacy will keep them from coming to blows. for all these reasons a military collapse of the soviet government at the present time, even a concerted military advance of its enemies, is unlikely. it is undoubtedly true that the food situation in the towns is likely to be worse this winter than it has yet been. forcible attempts to get food from the peasantry will increase the existing hostility between town and country. there has been a very bad harvest in russia. the bringing of food from siberia or the kuban (if military activities do not make that impossible) will impose an almost intolerable strain on the inadequate transport. yet i think internal collapse unlikely. it may be said almost with certainty that governments do not collapse until there is no one left to defend them. that moment had arrived in the case of the tsar. it had arrived in the case of kerensky. it has not arrived in the case of the soviet government for certain obvious reasons. for one thing, a collapse of the soviet government at the present time would be disconcerting, if not disastrous, to its more respectable enemies. it would, of course, open the way to a practically unopposed military advance, but at the same time it would present its enemies with enormous territory, which would overwhelm the organizing powers which they have shown again and again to be quite inadequate to much smaller tasks. nor would collapse of the present government turn a bad harvest into a good one. such a collapse would mean the breakdown of all existing organizations, and would intensify the horrors of famine for every town dweller. consequently, though the desperation of hunger and resentment against inevitable requisitions may breed riots and revolts here and there throughout the country, the men who, in other circumstances, might coordinate such events, will refrain from doing anything of the sort. i do not say that collapse is impossible. i do say that it would be extremely undesirable from the point of view of almost everybody in russia. collapse of the present government would mean at best a reproduction of the circumstances of , with the difference that no intervention from without would be necessary to stimulate indiscriminate slaughter within. i say "at best" because i think it more likely that collapse would be followed by a period of actual chaos. any government that followed the communists would be faced by the same economic problem, and would have to choose between imposing measures very like those of the communists and allowing russia to subside into a new area for colonization. there are people who look upon this as a natural, even a desirable, result of the revolution. they forget that the russians have never been a subject race, that they have immense powers of passive resistance, that they respond very readily to any idea that they understand, and that the idea of revolt against foreigners is difficult not to understand. any country that takes advantage of the russian people in a moment of helplessness will find, sooner or later, first that it has united russia against it, and secondly that it has given all russians a single and undesirable view of the history of the last three years. there will not be a russian who will not believe that the artificial incubation of civil war within the frontiers of old russia was not deliberately undertaken by western europe with the object of so far weakening russia as to make her exploitation easy. those who look with equanimity even on this prospect forget that the creation in europe of a new area for colonization, a knocking out of one of the sovereign nations, will create a vacuum, and that the effort to fill this vacuum will set at loggerheads nations at present friendly and so produce a struggle which may well do for western europe what western europe will have done for russia. it is of course possible that in some such way the russian revolution may prove to be no more than the last desperate gesture of a stricken civilization. my point is that if that is so, civilization in russia will not die without infecting us with its disease. it seems to me that our own civilization is ill already, slightly demented perhaps, and liable, like a man in delirium, to do things which tend to aggravate the malady. i think that the whole of the russian war, waged directly or indirectly by western europe, is an example of this sort of dementia, but i cannot help believing that sanity will reassert itself in time. at the present moment, to use a modification of gusev's metaphor, europe may be compared to a burning house and the governments of europe to fire brigades, each one engaged in trying to salve a wing or a room of the building. it seems a pity that these fire brigades should be fighting each other, and forgetting the fire in their resentment of the fact that some of them wear red uniforms and some wear blue. any single room to which the fire gains complete control increases the danger of the whole building, and i hope that before the roof falls in the firemen will come to their senses. but turning from grim recognition of the danger, and from speculations as to the chance of the russian government collapsing, and as to the changes in it that time may bring, let us consider what is likely to happen supposing it does not collapse. i have already said that i think collapse unlikely. do the russians show any signs of being able to carry out their programme, or has the fire gone so far during the quarrelling of the firemen as to make that task impossible? i think that there is still a hope. there is as yet no sign of a general improvement in russia, nor is such an improvement possible until the russians have at least carried out the first stage of their programme. it would even not be surprising if things in general were to continue to go to the bad during the carrying out of that first stage. shortages of food, of men, of tools, of materials, are so acute that they have had to choose those factories which are absolutely indispensable for the carrying out of this stage, and make of them "shock" factories, like the "shock" troops of the war, giving them equipment over and above their rightful share of the impoverished stock, feeding their workmen even at the cost of letting others go hungry. that means that other factories suffer. no matter, say the russians, if only that first stage makes progress. consequently, the only test that can be fairly applied is that of transport. are they or are they not gaining on ruin in the matter of wagons and engines! here are the figures of wagon repairs in the seven chief repairing shops up to the month of june: december ............ wagons were repaired. january ............. february................. march................... april................... may..................... june.................... after elaborate investigation last year, trotsky, as temporary commissar of transport, put out an order explaining that the railways, to keep up their present condition, must repair roughly engines every month. during the first six months of they fulfilled this task in the following percentages: january.................. per cent february................. march.................... april.................... may...................... june.................... i think that is a proof that, supposing normal relations existed between russia and ourselves, the russian would be able to tackle the first stage of the problem that lies before them, and would lie before them whatever their government might be. unfortunately there is no proof that this steady improvement can be continued, except under conditions of trade with western europe. there are russians who think they can pull through without us, and, remembering the miracles of which man is capable when his back is to the wall, it would be rash to say that this is impossible. but other russians point out gloomily that they have been using certain parts taken from dead engines (engines past repair) in order to mend sick engines. they are now coming to the mending, not of sick engines merely, but of engines on which post-mortems have already been held. they are actually mending engines, parts of which have already been taken out and used for the mending of other engines. there are consequently abnormal demands for such things as shafts and piston rings. they are particularly short of babbitt metal and boiler tubes. in normal times the average number of new tubes wanted for each engine put through the repair shops was ( to for engines used in the more northerly districts, and to for engines in the south where the water is not so good). this number must now be taken as much higher, because during recent years tubes have not been regularly renewed. further, the railways have been widely making use of tubes taken from dead engines, that is to say, tubes already worn. putting things at their very best, assuming that the average demand for tubes per engine will be that of normal times, then, if , engines are to be repaired monthly, , tubes will be wanted every six months. now on the th of june the total stock of tubes ready for use was , , and the railways could not expect to get more than another , in the near future. unless the factories are able to do better (and their improvement depends on improvement in transport), railway repairs must again deteriorate, since the main source of materials for it in russia, namely the dead engines, will presently be exhausted. on this there is only one thing to be said. if, whether because we do not trade with them, or from some other cause, the russians are unable to proceed even in this first stage of their programme, it means an indefinite postponement of the moment when russia will be able to export anything, and, consequently, that when at last we learn that we need russia as a market, she will be a market willing to receive gifts, but unable to pay for anything at all. and that is a state of affairs a great deal more serious to ourselves than to the russians, who can, after all, live by wandering about their country and scratching the ground, whereas we depend on the sale of our manufactured goods for the possibility of buying the food we cannot grow ourselves. if the russians fail, their failure will affect not us alone. it will, by depriving her of a market, lessen germany's power of recuperation, and consequently her power of fulfilling her engagements. what, then, is to happen to france? and, if we are to lose our market in russia, and find very much weakened markets in germany and france, we shall be faced with an ever-increasing burden of unemployment, with the growth, in fact, of the very conditions in which alone we shall ourselves be unable to recover from the war. in such conditions, upheaval in england would be possible, and, for the dispassionate observer, there is a strange irony in the fact that the communists desire that upheaval, and, at the same time, desire a rebirth of the russian market which would tend to make that upheaval unlikely, while those who most fear upheaval are precisely those who urge us, by making recovery in russia impossible, to improve the chances of collapse at home. the peasants in russia are not alone in wanting incompatible things.